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Abstract
Ambivalent Sovereignty inquires into the subject of political realism. This subject, 
sovereign authority, appears to have a dual foundation. It apears divided against itself, but 
how can realism nonetheless observe legitimate modes of sovereignty emerge? Against 
the liberal idea that a “synthesis” of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive powers
should be accomplished, within the world of international relations, realism gives 
meaning to a structural type of state power that is also constitutionally emerging and 
legitimately dividing itself—against itself. Machiavelli but particularly also other realists 
such as Hannah Arendt, Max Weber, and Aristotle are being reinterpreted to demonstrate 
why each state’s ultimate authority may symbiotically emerge from its self-divisions,
rather than from one synthetic unity. Whereas liberal theorists, from Montesquieu to John 
Rawls and Alexander Wendt, err too far in assuming the presence of the state’s monistic 
authority, the realist theorists further advance an answer to how sovereign states may 
begin to both recognize and include only the most-legitimate manifestations of their
common dualist authority. Ambivalent Sovereignty is relevant in this sense as it
transcends-and-yet-includes these common dualities: freedom/necessity; 
emergence/causation; self-organization/power structures.
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1INTRODUCTION
What in all the republics ... has never been thought of [is that they could be] 
exhibiting within the same [body politick] ... and among the same citizens, liberty and 
tyranny, integrity and corruption, justice and injustice.
— Niccolò Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396).
States are the free constituents and not the captive clients of the bodies [politick] 
to which they belong.
—Alan James (1986: 167).
[F]or Rousseau, a proper resolution [of the paradox] would compromise neither 
the individuality of the individual nor the legitimate ends of the body politick.
—Peter J. Steinberger (1988: 30).
[T]he mighty current of the revolution, in the words of Robespierre, was 
constantly accelerated by “the crimes of tyranny”, on one side, by the “progress of 
liberty”, on the other, which inevitably provoked each other, so that movement and 
counter-movement neither balanced nor checked or arrested each other, but in a 
mysterious way seemed to add up to one stream of “progressing violence”, flowing in the 
same direction with an ever-increasing rapidity. This is “the majestic lava stream of the 
revolution which spares nothing and which nobody can arrest”; [it is].... “[t]he 
revolution devouring its own children.”
—Hannah Arendt (2006: 39).
It is necessary ... for men living associated together under ... regulations often to 
be brought back to themselves ... either by external or internal occurrences.
— Machiavelli (1996: 3.1).
2New Introduction: Two Possible Responses to the State Authority Problem
No human being is not subject to the structure of modern states. Nearly every 
human being, born today, becomes subject to the will of one of the world’s close-to-two-
hundred states. From requesting a birth certificate to applying for a passport, and from 
filing for tax returns to casting a ballot, human beings are also identified as citizens. In 
everyone’s life come moments of subordination to the state. Because populations have
relative degrees of access to structures of state power, each state is unique. Power is 
never shared fairly and allocated equally, so that power differentials can in great part 
explain why some states become sovereign states—and others not. Beyond their 
uniqueness, states do share one universal attribute: all have been internationally 
recognized, usually by means of a peace agreement, and nearly all have also been 
recognized as United Nations members.
But UN recognition methods and standards are better believed to have remained
ambivalent, however, because they are far from neutral instruments. The UN itself is a 
war-time alliance, originating in the first days of 1943, and with a long Cold War record. 
There would not have been a UN Security Council, for example, if the the United States 
(and Britain and France) had not used the Council to effectively ‘balance’ their power 
against those of the USSR (and China). Moreover, there would not have been a strong 
correlation between sovereign statehood and UN membership if it had not been for the 
decolonization resolutions. When the UN in 1960 began to adopt the language of self-
determination and universal human rights, this was the result of American pressures on 
3European allies: by ‘granting’ international recognition to African and Asian states, the 
hope was, “reputational social power” would expand—more so among the American and 
West European allies than in Moscow (as Daniel Philpott has suggested). Decolonization 
was thus the outcome of both a normative and a self-interested consideration of 
sovereignty’s meaning. 
What does it mean for a group of people to be recognized, internationally, and be 
declared the citizenry of a sovereign state? Apparently, the recognition criteria apply not 
only to a population in its territory, but especially also to the perceived moral standing of
this population’s relationship to government officials at home and elsewhere. History can 
demonstrate that many more state-like entities have appealed for recognition, by the UN 
or by other Great Powers, than the number of entities that actually became sovereign. The 
thousands of nomadic or tribal societies that were ignored at the large Great Powers 
conventions—at San Francisco, The Hague, and Berlin—were not only ignored because 
they had little structural power, and no modern standing armies—but especially also 
because they had never been admitted as players to the game of high politics. Indeed, 
they were not regarded, at least not in the West, as capable of making a moral difference
in the relations between sovereign states. The West had developed its own rules on how 
to recognize this highly-moralized difference between legitimate and illegitimate 
governments, so that far fewer entities actually received recognition than those that could 
historically have gained it. The number of potential UN member states is, or at least once 
was, far greater than it currently is—despire a brief post-Cold War uptick in the number 
of actual UN members. 
4What may it come to mean for one state, or one club of states (such as the UN or 
the World Trade Organization), to recognize another state as a member with its own 
rights and responsibilities? Do all sovereign states have particular or constitutional 
responsibilities towards other states? This question can be answered from a legal and 
formal perspective, or from an informal and theoretical perspective. Especially in the 
latter case, the answer has to admit a curious tension between the particular power of any 
sovereign state, first, and the diversely-legitimized modes of its governmental authority, 
second. This tension produces a modicum of order. From the tension between legitimacy-
recognition processes and the structure of state powers, orderliness emerges. The people 
and their own legitimizations or their own authorizations of government, on one side, are 
forming a process. (For one theoretical illustration of how this process tends to manifest 
itself, through a coincidence of reason and will, see the in-2011-published work of 
Paulina Ochoa, The Time of Popular Sovereignty.) But the state and its timeless 
administrative apparatuses, on another side, are not often believed to be a process: they 
are a structure, rather, with tremendous forces and capable competencies. The problem in 
determining sovereignty recognitions, or criteria thereof, is that the process and the 
structure are in tension. The process of how people obey the will of the state, or 
legitimize it, also, is differing qualitatively from the state’s structural competencies and 
functions—because of their mutually-maintained oppositions. The relation between the 
legitimization and the powers of government, briefly, is the tense relation between a 
process and a structure. The organizational process of legitimacy is not identical to, nor 
can it be completely integrated with, the structural powers of a state apparatus. This tense 
non-identity is historically-contingent, and open to chance, of course, so that there is 
5never one standard account of how order has emerged. The degree of tension and 
orderliness may on some occasions have given way to a sovereign state—but not on other 
occasions. The question is this, therefore: who suffers from and who manages this
curious tension between the many (national, territorial) state powers, in the world, and the 
few (international) legitimatization processes that also organize these structural state
powers—so that these powers will eventually also be, rather constantly, recognized as the 
powers of sovereign states? And, to mitigate the suffering, how should this apparently 
perpetual tension be revolutionized and reconstitutionalized—either by the UN, or by 
other powerful organs and popular processes?
Over the course of modern history, states have emerged as the supreme affiliation
of a population. Affiliations, affects, and associational ideals have increasingly been 
experienced in relation to the nation-state. The interesting problem with this relation is 
that the members of the nation cannot be recognized, under most circumstances, unless 
they not also proclaim their citizenship: the national unit cannot be recognized without 
membership of a state or state-like entity. National identity and state have become almost 
identical, at least in the minds of a significant part of the world population, so why should 
the state not be confused with its own population, or with the nation? Scholars have for 
decades been telling stories about the origins of the modern state, or also about the 
‘Westphalian’ characteristics of nation-state structures, but the purpose behind their 
stories must be doubted.1 Theirs are stories that can only privilege the beginning, and 
when it involves an enemy often also the ending, of a singular nation-state. Stories about 
state origins are, necessarily, stories about only one state and its own lineage-of-
successions: about those who held the offices of government, for how long, and how 
6these persons were succeeded. Nationalist saga cannot be understood without military 
victories, moreover, so that they are saga about an enforced peace rather than about an 
ongoing war. It is also important to note that civil wars, food riots and suffered 
insurgencies are usually written out of the nationalist saga—which then turn into moral 
justifications for the sheer existence of one only state and its own territorial drift, as 
opposed to the drift and expansion of an outsider state. Again, little in such a justification 
is conveyed with respect to the nation-state’s subordination of its own citizens, of the 
poor and powerless, or of any civil wars. Rather, its justifications become part of a 
‘selective memory’ phenomenon. They prevent specific events and actions from 
appearing in a genuinely public forum. It is as if the stories of national morality and 
national self-determination are not only justifying, now, but also legitimizing and 
authorizing the state’s apparatuses. Nevertheless, together with Hannah Arendt, it must 
be much further evinced that moral justifications are not the same thing as political 
legitimizations of certain events. It is easy to justify events in which state officials pursue
private interests. It is easy to say that private interests are derived from ‘the’ national 
interests: or that both types of interest are means towards the same end. It is not only 
much harder but it is also impossible to legitimize official corruption, or graft, however. 
What theorists of world order and sovereignty’s self-organization should ask themselves, 
hence, is how the (popular) processes of legitimization and the (state) structures of power 
tend to coincide, without reverting into mere and easy moral justifications for each 
other’s existence.
Narrated forms of the national interest, or of power politics (as the international 
competition for national interests has also been called), are now becoming more and more 
7constrained by the globalization of financial capital and Internet technologies. The 
national interest is being hedged in by a ‘new’ global public realm: by financial, 
economic, and digital spheres.2 Contrary to Stephen Krasner’s impression, the national 
interest of a power-pursuing territorial (‘Westphalian’) state has never existed: it has 
always been an abstract ideal, somewhat similar to the monetary value of an old gold 
coin. Possession of the coin (or: the power) is not enough to give meaning to it, or to the 
party claiming value for its own sovereignty: those who possess it cannot survive very 
long without legit valuation (social recognition) of that unit, by all other parties and their 
own interests. The preferences and the entire milieu of the owner of a coin (power) do 
have an influence on its value: on how it may be recognized in the field of numismatics 
(international sovereignty).3 Also not unlike a very old coin’s origins, the national 
interest’s inception remains so mysterious that it is often wiser to simply assume that 
each state has no such single interest.
Although David Baldwin (in his Paradoxes of Power) has convincingly shown 
that the primary relation of the state to its power (to its military capabilities, for example) 
is not to be confused with a secondary relation of the gold standard to purchasing power 
(money), Baldwin could have done more to account for the intensity in/of the relation 
between the sovereign state and the structures of powert that it transcends. And although 
he also has shown that structures of power are relational, and that any given two powers 
relate to each other similar to how A has an effect on B, he might have been mistaken to 
not also show that power is extremely complex. The powers of modern nation-states are 
interdependent, and they are non-unitary. This means that aggregations, constellations, 
and formations of power cannot be identified, as belonging to one state rather than 
8another, unless they are fully believed part of an organizational web that somehow 
negates their own unitary and singular identities. Power is relational, as Nye rightly 
agrees with Baldwin, but this should not prevent theorists from showing that power is 
also increasingly complex. It is also not the case that power is becoming more and more 
diffuse, diffused, and confused (as Nye seems to argue, in his 2011 The Future of 
Power). Instead, the relations between powers are becoming more and more complex; 
they are forming a web-like organization, or; these relations are forming ‘networking-
processes’ that are transcending the nodes of power they nevertheless must include. In 
other words, state rights and government responsibilities are creating and have been 
created by a complex web of patterned risks, sufferings, mores, and mutual expectations. 
It is this web that transcends, yet also includes the powers of the states. The web is, as it 
were, the organizational processs through which partial power structures are being 
included: the web is the whole process of world organization that is greater than the sum 
of its parts.
This paragraph introduces sovereignty in terms of a complex system. Each
sovereign state is best assumed to have been produced by a mysterious tension between a 
structural plurality of powers and needs, first, and by more-or-less-apparently self-
regulating organizations that include this plurality, second. The problem to be worked out 
in the next chapters is how and why the process of self-regulation and self-organization 
can transcend and yet continue to emerge from its relation to diverse and even unique 
structural powers. Although couching the problem of sovereignty in the language of 
systems theory, of structures and organizations, may alienate some readers it is a 
language that is not unfamiliar to international public lawyers. It is the language of freely 
9expressing a tension between the effectively pursuing of powers and the optimalizing of
governmental interests, as Krasner has described it, first, and the self-organizational 
process through which these powers and interests can begin to take on historical forms, 
second, such as the forms of sovereign authority. There is a material need to pursue 
interests and to expand specific powers, but there is also the organizational potential to be 
doing all of this together with more general powers. That is, if there must be a problem of 
world orderliness then it must the problem that each sovereign state appears divided 
against itself—somehow appearing to contain a strange tension between its processual
appearing as a free actor, within complex external organizations, and its structural needs 
or the necessity of its internal power dynamics. The ever-possible social delegitimization
of how structural needs and powers are pursued, then, is an organizational risk of 
sovereignty: (de)legitimization is an organizational, not a structural contingency.4
Representations and delegations of power are both structural as well as organizational, 
however, because it is power that is being represented through an organized process. It 
cannot be the case that the organizational process itself is being represented by power. 
Whereas the process is what becomes, power is that what is. Briefly, organizational 
process can create and can represent power—but power itself cannot create or represent 
or make visible organizational process. These are the parameters of the system of 
sovereigns. 
Why have most people ambiguous feelings about the sovereignty of their own
state? Is it perhaps because they are the subject to the power of the state, as a unified 
structure, or is it because they are both attracted and repelled by the manner in which 
their nation-state is being represented, processually? What is it about the state that 
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prompts people to have a sense of national pride and to call on statespersons to protect 
their competitive stakes, and yet at the same time to question their own loyalties towards 
the state? What is it about their mixed affections that helps legitimize, or that helps make 
the state into a state? May these affections reach a moment of order, equilibrium, or 
parity?
Statespersons usually pretend that they alone should represent the state: they 
alone would be its legitimate representatives. They alone would be authorized to declare 
war, to ‘freeze’ the bank accounts of those who have been financing terrorist groups as 
well as of those who exploit entire populations, or to distort news messages coming from 
a foreign press agency. Statespersons alone may claim they have been authorized to shut 
down, or deny service from, politically unfriendly Internet sites—especially in this age of 
Wikileaks.5 But the problem with this (quite pretentious) representational dynamic, 
especially in the case of cyberpower and Internet censorship, is that it tends to remain 
divided against the dynamic as a wholesome and integral organization. There remains a 
difference between cyberespionage and a substantive act of war, for instance. There also 
remains a clear difference between the idea of hostile intent, and an actual act of war. Just
as that there is still a real difference between the actual killing of a group of border-
crossing enemy soldiers and the intention (but mere threat) of shooting armed missiles in 
the direction of large urban areas, to give another contemporary example. It can likewise 
make a world of difference between whether one’s ambassador is publically disinvited 
from a foreign state banquet, or whether one’s diplomats are only verbally threatened to 
be expelled by a country’s government—but no action is ever taken. The tension between 
the actual action by a statesperson, and the more-or-less-justifiable idea or ideology 
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behind that actual action, then, is a tension that should be understood to indicate the more 
or less symbolic tension between a measurable balance of structural powers, and the 
immeasurable potential to one day have been or one day be alternatively organizing these 
powers. There is a qualitative difference between the actual use of state powers and the 
potentially applying of these powers in accordance to recognizably lawful, or legitimate, 
or perhaps also ethical methods. Prudent people can recognize this difference.
If liberal idealism is a method of analysis which recognizes the individual before 
the state, and individual liberties before the group’s potential, then political realism is the 
method of inversing idealism’s priority—without negating the critical need, in the world 
of politics, for both individual minds as well as for shared societal dynamics. But only 
political realism is the method of expressing caution or prudence, rather, in encounters 
with any of the constitutional tensions between the modern state and its individual 
citizens. As Thomas Hobbes teaches, prudence is critical in encountering the open-ended 
structures and perpetual tensions between state powers, between the powers of groups 
and individuals, regardless of the historical fact that some state powers will always 
appear to have been used with greater justice and with better justifications than others 
have.
Realism holds on to the virtue of prudence, over justice, as realism also holds that 
organizational processes and such patterns of prudent behavior should be considered 
‘only’ natural. Still together with Hobbes, this does not mean that nationally egoistic or 
nation-state-wide anti-social behaviors cannot be natural. It only means that even in the 
generally abject (but hypothetical) conditions of a state of nature, specific laws of nature 
may contingently emerge—among which will have to be the ‘law’ that human beings 
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should use their speech faculties in order to recognize that prudent actions will somehow 
have to have (or have had) intrinsically-greater legitimacy (greater moral standing, 
greater political authority, greater reputational authority, and so on) than any observed 
imprudent actions. Arendt would have agreed with Hobbes, on this point, although she 
rejects his singularization of state sovereignty.6 Before turning to Hobbes, who argued in 
his Leviathan that speech is ambivalent and that its moral force comes into being through 
‘the’ metaphor of a single sovereign Mortal God, the question of how realism 
differentiates itself from idealism must remain very much a matter of how human beings 
use their speech faculties. It is through public exchanges of analogical meanings that they 
newly recognize their own sources of power, as more or less good sources and 
applications of power—or, that they through public speech become again willing to
recognize and self-organize their powerful states in accordance to good laws. This insight 
was prior to Hobbes being attained and elaborated on by Machiavelli, by his exemplars 
(Numa, Moses), and by countless Roman Law-scholars before him.
Besides liberal idealism, social constructivism leaves too little to chance. Both 
approaches to international affairs have too long ignored problems associated with chaos 
and uncertainty—as they mostly invested in models of positive structuration and in single 
measures of rationality.7 The result has been that their models can almost only help them 
account for the evolution of structures of power, and for identity representations, also, but 
only so to the degree that these structures/representations and powers/identities 
themselves seem to have been organized in a rational fashion. This means that the models 
in themselves cannot account for banal, irrational, underrepresented, and painful 
phenomena such as rising resource inequalities, water scarcity, statelessness, or 
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undisciplined warfare. When confronted with the moral ambiguity of war and other such 
unorganized uncertainties, they wrongly resort to defending their hypothesis that 
peacefulness is steadily progressing—for their “democratic peace” amounts to nothing 
more than a stopgap measure, if compared to all the rising inequalities negatively 
affecting the world’s population.
The counter-argument developed in these sections shall conclude, by calling on 
Althusserian theory, that political realism leaves it to chance whether power will be 
applied either ideologically and persuasively or more structurally and coercively. It thus 
also leaves to chance whether either rational-ideal or concrete and irrational outcomes 
should be expected from the political world. That is, realism is attentive to the 
coincidence of reason of will. It is attentive to the aleatory possibility that the rational 
structure and the non-rational process are coinciding within the real of sovereignty, 
however ambivalently. Even though political realism can be said to lack criteria, and to 
lack a stable model of how sovereign states (should) either cause or construct each 
other’s actions and identities, aleatory realism still provides the most meaningful answer 
to why states will remain deeply ambivalent entities. On that premise, aleatory realism 
can give much more meaning to the timeless story of how most people may either decide 
to justify or to not justify the actions of ‘their’ modern states. People constantly help 
legitimize or delegitimize the representational sort of authority that emerges from amidst 
a complex system of states and societies, and realists are in a better position than other 
theorists to think through why public authority may begin to emerge in its supreme and 
ultimate mode: sovereignty. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau knew, even the most legitimate 
state institutions will have to be subordinating and subjectifying the people. But he did 
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not know why this paradoxical problem cannot be solved, as he eventually suggested that 
he had found the problem’s solution in opting for the people’s Tribunate—or, actually, 
for a semi-institutionalized democracy absent any state representation and absent any 
state-governing aristocracy (a modern state without the equivalent of the Roman Senate).8
In this, according to Arendt, he went too far.9
Rousseau was right to see that power is held in common, and not individually, yet 
he mistakenly rejected the legitimacy of representational structures altogether.10 Perhaps 
only Machiavelli could have corrected his error by opting for strict constitutional parity 
between the singularity of the state’s representatives and the pluralism of the people.11
Nevertheless, the problem of state authority seems even today completely irresolvable. 
Rousseau was thus merely realistic when he noticed that all groups of people are 
struggling—not unlike how each human being must struggle and cope with a tension 
between her physicality and mentality. Most individuals have had to cope with this 
tension and, if they are not stateless, most form therein the constituents of a sovereign 
state. They would have had to mitigate a tension between a physical body politick and its 
characteristic but invisible intentions and passions. More or less reasonable preferences 
had to have been transformed into physical movements, gestures, and traces of power. By 
coping with this tension, in brief, everyone will have learned to express trust in and even 
to love the state—but especially also to love the inter-state and international recognitions 
of that state’s sovereign authority (even though most adults know very well that their love 
for the sovereign state remains more often than not unreturned). Their nationalism is 
therefore, in essence, a deeply conflicted emotion. In one dimension, nationalism is an 
expression of group survival. It is a self-sacrificial and loving attitude towards the nation-
15
state. In another dimension, it may be a civic affection for the ultimate source of 
authority: for the voice of the people as a whole.
This is all a very complicated, undecided affair. Although modern statespersons 
regularly claim that their state’s actions have been legitimized by rational voters, or at 
least by their democratic persuasions, many questions remain about this state’s degree of 
legitimacy and representativeness. Such questions are controversial because they arise 
from a curious tension, well identified by Jürgen Habermas, between people’s two 
political functions: people are both authors and subjects of the sovereignty of states.12
The authorship function is their civic function.
In actuality, people do authorize their representatives by publically legitimizing 
their authority. Yet, public authorization is a ‘natural’ process and therefore can never be 
perfectly rational: authorization rarely occurs through rational structures of power alone, 
as it occurs certainly as often through countless and immeasurable natural law dynamics. 
The representational ideality and the naturally desired characteristics of the statespersons 
remain part of an emotive and even archetypal matter, as well.13 Perhaps this is why the 
state’s representational ideality is so political: there often remains such a deep void 
between both the people’s (self-conscious) normatively appropriate civic functioning, 
first, and their ethnic and possibly their national (particularistic, archetypal, subconscious, 
and so on) experiences, second. This mysterious void is nearly the same “void” as that 
Althusser observed between a people’s normative idealism, first, and their experiential 
(but aleatory) materialism, second.14 Aleatory realism and Althusserian materialism, then, 
are two theories with much in common. They are both theories of the intense relation 
between the rationalized ideals and sense-experiences, or between the organizational 
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processes and power structures, that most people have in common with one another when 
they speak of their diverse sovereignties. 
Part Two/Two
The state, and its moral obligations, appears within a complex relationship with 
the people and their powers, needs, and special preferences. This relationship itself can 
perhaps best be understood, with Althusser, as a political void. Liberal theorists suggest 
that it is not a void, however, but the effective outcome of each individual’s intentional 
acts of agreement. Their suggestion is that each state’s particular modes of authority have 
been effectuatedby means ofan aggregate of intentions, volitions, and preferences. On 
this grounding grows the liberal ideal of (electoral) consensus and (contractual) 
agreement. To their contrary, Thomas Hobbes is among those realists who make the case 
that human beings are members of naturally-competing groupings, each having their own 
more or less subconscious prejudices and conflicted emotions—including love and fear 
and many other affects—towards the general structure of states as a whole. But these 
affective prejudices can be decided over, he adds, on condition that the whole transcends 
the sum of all intentional agreements. Once the state has begun to form a whole, by 
respecting the laws of nature, it will be greater than the sum of its individual constituent 
intentions. This is how the sovereign state must respect, at risk of its own instantaneous 
dissolution, the natural right to life and to longevity—of all subjects.
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The following inquiry demonstrates that countless theoretical responses, to the 
undecided affair between natural-born peoples and their intentionally recognized states, 
have neglected the critical importance of how political expressions tend to mutate, and 
tend to divide against themselves. Again, it is not uncommon to see an individual or 
group expressing both a caring love for as well as a violent hate against the whole of 
sovereignty. In the same event that seemingly antagonistic states are being detested, 
friendly statespersons may be acquiring charisma. The state’s command authority is then 
being symbolized by the intensity of a relation between friend and enemy. Indeed, Carl 
Schmitt reminds theorists that this intensity in itself constitutes “the political.”15
But as how Hobbes’s work has been claimed by advocates of individual rights as 
well as by those of the natural law of political groups, so has Schmitt been claimed by 
both pro-democratic and neo-conservative elements. It thus seems to be the case that 
there are only two classes of responses to the problem of political authority. But are there 
indeed only two responses to the problem of how and why people obey their own state’s 
supreme, ultimate, and legitimate command authority? How do and how should these two 
classes themselves relate to each other? What is it that limits, and what distinguishes 
them as such? And, why should there be only two categorical responses?
In the first class, liberal theorists aim for an ideal form of agreement. This 
agreement has previously arrived in the ‘Westphalian’ sovereign state, the modern 
nation-state, or may even be said to soon appear in the form of a transnational world-
state. G.W.F. Hegel should be mentioned here, as having suggested that any human 
grouping’s yearning for freedom is very much a nationalistic kind of love: the limits of 
the nation-state are determined endogenously, by a nation, but these limits are still to be 
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recognized through transnational structures of power. This nation-limiting love is further 
and mainly expressed through reason, but reason itself is also freely being transcended by 
immaterial means: by means of one philosophically determinable series of historico-
spiritual syntheses. In comparison to Hobbes and his materialism, Hegel is an idealist.
The name of Descartes should also not be forgotten—and especially not in trying 
to have anticipated the idealist or the Hegelian position, however. Most positions in the 
area of ‘Western’ and Cartesian philosophy have had an idealizing effect on the world. 
They have also had a monistic effect on how reason and reasoning relate to the world of 
the senses and sensing: they tend to unify reason, briefly said, while subordinating the 
senses and restricting them to the will. Cartesian philosophy preferences reasoning over 
willing, and thus restricts or subordinates the aleatory coincidence of these two practices. 
The ‘Western’ philosophical category often subordinates sensory, sensible, and popular 
experiences to the rationality of political models. The sense (material) expressions of love
for these models are then, thereby, being subordinated to an agreement with the first and 
final source of (ideal) authority—or, among Protestant traditions, with monotheism. That 
is, the love of the model state—or the love for the states of the ideally monistic model—
is then dominated by the mind, by ideology, and eventually also always by an individual 
rational concession to one of the many ‘ideological state apparatuses.’ But the 
disadvantage of this area of philosophy, overall, remains the fact Max Weber observed so 
well: those in this area will individualize and privatize the affects people may have in 
terms of their own complex relationships to their state and its sovereignty. Affect 
privatization is a form of confessionalism: it disenchants exogenous or transmundane 
sources of authority, yet confesses to endogenous sources.
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In the second class, political realists follow Weber. They argue it is impossible to 
deny that statespersons have ulterior motives or private aims—which may disenchant 
their world and deprive them of their own moral standing. Hence, realists have to try to 
understand the tension between both abstract affect privatizations (confessionalism) as 
well as the more or less representative public actions of concrete statespeople (their 
struggles, or their agonism). The realist’s aim is to understand how authority emerges 
from within agonistic and qualitatively different dimensions of human life. How is state 
authority being recognized, and how does sovereignty actually emerge from within the 
dimensions of power—between as well as within states? Although much controversy 
remains about political realism’s proper subject of inquiry, much about this subject can 
be clarified by taking sovereignty theory in great part out of the Cartesian (also: the
positivist) fields of philosophy.
Much can also be clarified by pointing out that realists ask why people’s actual 
love-hate-relationships, inside and outside their particular states, appear to be 
relationships perennially featured within a rich diversity of political (and not just state) 
organizations. Hannah Arendt, in The Life of the Mind (1978), has a lot to say in this 
context, perhaps not about people’s love of statehood in itself—but certainly about their 
love of courage and prudence. For their love of political wisdom, briefly, she refers to 
Socratic philosophy as an alternative to Hegelian and Cartesian attempts to simply 
rationally close off the organization of politics. In this book, she then holds that the 
Cartesian field continues to be formed by its own grave misidentifications of ‘the land of 
truth.’ By calling on reason, Cartesian (liberal) idealists are still both identifying and yet 
misidentifying ‘truth.’ They disallow any alternative identifications of ‘truth’—other than 
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rational identifications—as they at the same moment disallow any sharing of meaningful 
events and thus, really, are negating people’s common and public experiencing of their 
sense faculties (speech, gesturing, movement, and so forth).
In their stead, Arendt reminds her readers that Socrates is thoughtful, as opposed 
to being rational. In this sense, Socratic philosophy exemplifies the public speech acts 
and the actions of a plurality of freethinking men. It exemplifies the diversity of men who 
know that they may “always” have to stop listening, to interrupt others, and to step 
outside the regular order. Arendt’s conclusion sums up this distinction between, first, 
having learned how to be an obedient state subject and, second, knowing that one may 
“always” appear to disobey the state by thinking “out of order.” “The best illustration of 
this may still be—as the old story goes—Socrates’ habit of suddenly ‘turning his mind to 
himself,’ breaking off all company, and taking up his position wherever he happened to 
be, ‘deaf to all entreaties’ to continue with whatever he had been doing before.” The 
Socratic faculty of thought rests in the power of solitariness: it is the ‘enlarged’ sort of 
thinking that provides men with their common ‘capacity’ for public speech and political 
action. But this ‘enlarged’ capacity cannot be recognized by others unless it manifests 
itself as a common power—within a particular public realm. It is herein that the decision 
is to be made to break “the thinker’s solitude”—and that the people should somehow 
decide to recognize the “inner duality” of their faculties and, now, of their common 
powers. Arendt’s Socrates, in this respect, demonstrates not just his but the people’s 
capacity/power to oppose sense with reason, and to oppose reason with sense. More 
critically, that opposition itself is open to chance interruptions as well as to innovations. It 
may or it may not be manifested (as this manifestation occurs no longer merely 
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throughout the Socratic dialogues) “in the ease with which the opposition of thought and 
reality is reversed.”16
On the premise that “thought” and “reality” are reversible, and that reasoning 
does not have to subordinate and restrict sense experiencing, but that reason and sense are 
also reversible, it becomes possible for anti-Cartesian and Arendtian realists to 
demonstrate that rationalism and empiricism are coinciding as equals—without losing 
their distinctiveness. The Socratic opposition of rational ideas and empirical facts has 
manifested itself throughout the tradition of political philosophy. Here, the main 
companion for rational causality should be considered empiricism—but rationalist 
idealism’s companion, empiricist realism, is not its ‘true’ companion. Rather, realism is 
often idealism’s antagonist. Especially politically, realism not just accompanies or 
reverses idealism: it also cautions against it. Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, in 
Reading Capital (first published in 1968 as Lire le capital), discover several signs of 
empiricist realism while walking on Marxian grounds. But Althusser finds that 
empiricism cannot be understood without its opponent: they implicate each other, and 
Marx would have helped solve the problem of their mutual implication.17 Marx is known 
for resolutely opposing the societal and economic realities of human history (Marx 
opposes inequalities that were structured by the modes of production) while avoiding the 
various rationalist schemata that had been brought forth by the Western canon or by what 
Althusser calls “classical philosophy”. Not completely unlike Rousseau, it is Marx who is 
setting out to solve “a dramatic theoretical problem, ... in the absence of its concept [of 
reason], ... but without completely avoiding a relapse into earlier schemata”. Among 
classical philosophers, however responsible for having made these schemata, each 
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containing another concept of reason, the Cartesians had wrongly “reduced causality to a 
transitive ... effectivity”—whereas the Hegelians had “presupposed” that a rational whole 
could appear as, and could express itself in the total sum of its individual parts.18 Further, 
it can now be said that the Cartesians would have been essentialists and the Hegelians 
phenomenologists, at least with respect to how rationality expresses itself into the ‘real’ 
world.
Anyhow, Althusser begins moving Marx in a direction parallel to the direction in 
which Arendt would soon afterwards come to move Socrates. Indeed, both were 
beginning to index why the authority of economic scientific knowledge cannot be 
objectified, why it must remain private and ambiguous, and how economic knowledge is 
a social interest. It expresses itself within complex historical patterns and political 
meanings: it is inherently biased, or ideological. Perhaps not completely surprisingly, but 
particularly Althusser argues that beyond Marx only Machiavelli understood why the fine 
negatively-defined distinction between the ‘ideal’ (phenomenon) and the ‘real’ (essence) 
should be maintained, politically, as they implicate one another as much as that one ideal 
statesman and the real people are implicated by their dualism.19 Althusser can be 
applauded, hence, less for having first distinguished between a reason-focused idealism 
and a sense-experienced materialism than for having so clearly recognized how they 
mutually implicate and yet also mutually oppose one another.20
This distinction is critical in the evolution of sovereignty theory, as will be shown, 
because it has for centuries been believed that sovereignty can consist of a complex 
relation between two mutually opposing dimensions. Friedrich Meinecke, one of the first 
self-declared political realists to have followed Machiavelli’s guidance, in particular, 
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clearly re-worked and re-identified the mentioned dimensions of materialism and 
idealism as respectively those of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.21
Political realists often feel perplexed by the ambivalent manners in which states 
recognize themselves as sovereign states. As a subject of political scientific inquiry, 
sovereignty has indeed perplexed self-declared realists such as Waltz, Mearsheimer, and 
Nye.22 These realists write stories about the Great Powers of the world, are mostly 
concerned about the coercive function of the United States, and yet they do not shun 
recommending limits to its coercive power. They are increasingly studying the 
persuasive, diplomatic, and institutional checks on power. Joseph Nye, for example, calls 
for “liberal realism”. He advocates for a “new synthesis” of both coercion and persuasion 
in the relations between a hegemonic U.S. and the ascending states of “China, India, and 
Brazil.”23
Ambivalent Sovereignty respects the confluence of liberalism and realism, as 
advocated by Nye, but the next sections inquire into the subject of political realism in 
order to find out why a “synthesis” of both approaches would be insensible and would 
not even help solve Rousseau’s or Marx’s problem. For, the underlying problem is about 
how realists observe and anticipate various appearances and emergences of sovereign 
authority—in light of sovereignty’s own dualistic foundation. Against almost any 
(including Nye’s) idealistic “synthesis” of both material-coercive and ideal-persuasive 
powers, within the world of international relations, realists sustain a concept of power 
constantly and constitutionally divided against itself.24 Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, 
but particularly also Aristotle and Machiavelli (and Althusser), are being reinterpreted to 
demonstrate why each state’s ultimate authority emerges from constitutional dualities and 
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self-divisions rather than from a synthetic unity. Whereas liberals such as Montesquieu 
erred too far in assuming a unifiable or monistic mode of authority, every one of these 
theorists helps advance a realistic answer to how sovereign states may begin to recognize 
and include their most legitimate organizations and commonsensical expressions of 
dualist authority. In this sense, Ambivalent Sovereignty transcends-and-yet-includes these 
dualities: emergent authorities/structural causations; self-organizational processes/open 
structures of power, and; freedom/necessity and political participation/national interest, 
as well.
Political realism’s subject consists less of the balance of powers, among Great 
Powers, than it consists of how command authority emerges from within a modicum of 
order between opposing powers. This work argues that the world of power has usually 
remained structurally divided, against itself, and yet also sustained the balance within 
itself. Rather than to call for a “synthesis” of division and balance, however, the work 
concludes that sovereign authority emerges from within the deeply dualistic foundation 
of human nature. The question here to be asked is, therefore, how a more natural balance 
should be struck between both the rational-idealist but especially also the empirical-
materialist dimensions of how human beings naturally recognize and legitimize their own 
authority.
In all matters of supreme authority, a combination persists of both regulatory and 
exceptional dimensions. It may also be said that there can be no state sovereignty, or at 
least no political theoretical recognition thereof, without understanding the meanings of 
the complex combinations of both legally free and politically necessary patterns of 
authoritative action. This work proceeds by respecting the answers, to the perennial 
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question of state authority, that were professed by Aristotle, Max Weber, Friedrich 
Meinecke, and Hannah Arendt but it will then amend them by returning—through the 
lessons of Carl Schmitt and Louis Althusser—to Niccolò Machiavelli.
By reading Machiavelli, it becomes possible to reappreciate the dual sovereignty 
thesis, as well as the material thesis that legitimate popular freedoms tend to emerge in an 
open-ended or dialectical opposition against the oligarchical status quo-interests. Further, 
although neo-Montesquieuan idealists (including John Rawls) would end up distorting his 
legacy, Machiavelli still understands the sources of sovereignty to be far less united and 
monistic than they have done. Sovereignty is, to him, being engendered by a foundational 
duality such as the one consisting of the commoners and the great (the Tribunes and the 
Senate) from which all kinds of constitutional balances may symbiotically emerge. The 
relevance of this duality, for International Relations theorists, is that it can help them 
reorganize the complex tensions between open structures and a limited number of agents, 
between material substances and group formations, but particularly also between the 
state’s political necessity and the people’s revolutionary freedom: between the pursuit of 
some ideal-image of national heritage or of ‘the’ national interest and, as its contrary 
process, the freedom to participate in self-organizing structures of more-or-less-
revolutionary power.
White and Red Dragons: Aristotle and Ambivalent (Sovereign) Authority
Some states are more respectful of their subjects’ liberty than others are. As 
Arendt’s epigraph implies, some “devour” liberties and some respect them. For as long as 
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that most people’s rights are fairly equally protected, this incongruent level of respect is 
no problem. Most members of the international community are moderately protective of 
the rights of their citizen-subjects, so that at least for them no tipping point will have been 
reached. Constitutional equilibria are herein believed stable, and the peace will have been 
maintained. Organs of public order, such as the United Nations, can remain on the 
sidelines. But the UN’s dominant member states do often use the treaty-organization as if 
it were one of their own state apparatuses: they can legitimately come together to decide 
when the threshold between war and peace, order and disorder, has been crossed. They 
can basically ask the Secretary-General to serve as their personal ad hoc crisis 
coordinator, rather than for the purpose of constituting or developing new broadly 
applicable rights-protecting policies.25 Dominant UN member states, but specifically the 
permanent members of the Security Council and among them specifically the United 
States, are then only willing to take action against those violations threatening both the 
equality of human rights as well as the flow of corporate commerce.26 It is as if human 
rights play a subordinate role to national interests. Should the manner in which UN states 
recognize each other’s equal rights to sovereignty—to avoid an overbearing U.S. or 
EU—not be reconstituted and revolutionized?
In the current time, the Security Council acts only when population elements are 
massively beginning to migrate, are being extremely forcibly displaced, or are taking up 
arms against the rulers-that-be, while skirmishing both for their material advancement as 
well as for better self-protected rights. It is then too often and too conveniently forgotten, 
however, that insurgents and terrorists in Iraq, Congo, Nepal, and so many other militant 
factions elsewhere can justifiably claim to be protecting themselves from a corrupt or an 
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absent state.27 The just cause of the militants cannot and should not be negated solely on 
the basis of Western preferences for UN’s multilateralism, however. Even the UN itself 
should be understood to remain subject to political negation. At its core it is still a 
wartime alliance and, as such, it may reasonably be perceived to have taken sides in 
wars—with the American occupiers of Iraq, for example.28 Moreover, the UN continues 
to be controlled through the “murky backroom diplomacy” of the permanent members of 
the Security Council (P-5), as one commentator writes, rather than by any belief in the 
“principles of democratic legitimacy.”29
Still, beliefs in legitimacy are difficult to qualify. Not only UN-mandated 
intervention forces, but even the least-recognized armed factions in the world will have 
their own reasons to try to provide orderliness and to maintain legitimate levels of 
‘global’ governance.30 One of the greatest paradoxes in international politics consists of 
the notion that both the world’s militant elements as well as the Security Council can 
equally claim to be fighting under the banner of offering “human security.”31
The corridors of the UN are worlds apart from nearly all elementary school 
classrooms—including those in affluent nation-states. But there is one similarity: the UN 
is peopled by professional state diplomats; classrooms by natural-born diplomats. One 
main difference is plain to see: school-students have far fewer fears of secessionists and 
armed factions than that state representatives seem to have. While professional diplomats 
can rationalize cultural and political differences, young students would be visibly 
enthralled upon learning about the different rights and prerogatives children elsewhere 
may enjoy, rather.32 Teachers will have explained to them that the human population is 
divided into nation-states, each with its own legal and constitutional structure as well as 
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its own anthem and flag. These symbols may also have been said to express the equality 
of all peoples, and the equal dignity of their own national values.33 Children might even 
have been given an assignment to search for ‘strange’ flags, or to simply have imagined a 
national emblem for their own wonderlands. Visitors to these schools will find far it less 
likely, however, that most children were also taught why flags are deeply political
symbols—as opposed to merely different signs of national unity.
Flags and banners originate from shipping cultures and from the need to 
differentiate between naval and army troops: they are codes for formations, allegiances, 
and disciplines. For any group to follow the same flagging protocols means that it will 
have at once integrated and disciplined (as Foucault would have said) itself.34
Flagging rituals are being followed to give a political performance. The flag can 
instantly appear as a symbol of cultural cohesion and national integrity. Of course, the 
integration process itself must not have passed some ‘point of no return’ as the 
recognizing group cannot have split apart—more or less violently—in order for the flag’s 
appearance to be believed legitimate. Unlike most heraldry emblems, a national flag 
signifies therefore not just a (dynastical) unification principle, but also always the union 
of a specific group’s various principles of elemental self-integration and self-regulation. 
This inquiry will be about why groups have so long been believed to self-
integrate, to maintain their political autonomy, and—as Machiavelli speaks about this 
phenomenon of either political or constitutional self-integration—how groups do or 
should believe their natural constitutions somehow necessitated their having brought 
themselves back to their own foundations, and to thus have been “born again”, either by 
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means of force or by law: “[by] extrinsic accident or ... intrinsic prudence”, and; “either 
by external or internal occurrences.”35
Each flag symbolizes a moment of principally legitimate self-organization, but the 
flag is also a political symbol because no group can be recognized as an equal if that 
group were not also capable of maintaining its own moment of self-organization for some 
considerable period of time. In answering Machiavelli’s question of how this self-
sustaining and self-organization capability should be recognized, as having caused either 
by accident or by legality, the case of Sudan comes to mind. The degree to which the 
country forms two self-organizing sovereign states, as of 2011, was determined both by 
third-party states (in the Security Council) and their interpretation of international law as 
well as by the internal usage of armed force. Sudan’s partition has been a consequence of 
the political fact of inequality. That is, only one of of the two Sudanese states can be most 
financially dependent on a patron-state, and only one of them can rely more than the 
other on foreign trade and on consular offices and, especially, on revenues from “Chinese 
oil operations.”36 Of course, there are many peoples who are not unlike those living in 
South Sudan, and still struggling to determine who among them is in the relatively most 
advantageous position to govern, to self-organize, and to be recognized as most 
politically autonomous. Besides the Sudanese, also, many groupings with a determinate 
ethnic or linguistic character have sought—but never received—diplomatic recognition 
and UN membership.37 This book explores new opportunities, both practical and 
theoretical, to come to better understand the rights of self-organizing groupings—by 
passing by the anarchist Michael Bakunin’s call to dissolve any and all sovereign states 
and to instead ask the realist Niccolò Machiavelli to help contemporary states/peoples 
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better identify their own aspirations to become recognized as equally-constitutionalized 
sovereign persons.38
Why are human groupings more often symbolically, than that they are also 
juridically recognizable as political societies—under international law? Both the 
Bhutanese and the Welsh, for example, have been politically recognized. Both of these 
groupings have political societies, therefore, but only the latter are not also being 
recognized as a sovereign state with juridical equality.39 On the level of symbolism, 
however, the countries are more equal. Flags of Bhutan and Wales depict respectively a 
white and a red dragon, and precisely these symbolic sorts of depictions continue to raise 
critical controversies—which teachers should (more frequently) invoke in order to 
characterize the ambivalent relationship between any given population, on one side, and 
the complex combination of its political principles and its internationally legitimized
juridical prerogatives, on another. To some Bhutanese people, the thunder-dragon 
represents a principle of independent monarchical authority whereas others may add that 
this mythological animal primarily refers to the country’s Buddhist foundations.40 The 
Welsh Christian Party has called the flag’s dragon a mid-twentieth-century sign for the 
devil, further, whereas traditionalists maintain that (already for many centuries) “the red 
dragon gives impetus.”41
Flagging protocols are omnipresent in today’s world—but they are also part of 
those rules that continue to mirror yesterday’s beliefs and yesterday’s concepts of what it 
means to be recognized as a member of a political group: of a unified people. This 
conventional aspect explains why flags may be draped over the coffins of some 
citizens—but not over those of others, and definitely not over those of non-nationals. 
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That is, this conventional rule mirrors the in-group’s self-selection process, and thus a 
political behavioral pattern, already known to Thucydides—who describes it as the 
proper honoring of all those who had fallen in battle, as he thought should be done upon 
the rifling of “the dead bodies of the enemy.”42
Although flags and other emblems of national unity were first created during 
meetings of eighteenth-century university students, political groups would quickly after 
adopt such emblems to become better recognizable just as well. States thus used 
nationalism to advance their own appearance of societal integrity and cultural dignity.43
But to be seeking recognition for an in-group’s dignity, or to be honoring its autonomy, is 
an activity that has preconditioned politics at least since the first walled cities were 
build—usually in order to store and protect a quantifiable surplus of agricultural 
products. Nevertheless, at least since Greek antiquity, the walled city (polis) has been 
conditioned by much more than its measurable “power potential”—because the polis
must also always have been recognized, as Arendt writes, as an entity “independent of 
material factors, either of numbers or means.”44 The below-presented inquiries are all 
inquiries into the qualitative difference between the state’s “power potential” and its 
“material factors” or, as well, between a more or less symbolic organization of powers 
and each state’s territorial and physical factors and appearances.
Reconciliatory Comments on Recognizing (Sovereign) Statehood in Antiquity
Although pro-democracy liberals are correct to point to the ancients for their own 
anti-state philosophies, Plato and Aristotle were not unique in having analogized the 
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then-known cities to less-than-democratic constitutions. This meant the ancients felt 
themselves part of a generation that had identified both democratic and oligarchical 
elements within most constitutions, because they supposed that physically recognizable
groupings organized themselves within their walled cities as if they could have their own 
unique symbols and even their own souls: mixed constitutions to call their own, in 
modern parlance.45 The philosophers analogized each such group’s general soul to an 
autonomous person’s disposition. 
Despite all sorts of problems with their analogies, the philosophers have remained 
uniquely important in that they understood why the political group should be believed to 
be analogous to an individual person. Both are struggling to make sense of contingent 
events, and both tend to do so by trying to maintain an appearance of coherency and 
integrity.46 Plato’s Socrates asks, for example, whether the “individual soul” indeed 
appears to contain all three elements of virtue: contemplative wisdom, courageous action, 
and self-moderation. What has been forgotten, too often, is that he then also asks how 
these elements might relate to one another: do they form “an undivided entity, or is [their 
soul] a set of disconnected components?”47 But prior to claiming he would know how to 
recognize the missing fourth element, of justice, in The Republic, Socrates most clearly 
wanted to know how he should recognize the immeasurable elements of the polis, and 
thus also the character of its whole government. For, each known personal element and 
each city’s general nature “ought to [be expected to all] perform different functions.”48
Despite the multiplicity of and within each state’s elemental functions, therefore, 
Socrates proposes that the individual partial elements as well as those of the city as a 
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whole “will [have to] be united by a common interest: ... [t]his unity will cause them to 
share pleasure and pain in common.”49
Before wanting to approximate any definition of justice, Socrates here 
recommends that the general functions of causing pleasure and pain, and of the 
government’s right and wrong actions as well, will have to be politically moderated—
akin to how each individual may decide to cope more or less temperately with pairs of 
opposites such as “attraction and repulsion, desire and aversion, agreement and 
disagreement.”50
Not entirely unlike Plato, Aristotle mentions that each government’s actions will 
somehow inscribe/constitute the character of that government’s powers. In this, 
government action itself may certainly be analogized to an individual sage’s actions, 
although Aristotle would have added the provision that any analogy by itself may 
nonetheless lead to unjust results: the sage may prove to be a tyrant. Yet, such unjust 
results can still be mitigated by following a simple “rule of proportion.” Aristotle designs 
that rule in order to help Greeks better recognize more or less justly acting multi-
elemental governments. So, the government of Thrasybulus certainly had been accurate 
in drawing its analogy, in itself, but had probably been morally wrong to have “cut off 
[all] outstanding men” after having send “an envoy to ask ask for advice [from the tyrant] 
Periander, who [had given] no verbal answer; [Periander had] simply switched off the 
outstanding ears in the cornfield where he was standing.”51 Aristotle still much agrees, 
with Plato, that individuals and states have their own elemental functions to perform 
(their own “excellences”). But he additionally wants to warn that analogies could end up 
being manipulated and would then seem to justify tyrannical or broadly anti-egalitarian 
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acts. To prevent such justifications from gaining leeway, he proposes it is only natural for 
people to try to equally divide their functions of governing and obeying. That 
proportional form of equality should be believed applicable both among the elements 
within the government’s constitution, as well as within each citizen’s character: “the 
good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as 
for being ruled.”52
At least since Plato’s symbolism, it has been common practice to use metaphor 
(or analogies to bodily organs, personal moods, and alchemical elements) in giving 
meaning to the goodness of a grouping’s behavioral principles.53 Political metaphor 
followed commonly from a popular belief, in a founding moment also known as the 
state’s constitutional moment. In every contemporary state, it has been widely believed
that in its beginning there were a few extraordinary individuals who reached a good 
decision—as they were instructing the people on how they are to be recognized, legally 
and symbolically, and how their rulers should respect their rights. That good decision 
usually pertained, as well, to the successions to offices of state and to how the state’s 
future should be regulated in reference to its constitutional past.54 Besides a more or less 
cohesive population, therefore, constitutional organizations and acts of state recognition 
(the recognition of “all sovereign rights,” that is) could never really be separated from the 
physical realm of self-regulation and political power. The physical realm in which people 
were and still are gathering in order to witness acts of regulation is philosophically 
inseparable from the realm in which the same people will also reach their decisions on 
who should rule whom, and thus also inseparable from the realm in which this decision is 
literally being metaphysically legitimized—almost precisely as how Ernst H. 
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Kantorowicz describes the physical-yet-metaphysical realm of the crown.55 The crown is 
recognized as a symbol of the successions to a sovereign office. It symbolizes both the 
physical movements of succession as well as a metaphysically-assumed responsibility or 
duty for the common good (‘office’ means ‘duty’). The recognition of sovereignty is part 
of a systemic organizational process, inseparable from people’s witnessing of (and 
popular beliefs in) some kind of symbolically self-regulating realm of political decision-
making.
Even though various constructivist theorists have said that both old and new 
popular beliefs should be expected to have been constructed against a social and cultural 
background—and that culture should be the main “resource” for any intelligible 
argument about beliefs, as well as that it is such a “resource” for identity structures—a 
more ‘realistic’ thinker, Georg Simmel, helps warn that any such constructivist 
definitions of social background will be likely to “transmute” the beliefs themselves, and 
to be turning them back into “something almost like a physical need.” Social and cultural 
identities might well be experienced as if they create someone’s needs and interests, 
Simmel would admit, but there are beliefs in something good and in something 
metaphysical that will differ quite starkly from these social identities: they are certainly 
not being causally created by these identities. Simmel’s argument is that because people 
will rather believe that their “interaction” with God serves as their ultimately meaningful 
purpose, and as a sort of metaphysical constitution of their lives, they can by analogy 
begin to interact with God’s worldly mediators, and thus also again begin to believe in 
“[social] interaction as unity”—rather than only in their abstract ideas and symbolic 
ideals of unity (or rather than only in the ideal objects of their beliefs). For, unity-
36
respecting and religiously believing people tend to interact and act qualitatively 
differently than non-believing people, and yet their interactions remain somehow 
inseparable from the causal consequences of their own cultural ideas or national 
identities.56
To return to the difference between (metaphysical) beliefs in a symbol of 
goodness and the (physical) needs to recognize a social or cultural identity, it may be 
recollected that the image on Bhutan’s flag embodies this difference. The image of the 
thunder-dragon is not only a sign of cultural identity. The dragon rather also exemplifies 
qualitatively distinct beliefs in the good, foundational, constitutional decision from which 
all (Bhutanese) political action is believed to flow. Not only a mythological creature, 
thus, the dragon is believed to signify a hybrid creature spreading itself out evenly across 
two colored fields, representing an equal union of two traditions: civic and monastic. 
Though the Buddhist orders do not actually have the same level of power as Bhutan’s 
head of state has, their joint flag nonetheless expresses a belief in equality and unity. For, 
the monastic orders and the monarchical state should be believed to continue to have a 
relation of unity: they have one co-constitutive source of ultimate authority.57 It is not 
only in Bhutan that this co-constitutive aspect of sovereignty has been represented by 
mythical animals such as dragons, however, because in seventeenth-century England it 
would be Thomas Hobbes who believed in the perpetually-pending arrival of a sovereign 
he analogized to a leviathan: this sea-dragon should be believed to symbolize the state’s 
dual authority. 
All this means that authority cannot be, by contrast to what Bakunin would argue 
it can be, completely imposed by means of each individual’s “own reason”. Instead, all 
37
authority should also always be believed to symbolize a shared or a common “faith” in a 
good constitutional decision (however “skeptical” that system of beliefs may be, to use 
Bakunin’s own word), which then again manifests itself in some legitimate relationship 
between rational as well as non-rational actors.58 The authority of a leviathan-like state 
exemplifies, particularly according to Hobbes, furthermore, the co-constituency of 
“vainglorious and modest” elements, but also of external-physical (common) and 
internal-mental forums (rational), within the population—neither one forum of which 
should be believed to ever become any less morally good than the other.59 The two 
forums cannot be actually integrated, or they cannot be synthesized into one radically 
moral and absolutely rational state: they remain to be seen as—at least by Hobbes, 
instead, but also by a turn-of-the-twentieth-century realist like Meinecke—contraries, in 
the sense that their contrariness should perform two functions. It should motivate a 
sovereign authority to serve the commons and treat its diverse subjects “with care” but it 
should also, in the same moment, prompt this “holder of state authority” to pursue his 
“own interest”: to pursue his raison d’état. Meinecke would come to understand this 
concept of rationality and utility to be contradicted, and yet also to have to remain 
unified, by a non-rational belief in the “care” expressed by a good sovereign authority.60
Not completely unlike the double-headed eagle (familiar in the old Germanic-
language statelets), the dragon represents a spiritual world force emerging from within 
the relationship between any sovereign state’s two opposite dimensions: the rational use 
of power and the power to care for a common realm, but also between both the external-
civic and the internal-confessional dimensions of state power. These dimensions are two 
contraries because the rational, nevertheless, can rarely also be held and be cared for in 
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common with all other members of the state. Instead, the rational is usually being 
reformulated into a higher code of public service and in a higher interest (a sovereign 
duty, a high office), rather, in maintaining the raison d’état. And so, the dragon signals to 
the notion that both the public and metaphysical as well as the self-interested but rational 
dimensions of the state may newly appear as if they form one union, and yet continue to 
divide themselves against each other.61
Bhutan’s and Hobbes’s dragon-symbols are, both, compounding a duality. Each 
dragon-image is of course also compounding a serpent and a bird, so that the symbol as a 
whole indeed represents the dynamic union (or, the alchemic unification process) of the 
elements water and air—as Carl G. Jung points out. Through fire (breath, spirit), water 
and air would accomplish a union similar to how the contraries of external-body (matter) 
and internal-mind (idea) are just as oftentimes being united—through popular beliefs in a 
spiritual force. (Jung may refer to that force as the anima mundi.)62
The important problem to be solved, in the next chapters, is the problem of why 
sovereignty would at least since antiquity have to have been believed to have two 
opposite dimensions or two contrary foundations. Why would sovereignty have to have 
been co-constituted by monasticism and civics, or by the various symbolic meanings and 
metaphysical principles as well as by the physically acquired domain of a select 
population? And why should the state’s ultimate authority be believed to have been 
hybridized by—what Aristotle-scholars usually refer to as—both the social and the 
natural, or actually by both its ruling as well as its ruled elements?63 Can every state be 
recognized as a sovereign state, just because its people can be trusted to represent both 
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organic constituent bodies as well as to share the same set of self-ruling principles and 
social-cohesion ideals?64
Karl Marx learns from Aristotle that as societies are beginning to acquire and 
accumulate the means (including slaves), to accomplish their private ends, societies will 
also somehow have to separate themselves from their natural purpose of proportional 
equality. Social hierarchies will have to limit the possibility for any political entity to be 
transcending its own utilitarian acquisitions and interests.65 This lesson would come to set 
a critical theoretical precedent. Marx did correctly infer, from Aristotle’s Politics, that 
statespersons should not be separating—and should at minimum try to close the gap that 
tends to divide—the pursuit of their measurable and quantifiable social interests from 
their immeasurable and naturally-meaningful ethic of pro-egalitarian self-limitation. That 
is, statespersons (citizens committed to variously-recognized levels of political 
organization) should be confident they can help each other to transcend the void they 
created by means of their own individual interests, and that they can best do so by 
naturally obeying the kind of laws that prohibit, and that may authoritatively interpellate 
on, any given individual’s or economic class’s pursuits of pure self-interest. As how 
school-children will have a natural fear of weapons, rather than of a secessionist walking 
one day into their classroom, so may statespersons quite naturally and quite responsibly 
recognize other political actors but nonetheless fear the socially-constructed machines 
these other actors represent—because, in the end, as Schmitt agrees with Hobbes, every 
state is indeed a machine-like instrument of power.66 The various statespersons may thus 
have greater fears of some UN member states than they do of human beings with more or 
less temperate ambitions. Statespersons may also quite spontaneously begin to obey those 
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laws that affirm the “connection” between all subpopulations, without having to use a 
social grammar that would confront them “in a thing-like manner.”67 Subpopulations 
(slaves, migrants, separatists, insurgents, and so forth) are not to be reified as if they were 
things, constructs, products, nor as if they were the means to an end: statespersons should 
alternatively begin to obey those laws believed to be most symbolic of each 
subpopulation’s natural spirit and purpose—according to various realist, neo-Aristotelian 
Marxian theorists.68
Contemporary political theorists are often heard to dispute each other on what the 
proper relationship between (social) self-limitation and a (natural) moment of self-
transcendence should come to look like, of course, and this is why Aristotelian thought 
remains critical. Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, among several theorists of global 
constitutionalism, opened disputations on the question of how functional self-regulation 
relates and should come to relate to the idea of legal and moral progress.69 Generally, 
these theorists conclude that human rights and equal liberties are best warranted by 
progressive organizations such as the European Union and its post-national courts—but 
without a strong state. Populations shall best protect their own liberties through regional 
and functionalist institutions, but without having to believe in self-transcendent decisions 
marked by sovereign discretion. In a Habermasian world, they should not have to protect 
themselves by following a foundational decision on how to honor their fallen soldiers, in 
all likelihood, nor by following the decrees of any military commanders. Much rather, 
general (or, functionally institutionalized) multilateral treaty-organizations and other such 
post-national regional networks, with greatly decentralized powers, should suffice.70
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Bonnie Honig, a ‘realistic’ teacher of political constitutions, says that those 
defending liberty by means of functional power-decentralization are too optimistic. She 
points to the discretion state officials may very well be needing while they are 
spontaneously creating moments of transcendent freedom, which is really the natural law-
freedom to moderate interest-centric competition. Officials should have the discretionary 
authority they need to continue to serve the law, and to do so in the ethical spirit of their 
state’s natural and foundational decisions. It would be impossible to formally protect 
human rights and to maintain other legal norms without at least some number of 
discretionary interpellations by an adequate number of continuously recognized
sovereign persons, that is.71
William E. Scheuerman seconds her probably inadvertently in his own attack on 
Habermasian theory. He suggests that clubs such as the EU, WTO, and IMF may 
certainly have served as the instruments that were designed to accomplish multilateral 
ends, but that their presence has simultaneously disqualified any prospective (world) state 
institutions from more naturally and from more legitimately coordinating policies 
“among regional blocs and/or the Great Powers.” Rather than to want to speak for post-
national networks and global legal norms, without any policies that can be enforced by a 
central military component, Scheuerman finds that realists should instead become (or 
remain, actually) advocates for “a supra-national political order” within which state 
discretion and sovereignty will continue to be experienced as “essential to law’s 
generality.”72
The practical side of the question of self-regulation is informed by the fact of 
disproportionate social inequalities. As the world’s populations hold on to their own 
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regulatory principles and ideal liberties, they often end up utilizing these same principles 
in exclusionary manners. Subpopulations become either supportive of separatist and even 
terrorist factions, or of formal and legalized networks that they hope can fulfill their 
security needs. Paradoxically, population support for either informal or formal, and for 
either intra-jurisdictional or extra-jurisdictional institutions, cuts two ways. If the EU 
helps maintains equalities between its member states, it also maintains great inequalities 
among non-EU states—as even the youngest schoolchildren may soon learn on their 
foreign travels, outside their affluent home-countries.
Inequality and unfairness are principal (natural, moral, and religious) offenses to 
human beings of all ages, in all places. Yet, most Western elementary and middle schools 
(and news outlets) provide hardly any instruction on how inequalities have been 
structured by the very close relationship between capitalist economies and their 
dependency on states, and their national interests—as well as by, especially, 
economically- and socially-exclusionary ideas about the origins of America’s liberties.73
The paradox is that national interests are very much like all social identities: they tend to 
have been constructed by means of signs and symbols connoting exclusive cultural or 
independent ethnic groupings, and yet they in the same moment help the system of states 
to create all sorts of market-inclusive financial dependencies (to create globalization).74
When the U.S. had turned into a debtor state, in the 1980s, it became structurally 
dependent on a capitalist market system, for example, while nonetheless maintaining a 
frontier-culture that would only value the individual’s absolute independence from 
society (by means of its rags-to-riches dreams and its various lone-warrior ideals) and 
even would value political solipsism above its own constitutional purpose—which, from 
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its foundation, had been believed to be the (possible world) union of naturally sociable 
and naturally federated states.75
Contemporary theorists (and teachers of government and civics) have an 
obligation to demonstrate that global social inequalities are more likely to follow from a
passive acceptance of socially-constructed concepts and signs (such as national flags), 
and from the exclusionary principles they connote, than from the naturally proper or pro-
egalitarian meanings they might alternatively begin to have within the politically-founded 
realm. What is too often forgotten, even in schools, is that the concepts themselves 
cannot be discarded. Concepts are unavoidable—particularly in the political realm. But 
they should not be used lightly: the one thing Socrates knew for sure.76
Their proper connotations and possibly-ethical meanings will constantly have to 
be restored to them—so that, hopefully, one day a more healthy relation may be 
developed between the concepts themselves, the regulatory principles they connote, and 
the structural inequalities these principles can purportedly newly transcend. As Aristotle 
and (particularly Arendt’s reading of) Socrates can reveal, then, human beings are 
naturally capable of sensing their obligation (more so than other social animals) to 
develop a healthier relation between hearing others apply concepts (signs, names), or 
hearing others speak (not: write), first, and their wondering about the proper or the 
foundational meanings of their concepts, second.77 The hearing of a concept is what 
invites even the youngest witnesses to ever-more carefully distinguish between what the 
concept might have been intended to mean, and what it should alternatively have been 
used for.78 Children often reach adulthood, biologically, around the same age as they 
come to know (not unlike Socrates) why there may have remained a void between the 
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intentional use of a concept (the social construct) and that same concept’s naturally-
proper, non-ironic, or literal usage (the definition).79
Moreover, from inside the invitation/obligation to obey the concept’s natural 
meaning “arises”—as Hannah Arendt says—the one question to have most perplexed the 
Greeks: “Who becomes immortal; the doer or the teller? Or: who depends on whom?”80
Their polis was founded, she adds, on its determining of the proper relation between 
seeming opposites: the man of “action,” or the actor, and the man of “contemplation,”
who withdraws into an audience. The distinction between actively leading and
thoughtfully following is a distinction to be experienced within the political relationship 
between an actor’s subordination and/or the serving of others. McGowan has suggested 
that, for Arendt, the knowledge of when to switch roles is a deeply political type of 
knowledge: when offices should be rotated is typically a question of non-violence.81 The 
best answer to this question, of how political actors may act non-violently, thus, also 
somehow depends on a basic distinction between their natural and their social functions. 
For, there tends to be considerable tension between the at-times-opposite functions of 
speech: it may take on the natural function of a political (non-violent) sharing of 
contemplated intentions, but it may also lead towards a (possibly-violently) 
propagandized social conflict about the definitional meaning of any particular intentions. 
As speech may have these opposite effects, and as Arendt made her case, the entire 
paradox of politics all too often emerges from the underlying relationship between both 
the metaphors for “unity”, that are humanly or intentionally being constructed (in 
monotheistic cultures), and that often are appearing as signs of national unity, and the 
many associational and pluralistically-cogitated definitions of “God-created nature.”82
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This latter “nature” is the self-organizing, self-unifying purpose of the pluralist 
definitions. Or, this paradox emerges from the unity of, as well as from a relation of 
contrariness between “the diversity of human associations [and] ... their ultimate unity of 
purpose.”83
The Greek art of politics is best practiced by wisely differentiating the manifold 
opinions of men, and their pluralistically competing interests, from those conceptual 
constructs and metaphorical signs that may connote unity, singularity, but even also 
universality.84 Egalitarian justice is only one such a metaphorical sign (law, piety, and 
compassionate love are some of the other concepts Plato studied), because no city’s 
population has ever lived up to its natural purpose of full equality.85 Further, Aristotle 
conceives of the political art as the judicious exchange of two political functions, mastery 
and service, or as the open-ended rotation of the city’s available positions of relational 
authority.86 The political art is to be practiced by those who maintain a principled 
distinction-and-relation between the two conditions of ruling and of being ruled—
because this one socially-constructed distinction that will inform public judgments of the 
many persons who are contending for honors, or who are to be rotating the state’s 
offices.87 This is the one distinction that will help both officer-holders and office-seekers 
remain faithful towards a proportional relation, and a just union of “the naturally ruling 
element with the element which is naturally ruled.”88
Nation-states artificially maintain divisions between populations, yet they almost 
naturally obey the behavioral laws that appear to govern all populations, not regardless 
but because of the divisions these laws help maintain—in the form of national and 
territorial jurisdictions.89 Some laws are surprisingly similar, thus, whereas jurisdictions 
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are extremely diverse. Yet, most jurisdictions are minimally formed by protocols on how 
to honor (or demote, or even bury) high-ranking officials, by standardized principles on 
how to divide the means of production, as well as by posited rules on how to punish 
treason, murder, adultery, and so forth. The identification of behavioral rules, as 
compared to positivized rules, remains a complicated business, however, because the 
former are more likely to unite than to divide the population. Positivized rules are closer 
to socially constructed identities (which are usually expressed by means of anthems, 
honorific titles, and other signs of national folklore), and therefore a bit more selective 
towards than that they actually unify the peoples of the world. But the real complications 
begin whenever people forget to differentiate the positive rules that allow them to hold 
equally shares in their own artificially constructed identity (nationality), first, from those 
natural inequalities all human beings have, paradoxically, in common with each other, 
second.
Consistent with the Jungian interpretation of the concept of co-constituted 
authority, as well as with findings in the field of evolutionary biology, the problem of 
self-divisions and self-unifications within the world population—and within the system 
of states—is a complicated problem because it cannot be solved by simply redefining 
every nationally-constructed limit to people’s jurisdictions. Why the problem resists such 
a solution is—in accordance to Arendtian, Jungian, and Aristotelian theory—not very 
easily explained and yet must have something to do with the tense relation between the 
two constitutive elements of human sovereignty. One element, the unified population, is 
evidently a social construct that can be used as a means to an end. It can be used to 
refer—culturally, ironically, or at least metaphorically—to a population’s imagining itself 
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to be a unified nation or also, perhaps, a band of lone warriors or some formerly enslaved
tribe—and thus to provide moral and religious (but especially monotheistic) justifications 
for international wars and revolutionary separatism or, perhaps, anti-colonialism and 
frontier settlements. As Marx and Engels so well understood, this element of justification 
(either for or against wars and colonialism) is to remain the element of social 
deliberation.90 The other element consists of all the manifold official jurisdictions—as 
these will have to be believed to have been founded as naturally diverse, pluralistic, 
purposeful, and principled modes of law: these are always the formally authorized modes 
of self-organization. And, this second is an element of foundational decision-making. 
Because both elements imply each other, however, a “paradox of politics” is sustained 
which according to Honig “can be a generative force.” As she adds, in this “paradox” 
there is “neither deliberation nor decision as such”—yet both elements can be struggling 
for recognition of their mutually constituted legitimacy.91
Political theorists such as Honig, rightly, have been building their case against 
those global constitutionalists who, like Habermas, would rather prefer to construct some 
sort of regionally-situated deliberative element (like the Philadelphia Convention) which 
then should come to subvert the many discretionary or decisionist elements within the 
current world of states.92 This book carves out several cornerstones that can help realist 
theorists to continue to build their case against, and hopefully to lower the risks involved 
in, globalized constitutionalism. The list of risks includes a surplus of policies motivated 
by neoliberal and individualistic values—as well as an abundance of social values and 
constructs connoting solely the instrumental ends of unity or even of harmony. It also 
includes the chance of continued professional and (UN) administrative ignorance about 
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the struggles between the elements of deliberation and decision, and severe international 
miscommunications about how the system’s naturally proportional-egalitarian spirit of 
purposefulness emerges from within such struggles.
Probably unfashionably, the book follows Georg Sørenson in premising that 
sovereignty is neither rising nor falling. Sovereign jurisdictions and state territories are 
certainly not soon-to-be obsolete unitary forms of power. Rather, this book reformulates
the question about how statespersons can newly begin to organize forms and structures of 
power. How can the transcend the powers of the international structure while also 
preserving their own state’s natural modes of self-organization?93 How can they protect 
the health of a complex system that organizes, or that both transcends and includes, an 
aggregated structure of powers? Just as how the population’s natural purpose is 
“homeostasis,” so is the state’s natural purpose to self-organize and sustain a web of 
equilibria. Its self-organizational jurisdictions will hereby be assumed to have been
helping other structures and subsidiary societies in achieving (international) legal parity: 
a “regulatory principle” not unlike the dynamics that self-regulate diverse and complex 
organic systems.94
Constitutional founders, designers of legal structures, and users of legal and moral 
concepts are remarkably consistent in that they strive to maintain at least a resemblance 
of harmony and balance. Like most human beings, they strive to “perpetually maintain a 
balance between opposing propensities.”95  From within apparently contrary tendencies, 
in other words, systemic possibilities for balance and even for growth are somehow 
believed to emerge—throughout the system of states. Traditional cultures have long 
referred to the group’s social and economic expansions by using metaphors: they would 
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believe these expansions were legitimized by the gods that had created organic-
homeostatic systems as well as to have protected the longevity of all life, as Jung would 
go on to demonstrate. The concept of life-expectancy refers in these cultures then also 
much less to an individual’s than to the group’s chances of survival—or, less to privately-
experienced than to public moments of growth. For Jung, biological growth is analogous 
to group psychological individuation.
The analogy suggests that in order for any human grouping to attain some proper 
measure of cultural and historical longevity, as Aristotle would quite concur, it will have 
to begin to grow: for the group to survive, physically, it will have to believe it can 
individuate itself—and that it can demand respect for its own dignity.96 Each grouping 
will have to grow into its own distinct social personality, although it should try to do so 
by maintaining divisions (vis-à-vis other political entities) legitimized from within itself. 
The externally recognized constitution, of every self-unifying grouping, will somehow 
have to be legitimized by the “balance” within the grouping’s internally recognizable
natural dispositions. In order to succeed as a positive jurisdictional system, the group will 
first have to have learned to respect the organically systemic principle of “self-
regulation”—or, it must first have fulfilled certain “archetypal expectations” of fairness 
and parity, within itself.97
To summarize the above introductory points, the first reason behind deliberations 
on global social justice is (and has very long been believed to be) a mysterious decision 
to naturally maintain homeostasis. Discussions and deliberations invoking legally- and 
socially-constructed ideals of balance have always tried to place premiums on natural 
ecosystems, and the ways in which these managed to regulate themselves: to sustain 
50
naturally self-balancing constitutions. After all, the human species evolved through 
nomadic bands—each with its own shared and yet subconscious idea of what 
individuality, personhood, and maturity should mean. That idea would then, over the 
course of generations, have to have been shared by the members of the in-group—which 
again helps explain why human animals have remarkably little tolerance for social 
imbalances and rigid hierarchies. The political unity of the band, and its authority, 
emerges from a metaphysical belief that justice is ‘only natural’—and that law and order
follow from those dispositions that individuate: that ‘make’ humans less human and thus 
less fallible, while these ‘first-nature’ dispositions are also making humans more attuned 
to their common senses or to their ‘second nature.’98
This emergent belief in natural justice/balance could, however, have exclusionary 
effects—as the believers begin to create their own in-group, which then could also try to 
punish, ostracize, and ban (or rifle) all those they imagine to be ‘unnatural’ or ‘unjust’ 
and whom are declared enemies of the in-group.99 This is one of the great paradoxes of 
politics. For, the natural emergence of justice could cause an imagined identification of 
injustice, and order could then cause disorder, similar to how deliberative politics may 
demand or have been demanded by some decision on which punitive treatment the 
enemies of the state deserve. Anyhow, the paradox itself may also be an underlying 
reason as to why the mythological dragon, not unlike a two-headed eagle, symbolizes 
emergent authority—and why this symbol of sovereignty only presents itself on the 
mysterious condition that opposite elements can well be sustainably compounded, or can 
well have been conditioned by popular beliefs in a systemic foundational moment of 
homeostasis.100
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Hobbes and Machiavelli on Political Autonomy or Supreme Power
Sovereignty: “one that is sovereign; especially an autonomous state.” Also: “one
holding supreme power over a body politick.”101 The dictionary’s explicit message is that 
sovereignty is a noun, is singular (“one”), and that it has been formed by some conscious 
choice to exercise a supreme degree of power. Would this be the choice between either 
the measure of a person’s independence from, or the measure of that same person’s reign 
over others? Dictionaries use both of these two degrees, of supremacy and autonomy, to 
define sovereignty as a matter of power—rather than of authority. Yet, the difference 
between such two degrees of power—of being independent and of depending on a 
rulership—nonetheless implies a sort of conceptual equilibrium. It is this difference 
between supreme and autonomous types of power, in other terms, that raises the stakes on 
all those theorists who are now trying hard to award primacy to either one type—but who 
may be forgetting that Machiavelli’s study of equilibrium was still much premised on one 
(albeit dualistic) relationship between these types.102 The problem is that for many IR 
theorists is that their “monistic vision” prevents them from exploring the possibility that 
neither one type is the primary power—and that neither state supremacy nor international 
law-secured autonomy gives sufficient meaning to sovereignty, whenever it would be 
alternatively understood as the conceptual symbol of a homeostatic union, or as a similar 
complex Gestalt.103
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The concept of sovereign authority—either despite or because of its complexity 
and ambivalence—is probably far more dualistic than that has conventionally been 
presupposed, in the definitional literature.104 This book’s research question—as it will be 
reinterpreted in its various sections, introducing thinkers such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Weber—is a question of who appears, and who should appear to 
occupy the nave of sovereignty’s apparent ambivalence. How will that human person’s 
authority have to be honored, and how can the relation between authority and obedience 
be honored just as well? Written in the form of more or less freestanding chapter sections, 
the book will present various answers to that question, as if the answers were the spokes 
of one dialogical wheel. Sovereign authority is in some sections discussed as a degree of 
autonomy and freedom. In other sections, it is said to consist of supremacy and 
omnipotence. As these sections start to spin around with the same wheel, nonetheless, 
they give readers a push in the back in terms of their ride through the academic fields of 
International Relations (IR), political theory, and historical sovereignty studies.
This introduction supports the case that Machiavelli’s conceiving of a free 
republic helps him to unite both meanings: republican sovereignty connotes supremacy as 
well as autonomy, without being reducible to either one of the constructs. Machiavelli’s 
discussions of civic religion, actually, demonstrate why sovereignty would somehow 
have to unite both deliberative autonomy as well as discretionary supremacy while 
retaining a qualitative difference between these two connotations. From the canonical 
dialogue that followed from Machiavelli’s introducing of his ambivalent concept of 
sovereignty, further, it may still be learned that this concept not only does but also should 
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tolerate a religious sort of supremacy over, together with the autonomy of, the people as a 
whole.
Numerous variations on the thematic concept of ambivalent sovereignty have 
been composed. The canon of political thinkers, as it ranges from Aristotle to Hobbes and 
from Montesquieu and Rousseau to Weber and Arendt, has responded to the paradoxical 
qualities of sovereign authority’s more or less spontaneous emergences. But Machiavelli 
was the first among these thinkers to have tried to theoretically integrate sovereignty’s 
two most ambivalent elements: law and force. He reiterated in The Prince, Chapter 12,
that: “The chief foundations of all states—whether new, old, or mixed—are good laws 
and good arms.”105 More than a century would pass before Hobbes (Leviathan, Chapter 
13) quite similarly tried to combine good laws, or the laws of nature, with the specter of 
armed conflicts and quarrels occurring in that dreadful but entirely fictional “state of 
nature.”106 In the absence of any laws of nature, generating “sovereign authority” such a 
“state” instantly dooms itself as it would have to consist of all-warring “particular 
men”—or, in other words, it would be doomed by absolutely isolated and therefore no 
longer sociable individuals.107  Hobbes’s attempt is to unify and pacify the state—by 
allowing this state’s sovereignty to emergeboth spontaneously and individually. He 
moderates his hopes on unification with his fears that the conditions for a civil war tend 
to be maintained by vainglorious and solipsistic individuals, all too inclined to disrespect 
the laws of that peaceful and naturally secured state.
Hobbes’s Leviathan remains mostly known for having elucidated why not only 
the monarchy but that any sovereign person, who may even be a collective person, should 
equally incorporate both “the temporal and spiritual kingdoms.” Indeed, Leviathan first 
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casted the temporal and mortal body of the Roman Church (effectively, the Pope) “in the 
role of Antichrist”—and then went on to cast the believers, or the corpus Christianum, in 
the role of the spiritual and trans-worldly monarchy (or, actually, in the role of a 
sovereign person consisting of a self-organizing, covenanting group of people).108Hobbes 
knew also the (‘medieval’) scholars had long argued that the Roman Church, or the 
corpusmysticum, had to own “two swords” (temporal and spiritual, indeed).109 But he 
complemented their argument by pointing out that a viable corpus mysticum must rather 
possess two qualitatively different capabilities: the power of the sword as well as of the 
word. So, by pointing out that there is no empirical basis for the existence of the isolated 
“Man” (the multitude), with mere sword-power, Hobbes helped recast “Man” into the 
role of “men” who were additionally equipped with word-power: with the ‘added’ power 
they ‘naturally’ use to create Christian covenants.110 These particular pacts give scores of 
human beings a chance to reserve their sword-power, but also to realize that their 
particular covenanting power additionally helps them to cast themselves as the 
constituent members of a Christian commonwealth.111 They serve in that role for as long 
as they whole-heartedly believed they are being governed by the laws of nature (by laws 
that had ultimately been created by God) as well as by their those laws of honor they may 
then again apply against, to dishonor, any violators of the laws of nature.112
Hobbes appears to have believed that the multitudes, of mortal beings, could form 
a union with their own immortal Christian spirit, and that a recognizably sovereign 
people would emerge from this mystical union. That is, he is likely to have thought that 
the domain of political theology provided him with the concepts that could also help 
other people to closer unite sovereignty’s two opposite elements, on condition that the 
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mortal and the immortal God should be believed to have become one, without losing 
these distinctly related characteristics (Leviathan, Chapter 17). Leviathan is best 
interpreted as a confession to the mortal/immortal Christ.113 Only such an interpretation 
can demonstrate why Hobbes must, further, have believed in the prospect of either some 
degree of integration or otherwise at least in the possibility of a fuller reconciliation of 
the power of arms, or the power of the multitudes, together with the power of 
covenanting, or the common power he thought to be the defining characteristic of groups 
of natural law-abiding (Christian) citizens—without ever awarding primacy either to 
autonomous arms or to covenanted supremacy.
Hobbes is notoriously known for having written this: “Covenants without the 
Sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.” The premise for his 
sentence is that there can be no stable peace and no common power—and, therefore, no 
power forcing men to obey their “laws of nature”—for as long as there will not also be 
some solemn relation to an overlying power of covenanting: “the laws of nature, which 
everyone keeps then when he has the will to keep them, [cannot be kept] ... if there [will] 
be no [covenanting] power erected”.114 The most intriguing facet of Hobbes’s argument 
is that it never assigns moral priority to either the common power (the temporal sword-
power: force) or the power of covenanting (the spiritual word-power: law). Thus, neither 
force nor law are said to be sufficient, even though both are equally necessary conditions 
for (Christian) sovereignty’s self-constitution. Moreover, as the coming chapters will 
demonstrate, Machiavelli observes this facet in a highly similar argument, although he 
then described it by using less theological and more politico-historical references than 
Hobbes would do.
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Nevertheless, the thesis to be defended here is that in their major works both 
Machiavelli and Hobbes discerned the apparently contrary effects, on the life of the 
republic, of force and law—as well as that they could have agreed that both force and law 
should remain closely related to each other through a republican religion (within 
Christianity), without losing their distinctively contrary powers.115 It is exciting and yet 
puzzling to hear, from notable realists, that those human beings who hold on to such a 
religion have neither been providentially graced with absolute powers nor do they have to 
have been civilized through a culturally and historically fortuitous process. As Karl Marx 
could have concurred, to Hobbes, a republican religion should be maintained neither by 
those who have been “infused with [the absolute state’s] ... unreal universality” nor by 
those who have to appear as “profane being[s]” in a civilized society.116 Rather, they may 
just want to believe that they can come to appear as prudent human beings.
The liberal conclusion that international institutional reforms will depend on 
morally wise actions does not follow from the often-encountered premise that such 
actions must have been exclusively committed by either greatly charismatic individuals 
(Moses, Bonaparte, Madison and Hamilton, and so on) or by events of extraordinary 
foundational goodness and absolute rationality—such as those played out at, as the 
classic examples hold, the Philadelphia Convention or Mount Sinai. Rather than to 
depend on such culturally contingent circumstances, realist reformers ask what it might at 
anytime mean to say and to hear that a politician, or a state party, is acting prudently. On 
their own premise, realists find that public recognition of an individual’s or an event’s 
moral and legal excellence has to have been culturally and historically (and, especially, 
linguistically) determined. Misjudgment and imprudence ensue from acts of recognition. 
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But they then add that these biases warrant a more conscionable, and yet also a more non-
liberal conclusion about the nature of political reform than that many contemporary IR 
theorists would probably expect.
This book partially consists of sectional summaries of what realist thinkers, most 
notably Machiavelli and Hobbes, did in order to rank prudence, not justice, among the 
highest of virtues. To the realists, prudence is one of the foremost sources of genuine 
(sovereign) authority, precisely because it consists neither of virtue and strength nor only 
of moral goodness. Prudence is not a moral virtue but a source of two types of opinion, 
rather. The difference between these types may help explain why Hobbes argues that the 
meanings of prudence must be differentiated from those of “providence”—which is “the 
foresight of things to come”—and from those of presumption as well, which is a man’s 
invoking of his experience to claim that “the event [shall] answer [his] expectation”.117
Machiavelli, with his Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue, hopes to demonstrate that 
by diligently studying historical examples, statespersons can “readily [learn to] observe 
that all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and the 
same passions, so that it is easy ... to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any 
republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any 
that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of events.”118
Machiavelli goes through great length to answer why prudence is not merely 
foresight. It emerges from a strange conjecture of both a person’s foresight as well as of 
that person’s assessment of cultural contingencies and historical precedents. But foresight 
cannot be reduced to having knowledge of precedents and possible contingencies. The 
faculty of analogical or historical reasoning is trained, rather, by expanding a different 
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kind of knowledge as well. This latter kind of knowledge is not just acquired as a matter 
of chance, or by having learned how to make historically warranted presumptions. 
Instead, it is the sense of faith that historical similarities will continue to occur. Hobbes 
agrees with Machiavelli when he then also explains why prudence consists of a 
presumption of metaphorical similarity and particularly also of “conjecture.” For, 
“prudence is a presumption of the future contracted [by means of conjectural reasoning], 
from the experience of time past.”119
International Relations Theory and More Humbly Interpreting Hobbes’s Answer
Sovereign authority has and continues to evolve. Its meanings have for some 
periods of time formed a relatively minor theme, at least within the field of political 
philosophy, although they now have advanced to the point that they form a major topic in 
one of political science’s subdisciplines, International Relations. In that sub-discipline, 
students frequently see Kant’s or Hobbes’s philosophies being cited—as a way of shoring 
up respectively the liberal or the realist subdisciplinary flanks.120 But after rounds and 
rounds of debate, few IR students can say what it means to possess sovereignty—let 
alone who should possess sovereignty, or who can legitimately use this mode of authority 
to “intervene” militarily in the lives of others.121 Few can explain why one group of 
persons (and not any other group) should hold on to the highest available power within 
any territory or within any jurisdiction—unless they, perhaps, could truly convince their 
teachers that the state of nature is real and that anarchy is absolutely violent.122 To do so, 
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however, student-debaters within the IR field will have to profess their deepest ignorance 
about the fact that Hobbes himself never dared defending such a conviction: the state of 
nature is from his perspective merely a product of the imagination, and anyone invoking 
such a civil war-like state as if it were an actual threat should be summarily dismissed.123
The reason for this dismissal is that the state of nature cannot be used as a rhetorical ploy; 
it cannot be used to threaten only some citizens, and not others: in times of war, all may 
and all should come to believe they have been equally and therefore illegitimately 
threatened in their existence. The state of civil war is a mobilizing, legitimate 
sovereignty-generating myth.124
Throughout Leviathan, and specifically in several references that appear to have 
been penned to refine Machiavelli’s position on sovereignty, Hobbes spells out that the 
state of nature can perhaps be socially constructed, but should not be believed to have 
ever existed. Those “men that have no civil government” (the indigenous populations of 
the Americas are not far from Hobbes’s mind) are nonetheless “men” who will have to 
have come together to learn what they should and should not be doing. They will still 
have learned, from their internal forums—and from the court that resides “in [their] 
conscience only, [and] where not Man but God reigns”—what the difference between 
justice and injustice should be. For, it is God who authors the laws that all human beings 
can believe to be “natural”, in all sorts of diverse places on planet Earth (although not 
universally so), so that the “law of nature” is the “same thing” as international law: or, so 
that the “law of nature” applies to some of the most disturbed relations between equally 
sovereign persons, and even to relations between nations as well (with the word nations, 
he probably refers to those groups that upon having landed in a foreign place will there be 
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recognized as such: they will everywhere become recognized for their spiritual heritage, 
as if by means of a natural law).125
Stubborn students could now go on by reasoning that Hobbes must have been 
wrong, and that God’s (conscience-centric) courts of justice have no worldly 
jurisdictions. They can thus attempt to separate people’s internal conscience (natural 
justice) from their external court institutions (international law). Nevertheless, such an 
attempt would be in vain because it would additionally blind the students from Hobbes’s 
original distinction between “Man” and “men”, or between respectively the universal idea 
of individual solipsism and egotism, in the dimension of a beastly “Man” and the 
diversity of particular organizations, in the other dimension of historically-sociable and 
mutually-honoring “men”. Any explicit threat that the relations between nations were 
once or are now becoming structurally anarchical, and that without a universal monopoly 
on the use of force there would be violent mobs (bend on ravaging, rather than on simply 
taking over, entire countries), is certainly not Hobbes’s sort of threat. Indeed, Hobbes was 
rather active in building a pro-religious case against all those raising such a specter of an 
anarchical world, in which the Antichrist (dwelling in “Man”) could have come to rule, 
without that these heretics were not at least also appealing to a God-created 
(international) law of nature. He must argue, therefore, that there can be no such thing as 
a single or a universal state and not even such an idea as “Man” in the singular form—
because, instead, “particular men” (see, more specifically, Leviathan Chapters 13 and 30) 
have always decided they should have to spontaneously accept—by simply obeying the 
internal forum of their natural conscience—the supremacy of their common power, and 
thus also of their own external courts of justice.126
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By means of drawing a contrast to IR’s intractable image of the singular state, 
governed by an allegedly necessarily singular monopoly on violence, Hobbesian realists 
dismiss that image as fictional. To them, there is no singularity in IR. Both internal laws 
and external institutions as well as both natural-law autonomy and socially constructed
supremacy will somehow have to enlighten never one, always two dimensions of 
emergent authority. Yet, Hobbes’s own co-presentation of these dimensions raises 
another question: what does it mean for a group’s members to enjoy their autonomy and 
to use their covenanting power, to presumably freely regulate their own movements, 
while in the same moment having to belong to a body politick exercising its supreme 
power by restricting their movements by virtue of its own particular and limited physical 
nature?
Those taking a position on the seemingly Hobbesian flank, in the IR field, usually 
avoid the question. They will then begin their encounters with the sovereign state by 
asking what it is that each such single entity may have to do: under which violent 
conditions may states consider themselves to have been forced to combat their enemies? 
These IR students are also inclined to suggest that states reign supreme within their 
territories, and use their supremacy to limit any calls for autonomy from secessionists and 
seditionists. Some students imagine themselves to be realists because they anticipate 
under which conditions a statesperson may have to transgress the rights of such factions, 
and use the threat of civil war in order to justify his own use of armed force. But even 
fewer students actually answer the question of Hobbesian realism, which is where the 
limits of a statesperson’s orders are, and under which dangerous conditions he may have 
to negate positive laws without also negating the laws naturally inscribed in his heart (his 
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conscience).127 Hobbes himself said, after all, that even the most autonomous state 
(“commonwealth”) will perish if it cannot “foresee the necessities and dangers” before 
it.128
While the aspiring realists on this first flank begin to think about prudence as 
perhaps the highest virtue in politics, those on the Kantian side of the IR spectrum will in 
their stead stress the importance of justice and liberty.129 Both the Kantians and those 
who follow Grotius, who fathered the law of nations, ask then what just nation-states may 
not do.130 These Kantian students generally assume that state agents have good, or have 
adequately rational intentions, and that they will avoid taking any course of action that 
could end up being sanctioned by moral laws. Thus, private intentions and public laws 
are assumed to be complementary as single state agents intend to publically obey all the 
laws that could categorically apply to their own actions as well as to the actions of 
others.131 They would nearly-universally fear the consequences of not doing so, and as 
these consequences should be expected to be enforced by international law—and 
eventually by the omnipresent risk of an armed intervention mandated by law as well—
these agents are Kantian in their moral orientations.132 Briefly, second-flank IR students 
imagine that all states are autonomous agents, willing to regulate their own conduct, and 
to be positing laws that will prevent them from attaining full supremacy over each other.
In IR, neither the Hobbist image of supremacy nor the image of moral and 
deliberative autonomy can suffice. Neither one image may be used as sole illustration of 
how states are being recognized, and neither one can define their sovereignty other than 
as it being a merely non-anarchical affair. Motivated to overcome this predicament of 
human sovereignty, Donnelly demonstrates that any such image must rather be viewed as 
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a tautological definition, because sovereignty cannot only be growing as a set of non-
anarchical relations nor only as some singular, supreme, and hierarchical entities.133 It is 
more likely that sovereignty emerges pluralistically and heterogeneously, although not 
completely contingently either.134 Unfortunately for IR, this predicament of sovereignty 
seems for a very long time to have only been considered as if it were an anomaly. In 
sovereignty’s having been understood as an anomaly, it has continued to inform several 
of the reasons why both (Kantian) justice-centric as well as (Hobbesian) prudence-centric 
IR theories have, in recent times, been translated into another idiom. They have been 
placed on another scale of comparison, consisting of positive norms (substituting for 
justice), on one end, and critical exceptions to these norms (replacements for prudence), 
on another end. The liberal IR flank so hopes to abandon exceptionalism, as being too 
reminiscent of unlawful (or, of United States) interferences in the affairs of other states, 
while the conventional (or, actually, non-Hobbesian) realist side remains skeptical of new 
international institutions and specifically of new courts of justice as well.135 This more 
recent round of debate, nonetheless, still echoes an earlier theoretical-disciplinary 
dichotomy. But debaters who have been dealing with this dichotomy as if it were an 
antinomy, have also been repeating the typical mistake of not believing that this 
dichotomy opens itself up towards different contingencies and chances (as Max Weber 
says) or otherwise also to a potential for self-transcendent novelty (to what Hannah 
Arendt calls natality).136 The IR debaters are failing to observe how human beings try to 
overcome their own predicament, and may transcend the fact that actions by moral 
deliberators as well as those by discrete deciders may begin to coincide: they may newly 
transcend themselves.137
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Many of those working in the IR field admit that sovereignty refers to a morally 
ambiguous category of actions, yet few recognize that these actions cannot be as neatly 
divided or dichotomized between justice-centric and prudence-centric poles as that is 
currently being done. The IR theorists who take the social constructivism approach, 
especially, have tried to demarcate a middle ground between the two poles.138 Yet, how 
theoretically viable would their middle ground have to be? Which conceptions of 
authority should minimally grow from this social constructivist program—and can such a 
third program stay clear from that tarnished analytical separation, which has plagued the 
members of IR’s English School for so long, as they have been maintaining their 
dichotomy between merely forceful powers and a more common power, or between 
structural self-interests and the power of solidarity as well?139
Social constructivism helps IR theorists to reformulate an old question. Why 
should people believe that their own sovereign state is acting in both a just as well as a 
wise manner? Daniel Philpott asks why Britain and France gave in to moral pressures and 
therefore ‘granted’ their colonies the right to self-determination: to a sufficiently moral, 
wise, and sovereign state. His answer (Chapter 8, of Revolutions in Sovereignty) is that 
they were pursuing “reputational social power” and that their “imperial abjuration” was 
mostly consequential to their normative concerns over reputation and standing, and 
hardly also to their material interests. Philpott does not aks whether Britain did not find 
the concentration camps it had created in Kenya and Burma too costly, rather than just 
too immoral. Also, Neta Crawford, for instance, asks why government officials came to 
the insight that perhaps not their own state but that at least their state’s involvement in 
colonialism had become unwise, and amounted to an “abhorrent practice”. By the 1960s, 
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officials in colonizer-states would thus have to have come to the realization that both the 
immorality of their supremacy over the colonized, as well as that their material interests 
abroad had to be reassessed. Rather than to continue to interpret these interests strictly 
“as economic or strategic, [they now gained] ... evidence that normative beliefs and 
ethical arguments on occasion trumped material interests.” Just as that the officials of the 
British Empire had put a stop to the global slave trade, so would they try to start up a 
decolonization process that would help end unethical international dependencies. 
Certainly, by weighing their self-interests against the common appeal of international 
solidarity, they would have to harm themselves “economically”—and yet Europe’s 
metropolitan officials proceeded by making “ethical and practical arguments ... against 
[colonialism and] neocolonialism”.140
Sympathetic towards constructivism, Crawford suggests that by the end of the 
1960s a different identity had been constructed for, and by, the (formerly) colonized 
states. The value of moral autonomy had by this time begun to trump any strategic 
interests in maintaining supremacy. This historical case, she claims, disproves the realist 
argument “that there are no ethics in international life: [that] morality is a fig-leaf for 
interests.”141 In referring to Habermas, Crawford elaborates her much more ‘critical’ 
argument. Her premise is not that ethics are absent, but that they are contingent. “[T]here 
is nothing objective or timeless about [moral convictions].” “[N]ormative beliefs are 
historically contingent”. Children will have “learned” that their convictions are morally 
good, but they can only learn this within their own culture.142 When adult statespersons 
decide to protect the goodness of their state, and when they are convinced that they 
should be doing this because the results will be morally superior to their imperial state’s 
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continuous accumulation of wealth, they will have learned to make such decisions 
because they have been socially conditioned to do so. Indeed, if the European 
statespersons had only sought material gains, they could easily have continued their 
colonial dominance. The post-colonial idea of a state’s national identity, by inference, 
must have been reconstructed by means of moral persuasion rather than by economic 
necessity. The structure of material (objective) power itself, the loss of relational power, 
and the gain of high material costs for West Europeans, would have correlated only very 
weakly with the above-mentioned main normative-reputational and moral reasons why 
the decolonization process was being initiated—according to Philpott and Crawford.
The problem with her inference is that Crawford accepts the ethical 
(intersubjective) argument against colonial imperialism as if it were superior over the 
strategic (objective) argument. She accepts the idea that the laws of social morality tend 
to trump the laws of natural conscience. For, the inference precludes her admitting that 
Great Power statespersons might alternatively have believed that decolonization would 
give them additional leverage in their Cold War, against the Soviet bloc—by giving them 
additional seats in the UN General Assembly, and by thus shifting the balance of 
power—because the acquiring of this neo-imperialist form of leverage also seemed to 
them simply the more conscionable decision to make. The premise for this realist 
decision was, then, that if the former colonies would thankfully welcome their national 
autonomy, they would also be more supportive of their former colonizers and their anti-
Soviet politics. Crawford says that contingency is important in interpreting historical 
events, but still uses this as an excuse to ignore how deeply the 1960s would be 
influenced by 1950s events. From Washington’s 1950s-determined perspective, however, 
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the world was suffering from an unethical imbalance. Former colonies such as Egypt and 
Indonesia, and probably India as well, were slowly defecting towards Moscow. 
Moreover, the suppression of independence movements throughout Asia and Africa was 
becoming increasingly costly (Kenya, Indo-China, and so forth). To prevent losing more 
funds as well as a mass defection of these pro-decolonization movements, towards the 
Communist bloc, Dulles did not so much nudge (according to constructivists) the 
governments in London and Paris as that he was part of a Western movement which was 
freely ‘letting go’ of its territorial colonial claims.143
Constructivists conclude from this that the meaning of equality-recognition 
practices is less dependent on military ambition and economic competition than on moral 
ideas and social constructs, which would become progressively shared by foreign policy-
makers. (Grotius, Henry IV, Richelieu, and John-Foster Dulles would have had similar 
moral ideas, as these expressed themselves along one and the same historical continuum.) 
Constructivists also teach it would have been individuals such as Dulles who believed 
that the idea of “using military force to protect colonial interests” amounted both to a 
folly and to an immorality.144 The U.S. began to practice self-restraint, voluntarily, in the 
1950s, as it rejected pro-colonialist ideas held by Dulles’s French and British 
counterparts. This changing diplomatic culture suddenly jumpstarted the decolonization 
process—according to both Philpott and Crawford—because the Western colonizers had 
become independently and newly concerned about their moral appearance: they had 
become convinced there was a good ethical argument against their own earlier denials of 
“supervised independence processes” and “negotiated transfers of power”.145 In creating 
this impression that decolonization, when carefully negotiated, amounts solely to moral 
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and ideational progress, however, especially Philpott ignores the historical fact that 
Dulles himself was more likely to have advised against the use of military force in 
territories such as Egypt for another reason. America’s foreign policy-maker was perhaps 
not simply sympathetic to the Egyptian right to equal independence on ethical grounds, 
thus.146
Constructivists ignore the Cold War’s symbolic modalities. In this sense, they 
also ignore the chances that the Cold War itself formed an organization of structural 
enmity. The Cold War symbolizes, however, very much a system of sovereignty that 
transcended its parts (the two main alliances) and yet simultaneously included them 
within a (bipolar) balance of powers.This complex system is what led successive U.S. 
administrations to have structurally-determined reasons to fear that nationalist leaders in 
places like Egypt (and elsewhere in the former colonies).The U.S. feared they would have
begun to take economic offers and military packages from the Soviet Union. And, if 
Egypt had already fallen within the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’, however, then Dulles 
could certainly end up provoking a new sort of armed conflict (because of the atomic 
bomb). He was never prepared to risk doing that, however, so that his actions and 
especially those of the Kennedy administration were of special importance in sustaining 
the Cold War system by intentionally pretending to be enemies but by acting to the 
contrary of their own intented use of power. John F. Kennedy acted contrary to the 
intentional structure of war powers, precisely because he still followed the J.F. Dulles-
track of actually acting for the cause of peace. The entire duel was intended to appear as 
if it were anarchical and excessively competitive, rather than self-regulating, but Cold 
War duelists were in fact constantly regulating themselves. They were prudently 
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organizing and deciding on how best to moderate the nuclear risks, as if by abiding to a 
transcendent natural law. Moreover, the non-violent pacification of Egypt’s Suez Canal 
certainly created a great opportunity for Washington to guarantee its other allies, in the 
Middle East, that their independence would be secured for as long as they could help give 
the West access, via the Canal, to oil fields.147 In the system, both postcolonial freedoms 
and the dominant national interests were clearly coinciding.
The state’s autonomy-centric identity may have been determined by contingent 
ethical-religious deliberations such as Dulles’s, yet this does not yet also exclude the 
possibility that the state’s structural supremacy (even when assuming it is an imperialist 
form of supremacy) has equally been determined by such deliberations. It is very well 
possible for statespersons to morally justify their most prejudicial and most self-
interested decisions, as political realists caution, by creating attractive forms of rhetoric 
or by ignoring their own conscience. This does not mean that, contrary to Crawford’s and 
Philpott’s impressions, the laws of conscience are completely culturally contingent 
(although they are, indeed, not universally-applicable either). Rather, it means ethical 
deliberations cannot be understood in isolation from geo-strategic interests, rhetoric, and 
ego-pleasing decisions. Mere references to a lineage of ethical deliberations cannot be 
used to justify Crawford’s excluding of equally-relevant supremacy-centric interests—in 
explaining the historical decolonization process, therefore.148 The more social 
constructivism excludes material interests, the more it will create possibilities to refer to 
national self-determination as if it were the dominant element in its own definition of 
statehood. Yet, this exclusion still closes off the possibility that acts of “identity 
politics”—that is, acts that decisively affirm the national independence of states—could 
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very well have simultaneously been motivated by structural interests and the necessity of 
a supreme common power (such as the anti-Soviet alliance).149
Constructivists such as Crawford, Philpott, and Wendt find that agency and 
identity must be considered primary in explaining statehood, and that structurally 
competing interests and even the power-balance has historically remained of secondary 
importance.150 Genuine Hobbesian realists beg to disagree with this rank-order. 
Advanced political realists rather argue that the concept of sovereignty should refer to a 
condition in which the elements of autonomous agency and of structural supremacy have 
been equally integrated. However, constructivist and other theorists with a liberal bias 
may have a point when they accuse Hobbes of pushing twentieth-century realists such as 
Morgenthau over the edge. Morgenthau would have repeated Hobbes’s mistake by 
confusing the nature of the agent with the structure of politics, and of turning culturally 
contingent and non-enforceable forms of human agency into a matter of existential 
conflict. Due to Hobbes’s intellectual influence, then, Morgenthau would have fallen into 
making the mistaken assumption that especially violent conflict is caused by human 
nature: by “the animus dominandi, the desire for power”.151
(Constructivist) IR theorists may be right to fault Hobbist influences for having 
given realists those definitions of power that would have led them to confuse human 
action, in the absence of a police force, with a social evil. Human agency and structurally 
violent forms of competition, then, would wrongly have become viewed—again, by 
Hobbist authors such as Morgenthau—as one and the same cause of instability.152 The 
only counter-cause, or the only cause of order and stability, would for these authors have 
been a “social contract” and a binding promise of “complete subordination” to “an 
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absolute sovereign”. So, in Jack Donnelly’s words, realists such as Morgenthau made a 
serious mistake when they accepted the seemingly Hobbesian assumption that in all 
politics there is some “dichotomy of pure liberty or pure subordination”—and that they 
could just be “treating anarchy and hierarchy as a [dichotomy].”153
To repeat, Leviathan actually describes how people may come to believe that their 
anarchically competing interests have to have been constitutionally integrated with their 
own covenanted supremacy. Both their physical desire for power and their metaphorical 
common power, in other words, have to have been trusted to have been integrated—as if 
‘on faith.’ The notion of a fiduciary trust in the integration of two different powers has a 
bit of a mythological, or a mystical meaning, yet that meaning cannot be ignored. The 
constructivist and the liberal biases against realism, in the IR domain, are in part due to a 
reconstruction of Hobbes’s work although they lack a textual basis. In defense of 
Leviathan, hence, this book’s thesis holds that the self-respecting analyst of realism’s 
core texts (as Leviathan is one of them) should avoid dichotomizing the relation between 
dependent and independent states. The question of “who depends on whom” cannot be 
answered unless the integral relationship between subordinate and superordinate state 
parties is understood as a metaphor for a host of other such relationships of opposing 
parties, or of other such (mystical) unions of contrary elements.154
Not unlike Plato, Hobbes consistently shows that ideological disciplines (rhetoric, 
sophistry) may not always cause but that they certainly will increase the risk of civil war 
events. Ideology, therefore, must constantly be censored. Moreover, ideological doctrine 
should thereby be said to have been defined by a dual sovereign person, just like how 
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first philosophy (the philosophia prima, or the Aristotelian School) has long been said to 
incorporate the duality of both natural and supernatural philosophies.155
Leviathan (Chapter 31) reintroduces the argument that compounds both 
philosophies—or, in other words, both the physical sciences as well as civic religion—in 
four steps. First, all human action is conditioned by the precept of prudence, and 
specifically by the avoidance of war-like and other seemingly randomly committed
violent events. “[T]he precepts by which men are guided to avoid that condition [of civil 
war] are [called] the laws of nature.” Second, if human beings would not believe in the 
existence of these foundational laws of nature, they would have to be pursuing only their 
own wealth, as individuals, and their contracts with others would then immediately be 
turning into words “without substance.” Third, because wealth and contracts are artifices 
of the mind, and because disembodied minds cannot concretely exist (unless these were 
the minds of angels, however understood), it is only natural to believe that it was God’s 
intention for such artifices to remain embodied and be constantly reincorporated—by a 
sovereign person. For, God laid out “the foundations of the earth” and yet human beings 
(as Biblical Jobs) so oftentimes ignore them. They try to vaingloriously depend on their 
legal contracts, ideological doctrines, and other mental artifices while not realizing that 
these artifices are a dishonor to the “foundations”—and to the natural proportions 
determined by Creation as well. Fourth, the sovereign person ought to therefore better 
represent God’s foundational precepts by externally promoting a culture of “worship.”
The sovereign should at the same moment be calling on people to honor their internal 
forum, also, and to thus respect their own “opinion of power and goodness.” From this 
73
conscionable opinion will then again “arise three passions: love, which [refers] to 
goodness; and hope and fear, [relating] to power.”156
The next question of sovereignty is in which doses these three passions should be 
applied to the body politick. Before turning to that question, it can now be agreed that the 
sovereign person may become an artificial legal person, as a whole, yet is simultaneously 
obliged to represent and incorporate all those natural parts that constitute the whole. The 
sovereign person comes to people in two interlocking legal forms: both as a juridical 
covenant, as well as a living body politick; both as a covenant with the immortal author 
of Creation, as well as a living corporation of mortal bodies. In matters of authority, these 
two legal forms both co-constitute and co-represent each other. Even more fascinating is 
it, hence, that the three passions have already been announced (Leviathan, Chapter 6) to 
be humanly represented: by the human capacity for speech (word-power). It is in the 
spirit of speech that sovereign authority’s co-representations can come into being. Still, 
sovereign authority is doomed to remain ethically ambivalent, then, because speech acts 
are also said to never become identical to virtuous acts. All speech acts flow from one of 
these two different types of opinion: “one of the saying of the man; the other of his 
virtue.” Hobbes sharpens this distinction by suggesting that to believe in what is being 
said, must be an opinion of goodness. But to believe and to have faith in what is being 
done (more or less virtuously) is now only an opinion of power. Although what is said 
cannot be integrated with what is being done, quite miraculously, goodness and power 
can very well be integrated. By deliberating (or, by determining goodness) and by then 
deciding (by executing power) on what to believe and what not, human beings may reach 
an adequate level of integrating their words with their virtues. Deliberation and decision 
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are inseparable: deliberate speech is a human prerogative, so that the better humans are 
believed to apply their names and analogies, to Creation, the more closely the laws of 
nature can be honored. Hobbes concludes this: “[all] authority of men only (whether they
[might have been] send from God or not) is faith in men only.”157 All civic authority is 
“faith in men” which is ethical fidelity, and Hobbes here concurs—particularly with, 
among others Machiavelli—that fidelity may very well be called religious faith and,
therefore, does not even have to be ‘the’ Christian faith.158
Upon having demonstrated the possibility of integrating power with goodness, 
and deliberative authority with a foundational faith as well, Hobbes takes larger strides 
when he starts to challenge the conventional idea that sovereignty is singular or is 
otherwise held by one “Man.” To him, an assembly may be sovereign to the degree that 
the assembly remains representative of both the religious and scientific beliefs that are 
being shared by the members of the entire body politick. The sovereign assembly is thus 
neither instituted in opposition to, nor is it separated from the people’s living bodies. 
Also, it is not the case that human beings are caught up in violent conflicts because they 
would be living in some strangely anarchical sort of state of nature: “bees and ants” live 
in such a state, and they are not warring either. It is because they alone compete because 
of their ideological values: they additionally compete “for honor and dignity.” They alone 
(Leviathan, Chapter 17), also “think themselves wiser and abler ... than the rest.” This 
means they will compare themselves with other men on exclusively privately held
ideational terms, rather than to be maintaining a stable and productive relation between 
their “private” and the naturally respected but politically-censored “common good.”159
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Leviathan (Chapter 11) explains that whenever human beings will pursue power 
for its own sake, they especially do this because they are competing for “praise.” Those 
who are most inclined to assert their “perpetual and restless desire of power after power” 
are those most likely to “contend with the living, not with the dead; to [the living] 
ascribing more than due, [so] that they may obscure the glory of the other.” Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, state executives (kings) likely desire: “fame from new conquest[s]; 
... sensual pleasure; admiration, or; being flattered”.160 Their not contending with the 
dead is, in part, causing their imprudence: they fail to remember that their world is 
organized by ‘timeless’ path dependencies rather than governed by their ‘fleeting’ 
famousness and sensualities.161
The above-presented Hobbesian (not: Hobbist) maneuver was undertaken to 
effectuate prudence, based on remembrance. In this cautionary sense, it brings 
(international) political theorists closer to Machiavelli than to a (post-modern) liberal and 
pro-democratic philosopher such as Habermas. For, Leviathan brings them closer to the 
realist dictum that it is wiser to vie with the dead than with the living. It is wiser to 
engage, however critically, the grand issues of historical, Scriptural, and religious 
interpretation (“God”) than to only try to battle other single individuals (“Man”). The 
latter type of conflict is about the natural causes of an individual’s passions and desires 
and cannot, as Leviathan professes, by contrast to the more individualistic philosophical 
type of interpretive engagements, help avert civil war. “[T]he most frequent pretext of 
sedition and civil war [proceeds] ... from a difficulty, not yet resolved, of obeying at once 
both God and Man then when their commandments are contrary to the other.”162 This is 
the human predicament: the contrariness between civic religion, or natural laws, first, and 
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individual obedience to natural needs, second.163 But, as hinted above, the individual’s 
desires and intentions (those of “Man”) exist only as an idea, and only in a disembodied 
mind, so that “men” will instead have to be trusted to inhabit God’s planet Earth. (This 
fiduciary trust informs an Arendtian theme in political theory, by the way.)
Leviathan proposes to create a conjecture of, as opposed to a separation between, 
both the state of nature (“Man”) and a civil law-based government (a commonwealth). 
Leviathan simply does not separate a state of anarchy from the world of civil liberties, 
thus.164 Instead, the text observes a mutually constituted relationship between natural 
power (the state of nature, indeed) as well as goodness—because of the paradoxical 
contrariness of power and goodness, or of body and conscience as well, for that matter. 
Hobbes further construes, after having committed this observation to writing, an 
argument in support of Machiavelli’s notion of prudence: that notion is yet another 
combination of contrary elements, namely of both physical skills and of mental 
anticipation (see several of this book’s sections). Machiavelli states that antiquity’s 
Romans knew how to channel their private desires for glory, mainly by recognizing 
virtuous actions before trusting their opinions about contingent events. The glory of the 
Empire was not accomplished through Fortuna’s hands, nor through any single person’s 
outstanding virtue—and not even by the Empire’s domination over, Machiavelli insists, 
but rather mostly by its “making partners” with the provinces and the conquered cities, 
with the established colonies, as well as with the many migrants who had come to 
Rome.165 Clearly, Hobbes’s argument is not un-Machiavellian in the sense that it is 
directed against those few individuals—and, definitely, not against the many faithful 
citizens of a world not far removed from the Holy Roman Empire—who have been acting 
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all too vaingloriously and who have placed too much trust in contingent social 
constructs.166 These individuals would too often have “delight[ed] in supposing 
themselves gallant men” and then would fall prey to their own “credulity” and 
“superstition”, in particular, so that they failed to prepare themselves for the time that 
“danger or difficulty appears.”167
Contents of the Book: Civic Religiosity in Relation to Sovereign Authority
In Machiavelli’s historical examples, religion and authority become nearly 
interchangeable notions. The relations between civic religion and constitutional authority, 
more precisely, are richly blanketed (both in contents and form) with stories about how 
statespersons would or would not have had the confidence they needed to be thinking 
through the possible consequences of their actions. Prudent statespersons are said to have 
care for the people, and to have considered why people themselves would have believed 
in the presence of some emergent type of authority. Moreover, these statespersons try to 
understand why people believe sovereign authority to refer to both goodness and power, 
and both to good laws and effectively utilized arms and soldiers. Machiavellian realists, 
therefore, will have to try to answer why goodness may be believed to transcend and yet 
include this mysteriously-effective balance of powers, within their own worlds.168
Specifically Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories hypothesize that a good power 
and a corruptible power often tend to come together, within the notion of sovereign 
authority. Both honesty and utility, and both equal justice and social inequality all come 
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together without reducing sovereignty’s complexity to either one of these seemingly 
mutually-exclusive meanings of power. Rather, the contraries tend to play themselves out 
within every constitutional state (as will shortly be demonstrated). For now, importantly, 
it may be observed that Machiavelli’s notions of religious goodness and civic authority 
are not the only closely related in terms of their contrary meanings, but that such notions 
could exemplify the analogous relation between both the individual and the structural 
levels of constitutional organization. For, they do appear to have psychological-
dispositional substance as well as a social-jurisdictional form. Although, the caveat is that 
especially Arendt would have to disagree with Machiavelli’s idea that select individual 
agents can in special moments be said to have operated more-than-moderately 
independently from the other level of organization—as each agent also must serve, she 
warns, as an actor at the latter structural level, whose actions are here to be judged by an 
audience.169
In the post-1945 era, state governments are widely opined to be structurally 
honest, but also to be pursuing their own best interests as if they were lone individuals.170
This book works out the implications of Machiavelli’s inversion of such opinion. From 
Machiavelli’s angle, the idea that government structures are altruistic is mistaken. Even 
democratic and liberal governments must be self-serving. To him, most of the time, most 
structures appear to be corrupt—and only a few exemplary individuals will be honest and 
good. Of course, it would still have to be possible to adhere to both opinions, but the 
point is that within Machiavelli’s political science it can never be the case that both 
structures and agents, both society and individuals, are completely corrupted. Either one 
of the two elements somehow always opposes the other’s ethical value. More 
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importantly, perhaps, a later chapter shall explore the theoretical possibility—by 
rereading the secondary literature, but particularly Erika Benner’s book on ethics in 
Machiavelli—that Machiavelli believed both the idea of a single good agent as well as 
the dynamic construction of a pluralistic structure of corrupting powers to form the two 
equally-necessary elements in (and components of) sovereignty’s constitutional 
processes.171
Resistance movements arise from within corrupt régimes, and good leaders give 
way to tyrants. Even in a free republic, a tyrant may appear who will try to satisfy the 
needs of the multitudes. In a state such as the antiquity’s Republic of Rome, however, a 
stable balance emerges from within the relation between freedom and corruption—or, 
between the two elements of ultimate authority. Machiavellian realists can mark Rome’s 
history in building their case that the cycle can be broken by maintaining this emergent 
balance of elemental powers. The book at hand was written in an effort to pinpoint the 
location where this mysteriously self-stabilizing balance could have come from. The 
book consists in this respect of a map of the many possible variations on this thematic 
theoretical question: why should people have faith that a stable sort of balance of powers 
will emerge, somehow, from within the tension between equal and unequal, honest and 
corrupt, or also from in between licentious and just constitutional elements? Divided in 
four extended chapters, the book situates most variants of this question within a region 
named classicist realism, which is a method of interpreting political events in the context 
of civic beliefs, so that the book must regretfully but consciously exclude many of the 
more secular and more modernist (liberal) regions of political theory.172
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Apparently, each sovereign’s office may only be succeeded to by one line of 
persons. There may be many reasons why the singularity of successions, to the 
monarchical office of the sovereign person, have for so long been defined as mirrors of 
the mystical office of the Christ: the king of kings. Yet, the line of successions remains of 
symbolic significance for a people, more or less unified. Which single succession 
principle unifies, organizes, and sustains the people, and why? In Judeo-Christian and 
Islamic cultures, God is a power believed to be singular. The monotheistic definition of 
God would continue to have a political purpose in such cultures, for as long as it did, 
because human beings were for centuries willing to believe that their own powers were 
qualitatively different from God’s. Nonetheless, to them, it was not enough to say that 
only God’s power is unified whereas popular powers have to be formulated in the plural. 
The qualitative difference between unicity and multiplicity cannot sufficiently emerge 
from within any possible numerical interpretation of the two terms or also not from the 
two cities alone. A third relation of difference or a third qualifier is needed. In this 
realization, until long after the Reformation, at least in Europe, scholars not unlike 
Hobbes would therefore additionally have preached the importance of prudence: because 
the third qualifier that maintains the relationship between a people and their deity cannot 
be defined on the basis of historical and empirical data—alone. Prudence reminds human 
beings that they and that their own powers are relatively fallible, temporal, and 
mundane—and that their commonwealths thus remain essentially distinct and different 
from those powers they trust to be responsible for a spiritual, transmundane process that 
transcends and yet includes their own world’s beginning and ending.173
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By the first decades of the twentieth century, much had changed in human 
doctrines about how singular successions and plural authorizations (thereof), or about 
how monotheism and polytheism made their entries into the political world. Max Weber 
and Carl Schmitt had by this time started to teach that something went terribly wrong in 
the course of political authority’s evolution.174 Modern civilization would suddenly have 
“eliminated” God, and thus have banished its own “highest and most certain reality: [the 
reality] of traditional metaphysics”.175 Nation-states would soon prove to have formed a 
poor surrogate for this “most certain” reality, as particularly Schmitt found, regardless of 
how homogeneously each nation should have been constructed.176
On that note, the first chapter proposes to redefine the dynamics of sovereignty in 
terms of a system that incorporates a metaphysical or, more literally, a supernatural 
dimension alongside its organic dimension. Hobbes’s scientific system was evidently 
designed to define the literally supernatural as well as the natural movements of a 
sovereign person. By taking more cues from Hobbes’s system, as Schmitt indeed did in 
the 1930s, IR theorists can hope to provide more accurate information to students of 
globalization and of global constitutional reforms as well—about the emergent nature of 
all subsystems of authority.177 But before reading Schmitt’s own cues, in this book’s 
fourth chapter, Weber will be asked why sovereignty cannot be a singular and monistic 
affair—as such an affair would also have been completely alien to, specifically, Arendt 
but also to Hobbes himself. In formulating this question, to Weber, Chapter Two helps 
introduce the critical issue why not only Hobbes’s but especially also Machiavelli’s 
messages on fidelity and religion remain critical to understanding how the twenty-first-
century system of states actually functions.
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Chapter Two ends with a few remarks on why Weberian realism contains its own 
just war theory, and why this theory must be complemented by a natural systems theory. 
In the theoretical study of complex natural systems, justifications for enmity do not have 
to be provided by monotheistic religions; they may be replaced by the Gaia hypothesis. 
The notion that Earth (Gaia) is an autonomous organizational force, and the force for all 
life, does not sit well with a positivist scientific hypothesis. Rather, Gaia gives a symbolic 
expression to a scientific and yet intuitive belief in the wholeness and complex 
interdependence of all of the planet’s ecosystems.178
This belief in the presence of a complex open-ended system, and of its self-
rejuvenating or self-balancing (although imbalanced) political powers, in particular, may 
have a dialectical and it may also have a spiritual source—but, because of this belief’s 
intimate association with the perennial philosophy, it cannot be tied back to any specific 
denomination or tradition.179 Rather evidently, the belief itself has been expressed in 
numerous works—by philosophers from Cicero and Augustine to Hobbes, and from 
medieval monks or mystics such as Nyssa, Bonaventure, and Cusa to twentieth-century 
political theorists such as Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau.180 For the sake of brevity, 
not all of their thorny political philosophical and theological lessons will be repeated 
here. The book’s outline can appreciate only very few of the most colorful aspects of 
their lessons, instead—by now at least having mentioned that a certain kind of belief may 
have something to do with the way in which analogies between political conduct and 
dynamic, self-organizing, open-ended systems tend to come into being.181
For many centuries, such analogies were treated as if they expressed beliefs in the 
existence of such systems, and these beliefs would often be expressed inter-disciplinarily: 
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they reappear both in the physical sciences as well as in metaphysical disciplines, 
including in political theology and in elements of (international) constitutional law 
theory.182
Chapter Two concludes thus with the proposition that it may not have been 
unnatural, for political theorists, to believe that constitutions of sovereignty mimic the 
biosphere in that both society and nature harbor their own self-restoring powers. Gaia has 
long been believed to be responsible for sustaining these powers, but believing does not 
have to mean that seeing such powers appear within political societies must be 
impossible. Gaia is after all the goddess who both physically animates planet Earth’s 
movements and who acts in the more spiritual role of Earth’s metaphysical goodness.183
Gaia’s dual function is likely to have been mirrored, in so many cultures and societies, by 
their particular modes of emergent authority. In studying Weber, it becomes possible to 
learn that political realism remains at heart a method of examining how accurate this
process of mirroring and mimicking has been, or how exactly authority emerges from this 
functional duality. Realism is therein a basic method of taking sovereign states back to 
nature.
Conceptual sovereignty’s ambivalence may, to an enormous extent, have been 
caused by inaccurately abstracted images of complex natural systems. Posited rules and 
abstract norms may help politicians to manage conflicts, but there is nothing inherently 
democratic or ethical about rules and norms themselves. The truth of the matter is that 
people will need to know to which other regularities these rules are being compared—and 
whether these other regularities are coherently natural and conscionable. Humans know, 
usually since childhood, what it means to act conscionably, and ethically, but they will be 
84
conditioned and will be confusing themselves by means of their intangible idioms and 
abstract imageries, which is why it has becomes worthwhile to now ask whether political 
realism is adequately prepared to take states back to nature. Does realism have the 
confidence it takes to do so—against the odds of socially- and culturally-idiomatic 
abstraction?
To prepare ground for Chapter Two’s propositions, a few preliminary remarks 
must now be made on how a sense of confidence emerges from dualities inherent in all 
modes of authority, such as the duality of concreteness and abstraction (physical 
movement and ideational imagery). For, the second Chapter shall contain several sections 
revolving around dual authority, ambivalent sovereignty, and thereby also around the 
issue of why dualities are realism’s subjects—whereas IR constructivism’s antithetical 
subjects should be expected to consist of state-power singularity and the oneness of 
national identity. The Chapter specifically argues that realism is better prepared to tell a 
meaningful story about the dualities, inherent to all social and economic transformations, 
than that global peace theorist David Held and social constructivist Alexander Wendt can 
hope to be. Held and Wendt, not unlike Habermas, have become the protagonists in a 
widely read story about multilateral institutionalism (exemplified by EU law) and how 
this creates cosmopolitan progress in international affairs.184 Still, this story of progress 
itself lacks a good plot because of its naïveté, as realists such as Scheuerman argue. It 
perhaps over-simplifies its own trust in the (allegedly) legally positive and morally 
progressive consequences of multilateralism or of the international sharing of “customs, 
mores, [and] law” as well—as it makes it far too difficult for statespeople to concurrently 
believe in “the necessity of prudence, compromise, and tragic choices.”185
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Realists probably have certain advantages over social constructivists of a liberal 
or a cosmopolitan bend. Besides Chapters Two and Three, in which Machiavelli (and 
Arendt) help demonstrate that classicist realism’s advantages consist of its ethical 
appreciation of Rome’s constitutional duality, the last of the first chapter’s sections 
conceives of a Heracleitean duality. According to Heraclitus, antiquity’s process 
philosopher, ‘the’ god is or has a dual power. There is no goodness in the world, briefly, 
without dualities. By conceiving of dual sovereignty, therefore, classicist realists such as 
Machiavelli helped build the argument that all sovereignties are in flux, and ambivalent, 
yet also all continue to be believed to hold stable and self-perpetuating powers. To 
narrow the premise of this realist argument, a little; most people believe that the 
sovereign authorities of their world are under a transcendent (archetypal) obligation to 
judge all parties as if the parties were equals, first, and yet many of the same people 
would refuse to opine that sovereign states are equal, and that none are more equal than 
others, second.
Further, Chapter Two begins by making an inventory of Max Weber’s best-
known essay. Weber uses therein a dialectical method, albeit only between the lines. This 
method helps other realists to make sense of historical events and of how well these 
events can lend empirical support to their hypothesis that rational actors will have to 
understand why their own ethical authority has been divided against itself. Weber 
commences with a two-way, or even a three-way legitimization of political authority. 
Against legal positivism, which excludes legitimization processes from the legal norms of 
society, Weber does include different but interwoven kinds of legitimacy within his 
understanding of legality. Via Weber, the Chapter then arrives back at Arendt and 
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particularly also at her notes on Socrates. At the dawn of the dialectical method itself, 
Socrates applied this method to define spiritual charity or (what later became known as) 
neighborly love. Moreover, the first application of the Socratic method, although now in 
a heavily-Christianized version, reappears of course in Hobbes’s call to closer distinguish 
“love” from the other passions, such as “hope and fear”—because only the former 
follows not from “power” but from “goodness”.186
Before gaining more familiarity with Socrates, also in Chapter Two, something 
must be said about Symposium. This is the Platonic dialogue in which Socrates never says 
that he knows who or what Love is, although he claims to have personally met a female 
demigod whom, despite her ambivalent appearances, taught him where the metaphysical 
source of Love should be found. He actually agrees with the other members of the 
audience that Love appears—like she often does in theatre plays—as a virtuous, good, 
and above all as a beautiful woman. But as men declare their love for other men, and in 
the absence of any final certainty about Love’s qualities, and about her sex and gender 
also, Socrates decides to create a turning point in a dialogue which has been considered 
so fundamental that Leo Strauss would dedicate an entire book to it. This dialogue forms 
one of the few times that Plato allows Socrates to know something others do not profess 
to know: to have had access to a sacred mystery.187 Anyway, Socrates now announces he
has learned (from the goddess) how to identify Love. She must be Desire and 
Contrivance’s offspring. Love has been born from a mother “always in need” and a father 
“eager for understanding and inventive.”188
Love cannot just be a child, Plato then implies. She should be mature, wholesome, 
and good. In order for her to attain her own sense of authority, therefore, Love should 
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never be reduced to either one of the two parental elements in the world. That conclusion 
may not have been spelled out by the dialogue, but evidently Love can neither have 
grown from the seed of Desire or Ingenuity alone, just as she cannot be reduced to her 
feminine side, of Poverty or Resourcefulness. Love’s neither-nor identity leaves the 
impression she is a contradiction in terms: she was born from two contrary relations; one 
in the masculine-inventive and the other in the feminine-desirous dimension of nature.
The contradiction is not an absolute impression, however, because the relation 
between the two dimensions transcends and yet is constitutive of Love—and, 
presumably, this is including the paradoxical notion of love of the state (also understood 
as civic fidelity or “constitutional patriotism”, as Habermas refers to it).189But here, in 
Plato, there is no suggestion that the dimensions enjoy no relational parity. This idea of 
parity returns and is actually affirmed in the conclusion. Symposium ends with Socrates’
failed attempt to convince his friends it is “possible for the same man to know how to 
write comedy and tragedy”—or, that both the comic and the tragic dimensions of the 
actor-audience relation can well be treated as if they were equal, by one emergent or by 
one third author/authority.190Socrates’ failure forms a metaphor for the absence of a third 
“writer”—in the face of the two contrary constituents of the polis. Consistent with other 
Platonist philosophical tenets, Symposium identifies emergent love’s co-constituents in 
political terms: ingenuity/capability; actor/audience; leaders/followers; mental 
ideas/bodily cycles; goodness/power.191
Although Plato’s Republic is significant, and has long been regarded influential in 
international theory, Symposium is far more critical in understanding how realism’s 
dialectical method should be expected to have been applied—within a series of works, 
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authored by Weber but also by Machiavelli. This is the Platonic dialogue in which duality 
is, however temporarily, being transcended. For, it is only in Symposium that an oracular 
goddess so prominently lends her authority to a metaphor. In sharp contrast, the 
philosophical enterprises which analogize piety and justice (and law), also by calling on 
Socrates (and the Athenian Stranger), can invoke no such deities.192 Moreover, the 
Socratic method takes on a rhetorical format. This is not the format of a contradiction in 
terms, but of a strange contradiction-within-analogy, and its rhetorical appeal cannot have 
been unintentional. It is not strictly coincidental that the rhetorical format will again be 
applied by Hobbes, Weber, Schmitt, and probably also by Morgenthau. The format is, 
therefore, inherent to realism’s development as a twentieth-century method of 
interpreting inter-state politics. As the connection between Weber and Schmitt, and 
realism, has nonetheless remained under-appreciated in subdisciplinary IR, the second 
chapter must first of all plow through the secondary literature on Weber in order to find 
sufficient validation for advanced realism’s overall defense of the dialectical method.
Still following Weber, Chapter Two reacquaints IR with the three terms in 
accordance to which authority emerges: social conventions, posited rules, and 
discretionary decisions. The two or three legitimization processes that are the necessary 
constituent elements in the emergence of sovereignty, thereby, consist of yesterday’s 
conventions as well as of today’s rules and decisions. The three terms are then compared 
to both the utilitarian and the deontological methods of identifying those who occupy 
positions of sovereign authority. Certain conventions serve positivist bureaucracies, 
others serve a recognized and a public mode of authority. Certain conventional rules may 
either be used as the means to accomplish just about any end, by bureaucratic institutions, 
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or these same rules may be affirmed by meaningful interpretations and ethical decisions. 
Rules may thus be used in the administration of needs, or to meet necessities, or they may 
as well be said to affirm freedoms. This contingent distinction between necessity and 
freedom could, of course, lead theorists back to a paradox of the political. But it could 
also help them better observe the first tension between economic necessities and the 
many political freedoms, in world affairs, as this tension is analogous to a second one 
between unequal needs (or interests) and the equal treatment of statespersons (or their 
legal parity). The tension itself, however, is extremely similar to one the ancients tried to 
moderate through the words of those “collegiate authorities” they believed to be 
practicing isonomy.193 Arendt uses the word isonomy to refer to the only type of equal 
freedom she finds to be neither reducible to the equal satisfaction of needs, nor to mere 
legal parity.194
Chapter Three proceeds by placing Machiavelli within a canonical dialogue on 
dual sovereignty, spanning at least ten centuries, and probably more, so that any 
dialogical conclusions will have to come in the form of notes and segments. It is 
impossible for any of the Chapters to fully comprehend the location Arendt, Weber, 
Hobbes, or Machiavelli has taken within the canon. Yet, the third Chapter forms the 
bridge between such notes and the argument of the other chapters, holding that classicist 
realism remains the most practical method of applying (sovereign) authority, regardless 
as to whether authority is predominantly applied by the UN and other formal state 
institutions or by civil society, citizen-diplomats, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Applying (sovereign) authority is an application of virtues, such as prudence 
and sometimes also of justice—and classicist realists have the most advanced 
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understanding of these virtues, as compared to constructivists and other idealists. That is, 
only realists can keep the lessons drawn by the English School in mind, and find that 
there is no knowledge of sovereignty without not also encountering a minimally tense 
relationship between pluralism and solidarity, supremacy and autonomy, necessity and 
freedom, or empirical experience and normative rationality. However, Arendt’s work 
helps even the English School realists to refer more meaningfully to the relationship 
itself, and specifically to the relation between equal necessity and equal license, as 
isonomy. From the relational tension (some might stubbornly want to say “antinomy”, of 
course) within the dualities, some sense of isonomy emerges.195
If the isonomous or the third dimension fits anywhere in Weber’s system of 
legitimization, it would have to be the dimension of charismatic authority. For charisma 
is according to Weber both a matter of necessity and freedom. It is necessarily personal 
and yet is also held by a free official. Charisma cannot be reduced to either one of these 
constituent dimensions, so that it should somehow encompass both the socio-economic 
and national needs of the statesperson as well as her or his discretion to limit them 
politically. Although the literature has hardly reached a decisive definition of charisma, 
there have been many examples and emergences of charismatic leaders who sustained 
their authority by means of an isonomous equilibrium between their roles as persons and 
officers, between the necessity and the freedom of their actions, or also between their 
self-interest and ethical discretion.196
Why should meaningful and legitimate practices of authority be expressed not in 
one, but in two and possibly in three (when including charisma) dimensions? Weber’s 
answer can still be taken more seriously, in IR, because it helps reformulate some of the 
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criteria used in today’s international recognition practices. In modern democracies, 
criteria have become so intricate that they can now serve both good and evil recognitions 
of and interventions in sovereign states. Kaldor and Beebe argue then also that when 
China adheres to the criterion of both “non-interference” and “mutual non-aggression” or 
when Russia insists on its “political independence” and “territorial integrity”, these 
countries tend to do so out of fear that other Great Powers (the United States and the EU) 
might sanction their complicity to ‘interior’ human rights violations.197 Criteria of 
recognition cannot be ethically applied unless statespersons are taking a closer hold of the 
meanings and purposes of their own (sovereign) authority. What Weberian realism can 
do is to help them formulate what it means for any given political society to be 
recognized as enjoying an adequate level of isonomy, and as being respected for 
maintaining its own “human security” as well.198
Despite Weber’s wide-ranging intellectual offspring, Weberian realism remains 
more than a bit impractical because it cannot complete the turn back to nature. Weberian 
realism should thereto be applied to IR in ways that would be consistent with what is 
happening in the field of natural systems theory. Theoretically, then, it should become 
possible to speak of realism as a combination of Weberian ethics and natural systems 
theory. In effect, realism’s cause can be advanced by formulating the tenets of a dual 
sovereignty-theory (DST). This possibility, of both reformulating the realist method and 
of treating it as a theory of complex systems of natural sovereignty, will be further 
surveyed in a third chapter.
Chapter Three maps the contours of an advanced realist method, consistent with 
DST tenets, separate from the liberal methods used by non-realists. Baron de 
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Montesquieu, primarily, designed such liberal tools. Montesquieu made a profoundly 
modern ripple: Hamilton and Madison would take his design so seriously that they copied 
its idea of liberal justice (that “independent substantive idea”), while they fundamentally 
ignored Hobbes’s more complex (and more dualistic) notion that human justice is to 
remain interdependent with and yet contrary to the laws of nature.199 This whereas the 
under-secretary from Florence, Machiavelli, took his own theoretical work on dual 
sovereignty so seriously that he can still be considered as the first DST-author—only on a 
par with his foremost intellectual successor, Hobbes. Machiavelli dedicated his 
masterpiece The Prince (the booklet that has rightly been called “a nest of 
contradictions”) to a single ‘framer’, Lorenzo the Magnificent, but he definitely used his 
masterpiece in combination with his Florentine Histories to substantiate his conclusion 
that no individual should ever have to act like Lorenzo did—or, to have to come to 
depend on ingenuous diplomatic actions alone—and that everyone should also be able to 
depend on the people and on their structural resourcefulness and ‘naturally’ lawful 
potentiality (on ‘home-grown’ virtues).200Florentine Histories suggest it was the Order of 
San Giorgio, supposedly, that had managed to act in both individualist and structural 
ways. It will later be argued that the Order exemplified the most systemic form of dual 
sovereignty Machiavelli could imagine. For, San Giorgio would both have depended on 
structural pluralism as well as on fallible individuals: both on “integrity and corruption, 
justice and injustice.”201
Further, Chapter Three introduces Montesquieu as Machiavelli’s opponent. The 
Baron distilled his own notion of authority, solely, from the good judgments of specific 
individuals—as opposed to also of the people as a whole, and of their beliefs. He was 
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dismissive of civic religion, and rejected Machiavelli’s examples of religion’s importance 
in sustaining dual authority. For Montesquieu, law and order follow not from prudential 
reasoning but from judgments and verdicts. Interestingly, Montesquieu was less mistaken 
about the direction in which European nation-states were developing, and were 
modernizing themselves, than that he was about the nature of the people. The Spirit of the 
Laws spells the modern turn towards monism in how the subjects of sovereignty theory 
have been defined. Whereas Machiavelli had hoped to strengthen constitutional dualism 
(hence, Dual Sovereignty-Theory), by treating religious confidence and empirical 
experience as the main two co-constitutive sources of sovereign authority, Montesquieu 
comes rather close to excommunicating the religious authorities from ‘his’ sovereign 
civil society. At the most, he says, religion may herein be used as an instrument in 
maintaining the existing socio-economic disparities.
To clarify, Montesquieu does have some use for religion, but it should not be a 
religion of the people. Rather, it is the orderliness of a Church institution which prevents 
poor people from  participating in politics—and, therefore, from defending their civic 
rights as well as from enjoying human standing in their spiritual worlds.202 The 
Magistrate supposes that an enlightened, modernist religion should be a transmundane 
institution and not a worldly practice. His religion may offer the commoners a few 
images of both “hell” (“fear”) and “paradise” (“hope”), but it should also display more 
than sufficient of its own institutional wealth in the process of creating these images. For 
example, temples should not be austere places of refuge, nor be filled with “debtors” and 
“slaves”, but must appear “magnificent” so that “the very poverty of peoples is a motive 
attaching them to that [seemingly wealthy] religion.”203
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Machiavelli’s practice of civic religiosity stays far removed from Montesquieu’s 
religious instrumentalism—mainly because it is grounded in both the common people 
and their state. It is a DST grounded in popular legitimizations of all sorts of ambivalent 
personal authority, including the religious sort. Authority is for Machiavelli a 
constitutional practice divided against itself, as it were. In Chapter 41 of the first book of 
Machiavelli’s Discourses, for instance, it is described that Appius failed to comprehend 
authority’s dual nature, which then led to his tyranny. Appius had failed to unite the 
extremes, within his own mode of authority, in having slipped “suddenly” from appearing 
as the people’s “friend” to becoming their “enemy”—and in having sled “from being 
humane to [becoming] haughty’. He should instead have respected his own dispositional 
unity and his personal integrity, rather, by keeping his authority’s opposite elements 
together (pious/distrusted, humane/vainglorious). This one individual’s failure to create a 
combination of contrary moods echoes Machiavelli’s earlier description (Discourses, 
Book 1, Chapter 4) of Rome’s constitutional unity. The City of Rome was being 
corrupted and disunited by “agitations” that were taking place among the people’s parties 
and that were directed against the Senate. Even so, all parties would also esteem the 
authority of the Senate, which they found “worthy” of binding them together.204 It may 
now already be gathered that Machiavelli’s notion of authority might have emerged from 
a curious series of dualities or, more precisely, of unified opposites (People/Senate, 
discord/concord, distrust/fidelity).
The DST’s applicability to contemporary practices of state recognition consists of 
the DST’s kinship to studies of complex natural systems. Yet, too few IR scholars have 
been asking how and why Machiavelli’s concept of emergent sovereignty mirrors the 
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movements within such systems: why is emergent sovereignty a cosmogonic (or, 
perhaps, mystical) union of opposite dimensions? This question will have to be answered 
by closing in on the tension between any authority’s transmundane and mundane 
properties—because a language to describe this strange and agonistic tension would 
certainly help IR theorists to define the various other qualities and gradations of political 
conflict. Nonetheless, the Renaissance civic scientist’s language should at least help IR 
theorists to appreciate some of the realist reasons why all public authority is naturally 
divided against itself, and yet must somehow remain united—possibly by a third criterion 
of isonomy (political parity). The subject matter of whether or not this criterion amounts 
to a paradox will have to be further investigated in Chapters Three and Four. 
The sheer use of a concept of dual authority demands that more than a few 
glances are exchanged with Machiavelli. His argument that the constitutional state is 
constantly being divided against itself, by various popular ‘tumults’ (discords), as well as 
that these same divisions are ultimately unable to split any given grouping apart (they 
preserve concord as well), is the most intricately-illustrated argument available within the 
canon of political thinkers.205 After spending some time rethinking why IR theorists 
should take care to study Machiavelli’s identifying of an ambivalent relation between 
contrary (concordant/discordant) dimensions of political conflict, hence, this ambivalent 
relation can be illustrated by a modern-day decision. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that not the Congress but the Electoral College should be believed politically 
responsible for the task of assigning the proper person to the President’s Office. This 
decision effectively broke the Congress apart from the Presidency, and thereby failed to 
preserve or restore a Machiavellian constitutional equilibrium. To put this in political 
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theory terms: the Supreme Court asserted itself not as an authority, but as a third power. 
As a power, the majority on the Court suddenly imagined itself to be a popular 
organization—perhaps best comparable to Rousseau’s Tribunate—rather than to remain 
the spill around which both the legislative and executive powers should revolve.
Chapter Four moves away from Machiavelli’s dual sovereign (as, indeed, 
exemplified by the San Giorgio Order) as it starts to explain why Hobbes likewise 
persisted in demonstrating the parity of both person and office, or of execution and 
legislation as well. The conclusion of this Chapter is that it remains advisable to read 
Hobbes’s pages (in which he presented a political theological system), through lenses 
crafted by Schmitt.206 Hobbes will then appear to have conceptualized sovereignty two-
dimensionally. The sovereign person appears both as representation and as an 
incorporation of something perplexingly dualistic. In terms of representation, the 
sovereign represents the Son of God (‘Christ-on-Earth’), being both a mortal and an 
immortal person. As corporation, the sovereign embodies the people as a whole (a 
‘leviathan’), and is both a mythological and a machine-like animal. Hence, could it be the 
case that the Hobbesian sovereign holds both a metaphysical and a legal personality, both 
a natural-physical and an artificial-social power, and forms both a mythical animal and an 
industrious machine?207
If these indeed are the dualities laid out in Leviathan, then sovereignty would 
have to represent/incorporate a religious group of people, or their trust in god-like powers 
to unite them in their passions. Sovereignty would not represent their biological desires, 
their unique passions, nor their ethnicity, nor any other such geographically determinable
criterion. To the contrary, the sovereign rather would have to “transpose” everyone’s 
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individual desires, passions, and confessions onto the plane of its own legal personality 
by means of a unified theological system.208 Inquiries must now still be made, however, 
into the validity of Leviathan’s persistent arguing that wars and acts of oppression are 
mostly being caused by ‘theological hatreds’—and therefore not also by passionate, 
ethnic, national, or linguistic differences. Such inquiries may come to suggest that the 
idea of a state of nature is an idea about a state in which not the passions, then, but 
doctrinal intention should be said to form the real cause of violent action. 
For example, the Biblical Cain, who committed fratricide, seems under this line of 
argument “more a fugitive from his own conscience than a fugitive on earth.” For, 
Leviathan’s argument is that Cain could slay Abel because he feared no “common 
power.” But which sort of common power could nevertheless have given men like Cain 
sufficient impetus to fear God’s power as well as to cultivate their brotherly love? 
According to Helen Thornton, the conclusion must here be that “Cain did not [fear nor] 
recognize any power (even God) with the ability to punish him—and [that], in a sense, 
his punishment or rather the benefits he received, confirmed [to Hobbes that he had dared
to kill Abel].”209 Not a certain degree of fear or of hope, nor of any other such passions, 
henceforth, but much rather the doctrinally-constructed absence of compassionate love is 
what might cause a war of all against all. Hypothetically, the state of nature must be the 
anti-religious state, and thereby also the one state to be feared most by fallible/fallen 
humans.
Upon encountering Hobbes’s and Machiavelli’s many examples, the pro-civic 
religion (and pro-classicist) hypothesis will become ever-more robust. Conflicting 
doctrines and other confusing mental images, of moral goodness, can quite well be 
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thought to cause factionalism. The remedy is not anti-factionalism, by monopolizing the 
armed counter-forces, but appears to have been much more pacifistic. Hobbes’s remedy 
is theological and ideological censorship: a standardized curriculum of to teach 
metaphysical philosophy. It thus seems awkward for Ronald Beiner to still want to read 
Hobbes’s work as having, although perhaps inadvertently, prepared the way for “the 
Enlightenment’s full [liberal] rebellion against religion.” Beiner seems to be reading 
Hobbes by working against rather than alongside another Hobbes-reader, Schmitt, 
furthermore, because the latter political theologian did not just discover a “crack” in 
Leviathan’s argumentation. Schmitt actually would also join Hobbes in defending, not an 
irreversible split but a dynamic void. In matters of political authority, such a void sustains 
the ever-possible union of both religious intent and civic action, but also of both public 
and private law.210 For, Schmitt argues that not realists such as Hobbes but that the 
modern (‘enlightened’) liberals ended up newly creating a “rupture” in that mystical 
relation of both public and private or of both natural law and organized religion, as well: 
(‘Cartesian’) liberals ended up separating, in other terms, the internal (conscience) from 
the external forums (doctrine) of authority.211
In contradistinction to the conventional wisdom that Hobbes might have been an 
arch-liberal at worst or otherwise certainly a progressive secularist at best, Schmitt and 
Hobbes do not seek to defuse the tensions between civic religion and political science, as 
they well understand that their union is an agonistic process. The union is in tension. This 
paradox returns within the Schmittian myth of an ‘intense relationship’ between enemies. 
Synchronously, it appears within the intensity between the natural organs (forces), within 
the body politick, first, and the individual minds that each have own voice in (legal) cases 
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of doctrine or superstition, rather, second. This intensity persists because the minds seek 
honor, at the expense of others, as they will become so vainglorious that they no longer 
fear being dishonored by a deified common power. Intensity is caused by vainglorious 
individuals who are turning against the first members of the body politick, so that the 
union of all minds and bodies disintegrates.212 The mind has now grown too strong in 
proportion to the body: interior or doctrinal selfhood now trumps exterior social standing. 
In slowing down the dynamics of constitutional corruption, Hobbes generates a counter-
process. 
He restores the dynamical union of both sword-power (force) as well as of word-
power (law), by explicitly not rupturing it. As sections on Machiavelli help demonstrate, 
his counter-process depends on people’s spontaneously beginning to speak, as if with one 
voice. It is through the spirit of their speech acts that both their intentional minds and 
their bodily movements can become close-to-one, and yet maintain their contrariness. To 
put it a bit differently, and to redirect two of Oakeshott’s concepts into the route he 
predicted they would take, the “individuality” of the mind is not to be compromised by 
and it yet remains part of a body of “association.”213 Yet, Oakeshott’s conceptual route 
leads him to a paradox—which he fails to explore, but which would became much more 
palpable in Rousseau’s misreading of Hobbes than in Oakeshott’s own. For, as has often 
been found, Jean-Jacques Rousseau tried too hard to neither compromise the rationality 
“of the individual, nor the legitimate ends of the body politick,” and thereby probably 
ended up manipulating and distorting both individual minds as well as bodies politick.214
The field of International Relations has demarcated itself by canonizing several 
philosophers other than Machiavelli. IR’s canonical shortcuts to Hobbes and Rousseau or 
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otherwise to Kant and Montesquieu remain rife. Hardly feeling obliged to compare the 
entire philosophical programs of the so-called Hobbesians (Hobbists would be the correct 
label) and Kantians (cosmopolitans is better) among them, however, IR theorists have 
used these four authors as mere ‘stand-ins’ for the ‘isms’—and especially for structural 
realism and liberal idealism—that partition their field. Usually to their own frustration, IR 
theorists are increasingly agreeing with each other that the ‘isms’ are fostering an anti-
eclectic research climate which has remained needlessly paradigmatic and even sectarian, 
also. But at least one of them (Henry R. Nau) rightly finds that the natural sciences 
(“physics”) and civic beliefs (“politics”) are fundamentally in tension with each other. 
Only theorists of (international) politics inquire into the nature of objects that “have 
individual or collective minds of their own.” Theoretical knowledge of political objects is 
inherently less “exogenous” than it is an “endogenous” sort of knowledge: different 
minds will give different meanings to these objects.215 This is not to deny, as both 
Weberian and Arendtian realists indeed never tried to deny, that these different meanings 
are therefore unscientifically subjective and completely culturally contingent. Rather, 
realists can very well affirm that all possible interpretations of politics are ultimately
always either more or less meaningful (although not always more or less consistently 
logical).
The task at hand is not to explain how four philosophical logics are being utilized 
by either realists or liberals, to conclude this aperçu of what should be done, but to 
interpret and reinterpret those passages by Hobbes or Montesquieu in which they either 
aligned themselves or broke loose from Machiavelli’s civic science. Principally 
twentieth-century orientations (the ‘isms’), towards the system of states, are facing 
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incredible difficulties in that they are no longer, unlike the four mentioned philosophers, 
responding to Machiavelli. This book’s task is to  demonstrate why he was their 
intellectual predecessor, and how he—in Beiner’s well-chosen words—invited all of 
them to their “implicit and explicit reciprocal dialogue.”216 If Machiavelli’s (not: 
Machiavellist) methods can help statespersons to judge the “ultimate meaning” of how 
political societies tend to contemplate their actions, or how they should deliberate on their 
decisions, then such methods should also be trusted to help people to meaningfully judge 
the ideas and intentions of their enemies.217
Commencing with Arendt’s Paradox of Permanent Political Change
To complete this introduction to the following inquiries, what might Machiavelli 
have meant when he argued it would be necessary—for “men living associated together 
under some kind of regulations”—to believe that they should occasionally “be brought 
back to themselves”?218 Or, to rephrase the question by using Arendt’s word, what might 
it mean to say that radical change, and that changing modes of civic authority can or 
cannot be “arrested”? Or, what does it mean for authoritative institutions to “interpellate” 
on the movements of ordinary citizens by means of formal norms, but which these same 
citizens are hardly free to challenge?219 Before further introducing Niccolò Machiavelli’s 
understanding of “arresting” change, and of bring changing “men” back to themselves, 
another question must be asked: how would his intellectual heirs have felt about the fact 
that he had opened up their dialogue by reporting on revolutionary movements as if these 
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were merely constitutional rotations, and as if these movements were merely necessary 
and foundational preconditions for the state’s supremacy and its long-term strategic 
survival as well?220
Arendt, in particular, felt Machiavelli had been the first to teach that revolutions 
possibly effectuate not radical change, but much rather “a permanent, lasting, [and] 
enduring body politick.”221 Upon having observed that even liberal institutions will 
“arrest” citizens, and will block their free movements, by means of anti-democratic 
modes, Hannah Arendt argues for a more permanent type of authority that would not 
have to be liberal, nor democratic, but that would have to emerge from a group of peers: 
from their isonomy.222 Also, it would instead have to be a permanently changing, but not 
be turned into a permanently revolutionary type of (popular) sovereignty.223 This could 
mean that Arendtian (popular) sovereign persons should always be able to arrest other 
persons in positions of institutionalized authority, but their position of institutional 
authority itself should never be taken or stopped by strictly persuasive-deliberative, nor 
only by coercive-executive means.224
Arendt’s inquiry into the ambivalent nature of authority assumes some familiarity 
with Arendt’s studies of political power. In times of revolutionary change, the question to 
ask is what could happen to the state when it loses its power. As Plato had inquired, what 
could happen when the license of the multitudes no longer provokes a powerful reaction 
in the form of tyranny—and, vice-versa, when tyrannical power no longer negates the 
unlimited liberty of those multitudes?225 Who should, under such circumstances, be 
believed responsible for the powers of the state—and for slowing down those 
revolutionary changes that could be produced by this lack of mutual checks?226 Who 
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should then interpellate individual tyrants, and maintain the opposition in between both 
their state violence and the popular forces? 
In one of this Introduction’s epigraphs, Arendt points out that the most violent 
currents are likely to be produced in a political vacuum, in the absence of structural 
power balancing. Violence typically materializes whenever neither one of the two 
structural or political opposites is “arresting” the other opposite power. One such violent 
current did materialize immediately after, and because, the French Revolutionaries 
committed this fatal error: they failed to maintain the difference “between violence and 
power.” As they resorted to force, they were swept away by their own impotence, as well 
as their imprudence. They would seal their own fate, having let it become identical to that 
of the “natural force of the multitude.”227
On this point, Arendt joins Machiavelli. His description of unchecked liberty had 
also likened the multitude to an un-arrested force of nature.228 This force remains 
unopposed—for as long as no man of gravity appears. The force of the multitude should 
be balanced against, and be made to stand in opposition to exceptionally authoritative 
men, as he described in several passages. One such man had been a visitor to Florence: 
the Bishop of Volterra. The Bishop possesses ingenuity. He decides reveal his insignia, to 
over-awe the multitude, and to begin to use the power of “his words.” He restores 
equilibrium in the Republic of Florence.229
Machiavelli does not mention which words the visiting Bishop actually used. This 
is done by choice. By intentionally not specifying which words the ‘foreign’ Bishop had 
spoken, to calm the crowds ‘at home’, Machiavelli lends additional support to the 
symbolic nature of constitutional gravity—while simultaneously applying an 
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enigmatically relational-and-yet-dualistic concept of authority.230 For, the concept refers 
to these dualities, well-known in IR theory: agent/structure; foreign/domestic; 
sign/action.231
Further, Machiavelli might have developed the clearest eye, of all, for the 
distinction between violence and power. Arendt would train an eye almost just as keen, 
however, because she additionally understood why power presents itself through 
speech—and why speech never presents itself through violence.232 Power may restore 
itself, in addition, but this happens only when speech organizes people. Force and 
strength may be applied by the individual, whereas power connotes a communicative 
potential: it is constitutional.233 Power is a group’s capacity for social self-organization—
which is a capacity neither solely persuasive nor entirely coercive.234
Organizational and institutional power somehow depends, particularly, on 
metaphor. Although metaphor is certainly “not the most solid basis” for an ideological 
“doctrine”, Arendt writes, once metaphor is used in conjunction with power it may 
transform relatively unchecked individuals into a stable group of people.235 Indeed, 
metaphor helps stabilize power. The conjunction itself, then, forms an analogy to history: 
to exemplary revolutionary (or: foundational) events.236
Constitutional transformations become possible by using metaphorical speech—
or actually by using examples of apparently epic and transformative changes. “[T]hese 
examples [of epic changes] are adequate because ... concepts are drawn from 
appearances.” Thus, as Arendt adds, examples will prove their adequacy whenever they 
are used in order to provide individual minds (those caught up in their worlds of 
“imageless thought”) with one or another “intuition” of material bodies: of an “intuition 
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drawn from the world of appearances.”237 The power of metaphor, then, is really an 
apparent coincidence of minds and bodies, as well as of abstract essences and mundane 
appearances.238 In other words, analogy is most essential in matters of how the world of 
appearances should be organized, and of organizing power, rather than also in matters of 
imageless ideas and doctrinal logics.239
Yet, Machiavelli does not deny that individual men such as the Bishop were 
without authority. His rhetorical ommissions are remarkable: when such a man (as the 
Bishop) of authorityis by himself, indeed, he wouldhave represented only one 
individual’s mind. He alone could not have formed a power, or at least not until many of 
his peers would have performed similar symbolic acts, and would thereby have appealed 
to the common sources of their authority. Their authority would only so have sprung up, 
as Arendt likes to say, from which their structurally-conflicted power resources. Only 
once such men would typically present themselves as directly as possible in conjunction 
with the multitudes, without pretending to be too representative of their wills, in 
particular, these few men would also become able to appeal to the human faculty of 
analogous reasoning: through symbols. This appeal formed then the tipping point at 
which the multitudes began to coalesce, and gained unity (however imperfectly). Lone 
individuals would not yet fully take part in the group’s power, but they would certainly 
have the chance to become cognizant of a qualitatively different mode of (sovereign) 
authority in their midst. Power transitions into authority, although maintaining itself 
within the world of authoritzations, in the moment that the multitudes become less 
amorphous and take on the systemic features of a people. 
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This is how Machiavelli cites Virgil: “And when they saw a man of grave 
aspect/And full of virtue and of years/At once they all were hushed/And listening”.240
Machiavelli draws this lesson: the moment at which an audience begins to listen may 
follow even a speechless appearance. Whoever holds a public commission or high office, 
may occasionally have to speak well, but should always remain sufficiently confident to 
“[be presenting] himself before the multitude with all possible grace and dignity, and 
attired with all the insignia of his rank”.241
Statespersons should not appear in the public realm unless they can confidently 
present the sources of their authority, according to both Arendt and Machiavelli, and to 
do so in an exemplary manner.242 What does this norm mean, and how can it be applied? 
Authority appears in the form of speech, according to Arendt, and specifically also in 
analogies to exemplary events.243  Machiavelli adds that even without speech, authority 
may display itself symbolically. This could mean that both symbolic dignity and 
exemplary authority should emerge for a purpose, such as the purpose of restoring a 
balance of powers.
Political change may be arrested (interpellated) by different kinds of 
institutions—for as long as that their authority emerges in full view of the public. All 
modes of authority, including the ultimate mode of sovereignty, demand an audience. 
They thrive in an atmosphere of limited publicality, however, as Arendt suggests, 
precisely because those who practice these modes—and these authoritative actions—
would not need to be questioned by their audience. Authority is by definition 
“unquestionable.” Whereas power rests in organizations, in groups, and in pluralities, 
authority may express a sense of singularity. It is “vested in persons, ... or it can be vested 
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in offices.”244 Because any government office is also as a constitutional form of 
personality, oftentimes endowed with various legal immunities, it is possible to argue that 
authority should be thought of as both an office and a person. Yet, because of this double 
meaning, especially sovereign authority remains an ambivalent concept. 
What is ambivalent sovereignty? Arendt’s first answer is the most theoretical of 
the two: it is the sort of authority that emerges from among those constantly participating 
in political events; from among a kind of perpetually revolutionary cadre.245 Her second 
answer consists of a historical case: she refers to the different ideas of the people of the 
American Revolution and of the Parisian multitudes. Only the former people would have 
thought they did not need to revolt, but would actually have been free to do so. They 
enjoyed politics: they took pleasure in performing in public, that is. For, the Americans 
were enjoying “[binding] themselves through promises, covenants, and mutual pledges; 
only [this type of power] ... rested on reciprocity and mutuality”. By implication, a 
genuine mode of authority emerged. Its bearer takes pride in keeping her promises, or she 
takes care to be esteemed and remembered for her allegiances.246 More importantly, 
however, those in authority are not forced but voluntarily maintain their promises. Their 
bonds of mutual esteem would help them create power, much rather, especially when 
their so-created or their self-binding groups came to stand in opposition to the 
powerlessness of violence. This means that whereas authority may be born singularly, 
power grows both communicatively and pluralistically. Only power grows through 
promissory speech acts, as these tend to serve (but not always have to) a public purpose. 
It grows through “binding and promising, combining and covenanting”.247
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Multitudes are disorganized and powerless: they can cause change, but it tends to 
be a violent type of change unworthy of public recognition. Also, this does not deny that 
individuals caught up in a multitude cannot have unchanging, stable ideological 
convictions. They can have the firm conviction that not every human being is worthy of 
being saved from evil or, to the other extreme, that every human being must have been 
born with inalienable and equal liberties. The latter conviction follows not only from the 
era of the French Revolution. As Arendt argues, it also follows from one of the most 
common misperceptions about what it is that sets freedom apart from violence.248
On Revolution is the text in which Arendt fires her opening salvo against this 
misperception: “The very idea of equality [as] ... birthright was utterly unknown prior to 
the modern age.”249 Egalitarianism, but liberalism and individualism as well, would after 
the French Revolution (indeed heralding a “modern age”) too often be invoked to 
convince the masses they had all an inalienable right to meet their needs. This ideology of 
equal liberty would also cause a permanent, but tragic change in the state of affairs. In 
warning against a reversal of this tragedy, Arendt proposes that the Revolutionary Era did 
the multitudes more harm than good.
The dogma of the revolutionary Parisians held that each had been born with an 
equal right and even with equal needs, and therein created many false hopes. The dogma 
was part of a modernist and inherently liberal ideology deprived of commonsense, and 
lacking much in terms of organizational or republican prudence just the same. This 
ideology thus failed the revolutionaries, deprived them of their own interpellate authority, 
and prevented them from blocking the “stream of ‘progressing violence’ [that would be] 
flowing in the same direction with an ever-increasing rapidity.”250 Arendt finds that if 
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they really would have wanted to retain their public authority, then the revolutionaries 
should not have considered equal liberty their ideal, but should have undertaken more 
prudent actions: they should have anticipated the emergence of those authorities that may 
or may not abide by theirshared ‘second nature’ powers: by their common senses.251
ENDNOTES TO INTRODUCTION
                                                
1 Schmidt (2011), Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson (2010).
2 Nye (2011).
3 Nye (2011: 16), refers to Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International 
Politics (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962: 73-77, not further referenced in this 
book).
4 Compare, for example, Krasner (1999), (2009).
5 The Wikileaks scandal has received careful attention in the pages of The New York Times, but 
also of The Guardian. For a summary of the former pages, Alexander Star, ed. Open Secrets: 
Wikileaks, War, and American Diplomacy (Grove Press, 2011, not further referenced). 
6 Both Waldron (2000) and Arato and Cohen (2009) are helpful in understanding Arendt’s 
concept of sovereignty.
7 Both Berenskoetter (2011: 649-652) and Schmidt (2011: 617-618) mention that social 
constructivism reduces complexity and ‘ignores’ the historico-political fact of non-
linearity and other such uncertainties.
8 Honig (2007).
9 Arendt (2006).
10 Rousseau (1968), (1990).
11 Machiavelli (1966).
12 For a superb discussion of Habermas (1999), see Markell (2000).
13 For instance, Urbinati (2007). On representational legitimacy, consider also H. F. Pitkin.
14 Althusser (2006b: 174-175).
110
                                                                                                                                                
15 Schmitt (1976). Compare, also, Frye (1966) to Slomp (2006).
16 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 197-199).
17 Slight hints of this later argument—that Marx actually solved the theoretical problem of mutual 
implication, within political affairs, even if he himself remained had unaware of it—can 
already be found in Althusser (1971), (1972).
18 Althusser, “Marx’s Immense Theoretical Revolution”, in Althusser and Balibar (2009: esp. 
203-209).
19 Althusser (1999).
20 Althusser (2006a), (2006b).
21 Sterling (1958).
22 Waltz (2000), Mearsheimer (2001).
23 Nye (2011: 231).
24 Nye (2011: 21; 42; 14) uses single-scale continuums of power, in his tables on the “aspects” of 
power, without giving sufficient further consideration to the possibility that he has 
himself hinted at: this would be the possibility that power is actually more akin to a 
Gestalt than to a single-scale cause, and that it may appear with up-to-three different and 
especially with two or three qualitatively-different “faces.” Power could also be 
understood as a human faculty, for example, and must therefore be much less synthetic 
than that Nye imagines it to be. On the Gestalt analogy, consider Cakir (2009).
25 By contrast to Shue (1996) and especially to Bellamy (2009), Benhabib (2004), (2009) and 
Jackson-Preece (2003) pay relatively little attention to how the UN should factually 
protect the human rights of minority groupings.
26 Weiss (2008) and Scheuerman (2011: 167-168) are correct on the need for UN reforms, but fail 
to mention the problem of the Security Council’s political bias in its acting against human 
rights violations, as the Council usually only applied its Chapter 7 powers after such 
events also posed serious threats to the geo-strategic commercial trade in—and global 
redistribution of—scarce resources. In the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, East-Timor, and the 
sanctions against Iran, these were threats to petroleum oil-pipelines, and in Afghanistan 
to the strategic access to other minerals as well as to create a buffer zone to protect 
especially Iraqi oil against eventual Sino-Russian ventures, whereas no UN military 
powers have been applied to confront similar human rights violations in Africa’s 
seemingly lesser resource-rich areas (Somalia being the exception that affirms the rule). 
See, also, Kaldor and Beebe (2010: 48-49).
27 Kaldor and Beebe (2010) ask whether the right to “self-determination” is on the side of 
“Kosovars, Ossetians, Tibetans, Uighurs, [and] Chechens.” The list of independence 
movements can of course be expanded, but not indefinitely, as Fabry (2010) and Bain 
(2003) help demonstrate. There will have to be a moment at which even the national self-
111
                                                                                                                                                
determination criterion begins to tip over into international or intra-national (but possibly 
still self-protective) forms of dependency.
28 Joy Gordon (2010) and von Sponeck (2008) have argued that the Security Council was 
considerably delegitimized by the American conduct towards (and in) Iraq. For earlier 
efforts to ‘Americanize’ the UN, consider Mahbubani (2003), Gowan (2003), and 
Schlesinger (2003). For a prescient essay on the role of the U.S. towards the Middle East, 
consider Arendt (2000, orig. 1944).
29 Hurrell (2005: 19).
30 See, for example, Zürn (2009) and Cohen (1981) for some aspects of who may justifiably rule 
whom—even if states are not entirely absent. For two comparative studies of the self-
legitimizing dynamics within armed militant factions, consider Weinstein (2007) and 
Cunningham (2011).
31 Kaldor and Beebe (2010) develop a rich concept of “human security” but develop virtually no 
meaningful concepts of equal sovereignty and UN reform.
32 School-children develop their own inferences and possible explanations why children in other 
countries might have different prerogatives. From experience, some seem most fascinated 
by the Lunar New Year (firecrackers), others by Germany’s Autobahn (no speed limits), 
and again others with Japan’s linguistic signs (more homework).
33 The notion of equal dignity has gradually faded from international political theory, since 
around 1919. See, for a few prescient comments, Armstrong (1920).
34 Gordon (2009: 329) summarizes Michel Foucault’s famous position on “disciplinary power” as 
to have held that any group with such “power” tends to pursue “a radical and nihilistic 
equality that eradicates all distinction—and [that eradicates] the very possibility of public 
spaces as potential sites of [political] action [and recognizable] appearance”. Yet, 
‘eradication’ is too strong a phrase, as Aristotle (1958: bk. 3, ch. 13) would readily have 
pointed out, as he found instead that tyrants pursuing “nihilistic equality” (within the 
state) may emerge under any sort of self-disciplining constitution (regardless as to 
whether it is predominantly oligarchical or democratic). For Aristotelians, tyranny is thus 
never a simple matter of holding on to destructive or disciplinary powers but of a 
constitutional lack of homeostasis, as will be shown below.
35 Machiavelli (1996: 3.1), Discourses, or (1950: D 3.1, 398-399).
36 Douglas H. Johnson, “Sudan’s Peaceful Partition, at Risk,” The New York Times, 5/31/2011, 
A21.
37 Consider, for example, Naticchia (2005) for a study of how sovereignty may alternatively be 
recognized.
38 Bakunin (1971), Machiavelli (1975).
112
                                                                                                                                                
39 See, for instance, Oakeshott (1991: 281) on the paradoxical notion he observes in Thomas 
Hobbes, that it always will appear as if “the people” may only emerge “[n]either before 
nor after the establishment of [a] civil association [or a political society].”
40 The thunder-dragon is called Druk, which is also the name used for the country (Bhutan).
41 Molly Watson, “Christian Group Wants ‘Evil’ Welsh Flag Changed,” Western Mail, 3/3/2007 
(accessed online, 2011).
42 Thucydides (1989: bk. 4, sec. 44, p. 254).
43 After the Napoléontic wars, university fraternities would increasingly be organized by well-
traveled élites suddenly less interested in speaking French and Latin than in maintaining 
their regional vernaculars: this is how the nationes were created. Among others, Keitner 
(2001), Satz (1999), and Piel (1975) touch on some of nationalism’s facets. For critical 
introductions to the current but problematic practice of recognizing states as if they are all 
nation-states, see Biswas (2002) and Yack (2001).
44 Arendt (1958: 200), cited by Gordon (2009: 327). 
45 For example, Maddox (1982).
46 Compare, further, Arendt (1958: 220-221), as referenced in Gordon (2009: 337-338).
47 Plato (1996: 435b-436c, pp. 130-131).
48 Plato (1996: 454b, 145).
49 Plato (1996: 464a, 155).
50 Plato (1996: 437b, 131).
51 Aristotle (1958: bk. 3, ch. 13, 1284a, p. 135).
52 Aristotle (1958: bk. 3, ch. 4, 1277b, 105).
53 Simmel (1997: 61) mentions that some organs (the ten human fingers, for instance) have long 
been used to meaningfully and metaphorically refer to a group’s systemic functioning 
(“the dean [was] ... spokesperson for a group of ten”). Metaphor would always signal to a 
relationship between parts and whole (fingers and hand), or to a relation of 
“inseparableness”, and thus also to each constituent part’s inner tension between its 
“relative freedom and independent movement.” By contrast, Campbell (1998: 59-60) 
suspects the use of precisely such organic metaphors, by theorists such as Hobbes (1994), 
because the latter would have applied them not just to differentiate bodies “from their 
opposites”—but especially also as justifications for a forced separation of each body 
politick from “anarchy and war” (and “the outside”).
54 Honig (2009: 21) mentions Moses was long believed to have been the most excellent, 
extraordinary lawgiver.
113
                                                                                                                                                
55 Kantorowicz (1957: 381).
56 Crawford (2002: 6), Simmel (1997: 110-111; 201-203; 61).
57 For one remarkable study of authority (auctoritas), suggesting it emerges as if being conveyed 
through open structures of power (potestas), consider Agamben (2005: esp. 78).
58 Bakunin (1972: 228-229), “God and the State”, extracted from Bakunin’s 1871 “The Knouto-
Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution.” Compare, also, Friedrich Engels, “On 
Authority”, in Marx (1978: 730-733).
59 Hobbes (1994), as discussed by Springborg (2010: 307) and specifically Thornton (2002: 621).
60 Meinecke (1957: esp. 211-212).
61 For instance, Kantorowicz (1957: 341-342) uses the term dual sovereignty and argues that this 
term long indicated the co-presence of both the “political metaphysis” of the crown (of a 
formal constitution) and of its own opposite, consisting of “the pure physis of the kind 
and ... the pure physis of the territory” (of a functioning government).
62The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (Princeton University Press, 1963, vol. 14).
63 Nichols (1991: 120-121) further fleshes out Aristotle’s (1958: esp. bk. 6) discussion of how the 
polity’s ruling (or: initiating) elements are much less qualitatively than that they are 
quantitatively different from its ruled (or: latent) elements. The metaphor is as follows: 
the polity’s mind and body relate to each other (although they are mixed together) just as 
how respectively the ruling and the ruled, or the oligarchic and the democratic principles, 
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1252a, p. 3; bk 1, ch. 12, 1259b, p. 32) argues that the two functional elements of “ruling 
and being ruled” must remain interchangeable in order for the polity to survive (grow). 
In other words, because the polity’s growth (its natural purpose) installs the belief that its 
citizens should “differ in nothing”, offices will have to be rotated among (unequally-
regarded) citizens. Any social hierarchies can so remain more a matter of “[natural] 
seniority” rather than of individual status (or, rather than of “modes of address and ...
titles of respect [and honor]”). With his references to the Marxian concept of alienation, 
Gilbert (1990: 267; 261; 26) rightly suggests that any triumph of individual status 
(“isolation”) over the natural principle of “political association” thus amounts to a 
violation of the Aristotelian argument for the rotation of offices—and quite possibly even 
to a “denial of self-respect.”
65 The political theory developed by Karl Marx did much to revitalize the Aristotelian lesson on 
why barter should remain preferable to monetary exchange trade. Marx (1977, vol. 1: 
151-154; 253, n. 6) undoubtedly qualifies as an Aristotle-scholar in having conceived of 
economics as a natural art, of barter and retail trade—because “use-values predominate in 
it”—as Marx added that any socially-constructed form of trade, without such a bearing on 
natural necessity, was instead to be conceived as if aiming for the “preservation and 
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increase of money ad infinitum”. (This social form of trade derives from Aristotle’s 
chrematics, his “art of acquisition”, or what Marxians call “vulgar economics”.) Gilbert 
(1990: 264-271) extends this distinction by arguing that Marx’s theory of “alienation” 
and “critique of utilitarianism”, as well, flow directly from Aristotle’s (eudaemonist) 
notion that a spirit of pleasure arises, somehow, from “the intrinsic merit and quality of 
an activity or relationship.” The implication of this extended notion is then that if barter 
gives satisfaction to natural needs, and if it thereby also gives the kind of leisure that 
provides time for political participation, it will have to be considered a moral activity.
But if trade creates “surplus-value” (it enhances the utility of the means of production), 
then it may come to justify slavery. From Marx’s theoretical perspective, hence, Aristotle 
(1958) had indeed been wrong to still try to justify (wage) slavery. However, also 
according to Gilbert (1990: 272-273; 41), it should further be noted that Marx would 
agree with Aristotle that each political animal should nevertheless endeavor to become a 
participatory actor: “individuality” presupposes relations of “solidarity”—or at minimum 
the forming of “genuine friendships.” 
In conclusion, and yet contrary to Gilbert’s too forceful move of relegating of slavery to 
the “background” of Aristotelian thinking, some degree of “conflict” between political 
action (virtuous action, worthy of honor) and socially-constructed forms of slavery (and 
its counterparts, self-interest and tyranny) remains unavoidable. It hardly can be 
otherwise than that an agonistic void between (eudaemonist) political action and 
(chrematic) social slavery remains in place throughout the texts, but particularly 
throughout Book 1 of Aristotle’s Politics. Or, it is difficult to imagine that Aristotle 
would herein have argued that all slavery and/or tyrannical submission is naturally or 
biologically justifiable. As Winthrop (2008: 197) helps wrap up this conclusion, Aristotle 
(bk. 1, ch. 13, 1259b, pp. 33-34) consistently holds that political action should both 
“transcend” and yet “circumscribe” biological needs. (She rightly refers to the chrematic 
satisfaction of such needs as “money-making”.) Although Winthrop (2008) takes no easy 
way to reach this point, as she blurs the original distinction between natural economic 
austerity (virtue, honor) versus social trade acquisitiveness (self-interest), her outline of 
the Aristotelian argument remains praiseworthy for its straightforwardness. It nicely 
suggests that because even the category of “natural slaves” will have to consist of human 
beings, endowed with both a body and a mind, they cannot be enslaved otherwise than 
“because of their partial knowledge and [mental] competence.” All human beings are 
equally hybrid beings, so that differences among them can only be partial: social
differences must have been caused by varying levels of reasoning about, or of their 
mentally mastering of their polity’s natural bodily needs. This additionally could mean 
that slavery and servitude are simply to be thought of as very low levels of both
biological self-mastery as well as of social self-honoring. However, biological self-
mastery remains for Aristotle mostly a matter of degree, whereas social honoring is some 
constructed idea: the honoring of virtue suggests mainly a qualitative difference in status. 
Belonging to the class of the enslaved and the ruled—versus being among the rulers—is 
therefore, at least naturally, not a difference of idea/form but primarily a matter of degree. 
In the natural world, inequalities vary by degree and not by status. To continue to 
illuminate Winthrop’s (2008: 193; 195) outline, political action has the (eudaemonist) 
purpose of self-mastery, individuation, and personal growth. (As how a seed contains an 
oak, so has all life a natural purpose in its own freedom). “[F]or Aristotle, politics is to be 
the work of free human beings and yet is to have as its end the non-arbitrary, natural end 
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of human completion”. Thus, in the social world, in which political works may be 
performed (because this is where property and honor are allocated), free rulers are being 
honored more than others and are thereby again ending up being separated from those 
they rule and tyrannize. Also in this social world, this separation applies to all human 
beings, who now all become “slaves of sorts”—because this is where they will try to 
acquire property: the source of social inequality, which is tyranny. “Whether and to what 
extent it is fitting that such [social] slaves have property of their own depends on what 
nature or the gods require and permit. Knowing this much we can determine the 
[socially-constructed] degree of our enslavement to our [natural] bodies and to the gods. 
In Aristotle’s opinion, nature does require and permit property, but [nature also] does not 
require humans to acquire [too] many possessions for the sake of their economic 
wellbeing.”
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own arguments—mostly with respect to the relation between liberal power and 
covenanted sovereignty—in a manner not just inspired by these scholars, but especially 
also by Henri Cardinal de Lubac, author of Corpus Mysticum: L’Eucharistie et l’Eglise 
au moyen (Paris, Aubrie: 1949, not further referenced in the book currently at hand).
110 Also helpful, on political word-power, is Pettit (2008).
111 Notroriously ignored by the so-called ‘social contract’ theorists, and by John Rawls, is the 
notion of a covenant (constitution?) that the people are enacting by physically mirroring 
God’s two or three dimensions. Compare, however, Levinas (1989). For a few comments 
on Rawls’s idea of an international social (or: legal?) contract, compare Gudridge (2001) 
to Levy (2009).
112 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 118; ch. 28, 216-218).
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113 Particularly, Hobbes (1994: chs. 17-18; ch. 21; ch. 26). For the political theological 
implications of Hobbes’s argument, in its relation to the laws of nature, consider also 
Bobbio (1993), Paganini (2003), Springborg (1996), and Stanton (2008).
114 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 117).
115 Hobbes (1994), (1991), Machiavelli (1950: P, D), (1975), (1996), (1966), (2003).
116 Marx (1978c: 34).
117 Hobbes (1994: ch. 3, 22).
118 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.39, 216), also cited in Benner (2009: 185).
119 Hobbes (1994, ch. 3, 23). See, further, Oakeshott (1991: 241).
120 For a few examples of how these flanks continue to be developed, it would be interesting to 
contrast, for two images of Kant’s political philosophy, Franceschet (2000) to Carter 
(1993). For Hobbes’s juridical philosophy, contrast especially Holland (2010) to Zagorin 
(2009).
121 One of the rounds of debate was started by Kratochwil (1995) and concerns the notion that 
state sovereignty and the right to intervene militarily, even if only on humanitarian 
grounds, are mutually exclusive categories. Another round of debate has been 
summarized by Little (2007), and involves the notion of a balance of powers.
122 A rather similar but more elaborate point about IR’s willful ignorance, about students who link 
anarchy (or, the state of nature) to violently-unregulated wars, has been made by Ashley 
(1988), (1995).
123 Although not speaking specifically to Hobbes and his concept of the state of nature, Navari 
(1978) is giving meaning to the political ambivalence of the state of nature in itself.
124 For a few of the classic references to both Hobbes and Grotius, on the idea of a total civil war, 
see Tuck (2009). For the here-used definition of legitimacy, see Hurrell (2005: 16).
125 For these phrases, which can best be read as forming a response to Machiavelli’s classic 
question whether it is better for a military commander (versus a sovereign person) to be 
loved or feared by his soldiers (versus his subjects), see at minimum Hobbes (1994: ch. 
30, 243-244).
126 Continue to compare Springborg (2010: esp. 307-308).
127 Donnelly (2000: esp. 100-103), Onuf (1989: 163-168). Additionally, for a radically ‘Hobbist’ 
or a structuralist notion of IR, see Mearsheimer (2001) and Chertoff (2009). For 
introductions to a much less structuralist realist position, see Morgenthau (1985), Molloy 
(2003), and Schuessler (2010). Consider, further, besides Springborg (2010), Bendersky 
(1996) and Weiler (1994) on how Carl Schmitt was reading Thomas Hobbes in the mid-
1930s.
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128 One source of inspiration for the ‘Hobbist’ structural realists remains Hobbes (1994: chs. 13 
and 29, esp. 227-228). Even though he does not give a ‘Hobbist’ account, Beiner (2011: 
52, n. 30; 53; 149) does still refer to Chapter 29 of Leviathan (and to similar passages) in 
order to eventually conclude Hobbes herein would have favored “a single community of 
civic authority”—or a single state capable of subverting all ecclesiastic authority to its 
own royalist, as well as to its own civic authority. But Beiner combs too selectively 
through Hobbes’s texts, ignoring their theme of human nature’s dualism and even the 
theme of Christian mysticism as well. Yet, if these themes had been taken more seriously, 
then Hobbes would appear to have combined both monarchical and ecclesiastic authority 
into a third and perennial (that is, neither mortal nor immortal) body politick. Actually, 
Hobbes clearly announces he will recombine the monarchist with the populist, as well as 
the rationalist and the revealed components, within his original definition of this body’s 
dual sovereign authority. He did not necessarily subvert ecclesiastic power, therefore, but 
simply included it in the authority of the body politick as a whole (also known as the 
sovereign people). Spinoza accomplished a similar inclusion, Walther (2003) suggests. 
Anyhow, Hobbes’s defense, rather than subversion, of public religiosity invites further 
study.
129 Kantians argue that, as Bruner (2009: 343-344) puts it, a global cosmopolitan constitution is 
gradually being formed through “an inevitable process”—because human beings not only 
can but also will “create their own circumstances.” Yet, as many realists would later point 
out, Kant had been so preoccupied with “political liberty” that he could not foresee the 
possibility that even a global constitution could be subverted by “economic liberty.”
130 Tuck (1999). Baumgold (2010) makes more than a few excellent comparisons between 
Grotius and Hobbes.
131 For clarification, see especially Varden (2010).
132 Consider, for instance, Bellamy (2009), the IDRC (2001), and Williams (2001). For a much 
more (strongly American) neo-Kantian argument, consider Ikenberry (2009).
133 Donnelly (2006).
134 Donnelly (2009).
135 For a discussion of how the idea of (American) exceptionalism has fared, within the field of IR 
theory, see Mitchell (2006) and Louis and Robinson (2004).
136 For Weber’s understanding of political mutations and chances, as well as for his rejection of 
any structural antinomy between power and law, consider Palonen (1999: esp. 530-540) 
and Runciman (2004). For Arendt’s “political faculty” of natality, compare Birmingham 
(2006) to Burks (2002).
137 Aspects of IR’s concern with the analytical dichotomy between (negative, particular) 
exceptions and (positive, universal) norms can be found in, among others, Roach (2005), 
Suganami (2007), and Walker (1993), (1996). Consider also Cohen’s (2008) argument in 
light of the titles reviewed by Kelly Kate S. Pease (2010), “Who Says What The Law Is?” 
International Studies Review, 12 (4), 628-636 (not further referenced in the book). There 
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are of course many other works on this dichotomy, usually expressing the need for 
further separation of the legal norm from the political exception, which is basically the 
constitutional separation between (international) law and (prosecutorial) dictatorship. A 
simple starter selection may include, however, Onuf (1994), Rossiter (1948), Sarat and 
Clarke (2008), or Barros (2003). Lastly, Ungureanu (2007) again closes much of the 
distance between decisionism (as possibly being a more fluid expression of dictatorship) 
and discursivism (which would then equate to lawfulness).
138 Wendt (1999).
139 As known to students within the discipline, the English School of IR has also tried to develop 
an ethic of the middle way, in between realist interests and liberal institutions or, more 
accurately, between pluralism and solidarity. Beyond Bull (1995) and Little (2000), see 
especially Cochran (2009), Jackson (2008), and Scheuerman (2011: 131-136).
140 Crawford (2002: 357; 397-398).
141 Crawford (2002: 403).
142 Crawford (2002: 404; 408).
143 Strangely, Crawford (2002) does not index any entries for Dulles, yet he was largely 
responsible for America’s pro-decolonization diplomatic program after (and initiated by) 
the Suez Crisis. She could at least have mentioned, however, that the U.S. had strategic 
material interests in Egypt’s as much as in Saudi Arabia’s, Indonesia’s, or Panama’s 
autonomy because the national independence of such countries could help Washington 
prevent the Communist countries of the world from gaining influence over (oil) shipping 
routes.
144 Philpott (2001: 183).
145 Crawford (2002: 320).
146 Philpott (2001: 183).
147 See, for instance, Latham (2011: 77-81).
148 Latham (2011) describes the Cold War as to have given Washington its moral definition of 
self-interest: the Cold War spurred America’s large-scale investments in the economic 
development of the decolonized ‘swing’-states, often under the ethical banners of helping 
them to secure their modern and national forms of autonomy. For additional discussions 
of the idea that the decolonization process might have amounted to moral progress, 
consider Eckert (2004) and Jackson (2007).
149 A similar point is observed by Campbell (1998: 218-219).
150 Crawford (2002), Philpott (2001), (2002), (2009), and Wendt (1994), (1999), (2004).
151 Morgenthau (1946: 192), as cited by Donnelly (2000: 47).
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152 But Morgenthau (1946: 168), referenced by Scheuerman (2011: 23), actually affirms the 
ambivalence of the human being: both “a moralist” and a “political animal by nature”. 
153 Donnelly (2000: 102).
154 Arendt (1978: vol. 1, 133).
155 Hobbes (1994: ch. 46, 463; ch. 9, 60-61) appears to equate “supernatural” to “civil” 
philosophy.
156 Hobbes (1994: ch. 31, 245; 247-248).
157 Particularly, Hobbes (1994: ch. 7, 48-49).
158 The issue of ideational speech censorship receives attention, from Hobbes (1994: esp. ch. 31), 
on several occasions. Williams (2005: 32) reads Hobbes to be saying “the Sovereign 
ultimately must control language (definitions of what is).” Hobbes’s contemporaries 
responded by painting his concept of Christendom, as a civic religion subject to the 
sovereign’s interpretation, off as a Machiavellian ploy. Fleisher (1972: 134-135) 
mentions that for Machiavelli himself, this much had been evident: “Political power is a 
function of what people believe, whether true or not.”  As Hobbes would follow in his 
footsteps, then, because “Machiavelli indicts ideality”.
159 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 119).
160 Hobbes (1994: ch. 11, 70).
161 Olson (2007) stresses the importance of path dependencies, but in a similar context.
162 Hobbes (1994: ch. 43, 402, italics added).
163 Kari Palonen (1999: 523; 525-529) has demonstrated that Max Weber, most likely in 
following Benjamin Constant (“De la liberté chez les Anciens”) had been much “aware” 
of this sense of contrariness between republican beliefs in free political action, first, and 
the pleasure of fulfilling individual needs and individual liberties, second. His awareness 
forms a key to Chapter Two, of this book.
164 Donnelly (2000: 102).
165 Benner (2009: 465), referencing Machiavelli (1950: D 3.49, 540).
166 For example, Hobbes (1994: ch. 27, 205) defines “vainglory” as excessive self-worth: it is the 
illusion that a difference in social worthiness has somehow been caused by “wit, or 
riches, or blood, or some other natural quality not depending on the will of those that 
have the sovereign authority.” Machiavelli (1966: 2.8, 90-92) describes one particularly 
vainglorious individual, the Duke of Athens, as highly imprudent for the latter had asked 
the Florentine people to paint “his arms” on their houses, thus apparently being under the 
illusion that “name alone was all he needed to be absolutely prince.” See, also, Benner 
(2009: 221-226).
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167 Hobbes (1994: ch. 12, 72, 74-75).
168 Machiavellian realism was, of course, first explored by late-nineteenth-century German 
political historians. Friedrich Meinecke towers among them, but Max Weber should also 
not be forgotten.
169 According to Arendt (2006: 99-101), once individuals act only as mere individuals, and once 
individuals obey only “the force of elemental necessity” that moves the multitudes, and 
once they thus no longer recognize their own “legal personality” or no longer wear the 
“mask” that gives them their own social stature, it becomes very difficult for them “to 
believe in the goodness of unmasked human nature”.
170 One of the few to argue the converse case is Mearsheimer (2011). As a so-called structural 
realist, Mearsheimer suggests that governments are generally dishonest, for utilitarian 
reasons, but that this throws up no immoral barriers against the peaceful co-existence of 
their individual politicians.
171 Besides Benner (2009), essential texts in the scholarly literature (alphabetically) such as Bock 
(1990), Colish (1978), Del Lucchese (2009), Freyer (1938), Guarini (1990), Lock (2003), 
McCormick (2003), Peterman (1957), Sullivan (2006), Wood (1968), and Yoran (2010) 
will be consulted.
172 Very useful is Gillespie (2008).
173 According to Paganini (2003), Hobbes responded on these topics to the theologians: Boethius 
and Valla.
174 For a few brief comments on how serious Schmitt was in following Weber, see Kennedy 
(2011: 536-537).
175 Schmitt (1986: 58), as cited by Gordon (2009: 332). See, also Schmitt (1996b).
176 This point has often been misunderstood, even by Schmitt’s (1976), (1985), more attentive 
students, because in the relation between enemies it hardly matters how internally 
homogenous they each would be. What really matters is whether they (faithfully) believe 
they can kill each other.
177 Schmitt (1996).
178 Compare, especially, Liftin (2003).
179 For the perennial philosophy, see Huxley (1970). For notes on (beliefs in) the dialectical open-
endedness of the system, consider Brincat (2009) in response to Roach (2007).
180 Carl Schmitt (in Politische Theologie II) refers only once to the mystic Gregory of Nyssa, yet 
is reputed to also have said that Nyssa served him as one of his greatest examples. For a 
study of Saint Bonaventure, consider Cousins (1978). Also, Hobbes (1994) is perhaps not 
on a par, but at least familiar with political theologians such as these (Augustine, 
Boethius).
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181 Compare, for example, Olson (2007: 335).
182 For a small selection of critical work in the field of constitutional law theory, see Levinson 
(2006) and Michelman (1997) but also Schmitt (2008), Sellers (1994), and Bellamy 
(1996).
183 Lovelock (1988). Also relevant, for IR theorists, may be Liftin (2003) and Cudworth and 
Hobden (2010).
184 Compare Wendt (2003) to Habermas (2002), for this instance.
185 Specifically, Scheuerman (2011: 102; 101; 106-108; 146).
186 Hobbes (1994: ch. 31, 245; 247-248).
187 Plato usually sets statesmen off against poets, and legislators against “ambitious gods.” Strauss 
(2001: 229; 189; 158) interprets Plato (1970) as additionally having played Symposium
off against dialogues such as The Laws, in the sense that only the former dialogue “deals 
with a god”—whereas The Laws deals with human legislation. It is not Plato but Strauss, 
however, who first ranks legal and political philosophy higher than even any beliefs in 
the god of love: he alone argues that Eros that is being demoted, and is being deprived of 
divinity—by Socrates. Eros would thus have to have been transmuted from sacrality into 
profanity, without ever having been able to contain the opposition between her two 
qualities. Thus, in his obscure denial of the co-existence of both of the loving soul’s 
contrary qualities, Strauss (2001: 134) adds this: “Eros is striving for something 
unattainable, and this is also implied in procreation. This unity can never be achieved. It 
is essentially unsatisfactory. It is, therefore, man’s present nature—man as we know 
him—to be unhappy, to be sick. (...) The misery of man is traced to hubris.” This addition 
appears, of course, awkwardly idealistic. Advanced realists have far more ground to, 
rather, find Eros to be as attainable as unattainable, or otherwise also as much the 
outcome of ingenuous as well as of deficient political relations.
188 Plato (1970: 203cd, 81).
189 See, further, Markell (2000).
190 Plato (1970: 223d, 109).
191 For additional references on Symposium, see Dorter (1992) and Planinc (2004).
192 Plato (1984b), (1996), (1988).
193 Weber (1946: 237) suggests that none of antiquity’s “collegiate authorities” would have 
practiced their public authority in isolation of the world of power and private interest. His 
suggestion seems consistent with the elaborate work on authority to have been done by 
Arendt (1970), (2006).
194 Isonomy is not to be confused with “equality of condition”, according to Arendt (2006: 20). It 
refers not just to an intuitive practice of equal treatment, thus, but especially also to the 
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“equality of those who form a body of peers”—which is “the condition for all political 
activity”. Isonomy is anything but a contingent or cultural construction, in other words.
195 Ninčić (1970: 8; 78-79).
196 For a Weberian study of the Subcomandante Marcos’s charisma, see Di Piramo (2010).
197 Kaldor and Beebe (2010: 145), citing respectively the 1955 Bandung Declaration (for China) 
and the Helsinki Final Act (Russia).
198 Kaldor and Beebe (2010: 7-9) claim “human security” results from the implementation of six 
policy-principles. These principles seem too tapered because they place the idea of 
human rights above the necessity of any candidate (world) state’s obligation to actually 
protect these rights.
199 D. L. Williams (2010: 531; 526) mentions that “[Montesquieu] is cited in the Federalist 
[Papers] more than any other modern source, and indeed more than ... Plato, Aristotle, 
Cicero, and Plutarch combined.” Madison et al. (1961).
200 Negri (1999: esp. 51).
201 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396).
202 For one comparable conclusion, holding that the poor are being deprived of their rights (as 
poor human beings) by institutions of false consciousness, consider Gledhill (2003).
203 Montesquieu (2000: 25.2-25.3, 480-482; 25.5, 484) argues religion should only appear to be 
wealthy (obstinate, even) to prevent the creation of zealots, not that religious people 
(clerics) should actually be rich. (“The clergy is a family which should not increase.”) 
Religion is thus a tool: it keeps the commoners in poverty.
204 Machiavelli (1996: 1.41; 1.4).
205 Lucchese (2009).
206 Schmitt (1996), Rumpf (1972).
207 Compare, also, Rumpf (1972: 64-67).
208 Abizadeh (2011: 314).
209 Thornton (2002: 628; 630) reserves time to further explain Hobbes’s (1994: ch. 13) “common 
power to fear”.
210 Agamben (2005; 86) stresses the most paradoxical aspects of this dynamic void, as he seems 
refer to it as “essentially an empty space” in which no distinctions are possible. It should 
be asked, however, whether the void is indeed somewhat reminiscent of an anomaly and 
of an “empty” antinomy—rather than of a direct relationship between two well-
distinguishable contraries.
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211 Beiner (2011: 364-367), citing Schmitt (1996: 55; 57). 
212 When Hobbes (1994) rejects the idea of a disembodied mind (phantoms, apparitions, and so 
on), he also rejects the separation of body and mind. Note that this is how Unamuno 
(1977: 260-261) asks himself whether consciousness (mind) and extension (body) can 
bifurcate: “Are consciousness and its extended support two separate powers in
contraposition, the one growing at the expense of the other?” If the powers could 
bifurcate, by implication, then the “fateful outcome” must be that they will have lost their 
organic relation: one power become parasitical and may harm the other, and their web 
tears.
213 In his “Introduction to Leviathan,” Oakeshott (1991: 280-281) distinguishes not between the 
powers of the people’s natural body and those of their ideological artifices, but between 
natural universalism and individual atomism. Anyhow, Hobbes had given primacy to 
neither one kind of power. Instead, his sovereign person is the only person, Oakeshott 
rightly adds, capable of representing both natural associations and individual members. 
The “one sovereign representative ... is the only sort of association that does not 
compromise the individuality of its components.”
214 See, by means of contrast, Steinberger (1988: 30) and Honig (2007). Judith Shklar and Louis 
Althusser are among the many political theorists to have written about facets of 
Rousseau’s paradox as well.
215 Nau (2011: 488) does not mention, but supports here (and is probably familiar with) the 
academic disciplinary distinction between the Natur- and Geistes-wissenschaften.
216 Beiner (2011: xii-xiii).
217 Max Weber points IR into this interpretive direction, according to Nau (2011).
218 Machiavelli (1950: D 3.1, 399).
219 Honig (2009: 15).
220 Negri (1999: 15-20; 97) speaks about Machiavelli as if he would have sustained a “void” 
(within his concept of revolutionary or constituent sovereignty) which had also been 
observed, although only partially, by Arendt (2006).
221 Arendt (2006: 26).
222 On isonomy, see Waldron (2000: 210).
223 Arendt (2006: 40-41), (1951) dismisses the idea of a permanent revolution (or, the idea of an 
infinitely-functional constituent power). She finds that the idea might have gathered most 
force in early 1789, in 1830, 1832, 1848, 1851, 1871, and in other years as well, but it 
never did and should never be doing so infinitively, indefinitely, or without any time-
limits. The exceptions that proved this rule would be made by Robespierre, Hitler, and 
Stalin.
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224 Arendt (1970: 45).
225 Plato (1996: 494a, 183; 562de, 254) can be read as to define the multitudes as groups of 
individuals who are censoring “those who philosophize”—as well as that he defines their 
licentiousness as the kind of “liberty [that] should exceed all limits.” Hence, Platonists 
would say, the multitudes respect no (philosophical) limits between those who command 
and those who obey. Kohn (2000: 120-123) mentions that Arendt (1958) took a different, 
or a more anti-Platonist point of view, yet she certainly would have agreed that the 
philosophical limit between the rulers and the ruled is more than a justifiable limit: it is 
the Athenian source of all politics. Yet, not Athens but Rome came to understand why the 
relation between rulers and ruled should also appear legitimate and well-balanced.
226 Arendt (2006: 39).
227 Arendt (2006: 173).
228 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.58, 260-266), (1996: ch. 1.58), distinguishes between an unbridled and 
inconstant multitude and the wisdom of the people. For important variations on 
Machiavelli’s theme of the multitude’s natural force, or its forming a natural element 
such as a river, compare Masters (1996) and Parel (1992) to Pitkin (1984).
229 There has been tremendous speculation as to which man would have formed Machiavelli’s 
example of holding the most virtuous kind of authority. Most readers insinuate this 
example could never have been a religious and certainly no ecclesiastic man. Yet, 
Machiavelli (1950: D 1.54, 251-252), (1996: 1.54), himself most clearly discerns between 
the multitude and the Bishop, between violence and power, with only the latter appearing 
capable of re-establishing concord in Machiavelli’s beloved Republic of Florence. But 
the Bishop does not ‘perform’ power, at least not as an individual. Rather, it is his 
symbolic relationship with the group that transforms them; his clerical insignia are a 
metaphor for the group’s spiritual, and then as its political unity as a people. 
230 Compare, further, Hochner (2009). Yoran (2010: 281) also, rightly, refutes some common 
misperceptions about Machiavelli when he, for instance, points out that the latter had 
well-understood why “desire for glory and for power [tend to] become interchangeable; 
that those who achieve security begin desiring onori [honors]; that power and riches are 
desired at the same time; and so forth.”
231 For an IR theoretical study of additional such dualities, consider Wilson (2010).
232 Arendt (2006: 9) mentions that: “[V]iolence itself is incapable of speech.”
233 Compare, for instance, Waldron (2000: 212-213).
234 Arendt (1970: 43-45).
235 Arendt (1970: 26).
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236 Arendt (2006: 189) notes that exemplary analogies have perpetually served “the men of 
revolutions”: these men mostly created “models and precedents” based not on tradition, 
but on “the Roman Republic and the grandeur of its history.”
237 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 103).
238 This is Arendt’s (1978, vol. 1: 19) resonating salvo: “Being and Appearance coincide.”
239 For additional notes on analogical reasoning, see Crawford (2002: 19-23). Levy (1994: 282) 
must disagree with these notes.
240 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.54, 251), (1996: 1.54), refers with this quote, undoubtedly, to Virgil’s 
(1956: 31-32) introductory, metaphorical description of a first emergence of authority: “It 
had been like a sudden riot in some great assembly, when, as they will, the meaner folk 
forget themselves and grow violent.... But then they may chance to see some man whose 
character and record command their respect. If so, they will wait in silence, listening 
keenly. He will speak to them, calming their passions and guiding their energies.”
241 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.54, 251).
242 The theme of appearing publically was worked out in Arendt (1958), (1951).
243 On the meaning of metaphorical narrative, but also of tragedy, in Arendt’s works, consider 
Benhabib (1990), Malpas (2010), Speicht (2002), and Villa (2001).
244 Arendt (1970: 45).
245 Waldron (2000: 210) points out that perpetual change should not be effectuated by an 
“undifferentiated welling-up of mass opinion”, at least not in accordance to Arendt’s 
theory, but by the mysterious phenomenon that whenever groups meet to “constitute a 
public gathering, ... there are procedures to be followed, chairs elected, motions moved, 
amendments considered”. These procedures so affirm people’s sense of isonomy, which 
in itself is again “as much part of [their] political being as the faculty of speech itself.”
246 See also, for instance, Waldron (2000: 205-212).
247 Arendt (2006: 173; 166).
248 Arendt (1951: 297-302), as referenced by Waldron (2000: 205, n. 29), warns that the idea of 
equal rights poses a dangerous verdict: it condemns, not liberates human nature.
249 Arendt (2006: 30).
250 Arendt (2006: 39).
251 Passerin d’Entrèves (2000: 256).
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CHAPTER ONE
[O]ne of the most effectual seeds of the death of any state [is] that the conquerors 
[of this state] require not only a submission of men’s actions to them in the future, but 
also an approbation of all their actions past.
—Thomas Hobbes (1994: 486).
If their king is their god, he is or should be also their preserver; and if he will not 
preserve them, he must make room for another who will.
—Cited by Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo.
Is a man ever of two minds about the same thing? When it comes to action, is he 
divided against himself? Does he experience internal strife?
—Plato (1996: 603cd, 294).
There are people and things, persons and objects. There are also forces and 
powers, thrones and dominations.
—Carl Schmitt (1996c: 17).
[T]hey that have no science are in a better and nobler condition with their natural 
prudence than men that, by misreasoning, or by trusting them that reason that [then] fall 
upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set 
men so far out of their way as [their] relying on false rules.
—Thomas Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
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First Contemplation: The Symbolically Significant Succession Principle
In January 2006, the eleventh prime minister of Israel suffered a debilitating 
stroke that left him comatose. A few months earlier, Ariel Sharon had completed the 
withdrawal of all Jewish settlers from Gaza. The withdrawal had been massively 
contested, and an economic blockade would remain in place, yet Sharon evidently helped 
liberate many Palestinians from their occupiers. But as a minister of defense, in 1982, he 
had also been politically responsible for the Israeli Army’s massacring of unarmed 
Palestinian refugees in the Shabra and Shatila camps, so that his legacy may be believed 
to remain morally ambiguous. After Sharon had been in coma for more than four and a 
half years, and with few chances of regaining consciousness, the artist Noam Braslavsky 
unveiled a life-size sculpture of the statesman. 
The sculptured Sharon can be seen “in a hospital bed—with his eyes open and his 
chest rising up and down, as the work appears to breathe.” Braslavsky was instantly 
accused of voyeurism, but responded by suggesting no person better embodies the Israeli 
Entity’s impassive face to the world than the former prime minister. The New York Times
quoted the artist as saying he had chosen Sharon because he represents “an open nerve in 
Israeli society” and thus forms an allegory for the “inertia of Israeli politics.”1
Why is it that Sharon’s personal state of limbo—in between life and death, 
between vital nerve and inert state—should  symbolize this specific political society: 
Israel? To find a meaningful answer, and to better understand Sharon’s symbolism, it 
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must be remembered that ‘statesmen’ have long represented their own political entities, 
into perpetuity. The remains of one American president have been buried under an 
eternally-burning flame. Most U.S. presidents left or intend to leave libraries to posterity. 
For other heads of state, mausoleums may be erected: V.I. Lenin’s body was embalmed 
for this goal, whereas the pharaohs would be both embalmed and hidden in pyramids. It 
would also be advisable, as realists such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr found, to remember 
that very few monarchs were not believed to have represented their state, and that the 
distinction between their legitimacy and illegitimacy would traditionally depend on an 
honoring and a public judgment of their immortality.2 The next sentence expresses that 
judgment well.
“The king is dead,” someone announced; “long live the King!” the people 
acclaimed.
Why wish the king a long life upon learning of his death? Why are the king’s life 
and death presented within the same sentence? Should the people’s hurrahs not have 
preceded their king’s death, as opposed to have followed it? The sentence seems to have 
been emptied of pure logic: it unseemingly presents itself outside a world of 
commonsense.3 On second thought, and with Hobbes’s dictum in mind, it may have to be 
read conjecturally and not so logically. If the legendary King Arthur is said to be among 
the living, for example, then this statement amounts to a conjecture because it is 
impossible to invalidate the statement with certainty—and yet it may be believed 
possible.4 Not a sequential, but a conjectural and yet also a more commonsensical reading 
of these sorts of statements is demanded—because they could be referring to acts of 
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political remembrance, and perhaps to how these acts are believed to give meaning to 
their own prudence.
Commonsense, as Hannah Arendt defines it, is itself already a conjecture. It is a 
conjecture of  both sharing examples and experiences as well as of individual sense 
experiences. Commonsense neither has a straightforward logical cause within the 
individual’s sense organs—nor is it expressed by the physical togetherness of a group of 
individuals alone. It depends on the conjecture of both logics of sense. Commonsense 
thus emerges from a physically/metaphysically sensing of others, so that it is about a 
static physically-sensible togetherness as well as that it is a about dynamic belief in 
“community sense” (sensus communis).5
In reference to the issue of the continual representation of the state, and beliefs 
therein, Arendt’s definition of common/sense would itself form a transcendent 
conjecture, akin to the king’s mortal/immortal life. Both definitions express the notion 
that there is something that emerges from, but cannot be reduced to the sum of the two 
components. Common/sense combines a set of physically-sensory experiences with a 
shared judgment about these experiences, and this judgment cannot have been anticipated 
by merely adding sense experiences to the realm in which they are being shared. The sum 
total of ‘common’ and of ‘sense’ will not add up to a sharing of sensibility and 
judiciousness, in other words, just as that a newly-begun form of ‘popular acclaim’ and a 
king’s ‘physical death’ do not have to add up to an act of public authorization for the 
monarchical state. Instead, judiciousness and authorization are here acquiring meaning 
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because they are emergent properties of these respective conjunctions: common/sense 
and metaphysical beginning/physical ending.
Arendt imparts the notion that commonsensical judgments are not in-born but 
become ‘second nature.’ They can be cultivated, that is, but they will hardly emerge from 
within people’s ‘first nature.’ These are conditioned judgments, specifically in respect to 
general questions such as when to empathize with others, and how to care for one’s 
milieu and one’s world.They direct people to an ‘enlarged mentality.’6 The sphere of pure 
logics—or of bare reasoning, as Kant would say—is therefore unlikely to apply to a 
common/sensical person’s experiences of empathy, although applications of bare 
reasoning may of course remain one of the preconditions for the sharing such 
experiences.7
“Long live the King!” by itself is only a celebratory speech act. It is not so much a 
declaration as it is a positive appraisal of the many years the king will live. But by 
repeating the preceding sentence (“the king is death”), before appraising the king’s 
future, people are also mourning their futureless king. What are they celebrating and what 
are they mourning, then? They are celebrating a common convention: the monarchy. The 
people mourn the natural king, not the monarchy. They indeed legitimize the process 
through which select persons appear to be succeeding to the throne. In ‘sensing’ the 
king’s bodily death, then, they are indirectly celebrating their authorization of his royal 
office.8
Thomas Hobbes knew that monarchical successions depend on the popular will, 
on popular acclaim for the ruler’s maintaining the peace.9 He also knew that not all 
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monarchies are hereditary. Monarchies are defined by the fact that only one person may 
take the seat of government, even though that person may not take part in, and may also 
not otherwise define the constitution. As Hobbes would have agreed with Aristotle, what 
all monarchical offices have in common is not that they must have been inherited, but 
that they enjoy the singularity of their self-legitimizing succession principle.10 From 
Aristotle, he learns that such executive offices are not a necessary constitutional 
component, yet they do somehow allow constitutional states to individuate (or: to grow 
and flourish) in accordance to their own natural predispositions.11
In order to come to better understand Machiavelli, later onwards, it is quite 
indicative that Hobbes’s oeuvre seems to have been breathing an atmosphere of faith: it 
breathes in the reasons that allow people to trust in their unitary state’s natural self-
growth, its self-legitimization, or even in its self-succession rather than in its self-
prolongation at any costs.12 The Hobbesian hypothesis is that, against Aristotelian 
philosophy, the singularity (oneness) of each head of state performs a public role: it as if 
it gave each official a mysterious sense of relational legitimacy: it would somehow have 
legitimized the uniquely conjectured relationship between both the singular authority of 
the crown, first, and one moment of popular self-authorization, second.
From a perspective of Hobbesian realism, the royal office appears to have been 
symbolized by the crown, but also by the twin powers of the sword and the scepter: the 
powers of force and volition; of safety and liberty. Somewhat mysteriously, popular 
authorizations of the royal office emerge from not just from within a complex 
combination of two powers, but also from within a correlative combination of two types 
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of law: from the law on “acquisition” (a law of nature) and from the law of “institution” 
(of honor).13
From this perspective, further, it appears that Baron de Montesquieu was wrong to 
have relinquished the people as the source of authorization for the monarchical state. 
Chapter Two provides additional details why Montesquieu wrongly invalidated the 
people’s relation of contrariness towards their own laws of nature. For now, it suffices to 
see that whereas Hobbes sketches an elaborate opposition between people’s seeking of 
honor and glory, first, and the laws of nature that all people fear to disobey, Hobbes 
would never have erased the singularity of succession principle. After all, Hobbes thinks 
it is only natural and commonsensical for any sovereign state to have been authorized by 
a covenant of all natural-born persons with all persons: by the highest-imaginable natural 
law.
In considerable dissimilarity, Montesquieu’s implicit invalidation—of the 
people’s ensuring of their safety by authorizing the state to maintain the peace—causes 
this monarchical state’s natural oneness principle to be replaced with an honor principle, 
which the Baron deemed better applicable to the relation between monarchy and 
aristocracy than to the relation between the state and the people in their entirety.14 (As 
Chapter Three will show, his supposition is hereby that the king will bestow court 
officials and noble magistrates with honors and monetary rewards.) Monarchy’s 
principled intention, or its spring, consists more of the sort of titles and honors it bestows 
than it consists of its natural or even supernatural oneness.15 As Montesquieu argues, only 
the honor principle makes the various intermediate (aristocratic) orders more “dependent 
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on the constitution, [and] the [monarchical] state more fixed, ... and the persons of those 
who govern more assured.”16
The immortal monarch remains at a certain disadvantage, in comparison to rule 
by mortals, not so much because of the king’s principle of honor but because of his 
oneness: his “public business is [to be] led by one alone”—which, as Montesquieu warns, 
could invite excessive “slowness” on the part of the magistrates, because they so often 
will have to wait for him. Nonetheless, “their slowness, their complaints, and their 
prayers” will at least perform an important check on the king’s tendency towards
solipsism (despotism).17
Singularity is not always a good principle: the French Magistrate suggests it could 
oftentimes run contrary to the people’s desire to expedite their business affairs. It is 
perhaps even a bad principle, thus, because it could very well leave the king’s relation 
with the people is a state of flux. In order for the state to become “more fixed”, however, 
Montesquieu takes the side of the magistrates against the monarch. He takes sides with, 
as Andreas Kinneging sums up a longer discussion, the nobility of the robe: “it is the robe 
that has to contain the [king’s] sword.”18 More importantly, in terms of his implicit 
invalidation of Leviathan’s key, the Magistrate proposes that the monarchical source of 
honor is to be held hereditarily—“not in order [for honor] to be the boundary dividing the 
[strength] of the prince from the weakness of the people, but to be the bond between 
them.”19
Montesquieu abandons the Hobbesian and seemingly self-contradictory notion 
that a sovereign prince may be a complex person, incorporating the multitudes, and yet 
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having been authorized by a distinct group of people. Rather than to maintain 
Malmesbury’s functional difference between legal incorporation and popular 
representation, he thereby rejects all notions of constitutional duality (this thesis’s third 
chapter). As an Enlightenment philosopher, also, Montesquieu leaves behind him any 
sense that kings might be acting as single-will persons with a natural-born sense of 
conscience, as he rather expects their wills to have been conditioned by artificial 
institutions such as regional courts and networks of ranking nobles (the robe).20
Montesquieu moves closer towards the modern notion that the king’s actions have 
been legitimized exactly because his personal honor has been inherited—so that it will 
not always have to have been authorized by many people.21 Henceforth, the centralization 
of honor is a tool that may be used to assure the nobles (the “people of wisdom”), who 
will be holding the intermediary offices of government, that they serve the same interests. 
They serve not an emergent monarchical authority, but those interests that will best help 
them invigorate the constitutional laws of the state.22 So, why does not Montesquieu and 
why does Hobbes, in his stead, still take Machiavelli’s reminder to heart, that any 
constitutional state (“republic”) must on occasion be trusted to return to its own natural 
foundations (“principles”), similar to how Rome’s “renovation, or [her] new birth” 
followed from her rape by the Gauls?23 This is, dialectically, the ‘reminder paradoxical.’ 
This is Rome’s freedom, symbiotically related to the necessity of barbarians plundering 
Rome; both should be trusted. Both freedom and necessity are believed to be self-
organizing principles.
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Whose Prudent Actions Qualify as the Sovereign Person’s Autonomous Actions?
Charismatic agents and foundational events (Philadelphia) do not turn a state into 
a sovereign state. Statespersons will also have to have been recognized as conscionable, 
judicious, and sufficiently prudent human beings. Machiavelli and Hobbes rank 
prudence, not justice, among the highest of virtues. To these realists, prudence is one of 
the foremost sources of genuine (sovereign) authority, most likely because it neither 
consists of mental strength alone—nor only of moral goodness. Prudence is not really a 
virtue, even, whereas justice and charity are inescapably moral virtues. The difference 
between prudence and the other virtues can now help theorists to answer the question of 
why Hobbes would have argued that some of the connotations to have been attached to 
prudence are unhelpful. For, he concluded that prudence must be differentiated from 
providence—which is “the foresight of things to come”—and from presumption as well, 
which is a man’s invoking of his experience in order to support his claim that “the event 
[shall] answer [his] expectation.”24
Preceding Hobbes, the Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue demonstrate that by 
diligently studying historical examples, statespersons can “readily [learn to] observe that 
all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and the 
same passions, so that it is easy ... to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any 
republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any 
that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of events.”25 In his 
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Discourses, Machiavelli goes through great length to answer why prudence is not merely 
foresight. To him, it rather emerges from a strange conjecture of both a person’s foresight 
as well as of that person’s assessment of cultural contingencies and historical precedents. 
Foresight cannot be reduced to having knowledge of both precedents and possible 
contingencies. The human faculty of analogical or historical reasoning should also have 
been trained, so that factual knowledge can be appreciated by drawing analogies. This 
latter kind of training is not just acquired as a matter of chance, or by having learned how 
to make historically warranted presumptions. Instead, this training is to be conducted 
purposefully, and ultimately also faithfully. Historical analogizing expresses a sense of 
faith: historical similarities will continue to occur; the future is not radically different 
from the past; human passions will be of all times. Hobbes agrees with Machiavelli when 
he explains why prudence consists of certain confidence in the method of presuming a 
similarity, and analogy, and of “conjecture.” For, “prudence is a presumption of the 
future contracted [by means of conjectural reasoning], from the experience of time 
past.”26
Arendt, Hobbes, and Machiavelli are building a gateway towards a refutation of 
liberal philosophies—to the extent these remain centered in ideals such as equal justice, 
not in conjectural and historical reasoning. International liberalism is usually presented as 
the total opposite of a Machiavellist Realpolitik, but this thesis finds no fault with 
Machiavelli’s demonstration of why an official’s utmost political and ethical quality 
should consist of her prudence. From within the conjecture of historical experience and a 
reasonable presumption, and from empirical necessity and rational freedom, as well, 
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prudent decisions emerge. In Machiavelli’s Ethics, likewise, Erica Benner finds little 
wrong with Machiavelli’s argument that a method of historical analogizing, or that 
“conjecture is often needed to show people the intrinsic goodness and badness of things, 
especially when bad habits ... corrupted their judgment.”27 But this is not all there is to 
say about prudential authority: it is not all about analogizing, providing historical 
examples, and conjectural speeches. It demands a judgment about the future as well. 
Critically, any judgment in itself again demands non-empirical methods of recognizing 
what Benner describes as every human being’s “capacities for free will and virtú”.28
To amend Benner’s human-oriented interpretation, it may be remembered why 
Hobbes argued that prudence cannot be considered a typically human capacity. “[I]t is 
not prudence that distinguishes man from beast: there are beasts that at a year old observe 
more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at 
ten.”29 Hobbes’s argument is that humans may occasionally be acting more prudently 
than beasts, but not generally so, because their speech is not always to their advantage. 
The more intrinsic their speech advantage becomes, over non-sociable animals, the less 
likely they will remember the empirical experiences from  their own past.30 As both 
Arendt and Machiavelli find, also, the power of speech may give human beings a sense of 
common purpose—but the same power can still be used to distort individual interests, 
and present them in a better light than ethically warranted.31 Against the wide impression 
that the latter political theorists would have defended a utilitarian (consequentialist) 
position about a power of speech, in international politics, any advanced form of political 
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realism will have to respect this power’s moral ambiguity. Speech serves deliberation as 
well as decision, and both common and individual interests.
Prudent speech acts may not be as easily equated to acts of shrewdness, or to a 
realization of private ends, as that some philosophers have supposed. The arch-realists 
rather understood prudential speech to help people restore a balance of powers. As 
Machiavelli writes, a restoration of the constitutional balance may be due to “extrinsic 
accident or ... intrinsic prudence”—but the act itself will, either way, be a return to 
“original principles”.32 Machiavelli’s position houses the classic premise of the 
Platonists, and of dialectics: external necessities and internal forums are on a par, because 
both must be trusted to form equally critical elements in terms of the state’s self-
organizing principles. Good forms of change should of course be made to take place, but 
this ethical imperative will still result from the dual relation between the external and the 
internal: from a relation exemplified by elements of empirical as well as of rational 
experience. This relation is still a conjecture, rather than that it is either a fact or a logic. 
Gyroscopically balancing the constitution of powers is an activity that requires training in 
conjectural reasoning, hence.
As an aside, the realist proposition holds that change may be motivated either by 
freedom or by corruption, but also that good change (freedom) can only be distinguished 
from historical necessity (corruption) because it will have to have evolved in its own 
conjectural and cyclical opposition to evil change: these two dimensions are in perpetual 
flux.33 This side-injunction formed Machiavelli’s invitation to write both Discourses and 
The Prince in the style of mirrors: the books would mirror historical events created by 
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either unfortunate or imprudent men (corruption), mostly, but which also have to belong 
in a curriculum for those aspiring to be relatively more prudent and fortunate than they 
had been (more free). For, as Louis Althusser reads these texts, they form a curriculum in 
negative dialectics, positing far more examples of evil change than of good change.34
Still, prudent statespersons will at some point naturally and spontaneously begin to mirror 
their own actions in opposition to the former, or against the harmful and evil type of 
examples. Whence Machiavellian realism’s faith in their goodness?
To now reread Benner’s cue: realist statespersons will neither be thrown off their 
thrones by evil nor by good change—and neither by consequentialist, nor by 
deontological philosophies alone.35 Much rather, as Weber and Morgenthau could have 
agreed with Machiavelli, good change transcends the utilitarian aspect of Realpolitik—
without excluding it from conjectural considerations.36 There are only two dimensions to 
such considerations, however. First, to sustain a good system, or to save a free 
constitution, statespersons may very well find it politically necessary to “arrest” violent 
currents, and to do so in an expedient and utilitarian manner. If the end justifies the 
means, then this end may perhaps not legitimize the statesperson’s authority, but it should 
also not preclude this statesperson from acting judiciously in pursuing this end. For, 
judiciousness is a matter of moderation (immanent proportionality). Thus, second, when 
utilitarian actions are intended to succeed, they should not preclude deontological 
purposes from the considerations. To have training in creating historical conjectures is to 
be able to infuse utilitarian decisions with a sufficiently large dosage of deontological 
(ethically transcendent) purposes.
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Machiavelli’s reasoning process is simple, yet sophisticated. The simple part is to 
show that this process amends liberalism. This is the part that helps political realists make 
their case that if the conviction of equal liberty, especially held by liberal idealists, would 
be left unchecked by a transcendent purpose, then this conviction risks becoming too 
moralistic. It becomes doctrinally overbearing, as it were. Because no person was ever 
born as free as any other person, in terms of natural aptitudes and genetic heritage, the 
conviction of equal liberty should be moderated by this empirical fact. This means that 
doctrine must be empirically moderated. Realists do not agree with liberals that liberty 
would only be a matter of how rational a doctrine is. If liberty could be defined by 
analogy to a rational but nevertheless inherently doctrinal idea, then tyrannical 
strongmen, such as Josef Stalin and Pol Pot—or, briefly put, such as Periander’s 
followers—should be allowed to refine this idea of equality, even if this means they 
thereto have to be killing anyone their doctrine deems insufficiently equal.37Any moral 
value, including equal liberty, can become too utilitarian for its own good. Tyrants differ 
not all that much from liberals, in this, because both seem to share an appetite for their 
‘own children’—which is exactly why Arendt warned against the ‘cannibalistic’ 
undercurrents of liberal philosophy.38
The sophisticated part of realism’s warning consists of a perplexing story about 
human nature. The species is capable of more acts of speech, and of memory, than the 
other social animals are capable of. Before turning back to Hobbes’s views on human 
nature, it may already be agreed, with Machiavelli, that realist statespersons should not 
just think of themselves as natural leaders. Statespersons do not just owe their power to 
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naturally consequentialist factors such as their genes or social deterministic events. 
Indeed, particularly Hobbes detests explanations based on such factors because they reek 
of solipsism. In contrast to Oakeshott’s view of of him, Hobbes is clearly not pointing to 
human nature as an explanation for non-sociable and selfish actions. He thinks highly of 
human nature, but has less esteem for social sanctions (molestations) and prosecutorial 
justice (utilitarian justice). 
For instance, the Master from Malmesbury has nothing positive to say about the 
death penalty and summary executions. Rather, he holds hope that one day he may see a 
world in which each man enjoys his own equal sovereignty, or applies his equal 
promissory capacities, so that “no man ... can [anymore be] justly be put to death”. Every 
man should be acting as if he had given meaning to social justice, which is one of the first 
preconditions for his faith in his own legal personality. His faith in justice develops in 
him as a citizen (deontologically) because (as Arendt could have complemented Hobbes), 
citizens are simply men with their own “legal personality”—and who are believed to be 
acting truthfully as they are seen playing their own part “on the public scene.”39 Of 
course, no man will ever be equal to any other man—which is sufficient reason for any 
citizen to try to play as an equal of any other citizen. Yet, not so much by pretending, but 
by mostly and by prudentially trusting that every citizen-subject is nonetheless capable of 
acting as if she were an equal to every other citizen-subject, in other words, “every 
subject [can be becoming the] author of the actions of his sovereign”.40
Hobbes’s argument is much simpler than it has often been imagined to be. The 
premise is that whenever a citizen-subject has punished or killed another such citizen-
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author, her natural conscience will let her know she should have known that both citizens 
were throughout it all the fiduciary authors of their own citizenship rights (they both 
enjoyed legal personalities, as sovereign authorizers), then she would be harming not 
only the other but herself as well. Hence, it is only a natural law that all men have to 
author their own civil rights and that, thereby, each man warrants his own legal 
personality (citizenship). The principle is that civil rights are not defined by citizenship, 
because that would be a tautology, but that they were cognitively formed by a natural law 
principle that helps prevent any unregulated use of armed force 
Although Hobbes refers to one instance of excommunication as a “crime” he 
seems to prefer banishment to physical punishment (toleration of torture would be 
entirely unimaginable, of course, because it would be similar to a body politick’s self-
inflicted wound).41 He must hereby also prefer a prudential judgment to positive justice. 
For, the common power of the state should judge it wiser to ban anyone committing a 
violent act, than to try to artificially and positively justify an equally violent punishment. 
Whereas the Church excommunicates a sinner (a banishment from the Eucharist, and thus 
from joining a ‘common table’) by applying only its word-power, further, the sovereign 
state should be authorized to apply both sword-power as well as its word-power.42 As 
Leviathan (Chapter 18) elucidates: this dual sovereign person’s ultimate purpose consists 
of “the peace and defense of ... all.” Not even her “most sudden and rough bustling in of a 
new truth ... [can break] the peace, [and should] only sometimes awake the war.”
The imprudent use of word-power may be an act hostile to peace—because word-
power is inseparable from, yet transcends sword-power. “[T]he actions of men proceed 
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from their opinions; and in the well governing of opinions consist the well governing of 
men’s actions, in order to their peace and concord.” The sovereign person, singularly and 
pluralistically, must be a prudent judge “of what opinions and doctrines are averse and 
what conducive to peace.”43 Sovereigns are those who lend significance, purposefulness, 
and peacefulness to “doctrines.” They are responsible for the process through which 
“doctrine” (Hobbes is herein preoccupied with state religion) helps maintain the balance 
of powers. The word-power is far more responsible than the sword-power, which is why 
both will have to remain integrated. 
Specifically in the IR field, it is usually suggested that Hobbes’s dual 
(word/sword) person has a violent disposition, that the sword is dominant, and that all 
sovereign persons have been “designed [to accomplish the] destruction of the individual.” 
Oakeshott reverses his earlier rationalism-centric interpretation, however, when he adds 
that a sovereign person’s “reason, not [her] authority, ... is destructive of individuality.” 
Far more elegantly than his earlier solution, in which reason was concluded to be the final 
dominating power, Oakeshott’s second solution suggests that the (good) sovereign person 
applies her natural law-authority before resorting to rational ideas alone. That is, the good 
person applies not the force of reason, but the law of reason. Of course, this again means 
that the law may be ambivalent, and that the law can speak with force or with reason: 
coercively or persuasively. “[W]hen the law does not speak [persuasively], the individual 
is sovereign over [her own reasoning].”44 The law must speak coercively, therefore. 
Without any human sword-power, the law would be only a law of nature, and each 
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individual could resort to her own private doctrines—or fall prey to the ambiguities of 
word-power. 
The relation between word and sword cannot be understood otherwise than as a 
paradox, similar to Rousseau’s. His paradox was that “those who get together to 
constitute a government are themselves unconstitutional.”45 Anyhow, for Hobbes the 
puzzle is instead that in order for people to authorize—or to author the constitution of—
their own sovereign personalities, they will need to apply word-power. But in order to 
apply word-power persuasively, they may have to threaten to act coercively, and to show 
others why they would want to resort to using their sword-power. To sum it all up, the 
puzzle can only be completed if neither word nor sword informs the predominant power. 
Sovereign authority should ‘somehow’ emerge from their co-constitutionality, rather. 
Dual sovereignty emerges, but it does not happen as the result of a simple case of the 
chicken and the egg, as it would have done for Rousseau, to the contrary—and as Honig 
clearly hears only Rousseau, not Hobbes, say.46
Dual emergent sovereignty depends on a definition of statehood which, with 
Leviathan, is ultimately a definition of war and peace, and of life and death. But any such 
definition cannot be divorced from its own ethics. The definition has a certain moral 
authority—particularly because it refers to matters both spiritual and temporal, mundane 
and transmundane. For instance, both Machiavelli’s Bishop and Arendt’s Jefferson (she 
practically dedicates On Revolution to Thomas Jefferson) were exemplary men, but they 
were no absolute rulers. The Bishop of Volterra’s “words” may have over-awed the 
multitude, but this happened only because they were believed to inform a relationship of 
148
emergent authority. The Bishop was a guest in Florence, not a ruler, so that his 
relationship to the Florentine crowd must have been one of instantly-recognized 
(‘natural’) authority (no other reasons were given why it could have been otherwise, after 
all). For, upon hearing “words”, the Florentine multitude morphed into a people.47
(Individuals moved from their own plurality into their individuality, as the constituents of 
a people.)48
Machiavelli’s emergent authority, however, remained grounded in the principles 
of partisanship as well as of prudence. Machiavelli’s men’s purpose is to help 
prudentially restore the state to its past glory, for the sake of the future, by siding with 
one party rather than another.49 The art of emergent authority, rather than of absolute 
power, thus, is always an arcane art of maintaining the balance between parties—and of 
the state’s self-restoration. Arendt describes various actors who were practicing this art as 
well. They would have to have maintained a Jeffersonian practice of covenanting with, 
and of caring to appear among the people as a whole. It is critical to realize, however, that 
she further thought that each of these actors expressed a certain confidence. In being 
confident that their authority could transform the multitude into a people, and then bind 
that people to their own state’s foundation, such actors must have had tremendous faith in 
the people.50 Their impetus must have been a kind of “civic religion”—which could not
have been given to them by some super-rational, absolute, transcendental Creator.51 Their 
faith in the people themselves, rather than in a Creator, must at some moment have led 
them to decide they could no longer remain inert and neutral: they had to be moving, in 
order for them to come together as an independent polity.52
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Emergence of a sovereign person depends on, in all likelihood, to conclude the 
above points, the complexity of as well as of the tension between the two faculties all 
social animals appear to enjoy. These are the faculties of speech and of physical 
movement. Speech may be used to persuade, movement to coerce, but both never 
function necessarily so. Further, the hypothesis makes it possible to argue that a complex 
person should firstly have been recognized, as an actor, by an audience legitimizing the 
play she performs, and secondly should have been taking sides on the world-stage, so that 
she will inspire confidence rather than public inertia. The next chapters must specify how 
confidence, faith, but also fate and fortune, are the all-defining concepts of Machiavellian 
(or, classicist) realism. 
What it Means to Advocate for an Approbation of the State’s Past Actions
States usually lose their sovereignty, or their popular unity, because the “seed” of 
such a loss will have been sown. That “seed” consists of forms of historicist and futurist 
utopianism. Hobbes’s basic argument holds that when visions of both future and past 
actions are growing increasingly contentious, these visions could bring to a close the 
state’s constitutional process. Those who will have conquered a state, therefore, should 
always first have tried to maintain its constitutional or its emergent authority by requiring 
“not only a submission of men’s actions to them in the future, but also an approbation of 
all their actions past.”53
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Hobbes’s argument perfectly coheres with Machiavelli’s dictum that any “prudent 
man” (he lists as his examples “Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and their like”) were 
usually timely to have realized that in order to  save a conquered state, it was necessary 
for him to destroy their enemies within that state. With their enemies, the latter’s past 
actions will live on into the future of the state. But, he also warns, even to such 
extraordinarily prudent individuals it was always evident that their own practices, of 
emergent sovereignty, were among the most “doubtful of success” and the most 
“dangerous to handle”. Their enemies could always benefit from the old laws, old 
customs, and the reactionary tendencies all human beings share—because nobody will 
“believe in anything new until [having] ... had actual experience of it.”54 This section 
takes realism’s advice to heart: individual, rational ideas about the future should cohere 
with people’s empirical and sensory experiences. Most individuals are unable to recreate 
the state, therefore, because they misunderstand the importance of self-coherent 
constitutional process, which are never completely inert. Rather, individual rulers must 
take into account that “actions past” may continue to be honored, and that this happens in 
such a hostile manner that their newer rules will be delegitimized. 
George Orwell’s thoughts have never been plain to summarize. Throughout 
Orwell’s oeuvre, nevertheless, a red and nearly-anarchist thread leads readers to some of 
the realist reasons why it would not make much “difference” when an individual remains 
indifferent, inert, and willing to accept both past and future as her fate (providence).55 By 
leading readers to the reasons why their own inertia may have a depoliticizing effect, on 
any notion of a common future, however, Orwell implies that diverse citizens should be 
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coming together on behalf of history’s approbation (prudentially). For, their history is not 
just their past, but also a process of constitutive decisions and deliberations on what it 
means (for them altogether) to entertain their ideas about a common past.
Yet, the entire process still will also require a certain civic faith, of these citizens, 
in the sense that they will have to believe that their taking sides allows their past to 
cohere with a common future as well. Orwell’s “Looking Back on the Spanish War” 
well-captured the meaning of this moment, of taking sides—as well as of the sort of 
confidence that can intimate prudence, rather than fate. Orwell’s essay first describes 
what goes on within anyone’s mind when confronted with violence, with war, and with 
its “cruelty [and] squalor and futility”. Orwell then adds it would be too easy to think that 
in time of war both the progressive and the autocratic or, rather, that both the Communist 
and the Fascist forces are evil. It would just be too simple to think “[o]ne side is as bad as 
the other; I am neutral.”56
About Gandhi, Orwell writes this: “Even after he had completely abjured violence 
he was honest enough to see that in war it is usually necessary to take sides. He did not—
indeed, since his whole political life centered round a struggle for national independence, 
he could not—take the sterile and dishonest line of pretending that in every war both 
sides are exactly the same and it makes no difference who wins.”57 Principled non-
violence does not and should not require neutrality, and perhaps not even justice. It 
requires popular movements and civic mobilizations. Agency may be prior to structure, 
and mind may even trump over matter, thus, but this still does not mean that speech acts 
with respect to the past and movements shaping the future are not equally conjecturally-
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related and inseparable.58 Speech and action come conjecturally together before they can 
and should begin to count as a people’s emergent properties, much rather.
Rather than to reject warring ideological extremes outright, but also against the 
image of neutrality as a separate third way, Orwell joins (with his above observations) 
both Arendt and Machiavelli, but Hobbes also. To all these realists, there is no authority 
in being neutral. Taking the middle way would prevent the actors from being recognized 
by both sides. Actors who care for the life of the republic should, instead, be heard to 
have taken sides. This is the only way that their covenant can be performed otherwise 
than as an empty promise. For, it does not matter how rational a promise-maker really is. 
What matters is that this person cares to stand by her words. Sovereign republican 
authority emerges not from remaining neutral (inert, insolent, dispassionate), but from a 
public recognition of some strangely conjectural and oddly-dualist relationship that binds 
actors and audience, speakers and actors, rulers and ruled, state and people.59 Yet, who 
should be the judge of whether this relationship is actually binding? Arendt agrees openly 
with Machiavelli (but could herein equally have agreed with Hobbes) that this judgment, 
of the conjectural political relation, again should be made by experienced, prudent 
persons.60 Who are they?
Arendt’s concept of freedom helps identify prudent persons. It is a concept with 
an agenda. Freedom actively situates moments of agony and struggle into a historical 
discourse. Freedom is not volition, nor cause, but spontaneity. Arendt’s freedom 
comprises people who are struggling to appear in public, and yet spontaneously and 
newly may begin to take part in the political life—as opposed to be conducting mental, or 
153
imageless, cause-and-effect calculations.61 These so-appearing people are acquiring 
states, as Hobbes or Machiavelli would have said, not as solipsistic individuals but as 
new sovereign persons. These are persons living (for) ‘the’ political life, in brief. “The 
greatest threat to political life ... is the reduction of politics to the pursuit of ends”—as 
James D. Ingram correctly concludes, as well. For, in solely pursuing an end, persons 
would have to step outside the political group and even degrade themselves to mere 
individuals. If the end justifies the use of any of the means, available to each individual, 
then the freedom to discuss possible alternatives within diverse groups would become 
meaningless. Those who would accept their own usage of any means, or those who 
justify “mere means” in order to fulfill their needs, invariably, will then “reject as useless 
anything that does not serve them.”62
In her “Introduction into Politics”, where she further developed this argument, 
Arendt establishes that the purpose (Sinn) of political activity must be distinguished, 
although it cannot be separated from consequential logics. This purpose should 
spontaneously well up from among, and be intuited by, those who appear within the res 
publica.63 Intuitive spontaneity lends a certain degree of self-coherence and 
organizational integrity to acts of freedom: it turns acts of freedom into acts worth to 
remember, and; it augments the republic’s historical exemplariness.64
Arendtian realism adds a lot of nuance to the paradox of the political realm. First, 
Arendt herself acknowledges that Rousseau had too clearly suggested that only good 
people should legislate for, and should maintain a good state. The good state should 
indeed have been created or acquired by naturally uncorrupted individuals. But in 
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beginning to assemble that good group of people, it will have to become corrupted by 
social norms, which again necessitates their having to have had a good constitution. 
Contrary to Rousseau’s chicken-egg suggestion, Arendt (and Honig) refuses to consider 
state constitutionalism in terms of any such closed circle.65 “[T]hose who get together to 
constitute a new government are themselves unconstitutional”—Arendt wrote not to 
defend Rousseau, but to attack him.66 She implied with these words it is simply wrong for 
persons to presuppose they alone are ‘the’ good people: they should know better than to 
pretend that only their actions will become actions of great historical and extraordinary 
constitutional legitimacy.
Second, the political realm may appear to be an ambivalent and paradoxical realm 
not because it is political, but because politics itself ends up being misunderstood. 
According to Arendtian realism, however, politics is about how orderliness emerges from 
“power, passion, and reason.” Politics is the (Aristotelian) restoration of a power within 
which “obedience and support are the same.” Political obedience would be non-existent, 
thus, without many obedient persons—which can only mean that they will have grown 
mutually dependent. Their relationship of constitutional inter-dependence and inter-
reliance, of ruling and of being ruled, however, are sustained on this condition: the 
faculties of “reason” must as much have appeared to lead the “passions” within 
government institutions, as well as that they can lead among individual dispositions. The 
government becomes only well-ordered and well lasting after sufficiently many actors 
will have appeared confident and convinced that their individual faculties (their internal 
forums) are thus indeed mimicking those of the world (an external court), and its natural 
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rationality (proportionality). Whereas the power of the one (over all) amounts to an 
impossibility, and whereas the power of the all (against the one) amounts to a “pre-
political” violence, the power of promising is genuinely political. It was only “in colonial 
America, prior to the Revolution, [that this] ... power was kept in existence by the then-
newly discovered means of promise and covenant.”67
Third, Arendt understands that politics is power and that power is politics because 
she also understands that their relationship is grounded in speech, and that no speech-act 
can be left to chance. There is no single “God-Man” whose power would be so great that 
it creates either random speech or random events closed off to speech.68 Leo Strauss 
developed a very different idea of power, suggesting that power does mimic fate.69 A 
Straussian power or civilization is being guided by a higher-order: a “hidden hand.” 
Arendt’s refutation of such an image is distinct from Machiavelli’s refutation (she claims 
in On Revolution), because only she would be asking this: “how to conduct human affairs 
without the help of a transcendent God”—and how to begin “something new” without 
presupposing that its first and final cause will have to be such a God. Not the Aristotelian 
“chain of causality” but the “coincidence” of both “freedom and necessity” animates 
politics. New things might certainly be imagined to have happened either “at random” or 
to have been presented “in the guise of necessity”—but these imagined/imaginary events 
themselves can still not also be believed to have been their own final cause. Together 
with Duns Scotus, Arendtian realism warns against any invocation of beliefs in political 
history’s transcendent causation, because any such an image of a “causative element in 
human affairs ... condemns them to contingency and unpredictability.”70
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The paradox of the political, as many realists can agree, is not much more than a 
paradox that gives expression to a constitutionally contingent tension between freedom 
and necessity. But Arendt took (with the above words) another position: both necessity 
(the historical past) as well as freedom (the common future) are contingent to human 
action. The paradox is thus not just that there is tension between the two dimensions of 
action, but that necessity would certainly also make it impossible to negate the past, while 
freedom would again make it just as impossible to negate the future. From within the 
tension between necessity and freedom, then, contingencies emerge. 
Government can sometimes act retroactively, but they can never be allowed to act 
arbitrarily, and to somehow turn “actions past” into meaningless events unworthy of 
remembrance. The affairs of government are no self-fulfilling prophecies, in other words, 
unless government would have dissolved into totalitarianism, perhaps. Yet, as 
particularly Weber persists, seconded by Arendt, no government may randomly decide on 
its future course of action—regardless how free government is. Each government’s 
futures should thus never be randomly-chosen, because such (seemingly) ‘free’ choices 
would not just violate all reason; they would also violate the precept that human beings 
believe that their chance encounters with the world (might) not to be completely 
random.71 Moreover, limits on randomness (rather than on contingency) can help 
reintroduce government to its own belief in the systemic possibility that an originally 
legitimized, and possibly non-rational, entity may mysteriously have transcended itself: 
that a transcendent constitution exists, even if it has never taken on a basic law-structure. 
For Arendt, hence, the question of self-government (isonomy) can neither result from a 
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meaningless past nor from an entirely random but rational God—and neither from 
prophecy nor from providence either. With Hobbes in the background, rather, Arendtian 
realism holds that the only alternative to both such results must be prudence: the power to 
care for chance inter-dependencies within the relationship between both reason and 
passion or, rather, between both the laws of the intellect and ‘free’ will as well.
This nuanced approach to politics shares very little with the mid-twentieth-
century’s legal positivist and other liberal philosophical approaches. Some legal 
philosophers, including Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, have claimed that at least the 
idea of a basic constitutional law can ‘grace’ the people with their equal rights.72 From an 
Arendtian realist perspective, to the contrary, either these philosophers must have been 
prophesying or they were lying whenever they said they had no personal presumptions 
about the ultimate meaning of that basic law. Whenever philosophers claim that a state’s 
basic law has been ‘graced’ by the deliberations of some collective Immortal Legislator 
(even including the ‘Framers’ and ‘Fathers’ who convened in Philadelphia), they are still 
presuming that such a collective Legislator had to have held the final responsibility for 
creating that basic law. However, Arendt insists, it simply should not be tolerated for 
anyone to presume the absolute or even not the causal existence of such a collective First 
Legislator, “[who] would give sanction to positive, posited laws.”73 This presumption is 
only modern: it follows from the eighteenth-century ideal that “the Legislator must be 
outside of and above his own laws; but, in antiquity it was not the sign of a god but the 
characteristic of a tyrant to impose on the people laws by which he himself would not be 
bound.”74
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In the seventeenth century, philosophers were (unbeknown to themselves) paving 
the way for modernism and liberalism. They were observing the state as a machine: as if 
its functions had been designed and had been caused by a First Legislator. Thinkers at 
that time would thus too often have believed, as Arendt summarizes her longer 
discussion, of the paradox of the political, that some absolutely immortal entity had 
‘graced’ the prince in such a way “that divine power, being by definition the power of 
[o]ne, could appear on Earth only as superhuman strength, that is, strength multiplied and 
made irresistible by the means of violence.”75
Arendt’s nuanced interpretation of the paradox makes it possible to understand 
why the power of one is no power, but sheer violence. The prince whose power derives 
from some single chain of causes is a prince whose moral claims should be dismissed as 
mere prophecies. Such claims cannot be allowed to legitimize the use of violence. In 
sharp contrast to liberal philosophy, further, Arendt argues that whoever believes that 
“the means of violence” are to be justified by their own singularity, or by the state’s 
irresistible unicity, is performing a bad magic trick. The trick creates an illusion: violence 
only seems to have been justified by the end of liberating “the life process” from its own 
necessity and its own scarcity, whereas violence is in fact only being justified by a 
providential type of prediction. Thus, whoever claims to be liberating life itself from the 
iron shackles of “historical necessity” is cheating. Any modernist prince would be 
cheating when he prophesizes, like the neo-Hegelian and Leninist philosophers came to 
do as well, the coming moment of “liberation from the curse of poverty”—and “from the 
fetters of scarcity” as well. His princely prophecy may end up cheating even himself, by 
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thus invoking “historical necessity”, because its own rationality forms a barrier against 
any discussants who perhaps had wanted to present him with conjectural alternatives and 
other empirical examples.76 Together with the prince’s first historical cause, as well as 
with tyranny, neo-Hegelianism forms both an imprudent and unethical basis for legal 
philosophy and IR theory as well.77
One sample of neo-Hegelianism can be found in the conclusion to On the Jewish 
Question, where Marx promises that history will irreversibly reach a synthesis of both 
human rights and civil rights, of the political state and of civil society, as well as of each 
state’s “practical need” (“species-existence”) and of its own “ideal representation” (its 
“supersession of law”).78 As Hegel had done, so would the young Marx promise that the 
“existent state” is becoming historically and factually identical to the “rational state.”79 In 
contrast to neo-Hegelianism, advanced practices in realism cannot help theorists to 
prophesize a coming synthesis and identity of contrary terms. Realism maintains the 
paradox of the political, instead. Friedrich Meinecke helps (realist) IR theorists to respect 
the deeply ambivalent, deeply contingent, and yet also the well-constitutionalized modes 
of political authority. As Meinecke writes, Hegel would erroneously have promised the 
coming of a full and factual identity of—and, thereby, also a final ceasing of the classical 
dualism—“between the individual or actual state and the best or [the] rational state.”80 By 
contrast to Hegel’s promise, realists argue that the authority of the state is neither actual 
nor rational alone: it is neither constitutionally nor rationally good. Instead, the state’s 
ambivalent authority emerges from the kind of contrariness that is inherent to each 
politically constitutional (contingent) organizational process. State authority is, thus, 
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never final and “ever-lasting” but it is also never straightforwardly logical, nor is it 
absolutely random. Rather, authority has to have remained grounded in a perpetual 
constitutional process, “birthless as well as deathless”, so that authority continues to hold 
out its own human potential to be ungrounded—and to thus become perpetually 
imbalanced—at its own hands: a mystery, perhaps, but not a chicken-egg paradox.81 In 
sum, realists such as Arendt and Hobbes can help IR theorists in making the case that the 
state’s emergent authority simply cannot cohere with any appeals to the final, synthetic, 
and infinite aspects of state power. Any such appeals would, rather, have to have a 
chilling effect on political virtues, which should instead be believed to have remained 
essential in efforts to conceptually and ingenuously sustain the state’s legal personality 
(which is, really, to be believed in as if it were a homo artificialis). To use Meinecke’s 
words, but as Hobbes could also himself have said, these sorts of appeals have to have a 
stifling effect on both “human ingenuity” and “tranquility.”82
In the emergence of sovereignty, to conclude the above sections, multitude and 
people coincide. The multitude is “deathless” in the sense of it being comprised of 
individuals and their passions (or it comprises the “willing”, as Arendt calls this element). 
But the people are “birthless” in that they multiply not just their physical strength, as an 
unordered multitude, but are also embedding reasoning processes (“thinking”) without 
any first causes. The tragedy of politics is that modernist or positivist philosophers at 
some point were assigning a “power ever-lasting” or a “power transcendent” to the 
people and their actions—in the form of a synthetic nation-state. This modern power 
lacked any meaningful purpose, however, and because power without a purpose is no 
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genuinely political power, the nation-state can also not be believed to ever finally 
transcend individual ends. The nation-state may be a means to an end, but it does not 
have the common power that Arendt (together with her unlikely ally, Hobbes) believed 
any state’s government should instead be holding indefinitely. Revolutions should be 
believed to have remained a contingent feature of the constitutional state, instead.
Hegelians express a certain fear that without a transcendent common purpose, and 
without acts of promising, there would be no civil society and even no people. There 
would only be the impoverished and illiberal multitudes, they fear. But Hobbes 
alternatively imagined such multitudes of individuals not to be living in a state of nature, 
and yet also not in a state without society. Rather, Hobbes was a realist in the sense that 
he said that individuals in the state of nature will have to be living without any 
meaningful language and without any binding laws—even though they will more than 
likely be trying to retain their common purpose, which is their existential security.83 For 
Hobbes, the paradox is framed by the notion that without any laws of nature there also 
can be no state of nature. Together with both Arendt and Hobbes, and other realists, 
henceforth, it can be believed impossible for human beings to liberate themselves from 
their own interests and their own needs—by means of a violent current—because such a 
form of liberation will form nothing but a direct reference to the ends all individuals have 
as individuals, but not to any meaningful purpose they will nonetheless be sharing as a 
society. The instruments and the means that would be required to accomplish such 
individual ends, now, belong to the type of means that cannot but be applied in violation 
of the notion of a people, of social animals, and therefore also not in rejection of “the 
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authority of the body politick”.84 This type of means is never completely transcended, but 
is also somehow included by sovereign authority.
The issue may now come to the table, as an afterthought, that Arendt never 
answered the question of which meanings should be bestowed on (sovereign) authority. 
Indeed, she calls authority “the most elusive” of concepts (she does this as part of her 
discussion of the qualitative difference between power and violence). With Orwell, 
however, Arendt could have argued that authority refers any action that is not neutral but 
politically interdependent. Authority could then refer to a spontaneous and free 
recognition of the need for political partisanship. She could even have so referenced 
authority in support of her own thought that “[authority’s] hallmark is unquestioning 
recognition: ... neither coercion nor persuasion is needed.”85 Certainly, the meaning of 
authority is ambivalent. As Arendt’s critics may point out, her concept of authority seems 
to refer to something outside the flux of time: to something unchanging and yet infinite. 
In defense of Arendt, now, she would certainly not have wanted to reduce authority to 
things infinite. For instance, authority is not a thing subject to persuasion (deliberation), 
nor to coercion (decision), because that would imply that authority had become subject to 
power: it would no longer be spontaneous. This further means that authority cannot 
emerge from a quantifiable scale: only power can be quantified. It should, rather, be 
believed to emerge from within a qualitatively different dimension of politics. It emerges 
from within a dimension in which actions appear to be remembered and to be anticipated 
by an audience: actions are herein being believed, however heterogeneously they might 
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be appearing, to still exemplify a particular body politick’s immeasurably common
purposes.
Hobbes on the Monarchy and Cognitions of the Two Spheres of Political Action
It is worth looking a bit longer at definitions of monarchy, and how these have 
made contact with the ambivalent emergence of public authority. Especially in Leviathan, 
Hobbes refines and alters Aristotle’s definition, which simply had held that monarchy is 
one supreme office among many: its organizing principle would have to be unicity within
multiplicity. Also, Aristotle had still used this analogy: as how the father of all the gods 
relates to them, so is the king related (as a father) to all the state’s citizens. “A king ought 
to be naturally superior to his subjects, and yet of the same stock as they are”.86 Or, a 
king should act as if he were a peer of his subjects, even though he is certainly not equal 
in age nor in strength. Aristotle added to this that the monarch’s superiority could be the 
source of his own equality. His prerogative is thus to be legitimized by its own self-
limitation: “The less the area of his prerogative, the longer will the authority of a king last 
unimpaired.”87 The question is how royal supremacy and popular autonomy, ruler and 
ruled, are coming together in this one relationship of self-limitation.
This section is an inquiry into why Hobbes agrees, and sometimes disagrees, with 
Aristotelian scholasticism on the significance of this relationship, and why Oakeshott’s 
gaze at the same relationship has to result in a painful divorce or in a philosophical 
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dichotomy, rather than in a union of opposites (as Hobbes originally intended for it to do, 
instead).
Hobbes agrees with Aristotle, sofar, on the definition of monarchy. But he 
disagrees with the latter’s creating the possibility for a monarchical person not being 
believed to transcend all his peers. Hobbes argues that monarchy should instead be 
treated as one of three significant names (the other names being democracy and 
aristocracy), each of which refers exclusively to one of three possible types of power, and 
their corresponding sovereign states—as opposed to the powers within one constitutional 
mixture.88
The three names may never be used to refer to the constitutional components of 
one and the same state, however, so that they should also not be lending moral 
justifications to mixtures of monarchy and aristocracy, for example.89 Rather, the name 
monarchy must apply only to those states where “one man” is not just a mortal individual 
but also “the person [legally] representative of all and everyone of the multitude”. As this 
person will here be considered wholesome, and be believed to be immortal, some of the 
states with merely mortal kings would therefore perhaps be better off to rename 
themselves and be called either an aristocracy or a democracy, because herein 
respectively “either ... more [than one] or all must have the sovereign power ... indivisible 
[and] entire.”90
Still, Hobbes can well agree with Aristotle that even though the monarch holds 
the highest office, this does not mean that the monarch also holds unlimited or absolute 
authority. In most states, it would seem, the king is limited in his executive power by his 
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peers. This limitation, created by either an aristocratic council or a democratic assembly, 
then helps bestow legitimacy on the actions of the mortal king or the temporary dictator, 
as well. But the limitation itself cannot confer legitimacy onto the constitution as a whole. 
By its very presence, the act of limitation is what divides the state into separate elements.
Against (neo)Aristotelian scholars and theologians, Hobbes argues that the 
sovereign power of the state itself is “indivisible”—regardless as to whether the 
sovereign person consists of one or of more than one nobles, or even of all the 
commoners. The sovereign person can therefore not be a numerical person, but has to be 
a qualitative person, as Hobbes had learned from Valla.91 Yet, this qualitatively complex 
and presumably immortal person, somehow, will also have to have incorporated a 
number of mortal bodies. Some such bodies may be those of mortal kings, who have 
indeed been limited in their quantitative power, by others. The Spartan kings (in Sparta, 
“the sovereignty was in the Ephorate”, as Hobbes adds) as well as the Roman dictators 
(and various sorts of high court-officials and presidents) were not sovereign persons, for 
example, as they had clearly been believed to have been incorporated by such 
transcendent persons (the Spartans had of course been known, to Hobbes, via Aristotle, as 
absolute egalitarians).92 The most intriguing premise in Hobbes’s argument holds, now, 
that despite their obvious (executive) supremacy, any such limited kings would not have 
been considered “superior to him or them that have the [legislative] power to limit it; and 
he that is not superior, is not supreme.”93
Wherever a queen will have been legislatively prevented from appointing her own 
successor, her authority is no longer that of a sovereign monarchy. That country’s state 
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will instantly have to be renamed: it must either be named an aristocracy or a democracy. 
This may sound odd, but Hobbes uses this oddity to help explain that because not all 
kings and queens have been self-appointed, and because not even all monarchies are 
hereditary (physically), either one of the two other régime-types can take over its 
authority-forming principle of singularity.94 The singular-succession principle, in other 
words, can be adopted by an assembly in which both the few and the many or, otherwise, 
either the few or the many begin to meet each other—into perpetuity—in order for either 
the few or the many to be recognized (qualitatively and metaphysically), as if they 
formed only one sovereign person.95
Successions are emblematic of two inter-locking dimensions, both of which show 
what it is that makes the state into a sovereign state. In the first dimension, both 
Aristotle’s one-man rule and Hobbes’s singularity-of-succession appear. Political 
theorists borrow even today from this first succession principle when, for instance, they 
refer to a dynastical line of sovereigns or to a single lineage of persons, perpetually 
holding the same presidential office. However, in the second dimension, this one-person 
lineage begins to couple itself to an organizational principle of equal treatment or to a 
sense of equality. The “unimpaired” (Aristotle) and the “unlimited” (Hobbes) authority of 
the one-person is here and now being coupled to this person’s office. Although the person 
may not be naturally equal to other persons, her office somehow has to have become 
equal to the offices of many other subjects and assemblypersons.
If the coupling of person to office, or if sovereignty’s two-dimensionality is to be 
taken seriously, then sovereignty already can no longer be said to refer solely to the unity 
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of a group of natural-born persons. It refers not only to a population. Rather, two-
dimensional sovereignty consists from now onwards both of the natural persons as well 
as of their legal personalities. It consists also of their equal representation as office-
holders or, say, of their roles as citizens with an equal right to serve in office. With 
Arendt, it is probably possible to find that sovereignty means simply that groups of social 
animals come together within a physical and sensory dimension, while these groups also 
have to meet in a shared dimension wherein they will perform as citizen-officials and as 
assemblypersons who may either approve or disapprove of their own successions to 
power.96
The sovereign state is comprised both by the principle that the succession of 
persons is a natural and singular principle (as it would be in a patriarchy), as well as by 
the popular acts and the citizen decisions that then legitimize this succession principle. 
But should a sovereign person not be born from either the singularity of the government 
or the unity of the people, and should this person not only be derived either from 
government supremacy or from popular autonomy? In other words, why may sovereign 
authority not emerge from either a supreme power or from a good people—but, perhaps, 
rather only from both constituent parts?
Hobbes comes up with a creative answer. He certainly accepts that sovereignty 
comprises, or at least should include, the unity of many people. At this point, Hobbes 
seems to have begun to defend the unicity of multiplicity, indeed, because some 
qualitatively unique sort of monarchical unit may be believed to transcend, and yet to 
also incorporate all sorts of quantitative pluralities. He must have read parts of Lorenzo 
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Valla, to search for support for this defense, however, because the latter theologian had 
broken with Aristotelian metaphysics at a quite similar point. Valla had, to put it very 
briefly, reduced various of the known metaphysical predicaments to only two or three 
types or qualities, so that all predicaments could be classified as one of these three: 
“substance, quality, action.” Also, these three concrete qualities would somehow have to 
be trusted to form (faithful) mirrors of God’s far more abstract and ‘accidental’ qualities: 
“eternity, wisdom, goodness.” As a defender of realism, and as a follower of Valla, 
among others, thus, Hobbes must have seen it as his task to use a dialectical method 
which will be pairing temporal substances to their own eternal spirituality: which will 
pair substantive powers to their spiritual goodness, and the passions to compassion as 
well. Paganini elaborates: Hobbes thinks this method is best used to pair “the name of a 
[concrete] body (that is a substance) to the name of an ‘accident’ or ‘phantasm’, that is to 
an abstract name.”97
The plurality of all citizens, and their legislative assemblies, should be believed to 
have the quality of singularity. This requires is a leap of faith, however, because no 
human being can know for sure whether all citizens have indeed the same beliefs and 
doctrines in common. Yet, in a Christian commonwealth it may be possible to couple, 
dialectically, the wealth of self-interested individuals to their own functioning as self-
regulating citizens. The difference between a mere commonwealth and a Christian 
commonwealth is of the essence, however, because Hobbes suggests that the dialectical 
method is also a theological method. The many hereditary lines of all natural-born 
persons, for example, may be said to form one multitudinous grouping and yet if these 
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persons will not believe they have been represented by one personal Church, or will not 
have confessed to the Resurrection (as analogy for their own self-rejuvenation), then they 
also will not trust they have been equally incorporated by the sovereign “Mortal God”—
who mirrors that one “Immortal God.”98 “For the good of the sovereign and people 
cannot be separated.”99 That is, unless they agree to be incorporated by one sovereign 
person, the people will not believe that their own common power represents God’s 
goodness.
Most twenty-first century political theorists know that Hobbes’s state emerges 
from a contract or from a covenant, more precisely. Natural-born human beings have 
promised to obey the state’s office-holders, for as long as that the latter guard and protect 
them from physical harm. Each citizen will have to have chosen to be represented by, and 
thus to have authorized one guardian who may control all state officials in order to best 
protect them and their properties. What is less well known, perhaps, is that when human 
beings authorize their guardian to protect and defend them, either legally or in war, they 
also must recognize this sovereign person for two reasons. They must be following 
neither the laws of honor, nor the laws of nature. The issue is, rather, that they should 
somehow be obeying both laws. The laws of honor prevent human beings from breaking 
their promises, but the laws of nature demand their trust that cheats and free-riders will be 
punished and fined.100
The issue is that although the “sign” of sovereignty lends its significance, 
symbolically, to a covenant, this does not always mean that the symbol will be 
meaningful and that it will also be recognized as such.101 Natural-born beings do not have 
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be be represented by ‘legal guardians’ or other such symbolic persons of authority. They 
may very well choose to continue to belong to the unrepresented and unincorporated 
multitudes. Because it would be every citizen’s free will to either follow only the laws of 
honor or only the laws of nature, Hobbes would have been stuck, according to several 
theorists. He never demonstrated why both types of law will be obeyed. 
Nonetheless, in light of the above remarks, Hobbes thought of the sovereign 
person as a complex person, following both the principles of singularity as well as of 
plurality. If he premised that singularity is also a principle of honor, and plurality of 
natural law, then perhaps it can be concluded that the sovereign person is obeyed because 
of this complex person’s duality. How may this conclusion be validated?
Although more will have to be said, on the issue, in later sections—and 
specifically in those of Chapter Four—about Hobbes’s strange division of the realm of 
ultimate authority into the twin principles of unicity and multiplicity, and into the twin 
dimensions of the artificial citizen and of natural men, Hobbes-scholar Michael 
Oakeshott observes that these dimensions cannot compromise each other’s integrity—and 
even exclude each other. To appropriate Arendt’s notion of commonsense, then, 
Oakeshott’s observation suggests that physical sense experiences, which can be felt in 
common (and that are intuitive or, literally, supernatural), cannot do any harm to the 
empirical sense experiences, and how these latter experiences are being communicated, 
narrated, and corroborated by all human beings (by virtue of their own nature).102
Essentially, the issue is whether and how natural sense experiences can be validated by a 
single supernatural reasoning process—which is the issue of how according to 
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Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hobbes, there is no supernatural rationality in the universe. 
What is supernatural and absolutely common is something that cannot be rationally 
known, says Oakeshott. The Master from Malmesbury, on this interpretation, would have 
to have assumed that reasoning processes consensually follow from the many laws of 
nature that are not metaphysical: reasoning citizens will ultimately follow their sense 
experiences, and act sensibly, and thus also common-sensically because there is only one 
reason to do so. Rationality is the cause of their movements and their actions, not non-
rationality.
To elaborate, Oakeshott seems to have presupposed that a Hobbesian individual 
(“Man”) suffers from passionate desires for power, and especially from surplus 
metaphysical passions. Suffering is the idea that everyone does have at least some 
“illusion about power” (pride and diffidence), or an “opinion about power” (honor and 
glory), but that nobody is necessarily reasonable about the proper/proportionate functions 
of power. Hobbes would therefore have chosen to derive his social and political 
philosophy not from naturally proportionate, but from reasonably good things (his 
philosophy is directed against, indeed, the Aristotelian proper mean). Oakeshott further 
explains that all these good things must have been rational things, for Hobbes, so that 
they could not have been derived from “observation” and would only have to have come 
from “the rational world.”103 He then considerably downplays the significance of 
Hobbes’s own analogy, however, because he does not explain why this “rational world” 
would still very much have been metaphor for, and a mirror-image of the non-rational 
world over which God alone may preside.
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Hobbes did, admittedly, write that all individuals tend to opine about power as if 
it were the effect of their ambitions. Power is caused by individuals who use it as the 
means to satisfy their ends “of riches, of knowledge, and of honor”—so that power must 
logically become something very divisive. There is never sufficient power to go ‘around.’ 
But he also found that select individuals (most notably Moses, with the aid of the High 
Priest) in the Old Testament, had understood power in transmundane terms: they had 
served as God’s vicars on Earth. This is ultimately why “the Kingdom of God is a civil 
kingdom.”104 In reminding theorists of God’s Kingdom on Earth, it becomes possible to 
demonstrate that Oakeshott’s own explanation is too modern and possibly too liberal as 
well. Mistakenly, it holds that Hobbes would nearly-only have wanted to exclude 
anything non-rational—and thus would have excluded even “God’s government” within 
the human world—from political philosophy.
Oakeshott says in fact that Hobbes would have excluded even “things infinite, 
things eternal, [and] ... theology and faith.” Such things could well be believed to exist, in 
another period of time (in the time of Moses, probably), but the “rational world” itself 
can in the modern era only be said to remain analogous to a machine-like thing. Hobbes 
could not have argued otherwise than that progress functions like a machine in which 
political powers obey not the laws of eternal Creation, hence, but or only except the laws 
of logic. For Oakeshott’s secular Hobbes, then, all empiricism goes out the window. In 
alleviating suffering, individuals should instead depend on their rationally-correct use of 
power—by analogy to how an “immediate effect” depends on its “immediate cause.”105
The issue with this point in Oakeshott’s interpretation is now, apparently, that it has far 
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too cleanly separated the rational from the non-rational, and thereby has isolated bare 
logic from any transmundane beliefs that could otherwise have been transcending even 
the barest form of logic itself. For, although transmundane beliefs may not be empirically 
observable, this does not they cannot be more or less reasonably communicated. God 
communicates through mysteries or, in Hobbes’s own words, God speaks to people 
through their “lots”, “visions”, and “angels.”106 To simply say that Hobbes excludes these 
non-rational mysteries from his philosophical system is to needlessly downgrade its 
political theological caliber.
By contrast, realist interpreters argue that Hobbes actually found that rational 
knowledge is not always compatible with laws of nature, or commonsensical laws, yet 
should continue to form a mystical union with these latter laws. William E. Connolly 
would probably concur, on realist grounds, that all the various cultural expressions and 
all the logical validations of the use of power cannot be understood by means of bare, 
objective reasoning.107 Knowledge of cultural expressions, of particular symbols and rich 
representations, is instead a bit like Arendt’s notion of commonsense: it is a conjunction 
far more subjective, open to judgment, and intuitive than is usually being presupposed by 
bare rationalists.
Commonsensical knowledge emerges as if it were ‘second nature’ rather than as if 
it were an objective logic. Chapter Four more elaborately demonstrates why Hobbes 
argues that human knowledge, including the human passions, is subject to commonsense. 
Human knowledge is a sensible social convention. As a political realist, he also knew 
these conventions themselves not to be contingent on deliberations alone. Rather, 
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conventions and mores hide the implicit ends of power (individual wealth, reputational 
honor) to which they are often quite decisively being subjected. Not all cognition may be 
empirical, but empirical experiences of power are certainly open to cognition.
The issue Oakeshott creates, mostly for himself, is that he has read Hobbes’s civil 
scientific system as if it dominates Hobbes’s theological system. This leads Oakeshott to 
conclude no cognitions of power should be empirical, because rational cognitions are 
more objective and therefore less erroneous. This conclusion still spreads itself, 
needlessly, throughout the disciplinary field, however, because Oakeshott’s conception of 
rational knowledge is that it is either true or false. Herein, it cannot be otherwise than that 
power is subject to a binary logic.
Contrary to Oakeshott’s interpretation, as Machiavelli will help demonstrate, 
Hobbes’s own conception must have been less binary, less dichotomous, and more non-
dualistic. It quite apparently involves a rational relationship between right and wrong 
applications of power. In this sense, Hobbes did not fully break free from scholasticism, 
for he still accepted the notion that there will be some sort of proper ratio, or some 
rational proportion within the relation between two qualitatively-different powers. One of 
these powers has been passionately desired, by fallible beings, whereas the other is a 
common power, which is the outcome of their rational decisions. If Leviathan were to be 
read in its entirety, then this common power, or this covenanted sovereign, in the end 
somehow still proportionally mirrors yet other kind of power: the power of compassion 
and goodness. This mirror-effect then further implies that the sovereign as a whole (the 
common/wealth, or the dragon/machine) cannot be understood without Hobbes’s 
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metaphor of Christ’s mystical non-duality (Son of God/Son of Man). This metaphor will 
have to be re-appreciated elsewhere (Chapter Four), as it is of greater urgency to locate 
Oakeshott’s mistake—and its potentially damaging effects on IR concepts of sovereignty.
For, Oakeshott further suggests that Hobbes considered merely a series of 
theorems and dicta: he would never have developed a general theory, nor an integrated 
system. Hobbes would never have wanted to create systems theory, even. He simply 
aimed to separate cognitions derived from rational communications from those cognitions 
that are influenced by empirical, sensory data: he would have aimed to exclude the 
sensing bodies from their rational minds, in other words. Oakeshott admits that Hobbes 
was closer affiliated with Pascal and Augustine rather than with Descartes, but he here 
nevertheless suggests Hobbes’s cognitions solely derived from a solitary Cartesian 
mind.108 This puzzle can be completed, certainly, but only on condition that Hobbes 
further informs his readers about the analogical relation between the spheres of minds 
and of bodies, between word-power and sword-power, or between the criteria of 
metaphysical proportionality and physical movement as well.
On condition that Hobbes appropriated Valla’s dialectical method, he would not 
have wanted to reconcile law and force, nor the two spheres of political action. He would 
much rather have wanted to rejuvenate their foundational relation, perhaps, as he also 
must have realized the spheres were ultimately irreconcilable. In the dimension of the 
sword, politics is what binds persons to a common power, whereas in the dimension of 
word-power, politics tends to result from the speech acts of solipsistic, proud, egoistic 
individuals. Indicative of Oakeshott’s work on Hobbes is this sentence, however, as it all 
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too clearly separates the two above-developed dimensions. Individual “man” is in the 
sentence being separated from the artificially-created power that “springs” from this 
“man” in his capacity as a religious believer. For, only in this latter capacity is he holding 
his power in common with others: “The seed of religion, like that of reasoning, is in the 
nature of man, though what springs from that seed, a specific set of religious beliefs and 
practices, is an artifact.”109
Admittedly, Hobbes himself would not have said it much differently: both 
religion and reason do indeed express themselves in a wide variety of social artifacts and 
communicative institutions. The issue is, Oakeshott continues as follows, against 
Leviathan’s original grain: the natural-born man becomes now rational man. Natural 
man’s reasoning process would allow him to become completely “individualized”—or a 
Cartesian (completely disembodied) mind, perhaps? Oakeshott finds apparently that 
Hobbesian individualization has nothing to do with individuation or personal growth, for 
mental reasoning must here be the predominant cause of the individual’s self-interest, 
making him, “by nature, the victim of solipsism: he is an individua substantia
distinguished by incommunicability.”110
As a point of criticism, directed at conservative and modernist Oakeshott-
followers alike, Hobbes is much more a scholastic dialectician than they might have 
imagined. He actually discourages any analytical separations of the natural man from the 
artificial person, or of the word-power from the common power as well. Instead, Hobbes 
trusts natural man to grow as a person precisely because all persons will have to suffer 
from a dialectical sense, or a conjectured sense of open-endedness: from an all-too-
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human (dispositional) crack in between their rational (speech) acts, which are self-
interested, and their non-rational (faithful) obedience to laws of nature, which again give 
them impetus to design and institutionalize associations serving a joint cause—for ‘the’ 
common good. Leviathan: men who have “natural prudence” will still have the power to 
distrust “reason”—because natural men are less likely than social men to “fall upon false 
and absurd general rules.” And although natural men may be ignorant about the legal 
rules and social institutions of the world, this ignorance “does not set [them] so far out of 
their way as [their] relying on false rules.”111 There is very little “incommunicable”, then, 
about these natural men. Hobbes turns against the social man, much rather, who will 
become confused by his own use of word-power, and by his communicative socialization, 
and who might therefore start to prepare for his solipsistic withdrawal from ‘the’ 
common power-associations.
To now revisit the well-known issue of why Montesquieu differs so clearly from 
Hobbes: in Montesquieu’s opinion there is nothing wrong with social man. It may be a 
familiar refrain to sing but Montesquieu moves away from Machiavelli on grounds such 
as that the Florentine Secretary’s republic would have remained too close to natural men, 
and that he himself had even been too much of a dialectician, allowing too many 
tumultuous events to be necessary for associational freedom. (To the French Baron’s 
horror, in Machiavelli’s republics anyone may accuse anyone.)112 With this in mind, 
Oakeshott is moving away from Hobbes on the same grounds. He, like the Baron, abhors 
that perplexing distinction between men who remain so obedient to laws of nature that 
they must be called immature, first, and those men who have been raised in a civil 
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society, second. For, Oakeshott presupposes, the first kind of laws are to be included by 
those of the second, so that a civil society can develop independently of any laws of 
nature. Montesquieuan conceptions of civil society are even today being admired, 
especially within the IR field. There are too many IR scholars to name who still praise 
Montesquieu’s arguing that commercial trade and international socialization (and, 
thereby, the proliferation of civil mores) are preconditions for the national creation of 
democratic institutions.113
What is Montesquieu doing, for the canon and for IR? Some find him running 
back and forth “between Cartesian rationalism and Newtonian empiricism”, for instance, 
while others say he only ended up with a “potpourri” of ill-combined topics.114 But if 
some are right, and if Montesquieu’s conception of what it means to live in a free state 
would indeed be a conception that blends both empirical data about so many societies 
with the Cartesian analysis that presupposes a separation between social and natural men, 
then perhaps Oakeshott has been reading Hobbes through Montesquieuan lenses. 
According to Hobbes, to switch lenses, natural and social men are caught up in an 
ambivalent relationship: as natural-born men they all have mortal bodies (and which 
render their empirical data), yet they also vest powers in these bodies which they then 
begin to honor as if they belong to immortal persons (to which they attribute great levels 
of rationalism).115 In other words, Hobbes finds it is the relation of both empirical-
external and internal-rational cogitations, or also between natural passion and social 
reasoning, that is suffering from its own ambivalence. Hobbes probably never tried to 
dichotomize external passion and internal reason, nor to exclude one from the other, 
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because the sovereign never incorporates the passions of a power-hungry multitudes, yet 
Hobbes (evidently not unlike Machiavelli) puts almost all his trust in a spontaneous 
“mutation” of these same multitudes into a well-ordered and unified people.116 “A 
multitude of men are [so] made one person: ... they are [represented] by one man or one 
person.” He adds: “For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, 
that makes the person one.”117 That is, while the monarchical principle was identical to 
the unicity of multiplicity, the sovereign person holds on to a more elaborate self-
organizing principle. The sovereign person’s internal unicity actively represents the 
external unicity of this person’s own multiplicity, because it is impossible for any 
multiplicity to represent its own external unicity.
To first conclude the above points, Hobbes’s sovereignty concept remains 
ambivalent—in comparison to both Oakeshott’s logic-centric reading, as well as 
compared to Montesquieu’s seemingly Cartesian bend. In all probability, Hobbesian 
realism continues to divide and perplex the political theory field because of ambivalent 
sovereignty. Did Hobbes perhaps indeed intend for it to be that way?
Before answering this follow-up question, and before making another turn 
towards a Hobbesian systems theory, more must be said about the relevancy of the 
question itself. As hinted above, first, the monarchy is not the only type of principality to 
concentrate its power at the top. The common power may just as well have been 
singularized, at least nominally, by aristocracies and empires, or by armies and business 
companies. The common power is also not a numerical power, second, but a 
representation and a personification of the multitudes. In this sense, the “representer” is 
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the first source of a group’s political independence, and the multitudes the second source. 
Both sources should somehow manage to remain co-constitutive, as there can be no 
emergent authority without a mysterious relation between these elemental sources. In 
other words, the source of rational autonomy (unicity) is equally a part of dual 
sovereignty as that the source of physical supremacy (multiplicity) will be. All other 
things the same, autonomy’s representational character (unicity) still somehow precedes 
the role performed by supremacy (multiplicity).
Aristotle observes that human beings are only partially autonomous. They are 
partially natural and partially social animals, so that their political societies should be 
founded on their natural individual needs.118 How well the human species grows (not: 
expands) is how well it can integrate individual dependencies with societal 
interdependencies. Hobbes could have agreed with Aristotle, then, that even absolute 
monarchies cannot just decide to reign supreme.119 Every king’s reign has to develop a 
relational dependency on the autonomy of the estate-holders, or court officers, or 
councilors—so that his internal unicity will represent their multiplicity, rather than the 
other way around. (The horror!)
To now also conclude this entire section, there can be no conscionable 
recognitions of any given sovereign state unless both its supreme and its autonomous 
powers will have co-emerged. Today’s predicament is essentially yesterday’s 
predicament, also, because few statespersons can agree on the proportion in which 
supreme-decisive and autonomous-deliberative sources of power should appear into their 
world. Yet, this sort of agreement is long overdue. State officials continue to ignore the 
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deeper connection between their disagreements on the functions of two qualitatively 
different powers, on one side, and their agenda items such as climate crises, diseases, 
weapons arsenal reductions, sporadic governance, and the transnationalization of 
corporate capital, on another.
It would be theoretically impossible to conclude that the qualitative difference 
between sovereignty’s two powers is no long an applicable, meaningful difference, in the 
modern era. Sure, things change. Fewer state officials are being selected and appointed 
by kings and queens. Other things stay the same. None of these officials may serve two 
sovereigns simultaneously. And, no official or diplomat would think it normal and legit if 
anyone of them summarily decides “to stop the public business”. Machiavelli mentions 
the example of Venice’s aberrations: “disorders” had been caused by her sovereign Grand 
Council’s utterly illegitimate decision not to “appoint successors to the magistrates of ... 
the provinces.”120 Or, in Hobbes’s words, the laws of the provinces are not to be trusted 
to be maintained “by virtue of the prescription of time” but because those institutions 
functioning as if they are one sovereign person will also be believed responsible for the 
“civil laws.” Moreover, the civil laws and the laws of nature form constituent parts of 
each other: it would always be both uncivil and unnatural not to be able to trust the 
sovereign to appoint judges—or, not to make their verdicts and ordinances “binding.”121
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Relations of Superiority and Revolution from Aristotle to Arendt
Who should serve the polis as a sovereign person? No answer to this question of 
authority will ever be found: all (sovereign) authority is a dual relationship. It has an 
ambivalent meaning, as the relationship of sovereignty cannot be situated in ‘the’ one 
individual agent and yet is so often believed to be singularly good.122 This section 
reinterprets this relationship’s ambivalence by making note of how the Greeks would 
have felt about this relationship, between superior and subordinate elements, as compared 
to how Arendt suggests it is also always a relationship of mutual respect for autonomy. 
The revolutionary rotations between superior and subordinate parts of every 
constitutional state are expressions of respect for autonomy, so that through the law on 
rotation and from within the tension between supremacy and autonomy, or between 
decision and deliberation, a sense of emergent/sovereign authority may appear.
Aristotle already tried answering the question, of who should govern the polis, but 
his references to a poignant sort of bodies enacting authority over other bodies may 
nowadays seem awkward. His are references to masters governing slaves, simply because 
the former would have relatively more prudent “souls.”123 Aristotle’s unbecoming moral 
justification for slavery, nonetheless, follows from his definition of natural instincts 
rather than from his type of moral or doctrinal reasoning. Slavery is to be defined by the 
relative rather than by the absolute absence of a “soul” and is thus the comparative 
presence of non-rationality. Only in its purest form must slavery be understood as—what 
has elsewhere in the literature been described (by Alan Gilbert) as—Aristotle’s 
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“teleological biology.”124 For, paradoxically, slaves cannot survive very long or, at least, 
not in their purely biological form. If they could survive without any access to rationality, 
then slavery would have to be considered an institutionalized evil: it would presuppose 
that those who serve as slaves were biologically predetermined to do so. However, 
creation only determines that some humans are better work-animals than others, but it 
cannot also determine that humans must be work-animals because they are non-human. 
The idea of slavery is ultimately perverse—both from Aristotle’s and particularly 
also from Plato’s angles—not because either each person “is superior to himself, or 
interior to himself”, as the Athenian Stranger opens a dialogue on political subordination, 
but because it appears that each person can be in both positions. Hence, the polis should 
reserve its positions of superiority for “the part that is most persuasive ... because of its 
age, and also its prudence, ... so as to effect the most good things”. The younger and less 
experienced part does not cause evil things, however, but should be prevented from 
becoming socially conditioned to do such things. The younger, rasher part of the polis
ought to be kept “in a flock [and] like a bunch of colts grazing in a herd.” By denying the 
“flock” access to the market and by censoring the “grooming” effects comical poetry 
could have on them, then, it may become possible to prepare the youngsters for the day 
that they too will have to serve as superiors.125 Socialization may damage young minds, 
once again, but animal-like prudence will be counteractive.
Ever since Aristotle asked which kind of authority must have been uniquely 
determined, not just by social animals but also by their polis, different answers have been 
given to the same archetypal question: whence and whose sovereignty?126 But most such 
184
answers are really dependent on their own references to supremacy, or otherwise to a 
biological or a sexual hierarchy, so that these answers are as in/applicable in world 
politics today as they were two thousand years ago—because the recognition of sovereign 
states follows not just from their hierarchical supremacy, but particularly also always 
from their autonomous belief systems. Nevertheless, Crawford argues that novel norms 
and new treaty obligations (among sovereign states) did at some point in time reduce the 
state’s supremacy. They ended much of the nineteenth-century African slave trade.127
The treaties were also—supposedly for the first time—being closed because racial, racist, 
and biologically justified hierarchies were no longer thought morally acceptable: the 
meaning of hierarchy had been reinterpreted. But Crawford thus says that slave traders 
ended their business because they had been confronted with innovative moral reasons for 
abolition. Just as how enslavers could no longer find any justifications for their trade, so 
would colonizers later be persuaded to give up their territories, and this is how they 
would all have to have made moral progress.128 Still, if moral progress is also anti-
hierarchical progress, then Crawford must neglect the brutal denial of autonomy to 
workers across the world as well as the persistent facts of sex trafficking, child labor, and 
child slavery.129 Why should the latter forms of hierarchy and oppression not have been 
eradicated by means of moral reasoning?
This issue cannot be not solved by referencing sovereignty’s moral, legal, or 
procedural dimension alone. Thus, even though an instance of child prostitution would be 
believed to be a violation of the laws of nature, in any country, according to those who 
operate within this legal-procedural dimension this type of belief cannot explain why this 
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particular form of child slavery (and forms of child pornography, as well) can continue to 
exist despite having been criminalized. Their reason is that child slavery is a more 
persistent form of superiority than that liberal constructivism can help account for. 
Liberal operators usually hope that all slavery can be outlawed, concretely, without a 
complementary popular trust and a religious belief in the abstract idea that slavery 
violates ‘the’ laws of nature. Not unlike Montesquieu, by the way, Crawford expresses 
this same sense of hope when she attempts to scientifically construct a reason for slavery 
to be outlawed, by means of a moral consensus that causes treaty organizations to be 
formed, and that thus causes a positivization of (international) legality, without that she 
asks whether people not also have to be observantly believing in their own idea of an 
amoral law of nature (such as a law of compassionate love) against slavery.130
Crawford’s attempt amounts to an embellishment of Habermas’s “discourse 
ethics”—to the extent that it expands the importance of consensus. It expands 
“communicative action” while limiting “strategic action”—and it expands, therefore, the 
space reserved for short-term, intentional, and especially consensual actions while 
reserving less room for popular beliefs in the goodness of (Creation’s) long-term, 
purposeful actions. In coping with slavery, Crawford proposes consensual and 
deliberative speech in the form of “a person-to-person or case-by-case response.” It 
remains questionable, however, of course, whether all involved persons will indeed have 
a strategic interest in her proposal—especially if they were not yet believing, 
theologically, in those laws that recommend their engaging in “communicative action” 
because doing so would be in their self-interests. So, why should persons not believe that 
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deliberative communications are their strategic interests?131 To Crawford, this is a matter 
of taking ‘beliefs’ out of the equation. But to Aristotle, Arendt, and especially to Hobbes 
it is a matter of making (natural law) ‘beliefs’ compatible but never identical to the 
tension between claims of both deliberation and decision, togetherness and 
purposefulness, or of both personal communication and strategic interests.
Communications need to infringe on interests, according to progressive and 
liberal constructivists. Realists could very well make the alternative case: people should 
not only be deliberatively or consensually or morally opposed to the supremacy of 
enslavers, sexists, and rapists. People should rather also ask themselves whether they 
believe that such social supremacists are committing evils, by disproportionately 
violating their own interest in and their natural law on self-preservation. Each victim of 
supremacy is violated, not just because this victim will have been subordinated to the 
strategic interest of an abuser, but also because the victim’s autonomy-dimension betrays 
its own natural tendency to remain contrary to the abuser’s representation of that strategic 
supremacy-dimension, as well. From this sense of contrariness and opposition between 
these two dimensions, of both supremacy and autonomy, hierarchy and interdependence, 
then, it is possible to observe a far less pure and simple distinction between immoral 
subordination and involuntary dependency or between immoral and amoral, between 
legally and formally illegitimate and possibly unnaturally illegitimate, behaviors. Yet, 
that distinction itself is far from contingent and subjective. It is not contingent on moral 
progress as much as on those laws widely believed to supernaturally maintain social 
interdependencies and systemic proportionalities. Hence, the distinction is alternatively 
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(more realistically) to be understood as part of a conscionable, wise, authoritative 
judgment—and it will be recognizable as such regardless of cultural bias, although not 
always objectively so. No judiciously asserted mode of emergent authority is entirely 
contingent on cultural preference, however. 
Emergent authority may be an archetypical myth, but it cannot be either 
objectively hierarchical or subjectively liberal and fair. It cannot be either supreme or 
autonomous. Alternatively, emergent authority is better understood as a matter of 
isonomy, in which there are no true-or-false myths. The big issue is how any emergent 
authority myth conveys an ultimately meaningful morale, much rather.
Akin to Aristotle’s Politics, Arendt’s work on authority embraces authority’s 
ultimate ambivalence.132 The authority of each state will always be uniquely ambivalent. 
It is contingent on two major political contradictions. First, state authority may be drawn 
from those powers that create a political exception, to the rules of the law, as well as from 
these rules themselves: this exception is according to Schmitt an Ausnahme (abduction, 
or out-take).133 In other words, the exception is the moral/immoral contradiction of 
positive legality, but which has been taken from a political or a transcendent order of 
legality. Second, like all other sources of authority, every state both creates, and yet is 
subject to flux. This is the amoral or historical contradiction of the interdependencies of 
states. State forms of authority may for example be realized, or altered by enemy states. 
Thus, authority remains always subject to the beliefs of different persons, of how they 
communicate their fluctuating opinions, and to their ever-varying images of ideally 
proportioned bodies politick. But these varying opinions and images, however biased 
188
they could be, may also be used to subject these same different persons (the citizen-
subjects) to one particular sovereign state rather than to another.
The presence of the two mentioned contradictions strongly suggests that despite 
the fact that various persons are bringing their moral and legal authority to contingently-
differing realities, the one person in the position of sovereign authority has perpetually 
been believed to have a certain tact or sense of diplomacy—which legitimizes that 
person’s decisions, especially those regarding an enemy, even if the decisions themselves 
were to be believed to have been legitimized by some amoral and extra-legal 
contradiction.
Traditionally, authority was exercised by advisors to the monarchy: by a central 
organ of government. They were counselors who could be asked to help guide the 
executive, prosecutorial, and usually also the adjudicative powers of their state.134 For a 
very long time, as Max Weber knew so well, authority (auctoritas) would not have been 
understood as a power potential—and certainly not as a power of execution—but much 
more as the source of foresight, tact, discretion, good manners (mores), and thus as 
source of all the types of virtuous advise from which the structural powers of the state 
could benefit.135 Today, authority still refers to this classic function of advisory 
judiciousness: it remains a manner of consultation.136 Yet, much has changed since the 
seventeenth century revolutions within the structure of statehood. Hannah Arendt 
mentions that authority—specifically in the American juridical tradition—only after the 
Revolution came to involve the “legal” interpretation of rules, whereas authority would at 
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its core have retained that classic “political” function—or that extra-juridical mode of 
advisory discretion.137
There are many possible levels of contrariness between sovereignty’s legal and 
political functions, yet these levels are interconnected and interdependent. In times of 
peace and plenty, there are few contradictions, and levels of contrariness may be low. In 
revolutionary times, contrariness becomes more intense. Not the so-called Democratic 
Peace theorists, it shall here be demonstrated, but advanced realists (Hobbes, Weber, 
Schmitt) hold that, across the span of many centuries, these intensity and contrariness 
levels would generally have been determined by a mysterious union of two types of 
institutions: the monarchical office with its war prerogatives, first, and the representatives 
of the people with their right to resist unjustifiable war duties, second.138 If a king or 
queen was being advised as a mortal person, it would typically become a matter of the 
powers he or she could apply and how these powers should be effectively executed.139
But if the monarch would be advised as an office-holder, it would become a matter of 
whether these powers were also both legitimate and legal. Had the monarchical office 
also been authorized to use its power under the circumstances, and to act on behalf of the 
public realm?140
The powers of natural-born persons as well as those of the office, held by the head 
of state, are the two main parts out of which sovereignty emerges. Although medieval 
Commentators already finely distinguished between the monarchy’s natural body and its 
perpetual office, the distinction has in the current era become increasingly difficult to 
maintain.141 The long tradition holds that the one source from which authoritative 
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judgments may emerge, legitimately, is both the distinction between as well as the 
combination of mortality and immortality, man and office, and of body and mind. But 
throughout the ages, such authoritative judgments have become corrupted: it is becoming 
more difficult for states to make the distinctions they need to solve problems as various 
as international enmity, separatism, sedition, and conflicts of interest. With Schmitt, these 
problems cannot easily be regulated by law—because, both internationally and 
constitutionally, there are never enough laws being posited to make sense of problems 
requiring a popular faith in political solutions.142
The historical fact that monarchical offices have benefited from their access to 
discretionary authority is indisputable. Even during the most intense revolutionary years 
in modern history—such as experienced in 1848, 1871, in the 1905 soviets and 
Germany’s 1919 republic of the councils, in Budapest 1956 and Cairo 2011—popular 
assemblies succeeded in organizing power but failed to replace every remnant of the 
monarchical state’s discretion.143 Monarchical or, later onwards, presidential power was 
certainly ending up being limited by the revolutionary and legislative assemblies. But the 
authority of the state was never limited: particularly sovereign authority remained 
accessible to the assemblies and to their post-revolutionary constitutions as well. Perhaps 
revolutionary assemblies never intended to, or never could have eliminated all authority? 
Nevertheless, why should the authority of so many popular republics and assemblies have 
been any less, or any different than the kind of authority that serves either a president or a 
tyrant?
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Arendt reformulated this question, most notably in her On Revolution.144 But even 
without reading the text, it is perhaps already possible to infer that any serious answer has 
to have three components. It will have to be a partially conceptual, partially theoretical, 
and partially historical answer. Conceptually, constitutional states may either allocate 
most of their powers to the presidential and prosecutorial institutions (or, in prior times, 
monarchical court officials) or they may allocate more powers to legislative and 
representative institutions (elected parliaments). But this choice cannot prevent power 
from being applied by either illegitimate tyrants or corrupt legislators, or by both of them. 
The constitutional distribution of powers in itself has no consequences for the possible 
disappearance and re-emergence of public authority.
Authority is not necessarily being held by structures and institutions as it—by 
virtue of its own definition—must additionally somehow have to have been infused with 
organized experiences of prudence, legitimacy, and even of solidarity and loyalty.145
Thus, all states hold the structural power to administer law, but they may not always be 
performing this power sufficiently well organized, discretely, or also not authoritatively. 
In such instances, state authority declines: it no longer conveys the same sense of 
sovereign perpetuity. Arendt was not the first realist theorist to maintain that now the 
state’s performance is likely to end up being challenged by the people, or by other 
states.146 Aristotle’s concept of authority, which would for many years remain the most 
influential concept in the occidental world, readily demonstrates why political authority 
may only emerge, meaningfully, from a balanced mixture of two different institutions of 
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power: from both the democratic and the oligarchical powers (see, also, the following 
section).147
Theoretically, it may be hypothesized that no state has ever been governed solely 
by its monarchical executive. Historical practices may show that all states have had 
mixed constitutions, instead, which would explain why Aristotle could not help but 
noticing that not a permanent kingship, but a military commission (or a temporary 
dictator, perhaps) forms the necessary yet also insufficient component of constitutional 
statehood.148
Although Arendt would have agreed with Aristotle that the temporarily 
commissioned executive power alone does not ‘make’ the state, and that another 
component remains necessary, she nevertheless came to disagree with almost all other 
political theorists she had been reading. She unconventionally insisted that no power 
should be separated from the popular assemblies that authorize the application of power: 
the assembly is both a legislative and an executive institution. Local constituent 
assemblies, preferably federated with their neighbors, are both necessary and sufficient 
for the emergence of their own sovereignty.149 Each constituent assembly would have to 
have procedurally agreed to exercise all available powers, without that the whole 
assembly may ever be reduced to only one of its partial powers. Rather, its powers 
remain both the parts and the functional principles of its republican autonomy. These 
mixed assemblies must thereby be understood, she wrote, as “the only political organs for 
people who [belong] to no party”—and as “the first beginnings of a true republic.”150
Tragically, the wells of “authority”—as the mixed assemblies once held them—dried up 
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over the years. Nationally-elected parties, and factions of legislators, now derive their 
political authority not from a balanced mix of their powers but from merely seemingly 
homogenous voter segments as well as from “pressure groups, lobbies, and other [self-
interested] devices.”151
From the historical perspective, authority cannot be seen without not also 
researching how institutionalized powers have been represented—and by means of which 
conventions, including the convention of equal sovereignty, authority has been 
symbolized. Even though it may be theoretically comforting to know that no sovereign 
state can exist without both an executive as well as a legislative power, or without what 
Aristotle actually refers to as the oligarchical and democratic powers, it is unlikely 
statespersons have historically been recognized because they would be representing only 
one of these two powers. Instead, they would usually display a modicum of respect for 
both powers, and their mixed applications.152 Although they may not necessarily always 
have respected the third or the adjudicative power, they would typically assess a 
proportional tension between execution and legislation, or between discretion and 
regulation. 
Arendt warns that in the totalitarian nation-states, which were being created in the 
twentieth century, this respect for proportion (and even for the tension between execution 
and legislation itself) disappeared from the public realm. Governmental respect for 
administrative decisions (for exemplary verdicts) would be turned into a mere pretense 
for murder.153 Appeals to the legislative power became of course unconvincing, even 
though they would still be part of these states’ attempts to justify their abuse of power. As 
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is known, the totalitarian states had thus enacted some pieces of legislation, or some 
legally-created competences, as if these pieces were the means that could legitimize their 
unspeakable horrors. (The sardonic invention of the show trials formed thus only one of 
the latest installments in a series of failed attempts, by the totalitarian state, to respect its 
own legislative power, just as that the various nuclear weapons test-ban treaties have 
internationally remained an example of such failed attempts.)154
What does it mean for a state to be recognized, particularly for its emergent 
authority? Twentieth-century history suggests that whenever basic laws and legal 
procedures had been suspended, human beings still began to believe it was within their 
authority (their ‘second nature’) to follow certain conventions or mores.155 Regardless as 
to whether a secret or tyrannical institution had legality on its side, somehow humans 
would believe that the powers of the tyrant or the arbitrarily-acting police agent had been 
naturally limited by a transcendent mode of authority: that there were matters of 
convention, of natural tact, and of discretion that remained always present outside the 
posited laws. (In the United States, for instance, framers of the Fourth Amendment found 
authoritative precedents in pre-revolutionary and extra-legal mores.) Most contemporary 
states exercise their executive power by means of privy councils and cabinets, 
prosecutors and police forces—or, internationally, also with the aid of the UN Security 
Council—and yet their power is widely thought to remain checked and limited by a prior 
constitutional kind of power, which is generally classified as the legislative power. But 
what is legislative power if it does not solely exists in the form of posited and positive 
law? Does it also encompass and derive from society’s mores and, if so, how?156 How 
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authoritative are the mores, the precedents, and exemplary actions—and which sort of 
interpretive discretion in this matter will appear to be adequately legitimate?
Which modicum of respect will suffice in recognizing the proper relation between 
executive and legislative government action? Disrespect and excess cannot be 
condemned unless there is some measure of power’s limits. There needs to be some 
political criterion, thus, to determine when power corrupts. Or, there needs to be a display 
of political authority in matters involving both power’s natural limitations and at which 
point these limitations have been humanly transgressed. When Aristotle found that 
legislative power is, like all systems of “orderliness”, naturally limited by the number of 
people that can apply it, he well-grasped the importance of how both positive legislation 
and popular power tend to place limits on each other. Like any other living system, the 
state’s system of laws tends to remain in line with “a definite measure of size.”157 In the 
essential Book 5 of Politics, he added this about why the partial powers of the state 
should be analogized to bodily organs: “The body is composed of parts, and it must grow 
proportionally if symmetry [among the constituent parts] is to be maintained.”158
Although authority has stable characteristics (such as legitimacy and publicality), 
it is also ever-changing. Conventionally, it has been attributed to different persons and 
their different beliefs about the natural limits of power—rather than that it was believed 
to be an attribute of power itself. Thomas Hobbes is resolute on maintaining this
distinction: each public person should be considered a social construct—to the degree 
that powers have been assigned to that person. But the authority of the person, to the 
contrary, he thinks is drawn from the laws of nature. By following the tradition of Roman 
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Law, Hobbes deepened his insight that if a constituent part will have begun to act on 
behalf of any body of people as a whole, or that once one of the constituent organs has 
moved on behalf of the institutional powers of all government organs combined, that then 
this one part must have acted with its own sense of personhood (it must have a 
personality).159Personal authority now performs a necessary but nonetheless insufficient 
function, however symbolically, in sustaining the body politick’s innate survival instinct. 
Attribution of sovereign personhood, to the whole body politick, is not Hobbes’s 
idea. It is an idea that derives from Roman Law and from the Commentators—of whom 
Baldus de Ubaldis should be mentioned. Baldus listed many provisions through which 
fiefs and offices could legitimately be granted to persons who were acting on behalf of 
the people, or of the Roman Empire as well. Within the medieval world order, emperors 
could grant vicariates to all sorts of persons, actually—who would thus both acquire 
certain powers but who would also had to have instituted and obeyed certain imperial 
laws. The vicariates were thus not unlimited. The vicarious persons were rather partial 
and yet functionally necessary—or, both de facto as well as de jure—representatives of 
the sovereign whole.160
Hobbes’s list of vicarious imperial persons, or his list of offices that may be 
legally attributed to one of the popular body’s constituents, simply put, includes “a 
lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, a rector, a master, an overseer, a 
guardian, [and] a curator”.161 In Leviathan, Chapter 16, Hobbes repeats the medieval idea 
that every person is like an actor, potentially performing a service for the whole body (the 
Empire). The person’s performance is to be publically honored, and it is the continual 
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process of honoring that bestows authority to the (vicarious) agents—rather than that it 
must be awarded to the (imperial) structures they now actively represent.162 For, “to 
personate is to act.” This further means that, in matters of vicarious representation and 
institution, there have to be two kinds of artificially created actors (two imperial persons). 
The first kind represents “man in their natural capacity”. They are persons who perform 
acts authorized by natural, or living constituents: “some have their words and actions 
owned by those whom they represent, and then the person is [named] the actor; and he 
that owns his words and actions is [named] the author [who authorized them].” These 
persons are the attorneys, deputies, or the lieutenants of the body politick. The second 
kind of group represents the body not by means of such a fiduciary trust (“fiction”) as is 
being created by and for the first group, but it represents the body as a consequence of a
previously created “state of civil government.” This second group represents, for 
example, a church or a school or a hospital: it generally consists of rectors, masters, and 
overseers. These actors represent “things inanimate [which] cannot be authors, nor ... 
give authority”.163
Actors who are publically being recognized, for their authority, can be said to be 
acting on behalf either of the animate or of the inanimate parts of the whole. The animate 
parts of the biosphere can also be divided into two categories, Hobbes finds: there are the 
beasts that live in a state of nature as well as those “living creatures [that] live, as bees 
and ants, sociably one with another”. Human beings belong to the sociable category of 
“creatures”, however, because they have much greater faculties of speech than that the 
absolutely lonely beasts do. Yet, their speech faculties (their “art[s] of words”) form a 
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mixed blessing. Words can be used to trouble “their peace”; they too often end up being 
used to confuse a sense of the proper distinction and the rational proportion between the 
movements of the representing actors, on one side, and the instruction or the 
authorization they might have received from the natural body as a whole, on another side. 
For example, some constituent actors will misrepresent their own authorizers when they 
announce only their own “desires and other [such] affections”. They will then be using 
words to “represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the 
likeness of good; and [to] augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and 
evil”.164
Functional representation, of the people as a whole, is a double-edged sword. 
Whenever a monarch is called upon to represent the people, within the public realm, this 
supreme official may use speech to misrepresent those who principally authorized him or 
her. Misrepresentation results from a confusion between private affection and common 
good—which then causes the constitutional state to default on its obligations to protect 
the people as a whole. The problem is that contemporary utopian (postmodernist) 
theorists such as Hardt and Negri, authors of Empire, argue that private affections and 
material interests are like the fertile soil from which the commons can be enjoyed, 
whereas Hobbesian realists politically oppose precisely such desires for (and such 
strategic interests in) inanimate objects.165 Such desires should not be the sole objects of 
political power. That is, political realists rather argue that animate desires can, and should 
be represented by methods of reasoning. Authority emerges from both passion and reason 
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and yet cannot be reduced to either—since only interdependent living objects, and only
relations between living powers, form a really fruitful source of emergent authority.166
The speech of the sovereign person may also be confused by others, of course, 
and so end up appearing too friendly towards oligarchs pursuing their private interests—
as opposed to the public good. Not unlike Aristotle, by the way, Hobbes holds that 
supreme official persons should therefore never be authorized to act on behalf of one 
professional trade-group or another, but only should serve the common good.167 If they 
represent “a trade” they become increasingly more likely to be going “against the law of 
nature,” he warns. History evinces that the more profit any legal persons are making 
(Hobbes usually refers both to heads of state as well as to corporate officers), from trade, 
the less interested they become in “[abstaining] from cruelty, [and in] leaving to men 
their lives and instruments of husbandry.” Or, they then became increasingly unlikely to 
have continued to observe “laws of nature [such] as justice, equity, modesty, mercy”—as 
they instead mostly followed the laws of honor: they so came to expect, however 
mistakenly, that “the greater [the] spoils they gained, the greater ... their honor”.168
Revisiting Machiavelli: Ambivalent Institutions and Conventions of Sovereignty
The realist method helps discern a balance of powers from a separation of powers. 
In matters of sovereignty, both balance and imbalance are premised to remain grounded 
within a world-system, filled with living powers. These powers are complex and 
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interdependent—and should nonetheless strive to remain partisan in relation to one 
another, as Orwell believes, so that the powers antagonize one another while no 
separation of powers iscondoned. Political realists also find that sovereign states should 
have a common purpose, which is to pursue peace and justice. The purpose is not to 
violate territorial supremacy, nor popular autonomy, but to understand why the 
autonomy-parameter may transcend without separating itself from the supremacy-
parameter. Thus, in accomplishing this dual purpose, the means to attain supremacy 
should also never justify the ends of sustaining autonomy. Rather, states must refrain 
from ‘separating’ both their supreme and autonomous powers from each other: no power 
should be used as a mere means, because all power is interdependent and human.
Arendtian realists, in particular, find that sovereign states cannot be nation-states 
deriving their legitimacy solely from quantifiable powers, such as geographical territories 
or national populations.169 States should instead be considered as sovereign persons with 
interdependent relations and political roles to perform, within a complex system of 
powers. Yet, the actions and movements of the many statespersons (“actors”) will, within 
that system, somehow have to have been believed to have been spontaneously authorized. 
Statespersons have to have been freely authorized and freely recognized, as sovereign 
persons, by others: freedom and necessity thus coincide in methods of mutual 
recognition. Moreover, these persons will have to have been authorized to the extent that 
their actions remain adequately representative of neither only the animate nor only the 
inanimate objects, and of neither only social animals nor of only their material properties, 
but of both types of objects. 
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This book will represent animate objects as common goods, and possibly as 
reasonably-honored persons, while inanimate domains will be represented as part of 
individual interests (examples of interests: legally-owned properties such as armaments 
and buildings, spoils of war, and trade profits). Hobbes distinguishes between honors and 
profits, as contrary sources of power, yet his distinction remains a mere variation on a 
larger thematic turn. Hobbes would turn these objects of political power, or the sources of 
representational power, thereby, into a sovereign authority transcending these objects and 
sources altogether. This book’s research question, to avoid any such absolute and final 
transcendence within the relation between objects of power and their emergent authority, 
will have to be posed in such ways that it may help realists make the next turn: how can 
realists move beyond Hobbes’s seemingly too-abrupt dismissal of power resources?
The question should help the IR field advance, and gain a broader view of the 
systemic nature of the differences between power and authority—as well as of those 
between goods and interests. Moreover, Machiavelli can at this point help realists to 
observe how systems of power may function, however contingently. For, a systemic 
balance of powers could further be premised to be a balance between only two 
qualitatively different dimensions (powers/authority; objects/legitimacy), and 
Machiavelli might have known why each system of powers should be observed to have 
only two dimensions.
Mid-twentieth century realists have written a lot about the ambivalent convention, 
as well as about the mystifying ideal, of a balance of powers. As William Scheuerman 
reads and agrees with their work, however, most of them could not help but adding an 
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“unduly nostalgic gloss on the role of the balance of power in international politics [as 
these realists clearly admitted to] ... its limitations as a method for preserving peace.”170
In sharp contrast to nostalgic realists, Hedley Bull finds that the balance of power 
performed a shining political function: it long augmented the laws of war. Balance 
continues to prevent the “conquest” and “absorption” of independent societies.171
Historically, also, had it not been for the adversarial but self-organizing relations between 
Europe’s Great Powers, they would not have felt a need “to outlaw war”, and particularly 
not to banish “private wars.”172
The idea of a balance of powers remains notoriously difficult to pin down, but if it 
were to have to refer to an object of power then it cannot also refer to a degree of balance. 
The objects of power are animate and inanimate but, as Arendtian realism holds, cannot 
be used as the means that justify any ends. The powers themselves should rather be 
recognized within a legitimately authorized and self-perpetuating relationship that then 
also transcends the utilitarian usage of powers. Without this relationship, there may be 
objects of power but there can be no politics. With Bull, furthermore, the intra-relational 
degree of balance/imbalance undeniably refers less to private and civil wars than it does 
to a formally-recognizable form of warfare: a war between sovereign parties. The degree 
of balance depends on a degree of public safety, in a time of inter-state war. 
The message conveyed in the above sections was that different objects of power 
should be qualitatively different, in order for their constitutional relationship to remain 
adequately stable and cross-temporal. Realists can create an addendum by arguing that 
objects of power differ qualitatively from the dialectics of emergent authority. For, both 
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the animate and the inanimate objects of power would be necessary, and yet insufficient 
elements—in accounting for the emergence of (sovereign) authority. The total sum of all 
the state’s objects and all its sources of power is insufficient in explaining sovereignty, in 
other words. For, the question of sovereignty is how proportional the relationship 
between powers and partisans really is. The more proportional the constitutional relation, 
for example, the less likely the relationship becomes corrupted by private warfare 
(mercenaries, buccaneers). The objects of honor and property, and potentially the objects 
of glory and profit also, could serve as the mere means to various ends while they could 
alternatively be serving to accomplish a common purpose transcending the various 
means-ends functions. The best way to account for this moment of transcendence-and-
inclusion of powers is to introduce a third element. The concept of sovereignty should be 
understood to refer to a third element which maintains the equilibrium among powers. 
The equilibrium itself is less to be thought of as a substantive source or a material part of 
power, however, than as a compatibility-function shared by all powers. 
Aristotle advises realists to think of the first two objects of power as the first two 
elements of politics. These objects should have “symmetry” before they can become 
politically recognized as such. But because the objects are also the two parts of a political 
system, they should be growing “proportionally” if the system—now to be understood as 
a constitutionally-integrated whole—is to survive.173 This third element, of survival, is of 
course the equilibrium itself. Before turning to (in)equilibrium’s own purpose—as 
political systems theorist diZerega rather understands this transcendent purpose—it 
should be noted that Scheuerman concurs with a class of IR scholars, whom he refers to 
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as twentieth-century Progressive Realists (Morgenthau is a preeminent class-member), 
that the balance of powers would be an ambiguous, even hackneyed phrase. The balance 
is a tool with very limited applicability, as so many powers can so rarely be found to have 
remained in a state of equilibrium. Yet, Progressive Realism’s dismissive attitude 
(including Scheuerman’s) might have led other realists to overlook the theoretical 
possibility that the balance of powers may not be a reference to full equilibrium between 
many states, but to a relative degree of (im)balance between two qualitatively different 
powers.174 Indeed, (im)balance may be a matter of the (dis)proportionality between only 
two altogether-different constituent parts.
Aristotle observed poleis in analogy to living systems,capable of maintaining their 
own conditions of non-linear equilibrium. He also appears to already have analogized 
each polis to an open system, which would again suggest that Aristotle’s state was a self-
organizing structure. This state’s organizational form is a collective body of relationships, 
with structurally open-ended and homeostatic properties. “In homeostasis, the pattern of 
relationships is maintained even though its [structural and] physical components can 
change.”175 In any homeostatic system, thereby, organizational relations are seen to be 
sustaining themselves through stable sorts of “autopoietic networks”—even though the 
material, structural forms of each “network” or of each “pattern” will remain open to 
change. As Capra sums up this basic tenet of systems theory, “the system’s organization 
is [not separate but relatively] independent of the properties of its components, so that a 
given organization can be [structurally] embodied in many different manners by different 
kinds of components.”176
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Aristotle’s political systems theory may now seem rather undeveloped, certainly 
in comparison to the various cybernetic and Gaia models developed during the 1980s, but 
for centuries certainly Aristotle’s was the intellectually dominant theory of balance.177 To 
put this in other terms, it is well possible for the relations between interdependent powers 
to be maintained (the balance of powers, hence), as if these powers would belong to a 
homeostatic system, while the various material sources of these same powers are being 
observed to remain in perpetual flux. Political realists suggest now that the overarching 
natural purpose of these material sources, to the extent that this purpose is legitimate and 
non-violent, is to be called a balance of powers. The state’s purpose (“longevity”) is also 
a natural stimulant, to maintain a constitutionally homeostatic balance, both externally as 
well as internally (and, thus, not necessarily only within “the physical city” itself).
Aristotle found it impossible for any group of persons to be recognized as “both 
rich and poor.”178 From this impossibility, as experienced both in foreign and 
constitutional affairs, as Gus diZerega continues to read Aristotle’s Politics, it appears 
that “neither the rich nor the poor [should] ... triumph at the expense of the other.” The 
state will rather have to recognize some third element, or a third purpose, however 
understood, in order to reach a balance between the politically-represented interests of 
both rich and poor. This third balance can best be called natural happiness. It is the one 
purpose that may potentially be enjoyed by all persons, equally, or as Arendt says: it is 
the potential satisfaction of enjoying isonomy: “equality of condition”.179
Thus, Aristotle’s own principal premise already holds that everyone can “be 
happy with the existing constitution, [as] .... [t]his is true not only for the rich and the 
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poor, ... but for all other divisions that existed within the polis.” A life of happiness, 
further, should appear within the life of political homeostasis. Sparta, however, had 
violated this prescriptive insight when its polis had legislatively ordered everyone to live 
as if being poor. By contrast to the Spartans, (Aristotle’s) people, in living a politically 
homeostatic life, would not want to use legislation in order to heap the objects of their 
power onto a loose pile: they alternatively treat their laws as a mirror of their own 
natural-constitutional development.180 Their laws would represent a politically 
proportional but structurally open equilibrium of both rich (oligarchy) and poor 
(democracy). As diZerega further notes, this equilibrium itself “typifies a mean, free from 
either overweening ambition or servility, neither destitute nor entirely free from 
economic concerns.”
To reiterate, next to Aristotle, Hobbes quite likewise and quite apparently 
understood there must always be some sort of difference of quality, rather than just of 
quantity and extension, between the state’s two constituent parts: between representations 
of both rich and poor. Although Hobbes’s understanding of this difference was at some 
points more rudimentary than Aristotle’s, Hobbes’s system of powers far more clearly 
represents the two qualities of representational power. Rather than to resort to “a mean,”
Hobbes’s system defines the first quality as a representation of animate objects, each 
having the quality of physicality. The class of these physical objects includes the 
multitudes and their dispersed opinions, as well as their passionate but selfish interests in 
their own survival. The second quality consists of several consequences of human 
speech: it comprises all sorts of names and ideals involving inanimate possessions, or 
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profits and properties, but also the rules that have been constructed by the faculties of the 
mind themselves: by faculties such as calculative reasoning and also by judgments of 
pure hope: these “superstitiously” informed judgments involve “invisible agents” rather 
than deliberate metaphors for “invisible spirits”.181 This second quality may well again 
begin to appear under the light of public reason, yet it should be feared more than the first 
quality because of its capacity for doctrinal confusion.
For Hobbes, the constructions as well as the speech-faculties of the mind are to be 
feared. For, they tend to create (false) hope, and thereby always un-root themselves from 
bodily sense experiences. Fear is the one amidst “all passions” (Leviathan Chapter 27), 
however, which can balance itself against such constructions. Fear is one of the political 
life’s most autopoietic qualities: “it is the only [quality or] thing—when there is 
appearance of profit or [private] pleasure by breaking the laws—that makes men keep 
them.”182 The appearance of the multitudes and their great hopes, and then also of their 
own functioning as a people, fearful of breaking laws, are not to be understood as two 
separate moments in the political life. But these moments can also not be measured along 
one and the same scale. This means that there is no numerical but rather an intra-
systemic, self-transformative difference between multitude and people. The difference 
between excessively pursued interests and opinions (a multitude), first, and passions 
moderated by reasonable fears (a people), is an autopoietic difference. Authoritative 
actions, as Arendt also found, must somehow respect neither one, and yet both of the two 
qualities of power, simultaneously.
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Before finally turning to Machiavelli, one instance must be mentioned in which 
Hobbes explores another basic qualitative difference: this is the one between the public-
animate and private-inanimate objects of power. In The Citizen, he stridently reconstructs 
the precept that the institutionalization process, of these two different types of objects of 
power, should respect a sense of proportion. To be accurate, he indeed seems to want to 
reconstruct the scholastic notion that the most-disquieting institutions of sovereignty, 
being both the multitudes (“democracy”) and the kings (“monarchy”), should “be equal.” 
If either the disorganized pro-democracy forces or the executive monarchical powers 
were to become dominant, and if either one of these two parts were to intrude “into 
public councils”, he adds, then they would here be giving rise to “infelicities”. But if both 
elemental estates have an equal interest in their “safety and welfare” then they will also 
be naturally able to experience, Hobbes quite strongly suggests, that “the power in all 
[their] kinds of government is [proportionally] equal.” 
Hobbes follows through with a comment to the effect that without equal power in 
government, everyone’s “preservation” can be put at risk. But with preservation he means 
not to say possession. Instead, he says mental as well as bodily longevity. The 
implication is that the multitudes—or the inanimate, physical, material bodies of power—
cannot be the only objects that are to be represented in the public domain. A domain that 
concerns itself with the survival of the body politick should also always represent the 
people—and their animate, free, reasonable, or mindful powers. If assumed otherwise, 
animate faculties and inanimate interests would be separated from each other. Hobbes 
concurs with Bodin that any such separation would too much upset the natural balance, 
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and that the prince could then basically start to acquire more material sources and bodies 
of power than those to naturally belong to the pro-democratic multitudes.183 To prevent 
this sort of tyranny, however, any well-balanced state will constantly verify that “the 
lands and monies of the subjects are not the prince’s treasure, but [that] their bodies and 
wily minds [certainly are].”184
The above-defended pro-Hobbesian thesis holds that anyone’s acquiring of 
inanimate/material interests must be considered an act of word-power. But it is also an 
application of words and names (social constructs) that will somehow have been designed 
to satisfy a mere end (profit, honor). The Arendtian corollary to the thesis holds that 
word-power cannot be balanced by sword-power just as that the multitudes cannot be 
transformed into a sovereign person, unless a qualitative mismatch has been observed in 
the interdependent relations between both word-powers and sword-powers, in the first 
dimension, and sovereign authority/authorization, in the second. Arendt argues, 
moreover, that this two-dimensional mismatch has historically best been understood and 
yet also been transcended by constituent assemblies. Herein, both the powers and 
authority, and thus those with private interests and those whose public speech-acts were 
believed to be legitimate acts, would both have been believed to have became close-to 
interchangeable. 
From this point onwards, authority is regarded as a practice of consultation that is 
attached but never identical to the realm of power. As Arendt knew, authority helps 
executive powers to differentiate more judiciously between substantive material interests 
(the parties that seek “conservation” of these interests), however, as well as ideological 
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public powers (the parties that seek to “improve” government by means of their social 
deliberations), while excluding neither material interests nor public powers from 
systemically-emergent bodies/minds politick.185
Another hypothesis holds that sovereign authority can be universally recognized.
Liberal philosophers may treat it then as a general type of authority: it has to represent 
and it has to have been legitimized by the general population. This non-realist hypothesis 
further holds that the population is the source of its own word-power. Absent a single 
body of people, it is impossible to identify its sources of power and autonomy, so that no 
state can exist without these sources. Indeed, every state’s dignity must derive from its 
own population, as the final author of a recognizable civil government. As Immanuel 
Kant teaches, “the sovereignty of states is recognized only in so far as they recognize and 
respect the dignity of [natural-born] persons.”186 Before Kant, however, Hobbes had 
indicated that dignity and honor are constructions of word-power that should be checked 
by a sword-power—in order for both types of power to even begin to give way to 
sovereign persons. Sovereigns will thus in part have to have been artificially created: they 
are created by means of a covenant. Each sovereign person is in part an artificial entity, 
with a legally-constructed personality, charged with the conservation of material and 
territorial properties, as well as that it is in another part responsible for deciding on all 
matters of public doctrine and civic religion. Sovereignty expresses, hence, both a 
population’s supremacy over its own land (acquisition), in particular, as well as a sense of 
popular autonomy and recognition of dignity (honor). It is both material as well as 
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ideological, in short, and both determined (by natural conditions) as well as free (to honor 
and dishonor certain actions).
Centuries before both Hobbes and Kant, Aristotle’s constitutional state had 
remained internally conflicted. This state is like a large animal, suffering from two 
afflictions or from two springs of discord. In every polis, persons of authority will try to 
represent either mostly the profits they acquired from, or the honors that were attributed 
to them, by others—which is why societies should try to proportionally (and: 
constitutionally) represent both their acquisitions as well as their honors.187 Yet, 
regardless of how hard they may try to be egalitarian in distributing the sources of power, 
not all persons can have equal authority. All persons are social animals, as well, 
contending for standing and for honor. It is therefore impossible to expect that they will 
equally represent any disparate material interests, as Hobbes insists, although in an ideal 
world of full representation “the public and private interest [would indeed remain] ... 
most-closely united”.188 In practice, of course, the union of public and private is never 
complete. Sources of moral ambiguity and private discord are the staple of constitutional 
emergent authority—as Kant could have agreed with Hobbes, and Hobbes himself on 
several occasions seems to have agreed with Machiavelli.
Specifically the latter had argued that in order to maintain the state, both 
commoners and nobles should be seen to participate in civic associations and to herein 
contend for “supreme honors.”189 By contrast to antiquity’s Romans, therefore, the people 
of early-sixteenth-century Florence had been wrong “to exclude the nobility from all 
participation”.190 Because Florence had banished this critical element of leadership—and 
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had thus disallowed almost all contention between oligarchs and democrats, rich and 
poor, and between commerce and virtue as well—Machiavelli’s beloved statelet risks to 
disintegrate its sources of powers, and subsequentially lose its dual authority as well.191
As Aristotle could have added, Florence risks repeating Sparta’s legislative mistakes.192
Contrary to Arendt’s, Machiavelli’s compositions hold on to a religious 
undertone.193 They can be heard to convey a religious fidelity to a republican 
constitution, or actually to the union of opposite groupings and of their respective 
‘qualities’ as well (this follows the medieval notion that the ‘humors’ of the rich stand 
opposite to those of the poor, just as how excessive corruption is opposed by common 
virtues). A later chapter section shall work out the proposition that Machiavelli’s beliefs 
are far more Christian and thus far simpler than that some secular cynics are suggesting. 
For now, it is worthwhile hearing that in Machiavelli’s composition each state’s 
constitution presents itself as a homeostatic complex of opposites. Each particular state’s 
constitution herein mirrors Creation. Anyway, the proposition shall be holding that this 
mirroring effect can best be considered as an open and direct effect, in organizational and
qualitative terms—while the same effect is also structurally indirect, and only more or 
less accurate, because it still depends on quantifiable relations and on partial sources of 
power.
Some of the next sections are inquiries into this mirror-effect: can it account for 
Machiavelli’s mysterious clue that in the relations between any community and its 
citizens, both “integrity and corruption, justice and injustice [will appear?]”194 This 
complex relation presents itself within a particular constitution and yet, in all likelihood, 
213
is to be understood as a general mirror image of yet another relation, between heavens 
and earth as well of what can be known about relations between God and social 
creatures.195
To wind up the above propositional remarks, when Strauss alleges that principally 
Machiavelli devised a sophisticated but radically secularized form of sovereignty, he is 
underestimating the positive importance Machiavelli himself attached to a civic religion. 
Anyhow, Strauss writes that a secular form of authority would have helped Machiavelli 
to nearly-fully replace various medieval political imitations of “the God-Man Christ by 
[means of] the imitation of the Beast-Man Chiron.” Strauss adds to this allegation that 
whenever Machiavelli spoke of God, he would have referred “in truth [to] nothing but 
chance.”196
In contradistinction to Strauss, who would go on to argue that the founder of an 
entirely new state may act beastly, or may well do evil, indeed, Machiavelli’s The Prince
never conceived of only one such an “innovator.”The Prince had instead been written out 
of dissatisfaction with the status quo, under which there had been “as many stati as there 
[were] princes”—as Peter Breiner puts it nicely.197 But this dissatisfaction with pure 
pluralism never meant that The Prince also newly called on one individual to serve as a 
founder-ruler, separate from both God as well as from the complex (legal) personality of 
the people. Instead, Machiavelli was rather alarmed by the unstable relationship between 
noble princes and the common people, within most of the Italian statelets (stati): this 
great imbalance was depriving all groupings of both the constitutional fidelity as well as 
the political longevity the Republic of Rome had once enjoyed. In Rome, after all, the 
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constitutional republic had always been generated by a tumultuous although stable 
relationship.198 Contrary to Straussian impressions, however, it seems highly unlikely that 
Machiavellian realism should refer to the republic’s self-stabilizing potential as if it were 
the creation of a “neutral hidden hand”.199 This homeostatic potential is not created by by 
chance, by the goddess Fortuna, nor by any other such neutral or indiscriminate third 
element. The Secretary from Florence argues, much rather, and not unlike Socrates, that 
it is a potential emerging from within the constitutionally-dualistic nature of any 
system—and from the dialectical agony of trying to foresee how this system will be 
functioning, also.200
Sovereign Authorizations of Urgent Matters: Rebalancing the World of Power
In accordance to which methods may the balance, within the contemporary world 
of powers, be restored? How should people recognize, authorize, and represent 
themselves and their many sources of power? In recognizing the self-stabilizing and 
homeostatic characteristics of their self-representational systems, which characteristics 
may people legitimately ascribe and attribute to that system? On the premise that it has 
remained possible to augment today’s system, of state representation and power, as well 
as that public action does have a meaningful role to perform in any such augmentation, it 
may be concluded that the urgency of the questions is indisputable. 
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Statespersons are increasingly believed responsible for all sorts of decisions 
concerning the fair and proper distribution of the world’s resources—but also for all sorts 
of misrepresentations and illegitimate decisions concerning this distribution. 
Statespersons are widely believed to have a higher responsibility to help protect the 
biosphere, for instance, than that most common people do. In spite of surging popular 
beliefs in the existence of this higher responsibility, and however fictive the 
responsibility might be, the harsh reality remains that the biosphere is suffering. The 
activities of agents—such as neo-imperial states, transnational corporations, and their 
joint scramble for energy resources—are adding up to a dangerous surplus of carbon 
particles in the atmosphere and to a depletion of biodiverse life-forms as well. However, 
these dangerously destabilizing activities are not being caused because the destabilizing 
agents are new or modern or neo-imperial types of agents, as Antonio Negri prefers to 
argue to the contrary, for example.201 These activities are quite clearly being caused by 
the eternal fact that constitutional powers are constantly being thrown off balance by 
unreasonable desires for and acquisitions of the inanimate sources of power: by profit and 
glory (Arendt, Marx, Hobbes, and Aristotle all saw greed as an eternal threat to the public 
order).
Earth’s diminished biodiversity as well as its diminished resilience against human 
activity, are reminders of the brute fact that the biosphere has been surrendering its 
(previously believed to be perennial) power to restore life.202 Earth has been losing its 
potential to animate itself—mainly due to boundless human activities that include fossil 
fuel exploitation, rare mineral exploration, and agricultural homogenization. Although 
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humanly created states have more distributive and more industrious functions to perform 
than ever before, planet Earth is also more rapidly losing its potential to provide humans 
with ever-more goods than previously. It can be said, henceforth, that state officials now 
hold a greater kind of imperium than all of their predecessors combined, in material 
terms, while they hold a far lesser kind of authority to bring the many exploitative and 
too-homogenizing processes of environmental destruction to a halt. On balance, it 
appears as if the system of states is losing its authority because statespersons are 
dishonoring, or disrespecting, and misrepresenting the ultimate author of their own 
imperium: planet Earth’s diversity.203
Not a few statespersons reckon that unchanging factors, including human greed, 
are to blame for the ecological crises of the world—as opposed to factors that pertain to 
the exclusion of possible alternatives. The system of states is closing itself off against 
alternative decisions, such as decisions that would help answer questions of how people 
may begin to better honor their treaties and their covenants with other state actors, or of 
how they can select conscionable public representatives. The state of nature-answer is 
that all animals abide by laws of nature: non-human animals do act in respect of a bio-
diverse, ecologically rich planet—if not only because these animals are structurally 
unable to create systems that emit polluting atmospheric particles, that accelerate the 
global rise of seasonal temperatures, or that can decrease global humidity levels.204
Hobbes believes that human animals are most able of disobeying the laws of 
nature, by misrepresenting their promises (by breaking their word, they break these laws). 
Human animals are able to create a “condition of war”—which is a condition in which 
217
they all compete with all others, to gain ever-more access to a (common) wealth of 
planetary resources. Yet, they cannot compete without not also be violating “the laws of 
nature [including the law holding] that a commonwealth, without sovereign, ... is but a 
word without substance—and cannot stand.”205
Hobbes knew that resource scarcities and environmental degradations were 
consequences of natural law violations, the first of which is the violation of the law on 
equal sovereignty. Those who obey this law, however, are authorizing a sovereign—or an 
artificially created and legally incorporated person, to be more precise—to represent their 
body politick as if it were one natural whole. This does not mean that all people are part 
of the same whole, but that all people have been naturally endowed with the ability to 
authorize their own sovereign persons, to represent them. Authorization then helps these 
persons to maintain peace, and to perform other constitutional responsibilities as well, 
because their own constituent parts are in fear of disobeying the laws of nature. The 
whole person and its parts cannot be divorced from each other, at risk of encountering 
fearless and recklessly-uncaring individuals. Such individuals are not the norm, because 
nearly everyone lives under some “civil government” or another. Yet, if there are too 
many fearless and solipsistic individuals, then they could nonetheless poison their 
“commonwealth” with their “seditious doctrines, whereof [the primary] one is that every 
private man is judge of [his own] good and evil actions.”206
Hobbesian realism’s concept of political sovereignty sharply contradicts any 
Earth-destroying economic logics. In political realism, broadly understood and inclusive 
of Arendt’s theory, there is no place for individual consumers and other such solipsistic 
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agents—and thus also not for corporate agents with a single end—who remain bend on 
breaking apart the naturally-contrary relation between public esteem and their own 
private desires. Politically-authoritative persons have to have chosen a state of 
solitariness, rather, but never of solipsism, in which they will have to have been 
“thinking”—and to thereby have asked themselves how their actions would be judged (as 
either good or evil), and how they (as speaking persons) would ultimately want to be 
honored by others as well as by themselves.207
Realism is urgently needed because, as the next-following paragraphs evince, it 
helps statespersons to deny the appeal of economic logics pure and simple. Institutions 
such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank Group, and the International 
Monetary Fund are now working hard to improve their image and their brand—but they 
remain structurally intolerant of any responsibilities other than to accommodate liberal 
market logics.208 Their purpose is not to study the relationship between rich and poor, at 
least not in just and proportional terms, for instance. Their end is usually, instead, to 
increase the profits of the ‘man’ whom they define as an individual business corporation, 
perhaps, or otherwise at least as an aggregate of (such) individual producers: as a 
deregulated economic sector. 
Advanced (Hobbesian) realists propose that international governmental 
institutions should be reformed, so that they will stop brandishing their logics of 
individualism and solipsism, and so that they may newly begin to counter these artificial 
logics by introducing more naturally qualitative methods of public recognition.209 The 
power of economic markets, private interests, and their (neo)liberal logics is very much a 
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type of power unlikely to limit itself. It is a type of power that can be defined in 
measurable terms, but its effects are likely to remain immeasurably harmful for the 
biosphere. People should therefore renew their fears of this power, and of its “selfish 
liberalism”, because if they do not fear this power then it will not only continue to violate 
their social conscience: it will also, even more dangerously, separate itself from the other 
source of power; from politics itself.210 Hence, economic power should constantly be 
checked by a politically-animate and qualitatively-different power.
Twenty-first-century institutions of sovereign authority remain ambivalent. 
Armies are outsourcing many of their capabilities to legally incorporated enterprises, for 
example, and this development blurs the lines between political action and economic 
profitability.211 Conventions of sovereignty are growing increasingly tolerant of the 
model of private corporate ownership over exceptionally powerful communicative media 
technologies, as well. Even though armed for-profit institutions as well as the private 
telecommunications and Internet conventions were initially authorized by the 
representatives of the people, they can no longer be said to be governed by the peoples of 
the world. Rather, these institutions and conventions cater to non-representative 
businesses. They flourish at the hands of liberal, rather than as much at those of 
democratically selected statespersons.
Conventional liberalism ranks the wills of all above the ideal of a general will. 
Tenets of neoliberalism, especially, suggest that the wills of all are the same as the 
interests of all: the economic preferences of all are directly resulting, without any 
processual or qualitatively-different transmutations, into the structures of (market) power. 
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How these structures may have been organized and regulated, or not, is of little concern 
to most neoliberal scholars. But advanced realism warns that there can be no direct 
economic equation of aggregate wills, of all, to a political and organizational modality of 
authority. For, the market assumes that the democratic representations of any number of 
wills is effective and efficient. Realists, however, object that because democracy implies 
rule by the poor people, rather than by a certain number of people, the issue in equating 
low economic status to a mode of political authority is that the equation becomes a 
hypothesis. The authority of the people is thus not to be confused with rule by as many as 
possible, and not with majority-rule either.212Authority remains qualitatively different 
from the structures of individual preference and citizen voting. According to Schmitt, 
Rousseau, Aristotle, and others, majoritarian doctrines of representation can only have 
tyrannical effects.213 In contradistinction to such conventional liberal doctrines, hence, 
particularly Arendt would propose that local assemblies and regional councils should take 
over the role that is now being placed by majoritarian liberal democracies, because such 
assemblies thrive much better on the basis of equal participation.
The realist method provides aid to those who need to rebalance complex relations 
between qualitatively different sources of power. The method aids, as well, those 
responsible for the state’s distributive and stewardship decisions. In contrast, the liberal 
method mostly aids those invested in distribution of resources. It is a method that 
stimulates the creation of democratic states, within which electoral majorities and 
minorities may formally acquire slices of the economic growth-pie—and, more 
dangerously, in which they may do so without regard of the qualitative differences 
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between the sources of their power. In this way, liberal democratic states can very well 
pretend to have identified the will of the many or of the majority, and yet  only try to 
represent a total number of individual citizens rather than also their actual or their relative 
differences. 
Business corporations, for example, are entities that are currently being 
represented by liberal states. Statespersons may receive non-national business lobbyists, 
trade missions, consulate officers, and so on. But it is not illogical to suppose that these 
liberal statespersons will try to represent the interests of these corporations by paying 
close attention to their profitability. In this sense, most transnational corporations (TNCs 
but more common is MNC, for multinational corporation) actually form only one 
aggregate interest: they have the same incentive, which is to grow in terms of their 
market value—without any greater responsibilities towards actual polities.214 TNCs have 
only an incentive to acquire those means of production that are most likely to be valued 
as strategic investments. Yet, statespersons representing the TNCs are, by definition, 
helping capital-owners to accumulate a greater surplus of capital. On the same note, 
liberalism caters to the rich and democracy to the poor, politically, so that this just means 
that anyone who is instrumental in pursuing the structural aggregate of most interests, 
within any society, however, will necessarily have to shirk her own public 
responsibilities—and will have to become more, rather than less, irresponsible and more 
unconscionable in the process. 
Young followed Arendt before she arrived at her conclusion that the two major 
bearers of political responsibility are the person, and the structure of the social relations 
222
between this person and diverse others. One of the most urgent matters to have troubled 
capitalist societies is that political responsibility is herein easily, almost too easily, 
confused with “responsibility as fault, blameworthiness, or individual liability.” Iris 
Marion Young adds that political responsibility has to be immeasurable and indivisible, 
although the members of a responsible class (individual persons, corporations) may of 
course very well be quantified. In this sense, the political responsibility for the actions of 
corporate agents transcends each of these agents individually, and yet it includes them. 
Therefore, an assignment of political responsibility can form a check on the power of 
individual economic agents. As global economic markets now consist of a more 
“complex chain” of consumption and production than in previous eras, such an 
assignment should not have to limit its scope to “relations among persons who dwell 
together within the same nation-state”. Their nationality, and their formal citizenship, “is 
relevant only instrumentally, [as it is only] ... providing [the] efficient means of 
discharging obligations and distributing particular tasks.” But their political responsibility 
is a transnational affair: it transcends borders. Contrary to economic or financial 
accountabilities, political responsibilities are primarily a matter of whether ‘nationals’ (as 
individual members of a class) might in some indirect way be maintaining “active 
relationships” with each other—because they can reasonably be believed to be taking part 
in the same socio-economic, financially-interdependent structures.215
Today’s problem is that nation-states continue to represent themselves by means 
of multilateral treaty-organizations (the UN), supranational financial institutions (IMF, 
World Bank), and the arbiters of a globalizing market-economy (WTO, OECD). Many 
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state members of these treaty-organizations and institutions have acted politically 
irresponsibly, as they fail to learn from their own failure to regulate TNCs and to reign in 
their business lobbies, in particular.216 As the wealthiest corporations, and several other 
individual entities with their own legal personalities, profit tremendously from the legal 
protections they all enjoy, it can be said that maintaining these legal protections are really 
identical to their economic interests. The individual interests run against the direction of 
the general will, which alternatively holds that individual corporations should serve the 
common good rather than only their larger stockholders. The individual members of a 
liberal market economy, in other words, politically, tend to effectuate anti-democratic 
forms of irresponsibility. Any market has been constructed to consist of the total of all 
individual interests, but must therein again oppose an immeasurable general will. 
The attack on the wills of all, and on how everybody’s immeasurably competitive
private interests tend to add up to a structural form of irresponsibility, is not only a 
political attack. As even Jean-Jacques Rousseau knew, almost despite his own stag-hunt 
dilemma, this attack can only be validated by an empirically non-existent religion: by an 
idealist theodicy.217 Rousseau seems to agree that in the abstract condition that all private 
men had somehow become able to to judge what it means to commit “good and evil 
actions”, for themselves, as Hobbes had said, evil must have become a banality. Each 
man would only be committing banal and ordinary violations of the natural law—because 
nobody would be believing in, and nobody would be fearing a sovereign person to 
condemn the actual extraordinariness of evils committed.218 Further, these individual men 
would then not be sharing, however vicariously, any political responsibility for their evil 
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deeds. But as they can still newly begin to serve as the constituents of a complex 
sovereign, each individual or each private man nonetheless may come to accept that he 
also bears an ultimate responsibility for evil—on behalf of this single, complex, and 
wholesome sovereign. As both political systems theorists and proto-realists such as 
Friedrich Meinecke have reiterated, the individual’s common responsibility, which may 
only be experienced through the sovereign realm as as whole, is not just independent 
from but is also to be (religiously) believed to be greater than the total sum of all 
individual rights and all constituent liberties.219 In this respect, the lines of both 
Rousseau’s post-Hobbesian realism and of Young’s Arendtian method appear to form 
parallels—to the extent that these lines also form the contours of a political systems 
theory, inclusive of a moment of (religious) faith, or at least of a systems theory not 
entirely incoherent with some of the above-made Aristotelian points.
One additional point must still be worked out: the parallel between Arendt and 
Hobbes can, perhaps, best be seen from a realist perspective first offered by Machiavelli. 
This additional interpretive point has often and readily been touched upon by prototypical 
realists as diverse as Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and more recently by William 
Scheuerman. But he himself denies that Hobbes and Machiavelli could have belonged to 
any of the realist schools that were founded just prior to and during the Cold War.220 In 
his “The Realist Case for Global Reform”, Scheuerman shows that mid-twentieth-century 
realists such as Hans Morgenthau (who had studied both Weber and Schmitt) 
encountered various inequities in the world’s distribution of powers. Their encounters 
with various forms of colonial exploitation and inequitable constitutional degradation, 
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were leading these realists to both defend equal sovereignty norms as well as to propose 
radical reform of the international treaty-system.221
Reformist realists usually led themselves to propose a better-functioning UN, a 
more universal mode of constitutionalism, and more functional modes of representation 
for all peoples as well. Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and other well-known realists were soon 
after 1945 starting to take ways that were thus leading them towards “a systemic break 
with the international status quo.” State representation and equal sovereignty, for all, 
would not need to be hollow phrases: rather than that sovereignty had to take on the form 
of a single monopoly, on the means of violence, as some positivist liberals believed it 
should do, however, equal sovereignty could just as well remain compatible with its 
complex history and with its “rich diversity of institutional forms”. Usually by reading 
Weber, these realists further learned and then demonstrated that any group’s moral 
virtues and legal representations can well be institutionally integrated with that group’s 
authorization of a particular sovereign person. Against liberal idealists, they thereby tried 
to demonstrate that moral universality and sovereign particularity did not always have to 
exclude each other at the structural institutional level.222
This chapter section has sofar made a case against the outsourcing of political 
powers and responsibilities to non-political organizations, including to economic 
markets. Economic needs and economic powers could turn into dangerous and certainly 
also into unsustainable violations of a complex public law system—and, thereby, of 
republican laws on sovereign authority as well.223 The case for a restoration of the 
balance between economic gains and political recognition, between these two objects of 
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power, is a case against neoliberal dogma (privatization, deregulation, the outsourcing of 
common goods). In addition, it is a case against the ongoing neutralization and constant 
delegitimizing of responsible and complex sovereign persons. In line with the 
Aristotelian realist tradition, the case endorses neither pro-democratic nor anti-
oligarchical conventions. Much rather, the depletion of natural resources is to be 
condemned because it has upset a mutually-constitutive relation between poor and rich, 
between democracy and oligarchy, and because it has thereby also disturbed the balance 
of qualitative powers. The scramble for scarce resources shifts the legal titles, to 
inanimate sources of power (capital), into the hands of a globalized oligarchy, while 
misrepresenting or ignoring this oligarchy’s ethical obligations to better protect the 
various forms of democracy.
Sovereign persons ought to be believed to transcend, yet include the balance 
between the various political representatives of incompatible economic interests. Earth’s 
resources are not infinite, so that all economic interests are structurally competitive. Any 
problems of scarcity, however, ought to be believed subject to those exercising their 
responsibilities in common with any of the other persons or involved parties. According 
to most advanced realists, to put it in Young’s words, individuals avoiding these political 
responsibilities are indirectly committing “structural injustices.” These injustices are 
principally no less evil than if they were committed more directly, so that the underlying 
problem is a problem of evil’s banality as much as of perceived scarcities.
Classical liberal and especially neoliberal philosophers have little qualms with the 
state’s delegation of its own executive functions to economic operators. However, 
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advanced or republican realists can undercut liberal delegations by generating an open 
structure of micro-political recognition processes, which they then again can believe to 
have macro-political and other constitutionally restorative organizational effects. Both 
structural institutions such as TNCs and organizational conventions (mores) at the local 
level, will be necessary elements in sustaining this belief that human beings can again 
become respectful of Earth’s diversity.224 To counter Mearsheimer’s impression that all 
realists have to be acting like ‘Hobbist’ hypocrites, in order to be preserving their power 
resources or to accomplish other such structural strategic ends, advanced realists are 
additionally under an ethical obligation to help create institutions and conventions of 
greater transcendent authority than that Mearsheimer can anticipate.225
The final but most important theoretical advantage of political realism over 
economic liberalism is that it dares to recognize the ethical ambivalence of sovereign 
authority. On the one side, most forms of sovereignty have been instituted by modern 
nation-states which support locally headquartered TNCs and other capitalist operators. 
On the other side, sovereignty is also sustained through a complex web of public laws 
and diplomatic relationships. This web was mostly spun by only two parties. One of these 
parties was formed by a few nineteenth-century sovereign states, mostly survivors of the 
World Wars and mostly situated in the global North. The other party can be said to have 
been formed by many last-generation sovereigns (states that were only born in or after the 
1940s, and that experienced the historical convulsions of 1960, 1991, or 2011) in the 
South. The tension between these two parties is becoming increasingly visible within the 
web of currently globalizing relationships.226 Due to rising disparities in the global 
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distribution of military and communicative technologies, this political tension is not 
growing smaller but much greater than it was during any of the previous centuries.
A first reason why the web’s politicization is so urgent is numerical. There are 
more states, and more states have more constitutional offices. They also have more 
societal functions, such as secret surveillance and the maintaining of weapons arsenals. 
This means that there is a measurably greater potential for (civil) war in the world. But as 
Weber can help remind political theorists (see Chapter Two), the aggregate power of all 
these functions and offices combined, whenever these have thus been represented in 
absolute terms, has hardly increased as fast as that the qualitative sources of legitimate 
authority—including the qualitative beliefs in charismatic authority, or in naturally-
prestigious laws as well—have been decreasing in significance.227 By looking at the 
ambivalent tension between aggregate functions, interests, and identities, in one 
dimension of sovereignty, and various qualitative beliefs, in another dimension, it 
becomes possible to put on realism’s lenses. For, with these lenses, it becomes possible to 
dim and to weaken constructivist idealism’s assumption that the total of structurally-
aggregated functions tends to form a positive contributor to democratic politics.
Realist or Liberal: Self-Organizational Covenanting or Contractual Structures
International law and diplomacy are first among sovereignty’s vital, self-
organizing processes.228 Law and diplomacy have generally been utilized in order to 
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maintain each sovereign state’s virtues, identities, and interests. But the more inert, and 
the less intense both law and diplomacy tend to become, the less likely it becomes that 
they can sustain “equilibrium”. They are less likely to organizationally transcend 
particular states, their identities, as well as the structural interests the states represent.229
To be asking why states are sovereign is therefore quite similar to asking why the 
international law-domain can sustain and transcend particular states, as well as their 
internally-structured regulatory hierarchies. For, equal sovereignty partially consists of 
the one type of law that all states may appeal to—in order to, for instance, effectively 
sustain their diplomatic missions.
Sovereignty sustains the law of nations as much as that the law itself again 
sustains diplomacy: these are all relatively closed but self-balancing, and vitally unifying
organizational processes. The list of other such organizational processes, all together 
forming a closed world-system, of sovereigns, includes the balance of the Great Powers, 
diplomatic protocols, common law, declarations of war, and recognition of insignia. 
Without spelling out how each of these processes helps symbolize popular beliefs in 
emergent sovereign authority, they can be read to help sustain a natural web of 
interdependent state structures. Each of the processes takes part in the organizational web 
of sovereignty, yet not one of them can be reduced to any specific state’s identity, 
interests, or institutions (and not to this state’s military units, foreign policies, or flags 
either).230
The hierarchical structure of internationally applicable rules forms a capstone 
study-subject for legal positivists, and for some constructivists. This whereas various 
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organizational processes such as the balance of powers are mostly being studied by 
political realists (at least, within the International Relations domain).231 In this sense, 
international law can be said to have been examined as if breathing a sort of sovereign 
authority that divides the field against itself. For, the theoretical study of the law of 
nation’s self-division can be traced back to the implicit and sometimes more explicit 
debates between the liberal-tendency-betraying Hugo Grotius and the ‘realistic’ Thomas 
Hobbes, between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt (who ended up siding with Hobbes), but 
also more recently between Alexander Wendt and the mid-twentieth-century realists 
(Hedley Bull, Hans Morgenthau, and several others who refused to dismiss Hobbesian 
lines of thought altogether).232
On one hand, legal positivist and liberal-institutional theorists are rather trustful of 
international law’s capacity to be applied to each state and its regulatory structure. 
International law helps states maintain their internal hierarchies, of legal norms, so that a 
majority of states always obeys its own norms: law seals the states off against any 
exceptional political changes. On the other, advanced realists are more likely to lay out 
the reasons why international law cannot close itself off to change—as well as why it 
would be irresponsible to imagine that any positive law or multilateral institution is just a 
social construct. The realists are less willing to recognize states as if they were each 
having their own unified regulatory hierarchy, because they fear that the image of such a 
hierarchy could be used to justify the social construction of a unified state. Realists have 
thus not as strong a tendency to presuppose that international law applies to one and the 
same structural pattern of inter-unit relations. For, they warn, international legal 
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positivism is not a method that can be validly applied to the irregular relations between 
enemy-states, nor does it apply well to relations between states and non-states. 
Instead, realists take the position that the law of nations governs an open 
structure. Some states may, and others may not obey the law. Some states may even, 
sometimes only temporarily but oftentimes forever, disappear (Poland is the classic 
example). Every sovereign person’s decision to obey the law of nations remains 
somehow contingent on an exogenous criterion: can that statesperson, existentially, 
continue to appear in the political realm? Can the statesperson’s faith, in the unitary and 
pure state’s existence, thus not be redefined as if it were an expression of constitutional 
fidelity? Schmitt demonstrates that the decision to obey is also a decision to have faith, 
and to believe in the state. It is a decision about its “existence and meaning” and how 
both may ultimately be affirmed “as the ground of all non-arbitrary relation.”233
Bull and Wight have taken a similar realist position, albeit by coming from a less 
radical and non-theological (especially in Bull’s case) direction.234 To them, realism is 
taking a position of skepticism: whenever someone would claim that international law is 
making progress, and that more and more states are obeying the will of the “world 
community”, that claimant is probably protesting “the facts of international politics.”235
Emerson knew this too: societal flux (as opposed to progression) is a fact of life.236
Moreover, besides conjuring an image of moral legal progress, the 
claimant may hereby be reformulating Kelsen’s analytical dichotomy. Kelsen had 
dichotomized and separates his positivist position from diverse realist positions, mainly 
by holding that international law is an extension of national law: the hierarchy of legal 
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norms is according to him a singularly enforced hierarchy.237 To Kelsen’s contrary, 
advanced realists, including Bull, hold alternatively that international law might as well 
be believed to be one of the many non-national kinds of order (such as “religious orders 
based on supernatural sanctions [or] ... moral orders based on voluntary obedience”), and 
that international law is thus not unlike a law of nature in the sense that the sanctions for 
a “delict” do not have to have be physically-enforced.238  Even Cain heard his conscience 
speak to him, in God’s voice, and yet he was not forced to obey it. Some lawful sanctions 
are actually matters of a belief rather than of a norm: they are perhaps an extra-legal (but 
not necessarily unlawful) matter of confession, conscience, or voluntary exile.239
No decisions, taken by a sovereign person, can be endogenously engendered by 
one specific type or set of legal norms. No single hierarchy of legal rules can produce the 
decisions that must everyday be made by politically responsible persons, as Schmitt 
invariably helps point out.240 Advanced realists, additionally, help argue that sovereign 
decisions will have to be thought to transcend, yet to also include the tension between the 
structured set of legal norms and an organizational process through which either these 
same or very different norms may come to be believed to have been the valid norms. 
Hobbesian realists, in particular, argue that sovereign decisions are only valid in terms of 
their securing the physical well-being of the state’s components and the structure of state 
agents: sovereignty does not need to be based in a prior moral order in order for it to set 
in motion an organizationally self-securing process that transcends all the individual 
states and all of their structural components as well. This self-securing and self-
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organizing process is a mysteriously ‘birthless’ process, usually believed in analogy to 
the natural process through which religious beliefs emerge.241
Grotius fathered a method of analyzing the law of nations, not the law itself. This 
method may today best be described as international liberalism, mainly because it is less 
consistent with methods of legal realism than with those of international positivism 
(which essentially suppose that whenever legal norms are being posited, they contribute 
to progress). Grotius designed his method by directing international lawyers into the 
direction of norms that could historically have preceded the formation of state agents and 
state institutions. Sovereignty would have to have been derived from legal norms, thus, 
because these norms have to seal the structures off against extra-legal anomalies: against 
non-state piracy and other radical evils. Or, each state has to have been socially 
constructed on the basis of a prior-existing normative and regulatory hierarchy.242 The 
then-rising State of Holland, for example, should be recognized for its sovereignty 
because it would have been constructed on the basis of its normative right to govern 
itself: this right, according to Grotius, was older than that of some of its own neighbors. 
The problem is that these imperial neighbors were refusing to recognize Holland’s 
national lineage for political reasons: this was a concrete, existential decision on their 
part, which Grotius fails to take into account when argues Holland had been constructed 
much earlier than had previously been imagined, because it could date its national legal 
norms back to the downfall of Rome’s Roman Empire—rather than to the Christian 
Emperor and rather than to the Empire’s political reasons.243
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National lineages prove themselves very difficult to trace: Grotius conveniently 
ignored this difficulty by never mentioning the great migrations, for example. It may 
therefore be safer to say, however, that the State of Holland only became recognized as a 
sovereign state because its government had centralized its capacity to physical protect its 
own borders—as Max Weber might say, quite a bit more accurately than contemporary 
Grotian liberals.244 Henry Kamen indeed reports to the effect that Holland’s independent 
government could only have been recognized, as if having its own sovereign personality, 
after 1572 (the year in which the Duke of Alba began to lose a series of towns to the pro-
independence rebel forces).245 But by 1648 the peoples of the Netherlands would still not 
have been recognized as an independent power.246 Formally, Holland continued to be one 
of the many imperial provinces, and at least remained so until into the last decades of the 
eighteenth century. But, then again, few IR theorists have agreed on what it really means 
for any particular state to be protective of its own structural representations and even to 
be willing to—like Grotius in his own attempt to help incorporate some of the wealthiest 
provinces (but especially Holland) into a Batavian Republic—construct its own political 
identity. 
Constructivist IR theorists, not unlike Grotius, indeed, have taken comfort in the 
myth that relations between unitary states were first formed during the the demise of an 
empire that preceded them: these were clear-cut ‘bangs’ within the structure of power. 
States were, assumedly, formed by means of the often-prolonged negotiations at 
Westphalia (1648), their rights to independence were affirmed in 1815 (Vienna) and 1919 
(Versailles), and were concluded in the 1960s (by the UN). Because this is only a myth, 
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holding that IR structures would have been formed by a one-directional series of ‘big 
bangs’, and because this myth has remained so pervasive, however, it must be asked 
whether neo-Grotian constructivists are not entirely incorrect to so long have implied that 
each state only exists if it only has to have nationally inherited, socially constructed, and 
have legally posited its own (self-representational) structures.247 Or are constructivists 
nonetheless correct that legal norms and other such social constructs can truly represent
(and thereby, it is believed, can preserve) a people’s intellectual construction of their own 
state’s heritage—and, therefore, also its own political identity?248 Yet, as realists of 
various eras have contradicted this question’s assumption, it may simply be impossible 
for human beings to ignore the apparently self-perpetuating void in between the abstract 
norms and constructs, in one dimension of state sovereignty, and the concrete popular 
beliefs in its other and more natural dimension (ambivalent sovereignty is not entirely 
mythological, thus).
The question of how realists differ from constructivists shines a bright light on the 
concept of equal sovereignty: the source of international law and the object of diplomacy. 
The question not only sharpens the contours of what constructivism’s idea of 
international law is. It also shows what realists believe that this idea is not. For, advanced 
realism always defines the law of equal sovereignty, in contrast to social constructs of 
sovereign identity, as if it has been organized around popular discontent with the idea that 
abstract norms and positive laws alone can be believed to suffice—as legitimizations of 
sovereign authority. Realist concepts of equal sovereign authority are to be organized in 
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terms of a law of nature, instead of only in terms of social and national identities, as 
well.249
Hobbes teaches that the law of nature—which he believes to be present in “the 
consciences of sovereign princes”—will include the law of nations (he writes that the two 
types of law are the “same thing”), because even within those international relations that 
there would be “no court of natural justice” there are still those laws of natural 
conscience that “oblige all mankind”. These sentences (Leviathan 30) are preceded by his 
remark, further demonstrating that the enjoyment of an equal right to sovereign power is: 
“so popular a quality as he that has it, needs no more [of this equal power] ... to turn the 
hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own 
family: nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest 
and most active part of mankind has never hitherto been well contended with the 
present.”250
Equal sovereignty is not only a positive legal norm, according to Hobbesian 
realism, because it is also an organizationally emergent quality: it is also a natural quality 
of authority. Armies will spontaneously begin to disband, and subordinates will grow 
sympathetic towards their superiors, for example, once such groupings will have heard 
that sovereign authority is emerging from among themselves. After all, it is very unlikely 
that they will then continue to believe more in “the present” than in the alternative futures 
that are being decided on by their own sovereigns. There are many other possible 
practical applications of emergent sovereign authority, moreover, so that it cannot be 
dismissed as an utopian ideal. The first application should be the representation of the 
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body politick, not universally but through the particular relations between its living 
members.
Authoritatively legitimate representations of particular bodies and of particular 
nation-states, then, are representations of beliefs in the ultimate unity of groups of (but 
never of all) human beings. These are also representations of the law of nature, thereby, 
for each law of nature transcends the law on the relations between relatively unified but 
equal sovereign states. However, the law of nature does not exclude, as Hobbes also 
taught to be a law of political conscience, but it rather limits human competitions for 
profits and glory. Few individuals (including very few kings) are naturally content with 
“moderate power”—so that many of them must be anticipated to want to compete for 
“riches, honor, command or [any] other [such object] of power [making them] inclined to 
contention, enmity, and war.” “[I]n the nature of [each individual] man, we find three 
principal causes of quarrel: [f]irst, competition; second, diffidence; third, glory. The first 
makes men [want to] invade for gain; the second for safety [from these invaders]; and the 
third for reputation.”251
Yet, note that each of these immoderate desires (for the objects of power) could 
very well be considered as a natural cause of war even though none of them is said to be 
an actual cause of war. Even the natural causes themselves have ultimately been 
(believed to be) transcended by natural laws—the first of which can be called the law of 
equal (that is, authoritative) sovereign representation. This law always remains a natural 
law, moreover, because it is a “precept” that prohibits each individual to act in a manner 
that could be “destructive of life or [that] takes away the means of preserving [it]”. 
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Hobbes: “[T]he first and fundamental [or the transcendent] law of nature ... is to seek 
peace and follow it. The second [is only] the sum of the [individual] right[s] of nature, 
which is [everyone’s right to self-defense].”252
The tension between a fundamentally wholesome law of nature, first, and the total 
sum of all causes and of all individual rights of nature, second, is the tension between a 
state of peace and a war of all against all. Hobbes does not argue that these two 
dimensions are mutually exclusive, but that they can newly begin to form an integrated 
system. In this, his argument shifts the blame for civil wars on a logic of acquisitiveness. 
Hobbes faults economic logics (the formal acquisition of the material objects of power) 
for a relative absence of equal sovereignty in the world. Economic logics help private 
individuals and individual states (kings) to meet the material preconditions for another 
sort of competition, however, which is the public recognition of a person’s integrity 
(dignity, stature, esteem, and so on, and so forth). The problem for Hobbesian realists is, 
henceforth, is that the relational tension between economic logics and public integrity has 
dissipated. Too often are bodies politick no longer capable of maintaining this complex 
tension within themselves, so that some of their constituent parts become much more 
equal than the others. Some individual parts have been waxing slowly, in terms of their 
power, and some much more rapidly. Disproportionate growth severs the natural relation 
(even though this natural relation is one of contrariness) between the whole and the parts. 
Consequentially, the transcendent qualities of the laws of nature are being substituted and 
are seemingly being replaced by a quantitative sum of state rights (by the profit, glory, 
and command of each of the individual states). As can be witnessed in the twenty-first-
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century system of sovereigns, some individual states were able to grow faster than others 
as well as to better consolidate their material growth than most of the other body’s 
members. Against the wishes of (Hobbesian) systems theorists, equal integral sovereignty 
disappeared as a result of this substitutive totalizing effect.
Uneven patterns of wealth accumulation create, and have been created by the 
political actions of statespersons. Djura Ninčić describes the complex tension that ensues 
from their actions as a tension between the nominal equality of states, first, and 
phenomenal inequality of states, second. She calls this tension an “antinomy”. On one 
side of a longer-standing debate on the meaning of international law, she sees that several 
legal theorists often pretended to have solved the “antinomy” by applying “a monistic 
conceptual framework”. By looking in this “monistic” frame, these theorists would try to 
grant states “supremacy over international law”. Some such legal positivists, including 
Kelsen, went thus in the direction of solving “the problem of primacy between 
international and domestic law in favor of the former.”253 But, either way, it were the 
positivist theorists who tried to erase the tension between nominal equality (all states 
have equal primacy) and concrete inequalities (some states are relatively supreme).
Conversely, Schmitt sides with Hobbes in arguing that both unequal and equal, 
concrete and abstract, and both the phenomenological and the nominal dimensions of 
sovereignty must be understood the form a vital union. In a juridical sense, this union is 
self-organizing. It is a covenanted organization which is perpetually transcending “the 
sum total of [its] individual subjects [and parts]”. In other words, the ‘social contract’ that 
binds the sum of all the individuals and individual states is a sort of ‘legal contract’ 
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because it has to be perpetually included, and yet also be transcended by its own 
opposite: a ‘state contract’ to have been closed with “the sole guarantor of peace”, which 
is also a ‘state contract’ best believed to be an emergent covenant.254
The following sections revolve around the theoretical possibility of an emergent 
covenant—as well as of a revival of an ambivalent tension between integral and 
transcendent sovereignty, first, and individualist and totalizing sovereignty, second. 
Rather than to have to dismiss the tension’s antinomy and complexity altogether, as 
Kelsen ended up doing, it is premised that it has remained possible to revive Hobbes’s 
mysterious sensing of a union of contraries: of a unified relationship between both the 
natural and juridical laws of conscience, first, and the particular interests and needs of 
concrete (legally unequal) persons, second. The idea of the legal parity of all states 
cannot be used as a valid premise in drawing conclusions about the foundations of 
international law, moreover, because legal parity cannot be guaranteed in the absence of a 
neutral and politically independent arbiter. Positivist theories have remained too monistic, 
too idealistic, and too infelicitous (as Hobbes could have said) in nonetheless premising 
that international law’s internal structure has to have been guaranteed by means of 
arbitration. In situating law in a degree of neutrality, these positivist theories become 
idealistic: they usefully help quantify international law structures but they offer too little 
insight into the complex but also persistently paradoxical relationship—between equally 
sovereign persons and unequal bodies politick—that then again includes these 
international law components.
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Distinct from political idealists and legal positivists (a group that includes 
Grotius, who had, after all, been among the first of a generation of lawyers to have 
defined the Batavian State as an equal and sovereign state, purely because of its 
constitutional law-pedigree and thus simply because its history could be retroactively 
nationalized), most political realists define the state in reference to something beyond its 
historical pedigree or its national legacies. For, they define statehood by asking what 
conscionable people believe to be a meaningful and just state—worthy of a political 
existence. Realists ask therein also if there is a difference between privately- and 
publically-expressed beliefs in the existence of equal sovereignty—or how persons may 
opine and deliberate in private, and how may they then proceed to decide on their 
opinions and their passions in public.255 For instance, do they privately express their trust 
in officials and do they freely respect the latter’s transmundane, transcendent authority? 
Or are citizens rather distrustful of all those officials claiming they acted politically (as 
they broke off diplomatic relations or waged war, maybe) because necessity demanded it 
from them?
Hobbes thinks any “rationale” for the structural or for the social construction of 
the constitutional state to be morally unjustifiable. In this respect, he responds to Grotius 
by, finely but severely, doubting the latter’s “rationale for a ... contractarian focus on 
investigating constitutional histories.”256 Although Hobbes is more than willing to defend 
the notion of an organizational covenanting process, he cannot agree that a contractarian 
lens helps theorists to view state sovereignty’s preconditions. Hobbes’s own notion of a 
covenant is a notion of a mutual, but rather non-intentional (a religious, or an archetypal) 
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agreement.257 But the Grotian state’s contract must always be an intentional agreement. 
From Hobbes’s perspective, every such contract has to be a social construct because it 
involves a mutually willed transference of rights. It is certainly possible for an individual 
to contract with another willing individual, thus, but it would be impossible to 
retroactively and cross-generationally begin to close any state-contracts. Hobbes adds to 
his critique that such contracts should properly be called covenants—to the degree that 
only a covenant will have been mediated by either one of God’s lieutenants or by 
“revelation supernatural.”258
By implication, Hobbesian realists can accept the idea that contracts (between 
individuals living within, or between components of the state) are legally binding. They 
cannot accept the Grotian idea that contracts between states (treaty laws) or between 
several generations (civil laws) are to be believed constituent parts of the state. Realists 
demonstrate that these are not laws of nature (sovereign constitutions): these types of 
normative contracts are, rather, “artificial chains”.259 They were intentionally posited in 
the form of legal hierarchies. Hence, they cannot also be organizational covenants or 
other such constitutions—which, according to Hobbes, are both metaphorically and 
institutionally being mediated by Christ’s vicars and other such sovereign persons.260
Socially constructed state identities belong to states more likely to die than to live: 
these states are intentional artifices and their rules are, as such, subject to random 
approbations. If a state was born by means of a contract, a treaty, or on any other such 
artificial exchange of legal rights, then this state is more likely to be believed to have 
been born illegitimately than not. Its beginnings will be likely to be questioned, 
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politically. The political community’s birth and death, as Finnis puts it, are “open-
ended”.261 No original peace-treaty can forever be believed to remain a just treaty.
Hobbes: “there is scarce a commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in 
conscience be justified.”262And, the sheer diversity of organizational 
legitimization/delegitimization dynamics is all the more reason for sovereign 
statespersons to demand “an approbation of [an acquired state’s] ... actions past”. To 
legitimize their rule over a new state, neo-Grotian statespersons ultimately have to 
believe that their own sovereignty derives from a covenant only legitimized and mediated 
by God—and not by other sovereign communities with their own concrete reasons.
Arendt casts doubt on that neo-Grotian idea of history’s ‘gift’ of statehood, given 
to human beings, as well as that Hobbes does. But she refrains from alternatively 
legitimizing this ‘gift’ in reference to a single and omnipotent entity.263 Arendt goes 
along with the realist notion that constitutional beginnings should not be thought to be 
intentional and artificial. But she takes an extra step by also blaming liberalism for 
having tried to find moral and economic justifications for radical beginnings or for final 
endings, as well. By pretending to have found such justifications, nevertheless, liberalism 
lends assistance to the modern state’s creators and it, thus, leaves it up to chance whether 
the modern state should be constitutional or totalitarian—as opposed to taking pleasure in 
its own “natality”.264 Or, (Grotian) liberalism is not just complicit to the contractual 
cover-up of each sovereign state’s illegitimate birth (as Hobbes hinted), but also to its
own indifference towards the sovereign’s potential for self-organization and rebirth. The 
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social contract is not to be confused with a covenanting potential Arendt refers to as 
natality.265
Twentieth-century states became totalitarian once they started dispersing the 
power of their administrative apparatuses and ‘gave’ virtually unlimited powers to secret 
police agents. These states had to a considerable extent been able to codify, or to legalize, 
the human rights-violations that were being committed by their police forces—without 
having to have called these killings lawful or legit.266 Continental totalitarianism, as well 
as the Thermydorian Terror, would form uncharacteristically violent moments in human 
history for two reasons. First, the people became inert. They failed to secure their own 
potential of permanent revolutionary actions: for natality. And, they would no longer be 
making use of their ‘second nature’ or of their common senses, and thus be losing their 
taste for politics. Second, they condoned state agents who—and they justified the creation 
of institutional structures that—applied their rules randomly. Legal arbitrariness became 
the hallmark of totalitarianism. The people took refuge not in the laws of the heart, but in 
an ideational and abstract world. That world would be governed by legal and moral 
justifications, by abstract structures, but its inhabitants would distrust concrete sense 
experiences. Their world was suddenly no longer an experience-grounded world. 
Arendt’s realist undertone becomes a bit better audible when she takes her readership 
back towards these concrete experiences and sensory observations: actions and words are 
now heard to be the substance of politics, not ideas and machines.267
Arendt credits worker councils and town-hall meetings for having breathed a 
sensible/sensory spirit of law. Judgment and commonsense are in such meetings the 
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atmospheric elements of social justice: not positive legality. The act of commonsensical 
judging is not a scientific deduction, and not even an artistic induction, but it is rather a 
process of making sure to avoid that societal structures become corrupted by the 
illegitimate or irresponsible effects they help create (the greatest trespass of the Nazi 
government had been that it failed to judge itself politically responsible for these societal 
structures).268
Arendt’s concept of natality expresses the relative and mediated novelty of 
authority’s self-regulatory spirit, and even though the concept remains pluralistic in 
orientation, and thus cannot be squared with Hobbes’s dual authority concept, the next-
below section argues that Arendt’s concept makes it possible to see why political 
theology can no longer be excluded from the current range of IR methodologies. Natality 
is a spiritual as much as temporal experience. Thus, IR theorists can no longer (at least, 
not in ‘good’ conscience) deny that the act of judging things spiritually as well as 
commonsensically is an act nearly-identical to activist expressions of constitutional 
fidelity. These expressions are acts of organizational self-legitimization because they are 
not limited to the temporal sphere: they enthuse a ‘birthless’ organizational process with 
its own capacity for perpetual rebirth. Arendt and Hobbes certainly differ from each 
other, but not too much, in this respect. They differ because the latter argues that exactly 
these sorts of acts of processual self-legitimization can be (because they have been) 
mediated by God (or, actually, by the Christ), while the former finds the idea of only one 
such a source of absolute goodness meaningless. But, they differ not on the notion that, 
more specifically, political realists are to some degree also political theologians. For 
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instance, Machiavelli is deeply cognizant of the Almighty—as he repeatedly returns to 
the complex relationship between the ultimate source of law (good laws, he says), and the 
unjustifiable and unfair manner in which human beings are treating the structure of the 
law. But, rather than that Machiavelli is being classified as a political theologian who was 
discovering the void between the law’s organizational source and its open structures, the 
IR field continues to label him as a “forerunner” both of (Bismarck’s) Realpolitik and of 
(twentieth-century) “amoral power politics.”269 It is likely that both Arendt and Hobbes 
would have taken offense to such a classification.
Neither Hobbes nor Machiavelli may have labeled themselves theologians, but 
they certainly were no philosophers either. No passage can be retrieved in which they 
were celebrating philosophical contemplation before political action. Their discoveries 
were thought to be civic scientific, rather, in the sense that Hobbes and Machiavelli 
always said they had studied general patterns of human behavior, or laws and 
constitutions, and that in order for others do so as well, they should have to engage in 
empirical research into the exemplarily ultimate origins of these laws of (human) nature. 
Hence, it should not come as a shock or a surprise that Hobbes and Arendt (and, of 
course, Augustine) were studying the political significance of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity.270 These realists must have understood that the constitutional state is a metaphor 
for the Trinity, and if not so then perhaps at least for a creational myth. In any event, it is 
not a surprise that political realists refuse to consent to the modernist idea that the 
constitutional state has, or that contemporary sovereignty is, merely yet another 
“secularist” mode of authority.271
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Realists may very well agree with each other, however, that both justice and 
balance coexist with their own opposites (non-justice, imbalance), that certain beliefs will 
emerge from within these opposites, and that many such beliefs are identical to beliefs in 
the  ultimately good origins of sovereign authority. More importantly, realists have 
sufficient reason to propose that these certain beliefs are best understood as a leap of 
faith, similar to Pascal’s wager, rather than to derive from the Cartesian dichotomy that 
has separated the organizational balance from legal justice, by analogy to how the same 
dichotomy also separates a self-balancing body from a legally just distribution of 
powers.272
Social Constructivism’s Attack on Realism’s Respect for Structural Beliefs
The Introduction hinted that the International Relations sub-discipline has been 
held together, both in North-America and in political science-departments around the 
globe, by theories such as structuralism and neo-realism (Hobbism), liberal
institutionalism (neo-Kantianism), and social constructivism.273 Each of these three basic 
strands of theorizing is dominant in IR, indeed, but especially social constructivism has 
become the latest and seemingly most-comprehensively-woven strand.274 Yet, 
constructivism’s disadvantage is not that it is too comprehensive but that it remains too 
exclusive. It professes a liberal bias against advanced realism.275 More specifically, it 
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excludes from consideration both the domains of political theology as well as of 
Hobbesian realism. 
The thesis is that constructivism has, comparatively, failed to establish a 
meaningful concept of self-organizational processes such as natality. Also, 
constructivism has failed to ask how these processes legitimize states through non-
tautological definitions of conscientious actions and conscionable decisions—and 
particularly through concepts of supreme, transmundane, and metaphorically-
metaphysical modes of authority. Although a handful of scholars in various political-
scientific subdisciplines has drawn out very useful maps—of the connection between 
metaphysically-legitimized authority and the system of states, as well as of connections 
between sovereign (including charismatic) authority and political orthodoxies—more 
work remains to be done to better include a structure of spirited and animate as well as of 
the temporal and inanimate objects of power into these connections.276
Perhaps one of the first maps to have been made specifically for the IR field, 
comes from the pencils of Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker. Their map can be 
cited to show that in IR the main three or four “general theories” have remained too 
constricted. Their theoretical definitions of political power have prevented them from 
including alternative definitions and issues, such as those involving civic religiosity. Or, 
too often were the conventional IR theories used in order to classify religious matters 
under the labels of “geopolitical position” (realism), “parties” and other such 
“institutions” (liberalism), and “heritage and culture” (constructivism).277
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More and more IR theorists have come to realize that phenomena such as 
religious legitimization and spiritual authority are immeasurable, and that they resist 
quantifiable  classification. So, whereas social constructivists classify these phenomena 
into one or another form of “agency, process, and social structure”—as Wendt says the 
IR discipline is to be doing—it now appears to many theorists that not all phenomena of 
faith would fit as neatly into either one of these three forms as that the constructivists 
might have expected.278 In particular, constructivists (like Wendt) do not expect they will 
need to account for systemic contingencies that invite religious responses. Of course, they 
know people tend to respond religiously to contingencies. But constructivists explain 
such responses by classifying them as either becoming progressively secular, or as 
becoming increasingly socially conditioned by “concrete situation[s].”279 Religion is thus 
either the cause of its own secularization, and disappearance, or it is contingent on 
cultural conditioning and specifically on national heritages.280 This may mean that 
constructivists find, for instance, that it should be entirely contingent whether individual 
agents may or may not respect notions of grace and absolution. Yet, they will then still 
try to argue that these agents anticipate a (divine) final judgment because their individual 
actions were socially conditioned by structurally aggregate outcomes.
These sections will show that Wendt, as IR’s leading constructivist, has been 
mistaken to have limited his own theoretical interests to the establishing of primacy of 
individual conditioning processes over and above any given social structure. For, he 
thereby has reduced the world of politics (world politics) to a few intersubjective links 
between “interaction and learning” (identities) and any sort of “distribution of power” 
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(anarchy).281 Wendt knew of course that the power-distribution has long been taken to 
form an independent, and that conditioned identities were long taken to form the 
dependent variable, and yet he nearly ended up replacing the model of positive causation 
with a theoretical form of randomness. For instance, Wendt introduced the notion that 
identity-conditioning processes are not causally dependent on “self-help and power 
politics.” Rather, identity conditioning would be the one social process that ‘makes’ the 
aggregate distribution of political power: even anarchy is what state-identities are 
‘making’ of it.282
Advanced realism warns that Wendtian constructivism makes the various 
meanings of any (and not just of the anarchical) structures subject to randomization. 
From constructivism’s perspective, then, it must seem as if there are no non-random 
ultimate meanings: all meanings are shared collectively and yet remain subject to chance. 
Realists such as Schmitt and Weber, to the contrary, find that the difference between 
meaningless and meaningful actions is less determined by social interactions and 
identity-formation processes than that such a difference sustains itself into perpetuity, 
both politically and structurally. There is no such idea as a final synthesis, at least not in 
any common political realm, so that the ultimate difference between meaningful 
(commonsensical) actions and meaningless (senseless, absurd, banal) decisions must still 
be respected as a political difference—and so that it will have to be believed to remain 
such a difference.283
Distinct from the neorealist variant developed by Kenneth Waltz, constructivism 
holds that the structures of political power are not ‘made’ by other such structures 
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(anarchy, nature), but by the “collective meanings” that variously-identifiable state agents 
are continuously in the process of seemingly randomly attaching to these structures of 
power. Individual agents and their “collective cognitions” are attaching themselves, 
through social interactions, to states and their institutions: the agents and their “ideas” 
herein precede the structural institutionalization of power. Also, the “ideas” of the agents 
cannot be strictly prudential, as Wendt rebuffs Waltz, because if they were, then the 
statespersons would have no need for any social norms: they would only be deciding the 
issues of the day “on the basis of worst-case possibilities.” Henceforth, constructivism 
amends structural neorealism by pointing out that agents cannot be assumed to decide on 
issues by attributing evils either to anarchically organized competitions or to human 
nature alone. They must primarily be said to decide, rather, in acknowledgment of their 
sharing of “intersubjective understandings and expectations.” Complex sovereign 
persons, particularly, cannot decide and cannot even exist if they were to constantly 
assume that they all are equally self-interested—and that they are all equal contributors to 
banal evils. Sovereign persons have for a long time, as the constructivist empirical record 
will show, initiated collective norms of “mutual recognition” which preceded all other 
normative processes concerning their own coming-into-existence: “If states stopped 
acting on those norms, their identity as ‘sovereigns’ ... would disappear.”284
In applauding constructivism’s correction to structural realism (neorealism), it 
must be admitted that structuralist theorists (Waltz and Mearsheimer) were indeed 
mistaken to have held that each sovereign state either pursues its own rational interests or 
fail to survive anarchy.285 Wendt corrects these theorists: states are not only acting 
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rationally because this would be ‘the prudent thing’ for them to do—even when their 
pursued self-interests may have immoral consequences at the aggregate and systemically-
organized levels. States also do act cooperatively, by creating legitimate multilateral 
institutions, as neoliberals have argued. Yet, constructivists such as Wendt are themselves 
taking their own wrong exit when they are steering into the direction of a neoliberal 
program, holding that if a majority of sovereign persons is not acting by defending 
rational interests this majority is then at least very likely to recognize the national 
identities of the individual agents. The sphere of both interests and identities could thus, 
in a subsequent neoliberal constructivist plan, include the institutionalized execution of 
more or less normative, legal, and economic programs by means of a few socially well-
adjusted and well-socialized ‘experts’ working with or for the IMF, WTO, and capital-
intensive TNCs.286 The effective enforcement of legal and economic programmatic 
policies (international business law, international financial investments) depends then 
almost entirely on each state’s decision to participate in a structure of expertise-based 
socialization and social learning—and nothing needs to be said about the organizational 
effects of this structure on the socially-adaptive powers of poor people and other non-
experts. IR constructivism steers herein not so much towards structuralism, however, as 
that it more definitely comes closer towards neoliberal state commitments to partake in 
technically-detailed multilateral trade-agreements, in the ‘expert’ privatization of national 
government services, or the liberalization of consumer markets—rather than that 
constructivism also becomes capable of making an inventory, of how the total of each 
state’s commitments can very well continue to have a negative effect on aggregate IR 
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systemic-levels of balance and health: on all people, regardless of their own state’s 
commitments.287
Constructivists take an exit towards an independent model of assessing state 
action, but the exit does not lead them towards the organizationally-closed process 
through which human animals tend to recognize sovereign persons among or alongside 
themselves—even if these remain symbolical recognitions—but also very much beyond
international trade or very much outside of consumer markets, self-interested agents, and 
their socio-economic structures. For, beyond the functioning of states within markets and 
other such economic structures, a significantly altruistic part of human nature may often 
much better explain why sovereigns compete for organizational reasons, other than only 
for maintaining their reasonable identities or their structural self-interests—and why 
states do not constantly think of themselves as solipsistic producers of power, nor as 
singular creditor- or debtor-states. Sovereigns may instead be playing their possibly 
violent games because they are more willing to cooperate with their allies than to 
compete with their enemies. Sovereigns may also compete for status, or defend their 
interests at inexplicably-high costs to themselves, because of reasons that could have 
everything to do with the organizational complexity of their political nature rather than 
simply with how their interests and identities were—at some point in time or another—
being socially constructed.288
Advanced realism, in sharp contrast to constructivism, holds that the identity of a 
sovereign person cannot be recognized without taking into account the chance that 
(possibly violent) oppositions start to emerge between two or more sovereign parties. 
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This chance can of course be reduced, politically, but the presence of the chance itself 
makes it possible to argue that sovereigns are parties to a conflict. They may be acting 
rationally (in the interest of their own security) while in the same moment be deciding to 
take the highly irrational course of action of defending their honor or alienating their 
allies (to feed into the conflict by creating insecurity). Sovereigns are sovereigns because 
they may have been divided against themselves, in terms of their authority, which 
ultimately originates in a moment of self-alienation (a moment sometimes referred to as 
anarchy, skepticism, and sometimes as partisanship). Anyhow, not their rational private 
interests nor their political powers are intrinsically competitive, but the chance that these 
interests and these powers become detached from one another is what is likely to create 
competition and conflict. This does not mean the sovereign parties cannot become 
violently competitive, or cannot be marking the absence of mutual relations of legitimate 
authority. Instead, it only means that sovereign parties are both able to mitigate the 
chances of violence, as well as to engage in legitimate and relatively non-violent 
relations. A sovereign’s partisanship performs a divisive function: sovereign authority 
emerges from all sorts of turbulent relations between competitive interests or between 
qualitatively different powers—and not only from between nation-states or their 
identities. Sovereignties have in fact for a long time been co-constituted by interests and 
powers as well as by identities and heritages. It is therefore simply not true that each 
nation-state’s cultural identity and historical heritage can as radically be erased as that the 
“recognition” for each state’s sovereignty can be withdrawn (rather than vice-versa).
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As the members of the diplomatic community, and as so many of the TNCs of the 
world, pursue their own interests in diverse places—possibly as diverse as the former 
states of East-Germany and apartheid South-Africa, but also such as Namibia, Sudan and 
Eritrea, or in South-Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, Palestine, Kosovo, and Chechnya—the 
diplomats and entrepreneurs will be quite conscious of the fact that these contested 
countries oftentimes are unlikely to be recognized as equally sovereign, without that their 
“identity” should be considered close to disappearing. 
Further, a potential surrender of sovereignty is in itself no reason for UN member-
states or for TNCs to stop obeying norms within a state that is about to lose or that 
already may have lost its sovereignty. Sovereignty-recognition practices are historically 
contingent and morally ambiguous—and cannot be explained by means of if-then 
deductions.
Constructivists often presuppose that sovereign persons completely owe their 
identities to social, and not to natural, sources of power: to inter-dependent identities 
rather than to independent movements, and to word-power rather than to sword-power. 
The problem with this presupposition is that constructivists may end up using it in 
affirmation of their own analytical dichotomies. They end up dichotomizing the IR 
domain, so that social constructivism and structuralist rationalism will have to exclude 
each other; they have to look at each other as paradigms. Because of any inter-paradigm 
debates, then, the IR field turns itself into a too-inclusive discipline. Michel Foucault’s 
work may well be invoked to counter IR’s self-disciplinary tendencies, and to win new 
respect for IR’s phenomenal complexity. But the disciplinary problem has not been 
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solved, despite a flurry of Foucault-citations.289 Issues are too often being redefined so 
that they seem to fit into either one of the paradigms, rather, which then again affirms a 
disciplinary need for positivism. The problem persists: potentially creative inquiries and 
potentially meaningful interpretations are being over-determined by positivism, and its 
own need for logical deductions.
Political theology grows parallel to realist IR inquiries into sovereign authority’s 
ambivalence. Theology arrives together with realist inquiries into how sovereign persons 
may use methods of cognitive induction and of spiritual abduction, also, rather than that 
these persons will logically deduce the meanings of one action or another.290 To mention 
only one example of cognitive abduction, soldiers usually believe that their armaments 
are not the sole preconditions for their supremacy on the battlefield. They may indeed 
less often believe that their life depends on either the identity of their military institutions 
(constructivism) or on their being equipped with sufficient operational machine-guns and 
ammunition (neorealism), than that that it could just as well depend on a talisman. Most 
soldiers collect trophies, further, not just because these items help them construct their 
own identities or because they would give them any tactical advantages, but because they 
believe that their trophies can morally and normatively abduct them from the amoral, or 
the strictly deductive logics of warfare. Weber would have argued, as an arch-realist, that 
precisely such beliefs thus have to be lending at least some additional “prestige” to a 
command chain—and to persons of authority as well. Weber writes indeed that military, 
civil, and juridical modes of authority all find a basis in these sorts of “belief[s] in the 
‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules”.291
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Hobbesian realists respect objects that have been lend political theological 
significance. Whether the objects are animate or inanimate, people may lend authority to 
them. Authority may thus also emerge without that the objects themselves have to have a 
recognizable identity or have to be of help in applying physical force. Emergences of 
authority, moreover, depend on beliefs in the normativity of the rules. That is, sovereign 
authority may emerge from within a positively cogitated realm of written rules, formal 
rules, powers, parties, heritages, identities, and so on. But this still does not mean that it 
will emerge from such a realm, because the actual emergence should coincide with 
norms: there can be no sovereign authority without a belief in the ultimate presence of 
normative patterns and ethical reoccurrences (in natural laws, perhaps). 
The currently used map of the routes that could lead from the positivist 
disciplinary IR realm towards earlier political theological inquiries is a faded map. 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has been among the first IR theorists, however, to have plotted 
a route that led her away from the predominantly positivist, as well as from this secularist 
field. According to Hurd’s thesis, the IR discipline has too long fixated itself on the idea 
that modern statehood is only achieved when religious denominations have been 
subordinated by—and have been kept out of—a secular form of state power.292
Hurd was among the first to demonstrate why the the system of states is an idea 
that maintains its own degree of “false secularity.” Secularism still contributes to (IR’s) 
orthodoxy, in other words, in the sense that it maintains the status quo view of modern 
statehood as having to have been historically formed by “the Protestant Reformation” or 
as having to be a “morally superior” form of public authority.293 Historical and political 
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subordinations and exclusions of religion may certainly have taken place, in other terms, 
but this should not also be allowed to warrant the conventional wisdom that these events 
were part of history’s hidden hand or of its own secularist plan. Not history’s self-
secularizing plan, but statespersons should be understood to intentionally maintain an 
illusion of political secularization. Once Protestants (WASPs), both within the U.S. and 
elsewhere, for example, had occupied bountiful positions in high office, it became very 
convenient for them to appeal to a modern separation-of-state-and-church doctrine in 
order to maintain their positions—and in thus excluding Roman Catholics or other 
religious minorities from state office. 
IR’s secularism bias gives theorists a cheap excuse to not have to study beliefs in 
the ultimate presence of patterned norms. Yet, public policies have long been believed to 
be part of a transcendent normative pattern, as it is only natural to believe that 
administrators are ultimately responsible for the contents of the policies—and not the 
contents for the administrators. Moreover, policy-administrators cannot be neutral: even 
atheists can be religiously motivated or may otherwise quite intentionally be 
disrespecting the pluralism of religious practices—simply because most public policies 
tend to affirm the status quo privileges of a dominant religious culture. To avoid that they 
end up internalizing IR’s secularism bias, theorists and practitioners should begin to ask 
how their own positivist types of knowledge about “causes and effects”—within a world 
of plural (civic) religious traditions—could in fact be types that promote the uneven and 
inequitable access to public office. To avoid secularism bias, IR theorists should also ask 
which emergences of sovereignty have morally justified religious discrimination. 
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Prolonged religious divisions between states, and between the religious beliefs within 
states, as well, cannot be reduced to independent variables or other causal factors. These 
divisions are not created by either human nature or social identity, nor by either 
geostrategic positions or cultural interests, but far more commonly result from cognitive 
abductions.
The significance of any divisions that may have historically followed on periods 
during which people were physically killing each other, as Schmitt suggests, cannot be 
understood by asking which rational objectives these people must have had. Killings 
were never rationally or morally justified, and yet their political and theological divisions 
are constantly being legitimized in reference to past killings.294 Human beings can 
supernaturally (intuitively) understand that  killing should never be considered a 
justifiable objective: all the world’s religious traditions rightly condemn killers. Yet, 
many killings are religiously believed to have had great metaphysical significance: they 
might have legitimized, but they hardly could have morally justified the concentrated use 
of authority. Cain’s slaying of Abel was ultimately and metaphysically meaningful, for 
instance, not only in having defined a religious tradition but also politically: Cain’s exile 
is Cain’s impetus to become the founder of the first city-state. The belief that Cain’s 
authority was divided against itself, by being metaphysically irresponsible but physically 
foundational, can therefore be called a structural belief. It is characterized by fidelity 
towards a social structure (a city of men, who were forced into exile). However, it also 
remains part of a transcendent or archetypal process, breathing beliefs in Cain’s 
metaphysically self-organizing conscience: in the laws of nature.295
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Religion’s normative patterns differ from rationalist and idealist patterns of moral 
justification: they differ in that they hold on to metaphysical sources of legitimacy that 
transcend any moral justification. This difference between religion’s and any of the other 
moral patterns is a qualitative difference, moreover, as religious beliefs cannot be 
accounted for by moral values: only the latter values can be used to normatively 
substantiate either rational structuralism or constructivist idealism. This qualitative 
difference between religious belief (political theology), in one dimension, and rational 
interest and social identity (power politics), in another dimension, has been inadequately 
acknowledged by IR theorists (other than Schmittian and Hobbesian realists) for one 
simple reason.296 They have not thought of this difference as a precondition for emergent 
authority—even though it has clearly been (believed to be) a difference that conditions all 
sorts of emergences and recognitions of dual sovereign persons. 
How should religious divisions, as well as the emergences of autonomous 
sovereigns, be recognized within the system of states? Warner and Walker help answer 
the question by mentioning that—following their own “search for [the] emergent 
properties or ‘system effects’ associated with the kinds of local causal processes within 
each [religious tradition]”— mainstream theories are failing to make sense of the issue of 
what it is that ‘gives’ religious authority its “emergent properties”. Structural realism, 
liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism can thus only do very little in 
authenticating the “correspondence between the religious label [of a subsystem] and a 
policy choice”.297
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Warner and Walker establish an itinerary to get closer to issues such as whether 
“a leader’s religion [forms] a reason (cause) of his or her foreign policy decision, or a 
rhetorical rationalization used to persuade others”. Rather than to ask how religion fits 
into conventional IR theories, as if it were merely a “variable”, thus, they prefer to ask 
which systemic and sub-systemic relations give meaning to actual policy decisions. 
Which instituted and organizationally emerging relations either allow or disallow 
“religion’s effects on foreign policy”—and which “methodologies” will have to be 
developed to study religion’s function in the creation of systemic bifurcations?298
By contrast to Wendt’s idealist proposition that progressive expansions of 
individual rights, as well as of rational institutions (neutral courts of justice, or elected 
political parties, for instance) tend to have a positive causal effect on state legitimacy, the 
reverse trend may also play itself out. Rational institutions, contrary to Wendt’s idealist 
expectation, may also have negative effects on sovereign states and delegitimize their 
actions and decisions. Submarines containing nuclear missiles are part of highly-rational 
military institutions, yet if they sink or if they fire a missile they instantaneously will 
have been delegitimized: their own institutional authority will have become morally 
divided against itself. State institutions thus cannot, and even should not under all 
conditions be rationalized, liberalized and modernized (vainglorious American attempts 
to liberalize the Middle-East have evinced, for example, that a rational interest can have 
seriously delegitimizing and gravely unethical effects on issues of ultimate authority).299
Nevertheless, the question has been raised. Which effects might religion have on 
divisions of and within matters of sovereign authority?
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Both liberalism and neoliberalism (inclusive of American neo-conservatism) 
promulgate policy-tenets such as the rule of law and democratic elections, certainly, but 
they too often do so because the implementation of these tenets would somehow amount 
to moral progress.300 Social constructivism can rightly administer an antidote to 
(neo)liberalism’s prophetic claims of socio-economic and moral progress, yet Wendt 
wrongly breaks away from all potentially regressive structures: he assigns analytical 
priority to structures consisting of social human beings rather than to archetypal 
organizational processes among human beings. In this sense, Wendt reiterates 
liberalism’s claim that each agent can be a free social agent. Every state agent can acquire 
certain social and moral ends, especially to the extent that each state will eventually be 
able to respect each individual and each individual’s civil rights. Between and within 
states, each agent is thus to be equally restricted in her freedom, so that both individual 
agent and social structure can eventually be reconciled with one another through a moral 
process of social learning and identity-formation.301
Contrary to political realism’s world, a coming historical synthesis in the form of 
a world-state has to be expected.302 Wendt’s world (or world-state) is herein moving 
towards a synthesis of all three elements: of “agency, process, and social structure”. 
Contrary to Wendt’s prophetic claim that statespersons continue to work towards a future 
reconciliation of their functioning as sovereign states (“agency”) and their social learning 
(“structure”), and of both their agent freedoms and any structural necessities as well, 
however, advanced political realists maintain that Wendt has ignored the qualitative 
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differences between the elements. Structure cannot be reconciled with, and differs 
qualitatively from organizational processes.303
Structure cannot be closed off from the organizational processes of emergent 
sovereignty. But rather than that structure is in some way to be made subject to a morally 
progressive process of reconciliation and synthesis, realists find that structure will 
perpetually remain open-ended—as only the organization of its physical components (the 
bodies politick) may be changing from time to time. Organizational processes can close 
themselves off to change, as they are usually believed to sustain a state of equilibrium, 
but structural conditions cannot be unchanging and they certainly cannot be synthesized 
into radically new conditions. The parts of the IR structure as a whole may be replaced, 
further, yet this cannot mean that they will be replaced by new constituent parts.
States prolong life not by keeping religious diversity completely out of politics, 
but by respecting religious traditions as if these are the constituent parts of a structure of 
statehood. Hobbes argues that states can live if they distribute rights, including the right
to worship, equally among their constituents. By contrast to liberal theorists, political 
realists such as Hobbes ask not how government should restrict individual rights, or how 
it should most fairly protect citizens and their rights, but how social animals tend to 
participate equally in their own rights-protection plan. This plan must be administered 
more or less meaningfully, and more or less judiciously, as citizens will have to be 
participating within their own government. As Machiavelli would certainly have agreed 
with Hobbes: freedom is the meaningful and equal participation of all rights, and not a 
fair or adequate level of rights-protection.304
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That difference between liberal fairness and realist prudence may seem 
minuscule, yet it can have a large impact on the social connections between states and 
churches, and how this impact should be perceived. Whereas fairness and equity are 
widely perceived as measures of what two or more individuals may ‘receive’ from the 
state, for instance, the virtues of judiciousness and prudence are criteria of what humans 
may legitimately do for, or even to, the state. This instantaneous comparison helps clarify 
that whereas liberal values tend to be much more dependent on a separate state, or on a 
dichotomy between state and church entities, it is probably (in following with Max 
Weber) also the case that realist virtues give much better expression to the symbiotic 
qualities of a civic and yet resilient relationship between human beings and their beliefs 
in the ultimate meaning of their state (and its legitimate authority).305
Besides Hurd’s caution against the threat of a secularist disciplinary bias, there is 
another reason why IR should diminish the room it has held reserved for constructivist 
idealism. The additional reason why constructivism ill-applies to complex relations 
between (civic) religions and (state) policies is that it, inherently, presupposes that the 
rational competition between states tends to produce rational results. As states compete, 
peacefully, the ‘price’ of their obedience to international institutions should be expected 
to somehow lower itself. For a constructivist theory, briefly, it is still possible to support 
a liberalization of power: economic market competition may still be said to enhance 
political fairness, even if there is little empirical evidence of this liberal expectation. 
Constructivist IR theory maintains several biases. The more secularized a state is, 
the more liberalized it must be. Or, the more liberalized a state economy is, the more this 
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economy will help consumers to protect their rights. Some constructivist theorists argue 
then also that when states began to be decolonized, and before they were being declared 
independent (before the 1960s), states had undergone few or perhaps no qualitative 
changes. As Daniel Philpott argues, especially, it was only the decolonization episode 
that finally injected adequate dosages of moral progress into statehood’s overall history. 
The decolonization process, thus, progressively rejected the morally ambiguous 
separation of powers between various (colonizing and colonized) nations: it was a 
process of moral rather than only of mutual recognition.306 Michael Doyle holds, 
likewise, that moral progress in the evolution of modern statehood is being caused by 
states increasingly sharing their liberal values.307
Disciplinarily, Doyle holds on to a classic neo-Kantian argument: recognition of 
authority is more about moral dignity and social identity than it is about the political 
distributions and shifts of power.308 However, Doyle and other neo-Kantians, but 
especially the Democratic Peace-theorists among them, have remained unable to account 
for capitalism’s persistence: they have not accounted for immoral banalities and other 
regressive mutations and how these tend to proliferate throughout economic structures, 
almost regardless of the social construction of identities and interests.309
Philpott explains the changes of the 1960s as if they were morally progressive. 
The national decolonization movements followed the Protestant Reformation, yet he 
misses the boat on the possible reasons why the IR system cannot be progressively moral, 
nor increasingly liberal. The French Revolution and the tumultuous events of 1848, as 
well, would then have to have contributed to moral progress—while the Terror of 
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Thermidor and other reactionary strategies (not to mention totalitarianism) have to have 
been immoral aberrations in the process of state identity-formation.310 This selective 
historical method is constructivism’s greatest disadvantage: it suffers both from a secular 
neo-Kantian bias as well as from moral historicism (progressivism). Political realism also 
has biases, it must be admitted, in that it gives an advantage to theoretical parsimony. But 
such a bias does not prevent realism from applying to both spiritual-animate as well as 
temporal-inanimate objects of power. Nor does it prevent realism from observing that it is 
believed to be a wrong, anywhere, to try to reduce theological complexity to either the 
definition of material needs and instituted rights, or to states competing to satisfy these 
needs and protect these rights. Rather, political realism’s observance of tensions between 
ever-present natural needs and mundane passions, on the one side, and the state 
authorities whom are believed to channel-and-yet-transcend these passions, on the other, 
should be taken more seriously. 
Contrary to Wendtian constructivists, Hobbes recognizes a qualitative difference 
between structure and agency, as well as between “the public” and all the various 
“private fortune[s]”.311 Hobbesian realists have as their first order of business, therefore, 
not to reconcile the public and the private affairs of “particular men” but to ask how they 
can meaningfully restore a sense of balance in the relationship between these two unique 
and yet interdependent kinds of affairs. Can restorations of the systemic equilibrium 
between time spend on satisfying private needs (structure), first, and the time dedicated to 
public affairs (agency), second, be believed to be ethically-meaningful restorations—or 
should they be believed to have banal, and even amoral consequences?
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To reiterate the above, political realism is a method uniquely capable of 
theorizing the “correspondence” between states and religions: it is a method capable of 
recognizing the qualitative difference between state rights and transcendent 
responsibilities, but also between mere distributions of power and various more or less 
meaningful criteria of supremacy and autonomy. Sovereign statehood never results either 
from social formations or from a theological principle, realists additionally argue, 
because the principle should somehow remain analogous to the formation of identities. 
The social construction of the state’s singularity and supremacy, in politics, is analogous
to theological principles of public legitimacy—such as monotheism and transcendental 
goodness.
In order for sovereignty to emerge, people should be sharing some sort of 
theological principles, Schmitt agrees with Hobbes (and, as still has to be shown, with 
Machiavelli as well).312 People should thus be having some religious beliefs in the 
adequacy, and in the legitimacy of their own social constructions and identity-formations. 
Without such an exogenous belief, any of the state’s endogenous institutions and national 
foundations would only be morally justifiable. These institutions of the state would then 
only be randomly justifiable, however, rather than to be meeting the intrinsically amoral
and organizational criterion such as political intensity or systemic balance/imbalance. 
Also, probably even more dangerously, historicist justifications for each state’s structural 
foundations would then too soon be accepted on blind trust—or randomly. Grotius 
accepted, as mentioned, Holland’s foundations on trust. He simply suggested this State’s 
single lineage of successions had to be trusted to be morally justifiable—not because the 
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distinct successions had appeared to be principally or singularly legitimate, but because 
they would already have been socially constructed as soon as the Roman Empire 
collapsed: the construction of a state’s national origins is a valid source of its 
sovereignty.313
Constructivists have a Grotian bias towards state-originating movements. They 
thus tend to accept the idea that each state’s foundations resulted from movements 
capable of social learning. To Wendtian constructivists, these foundations are the total 
sum of social identities and national interests (from a structure, rather than a closed 
process). Each nation-state may then even imagine itself, or may be imagined, morally 
superior in the sense that it will have been better acculturated (socially conditioned) than 
the other possibly-recognized states. Unfortunately, as realists point out, these states will 
have little need for a common/commonsensical criterion to assess their failures to have 
learned, from apparent mistakes, nor do they need any concept such as natality (political 
rebirth) in order to make sense of their ultimately self-rejuvenating and yet self-closing 
organizational world, which is really—in Arendt’s words—“a world which is not in 
constant movement, but whose durability and relative permanence makes appearance and 
disappearance possible.”314
The neo-Grotian constructivist theorists are likely to accept the status quo of 
existing states by presenting it as if it had been agreed upon by means of a moral 
convention: by means of a single and definitive, closed structure of social identities and 
endogenous nations. Political realists refrain from assigning any such closed-off and 
absolute moral purposes to the self-conditioning structure of statehood, to the contrary. 
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Realists instead argue that the structure of, and the convention regarding, the state’s 
origins are not just some social constructs with an inherently conditioned, morally 
progressive aim. Ultimately, rather, realists say that each state is also a part of an open-
ended structure, and states may well lose their place within that structure due to changing 
beliefs about the meanings of their transcendent political responsibilities. Each state’s 
responsibilities and each state’s international public affairs are ultimately, as Hobbes 
argued, both structurally and morally or economically unjustifiable.
Although the structural parts of the IR system, or the constituent states, may very 
well all have been legitimized by exogenous and religious references to an ultimate 
source of goodness, this still does not have to mean that each state’s actual public affairs 
are also being well conducted or are otherwise opined to be morally acceptable. More 
importantly, advanced realists are additionally willing to make the case that religion (as a 
faith in the sources of goodness) may actually be used to either legitimize or to 
delegitimize the world’s status quo of spatial boundaries and territorial divisions.315 That 
is, realists take an interest in recognizing the contingent potential for a spiritual 
delegitimization of the temporal power and the objects of power, as the latter will be 
managed by statespersons—while retaining the religious principle that the same 
statespersons serve (right or wrong) analogously to beliefs in legitimacy-generating
sovereign authorities.316 Both the spiritual delegitimization of organizational processes, 
then, and the authoritative legitimization of the temporal components of the structure, are 
vital in the recognition of sovereignty. Yet, they can well perform functions with 
politically-contrary and with apparently incompatible outcomes.
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It has here been argued that—contrary to Grotian, liberal, and constructivist 
(historicist) biases in IR—it is quite advisable to believe that a sovereign person is a 
legitimate actor even though each sovereign state’s origins will have been amoral. Each 
state owes its political independence to more or less intense and more or less violent 
relations, so that each state’s foundations would have to be considered as ethically less-
than-good and far-from-just. And, yet, people will also believe that their state enjoys its 
sovereignty legitimately. The tension between the seemingly (morally) unjustifiable and 
the political (amoral) legitimacy of the sovereign person is a tension which, according to 
Weber, cannot be resolved. Every political action may be believed, on principle, rather, to 
sustain an antinomy and a systemic intensity—mysteriously allowing a coincidence of 
political necessity and moral freedom. It takes a leap of faith to sustain the coincidence 
through which both political (legitimate/illegitimate) as well as non-political categories of 
evaluation (moral/immoral; legal/illegal; profitable/unprofitable) are somehow believed 
to be forming one political society. Hence, Rune Slagstad writes that “the interesting 
thing about [Max] Weber and his theory of politics is precisely the unresolved tension ... 
between two competing elements: ... power politics and democracy; decisionism and 
constitutionalism; Caesarism and parliamentarianism.”317
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How Political Realists Could Counter-Attack Cartesian Constructivists
Social constructivism is correct: most International Relations practitioners are 
aware that other state agents can be trusted. Not all agents are more than likely to only 
behave selfishly, or to try to survive at any expense. States are not isolated atoms unable 
of learning social (sociable) behavior.318 State agents are incomparable to the nuclei of a 
structure for, as Arne Naess responds to such atomist images, all human beings share a 
willingness to act as recognized and dignifiable members of a society. Statespersons act 
less analogously to single spiders, each in their own web, than to a herd of animals which 
has developed itself “through interaction with a broad manifold, organic and 
inorganic.”319 Statespersons are human beings who move around as if  they are the 
members of a single organism: the more they may want to isolate themselves within that 
organism, the more they will close their development off from their capacity for self-
organization through common institutions such as treaty-law, diplomacy, and warfare. 
But the same persons will still also feel an obligation to give form to an open structure 
within which some states die, an others are born. In other words, evidently, the entire 
herd of state agents enjoys access to a web of relationships between themselves and the 
other agents, and thus also to a moderately-open organizational space. But, structurally, 
all these agents remain also constantly constrained by natural dependencies on both the
inorganic and organic forms of these relations: on the physical substance of their flocks 
or of their webs.
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Arguably, social constructivists have been incorrect about the political relation 
between organizational homeostasis and structural change. They have too often failed to 
recognize that the relationship between organizational agency (social institutions) and 
physical structures (human nature) is an unavoidably ambivalent relationship. Political 
realists do recognize, however, that the web of inter-sovereign relations is ambivalent 
because sovereign agency is in itself still very much an atemporal process with a few 
politically-transcendent features, whereas sovereign structures are subject to moral or 
legal changes and are thus open to immanent beginnings and endings as well. This realist 
notion of an ambivalent web, structurally open but organizationally closed, shall shortly 
be shown to be strikingly consistent with natural systems theory. For now, however, the 
same realist notion must be highlighted in order to supply a counter-attack on 
constructivism. A first supply-basis has to be build on the classic realist example, hence, 
of how people express their beliefs in the symbolic meaning of inter-sovereign diplomatic 
engagements.320
Hedley Bull argues that IR practitioners believe in the symbolic functions of a 
“diplomatic corps”. Their beliefs then find symbolic expression in a “remarkable 
willingness” to be following flagging protocols or to apply various other “strange and 
archaic” procedures. Protocols, procedures, and rituals are being followed not just 
because they are symbolic expressions of the physical existence of “foreign states”, in 
structural terms, but because they give a perpetual expression to the abstract idea that all 
states take equally part in, and are the constituents of “organized international society as a 
whole.”321
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The organizational process of diplomatic recognition, as a patterned whole, is a 
closed process. It can nowhere be denied that the members of any given diplomatic 
community are human beings (as forming only one of Bull’s examples of who sovereign 
persons are). They respect one another, as human actors with unique roles to perform, 
because it is ‘in their nature’ to also respect the symbols and insignia that give expression 
to, say, free passage rights. Human beings have a basic faith in this symbolic notion that 
the behaviorial pattern of mutual recognition should include a legal right to free passage 
(not the other way around). Of course, as Bull observes, passage protocols and other 
diplomatic immunities have been becoming increasingly less archaic and less 
complicated as well. Over the course of the last centuries, the norms have been 
standardized and codified. After the Second World War (in Geneva), recognition of 
sovereignty came to be referred to as a precondition to diplomatic immunity (again, 
rather than the other way around). The legal positivization of the ageless norms of 
diplomacy, from that moment onwards, altered the fact that these norms not only 
symbolize the closed-off organizations and organized processes of sovereignty, however. 
Legal positivization of naturally-diplomatic norms also posited and expanded the existing 
IR structures (immunities became territorial, prerogatives became subject to court 
jurisdiction). Of course, the physical structure of diplomacy has much been altered, in 
thousands of ways—together with the formal introduction of special protocols with 
regard to secret telecommunications, for example—but the recognition of sovereign 
immunity’s self-organizational principle has remained both a ‘deathless’ and ‘birthless’ 
phenomenon. 
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Symbolic but self-organized processes of mutual recognition, in IR, including 
diplomatic etiquettes, are generally believed to be ‘second nature.’ This type of belief in 
the naturalness of organizational recognition processes can be exemplified by the idea 
that the successful conduct of diplomatic relations is preconditioned by naturally 
necessary, yet structurally-insufficient qualities and powers. The recognition processes 
transcend, yet include the structure of qualities, powers, and other diplomatic capabilities. 
The list of such structural qualities encompasses social intelligence, organizational tact, 
and political prudence or, briefly, commonsense. This idea that certain commonsense-
qualities will be needed, yet may remain insufficient, in creating succesful diplomatic 
structures is an idea to have evolved for more than two thousand years.322 But, to now 
take up Bull’s cue of a “remarkable willingness” to believe in the validity of this idea, 
why should he, and other advanced realists, have thought that beliefs in commonsensical 
diplomatic practices are willed to be valid or are willed to be organizationally- legitimate 
beliefs?323
Bull’s notes on inter-sovereign diplomacy differ to an astonishing extent from
Wendt’s notes about the social identity of sovereign agents. Wendt’s notes inform a 
research program. They help students limit the number of sovereign agents by limiting 
the number of “attributions of corporate agency”.324 The problem with Wendt’s program 
is that it has not (yet) been set up to facilitate research into the possibility that people will 
judge non-state actors as if they were qualitatively different sovereign persons.325 This 
possibility must not be confused with the program of popular sovereignty, but rather must 
be seen to sustain an alternative web of interdependent relations between states and all 
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those statespersons who are finding stable organizations through which they legitimately 
attribute corporate personhood and legal personality to non-states or, specifically, to the 
owners of TNCs, to unethical industrialists, to possibly poorly-conditioned 
mercenaries—and quite possibly to any ‘heretics’ who would rather put their own faith in 
legal, artificial, mythical persons as well. 
By comparison, Georg Simmel speaks confidently about pious attributions of 
personhood to others. In memory of Simmel’s theological stature, it may well have 
remained possible to argue that statespersons must be doing many other things than to 
just unify themselves (their nations) by means of their own type of personhood and their 
own type of social learning. Sovereign (faithful) statespersons would for example 
additionally be able to extend their realms so that each of their political realms will both 
come to transcend and include those ‘heretics’ who failed to learn  and/or all those who 
might have learned different things than they did themselves.326 Simmel’s point of order 
is that it should be possible to believe that any other person, regardless of cultural identity 
and social interest, might be a religious person: religious belief transcends thereby any 
other form of affiliation or any other “ideational form”—in the sense that religion 
belongs to a qualitatively-different relationship with the world’s unicity. Or, religion is 
not a need for but a belief in the ultimately unitary, self-organizing, and pure realm “from 
which ... relative, imperfect, and impure lives gain their meaning”.327
Constructivists can agree with structural realists that attributions and 
identifications of agency tend to ‘idealize’ the state. Both types of theorists would indeed 
admit that forms of nationalism and colonialism ‘idealize’ the structural differences 
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between culturally-monistic states. Formal state authorities are then subsequentially 
defined by reference to their identities and their interests, rather than by how they believe 
in the qualitatively-transcendent diplomatic relations. That is, conventional IR theorists 
make no references to something ‘archetypal’ that somehow makes it possible for all 
human beings to believe in the validity, as well as in the legitimacy of diplomatic 
mores.328
Whatever it is named, this something will be unitary and stable, and yet will have 
to differ qualitatively from the inherited cultures or the socially-constructed identities of 
each individual diplomat. It is something orderly and stable, yet it cannot normatively 
and not even legally prohibit the diplomat’s wrongdoings: diplomats may be spies, yet 
they are to be welcomed as guests. It is the organized belief in their exceptional guest-
status that cannot have been socially-constructed: it cannot be caused by shared ideas 
alone. It follows, rather, with Simmel, from a strange leap of faith in the relational unity 
of any diplomatic corps. From an advanced realist perspective, Simmel’s leap should be 
observed to be adding to and yet should not be defining the entire world of diplomatic 
authority. It will here be argued that this leap sustains sovereign authority’s ambivalence, 
rather, because all genuine authority respects the integration as much as the qualitative 
difference between abstract ideas (including laws of conscience) and concrete needs and 
interests (natural rights).329
It the aftermath of various American armed interventions, but especially those 
situated strategically in regions richest of petroleum oil and natural gas, it appears that 
social constructivists (Wendt, Crawford, and Philpott), erroneously, have tried to 
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showcase a theory in which ideas, or that ideational powers, tend to become the exclusive 
cause of historical change and of sovereignty’s historical emergences as well. For, 
constructivists have tried too hard to show that states’ structural identities, normative 
ideas, and ideational interests may very well remain closed off from any organizational 
disorder and enmity. Realism stands on more solid ground, however, in that it helps write 
out a long list of examples of contingent but not improbably modes of organizational 
disorder, and particularly also of how these examples can alternatively prove that equally 
sovereign states are not only not the causal effects of sudden revolutions in how ideas are 
being shared. Recognitions of sovereignty are not just being caused by structural shocks 
in the distribution of ideas and identities, that is, and they also cannot just survive in the 
form of abstract ideals and democratic ideologies. As Schmitt argues, indeed, 
organizations and recognitions of sovereignty simply cannot be abstracted from only the 
structure of powers. The organization creates and oftentimes representes, but cannot be 
abstracted or derived from a few powers or a few structural events: there is no final end 
(telos) to the organizational process of recognitions. Rather, there are many possible 
examples of some “concrete political antagonism” in which sovereignty’s meaning would 
never have been abstracted ideationally, form prior ideas, but became only apparent 
through what it did not signify: through only a contingent relation towards an enemy of 
the state, probably, or through any other chance encounter with such a “concrete 
antithesis.”330 But, realism holds that both Weber as well as Schmitt can help expand the 
list of such chance encounters, so that it may come to include concrete tensions probably 
resulting from a prospective withdrawal of ambassadors, from novel educational and 
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language policies, from changing interpretations of state religion, breaches of recognition 
protocols, unintended extensions of military occupations, and so on.331
Philpott’s Revolutions in Sovereignty construes an idealist argument about the 
ways in which states identify themselves. Revolutions focuses attention on how nations 
acquired their rights to self-determination, within a broader social order, by means of a 
few grand shifts in their shared ideas. The text describes two such grand transformations 
in, or shocks to, the IR system. In the last transformation, the British Empire began to fall 
apart as colonies declared their autonomy. This was the event during which nearly a 
majority of today’s United Nations members would acquire sovereignty. Unfortunately, 
while trying to show why decolonization movements created this structural 
transformation, Philpott fails to elaborate on the issue of how post-colonial autonomy has 
remained an abstract ideal. For, concretely, social and economic structures continue to 
negate a merely-ideational constitution of “colonial independence” as they are often 
stopping the “spread of anti-colonial ideas”.332
During the first shock, of the Reformation, states would have begun to participate 
in the IR system as if they were sovereign states. They would first have formulated and 
fought for this equal right, Philpott argues, in their resistance to a European Empire based 
on older ideas and, especially, on outdated religious beliefs. States such as England and 
the Province of Holland would thus even have been the first to abolish “religion as a 
source of contention in politics”. But in France, in particular, people of various social 
ranks had suddenly “no longer thought it imperative for the crown to enforce religious 
uniformity; they no longer thought that a legitimate public order had to be confessionally 
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unified.”333 Creation of France, as a modern state, rather had to have been historically 
“preceded” by a secularization of shared ideas and political ideologies, just as that 
recognition of the United Provinces (in the 1590s) would have been “preceded” by their 
own 1581 Edict of Abjuration—and therefore, also, by their earlier ideas about their 
natural right to enjoy a secular form of sovereignty.334
Further, Philpott argues that King Henry IV committed himself to a moral form 
offoreign policy when he signed the Edict of Nantes, in 1598. He was following Holland 
in specific and the Reformation in general by starting to conduct a “foreign policy” that 
would be respectful of confessional diversity. He even paved the way for Richelieu by 
having practiced religious toleration—and by thus, however unintentionally, making it 
possible for the latter to sign a truce with the Protestants rather than to have entirely 
‘dismantled’ or ‘eradicated’ their power.335 Before the seventeenth century had started, 
formal authority was already being shaped by a moral toleration-principle. Recognition of 
statehood depended for a long time previously on socially-constructed principles and 
norms, derived from concrete events such as the signing of the Edicts. But this does not 
mean that political realists (Aristotle, Hobbes, Arendt) would ever have agreed with the 
form such derivations would take: to them (as Finnis elaborates), rather, no normative 
right “can be deduced or otherwise inferred from a fact or set of facts.”336
Contrary to most realists, constructivists conclude that the meaning of equality-
recognition practices is less dependent on military ambition and economic competition 
than on moral ideas and social constructs. These constructs and these norms would, 
progressively, be shared by foreign policy-makers (Grotius, Henry IV, Richelieu, and 
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John-Foster Dulles would thus have to have had similar moral ideas). Most exemplarily, 
it would have been Dulles who first believed that the idea of “using military force to 
protect colonial interests” amounted both to a folly and to an immorality.337 The U.S. 
began to practice self-restraint, in the 1950s, as it rejected pro-colonialist ideas held by 
Dulles’s French and British counterparts. This changing diplomatic culture would have 
jumpstarted the decolonization process—according to both Philpott and Crawford—
because European colonizers had primarily become newly concerned about their moral 
appearance: they had become convinced there was a good ethical argument against their 
own earlier denials of “supervised independence processes” and “negotiated transfers of 
power”.338 In creating this impression that decolonization, when carefully negotiated, 
amounts solely to moral and ideational progress, however, especially Philpott ignores the 
historical fact that Dulles himself is more likely to have advised against the use of 
military force in Egypt for another reason. America’s foreign policy-maker was perhaps 
not simply sympathetic to the Egyptian right to equal independence on ethical grounds, 
thus.339
The U.S. had reason to fear that nationalist leaders in Egypt had begun to take 
economic offers and military packages from the Soviet Union. And, if Egypt had already 
fallen within the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’, however, then Dulles could certainly end 
up provoking a new sort of armed conflict (because of the atomic bomb). He was never 
prepared to risk doing that. Moreover, the non-violent pacification of Egypt’s Suez Canal 
certainly created a great opportunity for Washington to guarantee its other allies, in the 
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Middle East, that their independence would be secured for as long as they could help give 
the West access, via the Canal, to oil-fields.340
But especially the Wendtian program makes it difficult to understand why social 
groupings are becoming either more or less culturally amorphous—or even whether this 
has politically positive or negative consequences. The program has simplified the idea 
that every state is a corporate person, so that constructivists tend to have too little 
patience for the complex IR realm within which many states and non-states remain 
incapable of acquiring personhood (because these states have never been recognized or 
are being boycotted), were poorly incorporated (such as the former colonies), or that are 
being represented illegitimately (by tyrants). Constructivist ideas form the reason, 
however, why constructivists erroneously assume that social groupings exist on the basis 
of their “shared ideas” and that as they will continue to share these ideas until they have 
become culturally more homogenous—so that, eventually, the majority of these 
groupings will also have made sufficient progress to create a world state in which all can 
find a home.341
By comparison, political realists remind IR students of the fact that host-states 
may freely violate diplomatic immunities, may decide to close themselves off from 
foreign TNCs and, to a certain legitimate degree, may militarily attack other states. 
Sovereign persons may legitimately declare visiting diplomats personae non grata—as 
each host-state can not only expell them, but could even decide to assassinate them as 
spies or convict them as enemies.342 This is not to say that randomly declaring someone 
non grata would be morally justifiable, however. It is simply to say that the safe passage-
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principle is better understood by analogy to a politically-legitimized responsibility. This 
unique responsibility transcends and yet includes the formal rights and duties of IR’s 
physical components. In principle, this is a responsibility of all of the states and all of the 
political societies. Diplomatic relations are relations between politically-responsible 
entities, therefore: these relations can probably best be defined by what they are not.343
Diplomatic relations are not violent, for example, even though they are not particularly 
concordant either. In more practical terms, not all visiting diplomats can be killed, or 
even not be declared personae non grata by the same host-state, nor may any diplomats 
themselves harm their own state by acting irresponsibly and imprudently. As Bull adds, 
they will somehow have placed themselves under a transcendent obligation to minimize 
friction (by displaying their ‘genial’ or ‘tranquil’ and ‘patient’ dispositions).344
In contrast to constructivist idealist images of diplomacy, in which the social 
identities of moral agents have been emphasized, realists focus on an image in which 
actors appear to be both amoral and legitimate. Embassadors and plenipotentiaries may 
be acting amorally, and even completely sociopathically, for as long as they also appear 
within a self-stabilizing organizational process through which they have to have been 
politically recognized as the (‘achetypally legitimate’) representatives of their own 
sovereign states—as Bull also, correctly, mentions.345
In short, political realists can agree with each other that sovereignty-recognition 
practices do organizationally transcend each state’s structural components (consular and 
military staffs). But realists cannot agree with constructivists to this same effect. Wendt’s 
program generally disallows a vigorous agreement on how diplomats, like other state 
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agents, may very well find that their sovereign authority has been divided against itself. 
For, only realists acknowledge that any given diplomat’s act of sovereign authority may 
be organizationally legitimate in the same moment as that it will be observed to have 
remained structurally amoral and possibly illegal as well.346 Therefore, specifically 
Schmittian realists make an important point when they argue that sovereign persons tend 
to behave ambivalently—and that they may at any moment begin to appear as enemies to 
one another.347 As a complex system, diplomacy is structurally agonistic and discordant 
(in terms of morality, or legality), but it is also always organizationally conducive 
towards concord (in terms of legitimacy and balance). Sovereign diplomats, therefore, 
may find that both the structural and the organizational elements of their authority, now 
understood as a duality, form an ambivalent system: these two elements are co-
constitutive and yet they display considerable qualitative contrariness.
International Social Theory’s False Hope on the Creation of Monistic Authority
In International Relations (IR), both idealist and constructivist theories are 
deficient of skepticism and lean too heavily on a structuralist conception of economics, 
politics, power, and interests. First, many of these these theories take it as a given 
(structural) fact that “foreign policy decisions” are best represented—in deeds or in 
words—by democracies, supposedly because democracies would be both majoritarian 
and deliberativist.348 But enactments of foreign policy are rarely as majoritarian, as 
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deliberate, and as rational as that they were intended to be. Yet, constructivists plainly 
continue to try to fit the sphere of foreign policy—which includes both formal diplomacy 
and economic warfare—into a model of structural or democratic deliberation, rather than 
of decision and contingent modes of persuasion. Unintended ‘feedback loops’ are thus 
often being ignored, simply because they would not fit into the model of how deliberative 
powers and democratic interests seem to be spreading themselves out across the globe. 
Constructivists pay hereby far too little critical attention to the unintended consequences 
of deliberately-designed policy-structures, and how these structures may either appear or 
disappear due to unobserved and unintendedly-sustained organizational dynamics.
The standard example of a false democratization-hope remains 911, and next-
following Chapter Two illuminates further how terrorizing events (such as 911) may 
generally be counted part of the set of unintended consequences of structural shifts in 
how power is being distributed, and also of the ongoing government rationalization of 
and justification for the arbitrary use of power, which—in Max Weber’s words—
somehow all will add up to “the separation of public and private, fully and in 
principle.”349
After having been attacked on September 11th, 2001, Washington relied on a few 
neo-conservative idealists in order to find moral justifications for turning their long-
existing ideas about America’s geo-strategic private interests as well as their plans to 
‘democratize’ oil-rich nations in Saudi-Arabia’s vicinity, into a reality. The United States 
consequentially made it its policy to try to melt away “the Iraqi army and the Republican 
Guard”—all the while also forcing “transnational terrorists” out of Afghanistan.350 In 
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these geopolitical ‘restructuring’ attempts, the number of unintended consequences 
became so great it also became impossible not to accuse Washington of opportunism and 
imprudence. Global IR structures were thus witnessed to be undergoing qualitative 
transmutations, the most important of which took place within “the modern jurisprudence 
of war.” The U.S. government created a juridical anomaly in the form of secretive 
prisons, for detainees suspected of terrorism, and would transfer its domestic 
imprisonment culture to the Middle East, for instance, which again led to a general break-
down at the organizational level and specifically also to irresponsible human rights 
violations such as torture and indiscriminate bombings.351 But Richard Tuck points out 
that these IR systemic transmutations, which were only seemingly caused by the 
September 11th and later terror attacks, were always duplications of the essence of 
democracy itself: they were recreating the liberal-democratic principle that “all citizens 
[are] combatants of a kind” and that attacks on citizens had, at least since the the 
American Civil War and the end of the Great War, also duplicated “the conjunction of 
democracy and total war—which Hobbes and Rousseau had foreseen”.352
After 2001, also, the U.S. government became increasingly severely indebted to 
countries such as Saudi-Arabia and China while executing its military policies. It had felt 
compelled to combat numerous armed factions by deploying high-tech weapons, and had 
paid off local militias throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, while becoming deeper 
embroiled in neighboring countries like Pakistan—where the U.S. had already subsidized 
and equipped an over-sized military-corporate apparatus. The overall costs of these 
structuralist policies to the global economy were staggering, yet they would mostly be 
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paid for by the lower and middle social strata in the U.S. and elsewhere; democracy and 
war were fused into one effort, and this political effort found it increasingly difficult to 
extract itself from the sphere of high finance and corporate capitalism—as this sphere 
now itself, almost as well as the political war effort, became a source of much ‘domestic’ 
terror, fear, and frustration.353 However, eventually, all these structural shifts in the 
distribution of economic and military powers would still be transcended politically, by 
self-organizing revolutionary forces throughout the region (especially in Egypt and oil-
rich Libya, but also in Syria). It can be argued that the 2011 Arab Spring was an effort by 
autonomous peoples to counter-balance America’s beliggerent overburdening of a 
capitalist economic structure. In other words, the shifts that after 2001 began to open up 
the then-current IR structure had been causing unintended political ‘feedback’—which in 
itself soon appeared as a closed spiral, or within an organizational form described 
elsewhere as a “security vacuum” and a “vortex of violence.”354
Neta Crawford’s constructivist approach leads to a viewpoint from which the 
world of power, interest, and identity has been formed by a substantive structure—which 
is constantly opening itself up towards greater moral rationality and democracy. From 
this viewpoint, it seems as if fewer statespeople than before are holding on to ideas to 
‘liberate’ others on the basis of their own self-interest. It is no longer morally acceptable 
to use state power to occupy and exploit others: “colonialism is over.” The IR system has 
grown, at least in the decades before 2001, structurally intolerant of and immune against 
any sorts of occupations and denials of autonomy. By the 1970s, more particularly, it had 
alread been “no longer acceptable for states to take territory against the wishes of the 
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inhabitants.” Following Crawford, the post-911 American government must have been 
uniquely out of sync with other progressive structures—as even China had previously 
recognized the need for “greater autonomy” in Tibet and as Indonesia recognized  East-
Timor’s independence.355 Iraq must seem to have been the exception that affirms the 
decolonization rule. That is, from this constructivist structuralist viewpoint.
The disadvantage to taking Crawford’s approach is that it circumvents the 
difference between deliberative, intentional policy-making and imprudent executions of 
policy. “Decision-making” in international affairs seems to be of less importance, when 
viewed from her constructivist approach, than the shared ideas and the collective 
structures of rational deliberation (which should somehow outweigh the actual or the 
executive decisions, according to Crawford). If “[d]ecision-making” is an organizational 
process through which interests are being maximized (even if “not-rational”), then 
deliberation nonetheless outweighs all (both “rational” and “not-rational”) forms of 
“dispassionate utility maximizing.”356 Statespersons and policy-makers may openly claim 
to be defending their rational interests, thus, but Crawford and Wendt will respond to 
such claims by pointing out various “legitimacy gaps”. Power may be claimed and power 
may be defended, but it should not be a hyper-utilitarian, illegitimate type of power.357
For, if ever-higher degrees of utility, rationality, and power can be freely attained by the 
state, then why are there fewer and fewer people trusting the state to be acting effectively, 
objectively, and politically necessarily?358
In asking and in answering this question, constructivists continue to follow 
Wendt’s influential Social Theory of International Politics, which places a premium on 
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the socialization of interests, identities, and powers in IR. In defining the realms of 
political power and foreign policy, Wendtian constructivists suppose that most policies 
will have been motivated by a subjective formation and a social construction of the many 
state identities in the world. Foreign policies are being motivated, influenced, and even 
defined by identities. They thus suppose that foreign policies consist of what state agents 
intentionally ‘make’ of them.359
Further, Wendt’s Social Theory leaves the distinct impression that Hobbesian 
realists are at fault for not having mentioned the importance of identities. Realists would 
have made the mistake of imagining decision-makers as having been locked into a self-
perpetuating state of anarchy, within which each of them, or within which each individual 
state must “engage in no-holds-barred power politics.” The system of states must not be 
painted off as an anarchical system, of states acting only rationally or only violently. 
Rather, constructivists argue, the system is not best served by states pursuing only their 
own rational interests. Remarkably, this is not what realists argue either. Realists argue, 
instead, that rational interests cannot be separated from moral ideals and other such 
shared ideas about how social structures should be functioning.
The big question is how the separation between interests and morals, between 
concrete practices and abstract ideals, as well, should be tackled. Apparently, IR theorists 
can agree the separation should not somehow allow states to use only their “material 
forces ... (biological or technological)” in order to survive a world of incessant power 
politics.360 But not even Hobbesian realists favor this separation. Yet, Wendt promulgates 
the common constructivist error that Hobbesian Realpolitik is progressively being 
289
absorbed by a neo-Kantian form of idealism. A synthesis is being developed, in between 
both of IR’s subdisciplinary flanks, which would somehow evince that a third synthetic 
way leads the world towards a progressively-regulated structure of cultural identities and 
political ideals, and possibly to one world state.361
The question is also how abstract ideas and subjective cultural identities cannot 
just be derived from, but must be believed to remain opposed to a concrete balance of 
powers. Crawford focuses on how states adapt their foreign policies, and how they adjust 
their political decisions to international cultures: policies have been shaped by “beliefs, 
practices, and identities.” She thinks states are willing to adapt to an internationalist 
culture, further, so they can even better start to meet “shared expectations about 
behavior”—as well as so that structures of “behavioral norms and normative beliefs may 
[better decrease their] ... uncertainty about what actors are likely to do in certain 
circumstances”.362
Constructivist progressivism holds as its basic tenet that states interact 
(‘socialize’) more or less cooperatively because they will have learned that their “the role 
relationship[s]” are determined by the “meaning” of their individual roles—as opposed to 
having been determined only by each state unit’s material interests. In a nudge towards 
classical realism, Wendt holds that states derive “meaning”—in this socialization role-
playing game—“neither from their [each role’s] intrinsic properties, nor from anarchy as 
such”.363 Structural roles have no completely endogenous “properties”, thus, and they can 
not take part in concrete organizationally-antagonistic processes either. For instance, the 
recognition procedures that are being applied by the UN Security Council may form an 
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organizational process—but the process itself will not become anarchical, nor does it 
allow each UN member-state to script its own role. Wendtian constructivism moves 
hereby hardly beyond neoliberal institutionalism, however, as it reaches a similar 
conclusion: international forums such as the UN allow state agents to share “norms” they 
derive from within shared cultures, and from their national as well as international 
identities. UN member-states are evolving, morally, also, as they acculturate (‘socialize’) 
themselves. International society is growing in a global direction, and this means that it is 
increasingly likely that state interests will be effectuated by evolving moral norms and by 
increasingly cosmopolitan identities as well.364 Cosmopolitan norms are in essence an 
ideational effect on diplomatic role-performers—and this effect does not need to have 
been caused by the concretely-political and also not by the qualitative differences 
between (blocs of) the UN members. 
Political realists argue that in looking for a cosmpolitan world-state, 
constructivists are blinding themselves towards the ‘real’ divergences between the 
political and the sociable (‘socialized’) behaviors that occur in all states. They will fail to 
see the gap (the antinomy) that could at any time begin to differentiate the politically-
concrete from the socially-abstract spheres of life. Linearly opposed to constructivism, 
then, proto-realists such as Schmitt point out that the idea of a single world-state is 
inconcrete. This single state is only a figment of the imagination: all political singularities 
are specious.365
For two reasons, Wendt’s Social Theory remains more idealistic than is often 
acknowledged in the discipline. First, the texts knits strands of structuralism and 
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neoliberal idealism into a positivist-scientific cloth. The remainder strands of realism can 
give little color to this cloth because scientific positivism protects abstract ideas against 
material interests or, in brief, it shields ‘minds’ against ‘bodies.’ Therefore, Social Theory
offers protection to reasonable ‘minds’ against interferences by ‘matter’ (mental 
abstractions against physical concreteness, in again other words), rather than that it 
respects subjective confessional beliefs in the interactive relationship between these twin 
sources of sovereign authority. Wendt agrees—with structuralists and neorealists—that 
state authority must consist of monopolistic (or monistic) ideas about when the means of 
violence may be utilized, within a single territory, also. Perhaps inadvertently, however, 
he thereby locks himself out of any alternative definitions of sovereign authority—
including the authority of pluralistic councils or theoretical definitions of systemically-
self-balancing constitutional authority.366 Moreover, his own lock-out leads Wendt to 
mistakenly equate authority to a single ideational capability—and less so to concrete 
interactive relations. Authority may on his account never emerge, then, from the concrete 
or the existential relation between two enemies.
Second, Wendt discerns sociable from autistic states.367 These two classes suggest 
that he understands state authority to have been posited along a continuum: state 
authorities are much better than non-state entities in adapting their foreign policies to the 
needs of other agents and entities, within the international structure they all share.368
Problems of war and peace are resolved better by better-acculturated state agents, by 
implication. But Wendt’s account leaves almost no space for the possibility that a reverse 
trend will set in, and that better-socialized agents become instead only better at disturbing 
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the peace and at misrepresenting their hostile activities. On the account, wars cannot be 
waged in the form of humanitarian interventions, for example, and neo-colonialist 
military occupations cannot appear in the form of armed democratization missions. Just 
as that other such political (either/or) enmities and indeterminate grey zones have to be 
excluded from the constructivist account, buffer states situated in between Great Powers 
are to be reclassified before being entered onto the account. For, they cannot be classified 
as an effective surplus of socialization, on behalf of those neighboring Powers 
responsible for having created them, as buffers, nor can they be part of an organizational 
self-balancing but anarchical process. Twentieth-century buffer-zones such as Poland, 
Syria, North-Korea, and even Cuba must instead be classified as failed states, or rather as 
non-states—because their authorities would have failed to adapt.369 Did they?
Social Theory’s thesis—that role adaptation is a progressive form of structural 
‘social learning’—cannot be read in the reverse, because the text never suggests that 
states went too far and could also have over-adapted their roles to structural demands. 
Nothing is said (at least not in Social Theory) about the IMF’s structural adjustment 
policies which, for example, forced sovereign states to ‘learn’ how to adjust themselves 
to a liberal capitalist structure by privatizing their economies, usually to their own 
detriment. Yet, in many similar economic and political scenarios, state agents too eagerly 
adapted themselves to the morally-regressive wishes of their neo-colonialist exploiters 
(pre-1959 Cuba, pre-1979 Iran, pre-2011 Tunisia, and so on). In other such cases, agents 
chose to depend on secret protection-agreements with an imperialist neighbor or with a 
greater regional Power (North-Korea, Burma/Myanmar, Panama, Nicaragua, Chile, and 
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so forth). In other words, tyrants may try to ‘over-socialize’ in order to maintain a single 
state: they do not need to be politically ‘autistic’ in order to gradually lose their control to 
a progressive world order.370
State authority is constituted by a dualistic self-organizational process. The 
actions of states have clearly not been constituted by a structure of progressively-
evolving norms, nor by legal positivist recognition protocols alone. Equal state authority 
depends much rather on the extent to which its bearers have been recognized as such: as 
sovereign persons, by other sovereign persons. Or, the authority that makes the state into 
a state is, actually, an abstract relationship of interdependence which nonetheless may 
remain contingent on existential relations of political enmity as well (as is usually the 
case in diplomatic relations). In regard to sovereignty’s ambivalence, then, IR research 
programs should focus less on how much state agents will have assimilated their actions 
to international expectations, cultural norms, and societal institutions. For, their actions 
cannot be logically derived from norms and institutions, of course, just as that it is simply 
untrue that abstract norms are being caused by a sum of concrete actions.
To reiterate the above-said, constructivism assumes that social structures have 
been created or even caused by a collectively-meaningful and ethically-tendential history 
of one world. This assumption is mistaken, not because several social structures 
(especially interests defined by identities) may in part have been constituted by individual 
state behaviors. It is also not mistaken because one world is unimaginable, abstractly. 
Rather, it is a misguiding assumption because constructivism concludes (from this 
assumption) that structures have to have been created by ideas and by epistemologies that 
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they are nearly-only therefore to be differentiated from actual behaviors and other 
concrete actions. But from a (Schmittian) realist perspective, constructivism moves here 
onto very soft ground. It cannot find any solid reasons to caution against the use of power 
for the sake of over-moralization, nor against excessive moral learning.371
(Constructivism now appears to stand powerless against morally superior, or narcissistic 
and vainglorious, behavioral patterns.) 
Nevertheless, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson suggests that constructivism remains too 
‘realistic’ in the sense that it still tolerates a contradiction between morality and anarchy, 
between cognitive socialization and structural imbalance—or, in his own words, it 
condones the “contradiction between epistemology and ontology.”372 Jackson moves on 
by reconceptualizing constructivism, and by thus distancing it from those realists who 
would have turned structural power into an object that seems “irreducibly theoretical”.373
In contradistinction to Jackson, realists fear not that the structure of powers itself ends up 
being over-theorized, but that the sum of its parts may begin to become more important 
than the organizational processes that infuse the structure of powers itself. The threat they 
foresee is that the sum of individual agents could end up disadvantaging and destabilizing 
the process that transcends and yet organizes the structure of powers. If all agrents were 
licensed to use their own moral theories and their own biased epistemologies, thus, they 
would too soon disturb the structure to such an extent that no integrated balance could 
emerge from within this totalizing structure. The structural components and the 
organizational balance, in that case, would all too soon lose their mutually-constitutive 
relationship.
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Jackson seems to prefer a monistic conception of how knowledge about statehood 
accumulates. Contrary to Jackson’s optimistically-formulated preference, realists can 
predict that epistemological IR questions will have to remain unanswerable in the 
absence of ontological legitimacy.374 Jackson’s attempt to subsume ontology to 
epistemology, then, forms a serious accusation against political realists, who would rather 
‘condone’ a duality consisting of both types of cognition. That is, IR monists such as 
Jackson seem to have too little tolerance for any antinomy, or for any theoretical 
divergence, between epistemological knowledge of (moral/immoral) state identities and 
the ontological (amoral/political) notion of state power.375 Monists are instead trying to 
gain acceptance, it now also appears, for their idea that state self-rule (autonomy) is a 
measurable degree of inter-subjectivity rather than any existentially-independent 
relational experience (possibly of supremacy, possibly of enmity).376
Neither Jackson nor Wendt have asked if and why power can be defined by what 
it is not. But Arendt argues that political power is not defined by violence, for instance, 
and Schmitt believes that the concept of the political is antithetical: every power is 
defined by its own political opposite; by a really-different power.377 Instead of becoming 
more willing to examine these negative (possibly ‘dualistic’) definitions of political 
power, constructivists remain fixated by the monopolization of one essential type of 
power. As Wendt acknowledges, “[p]ower may be everywhere [but] ... the power to 
engage in organized violence is the most basic”.378 Schmitt and even Weber, however, 
rejected any such definitional positivization of either a basic or a monopolistic power.379
They, together with Arendt, would never have agreed with Wendt that the link between 
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power and violence is “basic”—because if it were, then this truism could hold true:  the 
more armed force is acquired (or is used) by the state, the more powerful it becomes.380
Evidently, this is a far too monistic account because power often invites a counter-
balancing power—or power may well deteriorate soon after it monopolizes all available 
means of violence.381
Unlike (neo)liberal and constructivist monism, Schmittian/Arendtian realism 
respects a qualitative difference between violence and power, and thereby between ontic 
Realpolitik (experiences) and epistemological power (ideas) as well. Power and force 
may negate one another, but they undoubtedly may not give each other meaning.382
Because IR monism misses this point, unfortunately, it can be said to have fallen prey to 
Cartesian philosophizing. Wendt’s assumption that experiences are less crucial than 
ideas, within the IR field, is symptomatic of his Cartesian dichotomy of mind over 
matter. Whenever religious beliefs and cultural identities are assumed to be stronger 
independent variables than group biological and other sense experiences are, a separation 
between such variables must be made.
In a 2006 response to his critics, Wendt reiterated that “[biological or] material 
factors [always] turn out to be constituted largely by ideas”. “[M]ind and matter are ... 
complementary aspects of an underlying reality that is [often] neither”, he gladly 
admitted.383 But he also continued to insist that matter can only be compatible with ideas 
to the extent that these ideas ‘realize’ its functions. Without ideas, matter cannot be 
counted as one of the world’s two “aspects”: matter cannot be analytically separated from 
the minds that construct it.
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Social Theory of International Politics imagines state agents to stand on one side 
of the Cartesian isle. The agent’s role appears thus in the shape of physical movements, 
and yet each role must have been mentally constructed as ideas were shared. In the 2006 
chapter, Wendt finds that by using an ‘interpretivist method’ it is possible to learn how 
agents’ ideas were shared, or how their role-identities were recognized, but the effects of 
these ideas/identities may still also have to be seen through the lenses of ‘scientific 
positivism.’ Both the scientific exploration and the interpretation of ideas will thus 
remain necessary, analogously to how it is necessary for physicists to assume that one of 
their study-objects, light, consists both of (substantive) waves as well as of (ideational) 
particles.384 Wendt adds that IR consists of correspondences between both idealism (the 
ideational mind) and materialism (substantive bodies). But he is unwilling to say that 
these correspondences must be believed to remain ambivalent, instead arguing that only 
physicists (rather than, say, painters) are the best students of light. More exactly, rather 
than to call on IR theorists to study how structures of power may be perceived by the 
naked eye, Wendt’s Cartesian program circumvents the problem of how dual authority 
may emerge from power structures. By evading the dual sovereignty-question, Wendt 
indeed affirms his own idealism. He ends up at the anthropomorphic location in which 
the natural world, and its experiential complexity, has been singularized by means of a 
social world of ideas/identities.
The constructivist program does not concentrate on any oppositions between the 
two dimensions of sovereignty, but locates itself in a place where a materialist 
(ontological) dimension will have been epistemically constituted by the idealist/ideational 
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dimension.385 Following Giddens, Wendt makes the point that “neither agency nor 
structure can be reduced to the other.”386 Yet, he also suggests that state agents are more 
likely to create social practices than that these practices can help determine how state 
agent identities will appear within these practices—or, within these organizational 
dynamics of power (within a balance of powers). Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander 
argue that this prioritization made it possible, at least for Wendt, to “start from agents [in 
order] to define their practices.” IR practices and recognitions of power-objects are 
whatever state agents ‘make’ of them, within their social minds, but hardly ever are state 
agents said to have been ‘made’ the other way around: by the practical organization of 
their power-objects. The point of critique is here that the structure that includes but 
cannot be reduced its state agent components is a structure that seems internally very 
active, while the self-organization of political power is condemned to remain a very 
passive process; Wendt “does not touch on questions of the redefinition of polities [by 
power’s self-organization]”.387
Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase help realists to take this critique a bit 
further: if constructivism does not touch on political power’s self-organizational 
dynamics, then who can sensibly determine whether these dynamics are structural, 
anarchical, and violent or not? Without sense of how political dynamics tend to close 
themselves off, whose conjunctions may be used to to determine whether IR’s objects are 
structurally either warring or peaceful, and either mundane or transmundane entities?
Even if all individual states were identity-creating agents, why should the total 
structure of state identities be trusted not to remain open-ended, but to develop into the 
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closed identity and structure of a world-state? Why should the organizational process 
through which political powers tend to balance against one another—and which, as 
realism argues, is a transcendent process perpetually including and yet closing itself from 
the structure—suddenly have to become an immanent feature of structural agency as both 
Wendt and Negri, contrary to realism, argue?388
To put these questions differently, why did Wendt take an incalculable risk by 
proposing that his Cartesian program could lead constructivism along a one-way street? 
For, this street is taking constructivism from structure of state identities towards one 
state’s corporate agency, and thus also from the societal structure—within which 
corporate agents give meaning to their own identities—towards these agents themselves. 
This street must either be a dead end, because any world-state would have to form a 
terminal in which the state agents will have shed themselves of their individual identities, 
or Wendt’s street simply does not allow for a U-turn. Indeed, the street leads IR theorists 
from the either societal or anarchical structures towards the issue of state identity—but it 
cannot lead them back from this corporate identity (which has all the early shapes of a 
world-state identity) back towards how the structures are being organized. There is a 
simple reason, however, why Wendt took the risk of not being able to see if there might 
be any traffic on the other side of the median. From his point on the street, after all, there 
seems to be no social interactivity emerging from within the structure itself—and thus 
also no “interaction (Wechselwirking), [when understood as] ... the coming together and 
apart of both social [structures] and corporate identities.”389
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The reason why constructivism’s street was never modeled to be a two-way street 
is that the builder, Wendt, had too little faith in the ultimate unity of structures and 
identities: he trusted it would be better if there were no social interactions initiated by the 
structures. Hence, he utilized social interactions only if they served the structural needs 
(or: the corporate and physical forms) of the agents. Georg Simmel, on the other hand, 
has warned that beliefs in the unity of social interactions should not be made to mutate 
into “something almost like a physical need.” Social and interactive identities differ 
qualitatively from physically-determined identities, he thus also would have cautioned. 
Because, however mysteriously, it may very well be exactly this qualitative difference 
that allows people to believe that their interactivity with God also forms the archetype of 
all of their socially-mediated interactions. As Jung could have agreed with Simmel, 
popular beliefs in “interaction as unity” are both socially as well as psychologically 
archetypal forms of beliefs.390
Cederman and Daase refer to Simmel’s realism in order to improve the chances 
that constructivism’s idealist (ideational) biases may eventually be removed. They admit 
that constructivist idealists have managed to be “freezing”—rather than to be opening 
up—the structures of IR. For constructivists, indeed, state identities may still “merely 
[change] in terms of their cultural content.”391 State identities may thus not change in 
terms of open structures, or of structures opening themselves up towards non-culturally-
specific organizational dynamics and politically-transcendent equilibriums. 
In making it possible to also see change coming from within open structures, 
Simmel should be consulted by all those constructivists who try to more ‘realistically’ 
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recognize that ontological structures (matter) will eventually have to be integrated within 
any ideational advances (mind). To assume that ideational agents (mind) must typically 
be superior to and must be solely responsible for constructing, and therefore will remain 
resilient to, structural change is amounting to stubbornness. By contrast, Simmel 
understands that any two-way relationship organizes its own “intensity”.392 Structures 
may well change endogenously, as structures are open. In concrete terms, this means that 
identities may be won or lost just as that political powers may become more or less 
intense. Political powers can effectuate balance, rotatations of office, and powers can be 
exchanged—and any such organizations of power may take effect because the structures, 
not their components and agents, have been changing endogenously. 
To conclude, political change is far more dualistic and far more complex than 
constructivism has been willing to admit. The boundaries of states, jurisdictions, and 
national identities are much more frequently being modified by exogenous structures and 
dynamic processes than has been previously admitted by IR constructivism—due to its 
own idealist bias. However, these unacknowledged modifications are often performed 
because material interests have been redefined less by the sum of the agents than by the 
whole constellation of “mass media, education, language policy, and deliberate 
campaigns of violence.”393
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Why Global Transformations and Democratizations Wrongly Depend on Monism
David Held’s theory of statehood aims at comprehensiveness, but at times also 
displays a dangerous disregard for the structural possibility of political enmity.394 Rather 
than to find war’s monstrosities inseparable from how states are being acquired and 
constituted, Held’s theory disregards the possibility that war is oftentimes as structurally-
constitutive of social relations, between various forms of government, as that peace may 
be. This theory instead predicts that neo-Kantian ripple-effects will occur as either 
territorially-congruent or intensively-connected state entities are democratizing their 
relations as well as themselves. Endogenously-changing structures (shifts in language 
education, civil wars, and so on) seem to be of less importance, to this theory, 
unfortunately, than the idea that liberal state agents are causing these structures to change 
and to thus become progressively more democratic as well.
For Held, globalization means that the identity of state agents is increasingly 
being constructed by other such state agents: their identities are being shaped by their 
democratic ideas, not by existential intensities.395 A false dilemma has been hidden in this 
idea of globalization: the idea presupposes that agents must either democratize 
individually, or retain their monopolistic control over the power of violence, structurally. 
If they were to want to do both, they would have to form a single democratic state, as 
Wendt proposed they could circumvent the dilemma. Held  helped inform Wendt’s 
proposition, however, because Held belongs to a school of IR theorists who equate 
globalization to democratization. Even more problematically, Held rather than Wendt 
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recommends for democratization programs to be based on the idea of a marketplace. The 
marketplace incites freedom. It informs the “social forces” of the future. The “plethora of 
social forces” that can be created by and within economic markets in enormous: it is 
intrinsic to a “global project, whether through the slogans of the global market or 
spaceship earth.”396
“[T]hrough a process of progressive [and] incremental change, geopolitical 
forces will come to be socialized into democratic agencies and practices.”397 In the same 
book, Held and his co-authors predict that a “global project” will be pushing states into a 
democratic direction.398 This comprehensive project is not just democratic, however, but 
also a global cosmopolitan project. Each state’s territorial authority is gradually 
diminished, as new cultures and “new social movements [will be] ... playing a crucial role 
in global democratization, similar to the role of the (old) social movements, such as 
organized in labor, in the struggle for national democracy.”399
Democratic Peace theorists assume that the globalization of liberal values 
somehow decreases the frequency, as well as that it decelerates the pace at which armed 
conflicts take place in the world.400 Democracy and the globalization of liberal values 
both go hand in hand, as Bruce Russett argues, with a reduced risk of war. As market-
trade is picking up speed, and as economic interests are informing foreign policies, states 
become more likely to identify themselves as liberal democracies.401
Both Held and Russett commit a historicist fallacy: they take earlier periods, in 
which the chance on strategic warfare was being diminished, as the standard along which 
this chance within later periods should be measured. Positive historical experiences such 
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as the American prosperity boom of the 1950s and 1960s (and the parallel rise of 
organized labor), but also the transnational corporate creation of a consumer culture in 
the 1980s and 1990s (and Washington’s hegemonic ambitions), therein seem to be the 
main experiences to have informed their ideas about democracy’s progress. However, 
realists argue that precisely such ideas are idealistic. They take the concrete effects of 
liberal capitalism to be part of an invariable process, so that an abstract ideal of 
democratization can be set as the only variable to explain even more democratization. 
Thus, the Democratic Peace is a dangerously self-fulfilling prophesy.402 Realists warn 
furthermore that idealists (Held, Russett, Wendt) may be disappointed by capitalism: 
global markets are abstractions, and have never totally washed away any of the 
concretely political, existential oppositions.
Political realists make few illusions about the possibility of historical progress, 
even if it were to come in the form of democratization. For, however much the people of 
the world will be sharing their liberal ideas or their socialist economic motives, it is 
highly unlikely that any act of sharing these ideas also mutates them into democratic 
ideas and identities. Liberal and other economic ideas are principally abstractions 
(interests, values, and brands are social constructs), whereas democratic identities are 
concrete representations. Democratic institutions, for instance, consist of plebiscites and 
assemblies organized by the least-oligarchical elements in the state. Democratic elements 
have the least means of production in their possession. To pretend that all democracies 
are liberal is, therefore, to fall in a trap: it is to commit historicist and determinist 
fallacies, as it helps liberals to justify democracy’s subordination to oligarchy. Against 
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this type of pretension, particularly Schmitt familiarizes himself with the neo-Hegelian 
(Marxist) orthodoxies of his time, which again made him wary both of market capitalism 
in general as well as of materialist determinism in specific. For, if liberal capitalism had 
made democracy possible, then why would existential conflicts have needed to been 
fought at the American frontier or in the British and French colonies that were at the 
forefront of the spread of capitalism, as well?403 After Bismarck’s retreat from the world-
stage, near the end of the nineteenth century, the European international law tradition and 
its strong notion of balance started to give way to liberal standards of competitiveness. 
Economic values and technological capabilities became the main standards of liberalism. 
The scramble for the colonies was being consolidated, and colonial imperialism was 
being justified by means of these liberal criteria, applications of which would have 
‘proved’ the West’s ideational superiority, while the classical standards of juridical 
thinking about concretely-balanced political actions were gradually being dismissed from 
this world.404 Against that tide of ideational liberalism, then, Schmitt helps proto-realists 
in building up their case that the classical European juridical tradition should be 
preserved.405 Natural laws—and their political theological interpretations—should form 
the main directions on Europe’s juridical compass, as opposed to the routes towards more 
materialist values and abstract ideas.406
Like Arendt, who dismisses the materialist ideology of the French 
Revolutionaries, Schmitt believes that materialist values and economic ideas, and 
competing national interests as well, cannot be authoritatively constrained unless their 
political antithesis has become known.407 Politics transcends both materialism and the 
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marketplace: it is the only concrete and existential realm of life, and not just a socially-
constructed form of possession or preference.408 Admittedly, Schmitt himself takes a 
Germany-centric (or, perhaps, European-centric) approach which then led him to 
mythologize a Catholic law tradition of existentialism which had probably long before 
lost its glory.409
But the gist of his argument was as simple as that it would be directed against an 
approach not unlike those now known as structural neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism. Rather, the gist is that sovereign states should not be stepping up their 
competition over scarce resources because they should not think of their political power 
as the sum total, nor as the effect of their material possessions. The supremacy of their 
authority cannot be as directly derived from the status quo economic choices and 
preferences as that statespersons might oftentimes expect.410 Whenever statespersons are 
trying to find moral justifications for their own state’s supremacy, these justifications are 
likely to be based on abstract ideas about their own superior moral values—including 
their imperial or racial values.411 The problem with such values is that they “neutralize” 
the political realm within which they should be assessed. The subsequent neutralizations 
of liberal, economic, and imperialist values are centered in dangerous abstractions, 
however, because these neutralized values may be even more likely to produce 
aggression than that properly politicized goods will do—as Schmitt readily agreed with 
Marx.412
The idea that a political front can only be expanded structurally (economically, 
technologically) is offensive to realism. Marx’s own dialectical theory had foreseen that 
307
each political realm remains open to structural change: politics is structurally open, albeit 
not random and arbitrary.413 The end of the Great War is the standard-example of why 
politics should be an open-ended process, rather than to be closed off by the structural 
inequalities between states, state identities, and their economic interests. Paris was the 
victor of the War. In conjunction with her allies, France would in 1918 begin to demand 
the payment of war reparations from Germany. The Weimar Republic would thus have 
become heavily indebted, even before it had been conceived (its reparations were not 
paid off, in full, until at some point during the 2000s). Schmitt worked in an intellectual 
climate in which it was common to hear, not only from the Nazi Party, that Germany’s 
foreign debt, that Germany’s loss of its colonies, and that French and British capitalist 
forms of competitive colonialism were exogenous ‘feedback loops’ determining how and 
whether the Weimar Constitution could survive endogenously.414 By the 1940s (or 
probably in the period after 1936), Schmitt begins to understand that very little had been 
learned from how the Weimar Constitution’s 1930s debacle (after 1933, the Nazis had 
silenced but they never threw out the Constitution) had been caused by a political failure 
to solve the international debt problem (a failure which in part culminated in the Great 
Depression). He also understands that the Great Powers had continued to use economic 
sanctions and financial competition as the means towards meeting their own goals. This 
economic model of competition had been brought into the world by the Soviet Union and 
especially also by the United States, so that it would not have come as a surprise to 
Schmitt if he could have learned that the U.S. (only seemingly under the juridical and 
political auspices of the UN) went on to enforce harsh economic sanctions against Iraq, 
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during the 1990s—which were in many respects as damaging as those the allies had 
designed, at Versailles, to bring down the Weimar Republic.415
Political realism holds that world problems do not need to be solved 
economically, or technologically, if it is possible to observe more meaningful 
organizational processes. Most of the time, in fact, structural issues such as the relations 
between debtor- and creditor-states are still issues which linger on until agents finally 
take it upon themselves to tinker around the edges of the global financial structures. But 
the point at which state agents thus end up ‘remaking’ and ‘messing with’ financial or 
economic structures, is also a point at which structures themselves are believed to 
positively respond to state action. The structures are believed to be in a relation of unity 
with the agents—and it is this kind of belief that (Schmittian) realists understand to be a 
political belief. It is political because it recognizes an existential intensity within the IR 
system’s self-restorative, self-organizational potential.
Sovereign authority reveals itself in political relationships, which are ultimately 
always existential oppositions (relations of enmity). To be able to recognize sovereignty, 
then, is to be able to recognize why profitable and unprofitable investments, or why 
moral and immoral values, as well, have to be transcended by those existential 
oppositions that have so long formed a pattern that this pattern itself would again be 
recognized as the public law (in Europe).416 Moral doctrines as well as material interests 
should be believed to be hedged by the public law tradition, and thus be prevented from 
transgressing each state’s proper juridical boundaries (Grenzen).417 Borders between 
states should be believed to be juridical boundaries, at least to the extent that they—as 
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Gabriella Slomp summarizes Schmitt’s take on the problem—are self-organizing 
boundaries. Jurisdictions are neither morally nor immorally justifiable, as Hobbes also 
knew, as they are instead to be believed to ultimately consist of laws present in a state of 
nature: they are existential (political) laws.418 On these solidly existential grounds, it 
becomes possible to to see why the purpose of restoring (Europe’s) endogenous 
jurisdictional limits is a more meaningful purpose than the conjuring of any novel types 
of moral justifications for causes of war (justum bellum). Moral doctrines tend to escalate 
the opposition between two enemies—rather than that they legitimize their relational, or 
their mutually-respected political authority. Hobbes probably warned Schmitt about the 
likelihood that moral doctrine depoliticizes and neutralizes the self-organizing political 
process, because he had written that states could easily be causing their own 
“dissolutions” once they come to rely on moral or ideological justification for a “war by 
which their power was at first gotten, and whereon (they erroneously imagine) their right 
[to rule should] depend”.419
In great dissimilarity to political realism, the often-in-IR-prescribed text Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture suggests that sovereignty is not 
recognized through an ultimate relationship—but forms a measurable form of power. 
Sovereign power is in retreat.420 The textbook’s lead author, David Held, argues that 
liberal consumer cultures have grown increasingly capable of determining how the 
sovereign state should eventually surrender its territorial powers to the structures of 
globalization. Held et al. expect that the “global capital market” will continue to expand, 
for example, and that “network[s] of trading relations” will reinforce the market’s self-
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expansive pressures on the state. Sovereign power is giving way to these pressures, as 
novel cross-territorial and economically-oriented powers take its place. Sovereign states 
are losing their power to a “trend towards free-er trade—as the evolution of the WTO 
indicates.”421
The WTO is a global regulatory institution. It manages capitalism. It helps 
supervise the spread of trade networks and TNC-based forms of capitalism. There is no 
room for ambiguity among the authors of Global Transformations on this point: the 
WTO is useful in creating political change because “capitalism, in its many forms, has an 
expansionary logic”. But they themselves add an idealist tendency to this logic. 
Capitalism should be expected to continue to expand, globally, because this expansion 
has had politically-positive effects: it has helped spread democracy around the world. 
Capitalism’s logic will not “narrow the scope for political action, [but is much more 
likely to] ... dramatically expand it.”422
As Held et al. add, “the emergence of a global trading system and the 
development of global production networks ... [turn capitalist] competitiveness [into] a 
new standard of national and corporate economic efficiency; [this turn causes a] ... 
reorganization of the state ... to maximize [its] national competitive advantage”. 
Capitalism gives incentives to states: they are incentivized to democratize, in order to 
then again maximize their comparative economic values and interests. Capitalism 
facilitates also a tendency among national cultures to share information, especially about 
issues such as the environment.  These incentives cause states to recalibrate the tension 
between “the regional commons and international economic externalities.” “[M]ilitary 
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power” will eventually prove itself “useless” in this effort, as “national sovereignty” is 
gradually being replaced. Pressures on sovereign power are caused by constant 
renegotiations of the world’s “environmental interdependency”, especially. Once these 
pressures have been build up, a novel structural constellation will be created of “power 
centers and overlapping spheres of authority: a post-Westphalian order”.423
Idealists such as Robert Dahl assume that economic logics can cause 
democratization.424 Additionally, Doyle and Russett claim to have found sufficient 
historical evidence in favor of this idealist proposition.425 The latter finds that intensified 
trading patterns have historically correlated, positively, with the international ascend of 
democratic states. This correlation is part of one variant of the so-called Democratic 
Peace (DP) hypothesis: democratic states are less likely to wage war on each other, as 
compared to other régime types, especially when they continue to engage in commercial 
relationships.“[F]ull-scale war between pairs (dyads) of [such] established democracies is 
somewhere between extremely rare and completely absent,” as Russett explains. The DP 
hypothesis further holds that most states “fall in the middle” of a scale, ranging from full 
autocracy to full democracy.426 The less autocratic states are, thereby, the more 
accustomed they will have become to maintaining the peace among themselves. But the 
less democratic they are, the more likely they will be to find some moral justification to 
wage war. 
The big problem with the DP hypothesis is that it must assume that there is a 
middle ground between war and peace. That is, DP defenders take it for granted that there 
will be a middle on the democratization scale, situated exactly between the two poles of 
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autocracy and democracy—so that they do not have to provide separate definitions of 
these extremes. The extremes are then merely gradations, measured along one and the 
same scale. Democracy is simply a standardized mean, in other words, from which all the 
non-democratic states would somehow have to be deviating. The DP hypothesis is 
particularly problematic, however, because its proponents mistake democracy with a low 
level or with a limited extent of state power—and certainly not with a qualitatively-
distinct power or a unique form of state government.427
The DP thesis is not only unreliable in the sense that it cannot be isolated from 
capitalist logics.428 It is also invalid because it is conceptually meaningless to define 
peacefulness as democratic, and warring behavior as a strictly autocratic symptom. 
Indeed, such definitions give again in to a monistic conception of state authority: the 
more authority, the less democratic. This means there is no room for a dualist relation 
between democratic institutions and discretionary officials, or at least not within the DP’s 
conception of sovereignty. 
By diverging from conventional IR analyses, as well as from the DP assumption 
that the world’s middle ground is moderately democratic, political realism finds no such 
middle ground at all. There is no continuum of legitimate statehood, because every 
sovereign state should be believed to have been legitimately authorized. If it had not been 
authorized, it would not be a sovereign state. Yet, this does not mean that individual 
statespersons cannot appear in an illegitimate manner. Indeed, statespersons necessarily 
act in more or less unjustifiably. But the DP hypothesis creates the problem that 
statespersons act only as direct representatives of their own sovereign power. As such 
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power is assumed to be gradational, each statesperson’s power may be compared to that 
of every other such person. There is a single scale to facilitate power-comparisons and 
power-rankings, after all. But by singularizing their scale, DP theorists either make a self-
fulfilling prophecy or they are, probably inadvertently, claiming a monistic form of 
authority as their ideal—which realists argue is actually not a viable ideal, but a 
falsifiable hypothesis.429
Several Marxian realists, but specifically Alan Gilbert, introduce dossiers about 
democratic statespersons who supported not large-scale territorial wars, perhaps, but who 
certainly orchestrated economic sanctions, military coups, or assassination attempts 
against foreign governmental leaders—including many democratically-elected 
leaders.430During the Cold War, and after, the U.S. and its democratic allies perpetrated 
illegitimate violence against states they suspected of forming a threat to liberal 
capitalism. This American-dominated alliance often took sides in civil wars, as well as in 
armed conflicts between poor states, in order to tip the balance in its own favor.
At least since the eighteenth century, the global West has been successful in 
maintaining status quo inequities throughout the IR system. Western democracies have 
posed their own interests vis-à-vis those of poorer elected governments. For instance, by 
deploying the WTO and the IMF, modern democracies were able to strangulate several of 
their former colonies—even if the latter were endogenously democratic—by keeping 
them in financial debt and maintaining their economic dependency. Defenders of the DP 
hypothesis define wars, usually, only as cross-border high-intensity military conflicts. 
But in an age in which only a few Great Powers can possibly win such conflicts (because 
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of their industrial capacity and technological sophistication, as well as their ability to 
threaten to use nuclear weapons), it is more than just awkward that DP defenders remain 
unwilling to allow global economic warfare and all sorts of economic sanctions and debt 
crises into their definitions. The ability to meet creditor obligations, economic 
productivity, and industrial output can very well be measured: these are distributions of 
power that can easily be placed on a scale of being more or less egalitarian and more or 
less just. By contrast, political conflicts between powers may not as comfortably be 
measured in terms of how they end up limiting the abuse of power. The structural 
distribution of powers, therefore, cannot be measured in terms of the use or abuse of 
powers as well as in terms of power has been distributed among peoples: is the 
distribution sufficiently egalitarian and is it rationally balanced, or not? If power could be 
dichotomized, and if power is either limited democratically or it must be undemocratic, 
then it would soon become meaningless to talk about how international economic policies 
skew structures in favor of the status quo distribution of powers. Against DP idealism, in 
brief, IR theorists have no good reason to not accept the fact that economic violences and 
structural disparities intrude on the political realm.431 In this, they are as anti-democratic 
(anti-egalitarian) as that large-scale armed conflicts are.
Naomi Klein, Alexander de Waal, Walden Bello, and Dani Rodrik argue, by each 
taking their own angle, that neoliberal (and DP) idealism forms a dangerous machine. 
Neoliberalism has serious defects, however. When statespersons insist that states in the 
global South should engage in economic competition, or should open up national borders 
to international trade, they are more likely to be defending their own national business 
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interests than the cause of liberal democracy.432 And when the IMF and the World Bank 
ask poor countries to continue to privatize their economies, they are first and foremost 
trying to create a viable consumer culture within the richer as well as in these target 
countries—so that TNCs may anywhere start to outcompete, or to buy out local 
businesses. But this neoliberal machine, fueled by Western consumerism, has been falling 
apart.433 And, its replacement parts are increasingly being used to maintain illegitimate 
economic sanctions (and foreign debt) régimes.434
The global South is not simply a creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the WTO. But the IMF’s structural adjustment programs, which measure success in terms 
of aggregate economic outputs (GDPs), have been politically misguided. They have 
facilitated ethically unacceptable and politically imprudent ‘loops’ throughout the IR 
system. Tragically, most policy-makers at both the IMF and the WTO will continue to 
prophesize that privatized corporate trade can cause democratic development. These 
institutions hardly dare to look back at their own record, however and unfortunately, 
because their trade doctrine is anything but rational. Throughout the 1990s and into the 
2000s, the Bretton Woods institutions licensed thousands of businesses, headquartered in 
rich states, and thus allowed these TNCs to extract valuable minerals and agricultural 
produce from indebted states. Yet, business profits were rarely being locally reinvested. 
Global inequalities exploded.435 An entire class of nations grew sixty to seventy times 
poorer than the few richest states.436
One of neoliberalism’s most subtle critics, Rodrik, suggests the WTO was 
deliberately allowed to move beyond its classic economic mandate. Leading WTO 
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members ventured into the writing of unprecedented exploitative trade-policies, which 
created little to no concrete forms of development. It has been this institution’s mistake, 
Rodrik writes, to turn the intensification of global trade into “the lens through which 
development is perceived, rather than the other way around.”437
It is erroneous to perceive development and peace as the outcomes of economic or 
financial policies. David P. Houghton mentions that the DP theorem’s positive 
correlation “between economic interdependence and ... the spread of peace” may be 
statistically reliable, but that it is hardly a valid correlation. The DP theorem allows 
policy-makers to take growing “interdependence” as their independent, and political 
stability as their dependent variable. But setting this priority also helps them manufacture 
a lens through which only the light of economic trade may travel while political light-
beams are thus dispersed, and fade out. On the one hand (as Houghton further points out), 
“if believing that interdependence produces peace is what actually causes peace, or is one 
among other causes, then the effects [of economic interdependence] may be largely 
benign. On the other hand, a widespread belief in the [DP theorem may induce political] 
... complacency”.438
Realists dismiss (Held’s) idealistic conclusions to the effect that the satisfaction of 
economic needs will alleviate political oppression. They turn to Max Weber for support 
in doing so. For him, political freedom depends as much on a non-consequentialist ethic 
as it does on the satisfaction of instrumentally meeting economic needs and necessities. 
The capitalist logics of the early twentieth century have their roots in a Puritan ethos, 
however, which valued the mundane satisfaction of economic needs above any 
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metaphysical beliefs in the non-consequentialist process that had previously been 
believed to politically transcend such needs.439
Weber teaches realists (as Chapter Two elaborates) that consequentialist choices 
and non-consequentialist decisions or that, rather, both the economic interests and the 
political ethics of most relationships, implicate each other within the practices of civic 
religion.440 Hence, religious beliefs may somehow strengthen the realist argument that the 
responsible and the ethical exercise of political freedom—within a system of states—
cannot be understood in separation from the private interests and functional ambitions of 
these states and their governments, and yet transcends them.441 Weber might have agreed 
with Simmel, in this respect, then, when the latter wrote that the significance of religious 
beliefs emerges from within a relation of unity: a relation which cannot be understood as 
“a temporal sequence” nor as a “historical development from the more imperfect to the 
perfect”—but which is very much a relation respectful of both the unity as well as the 
qualitative difference between “two spheres.” Hence, archetypal religious relations 
emerge at a systemic “treshold”—rather than from a temporal transformation.442 This 
emergence is relevant for IR theory, now, in examining political realism’s theological 
caliber.
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In Support of Hobbesian Realism, Dual Sovereignty, and Systems Theory
“In an era of democratization, nation building, and ‘democratic transitions’, it is 
all the more pressing to ask how a people can best constitute itself”—as Habermas helps 
point out, according to Olson.443 The problem with this point is that Habermas’s idea of 
democratization has been derived, in its essence, from Kelsen’s idea that political 
institutions and constitutions are to be valued as if they all share the same basic 
normative cause: to spread equal liberties, or to at least increase the value individuals 
attach to their freedoms.444 Still, a less liberal and a more republican realist perspective 
lays bare the counter-notion that when citizens freely participate in the organization of 
power, they cannot derive value from and they cannot literally make sense of self-
organizational power’s concrete existence.445 Therefore, the problem has become that the 
field of International Relations theory—in which this question of transition, constitution, 
and constitutional self-organization has been repeatedly asked—has not yet been irrigated 
by the notion that a mysterious ditch or a void remains in place in between the concrete 
existence of free power, first, and the abstract value of individual liberty, second. The 
field remains instead permeated by numerous biases, but especially also by Habermas’s 
idealistic preconception that democratic constitutions must be serving and yet be derived 
from the best cause of all: equal liberty.446
Kelsen has been unveiled as perhaps the very first twentieth-century philosopher 
to have positivized the value of liberal democracy. Both his and Habermas’s assumption 
would always be that democratization is a liberal value in itself. It is possible to trust that 
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the democratization process will legitimize itself, because of all the legal values that 
function as if they form its own basic and final cause.447 Or, democratization will be a 
self-propelling force for good, for liberty, and it needs no constitutional antagonist (there 
is no counter-element: it is as if it is being its own basic norm).448 Democratization 
consists also of a generally ideational activity, and this activity will be fearlessly 
valued—to the extent that it is hoped to trace itself back to the final cause of equal 
freedom, both institutionally as well as how individuals will be valuing and making sense 
of their constitutional institutions. “[A]s long as democracy and its institutions can be 
[hoped] ... to serve the general goals of freedom and equality and as long as institutional 
behavior can be made sense of as serving these [final] goals, democratic institutions are 
legitimate, at least as long as the values of freedom and equality are still upheld by the 
majority of the body politick.”449
The current chapter concludes that democratization should not be valued in terms 
of liberal idealism, but is to be examined through lenses crafted in the style of Hobbesian 
realism; through the most comprehensive and most comprehensible view of constitutional 
legitimacy—as well as towards the ambivalence experienced in recognizing new states 
and new forms of both sovereign and constitutional (although not necessarily democratic) 
statehood. The main reason that (Hobbesian) realism holds an advantage over 
(Habermasian) idealism, however, is that it respects the fact that a void will remain in 
between democracy’s ideally self-organizing processes and the world’s concrete 
institutional structures. This means that all self-organizing structures are paradoxical 
entities: no constitutionally-just state can escape the paradox of having been founded 
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unjustly, in particular.450 To this effect, of creating more respect for the paradox of 
politics, IR realism can introduce a third element—which must itself include a dual 
concept of authority. For, the third element will then have to include structural 
(Habermasian) idealism’s own hopes on an egalitarian world constitution, certainly, as it 
balances such hopes by additionally including the dystopian possibility that the authority 
of a common world state would one day no longer be feared.451
Political action is either more or less authoritative, which means it is being feared, 
more or less. Political speech may resonate in either legitimate or illegitimate terms, 
which means that it raises good or false hopes—according to Hobbes. Realists caution 
that the difference between good and false depends on good third judgments. These 
judgments do not need to be neutral, further, as they should not differ quantitatively from 
the sphere of competing hopes and fears, or of competing ideals and interests. Judgments 
should generate qualitatively-distinct constitutions, rather, that can somehow help 
transcend this sphere of competition while containing it.
Arendt demonstrates that the political judgments differ qualitatively from the 
socially- or economically- constructed sphere, simply because they should instead be 
expected to express themselves in a commonsensical manner. As such, political 
judgments may have to take on the form of metaphorical speech, describing the moral 
properness of manners and ideals. But they may also have to be recognized as 
conjectures: judgments are still to be assumed and believed to be supremely 
commonsensical (authoritative) in the sense that they can only be believed to be helping 
people to decide how they should transcend the totality of their quantitatively-measurable 
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competing manners, needs, and interests. Tension remains between ideational-
transcendent qualities and sensory-competitive interests, yet the tension itself should be 
understood strictly metaphorically—rather than as fearlessly as that (Kelsenian) liberal 
idealists do, when they try to alleviate the tension.452 Moreover, in accounting for the 
critical distinction between commonsensical modalities of authority, and how these 
modalities are (revolutionarily) transcending structural interests and ideals, political 
realism can help IR theorists to draw a sophisticated and judicious distinction between 
ontological and epistemological IR research.
IR theoretical propensities to subsume ontology to epistemology have resulted 
into a monistic conception of state authority.453 It has been of great importance for liberal 
idealist theorists, in specific, to determine how monistic and monopolistic states should 
be less burdened with their self-defining task of concentrating power, so that state power 
can be further limited by non-state institutional power: by cosmopolitan institutions, 
separating themselves from a future past era of these monistic sovereigns. However, this 
task has mostly been imagined to be an epistemological task: how can agents and 
institutions ‘learn’ to democratize, modernize, and grow to a point that they become 
finally known as the legit representatives of one sovereign?454
Because this image is restricted to an issue of how to structure the open-ended 
institutional dynamic of representation, realist theorists will rather argue that that 
sovereignty is a ‘deathless’ process which has always been able to simultaneously 
concentrate and yet limit numerous (quantifiable) powers—because sovereignty itself is 
not a power. It differs, as a mode of authority, because it may both be exercised 
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supremely and yet be respectful of equal autonomy. Arendt’s practice of isonomy is the 
practice of this mode of authority, however: it is both ultimately politically responsible as 
well that it respects equally free capabilities.455
Realists also are familiar with the notion that IR research efforts into the concept 
of sovereignty must divide themselves into two contradictory fields: positive (including 
cosmopolitan, or utopian) international law, first, and a long public law tradition rooting 
both in natural law as well as in a (for humans dystopian) state of nature, second.456
Together with some constructivist idealists, political realists can very well acknowledge 
that these fields, taken together, give an ambivalent meaning to the world of sovereign 
authority. But realists are not troubled by the notion that this sense of ambivalence should 
be sustained, whereas constructivist and neoliberal idealists do not want to take 
ambivalent and dual sovereignty into account.
Idealist epistemologies of sovereignty may remain useful in that they help 
understand how international law should function: in affirmation of the formal equality of 
all states (even if legal parity is an utopian idea). However, these epistemologies should 
only be used within the context of abstract ideas, of idealistic ideologies, as advanced 
realists will be certain to express caution about any alternative usages. Thus, ideational 
epistemologies of authority cannot be derived from the concrete, existential, nor from 
those religious experiences so commonly believed to unify people—as Schmitt so 
resolutely argued. Much depends, of course, on what is meant when it is said that 
idealists look for epistemic cognitive bases, or even on what it means to say that realists 
believe in a more inclusive ontology. For now, however, it must first be reiterated that 
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only (Hobbesian) realism considers prudence to resist its own epistemic, ideational over-
determinations. 
Prudence is a quality unlike justice, because justice can be achieved by means of a 
retroactive redistribution of various interests and powers. Such a distribution is 
essentially quantifiable, and may become standardized, so that it must be considered an 
open structure: the idea of distributive justice can be socially inflated or deflated. This 
open structure is vulnerable to being over-determined, unfortunately, by neoliberal 
institutions and their own ideas about the meaning of distributive or social or material 
justice. Prudence, to the contrary, depends in part on proactive as well as in part on state-
centric judgments. Prudential authority is dualistic in that it emerges both from empirical 
experience as well as in part from so-called deontological, ethical virtues. Political 
prudence has neither been determined by empirical and epistemic experiences, nor can it 
be reduced by a deontological ethos—as it somehow integrates both experience and 
ethos, without erasing their difference. Because political realism is anti-doctrinal, in 
sharper contrast with liberal and constructivist idealism, prudent realists will try to 
understand why this integrative process remains closed—while it may simultaneously be 
invoking and opening up the prospect of (revolutionary) structural change. 
Idealists have said that twenty-first century structures of international politics both 
will and should be constructed on the cornerstones of democratic representativeness. By 
aiming for a higher and more global level of democratic representation, a cosmopolitan 
state can be created, representative of all nations. Political realists argue that this aim is 
self-contradictory, meaningless, or could simply be dismissed as banal. Next to Hannah 
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Arendt, Hans Morgenthau argues that international politics is not, and should never 
become a mere representation of a democratic majority of national interests and socio-
economic needs. Because all human beings have their own needs and interests, it is 
imprudent to pretend that democracy universally represents a sense of popular pluralism. 
Rather, world politics is an affair of adequately giving voice to particular representations 
of the human condition—or, rather, of the commonsense judgments that can be reached 
by members of the diplomatic community, and by the statespersons active within the 
(UN) system—because it is definitely not about taking an instrumentally-representative 
route towards allegedly universally-applicable standards of democratic authority.457
Because there is not one sound criterion of adequacy, in the worlds of politics, the 
flaw in the argument made by liberal idealists is that it presumes that powers, interests, 
identities, and customs can be adequately represented by means of a democratization 
process. A variety of idealists (Habermas, Wendt, Held) persistently argues that a more 
cosmopolitan and more democratic world order will eventually have to be sufficiently as 
well as sufficiently democratically representative of the totality of power-structures of 
which it consists.458 In the IR field, this presumption has often been repeated in 
connection to another fallacy, most commonly referred to as the domestic analogy. The 
reason that idealism’s democratization process is especially vulnerable to repeating the 
analogy, then, is that states would domestically be able to represent the total sum of 
citizenry needs and national interests. And, if states can do so at home then they should 
also be able to do so abroad—as all neo-Kantian idealists assume.459 The orderly 
relationship between citizens and their own nation-state’s democratic government is their 
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model of a relationship between local or regional governments and the central authority 
of a European Union or a global-level state.
Contrary to what Nye, who is a liberal (or a pseudo-) realist, as well as what 
structuralist realists, might be holding: powers applied in IR consist not of those powers 
subject to the scientific laws governing a game of billiards. IR is not subject to causal 
factors, alone, but always also to non-rational and non-linear organizational dynamics 
that transcend even the most causal aspects of “smart power.”460 In this, IR consists not 
ofideally-unified states moving around as anonymouscompetitors, motivated only by 
their homogenous powers and only by their vector-like causes and effects. Rather, the 
structure of power is a cause in itself. It is one of the many potential causes of openly-
competitive as well as of potentially-representative behavior, and yet if these causes are 
regarded only as structuralist and as consequentialist causes, then realists forget the 
lesson of uncertainty. They forget that even consequentialist causes may at any time be 
transcended and negated by non-causal and even by non-rationally-represented 
organizational transmutations.
Predominantly, nevertheless, it have been constructivist idealists who argued that 
the paradigm shift to be accomplished, for states to recognize the time of organizational 
transcendence, is to ‘learn’ how to compete not only in accordance to causal logics of 
power, for economic interests, but to also use this structural form of competition in order 
to ‘share’ and to ‘develop’ their moral and democratic values.461But, realists interject, 
who decides that the organizationally-transcendent dynamics of IR and sovereignty 
should be subject to democratic values?
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For example, idealists first ask states to attribute anarchical violence to a past 
structure. They then ask state agents to leave that structure behind: their own domestic 
form of moral progress also contributes to historical progress elsewhere; this is how 
agents become accustomed to Democratic Peace. Each state’s foreign policies are thus 
assumed to become increasingly representative of their intrinsic moral growth. States 
engage in ‘social learning’ to attain moral as well as physical maturity, but nonetheless a 
moral type of maturity that remains unmediated by archetypal spiritual beliefs.
While taking a divergent path, realists go beyond the examining of relations 
between agents and structures. They so arrive at the point that they begin to ask how 
these agents and structures have managed to organize themselves into a system they 
believe to have evolved from with a mysterious tension between free corporate agents, 
first, and necessarily open structures, second. Agent representations and identities are 
(epistemologically) inseparable from the structures they must end up creating, and yet 
these structures remain distinct from organizational (ontological and deontological) 
processes. These closed processes are lending significance and transcendent legitimacy 
to, and yet also include the structures they somehow remain distinct from. This double 
movement—of organizational inclusion and self-transcendence—is the beginning of all 
meaningful, ultimate, and even spiritual modes of authority.
The research question no longer fits in a nutshell: the question of how and why 
statespersons recognize each other as sovereign persons, with more or less equal 
legitimacy, is now turning into a question of any of the possible rules that govern 
meaningful, legitimate appearances of sovereign authority. Are these spiritual rules or 
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material patterns, or both, or neither type of rules? By which structural rules should 
sovereign persons be willing to play? Why? Or, which patterns of rules are they willing 
to ‘learn’ to obey, and to condition themselves to? 
Hobbes expresses a realist dictum when he argues that it will always be better to 
remain ignorant of the existing rules than it is to become dependent on “false rules.”462
The dictum begs, indeed, the above question. And, who should legitimately differentiate 
the good from the false rules, especially if this is to be done in ignorance of at least some 
of the rules? Or, as William Connolly reformulates and updates Hobbes’s question, who 
should take responsibility for the differentiation between absurdities being spawned by 
“accusatory voices” and “righteous assertions of objectivism” (on cable television and 
talk-radio, especially), first, and the regulatory uncertainties that are being created by 
hesitant policy-responses towards immanent ecological and political imbalances in the 
world, second?463 This is also a question of which kind of general responsibilities and 
which kind of political theories can best assist human beings by recognizing their impetus 
to restore balance, and to again respect that one “better and nobler condition [of] ... 
natural prudence”. As Hobbes puts it, the question is about what human beings should 
believe to return to a condition governed by good rules, and supported by “natural 
prudence”, and how these beliefs may help them ‘unlearn’ their own obeying of “false 
and absurd general rules”.464
Hobbes is mostly known as the one political theorist who would have devised a 
social contract, because he would have been alarmed by a civil war and the general lack 
of good rules. Readers who skip most chapters of Hobbes’s Leviathan, but who place 
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most of their emphasis on pronouncing Chapter 13’s definition of structural anarchy, 
indeed may infer that it greatly matters whether they should obey good rules. For, without 
such rules, they fear that their lives would be beastly and could be cut short by violences. 
These readers must be called Hobbists, however, because they can be derided for their 
giving in to their worst fears as well as for their hopelessly utilitarian definition of rules. 
Their only issue in obeying rules is that they be effective: that they can take away 
existential fears, and thus fully guarantee their self-preservation.465 But one of Hobbes’s 
most-learned interpreters, Skinner, demonstrates that these critiques hold little water. The 
Hobbist readers, especially, have too often glossed over Leviathan’s dualistic concept of 
state rule—and its “underlying duality between nature and artifice.”466
For Hobbes, natural law and artificial law are contraries—similar to the fact that 
divine and positive law may seem mutually exclusive, and yet do not have to be believed 
to forever remain disintegrated. Politically, it would be highly imprudent to assume that 
both the natural and the artificial types of law may be divorced from each other.467 The 
contraries form not so much an antinomy, as that they should (nearly mystically) imply 
each other’s existence. So, it is “impossible” for the subjects of a common power to both 
obey the “temporal” (civil) as well as the “ghostly” (demonic) laws—because if they 
were to give preference to their “ghostly” ideas or their superstitions, above their 
“temporal” rules, then they would soon find themselves obeying only the power of 
words, which means they would be living in a state of civil war. In response, the 
members of the “body politick” should busy themselves integrating both the “temporal” 
with the “spiritual” (not: “ghostly”) types of rules—as if the two rule-types were to 
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personify respectively their corporate “nerves” and “soul”. Hence, Hobbes writes, “when 
the [truly] spiritual power moves the members [in the body politick] ... by the terror of 
punishments and hope of rewards (which are the nerves of it) otherwise than by [means 
of] the civil power (which is the soul of the commonwealth), they ought to be moved. 
[But if a ghostly spirit] ... by strange and hard words suffocates their understanding, it 
must ... distract the people and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression or 
cast it into the fire of a civil war.”468
The three elements of political integration are fear, hope, and spiritual love. 
Hobbesian ontology holds that the first two elements are the structural elements of the 
body politick—that is, they are souls/nerves, hopes/fears, and the word-power/sword-
power too—but they also cannot be separated from an ambivalent third element: spiritual 
compassion. Whenever people come to imagine that their spiritual ideas can somehow 
objectify ghostly apparitions and other such invisible doctrinal ideals, they will be casting 
themselves “into the fire”. But when they believe that their own spirituality is really “the 
name of the Spirit of God”—as opposed to the, former, type of “demonology in which 
the poets, as [the] principal priests of the heathen religion[s], were [still] ... employed”—
they may rather be said, however metaphorically, to be obeying a “command of God” in 
the sense that “[they] shall rise [as] spiritual bodies.”469
The author of Leviathan traces Saint Paul (or, at minimum, his concept of 
“spiritual bodies”) in order to more prudently and more judiciously think about what it 
might mean to recognize the emergence of a Christian commonwealth: of ‘the’ spiritual 
body politick. Leviathan presents its readers with a paradox, however, because the body 
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politick has been divided against itself: the nerves are fearful; the soul is hopeful. To 
better mediate the two structurally emotive states, the body should somehow begin to 
integrate itself spiritually. It may now become possible to begin to understand why 
Hobbes could not have intended ‘spirit’ to be an independent third element, however, 
because if it were then that would lend public authority to apparitions and demons. The 
paradox of politics is that sovereign authority should now continue to emerge from a 
dualistic body, and from both structural fears and hopes, and thus continue to remain 
internally conflicted, and yet sovereignty should also be vested in a state of peace and 
justice. This paradox is not a puzzle, realists say. It is impossible for it to be eventually 
completed; contrary to what some idealists (Habermas) might want to argue. 
The reason why sovereignty is bound to be paradoxical is that there are two types 
of law. The first type is artificially created, and it best expresses the hopes of the 
democratic idealists or especially the legal positivists within any given political society. 
This type is the most contemplated type of the two, yet it is also a natural right. The 
individual is free to make a rational decision to disobey such artificial laws, if they fail to 
secure or violate her human rights—and to, thus, decide to return to a state of nature. The 
second type consists of ‘second nature’ patterns (also known as natural laws). These 
patterns are not merely a matter of identifying people’s good appearances, but rather also 
emerge from the actions and memories of conscionable persons. Such persons have a 
natural fear of their own diffidence and shame—and, to overcome such fears, will have to 
animate themselves within a civil society. They will now participate in the process of 
obeying the civil law, in other words, because their conscience/consciousness (and God) 
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commands them to do so. Skinner puts it more succinctly: “the freedom of the state of 
nature is undoubtedly abridged by our obligation to obey the civil laws.”470
Hobbes-scholars are well-acquainted with law’s two-typological and two-
dimensional authority. But they have too often forced themselves to try to solve the 
paradox of dual authority—as the paradox was intended to be sustained, not to be solved, 
by Leviathan’s author. In a first of the paradox’s dimensions, people are obedient to the 
civil laws and to the commonwealth presupposed by these laws as well—for as long as 
people exercise their right to demand physical protection from this commonwealth. But, 
as Skinner explains, there is not one but there are “two separate routes” along which 
citizen-subjects may obey both the civil laws as well as that they will exercise their 
natural rights: “one is that all rational persons will, ex hypothesi, recognize that obedience 
is in their interests.” To protect their lives is in their best interest. A rational person will 
obey the state, hence, by trusting and hoping that its civil laws will be adequately obeyed 
by all other rational persons as well as by herself. The other route is that rational persons 
participate in the legislative and the juridical formulation of the civil laws. They are 
fearful that other persons may otherwise punish them for disobeying those laws they will 
have been equally free to positivize. “Even if the cause of their having this will is fear, 
the action they perform out of fear ... remain[s] [thus] a free action”—Skinner adds.471
Republican theorists led by Skinner usually understand political actions to express 
a freedom to participate in the state. As Hobbes first suggested, people participate out of 
fear of becoming involved in structural injustices. Liberal philosophers think instead of 
freedom in terms of their natural liberty to either obey or disobey the state. Hobbes 
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indeed also suggested that people hope that their state will remain just, and that they may 
give up this hope when the state proves itself to be acting unjustly. In the field divided by 
republican and idealist players, both fears of not being able to participate as well as hopes 
that participations will remain representative of one’s own definition of good laws, have 
been intermixed.472 Political realists are more inclined to agree with republican theorists, 
however, because they are much more convinced that some hopes may have been falsely 
raised and that these unstable emotions should therefore be moderated, by healthy fears.
Believing in the Sovereign Authority of States by Taking Them Back to Nature
Why should sovereign persons be believed, spiritually, rather than to only be seen 
or be heard to exist?473 Hobbes and Arendt responded each in their own way to this 
question. But they could have agreed, with each other and with other realists, that beliefs 
in a sovereign authority should not be said to be socially constructed. These beliefs are 
not just shared ideas, shared expectations, or shared hopes. If they were, they could be 
classified as the causal effects of a “learning process”, which is how Habermas describes 
them nonetheless.474
Jürgen Habermas indeed serves as a stand-in for those constructivist idealists who 
have been arguing that democratic constitutional states must be expected inherently 
capable of learning.475 The idealists conclude that all states can increasingly-well learn 
how rules are to be interpreted, and how their own policies should be implemented “as 
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time goes by.” Bonnie Honig and Kevin Olson, in distinction, stand for a group of 
political theorists who warn that this (Habermasian) argument threatens to become too 
idealistic. Social learning cannot be understood in separation from fallibility—which 
itself cannot be understood by only taking a “future-oriented” and “forward-looking” 
approach. The idea that democratic states can learn from their own mistakes, thus, cannot 
have been formulated in reference to democracy. Constructivists who would want to take 
this approach, however stubbornly, must end up not with a meaningful concept (of 
constitutional democratic legitimacy) but with mere probabilistic data, or with only 
possibly self-fulfilling prophecies, rather than to arrive at a location marked by prudence. 
For, it would be an act of prudence for them to recognize that the system of sovereign 
authority contains a “path-dependent dynamic”—and that this dynamic itself is a closed 
organizational process. But realists do argue that this dynamic is closed, and that it 
therefore cannot have been caused and also cannot totally consist of one structure of 
prospectively-democratized states—because any such structure remains constantly 
vulnerable, in the present, “to its own open-endedness”.476
Historical change does have an effect on how constitutional states are being 
maintained. But change should not mostly be understood as an open structure or as a 
social artifice consisting entirely of positive rules, legal norms, and social identities. 
Change can also remain nested within a system, and to be believed to be resulting from 
this system’s dynamics of self-organization and path-dependency. The meaning of 
political speech, in reference to this organizational-change-embedding system, takes on 
new dimensions because speech can now be assessed as an analogical (rather than as a 
334
majoritarian) representation of the system of states. The meaning of diplomatic and other 
political speech acts, more specifically, may best be judged in reference to the belief that 
a natural system (of sovereign states) exists, that it can and will continue to serve as a 
source of organizational orderliness in politics—as well as that this system is including, 
rather than that is being dominated by socially-constructed structures. 
Anyhow, a realist judge of political speech utterances is naturally capable of 
appreciating why all such utterances play a role in—the continuous exclusions from, 
expansions, and in augmentations of—ultimate public authority worlds. The realist judge 
would not want to appreciate the closed continual dynamics of speech acts because their 
truth-value has been prophesized or because the speech acts bring a distant future closer 
by. Realists can religiously believe, rather, that these closed dynamics of political speech 
have an extraordinary role to perform within matters of ultimate authority—as these 
dynamics can organizationally transcend the world’s many structures of social identities 
and legal norms, and of both word-power and of sword-power as well.
If only one point of contention between realists and idealists must be selected, it 
will be the point that only the latter, erroneously, separate the structures of the world’s 
statistically-correlated powers from the self-organizing qualities of sovereign 
constitutional authority.
Hannah Arendt says as much as that René Descartes analytically separated the 
powers of the body from the organizational potential of the mind. The Cartesian, 
philosophical separation of bodies from minds (politick), should not be believed to have 
been a legitimate maneuver, further, because it would have objectified minds and their 
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alleged superiority.477 The issue Arendt raises is that the Cartesian or the cognitive 
dichotomy of body (sensory data) and abstract probabilities (mental constructs, social 
identities), which is a dichotomy that would so every often be rehearsed by (neo-
Hegelian) idealists, ended up being politically abused. In the political realm, the 
philosophical dichotomizations could be abused to justify exclusionary tactics—with 
disastrous consequences (social identity turns into national exclusivity, for instance). Yet, 
the dichotomy itself was actually made possible by an ambition to reconcile these two 
spheres of cognition: by a longer ambition to arrive at a more objective, more modern, 
and more monistic conception of authority.
In the second volume of her last book, The Life of the Mind, Arendt then also 
accuses Descartes for having expected that he could both rationally and willingly create a 
synthesis of the two spheres, just as that he had expected he could somehow reconcile 
“God’s foresight and omnipotence with human freedom”. Schopenhauer would likewise 
have assumed that it was possible (outside of philosophy) to reconcile mortals’ thinking 
with the immortality of their freedom. Or, he would have pretended that he could not 
only philosophically but also in actuality escape “the dilemma inherent in the fact that 
man is at the same time a thinking and a willing being: a coincidence, [Schopenhauer and 
Descartes pretended not to know], fraught with the most serious consequences”.478
In relation to dual sovereignty, apparently, Arendt’s notion of “coincidence” 
comprises several sub-coincidences or sub-dualities; thinking/willing, 
contemplation/action, endogenous/exogenous, closed/open, and structure/organization. 
Before concluding this section with this notion of the political realm, or with this 
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coincidental dualism, it should be asked why it is a relevant notion to begin with. That is, 
why has it remained worthwhile, particularly for political realists, to believe (perhaps 
even religiously) in a coincidence and a duality, coming together in sovereignty’s 
ultimate meaningfulness? And, why should dual sovereignty’s self-integrative powers, as 
opposed to democratization’s self-organizational potential, also continue to cohere with 
ambivalent speech acts?
A valid answer to such questions cannot be reduced to the answer that self-
integration is akin to democratization. It would be both imprudent and empirically 
untenable to assume that sovereign statespersons will over the course of due time have 
learned how reduce the ambivalence of their own speech, their own diplomatic protocols, 
and their own symbolism. For, statespersons may only learn how to be limiting their 
powers. They will not be progressively learning how they can be democratically positing 
ever-improved laws (This DP assumption has already been belied by the underlying 
variable of capital accumulation: democracies are not ‘friendlier’ towards other 
democracies, at least not politically, because capitalist economies may actually be 
‘hostile’ towards other such modern economies regardless as to whether they happen to 
be democratic.)479 Realist answerers acknowledge, with Hobbes, that states are akin to 
actors who perform ambivalent speech acts. Normatively there is no disagreement with 
democratic idealists: these speech acts should, somehow, remain analogical to their 
natural meanings, or to the conscionable intentions behind them. But practically, there is 
considerable disagreement.  Leviathan demonstrates (quite adequately) that speech acts 
and trains of words should be believed to have politically self-binding, self-balancing, 
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and self-regenerating effects on scores of people—even when they are not, and without 
also automatically committing them all individually to one and the same (neo-Grotian) 
social or democratic contract.480
Sovereign persons should be believed to be legitimately-appearing persons, not on 
trust nor because these persons can command others to do so. This political belief is 
rather, according to Hobbes, a spiritual belief transcending self-contradictory structures 
of fear and hope. The Hobbesian theory is a theory of organizational longevity and 
systemic stability. There are many natural phenomena that can prolong their own life-
spans, but there are nearly none that can stabilize relations between all groupings of 
human beings. There is one exception. Human beings can begin to believe that the 
stabilization of their relations, networks, and social webs is a matter of guaranteeing their 
peace. These guarantees themselves must be thought to remain prone to absurdity and 
banality, yet these guarantees should also be thought to be sanctioned by a natural law-
covenant of all, and by all. Groupings attain adequate stability, security, and peacefulness 
when they are willing to decide on the meanings of their own laws. Some laws have to be 
recognized as open to change: they are positive, artificial, and amendable. Groupings will 
also have to be willing to recognize that amendable laws differ from, yet may be 
analogous to, the laws of self-regulation and isonomy—because only the latter laws are 
systemic and path-dependent organizational dynamics.481
From this point onwards, the book’s premise holds that Hobbes’s skepticism 
towards analogies between states and spoken contracts, towards prophetic speech acts, 
and towards the raising of false hopes is a sort of skepticism that testifies to and is 
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theoretically compatible with the domain of natural systems theory. To borrow 
Connolly’s words, natural systems theory is best practiced by asking and by studying 
why specific forces, entities, and parties within the IR system—which itself is to be 
understood in analogy to a “weather system, ecological balance, or [a] political 
formation”—may spontaneously come to “trigger novel patterns of self-organization”. 
Connolly argues that systems theoretical studies cannot be conducted in a cultural 
atmosphere of “resentment and cynicism”. In such a culture, each speech act would too 
often be imagined to be only either true or false—so that speech ends up being used to 
build a “model of simple objectivity”. Political systems theory is instead to be studied, 
therefore, in order to allow an adequate degree of complex but nonetheless subjective 
beliefs. Subjectively spiritual beliefs, more specifically, should be allowed into the 
political (IR) system: their subjectivity cannot be held against them. For, human beings 
behave in a manner that is often neither objective nor subjective, and yet will be able to 
experience “those feelings of abundance and joy that emerge periodically”—but that 
especially often “emerge” when they begin to “sense the surplus of [their spiritual] 
life”.482
Connolly premises that feelings of joy may emerge from a spiritual life—to the 
degree that such a life respects the system’s self-restorative powers and organizational 
processes. This is not a doctrinal life, therefore, but a life lived conscious of authority’s 
systemic legitimatizations: not from authority’s utility or its mechanical applications. 
Connolly’s conclusion opposes objectified identities (product brands) and economic 
markets (media markets), as it premises that the social objectification of things too often 
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‘outstrips’ their natural inter-subjectivity and inter-dependence. Nature is being 
‘outstripped’ by the social and economic sphere, Connolly warns, and this again suggests 
that the system of states is becoming too anthropocentric; that the (IR) system’s purpose 
is too often cogitated as the outcome of people simply adapting their behavior to 
objectivist, positivist, structural norms. Idealists assume only that such adaptations would 
somehow negate, however fictitiously, the notion that all people learn to bring closer not 
the periodic but the final emergences of “abundances” and “surpluses of life”.483
As alluded to earlier, and as is the constant variable within the philosophy field, 
modernity commenced with Descartes. He first ‘separated’ mind from body: his doctrine 
has sometimes been summed up as ‘mind over matter’, to stress that accomplishment. 
Arendt suggests that Cartesian minds are doomed, however, because they have been 
forced to imagine themselves as incapable of sharing their worlds with others: they are 
fixated on mundane, private affairs and see no need to discover an alternative or a 
transmundane world.484 The Cartesian doctrine made an impact on images of political 
bodies, and of statespersons, in that it ranked rational persons above sensible persons. 
This rank-order greatly offended Arendt as well as her unlikely ally, Hobbes, which is 
why she resoundingly demonstrates that mind and body are, and should be trusted to 
remain inseparable: “mind and body, [or] thinking and sense experience, [are]... ‘made’ 
for each other, as it were.”485
Modern philosophy regrettably decoupled the “bodily senses” from the manner in 
which the world can be explained by means of “mental activities”, and Arendt attacks 
precisely that modern maneuver by introducing a third element into the political world. 
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This element reunites, or is to be conceived as a third coincidence of both thinking and 
willing: of both commonsense (communal thoughtfulness) as well as of its precondition 
of natality (the willingness to begin anew).486 In this respect, she also explicitly accuses 
Cartesian constructivism of “no longer [having] ascribed the gratifications of [the great 
scientific discoveries] ... to the objects of thinking”. It only would ascribe “self-
sufficiency” and even “worldlessness” to the notion of scientific and theoretical 
knowledge.487 Yet, neo-Hegelian (IR) theorists such as Wendt are ignoring Arendt’s 
warning. To her there can be no such thing as, while to them there can very well be such 
a thing as a Cartesian (IR) political theory.488  Yet, with Arendt, not even political 
scientific theory can be practiced outside its own world: it would have no notable 
audience; like any Cartesian thing, its norms would have to be self-objectifying and thus 
derived totally solipsistically.489
It is hardly a trite thing that twentieth-century administrators of genocide 
routinely presupposed that their mental activities should take place solipsistically—and 
that they themselves could somehow appear, in their totalitarian worlds, as non-thinking 
or as private individuals. Realists have sufficiently objected to their presupposition, 
calling it “banal” (Arendt) and certain to cause “civil war” (Hobbes).490 The “objects of 
thinking” are structurally incapable of gratifying the senses, on their own behalf. No 
social animal can experience abundant joy in constructing an object of thought, or an 
object of power. For such an abundance to be experienced, to the contrary, speech acts 
and social interactions will have to be heard, sensed, and especially also be believed to 
have been and continue to be naturally tasteful.491
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The Roman Republic and Constitutional Organizations of Treaty Law
What do realists mean when they refer to a relation of unity, or to an integrative 
organizational process that they mysteriously trust to somehow unify both structure and 
agents, and both their necessity and freedoms? Or, what should advanced realists mean 
whenever they refer to contingent combinations of the need to control a territory and the 
presence of a free government, in recognizing the sovereignty of other states?492 Aristotle 
demonstrates that “the territory of the state and the inhabitants of that territory” should 
never be identified as the only “factors” necessary in the formation of states.493 It will, 
henceforth, have to remain impossible to deduce any general (political-scientific) laws 
about the nature of statehood from these material structural factors alone.
Aristotle’s Politics defines the city-state (polis) as a (hylomorphic) compound of 
two causes: structural and formative. Contrary to Plato’s The Laws, the definition holds 
that the structural groundings (population and landmass) are necessary, but insufficient in 
order to recognize a polis as such. City-states display namely also zoological preferences, 
or animal passions—which are their uniquely-formative groundings. City-states have a 
unique sense of political agency and identity, in other words, and Plato would have failed 
to understand that their self-formative (or, self-organizational) identity cannot be derived 
from their “territory” and “inhabitants” alone. Plato thus made the mistake of having 
presented the life of the city as a life in the city. He had merely represented the structure 
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(life in city-states) as if it could be analytically separated from their corporate agency and 
formal identity (the life of these states). Thus, he could not have known what it meant “to 
live a political life, and not a life of isolation”.494
The tension between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of statehood reflects 
itself in the tension between each polity’s structural singularity and its disposition to be 
acting politically and responsibly. It may be safely assumed that, besides Hobbes, Arendt 
takes her cue from Aristotle when she moves beyond his (and especially Plato’s) 
geophysical impressions of singularity—as she turns her own gaze towards the plurality 
of all polities and of all political activity, as well, referring to plurality as the first rule of 
that “great game of the world”.495
The greatest game is a self-regulatory but intersubjective process. It is the game of 
recognizing what it is that makes appearances into politically legitimate appearances. 
Recognizing the state, then, as a legitimate sovereign state should be a process sustained 
by politically pluralistic relationships—as opposed to by a single structural entity 
(population, nation). She agrees with the Philosopher, however, that pluralistic 
relationships are those in which political animals make appearances before one another—
either through action or speech.496 Plato’s state lends itself only to the utilitarian standard 
of awarding recognition, whereas the Aristotelian state coheres better with her own 
concept of a political life that both is instrumentally sensible, in terms of physical action, 
and yet is recognized supra-sensibly or pluralistically.497
But, who knows whether the single and the plural, both the sensible and the super-
sensible will begin to coincide legitimately? Peg Birmingham, a careful interpreter of 
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Arendt’s writings, suggests these writings affirm this coincidence’s non-violence. There 
can be no structural inclination towards violence, thus, nor towards evil deeds. Such 
deeds are, instead, to be understood as “a capacity of human beings, not an inherent 
trait.”498 In the instances in which Arendt reports that statespersons had been using armed 
force, these were instances effectuated by their own sense of agency—not by intrinsically 
violent structures, and even not by hierarchies. Force is not being effectuated because 
statespersons thought that their relationships had somehow committed them to do so. As 
noted, Arendt rejects that (neo-Platonist) idea: political relationships have not been 
structurally, geo-physically, or even not anarchically and violently predetermined.499 All 
structural violence is irresponsible—and it is in many ways the opposite of political 
relations, as only the latter can be believed to be responsible and practical expressions of 
freedom (isonomy).500 Structural predetermination is a scapegoat conception of the world, 
especially because it can serve the perpetrators of violence (such as the German Nazis) as 
a normative justification for their actions.501
The problem with the use of force, by state agents, is that any such instance 
remains vulnerable to normative ideals. Not all ideals are defined by indoctrination and 
propaganda, which can make them all the more dangerously irresponsible. The instance 
of force thereby (in its thoughtless irresponsibility) opens itself up to “fanaticism and 
madness”.502 Philosophically, the Arendtian problem is to see how it can be possible for 
statespersons to neither consider physical force as an agent’s absolutely immoral act 
(radical evil), nor think of it as normatively justifiable because it would have to have 
been motivated by an ideal form of structural necessity (such as: forms of anarchical 
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competition). Rather, the use of physical force will, even in the most extreme cases, still 
somehow have to have remained a recognizably solipsistic, banal, thoughtless routine.503
Routine irresponsibility and violent negligence, then, are neither an individual agent’s 
absolute fault nor can they entirely be dismissed as structural causes.504 In brief, Arendt 
agrees with realist authors such as Aristotle and particularly Weber, further, that the 
political responsibility sustained in pluralism is a paradoxical responsibility: it is neither 
reducible to the ideals of agency (singularly moral/immoral) nor to the factors of 
structure (territory, inhabitants).505
Binding, mutual, responsible appearances must never be confused with norms, 
values, and social ideals—because doing so would undercut their two-dimensional and 
perhaps even their inherently paradoxical ‘neither-nor’ type of organization. Fanatics and 
seditionists are all too often agents with ideals that are too great: their normative 
condition is too normative. Also, their condition cannot be modified on progressively 
democratic grounds, either, as even such (Habermasian) grounds consist themselves of 
normative doctrines; additional fanatics stepping onto them could create ‘feedback loops’ 
of violence.506 Responsible (Arendtian) appearances are made by animals that are not 
believed to be sociable, and capable of keeping their promises, because they have such 
strong values or such noble ideals. Rather, they are believed to be sociable because they 
share a responsibility to intervene, politically, against the banality of evils. That is, to be
exercising a shared political responsibility is to interpellate all those who might try to act 
solipsistically.507 This intervening and this responsive engagement with the banality of 
loneliness and individualism, in other words, should be made possible by and yet cannot 
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be derived from the humanity of the interveners and the intervened, the arresters and the 
arrested. Humanity is an ideal, not unlike national citizenship rights or the comity of 
nations.508
Theoretically, it is a paradoxical route to be premising that the shared 
responsibility of the public authorities cannot be concretely or directly deduced from the 
human beings, nor from the inhabitants, of their own state. For, it is a theoretical problem 
that no one can say who should decide whether an appearance is made possible by one-
dimensional factors (the nation, the population, and so on) or whether it has also been 
organized by two-dimensional organizations of authority (the public realm, the republic). 
In this respect, political realism’s but specifically Arendt’s problem consists of the 
paradox that neither one of the two Aristotelian causes can be reduced to the political 
realm, and yet both are necessary for its practices of authority and for its sharing of 
responsibilities. Arendt herself might have called on the people (who belong neither to 
the population, nor to its republic) to constitute themselves. In being a self-constituent 
grouping, or in being a sovereign people (as Birmingham helps solve the problem), the 
people emerge from a complex combination of desires, which cannot be reduced to their 
hopes or their fears. The people are people who may begin to institute a “different form 
of time—the time of immortality—rooted not in [doctrinal] religion or [eschatological] 
fear of death, but in the desire for an enduring image and mode of appearance. This is a 
desire met only in a public space, with an irreducible plurality of others”.509
From the twin notions of publicality and population emerges, now, what seems to 
be a third desire for plurality. Republican legitimacy and popular authority coexist within 
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the realm of appearances, which is a realm of otherness. It is a generally-unknown realm 
but it is also emerging from in between the various authorizations of future actions, and 
thus between power, in one dimension, and the many legitimizations of memorable past 
actions in another dimension.510 These two political dimensions, quite noticeably, do 
coexist in Arendt’s work on the recognition of authority: publicality (appearance) 
remains herein somewhat closer to the Aristotelian tendency to recognize the universality 
of a human capacity for politics, while plurality (being) is not entirely unlike the Platonic 
tendency to particularize the (appearance of the) ideal polity. Arendt must have 
understood why, Birmingham explains, that strands of universality and particularity tend 
to coincide within each statesperson’s actions, or appearances. But the tension between 
these two strands of authoritatively-legitimized appearances is a tension that itself quite 
possibly may have to be compared to a third criterion, nested in the binding aspect of 
promising: in promises such as treaties or covenants.511
This is the premise of realism: the first rule of the “great game” is that the 
appearances of persons and statespersons are appearances that somehow combine 
authority’s two strands or two dimensions into recognizable patterns; these are the 
appearances of a prolonged series of inter-subjectively binding, mutually-responsive (but, 
not contractual) acts of promising. The combinations of the two dimensions hold out the 
prospect of an alternative moment in time, in which the plurality of promise-making 
social animals is being respected. Third third moment in time is really the object of a 
desire, but it resists its own objectification. Rather, desire has to be a desire to be 
beginning anew. It is a definitive willingness to experience natality, on condition that 
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natality means that an alternative is a concrete possibility and not a social abstraction (as 
Heidegger’s abstract concept of mortality would be, rather).512
On this premise, can Arendtian realists conclude that emergent authority amounts 
to dual sovereignty? To reach such a conclusion, also applicable to IR, realists have to 
read Arendt as if she realized she would ultimately have to sustain the void within the 
relation between public and private dimensions, or between both plural and singular 
modes of authority. This void exists in the absence of any “images” of its own 
appearance, however, because it could be timeless and therefore also without appearance 
of its own. The void has an unknown capability to be making no appearances of its own. 
Arendt gestures that from within the void, nonetheless, “new relationship[s]” and 
“perpetual alliance[s]” may begin to emerge, fostered by newly-appearing political actors 
with their own particular identities (these actors are ‘natals’).513 This post-Aristotelian 
gesture is Arendt’s call on the people to continue to judge the appearances of, and their 
relations with others. The third factor comprises the prolongation or the added 
temporality of people’s judgments: of their political self-identifications. The striking 
facet of these three factors, finally, is that they tend to close the organizational process 
through which “perpetual alliances” emerge from the strutural self-identifications these 
“alliances” themselves are including. Arendt is a systems theorist.
Further, her third factor or criterion of identifying the political realm is an entirely 
relational desire. It is a third factor only to the extent that it has no visible, tangible 
substance of its own. Instead, it compromises a statesperson’s loving desire to be part of 
and to be participating in the world (in that great game, basically). Everyone can love 
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appearing in public, in the world, and yet one’s private sort of desire for public 
recognition is best understood as one’s care for what others might think: it one’s amor 
mundi. Breen suggests that Arendt invokes the amor mundi criterion to identify the 
known and unknown tensions in between the first-mentioned criteria, or between the two 
dimensions of political society. Keith Breen argues, actually, that her amor mundi notion 
orientates itself towards the Roman Republic. For, this third notion helped her distinguish 
“between two historically antithetical conceptions of both war and law; [w]hereas the 
Greeks understood war as entailing the annihilation of [their foes] and law as being 
inherently coercive, ... the Romans viewed the end of war as the making of treaties 
between erstwhile [enemies], ... [as the Romans thereby viewed] law not as coercive but 
rather relational, as the very means of such treaty-making.”514
In her own words, particularly the Romans (and anyone raised in the Roman Law 
tradition) are able to apply a “concept of warfare [through which] ... peace is 
predetermined not by victory or defeat, but by an alliance of the warring parties, who 
now become partners, socii, or allies, by virtue of the new relationship”. The Roman Law 
tradition is conditioned by the presence of a temporal relationship which breathes its own 
authority—by virtue of how the two partners in this relationship also decide to treat their 
relationship as a self-renewing alliance. Arendt perceives the origins of the Roman 
alliances as the origins of political societies (socii). Treaty law implies a constitutional 
transformation. Antagonistic strife, over mere material and more structural necessities, 
may be constitutionally transformed for the purpose of treaty-making and by means of 
promising. The Romans had to have discovered the secret of how they could transform 
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promises into alliances, and their key must have been that one “perpetual alliance” which 
could sustain the void, or the political tension “between patricians and plebeians”.515
Arendt’s point is clear: the Roman concept of treaty law derives from an 
exemplary constitution: a republic divided against itself. This concept would not remain 
beholden to the Roman Republic alone, however, because its effects continued to 
resonate throughout history.  Aristotle earlier observed a constitutional tension between 
rich and poor, oligarchs and democrats, but Arendt uses the Romans to illustrate that their 
concept of a perpetual alliance would be mimicked in many places, traditions, and eras.516
The notion of a perpetual treaty-based relationship is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, 
for instance: “all treaties made, or which shall be made ... shall be the supreme law of the 
land”.517 Treaties affirm the sovereignty of others: they are an unmediated relational 
promise, and in principle it is also the case that no treaties should require additional 
mediation and ratification. Principally and simply, treaties can become binding because 
they are being observed by other sovereign parties: they are so transforming themselves 
into an unwritten constitutional law. 
Hobbes could have agreed: Rome and her provinces, or Rome and her colonies 
had been governed by only one constitutional law. He finds that Rome had formed a 
single “commonwealth”—so that none of the statelets she had incorporated could have 
enjoyed absolute sovereignty. Rather, their sovereignty was evinced by the notion that 
they had all been treating each other as equal partners (socii).518 Roman antiquity, from 
Arendt‘s perspective as well as from Hobbes’s, therefore, forms an important case-study 
because of the manner in which   recognitions and engagements would herein have led all 
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(‘erstwhile enemy’) states to treat one another as if they were equal members of Rome’s 
imperial as well as of her republican domain. But the abstract value of equal membership 
itself would also have to have depended on non-partisan acts, inspired by amor mundi. 
The plurality of equally sovereign parties should still have desired to participate in a 
shared realm: in a realm of appearances and judgments. In comparison to Greek antiquity 
as well as to the post-French Revolution Continent, only the Romans could provide 
Arendt with her paradigmatic concept of responsible political freedom—based on a 
perennial constitutional partnership.519
Roman antiquity stands as a model for later republican activities. Cicero had 
recognized the importance of “conserving political communities”. While reading Cicero, 
as Arendt does in her The Life of the Mind, she further observes that particularly his sense 
of self-conserving publicality was a sense of those actions that were “most closely 
resembling those of the gods”. Cicero served the Roman Republic because this is where 
he believed citizens could experience immortality. Arendt writes then, quite admiringly, 
that Rome’s immortality and honor were understood as “the potential property of [all] 
human communities”. Romans were perceiving public appearances, in their communities, 
as evidence of their capacity to begin anew: to begin to be born anew, as it were. After 
all, they had found “death ... neither necessary nor ever desirable; [for them] it comes 
only as a punishment.”520
Arendt discerns rather sharply between Rome’s exemplary constitutional society, 
first, and individual members of this society, second. This exemplary society is a public 
affair. It is publicality that makes Rome’s society into a characteristic, integrated, closed 
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organization. But, as Machiavelli argued, membership in Rome’s society is open: this and 
any other societies survive if they can adapt to change, rotate officials, and allow 
immigrants. Membership is thus a potential, but not an actual status. The number of 
individuals who may potentially become members of a society is indeterminate, because 
the structure (not the organization) is open-ended. What matters most, at least to Arendt, 
is that the members’ public appearances will be the only sort of appearances to qualify 
them, as such members. Their appearances and their actions will have to have been 
judged publically, and their particular promises will have to have been regarded binding. 
But, if promises are broken, they are also capable of forgiveness.521 They publically seek 
companionship, in open pluralities.
For realists such as Arendt, it cannot be disputed that the Roman constitutionalist 
tradition is founded on a systems theory through which organizational processes are 
being closed off while simultaneously including and opening up the structure of 
diplomatic companionships and pluralities and alliances that these processes then again 
may begin to transcend. But compared to Arendt, Habermas is less respectful of systems 
theory. He is less strict, and perhaps less harsh in his determination of the difference 
between political organizational processes and the structure it includes—or, that is, the 
difference between a self-organizing or self-closing political society and its structure of 
societal members and citizens. He thinks that the European Union acts as if it is a 
political society, for instance, so implying that its members are actual (not: potential) 
equals before the law. Their membership status is to be treated as if it is identical to the 
legal status of the EU as a whole: they are equally the national members of a 
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supranational state, so that their sense of publicity or of “publicality” (Öffentlichkeit), 
more precisely, is to be considered an actual condition of their equal liberties within this 
EU state. The problem with this condition is that it turns publicality into a continuum 
measured in reference to itself, even though realists warn about such a self-referential 
notion of ‘the’ public. This notion does not have to become greater whenever the number 
of EU members becomes greater: the condition of publicality, companionship, and 
solidarity cannot be considered as absolute as that idealists might hope it should.522
Political realists, rather, argue why the case of the EU entity (is ‘it’ a state?) 
illuminates the historical fact that the EU’s regulatory society (its universality) has 
remained distinct from, and is often opposed by, the member states (their particularity). 
The plurality of European communities and of EU member states, in brief, has been said 
to form one exemplary constitutional society, by Habermas, but realists find that an 
underlying organizational-constitutional problem remains: this society is neither uniform 
and unitary in its rules, nor is it constitutionally republican. This entity is at the most a 
potential political society, if not only because the EU institutions were never designed to 
close treaties with any external sovereign parties. The EU simply does not yet have all the 
features of a sovereign society. Particularly, considering the low turn-out numbers in EU 
elections, there is just not one constitutional process that is publically believed to both 
authorize EU foreign policy in general as well as to legitimize EU appearances in the 
external forums of diplomacy and warfare in specific. Therefore, the EU continues to 
lack all the powers of care that it would need in order to be able to act akin to a sovereign 
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person: it cannot (yet) apply these powers in order to unitarily bind itself to a plurality of 
others.523
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1 “Ariel Sharon, in Coma, Is Subject of Sculpture.” The New York Times, 10/20/2010, C3.
2 It is surprising that Scheuerman (2011: 50-51) suggestively quotes both Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr to the effect that they warned against the vanity of all those who want to refer to 
the nation-state as their “Mortal God”, without that Scheuerman mentions the two realists 
were herein supporting Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 120; ch. 30, 244), who actually said he was 
using this analogy “reverently” because it applies only to “that great Leviathan ... to 
which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense.” The Leviathan is a 
mythological animal inspiring a common “awe”—which is therefore a very different 
animal, indeed, than a nationalistically-constructed and therefore ideational collective. 
Such a collective inspires not “awe” because it maintains peace: nationalism inspires 
“terror”, instead, because it inherently excludes all other nationalisms. God is nation-
blind and would not exclude anyone, however.
3 For one possible example of an application of pure logic to the world of commonsense, consider 
the work of Ray Kurzweil—who asks how computers ‘think.’ Kurzweil challenges the 
conventional idea that computers would never be capable of ‘communicative thinking’ as 
human beings can. (Computers are intrinsically able to pass the Turing test, he argues.) 
Humans use ‘common senses’, of course, whereas computers must apply logics to get to 
a similar and (he argues) indistinguishable result. For a few recent examples of the 
reconciliation of computer logic and human sense, moreover, consider robotics 
experiments. The experimenters apply computer models in such a way that these logics 
are beginning to generate common and physically-sensory, spatially-ordered 
organizations that the programmers never could have predicted. The results were never 
written into the models themselves. The robots are programmed for a simple task, 
following a simple computer model, rather, but because several individual robots will 
then perform the same tasks in the same timeframe, a non-programmed and even chaotic 
sense of order emerges (such as a sense of swarming, of flocking, and so forth). Guillot 
and Meyer (2010) describe a few such experiments.
4 “A popular traditional belief was long entertained among the Britons that [King] Arthur was not 
dead, but had been carried off to be healed of his wounds in Fairy-land, and that he would 
re-appear to avenge his countrymen and reinstate them in sovereignty”. Bulfinch’s 
Mythology: The Age of Chivalry (GuildAmerica, p. 33, not further referenced).
5 Passerin d'Entrèves (2000: 249-252) elaborates on Arendt’s definition of sensus communis: it 
stands in full agreement with Kant’s indication that sensus communis may not simply be 
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the faculty “we expect everybody to have, but [should also be] a special sense that fits us 
into a human community; ... communication and speech depend on it.” Further, it is the 
‘sixth sense’ Arendt associates with the possibility of experiencing a common life-world.
6 Passerin d'Entrèves (2000: 256).
7 Pure logics may be considered thought processes with a certain artificial quality. Because of 
their artificiality, these pure logics demand an account of human ingenuity or creativity. 
But whenever such purely logical theorems are being applied in practice, they risk 
retaining their solipsistic identities. They can still be identified as computer models, for 
example. To be precise, solipsism creates not thoughts but logics. Solipsism increases the 
chances that logics result in non-commonsensical, disingenuous, banal processes—as 
Hannah Arendt warned throughout her oeuvre (later sections shall highlight this 
warning). To prevent this from happening, however, she also proposed to recouple Kant’s 
two notions of pure reason and commonsense—by way of recoupling his First to his 
Third Critique. Compare Kant (1965), (1951), to Allison’s (1995), Beiner’s (2001), and 
Bernstein’s (2000) reflections on how Arendt reads these Critiques. For only two out of 
many and much-more detailed investigations into the Kantian possibility that a 
symbolical coupling of logic to sense, and of pure reason to commonsense might take 
effect, consider Bielefeldt (2003) or, perhaps, Raschke (1977).
8 The king’s dual significance is of special importance to Hobbes (1994: especially chapter 4, 
page 30). As a later section explains, he must have thought of the (constitutional) 
monarchy’s two components in terms of positive signs, rather than as negatively used 
names (or, worse, as “insignificant sounds”).
9 Note, for instance, Hobbes’s (1991: ch. 9.12, 218) definition of what hereditary and institutive
kingdoms hold in common: “every monarch may by his will make a successor”. Hobbes 
proceeds to condition this will towards monarchical succession, or this principle of 
succession, rather, on the monarch’s “performance of all things necessarily conducing to 
the preservation of peace”. Any breach of this natural law, Hobbes also argues in Chapter 
9 of The Citizen, returns the right of resistance back to the monarchy’s subjects. This 
means the right is directly tied to the king’s or the queen’s duties to neither give any 
reason for popular resistance movements, nor for the threat of civil war. 
10 See, once over, Hobbes (1991: 9.12, 218), as well as Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 131; 134). (“[N]o 
king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or 
contemptible, or too weak through want or dissension”.) This political condition both 
warrants and legitimizes kingship, which in itself would have to remain hereditary or 
institutive and elective. In any case, Hobbes means to say monarchy appears into the 
world through its own organizational, legitimizing principle, rather than as a birth-right or 
as any other such right to rule.
11 Oakeshott (1991: 352), “Logos and Telos”, mentions that Hobbes does not fully agree with 
Aristotle: the latter sees each constitution return to its own “final cause” and Hobbes only 
to its cause “continuous [and] incidental.”
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The Citizen (De Cive). Also of interest (but not additionally referenced) are the ‘early’ 
texts by Hobbes (1969), The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic, and: (1971), A 
Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, and; 
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chicken and egg circle in which we are law’s authors and law’s subjects, always both 
creatures and authors of law.” She raises the question, rightly therefore, what law is and 
what it might be that either constitutes of legitimizes its authority. For, apparently, this 
must mean that a paradoxical gap persists between law’s positivity (legality) and law’s 
authority (legitimacy).
47 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.54, 251).
48 The agonism (agony), involved in a similar move, has been considered by McManus (2008).
49 For Machiavelli’s definition of the state, consider Dowdall (1923) and Mansfield (1983).
50 For example, Arendt (2006: 63-67) seems very derisive of Rousseau’s role in the modern 
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51 Arendt (2006: 177) is dismissive of any such “transcendent sanction of the [public] realm.” 
Also, her strange “civic religion” expresses a lot of concern with publicality. Religiosity 
cannot be identical to publicality, thus, but it certainly enthuses it. The object of “civic 
religion” should not be confused with any conceptions of a Supreme Being, and even not 
with those of a so-called rational theocracy—which were conceptions that instead had 
sprung up during the French Revolution, and had been promoted by Robespierre. 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2009: 34-37).
52 In her review of a controversial play, Arendt (2003) points out that the Vatican’s neutrality, 
during the Second World War, remains an aporetic phenomenon. Neutrality was being 
feigned, she suggests. Not only did the Pope not resist the deportations of (Italian) Jews, 
he also did not speak out against the massacres of (Catholic) Slavic peoples. Although 
Arendt lets her readers reach their own conclusions, to some extent, she also does not 
share the play-director’s view the Pope would have been aligned with the Nazi 
government. Instead, he must have pretended to be neutral by not condemning every 
instance of violence and by probably only letting the Vatican do what it could do (hiding 
refugees in safe-houses and churches, including those in Rome).
53 Hobbes (1994: 486).
54 Especially, Machiavelli (1950: P ch. 6, 19-23; D 3.4, 406-407).
55Not unlike George Orwell, already in 1842, in his so-called pre-anarchist period, Michael 
Bakunin (1972: 56) reiterates his resistance—against all those still seeking a third way-
compromise—as follows: ‘The Left says, two times two are four; the Right, two times 
two are six; and the middle-of-the-road compromisers say two times two are five.’ This 
un-self-compromising affiliation, between Orwell and the Left, has been woefully 
ignored by Carr (2010), (2006), particularly in his ascriptions—of the capability to make 
intermediate concessions—to both liberal associations and civil societies as well as, 
although mistakenly, hence, to Orwell’s realist dystopias.
56 George Orwell’s full passage (2008b) reads: “When one thinks of the cruelty, squalor, and 
futility of war—and [specifically of the Spanish Civil War’s] ... intrigues, the 
persecutions, the lies and the misunderstandings—there is always the temptation to say: 
‘One side is as bad as the other. I am neutral.’ In practice, however, one cannot be 
neutral, and there is hardly such a thing as a war in which it makes no difference who 
wins.” 
57 Orwell (2008b: 359).
58 Carr (2010) consistently treats George Orwell (pseud. Eric A. Blair) as a liberal who used 
dystopian images to help create moral progress. Such treatment seems ill-advised because 
Orwell (2008), (2008b), is more deeply a realist than he is a liberal—in respect to the 
relation between both political action or its meaning and the interpretation of language 
and history, in particular. Orwell’s focus is never on individual liberty or limits on power 
alone.
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59 Ankersmit (2002), for instance, concludes his paragraphs on Machiavelli by mentioning the 
latter’s appreciation of the need for compromise. Lenin (1989), who supposedly slept 
with Machiavelli’s book under his pillow, likewise, insists that revolution demands 
negotiation and compromise.
60 Arendt (2006) says almost as much as that the key to a stable and binding law is to be found in 
prudence. Machiavelli (1996: 1.58) decodes a similar notion of a binding law when he 
writes that prudent people, for instance, shall “neither obey with servility, nor command 
with insolence.”
61 See, by contrast, Žižek (2008: 185).
62 Ingram (2008: 409), citing Arendt (2005: 199).
63 Arendt (2005: 108), as cited by Ingram (2008: 409).
64 Arendt (2006). Compare, also, Rigsby (2002) and Pocock (1975).
65 Honig (2007: 2-3), (2009).
66 Arendt (2006: 175).
67 Arendt (2006: 220; 167; 173).
68 Probably by supporting Machiavelli’s disposal of the idea that Fortuna would be causing or 
would have to be trusted to cause random events in the world, Arendt (2006: 181-183) 
goes on to respond quite agreeably to an implicit challenger, Carl Schmitt, when she 
writes that no “non-personal superhuman force”—or, no “nation” and no God-Man 
either—could ever have become so widely believed responsible for chance events if it 
had not been for the evolution of a Protestant eschatology. Compare, however, Strauss 
(1958: 74-78).
69 See, for example, Strauss (1958).
70 Arendt (1978, vol. 2: 211; 195; 137-138).
71 Palonen (1999: 535-536).
72 Although neither Rawls (1999) nor Habermas (1999) resorts to the metaphor of ‘grace’, both 
philosophers do nonetheless resort to general analogies such as the ‘veil of innocence’ 
and the common cause of ‘openness’ (publicality). Consider further, specifically for 
additional references, Vatter (2008), Olson (2003), and Wolin (1996).
73 Arendt (2006: 174).
74 Arendt (2006: 178).
75 Arendt (2006: 185).
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76 Particularly, Arendt (2006: 53-54).
77 This conclusion follows not only from Arendt’s thought, but also from Weber’s, as the latter 
would not have wanted “anything to do with the Hegelian dialectic”—as Palonen (1999: 
539) puts it. Despite several critical differences between Bakunin (1971: 133) and Weber, 
the former held not dissimilar grounds for throwing out the dialectic (this time in its 
Marxist variant), as he thought that any dialectical negation of civil society to also cause 
a “negation of humanity”. When Bakunin tries to counter-negate “absolute [state] 
sovereignty”, however, he retains its element of human authority. Arendt (2006), (1951), 
finally, according to Wellmer (2000: 220), discarded all types of the dialectic (both 
Marxist as well as liberal) as she feared and warned that it would be used to set a 
historical end-stage sometime “beyond politics”—as well as that this would justify a 
neutralization of the public realm (she, thus, threw out end-stages such as “a classless 
society” or a realized model of “social justice”).
78 Marx (1978c: 51-52).
79 Meinecke (1957: 349; 375) refers to Hegel’s promise as “sinister”.
80 Meinecke (1957: 363-364).
81 Arendt (1978: vol. 2, 17).
82 Meinecke (1957: 213-214).
83 Hobbes (1994), Meinecke (1957: 211-212).
84 Arendt (2006: 146).
85 Arendt (1970: 45).
86 Aristotle (1958: 1.12, 1259b, 33).
87 Aristotle (1958: 5.11, 1313a, 243).
88 Hobbes remembers that the monarchical state had, even into the seventeenth century, been 
believed to form a mirror image of the papacy. The constitutional state (civitas) had long 
been imagined as a reflection of the Roman Church, to put it more broadly. For 
Aristotelian scholars, the Church itself would again, as Burns (1992: 35) clarifies, have to 
have held either a fully mixed or a mixed monarchical constitution: “For some it was the 
classical politia mixta, combining the virtues of monarchy, aristocracy, and ... democracy. 
For others (...) it was a politia regalis; but this ‘regal polity’ had to be understood in such 
a way as to enshrine and safeguard the authority of the community as a whole.” Hobbes 
(1994) will clearly defend a form of politia regalis.
89De Cive, Chapters 6 and 7, would be the best place to start for a study of Hobbes’s (1991: ch. 7, 
195) anti-Aristotelian defense of monarchical (non-mixed) constitutionalism. 
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90 Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 129).
91 Paganini (2003: 202).
92 Specifically, Aristotle (1958: 2.9-2.10, 73-83). 
93 Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 134).
94 Hobbes (1994: ch. 18, 122-123).
95 Correctly, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate (10th edition) defines the monarch as: “a person who 
reigns over a kingdom or empire” and also as “one that holds preeminent position or 
power”—but not as a hereditary king.
96 Compare, for instance, Bobbio (1993).
97 Paganini (2003: 211; 213).
98 Particularly, Hobbes (1994: chs. 17; 18; 30), (1991: ch 16.17, 327-328 ; ch. 17.20-21, 351-
353). 
99 Hobbes (1994: ch. 30, 240).
100 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 117-121).
101 Compare, for example, Hobbes’s (1991: 17.27, 366) effort to define sovereignty in terms of its 
own transfer—by means of “some proper sign” (or of a significant, commonsensical 
principle of succession, in other words).
102 Oakeshott (1991: 221-294), “Introduction to Leviathan.”
103 Oakeshott (1991: 237-238).
104 Hobbes (1994: ch. 8, 53-55; ch. 35, 284).
105 Oakeshott (1991: 237-238).
106 For example, Hobbes (1994: ch. 36, 297).
107 Connolly (2010).
108 Oakeshott (1991: 237).
109 Oakeshott (1991: 251).
110 Oakeshott (1991: 281).
111 Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
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112 The merits of this complaint have been assessed by Sullivan (2006).
113 Although their praise of a self-organizing but peaceful democratization process may either 
consist of a misplaced metaphor, or a self-fulfilling prophecy. Compare, further, 
Houghton (2009), Oren (1995), and Whitehead (2011). For, Dafoe (2011: 260) concludes 
that the hypothesis that peaceful democratization, in state A, is caused by the 
democratization of neighboring states, B and N, rests on the presumption that ABN will 
be holding on to the same economic market model: to capitalism. As Dafoe puts it, the 
descriptive hypothesis, of a self-proliferating democratic peace in ABN, “does not rule 
out the possibility that it may be capitalism, development, or other processes that are the 
direct, and/or indirect, cause of the liberal peace. Nor, importantly, would a robust 
statistical finding that an economic covariate absorbs the association between joint 
democracy and peace be sufficient evidence that democracy is not a direct, let alone 
indirect, cause of peace.”
114 Kinneging (1997: 279-280).
115 For instance, Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 117-121).
116 For Machiavelli’s concept of the “mutation” (from multitude into people, actually), compare 
also Negri (1999: 37-50; esp. 40).
117 Hobbes (1994: ch. 16, 114).
118 Aristotle (1998).
119 The standard reference is to Norbert Elias, The Court Society (New York: Pantheon, 1983, not 
further referenced in this book).
120 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.50, 242).
121 Hobbes (1994: ch. 26, 18-186).
122 Also, Lake (2010) touches on the phenomenon of relational authority, in IR.
123 Nichols (1992: 20; 6, n. 21) points to Aristotle as having suggested that the difference between 
master and slave must be “a difference of degree.” Aristotle (1958: bk. 1, ch. 2, 1352a, p. 
3) used his concept of prudence for masterly qualities, because prudence is a combination 
of both “soul” and the practice of “virtue.” Those masters who can make this 
combination possible have “forethought”: they are by nature capable of ruling, whereas 
all those who fail to sufficiently unite their natural character with this “ruling element” 
(“soul”) must be said to be living in “a state of slavery.” Further, Aristotle (1999: bk. 1, 
ch. 13, 1102b-1103a, pp. 17-18) treats “body” as the cause of, and as possibly being 
caused by “nutrition and growth”—whereas he defines “soul” as the partially active or as 
the non-sleeping mind (Aristotle does not create a separate category for mind, however). 
To be having an element of “soul” is what it means to be fully sharing in “reason”. The 
suggestion is thus that “soul” is always a part of “reason” but that it is not always a part 
of what would be called mind (a person may be in a state of sleep, for example, and thus 
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still have what is now known as a mind). Anyhow, the gist of Aristotle’s argument is that 
because “soul” naturally and actively obeys “reason” it is also capable of virtue—and the 
more obedient “soul” becomes, the more chance that “wisdom, comprehension, and 
prudence” will develop (these are the virtues of “thought”). Of course, as it is also 
implied, whenever “soul” remains in obedience to and in combination with “body” it can 
likewise activate “generosity and temperance” (virtues of proportion). This means that 
slaves (and women) are capable of the latter virtues. Most importantly, Aristotle 
concludes that “there must necessarily be a union of the naturally ruling element [soul] 
with the element which is naturally ruled [body], for the preservation of both.
124 Winthrop (2008: 191-193), Gilbert (1990: 21-38).
125 Particularly, Plato (1980: 626e, 5; 665d, 46; 666e, 48).
126 Aristotle (1958), (1999).
127 African slaves were commonly referred to as ‘black gold’—at least until into the late 
nineteenth century. It was also only in the 1880s that Brazil’s treaty obligations, as a 
sovereign state, made it possible for the Emperor of Brazil to abolish slavery 
domestically as well as to seriously halt the (already illegal) slave trade.
128 Crawford (2001).
129 “An estimated 100,000 to 300,000 American-born children are sold for sex each year”, reports 
Patricia Leigh Brown. “In Oakland, Redefining Sex Trade Workers as Abuse Victims”, 
The New York Times, 5/24/2011, A14, A20.
130 On Montesquieu’s scientific (or, at least, not civic religious) laws of nature-account, see 
Williams (2010).
131 Crawford (2002: 412-413; 417).
132 Primarily, Arendt (1970), (2006), (1961), (2003).
133 At this point, in which the exception (Ausnahme) is made possible by a sovereign 
constituency, Negri (1999: 20) finds the work of Arendt (2006) to remain very similar to 
that of Schmitt (1985).
134 On this point of counseling those holding power, Agamben (2005: 74-78), additionally, refers 
both to Arendt’s essay “What is Authority?” (which was published in two versions, 
neither of which has been referenced here) and to one of Arendt’s sources: Th. 
Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht (orig. 1871).
135 Weber (1946: 237), for example, reminds his readers that authority would have been exercised 
by “the Roman Senate, the Venetian Council, as well as the Athenian Areopag”—even 
though such “collegiate authorities” could usually not avoid usurping at least some 
“actual power.”
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136 As a commentary to the entry for authority in Merriam Webster’s Collegiate, and with Arendt 
(1970) in mind, authority should not be confused with seeming ‘synonyms’ such as 
power and influence. It is not, therefore, the “power to influence or command thought, 
opinion, or behavior.” Power reveals itself in organized (physical) movements and the 
visual changes they cause. Authority, much rather, is the intangible (non-physical) source
from which a decision has been drawn. Testimony, example, precedence, and 
jurisprudence are all subcategories of authority—even though the subcategories do not 
necessarily need to be open to juridical interpretation. The point at which these categories 
connect is that they form the sources of guidance for all those who do have to execute, or 
to administer power.
137 For example, Arendt (2006: p. 192) mentions that the Founding Fathers, of the United States, 
‘assigned’ authority to—or asked for the authority of—the judiciary branch but then had 
to take it away from the Senate, which they had to have endowed with power instead. 
Afterwards, hence, it was possible to say that “the true seat of authority in the American 
Republic is the Supreme Court.” Yet, Arendt would not have denied (and would actually 
also have favored) that authority must consist of acts of counseling and advising the 
executive officers—as it had done within the Roman Senate. “In Rome, the function of 
authority was political, while in the American [R]epublic the function of authority is 
legal, and consists [only] in interpretation.” Arendt suggests this shift towards 
interpretation is a loss.
138 For one formulation of the Democratic Peace-theorem, see Babst (1996). For the hidden 
similarity between both Weber and Schmitt, consider Kalyvas (2008) and Pichler (1998) 
but possibly also Shilliam (2007) and Kennedy (2011).
139 For instance, Scheuerman (2005).
140 Kantorowicz (1957) helps to further remind political theorists of the critical distinction 
between a mortal king (the executive power) and the monarchical office (that is, the 
authority conferred onto the king or queen by the people).
141 For instance, Canning (1987: 189-192).
142 Schmitt (1957), (transl. 2008). Mehring (1989: 123-129) further discusses Schmitt’s 
consideration of whether the constitutional laws form the sovereign state, or the state 
forms the laws.
143 Arendt (2006: 247-257). Wellmer (2000: 223-224) apparently describes the autonomy of the 
revolutionary republics as if it were the source of their authority.
144 Arendt (2006).  
145 Arendt (2006: 108) argues that, in the modern era, authority could increasingly be lost with 
“incredible ease”—as Montesquieu had so clearly predicted when he first observed “the 
breakdown of the old Roman trinity of religion, tradition, and authority.” See, further, 
Wellmer (2000: 225).
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146 Arendt (2006: 173-174) suggests that whenever authority declines, new powers try to claim its 
“perpetuity.”
147 Aristotle (4.14, 1298b, 191-193), Nichols (1992: 121).
148 Aristotle (3.16, 1287a, 145).
149 Against the executive power of “centralized government”, Arendt (2006: 238) speaks 
favorably about a “communal council system” that would depend (and had once before 
depended) on the principle of federation in order for it to be spreading throughout 
(French) society. Birmingham (2006: 136-137) adds that Arendt consistently saw 
sovereignty as a combination of “liberty and federation” or, also, as an equal right to 
federate—throughout diverse societies.
150 Arendt (2006: 255; 237).
151 Arendt (2006: 257; 261).
152 Hansen (2010).
153 Arendt (1965), (1951), Canovan (2000).
154 Jones (2008: 247) mentions that whenever Adolf Hitler summoned Roland Freisler so he could 
preside over any of the Nazi show trials—but, specifically also over the trial of the men 
involved in the 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler’s life—Hitler would attempt to 
justify his choice by comparing him to Andrei Vyshinsky: Josef Stalin’s preferred 
‘judge.’ This act of comparison remains significant because it suggests that even Hitler 
had understood (in the months before his suicide and his government’s downfall) that the 
German state’s executive-adjudicative powers were still being curtailed by a need to 
publically broadcast justifications for their cold-hearted application. The point to consider 
is that nuclear test-ban treaties differ little from the Nazi show trials. In their utilitarian 
essence, they form merely a public justification for, and certainly not a legitimization of, 
the mad possibility that a state leader may indiscriminately annihilate all life (and 
contaminate Earth for tens of thousands of years to come). 
Prados (2011: 64-67; 71-72) reports that when Michael Gorbachev proposed to dismantle 
nuclear arsenals, he did not aim to justify their continued existence by means of another 
technology-oriented testing-and-oversight treaty. Upon having learned about the disaster 
at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor of April 26, 1986, he much rather blamed 
“departmentalism” and the “desire to avoid responsibilities” than that he thought of the 
disaster as a technological failure. What remains less known is that he also faulted the 
Soviet military in its entirety (next to its poor oversight at Chernobyl) for having become 
a “state within a state”—after having build so many nuclear warheads. Chernobyl cannot 
be separated, therefore, from Gorbachev’s offer at Reykjavik of “a formula for the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons.” Ronald Reagan accepted the offer, but would soon be 
forced to walk away from “the deal” by his domestic advisors.
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155 Todorov (2001) clarifies why J.-J. Rousseau’s research was directed towards the emergence of 
public authority outside the positive laws. For Arendt, likewise, as Villa (2001) details, 
there is great authority within experiences of theatrical publicality—outside of the posited 
rules.
156 Famously, Montesquieu (2000: bk. 24, ch. 8, p. 465) argues that legislation must be posited so 
that it remains in agreement with mores (regional customs, temperaments, and 
conventions), for even in those far-away regions where the law of religion might not have 
been “given by God, it is always necessary for it to be in agreement with morality [and 
mores]”.
157 Aristotle (1958: 7.4, 1326a, 291).
158 Aristotle (1958: 5.3, 1302b, 209).
159 See, particularly, Hobbes (1994: chs. 16; 18; 30) and Holland (2010).
160 Compare, particularly, Canning (1987: 221-227).
161 Skinner (2002: vol. 3, 190).
162 Public honoring is an ambivalent process, Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 119; ch. 28, 217-218) 
realizes, because even though human actors will compete “for honor and dignity” they 
also tend to act shamelessly. Their ignominy is difficult to sanction because it has both 
natural and civil elements, although of course only the civil marks of their honor and 
authority—such as “badges, titles, [and] offices”—can very well be “taken away by law.”  
163 Hobbes (1994: ch. 16, 112-113).
164 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 119-120).
165 See, especially, Hardt and Negri (2000: 305-350), as discussed by Bruner (2009: 335-340).
166 Hobbes (1994: ch. 16, 112-113).
167 That Aristotle (1958) expresses aversion to commerce, although not whenever (port) trade 
serves the purpose of peace, has been well documented. See also, for instance, Nichols 
(1992: 141-142).
168 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 117-120), Aristotle (1958).
169 Arendt (1943), (1949), (1965), is angered by nation-states pretending they are and had been 
uniquely capable in maintaining their ‘comity’ and to thereby have protected ‘human 
rights’—when they were actually judging civil rights to be highly exclusive and 
quantifiable properties. Or, they had in fact used people’s ‘rights’ instrumentally, and at 
will, during the Second World War, as only their nationalism was represented as their 
transcendent first cause.
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170 Scheuerman (2011: 33) refers specifically to Morgenthau (1985). See, also, Wight (1966).
171 Bull (1995: 102-103;111-112).
172 Further, Bull (1995), Little (2007: 153-155). 
173 Aristotle (1958: 5.3, 1302b, 209).
174 Scheuerman (2011: 31; 33) cites these of Niebuhr’s phrases: “social check,” “conflict of 
interest,” and “disproportion of power.” One of the passages he cites evinces Niebuhr 
was well-aware of the qualitative difference, however, between economic and social 
powers: although these powers should check each other as equals, they are also 
intrinsically unequally meaningful and purposeful in the life of the state. (As a materialist 
and somewhat pessimist realist, Niebuhr suggested that economic power had already 
become “most significant”.)
175 diZerega (2000: 7).
176 Capra (1996: 98; 210).
177 Specifically, Capra (1996: 85).
178 Aristotle (1958: 4.4, 1291b, 166).
179 Arendt (2006: 12), diZerega (2000: 31-32).
180 diZerega (2000: 31; 42; 44).
181 See, further, Hobbes (1994: ch. 6, 45-46; ch. 12, 76-78; ch. 27, 207; ch. 34, 269-279).
182 Hobbes (1994: ch. 27, 206).
183 For not a few solid references to Bodin scholarship, consider Wilson (2008).
184 This paragraph gives a spin to Hobbes (1991: 10.16-10.18, 233-234) consistent with 
Leviathan’s message.
185 As Waldron (2000: 213) adds, “Arendt associated authority as much with improvement ... as 
with conservation.”
186 Ivison (2002: 227), referencing Kant (1991: 99-102), or his “First Definitive Article of a 
Perpetual Peace.”
187 Specifically, Aristotle (5.2, 1302a, 207).
188 Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 131).
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189 O’Neill (2000: 49) describes how, at least for Kant, this need for public participation is vital: 
“Ethics and politics are not spectator sports.”
190 Machiavelli (1966: 3.1, 108), Guarini (1990: 32).
191 Particularly, Benner (2009: 153).
192 Aristotle (1958: 2.5, 1263a, 49; 2.9, 1270a-1271b, 76-80). Continue to see, also, diZerega 
(2000: 44).
193 As Arendt (2006: 29) herself observes: despite his significance in the secularization of politics, 
Machiavelli relies on a God “absolute.”
194 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396).
195 By contrast to Beiner (2011), see Parel (1992), Nederman (1999), and Sullivan (1993).
196 Strauss (1958: 78; 74), Machiavelli (1975: ch. 25).
197 Breiner (2008: 66-67) follows in large part Pocock (1975), who not entirely unlike Strauss 
(1958), argues that without some unprecedented and innovative ruler, there can be no 
stable state. But both Wood (1972) and Althusser (1999) have been reading Machiavelli 
more carefully and they found instead that the virtues of a balanced constitutional state 
are to be understood as common virtues: they are not being held by only a single ruler-
founder.
198 For a superb discussion of Machiavelli’s Rome, consider Benner (2009: 153; 251-253).
199 Hardt and Negri (2000: 3), referencing Schuman (1974).
200 Compare, further, Althusser (1999), (2006b).
201 Hart and Negri (2000: 164-167) demonstrate that neo-imperial states differ considerably from 
the nineteenth-century colonialist-imperialist states in the sense that only the latter extend 
themselves by excluding others. Neo-imperialism, then, would instead allow an 
immanently sovereign state to expand itself without also having to physically “annex or 
destroy the other powers it faces”. Yet, neo-imperialism is not so new as Hardt and Negri 
might think. Even ancient Roman imperialists would not have destroyed “other powers” 
as they strove to accomplish their juridical and cultural incorporation. Caesar reports 
occasionally on the taking of hostages; their (legal) education would have been part of the 
Roman Empire’s expansion, for example.
202 Jonathan Granoff, “Truth, Illumination, and Nuclear Weapons”, Tikkun, Spring 2011, 26 (2): 
p. 42.
203Imperium is actually, in sharp contrast to dominium, spatially unbounded. As Virgil (1956: 36) 
suggests, Jupiter would have given the Roman Republic its imperium: “To Romans, I 
[promise to] set no boundary in space or time.” Consider, further, Bobbio (2003).
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204 Alex Prud’Homme (“Draught: A Creeping Disaster”, The New York Times, 7/17/2007, sr3) 
reports that climatologists are tinkering with natural weather cycles, or are otherwise 
involved in geo-engineering, and yet desiccation, desertification, and aridification have 
become increasingly “progressive”—if not only because carbon emissions decrease 
humidity levels as well as because potable water resources are being exploited by bottling 
corporations, as Barlow (2007) has shown.
205 Hobbes (1994: ch. 31, 245).
206 Hobbes (1994: ch. 29, 223).
207 Arendt (1965), (2003), (1978, esp. vol. 2). See, for a comparably realist reflection on 
solitariness, William Deresiewicz, “Solitude and Leadership”, Utne Reader, Sept. 2010, 
48-53.
208 Bruner (2009: 289) helps describe how multilateral trade- and debt-policies ended up being 
rewritten to accommodate “investor rights over investor responsibilities.” “While 
multilateral treaty-based structures of representation”—such as those within the EU, IMF, 
WTO, and World Bank—differ significantly from one another, none of these structures 
tolerates any political responsibility-promoting “republican principles [if not only 
because] ... their primary constituencies are ... trade, central bank, treasury, and state 
officials”. 
209 Goldman (2006) indicates that the World Bank, in particular, has over the course of the last 
decade introduced several criterions to measure political power as opposed to only 
economic power. Yet, most such criterions remain subservient to its own institutional 
logics, which measure a state’s aggregate economic ‘growth’ and thereby again ignore 
political issues such as the absent balance between rich and poor—as, alternatively, 
reported on by the International Labor Office (2008).
210 Duverger (1974). Additionally, Bruner (2009: 175, n. 3) remembers that Pocock (1975: 519-
526) already argued that the (Montesquieuan) doctrine of a separation of powers would 
have “marked a shift away from classical republicanism, ... and toward selfish 
liberalism.”
211 Abrahamsen and Williams (2009). 
212 Contrary to Lummis (1996).
213 Rousseau (1968), Aristotle (1958), diZerega (2000: 41). Further, Schmitt (2008), (2004), 
(1988).
214 Nineteenth-century IR structures, of colonial imperialism, did set the stage for a later 
termination of “transnational corporate responsibilities.” Against these neo-colonialist 
legacies and trade disparities, that mostly continue to advantage the largest (the Western) 
corporations, Bruner (2009: 320) enters a plea for “global policies based on fair trade and 
fair debt relations backed by strong systems of transnational political representation.”
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215 Young (2010: 123-124; 129; 135-137).
216 Lobbyists attached to various treaty-organizations continue to work hard—on behalf of 
corporate finance, media conglomerates, armaments industries, and ‘big oil’, among other 
businesses—in order to deregulate the market economies of the world. Consequentially, 
the EU has hardly and the UN has never managed to create tighter regulations that would 
have reigned in the power of transnational corporate structures. See, further, Vagts (2003) 
and Coleman (2003). Strangely, Weiss (2009b), Kratochwil (2006b), and Risse-Kappen 
(1994) see little problems with the subsequent ‘economization’ and ‘hollowing out’ of 
especially the UN’s political responsibilities.
217 Rousseau (1968: 4.8, 182-184) seems to want to plea for, but then denies the existence of a 
“Christian republic.” That is, a religion of Christian men would have to be the religion of 
a people at once spiritual as well as temporal, yet Rousseau challenges anyone to prove 
that such a good religion exists.
218 Hobbes (1994: ch. 29, 223).
219 Sterling (1958: 45), Naess (1989).
220 Scheuerman (2011: 99; 96; 24; 21) calls the theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes too 
“pessimistic.”
221 Scheuerman (2011: 16-18) demonstrates that mid-twentieth-century realists, such as Hans 
Morgenthau, were deeply conscious of those comparative advantages enjoyed by Great 
Powers—or, rather, of the Marxist notion that even though “[international] law appeared 
to treat all [state] parties equally, de facto power inequalities meant that it favored those 
possessing superior power resources.” Yet, not Marx but Aristotle (1958: 5.1, 1301a, 
203) had premised the earliest known variant of this classic realist insight: “[T]he reason 
why there is a variety of different constitutions is the fact ... that while men are all agreed 
in doing homage to justice, and to the principle of proportionate equality (in which it 
issues), they fail to achieve it in practice.”
222 Scheuerman (2011: 68; 115; 147). See also, specifically, Morgenthau (1964), (1985). For 
additional theoretical commentaries on Hans Morgenthau’s and Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
proposals for reform, consider Tjalve (2008). See Pin-Fat (2005) for Morgenthau’s 
understanding of the (dialectical) tension between universal virtues and particular states.
223 Bruner (2009: 326-328) finds that republican realists would typically have asked statespersons 
to take their joint political responsibility seriously—by regularly performing “checks on 
economic power”.
224 Dahl (1993) stands among all those liberal theorists who would prefer economic privatization 
over political publicality. For some of the high risks inherent in their liberal stance, as 
estimated by one systems theorist, continue to see Hardin (1968).
225 As an aside, in an important book on international political hypocrisy, Mearsheimer (2011: 85-
86) confuses those lies that undercut formal and institutional (utilitarian) norms with 
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those lies that may offend natural conscience-based (deontological) conventions. That is, 
he conflates lying on behalf of formal institutions (this would be ‘his’ utilitarian type of 
lying: it makes “good strategic sense”) with another, far more informal and discretionary 
kind of lying (such as: the breaking of promises, or; the refusing to give equal treatment 
to people in need). On his own recommendation, state officials should follow the 
utilitarian and rational logic. Only when the risk and discomfiture of getting caught has 
become greater than the risk of not accomplishing the aim of the lie, the lie should no 
longer be promoted.  For states, that is, “the potential for backfiring and doing a state 
more harm than good is the paramount criterion”. Yet, consider also Mearsheimer’s own 
example of Governor Ryan of Illinois, “who initially favored capital punishment, [but 
who then] felt that he had to suspend all executions in his state because there was 
convincing evidence that many of the inmates on death row were convicted on the basis 
of lies and other improprieties.” This example does not make the case for utilitarian lying. 
If the state prosecutors had been lying in so many cases, then they had for years accomplished 
their ambition to lock up many suspects, on death row. They were acting as good 
utilitarians. More importantly, they themselves would always remain legally immune, 
despite having wrongly executed (and, of course, having threatened to execute) many 
innocent people. Under Mearsheimer’s own utilitarian logic, these prosecutors continue 
to have good reason to have lied so often: they could not be punished, and had reason to 
expect they would not be caught. When Ryan, years later, decided to undo their work, 
however, he invoked a different kind of reason to do so. He said not that he would try to 
punish the prosecutors. He said, instead, he would not have been able to live with himself 
knowing he was responsible and guilty (in a non-formal, non-legal, non-instrumental 
sense of the word) for the deaths of innocent State prisoners. Hence, he invoked his 
conscience in his decision to grant the Illinois prisoners both a pardon as well as an 
amnesty. Soon afterwards, Ryan’s decision backfired with respect to the institution of the 
governorship. As Governor, he would be prosecuted on trumped-up corruption charges, 
and was send to prison by political opponents generally in favor of the death penalty. 
Ryan’s decision, therefore, was not so much informed by any utilitarian benefit or also 
not by his weighing off the risks, as that his pardon must have been informed by a 
deontological consideration and out of respect for a non-institutional convention. Barry 
James, “Clearing of Illinois Death Row Is Greeted with Global Cheers,” The New York 
Times, 01/14/2003. Further, Mearsheimer’s failure to differentiate between lying against 
or for institutions, first, and lying against informal conventions, second, should be 
contrasted to Cook (2000: 29; 27, italics added), who mentions that: “Informal norms can 
be either far less demanding than formal norms or on the contrary far more so.” When 
states are conforming to norms, he adds, it “is not always with knowledge for all 
constrained by them: a convention requires the knowledge of the population in order to 
survive; an institution ... need not rely on the fully conscious complicity of its 
participants.”
226 Arendt’s phrase of “a web of relationships”, although in a different context, was cited by 
Waldron (2000: 208).
227 For instance, Slagstad (1988: 128-129).
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228 For definitions of the process of “self-organization” see Capra (1996: 24-27) and Connolly 
(2010: 64).
229 In essence, Pocock (1975: 79-80) helped develop this systems-theoretical argument: a 
sovereign organization cannot be reduced to the sum of its own components. The totality 
of its structural components (interests, wealth, the orders, and specific virtues) is certainly 
transcended, organizationally, by the sovereign but they still cannot be separated. In his 
words: “the richer ... a [sovereign] commonwealth became, the harder it would be to 
maintain the orders and virtues composing it in their proper equilibrium”. Cited in Bruner 
(2009: 165).
230 For a contrasting view, see Wendt (1995).
231 For instance, Paulson (1998).
232 Bull (1995: 253), Morgenthau (1985). For the secondary literature on and a few critical 
insights into Wendt’s non-realist form of constructivism, see especially Guzzini and 
Leander (2006). For some of the main points in the Grotius-Hobbes debate, Baumgold 
(2010) and Tuck (1999). For Schmitt’s siding with Hobbes, consider starting with Rumpf 
(1972) or Springborg (2010). For the difference between Schmitt and his positivist 
counterpart, Kelsen, consider also Suganami (2007) and Dyzenhaus (1997) and Hebeisen 
(1995).
233 Pourciau (2005: 1071).
234 Bull (1995: 122-155), Wight (1995).
235 Bull (1995: 145).
236 “Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes 
continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized”. R. W. Emerson, Self-Reliance, “The 
Over-Soul” (par. 4, not further referenced).
237 Kelsen (1960), (1967b). For one realist’s skepticism about this positivist idea of a singularly-
enforce legal hierarchy, see Morgenthau (1964).
238 Bull (1995: 124-125).
239 Wight (1936), for example, respects the sanctity of extra-legal decisions.
240 For secondary notes on Schmitt’s non-positivist concept of (international) law, see Burchard 
(2006), Hebeisen (1995), Kalyvas (2008), and specifically Zarmanian (2006).
241 Compare Kelsen (2000) to, for instance, Schmitt, (1986), (1985).
242 Bull (1995: 25) defines “the Grotian or internationalist tradition” as a tradition prescribing a 
type of state-conduct which will have been both preconditioned by and bound to the 
many “rules and institutions of the [international] society they form.” This definition 
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ignores the importance Hugo Grotius himself attached to the rules of the type of national 
society each state will have to form, prior to thus also helping to form an international 
society. Grotius (1995: 7.7, 81) is very clear about the precondition of a national 
regulatory structure, however, when he writes that the face of (Batavian) sovereignty has 
been passed on, across the generations, for seventeen centuries, because the national 
rights of the estates were passed on through their suffrage as well as because the more or 
less limited forms of monarchical authority must have been passed on hereditarily.
243 Grotius (1995: 1.3-1.5, 13) sees the Batavian people as providing a legit, exemplary, 
constitutional aristocratic model (because of their pedigree) to the “Estates of Holland 
and West-Friesland.” See also the translation by Jan Waszink, of: Hugo Grotius, The 
Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2000, not further referenced), 
the critical importance of which, for understanding Hobbes’s doubts towards this early 
Grotian constitutional model, is being ignored by Baumgold (2010: 29).
244 Compare, also, Weber (1946: 78). Politics as a Vocation.
245 Kamen (2004).
246 On the general significance of 1648, for the system of states, consider Straumann (2008) and 
Osiander (2001).
247 De Cavalho, Leira, and Hobson (2011: 757) write that “the myths of 1648 and 1919 ... are 
myths in [two] ... ways; [w]hile they are stories held to be true which turn out to be false, 
they have also served as a matrix for further thinking in IR.”
248 This question forms a starting point for the inquiries in Van Kersbergen, Lieshout, and Lock 
(1999). Manin (1997) and Ankersmit (2002) also investigate how various social 
groupings are generally being represented, politically.
249 Hobbes (1994: ch. 26, 197-199). In Hobbes-citations, original italics have been omitted more 
than occasionally.
250 Hobbes (1994: ch. 30, 244).
251 Hobbes (1994: ch. 11, 70; ch. 13, 88).
252 Hobbes (1994: ch. 14, 91-92).
253 Ninčić (1970: 8-9; 39) adds that Vattel would have been among the first legal theorists to have 
formulated the “antinomy” by presenting it in the form of a choice: either legal equality 
is to be endowed with “real substance” and thus transformed into “political equality” 
(which would create the isonomy of states, of course), or the equality of states must be 
turned into “little more than a [nominal] fiction devoid of any real substance”.
254 Schmitt (1996), as cited and translated by Slagstad (1993: 109).
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255 For instance, Zagorin (2009: 33) wisely remarks that “Hobbes thought it necessary to use [the 
passions] ... in achieving [a] ... civil society.” Rather than to exclude the passions from 
politics, realists such as Hobbes believe they are to be studied in terms of how they can 
best be represented to help achieve a civil political society.
256 This is a brief appropriation of Baumgold’s (2010: 82) description of this early Grotian 
project, or constitutional model.
257 Hobbes (1994: 9-10), “The Introduction.”
258 Hobbes (1994: ch. 14, 94-99).
259 Hobbes (1994: ch. 21, 147).
260 Hobbes (1994: esp. chs. 35-37) argues that constitutional states as sovereign persons are, in 
actuality, God’s lieutenants or vicars.
261 Finnis (1980: 223).
262 Hobbes (1994: 486), “A Review and Conclusion”.
263 However, because Hobbes (1994) never goes so far as to argue that sovereign statehood is a 
‘gift’ or an act of ‘grace’ either from a single lineage or from a monotheistic entity, and 
that every sovereign is rather a mediation of such singularity-principles, it should be 
investigated whether Arendt indeed would have completely negated Hobbes’s 
sovereignty. Compare, further, Arato and Cohen (2009).
264 Curiously, Birmingham (2006: 57; 76-79) at first tries to expel, from Arendt’s concept of 
natality, any possible “metaphysical understanding of the human being as having a 
nature”. Birmingham later wants to inject Arendt’s Augustinian coincidence of both God 
the Father and the Son of Man into what seems to be the same concept. To elaborate, 
Augustine’s “trinity of cognition” (“memory [or Creation], understanding [or thinking], 
and the will”) would of course have been observed, by Arendt herself, as a derivative of 
the Trinity of respectively the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The act of derivation 
itself is perhaps not a metaphysical act, but its political theological implications were 
certainly also not being disregarded by Arendt (1978, vols. 1 and 2). Anyhow, the 
metaphysical caliber of Arendt’s natality deserves further attention.
265 Specifically for the natality principle, Birmingham (2006: 7-72), Kohn (2000: 126).
266 Arendt (1951). Also relevant are Canovan (2000) and Buckler (2001).
267 For greater detail, see Arendt (1958).
268 Arendt (2006), (1996). On her concept of this spirit of judgment, and specifically on Arendt’s 
neo-Kantian finding that it is neither deductive nor inductive, as well, consider Passerin 
d'Entrèves (2000) and Marshall (2010).
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269 Scheuerman (2011: 26).
270 See, for instance, Arendt (1996), Augustine (1984), Birmingham (2006: 76-79) and Hobbes 
(1994) and Paganini (2003).
271 In accordance to Connolly (2008), Hurd (2008: 106) would be mistaken to think that 
American culture is influenced by (and influences) a meaningful concept of “secularist 
authority”.
272 Pascal (1995). 
273 Nau (2011) suggests IR teachers cannot avoid using ‘isms.’ Students may want to start with, 
however, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (eds.), Progress in International 
Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (The MIT Press, 2003, not further referenced in 
this book). For brevity’s sake, the mainstream (North-American) IR theories mentioned 
in this book are positivist theories, and the advantages and disadvantages of theoretical 
positivism have been elaborately discussed elsewhere. One notable assessment of the 
tension between progress and positivism, from inside the field of constitutionalist theory, 
however, was made by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Gesetz und Gesetzgebende Gewalt: 
Von den Anfängen der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehre bis zur Höhe des Staatsrechtlichen 
Positivismus (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1981, not further referenced).
274 Stinchcombe (1968) has had much influence on how IR would come to introduce itself to 
social constructivism, by means of Wendt (1994), (1999), (2004). See, further, Weber 
(1995), Weber (1999), Murphy (1996), Ruggie (1998), and Sterling-Folker (2004), 
among others.
275 Onuf (1989) and Wendt (1995: 131) could agree with advanced realists that statespersons are 
rarely committed to an “individualist ontology”—but this still does not have to mean that 
no ontology would never be structurally promoting the actions of selfish agents. What 
appears to matter much more, therefore, is how epistemic beliefs about the nature of 
ontology come into being contrary to ontological chains.
276 Jackson (2008), Kubálková (2000). Also, Hayden (2007) and Birmingham (2007) focus on 
Arendt’s theodicy, without calling it a theodicy or even without identifying Arendt’s 
conceptions of evil as a political theological issue. On Schmitt’s theological concept of 
sovereignty, at least in the IR field, compare Zarmanian (2006), Pichler (1998) and 
Chandler (2008). For two (excellent) studies of religiosity and (ultimate) authority—from 
within the Comparative Politics field—see Di Piramo (2010) and Warner (2000). Di 
Piramo studies authority as if it is the charismatic personification of certain (Mexican, 
Catholic, mysticist) oppositions, while Warner rather identifies authority as if it appears 
through parliamentary oppositions between political parties supported by the Vatican, on 
one side, and Europe’s socialist or liberal parties, on another side.
277 Warner and Walker (2011: 116).
278 Wendt (1995: 161).
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279 See, by contrast, Slagstad (1993: 111).
280 In important respects, Wendt (1999) was followed, in focusing on culturally constructed 
identities and socialization in IR, by theorists such as Flockhart (2006), Hobson (2007), 
and Philpott (2001). 
281 Wendt (1995: 129).
282 Wendt (1995: 132).
283 For instance, Slagstad (1993: 115; 124-125). 
284 Wendt (1995: 135-137; 141; 150), Waltz (2001).
285 Waltz (2001), (2000), Mearsheimer (2011), (2001).
286 Flockhart (2006), who is sympathetic to constructivism, does not omit the possibility that 
social learning only takes place among the ‘experts’ of a neoliberal élite—but she does 
omit, more dangerously, the risk that ‘experts’ maintain ethically unacceptable social 
differentiations and pro-status-quo functional specializations.
287 Andreatta and Koenig-Archibugi (2010) highlight some empirical difficulties with any 
neoliberal IR research program.
288 Grieco (1988). Compare further, for instance, Axelrod and Cohen (1999).
289 Consider, in this context, Chandler (2009), (2010) and Hindess (2005) on the relevancy of 
Michel Foucault’s work in sensing IR phenomena. Also relevant could be Ashley (1995), 
(1988), Devetak (2008), Lebow (2006), Rosenberg (1994), and Williams (2001), among 
many other articles.
290 Kubálková (2000).
291 Weber (1968), or as Slagstad (1993: 129) cites from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
292 Hurd (2008), (2004).
293 As summed up in Warner and Walker (2011: 121).
294 Schmitt (1985), Slagstad (1993: 116).
295 Genesis 4. Compare, further, Thornton (2002).
296 Schmittian realism is generally being practiced by scholars who understand that the political 
realm is contingent on beliefs about legitimate authority. In this sense, the realm may be 
both moral and amoral. Political actions both can and cannot be morally justified, so that 
specifically the sorts of actions that cannot be purely morally justified must alternatively 
be legitimized by reference to an amoral transcendent relationship, which is politically
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the relationship of enmity—and which is religiously the relation between Christ and Anti-
Christ. For Schmitt (1932: 27; 39), as Slagstad (1993: 114) summarizes, then, “politics is 
autonomous only in the sense that the validity of political categories is [believed to be] 
independent of moral, economic, [aesthetic], or other [relations].” This again suggests 
that the political categories are independent structures as well as dependent processes: 
they are the categorical relations between different enemies, of course, but the enemies 
themselves are not “purely” structural religious categories.
297 Warner and Walker (2011: 127; 114), particularly, make a reference to Axelrod and Cohen 
(1999).
298 Warner and Walker (2011: 114-115).
299 International democracy promotion is mostly a liberal, not a realist, (U.S. foreign policy) 
agenda point. See, for what should be anti-liberal positions, Robinson (1996), Lovell 
(2007), the NED (2006), and Young (2002).
300 For a critical take on both neoliberalism and neo-conservatism, consider Brown (2006). Van 
den Brink (2005) seems to propose that (neo)liberalism’s shortcomings must be found in 
its failure to recognize political agonism (struggle). Also relevant (specifically for Carl 
Schmitt’s realist rejection of liberalism, as well as of positivism) are McCormick (1997) 
and Cristi (1993).
301 Wendt (2003), (2005).
302 Compare, for instance, Scheuerman (2011: 113-121; 143-148). By applying his ideal of a neo-
Hegelian synthesis to historical action, Wendt (2003) essentially professes to have 
designed a world-state. Yet, problematically, his world-state cannot respect a right to 
secession—even though (threats of) separatism and defection are common in actual 
political practice. For instance, states may only symbolically defect from or join a 
military alliance (similar to how the Soviet Union declared war on Japan after the fact, as 
it were) against other parties. Some states have at least once staged ‘a walk-out’ so that 
they could, however temporarily, disobey the perceived intentions of an antagonist within 
an international forum or convention. The UN Charter (Chapter 2, Articles 5-6) makes it 
possible for states to freely surrender their membership. (Switzerland refused, until 
recently, to even join the UN and South Africa long remained suspended by the UN, but 
this was in great part by its own choice).
303 Wendt (1995: 161).
304 For additional work on (Machiavellian) political realism, which in this passage is being held to 
be a specific form of civic republicanism, start with Pocock (1975), Skinner (2002), 
(1998), or with Guarini (1990) and Benner (2009) as well. J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism 
and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2003, not further referenced) at times seems 
to err too far in the anti-liberal direction, however.
305 Kalberg (2009) provides more notes on Weber’s theory’s symbiotic qualities.
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306 Philpott (2001).
307 Doyle (1986).
308 Williams (2001) and Doyle (1986) and Russett (1993), (2009).
309  Dafoe (2011).
310 Weyland (2009), Keitner (2001).
311 Hobbes (1994: ch. 19, 131), Zagorin (2010: 33).
312 For a few notes on Hobbes’s political theological principles, consider Greenleaf (1974) and 
Springborg (1996). For Schmitt’s principles, start with Bendersky (1996), Chen (2006) 
and Fatovic (2008) and Žižek (1999).
313 Grotius (1995).
314 Arendt (1958: 97), cited in Birmingham (2006: 90).
315 Carl Schmitt’s body of work should be considered exemplary of political realism, at least in 
this first respect, as it consistently connects the state’s constitutional authority within, to 
its sovereign authority across boundaries.
316 The issue of the legitimization of the system of states (as well as of state and post-state 
entities) has drawn attention from, next to Habermas (2008), Mulligan (2005), Føllesdal 
(2006), (2007), and Buchanan (2006).
317 Slagstad (1993: 125).
318 For variations on this theme of constructivist idealism (which makes it audible that few agents 
will be putting themselves in danger if they are not rationally pursuing their best material 
‘interests’), see Campbell (1998: esp. 73-75; 203), Crawford (2002: 117-124), and 
Philpott (2001: 47-51).
319 Naess (164-165) adds: “[Human beings] are a part of the ecosphere just as intimately as [they] 
are a part of ... society. But the expression ‘[isolatable] drops in the stream of life’ may be 
misleading if it implies that individuality of the drops is lost in the stream. Here is a 
difficult ridge to walk: To the left we have the ocean of organic and mystic views, to the 
right the abyss of atomic individualism.” 
320 Bull (1995: 157) rightly notes that not all diplomacy takes place in relations between sovereign 
states.
321 Bull (1995: 176-177).
322 Thucydides (1989).
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323 Bull (1995: 176).
324 Wendt (1999: 10), as cited by Luoma-Aho (2009: 305).
325 Wendt (2006), (2004), (1999), (1995), (1994). For a theoretically possible, but seemingly 
empirically invalid divergence from the program, consider Wendt and Duvall (2008).
326 Particularly, Simmel (1997: 200-214).
327 Simmel (1997: 61).
328 Particularly continue to contrast Wendt (1995), (1999), (2004), to Wendt and Duvall (2008).
329 Simmel (1997).
330 As Slagstad (1993: 111) cites Schmitt, “Hugo Preuss: Sein Staatsbegriff und seine Stellung in 
der deutschen Staatslehre.” 
331 Palonen (1999: 535-538; 543, n. 94) mentions that Max Weber saw his own theory of political 
freedom as an inquiry into how human beings may more or less spontaneously and 
prudently begin to transcend consequentialism— “without rejecting it.” Political freedom 
would then have to be believed to emerge from a series of chance encounters: although 
these encounters are not to be understood as “a hazard or randomness”, and “some side-
effects are always to be expected”, they are also not totally reducible to a “choice of some 
definite ends.” Hence, freedom is less a consequential (means-to-ends) choice than that it 
is a power over, and a having a sense of, the world’s systemic chaos (it is a refusal to 
accept a world of arbitrary and incalculable risks, also, and thus again becomes a type of 
belief).
332 Philpott (2001: 102-110; 159).
333 Philpott (2001: 118).
334 Philpott (2001: 140).
335 Philpott (2001: 116-117).
336 Finnis (1980: 66).
337 Philpott (2001: 183).
338 Crawford (2002: 320).
339 Philpott (2001: 183).
340 See, for instance, Latham (2011: 77-81).
341 Wendt (2003), Scheuerman (2011: 143).
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342 See, especially, Article 23 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The realist-
versus-liberal constructivist opposition is herein illuminated by by principles such as safe 
passage: an ancient customary law. Constructivist theorists opine then that these 
principles have been learned: they are the result of an open socialization process. Cross-
border passage rites help to inscribe national identities, for instance. Constructivists also 
suggest that each generation of diplomats will have to be newly conditioned, and newly 
accustomed to the social construction of their national identities. Realists object to such a 
notion: they find the constructivist link between socialization and nationalism specious. 
They are then also much more likely to caution, for example, that exceptional 
circumstances may motivate a host-country to declare any diplomat non grata.
343 As illustration of negative definitions of political actors/relations, consider Pankakoski (2010).
344 Bull (1995: 175-176).
345 Bull (1995: 168) suggests, for instance, that ambassadors can have legitimate incentives to 
create structures of “collaboration” (to protect their common interests) but at the same 
time may have no moral obligations to work towards a “conciliation” of each state’s 
national interests.
346 For constructivists, the state cannot be said to be acting as an unidentified sociopath (it cannot 
act within the rules, while still acting in unethical ways). Realists would argue, however, 
on one hand, that international agents may have to walk out during conferences, refuse to 
negotiate with hostage-takers, or ignore pleas to deliver food aid if this aid can be 
expected to fall in the hands of violent seditionists—and these agents may thereby have 
to disobey international law without being dismissed as immoral sociopaths. On the other 
hand, some states may have to turn a blind eye to seditionists involved in, say, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’—precisely because they are obeying the law, and because they are following 
the rules of the supranational organizations they are members of. Social constructivists, 
however, have no ethical yardstick to condemn the difference between the first type of 
evil, and the second type of banality and inertia. Rather, from a constructivist stance, 
there is little difference because in both cases would state agents have displayed a highly 
immoral, abnormal, anti-social performance.
347 Ermakoff (2009). Yannis Evrigenis (whose work is discussed by Ivan Ermakoff) has 
performed extensive theoretical research on this negative definition of identity, but he 
seems to have underestimated the importance of Carl Schmitt’s own theological 
system—in the sense of the latter’s political theological notion of identity may emerge 
from a mutually negative/negating relation (from relational enmity, similar to the 
complexities of how Christ and Anti-Christ relate to each other). Another author to 
consider, besides Schmitt, and more relevant to the notion of a psychologically self-
negating relation, is Laing (1960).
348 Crawford (2002: 14).
349 Weber (1946: 239).
350 Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 53-56).
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351 Kerness (2001).
352 Tuck (2009: 326-332).
353 One poignant expression of these sentiments of frustration—particularly with the injustice of 
how irresponsibly-incurred government costs were being deferred to the (American) 
middle class—has been offered by an engineer from Austin, Texas, in a manifesto he 
completed before tragically flying his plane into the local Internal Revenue Service office 
on February 18th, 2010 (thus killing himself and an IRS employee, and injuring at least a 
dozen people): “The communist creed: From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his need. The capitalist creed: From each according to his gullibility, to each 
according to his greed.” Marx (1978b: 531).
354 Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 73).
355 Crawford (2002: 340-341).
356 Crawford (2002: 14).
357 For a few brief re-representations of such legitimacy gaps, consider, Føllesdal (2006) and 
Manin (1987).
358 Wendt (1992), (1994), (1999), (2003), (2006).
359 For instance, Wendt (1999), (1994). Compare, also, Ruggie (1998). For a moderately-less 
constructivism-oriented perspective, see Risse-Kappen (1994).
360 Wendt (1999: 262-263). 
361 Wendt (2005).
362 Crawford (2002: 64; 87). See, further, Eckert (2004).
363 Wendt (1999: 262). Several IR theorists have looked into turning back from structural 
constructivism towards classical realism, including Sterling-Folker (2004).
364 Wendt (2003), (2005).
365 See, for instance, Schmitt (1932) for a brief defense of his Catholic theorem that the phrase 
‘political singularity’ would be a contradiction in terms. In the realm of the political, 
there are no singularities. Each singular entity or each individual state must be believed to 
have been contained by whatever it might be that this entity or this state holds in common 
with its enemies. In this sense, contradiction or political enmity, rather, is the 
commonality that binds all states.
366 This author does not recollect whether Wendt (1999) cites Machiavelli or Arendt. Yet, it 
seems unlikely, if he has done so, that he as sharply discerned as that they would do 
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between form and function, or essence and appearance, abstraction and concreteness 
(???).
367 Wendt (1999: 2).
368 For instance, Wendt (1999: 9).
369 For an empirical study of buffer-states, consider Fazal (2007). The example of Cuba’s Fidel 
Castro, the longest-serving head of state, further, shows that many state agents like him 
did not fail to adapt to political circumstances while resisting a wide variety of pressures 
to give up their roles (including American assassination attempts). Rather, they became 
only better ‘social learners’ (less ‘autistic’) as they faced such pressures. There is no 
positive correlation between moral progress and ‘social learning’ in this respect.
370 Wendt (2005), (2003), (1999). 
371 Compare, for instance, Guzzini (2004), (1993), and Legro (2009).
372 Jackson (2008: 151).
373 Jackson (2008: 138-142).
374 Jackson (2008).
375 Jackson (2008), (2009). Kelly (2002) helps demonstrate that even Kant could never have 
endorsed monism—not in IR, and not in any other theoretical endeavors. For, there still 
remains the antinomy that unites, but that simultaneously differentiates the 
epistemological from the ontological cognitive dimensions.
376Realists want to retain the two-dimensionality of ultimate power, sovereignty. Their question is 
hardly why there should be more monism or why there should be less dualism in 
understandings of state power, but how to live with ambivalence. They are drumming a 
different drum than the one of the constructivists, in their stead often hearing that 
sovereignty neither  entirely stems from one register nor completely from another. From 
their view, Patrick Jackson is incorrect to think people are better off if the ‘two-ness’ of 
sovereignty were to be further reduced to ‘one-ness.’
377 Especially, Arendt (2006). For Schmitt (esp. 1926) and the meaning of negatively-defined 
(political) concepts, continue with Pankakoski (2010) and Pourciau (2005).
378 Wendt (1999: 8).
379 See, particularly, Slagstad (1993).
380 For a remarkable comparison of Weber and Schmitt to Arendt, see Kalyvas (2008).
381 Begin with Morgenthau (1985), Schattschneider (1960), and Little (2007). But compare, also, 
Barnett and Duvall (2005).
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382 Arendt (1970).
383 Wendt (2006: 214).
384 Wendt (2006: 219).
385 Wendt (2006: 216; 218) is correct that that the “materialist ontology” of the classical 
physicists “cannot take seriously that which is most uniquely social, namely 
consciousness and meaning.” Yet, he nonetheless wants to draw a distinction between 
these classical and the quantum physicists, taking his cues only from the latter. For, he 
also says: “In quantum [physics] theory it would be absurd for the ‘particle guys’ to fight 
with the ‘wave guys’ about who has the truth, since the knowledge each offers is
understood to be inherently partial.” However, even as he uses this analogy to quantum 
physics, he seems aware it remains insufficiently meaningful because neither particle- nor 
wave-centric theorists are disputing that their own general framework is composed by 
partial hypotheses, by falsifiable theories, and so forth. What they are fighting about, 
however, is to which degree light consists of neither particles but waves, or of neither 
waves but particles, so that it definitely does matter to them on which grounds they can 
refute their scholarly opponent. Contrary to Wendt’s analogy, the issue is therefore not 
whether a false dichotomy is being accepted by the two poles within the field of IR 
(between materialists and idealists, or between positivists and interpretivists), but whether 
he assigns any negative intensity to the relationship between these poles. His counter-
argument may certainly hold that his analogy continues to hold because bodies of 
knowledge about particles and about waves are bodies merely correlating to one another. 
Additionally, he may certainly argue that positivists and interpretivists are caught up in a 
false-dichotomy-argument. Contrary to Wendt, however, the false dichotomy precludes 
his correlation-argument, if not only because his notion of correlation derives from the 
entirely meaningless test of how two variable theories of IR ‘hang’ together. He believes 
there is correspondence between materialism and idealism, allowing these two theories 
perhaps not to be fully comparable, but at least to correspond in a valid manner. If one 
beam of light is being studied by both particle-centric as well as wave-centric physicists, 
their data sets may indeed be said to correspond. But if one state’s relations to another’s 
are being studied by both materialists and idealists, then there is no way of telling that the 
results of their observations correspond in a valid and reliable manner. The materialists 
may claim that a decision was made out of self-interest or relative advantages, the idealist 
may still claim that changing ideas about interests led to such a new decision. Of course, 
Wendt does somehow accept a third criterion in order to compare the tension between 
diverse material and ideal facets of sovereignty. He fails to show, unfortunately, that this 
third criterion consists of enmity—as Carl Schmitt understands the enemy. Schmittian 
understandings of sovereignty, thus, could very well help demonstrate that the third 
criterion is no actual criterion after all, but merely a spontaneous judgment that simply 
respects the validity and therein also the legitimacy of IR—precisely because it seeks to 
negate both the materialist as well as the idealist positions without transforming each of 
them into a new, synthetic, ‘both-and’ position of the kind Wendt pursues. The political 
problem Wendt is avoiding is not the partiality of correspondences between each of the 
two core positions, but the concrete partisanship (and self-consciousness) that gives 
meaning to the relations between the two.
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386 Guzzini and Leander (2006: 83). As an afterthought, or perhaps as a moment of speculation: 
Anthony Giddens, by contrast to Ernest Gellner, got stuck inside his own studies of the 
universalist and the ideational dimensions of the leading political cultures. Were Wendt 
to have better familiarized himself with Gellner’s (posthumously published) readings of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, however, then he could have seen that perhaps there is 
nothing like a third possibility in the complex dual relation between the cultures of 
nationalism, on the one hand, and those of liberal universalism, on the other. That is, 
Giddens failed to break the lock that kept him at the side of all those who represent the 
nation-state as an ideational and therefore universalistic form of political organization. 
For a start, however, consider Gellner (1994).
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397 Held et al. (1999: 450).
384
                                                                                                                                                
398 Held et al. (1999: 437).
399 Held et al. (1999: 449).
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(2007) and Sontheimer (1994).
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(1994).
417 As Schmitt‘s Nomos der Erde (1997: 141) holds: “Woran erkennen wir diesen fürchtbaren 
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person with moral ideas. Instead, the enemy poses an amoral or existential threat to the 
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nonetheless be believed to be hedged politically, it may be wiser to speak in this context 
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nature, at least not according to Leviathan, the best way of recognizing the enemy is not 
give him demonic or monstrous names, as such an enemy would know no boundaries 
(Grenzen), and his names would again be abused by moralistic ideologies or 
ecclesiastical rhetoric.
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428 As has been argued by Dafoe (2011).
429 Houghton (2009: 556-558).
430 Gilbert (1999: 33).
431 Duverger (1974) was remarkably clairvoyant about this intrusion of private economic interests 
into the political realm. Continue to see Bruner (2009), Pocock (1975), and Rigsby 
(2002) as well.
432 This line of critique is further laid out in Klein (2008), (1999), Bello (2009), and De Waal 
(1997), or in parts of the theoretical work by Young (2006) and Gilbert (1999) as well.
433 Calleo (2009).
434 On economic sanctions, see Gordon (2010), Crawford (1999), and Askari et al. (2003).
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Times, 12/06/06, C3. See, also, International Labor Office (2008).
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447 Start with, perhaps, Kelsen (1967b) and De Angelis (2009).
448 De Angelis (2009: 533) specifically helps understand why Kelsen would have presented the 
basic norm as the highest, or most final, among all legal fictions. These fictions had to be 
ideologically designed, he would have argued, in order to ‘bridge’ or to ‘cover’ the void 
that might otherwise have continued to exist “[in] between institutions and ideals, and 
between institutions and social reality: they work as ‘counter-factual’ assumptions that 
maintain their validity, although actors know very well that institutional and social reality 
diverges from the fictitious assumptions. [Reconciliation and bridging of] [t]he gap 
between ideals and institutions serves a twofold goal: it brings into motion our reflection 
on the institutions’ aptness to satisfy our needs and, at the same time, it tames our 
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that were created by Kelsen’s neo-Kantian reconciliation of institution and ideal, or by 
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449 De Angelis (2009: 544).
450 Habermas (2001), Olson (2007: esp. 331).
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455 Arendt (2006: 21; 23), (1970: 40-42), writes that isonomy is a “concept of power and law” 
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“specifically political realm”—and, thereby, also only within the realm “where freedom 
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clearly hints that isonomy would thus not just have to be an apparent unfolding of 
freedom-as-capability but is also always an intangible political responsibility. It is this 
responsibility-dimension of isonomy which, however, has been overlooked in work by 
Sen (1984).
456 Wight, (1994), (1995), Morgenthau (1995), Bull (1995). Consider, further, Jütersonke (2010).
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458 Especially, Habermas (2002) and Wendt (2003).
459 Bottici (2003), for example, defends a neo-Kantian variant of the domestic analogy.
460 See, especially, Nye (2011: 239, n. 11).
461 Held et al. (1999).
462 Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
463 Connolly (2010: 79).
464 Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
465 Skinner (2002: vol. 3, 284) mentions that in 1683, the University of Oxford condemned 
Hobbes (on grounds of his alleged Hobbism).
466 Skinner (2002: vol. 3, 219).
467 Hobbes (1994: ch. 26).
468 Hobbes (1994: ch. 29, 227-228).
469 Hobbes (1994: ch. 45, 440-442).
470 Skinner (2002: vol. 3, 221).
471 Skinner (2002: vol. 3, 220-223).
472 See, for an introduction of the republican players, Pettit (1997), Pocock (1975), and Skinner 
(1998).
473 In part because of IR’s fascination with modernistic and positivist ideas about sovereign state 
power, religious beliefs in sovereignty have been strangely ignored by (international) 
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field’s subject matter, as was shown by Luoma-Aho (2009) and at some points by 
Heyking (2005) also.
474 As cited in Olson (2007: 332).
475 Consider, for instance, Olson (2003) and Munro (2007) and Ungureanu (2007).
476 Olson (2007: 332-333; 340).
477 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 109).
478 Arendt (1978, vol. 2: 27).
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479 The Democratic Peace hypothesis can be invalidated by looking closer at capitalism as an 
extremely probable cause of intra-state as well as of inter-state violences. For this 
probability’s accuracy, consider Dafoe (2011).
480 Hobbes (1994).
481 Capra (1996). 
482 Connolly (2010: 64-65; 75-76; 81).
483 Connolly (2010), (2008), (2004).
484 Compare, further, Descartes (1979). Traces of her anti-Cartesian argument may be found 
scattered throughout Arendt’s (1958), (1961), (1970) work, and less obliquely also 
throughout her (1978) The Life of the Mind.
485 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 109).
486 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 109; 70).
487 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 47-49).
488 Wendt (2006) seems willing to create a Cartesian social theory, of IR. 
489 The political scientific theorist/actor cannot derive his own norms for another reason (than that 
he would end up alone, without another audience to ground them), which is the reason 
that his abstract norms will so be covering up their own existential groundings. Theorists 
such as Max Weber and Jean-Paul Sartre much rather understood freedom to be an 
existential curse, hiding in a normative disguise, however, as Palonen (1999: 538-540) 
points out.
490 Arendt (1965).
491 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 47-49).
492 On July 27th, 2011, London announced that Libya’s diplomats would no longer be recognized 
as the legitimate representatives of their country—and that they should be replaced by an 
ambassador of the newly-recognized Transitional Council of Libya. This constituted a 
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493 Aristotle (1958: 1265a, 57).
494 Aristotle (1958: 1265a, 57).
495 Arendt (1970: 97, n. 62; 40-41). See, also, Birmingham (2006: 23-27) for the dual birth of 
political pluralism.
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496 Arendt (1958).
497 For Arendt’s intersubjective understanding of plurality-in-recognition, consider her work 
(1996) on Augustine and the latter’s understanding of the dualism implied by the tension 
between plural appearances and singular recognition processes.
498 Birmingham (2006: 122).
499 For instance, Arendt (1970: 51).
500 Young (2010), (2006).
501 Arendt’s considerations of how to avoid ‘scape-goating’ while answering the (German) ‘war 
guilt’-questions have received already some, but possibly inadequate, attention. See, for 
instance, Striblen (2007) and Schaap (2001). For additional historical context to her 
problem, consider Buckler (2001).
502 Birmingham (2006: 125-126).
503 Arendt (1965), Arendt (1970).
504 Read also, for more examples, Arendt (2003).
505 On Arendt’s ‘hidden dialogue’ with Weber, consider Palonen (2008) and Kalyvas (2008). 
Palonen (1999: 533) calls Weber a “fierce critic of apolitism”; a label just as applicable to 
Arendt, of course.
506 McGowan (1997).
507 Young (2002), Ingram (2008).
508 Arendt (1943).
509 Birmingham (2006: 126).
510 See, particularly, Arendt (1961).
511 Arendt (1958) gives the most detailed account of promising. Interestingly, Biden (2007) 
defines human dignity in relation to the capacity to keep promises.
512 Consult, by illustration, Burnell (1999).
513Arendt (2006: 202; 180).
514 Breen (2009: 134).
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516 Aristotle (1958). Also helpful can be Arato and Cohen (2009).
517 The Constitution of the United States, 6.2; 1.3. It must be noted that treaties with “Indians not 
taxed”, as well as any possible future treaties with those former slaves who may 
previously have been counted as “three-fifths of all other persons”, should, under the U.S. 
Constitution, have been the law. That an estimated 408 treaties with American Indians 
and indigenous peoples were either never respected or were later broken by the U.S. 
Congress, therefore, is an insult to at minimum the framers of the Constitution and at 
maximum any sovereign party interested in upholding international treaty law. For, as 
Roman Law could teach in this case, treaty law is civil law: it is most fundamentally 
about legal parity.
518 See, specifically, Hobbes (1994: ch. 26, 175-176).
519 Arendt (2006) repeatedly refers to Rome. Hammer (2002), (2008), provides a remarkably 
learned interpretation of most of Arendt’s references to this paradigmatic political 
society.
520 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 158).
521 Arendt (2006: 202), (1993), has regularly suggested that the Roman Law concept of a society 
is a functional treaty-alliance (she followed Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, in this 
respect). Treaties with Rome’s war-time opponents would have turned them into her 
“partners, socii, or allies”—whom through an authoritative judgment, embodied in the 
treaties, it must be believed, were being forgiven of their belligerent actions. Schmitt 
(1997) writes not all too differently, albeit admittedly in reference to a different era, about 
the jus publicum europaeum: a curious body of public protocols that hedged societies off 
against one another, through the laws of war.
522 Continue to see Habermas (2002), (2008) as well as Lacroix (2009).
523 Habermas (2002) embraces European conceptions of the state (and, by extension, of the EU) 
as being representative of a unitary whole, in a constitutional-evaluative sense of the 
word ‘whole’, while Kayaoglu (2010b) finds several reasons to reject these conceptions. 
Lacroix (2009) also criticizes Habermas, mostly on the basis of his own method, 
furthermore, whereas Schmitt (1996c) may be read as having attacked any and all such 
references to unitary constitutional values.
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CHAPTER TWO
[T]he political realm [has been] .... overwhelmed by the cares and worries which 
actually [should have] belonged in the sphere of the household—and which, [once] ... 
they were permitted to enter the public realm, could not be solved by political means, 
since they were matters of administration ... rather than issues which could be settled by 
the twofold process of decision and persuasion.
—Hannah Arendt (2006: 81)
Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion 
from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the 
[sole] irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.
—Max Weber (1948: 351)
No man can serve two masters.
—Thomas Hobbes (1991: 179)
The meaning of what Socrates was doing lay in the activity itself. Or to put it 
differently; To think and to be fully alive are the same, and this implies that thinking must 
always begin afresh; it is an activity that accompanies living and is concerned with such 
concepts as justice, happiness, virtue, offered ... by language itself as expressing the 
meaning of whatever happens in life.
—Hannah Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 178).
[F]or fish drinkable and healthy; for men undrinkable and harmful.
—Heraclitus
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First Prelude: Two Foundational Causes of/Effects on Sovereignty
There is no beginning and there is no ending to the story of the state and its 
sovereignty—despite the many conventional norms to the contrary. For, there are too 
many nationalist and even transnationalist conventions on the original or the terminal 
attributes of statehood. Or, there are too many possible and alternative reasons why a 
particular state, as a particularly autonomous polity, may or may not have been 
recognized as such a state—with its own ultimate authority. The most common reason, 
however, is that this particular state survived a war-like attack on its people and in 
response must have decided to defend its government structures through a transcendent 
system of sovereignty. It is within this complex system, after all, that structures of 
government are constantly being subjected to the organizational processes of “power 
transition and power diffusion”.1
Becoming recognized as a member of a society of states, with a unique mode of 
authority, is somewhat equivalent to becoming recognized as an honorary professor at the 
university. Much will depend on a complex combination of both personal merit as well as 
on symbols of goodwill, created by the honoring faculty’s logistical capacities. In the 
case of states, the qualifying or the aspiring sovereign must demonstrate both merit as 
well as be received into the existing membership-base. Also, each of the current members 
may have many possible reasons, indeed, why a proposed new member should (not) be 
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admitted—as can still be evinced by the instances of and by the complicated discussions 
over the admittance of twentieth- and twenty-first-century peoples as diverse as the 
indigenous Americans, the Kurds, Georgians, Macedonians, Puerto Ricans, and the 
Palestinians and therefore really any grouping with self-organizing political aspirations as 
sovereigns (and, thus, not as observers) to the United Nations.2
The conventional wisdom, in International Relations theory, holds there has to 
have been a definitive beginning to this system of recognition: it would have been after 
the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and before the end of the seventeenth century that “the 
principles of sovereignty and territoriality became supreme.”3 Against this conventional 
norm, that the sovereignty-principle should have made its first historical appearance as 
late as three or four centuries ago, however, it is quite a bit more sensible to hold that 
territorial states with institutions of supreme authority have been emerging, together with 
the earliest city-states, for the duration of at least three millennia and possibly as early as 
during the Bronze Age.4
Although it is impossible to pinpoint the first and final cause behind the existence 
of states—let alone the identity of who should be believed to have founded them—it is 
certainly not impossible to recognize states as if they are equally sovereign states. It is of 
critical importance, however, to note that sovereignty is partially a fiction: it is ‘as if’ the 
state would have to have been recognized by its equals, as one of them. In concrete terms, 
the qualifying state may not even be the only supreme authority within its own realm, as 
many institutions of supremacy will often be contending with each other in order to 
perform different functions of authority (such as the military or the religious functions), 
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and yet in abstract terms it will still have to appear as if most people are bound to only 
one sovereign state’s founder and.5
To put the problematic tension between concrete contestations among individual 
persons and parties, first, and a single but abstract constitutional foundation, second, in 
the form of a question: for example, should Israel be trusted to have been founded by 
Moses? And the United States by George Washington? Should East-Germany even be 
counted to have existed as a concretely-independent state, or was this state merely an 
abstract experiment by its founders in simulating their sovereignty?6 And, if the GDR 
only simulated its political independence from West-Germany and (above all) from the 
Soviet Union, then why are so many similar satellites and ‘like’ post-colonial entities 
nonetheless believed to have legitimately or ultimately become sovereign states?7 The 
key to these questions is in the verbs: to trust; count (on); simulate, and; believe. Each 
verb expresses a fiduciary relationship between a set of concrete actors and some abstract 
entity (indifferent as to whether that entity is in its essence also imagined as a reliable 
guardianship, an absolute number, or a potent god).
The plethora of possible answers—and, thus, the great variety of sovereignty’s 
possible causes—cannot form a denial, however, of the fact that especially Aristotle’s 
catalog of causes was long exceedingly inclusive. That is, it cannot be denied that 
Aristotle has long been thought to have achieved great theoretical parsimony, as he 
argued that every particular city-state somehow has to have acquired its sovereignty-
identity through the effects of only two basic types of causes—in order for that polity, 
thereby, to have become both recognizably and constitutionally autonomous.
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This prelude consists of a series of notes on the significance of the Aristotelian, or 
of the qualitative difference between the substantive and the formative causes of political 
relations—as well as how these two types of causes even in the current era continue to 
inform a dual structure, itself somehow again preconditioning sovereign authority’s 
organizational emergence.
Politics consists of Aristotle’s guidelines on how to observe the organizational 
process from which political authority emerges. This organizational process takes on the 
material shape of a constitutional compound: this is a closed process because it is like the 
process of life itself. It constitutionally transcends, and yet incorporates various physical 
movements and other structural tensions.8Aristotle practices hereby a variant of 
hylozoism: a teaching captured by the phrase ‘all matter is (as) living matter (is).’ One 
encyclopedia holds he teaches thereby, also, that each polity should be seen as “a 
hylomorphic ... compound of [both] a particular population ... in a given territory 
(material cause) and a constitution (formal cause).”9 Hence, there should be a difference 
between each organized polity’s materially-living foundation (physis) and its 
constitutionally-living foundation (nomos). According to Ernest Barker, these two 
foundations may respectively be referred to as those of “nature and convention”—and 
this would mean that the two “are not in their essence opposites, but rather 
complements.”10 With these words, Barker responds to a passage containing this famous 
sentence (in Politics): “Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated 
from law and justice he is the worst of all. Injustice is all the graver when it is armed 
injustice; and man is furnished from birth with arms [such as language], which are 
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intended to serve the purposes of moral prudence and virtue, but which may be used in 
preference for opposite ends.”11
The twin causes of the polity, or of the causes of political constitutions and habits, 
are really the two causes behind the substantive and the formative foundations of all 
societal life, and according to Barker, these two foundations are to be believed to remain 
mutually complementary. But the above-presented sentence further holds that the polity 
of men also has to be seen as the effect of non-artificial “arms” such as language—and 
especially of the opposite effects of language. “Man” is quite apparently capable of using 
his “faculty of language” to accomplish two opposite effects: “language” may be wielded 
to satisfy either his natural intentions, or some “opposite end.” That is, he may either 
apply language to cultivate a more natural, more perfect, and more just life—or he may 
apply his faculties in order to adhere to principally-unjust, self-corrupting, or at least to 
mostly self-isolating conventions.
In this world, there is a permanent tension between language applied on behalf of 
natural causes and (deontological) intentions, first, and language for the sake of 
conventional (consequentialist) effects, second. In the literature on political habituation, 
the tension itself has been indexed as the tension between rationalism and empiricism. 
For, there remains what Max Weber calls an “abysmal” tension between naturally trans-
mundane ideals, such as public service and such as a general inclination to appear to be 
acting out of a rational conviction (Gesinnungsethik), first, and the objectivist type of 
knowledge that embodies the empirically-possible effects of each specific action 
(Verantwortungsethik), second.12
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For now, it may be said that the ultimate causes behind the polity’s creation are 
constantly being believed to remain complementary to each other (as every population 
and its own constitution should coincide), whereas the actual effects and the empirical 
actions that can account for the polity’s sustenance must also stand in a contingent 
opposition towards each other (as the use of language may both have just and unjust 
consequences). In reference to Weber, moreover, it may now already be said that the 
ultimate causes of a transmundane sense of confidence (natural rationalism, conviction, 
Gesinnung) as well as those of the mundane knowledge of possible consequences 
(proactive empiricism, responsibility, Verantwortung) are two kinds of causes that should 
complement each other—even though the two causes tend to have opposite effects on the 
world, and especially so on the world of political power.
Hannah Arendt stands among the last of the canonized authors, within the domain 
of political thought, to have repeated that the Weberian tension is almost the same as the 
one between a formally responsibly-lived life (which can be lived by administrators who 
follow rules and procedures, for example) and a meaningfully-lived life (which may be 
lived by expressing prudence and commonsense).13 This latter kind of life is lived by 
serving and creating the public law, of (rationally) participating in political actions, and 
of making public appearances. This whereas the former and more formal life seems to be 
an incomplete life, lived in isolation—or, lived by withdrawing into the household, by 
engaging in contemplation, and by possibly remaining tormented about possible 
consequential (empirical) violations of private law.14 Weber went so far, however, as to 
suggest that as public government structures became more and more open to private law 
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and other democratic conventions, the two causal foundations—of “public and private”—
were also being separated, further and further, from each other.15 Not only the effects of 
power could remain contraries, but even the causes of political power could also be 
ripped apart in a manner conducive to, and possibly strengthening the ongoing separation 
between public (rational) appearance and private (empirical) responsibilities.
Arendt’s repetition has been alleged to have over-simplified the complicated 
problem that realists such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Hobbes were facing. The 
problem, for them, would still very much have been that even though each sovereign state 
is indeed a state which integrates its self-substantiating population with its self-forming 
constitution, this same state will also disintegrate itself: its causal foundations will also 
separate themselves from one another (as Weber noticed, as well). Of course, all these 
advanced realists could have agreed with one another that human beings, capable of 
speech acts, may use speech so that it will have disintegrative effects on the constitutional 
state. But the paradox is that this language-capability is intangible (ethereal, some would 
say), and yet this same faculty may or may not substantively divide the population 
against its own constitution. For, every individual human being within the population 
may potentially end up speaking against a just constitution (against publicality).
Prior to asking Hobbes for his infamously-confusing position on language, it will 
have to be demonstrated why meticulous political theorists should ask Machiavelli 
whether he, in particular and likewise, would have felt that the sovereign state is bound to 
remain divided against itself by its own human faculties. Should the state consist of more 
elements than just the two foundational causes, and of more than its two potentially 
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foundation-tarrying effects (of speech) as well? Should each state be believed to be 
transcending both its self-integrative organization as well as its open-ended, contingent, 
and potentially disintegrative structure (of human speech) by means of a tangible or by 
means of a third capability?
Machiavelli will be invited, in Chapter Three, to lay out why both integrative 
organizations and disintegrative structures coincide, why they become inseparable, and 
yet maintain their own foundational characteristics. For now, this Chapter Two starts by 
presenting a series of notes on the complications that have (all too often) resulted from 
misunderstandings of the countless emergences of dual sovereignty. These notes on the 
problem of sovereignty are then followed by a reintroduction to Max Weber’s political 
theory, and why his theory is deeply reminiscent of natural systems theory—as both 
theories could be said to be observant of a symbiotic relationship between mutually-
opposing elements as well as between co-constitutive components.16
Introductory Notes on Recognizing the Sovereigns of the Twenty-First Century 
Whenever students of International Relations (IR) are being examined on the 
definition of sovereignty, they will want to include three components in their replies; 
each sovereign state should be said capable of maintaining a population, a territory, and a 
government. For extra credits, however, IR students may want to add that this so-called 
definition was formulated during the 1933 Montevideo Convention. But whether or not 
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the state’s government should also have been recognized by other states, and whether or 
not this somehow has to have happened by means of a peace-treaty (possibly with a 
constitutional effect on how statespersons should organize their relations), is too often 
dismissed as moot or as demanding too much scrutiny.
Wars tend to give birth to states, and many wars have caused the deaths of other 
states. It can be argued that no state’s foundations have been completely non-violent: 
illegitimate actions are part and parcel of each state’s substantive, structural foundations. 
Nearly all armed political conflicts in human history were concluded by means of a treaty 
or an agreement, however, which would have to have been respected as a closed form of 
organization. Treaty-organizations and other political agreements are not substantive 
structures: they are self-organizing formations. In this sense, these sorts of agreements 
would have to have been ‘sealed’ by means of some ratification ritual, in which the 
conditions were laid out for the future mutual recognition of ‘surviving’ states and their 
statespersons. Many armed conflicts, but especially civil wars, have ended in conjunction 
with the emergence of one or more new constitutions, which would further specify how 
statespersons and government officials within the conflict-surviving states should be 
recognized. Within the majority of contemporary (twenty-first-century) constitutions, in 
addition to their being negotiated political agreements, the line between civil and 
religious authority will have been calibrated by means of juridical interpretations—to 
minimize the chances of an outbreak of conflict between denominations, or between the 
national orthodoxy and its heretics as well.
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In the field of International Relations, the issue that has never been resolved is 
how any sort of political agreement, regardless as to whether it has taken on the 
organizational form of a body of treaty law or of a constitutional law, should be 
understood to be functioning in the future. What are the prospects of such an agreement’s 
survival? Particularly idealist IR theorists, or the liberal framers of such constitutions, 
have always expressed high hopes that the chances of future conflicts could indeed be 
minimized; they have hoped that each nation’s own line between politics and religion 
would be drawn into perpetuity. Realists, of whom both Machiavelli and Jefferson should 
be mentioned, have said that any such line should regularly be renegotiated. No 
constitution is forever. The line between the future of each constitutional state’s power 
politics and its status quo-distribution of powers, at least when seen from the Jeffersonian 
stance, is in flux: it is structurally open-ended, and bound to remain open towards 
contingent historical processes.
Mid-twentieth-century political realists such as E. H. Carr are known to have 
pointed out that no treaty and no constitutional law can be fine-tuned to such an extent 
that armed conflict, or the threat thereof, can be made to disappear from the world. There 
simply are no such “universal” nor such “absolute” laws within this world.17 Yet, 
especially during the decade after the Great War had ended, Carr found, statespersons 
were nonetheless quite daringly living within their illusionary world. They held on to the 
dangerous illusion that eventually all more-or-less-fluid linguistic groupings could be 
turned into territorially-fixed populations—and that these fluid ethnic and linguistic 
communities, at least within Europe, could eventually all start to enjoy their own rights to 
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nationhood, in the form of their rights to political independence.18 Europe’s political 
realm would no longer be grounded in relations of enmity, it was said by the idealists, but 
in a mutual respect for national autonomy: for the comity of nations.19 Consequentially, 
they added, as migrations would come to a standstill, chances of war would decrease.20
Certainly, this form of hope was somewhat instrumental in putting an end to the First 
World War (at Versailles), as this same form became also more and more engrained 
within some of the peace-rituals of the years to come (at Locarno, or in the Brest-Litovsk 
treaty). Hence, national independence had not only been first used as a sovereignty-
criterion but it also had become a formal part of the reason why various Great Powers 
could have agreed with the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, “that 
nationalism would be the [world’s] most stable and just fundamental organizing 
principle”, as Bruce Cronin puts it.21
Jean Piel writes that as nationalism expands into matters of sovereignty, “the 
nation-state [is] ... no longer merely a ‘Western’ concept. It [would] ... now [become] 
universal: a phenomenon in expansion.”22 Daniel Philpott speaks in this context of the 
modern nation-state’s “replication across the globe.” As sovereign statehood had become 
an equation between “independence” and national unity, it was “extended globally”. It is 
generally thought (but, especially, by Philpott) that sovereignty’s universalization, during 
the 1960s, originated in the Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 1648.23 Sovereignty begins 
in the seventeenth-century demands for national independence, in Europe, and it ends in 
its universal form somewhere before the twenty-first century. Contrary to authors such as 
Cronin, Philpott, and Held, political realists argue that sovereignty’s story has not and 
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will never be written—since it has no beginning in any specific century, and as it has 
always been a mode of fiduciary authority which cannot be reduced to its own 
components: sovereignty is neither only “autonomy” (national independence) nor is it 
only “territoriality” (territorial supremacy); it is a complex relationship through which 
such components have been organized, rather.24
Political realists express caution when they argue that the twentieth century’s 
proliferation of modern nation-states, across the span of the entire globe, does not imply 
that each one of these states will also have to have reached its natural limits—nor that it 
will have to be refraining from waging territorial wars.25 After all, wars may also be 
fought for non-territorial reasons. Because territorially-definable reasons seem to form 
such a poor justification for the legalized re-distribution of land (a process that clearly 
took shape in Africa, but also throughout the Americas, at the hands of European 
colonizers), however, several constructivist idealists have previously zoomed in on the 
ideological motivations and reasons for the decreased chances of armed inter-state 
conflicts (the U.S. ‘red scares’ in the Cold War, but also the crises in Palestine must come 
to mind in discussing constructivism’s favoured examples of allegedly non-territorial 
warfare).
Realists argue that national autonomy should not be believed to be the only valid, 
and certainly not to be the only applicable criterion of sovereignty. Because autonomy 
has a self-universalizing tendency, it cannot be said to apply to the conditions of 
particular states and also not to how each state relates to its own enemies. Autonomy is 
therefore not just the outcome of a structurally-endogenous willingness to remain 
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independent: it is not necessarily being informed by the will of a unified population (a 
nation). Or, it cannot have been constructed by nationalist agents alone, as it remains—at 
least theoretically—possible to take the position that nationalism undercuts autonomy, as 
it would certainly have to do in an international conflict in which all sides are losing their 
independence. Instead of divorcing national autonomy from the politics of conflict and 
the existential questions of warfare, therefore, autonomy must always be presented in 
relation to a military victory or a matter of political supremacy.
Autonomy depends on supremacy, just as that supremacy itself again depends on 
a complex relation with autonomy: a relation which, in matters of sovereignty, will have 
been expressed and symbolized by relatively-low degrees of disorderliness and enmity. 
Sovereignty emerges once the degree of enmity will have been mitigated by a lawful 
agreement, such as a transcendent treaty or a constitution in which the autonomy of two 
or more parties has been recognized. Neither one of the main criteria (autonomy; 
supremacy) is absolute, however, because they both recognize and both relate to a shared 
capability of prolonging peace and justice by means of specific treaty-agreements, or by 
means of covenants (as Hobbes taught) that must in themselves again either have been 
validated by the dynamical, recognizably-living (diplomatic) relations between state 
government actors—or have been invalidated by the relative absence of such relations 
(this absence would be characteristic of a time of war, in which the state’s ultimate 
authority itself is being contested).
Newly vested in the Versailles Treaties, the principle of national self-
determination (the autonomous government-criterion, in other words) seems to have 
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gradually replaced the supremacy-criterion in military and diplomatic relations. Until into 
the early twentieth century, however, cultures and nations were still trusting and obeying 
their own governmental authorities to the extent the latter should not so much be 
independent but that they should be fair and just authorities. But as cultures were, 
especially during the nineteenth century, less and less likely to be assumed equally 
capable of (national) self-determination, they were having even less chances of being 
recognized as capable of political supremacy.26 Even when the Montevideo Declaration 
of 1933 finally reaffirmed every signatory-state’s right to be governed by its own 
government (self-determination), nothing was said about every state’s right to govern 
itself supremely—rather than in relative subordination to the will of a foreign state 
(which was, in this case, the United States).
Philpott indicates that by the end of the 1970s there were no longer any Great 
Powers (Britain, France, Portugal) that could legitimately have possessed their own 
“imperial constitutional prerogatives”.27 It is his indication that by now a global 
decolonization process had been completed. Yet, decolonization would only be a shift in 
sovereignty’s structural elements. It would also remain part of process that left its 
organizational formations intact. Britain continued to hold a ‘special relationship’ with 
the U.S. or with first-decolonized societies, as well as that it continued to exercise much 
influence on its former colonies through its diplomatic pillars.
London maintained a strong official presence within the Commonwealth states, 
influencing their defense policies and decisions on (language) education as well. London 
went even sofar as to wage war over the Falkland Islands, and it long resisted the 
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surrender of its remaining Crown-colony, Hong Kong. Further, Paris would be aided by 
the U.S. in maintaining its controls in South-East Asia and clearly continued to hold a 
degree of supremacy over Tunisia long after its formal independence, through informal 
business-to-government transactions, so that the latter country could only first be 
liberated from a neo-imperialist tyrant by the first months of 2011. Tibet’s colonization 
by China and Chechnya’s suppression by Russia are two additional examples of why 
“imperial prerogatives” are still part of the question of what it is that makes the state a 
state—rather than that these examples can demonstrate why imperialism may or may not 
have been delegitimized. Each of these diplomatic relations forms an example of neo-
imperial (political) supremacy, and certainly not of post-colonial (national) autonomy 
alone. This could very well mean that neo-colonial dependencies persist at least 
informally, both inside and outside formally-independent states, although perhaps not by 
means of territorially-defined structures. 
The above argument was partially made possible by Andreas Osiander, and 
particularly by Hendrik Spruyt. Their contributions help conclude that the sovereign state 
was never so much a model of structured Westphalian independence as that it was an 
organizational model that would end up being imitated because of the novel dependencies 
which it helped to expand.28 The idea that dependencies would less often be defined by
structures of territorial colonization, from the 1950s onwards, does not negate the fact 
that states tend to replicate each other’s strongest features; states learn to adapt to a 
system, in which not all states need to possess overseas colonies in order for them survive 
within the system. Most modern states would not have survived, even, if they had been 
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territorially united or because they had solely maintained supremacy over their 
populations. The structural factors, rather, also always had to have been balanced against 
the factor of an autonomous will or, in other words, against a will to self-regulate and 
self-organize. The system of states expanded itself across territories not just because 
individual states had the means to do so, or also not because European statespersons 
could colonize the world, but because territories were traditionally being used as a 
currency: they helped measure the value of state powers.29 The problem remains, now, 
that the value of power cannot be counted on the same multiplication tables as the 
meaning of legitimate/illegitimate authority. Power is open-ended and structural; 
legitimate authority tends to be organizational, to the contrary, or systemically self-
closing as well.
The substantive structures, material interests, and causal powers of the state must 
be distinguished from the webs of relations within which every state has been enmeshed. 
As structures, states can very well represent themselves as autonomous entities with their 
own national or even their own timeless identities (this was part of Grotius’s effort, after 
all). But all such states emerged from wars, and all states emerged thus also from amidst 
other structures or from amidst less-effective structures and less-balanced distributions of 
power—such as the various lesser-supreme and lesser-efficient city-states and leagues of 
cities. But it has too often been forgotten that states also emerged from imperial and 
jurisdictional organizations, which included these city-states and their alliances. 
Structural statehood should, thus, always be compared to all the other organizational and 
jurisdictional modalities from which it historically and politically emerges. For, state 
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supremacy is not unlike state autonomy. These are only formally-necessary principles: 
they are only the required components to build a structure of power now known as 
statehood. Throughout history, however, precisely these (formal) principles have found 
very few actual (informal) applications. The principles of equal liberty and of just war are 
quite similar, in this respect. These are abstract moral principles, prone to be 
misrepresented, warns Schmitt, and these principles must not be directly derived or 
induced from concrete conflicts and other particular existential relations between states 
(and certainly not from their relations of enmity).30 To think otherwise is to unduly 
positivize the structures of independence and, thereby, to fall in a positivist (Kelsenian) 
trap.
Sovereign authority, henceforth, emerges from more than one structural element: 
it cannot solely emerge from a population and the territory it inhabits (if it could, then the 
sheer possession of land would have to be recognized as legitimate regardless of whom 
has lived on the land and how the land was used, or not). The other element, or the other 
substantive cause, should therefore be the structure of government. The right to live 
amidst a moderately-unified population and its territory cannot be divorced from a 
government’s obligation to protect this population and its possessions: both right and 
obligation are constituent components of a structure of sovereignty. Yet, of course, 
sovereignty cannot only be legitimized by this right and this obligation because the right-
holder and the obligated person must also stand in agreement to one another. They will 
have to have made a binding promise, by means of some organizational process or in 
some sort of balanced manner, before their relational sovereignty can become effective—
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realists conclude. Still, idealists may certainly try to erect historical milestones alongside 
the road of trustworthy promises, such as at the 1919 League of Nations or at the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. But 
idealists will thereby risk missing an alternative route as it could have led them into 
(studying, with Hobbesian realists) the political negations of these promises.31
Sovereignty is a concept best used to designate a status, or a rank (not unlike, 
indeed, an honorary professorate). But the designation itself is not a gift. It is a reward 
based on merit and it comes at a price that can only be determined in cooperation with the 
designators: the Great Powers that serve in a capacity that lend sovereignty its fiduciary 
status: these Powers operate, in that respect, not unlike rating agencies evaluating the 
credit-worthiness of bank clients. Today, a centuries-old adagio (repeated by Thomas 
Hobbes) remains applicable to such recognition-relations: “the sovereign is [as] the 
public soul [because it is] giving life”.32 Or, the state does not receive its sovereign life 
gratis, just as that a corporeal body does not receive its soul from a trade exchange. 
Rather, as this adagio means to convey, negotiations and contestations in matters of 
sovereignty-recognition are preconditioned by living organizations: the recognition of 
sovereignty is preconditioned by statespersons who are believed to be, literally, soulful, 
or who are to be, more metaphorically, animated and virtuous.
One of the pressing problems for IR theorists today is that, historically, not all 
contenders can have won all negotiations and contestations. Not all contenders can be 
recognized as equally supreme states. There have to be major and minor parties. Most 
wars, but also most aspects of trade, have to have winners as well as losers. This division 
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especially disconcerted the twentieth-century system of states, however, because in this 
system it became at some point meaningless to continue to contest land-claims. 
Territorial disputes were, after 1945, increasingly being settled by states agreeing to hide 
under a so-called nuclear umbrella or to abide by the (mostly advisory) verdicts of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The risk of territorial war, as compared to the risk of civil war, also diminished in 
terms of its significance because the disparities in military power had already become so 
large that it was no longer thought worthwhile, by major states, to continue to attack 
minor states solely in order to occupy them. After the 1950s and after having acquired 
nuclear weapons technologies, the major states could just threaten to—but hardly actually 
have to force themselves to—apply their military power, or their economic and industrial 
capabilities, as well, against the wills of the states with much-less advanced capabilities.
In the context of global military and economic disparities, sovereignty is a poorly-
applicable concept. After all, sovereignty demands in theory a relatively-equal degree of 
supremacy. There should be a fairly even number of winners and losers, in other words, 
in order to be able to speak of equal sovereignty—and to do so in the sense of every 
political grouping’s equal right to be governed autonomously. But when sovereignty is to 
be interpreted in the context of day-to-day practices, the meaning of the concept becomes 
instantly much more ambivalent.33 The research question is why any current-day state has 
to have been formally recognized, as a sovereign state, because both its rights (its degree 
of informal autonomy) and its obligations (its degree of supremacy) are being respected 
by other such sovereign states.34 Why is any target-state, or any state candidate for 
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sovereignty-recognition, to be believed willing to maintain its promises and treaty-
obligations towards other such states? Particularly the neighboring states and influential 
Great Powers (or, currently, the permanent members of the UN Security Council) 
somehow have to have agreed to exchange ambassadors and to thereby respect at least 
one incontestable quality of the target state: its quality of serving as a party to certain 
treaties (such as the conventions on diplomatic protocol, and of being admitted to the UN 
treaty-organization as a member). Nevertheless, not all sovereign states have equal 
capabilities in terms of how effectively they can participate in creating, and can help each 
other to create, global institutions—including, especially, the Security Council, the ICJ, 
the ICC (International Criminal Court), and (previously) the League of Nations. 
Henceforth, their formally equal sovereignty is contingent on their informally unequal 
sovereignty.35
Liberal idealists have argued that as new UN legal norms were being 
implemented, and that since UN Charter norms were first introduced as the new currency 
of the system of states, there has been increasingly less reason to fear war—and, 
especially, to fear territorial or inter-state forms of warfare. Jack Donnelly writes that, 
compared to the states of “[a] century ago”, fewer and fewer sovereign states now “have 
a real fear for their survival.”36 But is this really an effect of the introduction of UN 
norms, or is it not also an effect of the Cold War? For, during the Cold War it became 
common practice for the Security Council to ignore issues that divided the members of 
the General Assembly. The Security Council, typically, remained locked in a stand-off 
between the five permanent members—with Russia and China on the one side, and the 
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U.S. and Britain and France on the other. As neither one side ever opted to use all 
military means available to them, and as both sides chose espionage and even diplomacy 
as their preferred spheres of political contestation (the Cold War was actually never a war 
because it was not an armed extension of a political contest either), it became 
increasingly possible for the non-permanent members to mimic the actions of the Russian 
and the American blocs. The blocs fought their armed conflicts by proxy, by posturing 
and by shadow-boxing in front of a mirror they had hung up in between themselves—but 
which hardly allowed the opposite blocs to see and respect any non-sovereign states and 
possible states-within-states.37
One result of the Cold War was that the minor states came to understand they 
should be modeling their own governmental-behavioral patterns after those of the major, 
or of the modernized states within their own bloc.38 Indeed, the minor states would in 
exchange not have to fear a loss of territory. Yet, they would have to fear any seditions or 
any ‘domestic’ changes in their government ideology: they generally dreaded the day that 
a defection from among themselves could be announced (as Allende had done, in Chile, 
for example). Just as that Russian tanks had cracked down on the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956, further, so would in 1965 the U.S. decide to send up to twenty-one thousand 
troops into the Dominican Republic, in order to here ‘help’ accomplish the election of an 
anti-communist ally to the presidency. Even after the carpet-bombings of Vietnam, quite 
likewise, Nicaragua would be infiltrated by American ‘military advisors’ throughout the 
1980s. Countries such as Hungary and the Dominican Republic (following Cuba) were 
thus being punished for—as it was openly alleged by the interveners—threatening to 
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defect from their own blocs.39 In this, these sorts of armed ‘interventions’ posed 
terrifying warnings respectively to East-European satellites and especially also to the 
Spanish-speaking peoples of the Southern Hemisphere. Minor states were clearly being 
blackmailed, by either Moscow or Washington, in order for them to remain loyal to their 
own military alliance: this was the only way in which the states could ‘earn’ (rather than 
‘be given’) at least some economic and financial credit for their helping to maintain 
buffer zones as well as for their own efforts at international political posturing. 
Several states resisted the Cold War game of blackmail and its norm of absolute 
bipolarity, as is well known. The Shah of Iran and Mubarak of Egypt were being paid in 
the form of ‘modernization’ programs that consisted of selectively-distributed economic 
aid and military equipment—and both men ended up being unseated by resistance 
movements, thus ending their obedience to the dominant international (Cold War) norm. 
Yet, some of the early resisters themselves also ended up simulating their sovereignty. 
They created structures of ‘neutralism’ but soon thereafter often saw themselves forced to 
help squash any political dissent, and to thus prevent factions from creating ‘blowback’ 
against either Moscow or Washington.40 But the essence of ‘blowback’ is that it has to 
have been a type of ‘feedback’ initiated by the Great Powers themselves: when the 
peoples of Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Iraq (the list continues, of course) all refused to let 
their land to be exploited and to be used as neo-imperial buffer zones, these peoples had 
already resisted being occupied—by either British, French, Russian, and/or by American 
military forces. It was the earlier violence committed by these military occupiers that then 
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later, in terms of the IR system’s chronology, sowed the seed for the demise of their own 
geostrategic power.41
The idea that fewer and fewer states have remained fearful of not being able to 
guarantee their own “survival” must be qualified.42 This idea does not pertain to the 
survival of their government, or their autonomy. It pertains at the most to the continuation 
of certain territorial borders: to degrees of supremacy. Certainly, many more states may 
have less fears than they had in the past. They will be less likely to fear that one day they 
are no longer be able to maintain their territorial supremacy, in substantive terms, but this 
still gives them very little reason to believe that they should no longer fear the Great 
Powers of the world, in systemically-formative terms. Hence, it is difficult to maintain 
that minor states have not have become increasingly fearful of political (either armed or 
unarmed) interventions in matters that concern their governmental autonomy. Anyhow, 
especially the case of Iraq illuminates that internationally-enforced ‘régime change’ 
should be feared by the governments of minor states: this fear forms thus one of the first 
causes behind the intransient powers of countries such as Belarus and Venezuela, but also 
behind those of Cuba and North-Korea.
While idealist readings of books on the history of the twentieth century are 
downplaying the persistence of political fears, some pessimist realists pay much attention 
to rising fears of global terrorism or of biochemical and nuclear warfare. Contrary to both 
the optimists and the pessimists, political realists argue that fear is a human emotion on a 
par with hope. Fear may paralyze political activists, but it cannot eliminate their political 
ideals. Fear and hope are the two perennial features of the human condition—although 
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they, usually, have opposite effects on the criteria of political success and constitutional 
stability. What has changed over time, realists can add, is the sophistication of and the 
justification for a modernized state. During the last dozen decades, states have been 
imagining themselves to have become ‘modern’ and thereby ‘respectable’ and ‘civilized’ 
political societies. They have also been positioning themselves towards abstract legal 
norms. Consequentially, and tragically, many states turned themselves into the cogs 
within a global power-redistributing surveillance machine. The globalization of juristic 
and surveillance apparatuses, in part made possible by the Security Council and in part by 
satellite-cameras in outer space and other electronic spying-technologies, has resulted in 
an increasingly uncanny relation between states and the manufacturers of their 
surveillance technologies. States remain distrustful of many types of criminals and 
suspected terrorists—because of their self-exaggerated fears of systemic chaos.43
Second Prelude: Republican Realism against the Conventional Liberal Norm
Life in pre-modern societies was regulated by norms of cooperation that emerged 
from within these societies, from the polities, themselves as well as from their relations 
with outsiders. Aristotle was not the first to have observed that these norms typically 
consisted of patterns of cooperative behavior in either the matters of public safety 
(including warfare) or those of commerce (and the security of trading routes).44 In many 
ancient societies, most such norms would also have been believed to be protective of 
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pluralities. Quite unquestionably, indeed, the cooperative norms were hardly if ever 
considered protective of majorities. The latter were thought to be, instead, too conducive 
to manipulation and corruption. The multitudes were vulnerable to democratic and 
especially to ochlocratic structures which could threaten to—or which actually did—
oppose the isonomy of the government of all people and, therein, people’s sense of 
pluralism as well (as Arendt has shown).45
Life in modern liberal-democratic states, in sharp contrast, is regulated by the 
norms of an electorate: by a majority of voters, by voter segments, and by political parties 
representing these segments. Yet, from the perspective of the ancients, these democratic 
majority-centered norms had to have seemed particularly corruptible. Majority-norms 
stimulate a general culture of individualism and market interests.46 The latter norms are 
prone to corruption: they may be overwhelmed by those needs that are being created 
within “the sphere of the household” (to use Arendt’s translation).47 To this day, political 
realists ranging from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Weber and Arendt can be read to have 
concurred with the ancients on this tenet: political virtue emerges from the distinction 
between the private and the public spheres. Had they all lived to see the horrors of the last 
century (as only Arendt did), these realists would be likely to have argued that the liberal 
and democratic states have been failing to protect their populations from violence. 
Although there are more liberal nation-states and more market economies than ever 
before, few of them are succeeding in rejuvenating the kind of balanced constitution 
Machiavelli would still have celebrated.
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From the earliest of recorded times, and still from around the time of the 
Renaissance, as well, political actors would take it for granted that the most-exemplary 
constitution had to be the most-original, the oldest-known constitution. This constitution 
was long believed to have been created with the assistance of the gods, by charismatic 
ancestors, exemplifying the human good. Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle advise their readers 
that the constitutional laws are to be respected akin to how the ancestors and the gods are 
being revered.48 As time progressed, however, the constitution was also believed to 
degrade itself: its corruption was inevitable, as people would lose their civic 
faith/constitutional fidelity. The task political actors were setting for themselves, to stem 
the tide of corruption, was to try to maintain the near-mythical balance between their 
original constitution’s powers. These powers were said to be mirrored in the human 
faculties, or in the cognitive experiences. Within each constitution, the powers were 
assigned certain relative weights, or qualities, or virtues.  More importantly, the powers 
were believed to be applications of a method to get closer to the truly balanced 
constitutions. Powers were thus understood to be applications of a dialectical, although 
not a Hegelian-progressive method of understanding how constitutional change occurs.
To the ancients and (by implication) to many realists, it long appeared that 
constitutionalism was a methodology in the sense that it allows actors to be weighing 
“two kinds” of political power against each other. But power is, to the realists, not only a 
structural capability: it is not only a tool or a means to an end. Rather, power also has 
cognitive, explicatory features.49 Power thus performs a vital role in organizing and 
balancing the constitution—not just because it may serve capable people as a tool and a 
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cause of change, but also because power represents what people know to form a 
meaningful constitutional-organizational process. To say it more briefly, political realists 
can agree with ancient Romans that the exemplarily-balanced constitution would have to 
consist of a treaty between two parties—as such a treaty both represents the causal power 
of each of the parties as well as that it gives expression to the functionally-organized 
relationship between them. Nevertheless, specifically Machiavelli was among those to 
have understood that exemplary constitutions are complex systems, demanding 
considerable methodological coherency. These systems can be studied by human beings 
engaging the world of power through a dual methodology: through both rationalism and 
empiricism. Humans have reason to believe that ‘their’ constitutions can help them 
analytically differentiate between rational-legal norms and empirical-personal 
decisions.50
In sharp contrast to the classic realists, modern liberals create two images of 
politics—neither one of which is actually political because neither one appreciates the 
depth of realism’s cognitive-methodological concept of the human constitution. The first 
liberal image of politics is an image in which voters are consumers of power: these actors 
abide by the rules of an economic market.51 They have less trust in the dialectical 
differentiations and the dual methodologies than that they have in the rules of the market, 
and some liberals will even go so far as to trust the unwritten rules of laissez-faire
capitalism. In opposition to Marxism, especially, liberalism puts thus much of its trust in 
the ‘hidden hand’ that moves the consumer to satisfy her basic needs and that, likewise, 
moves the producer to accumulate capital. In broader terms, however, the combined 
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effect of these market movements is the widening of a material gap between the 
proletarian (need-satisfying) consumers and the capitalist (profit-hungry) producers. But 
what liberals fail to include in their first image is how this widened gap also must break 
apart the ancient constitution: this economic gap somehow disturbs and then neutralizes 
the political balance of powers.52
The second liberal image is an image in which government officials have been 
deprived of their ultimate authority. Governments could even be deprived of their right to 
command, so that they can be said to have been subordinated to the wills of the greater 
majority of citizens. Statespersons are honoring the wills and the rights of individual 
persons, of corporate persons, and of self-interested citizens—because this is what 
statespersons ought to be doing. Liberal philosophers will thus be treating these 
statespersons as if they are to be acting in accordance to more or less basic rights: 
statespersons are respected as statespersons because they are adhering to the basic norm 
of society, not because of their personal or their discretionary authority. It is implied, 
consequentially, that all other possible interests and norms should be posited and should 
be ranked below this basic norm. The state consists of its own supremacy over these other 
interests and norms. The implication is thus that the state can be reduced to a hierarchy of 
documentable legal norms, as Hans Kelsen described it, as his idea of constitutionalism 
was so evidently informed by such a hierarchy (Stufenbau).53 Constitutions are informed 
by finite hierarchies, each grounded in one basic norm (Grundnorm) which in itself, 
however, should not account for possible discretionary exceptions to any of the 
hierarchically-derived norms.54
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Kelsen’s liberal philosophy has one goal: to protect individuals from the state by 
means of their legal rights, or by means of statutory laws. In lieu of sovereign authorities, 
courts of law should be determining the validity of individual rights and other derived 
norms.55 Popular self-determination is to be reformulated, so that it fits within the 
hierarchy of norms. Popular or political autonomy will have to be judged as a 
discretionary and as an irrational norm once its meaning can no longer be determined in a 
court of law. Yet, particularly Carl Schmitt attacked liberalism’s tendency to exclude 
both autonomy and authority from Kelsen’s normatively self-transcendent constitution. 
From Schmitt’s position, it appeared that liberalism’s distrust of autonomy—and of the 
natural or of the existential authority of the people—would prove to be its greatest 
weakness. In alliance with Schmitt, political realists do not try to validate their criterion 
of state recognition on the basis of a basic norm, nor on a court-approved normative 
identity. Realists are lured towards the notion that states recognize each other by asking 
who is ultimately autonomous or, in other words, who is holding the constituent power 
within each state.
Some liberal philosophers and some IR specialists have made the case that the 
realist criterion of state-recognition over-estimates the need for a degree of constitutional 
autonomy. Because the supremacy of more-basic norms can always be objectively 
deduced, and because autonomy would instead have to remain in the eye of the beholder, 
the power of autonomy may form a cause of irrational violence or anarchist insurgencies. 
(However, as realists point out, the fact that violence can be irrational does not warrant 
the idea that the subjectivity of autonomy should be leading to violence.) Realists are 
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much more inclined than liberals to conclude, hereby, that constitutional autonomy is the 
ultimate criterion of whether or not a state should be recognized (as a sovereign state).56
Political realists have long objected to philosophical dependencies on liberal-
democratic norms, as these norms are generally only being obeyed by those who love to 
hate the state.57 To add moral force to their objection, realists take active care of the 
various tensions within the state and its body politick. They are more willing, than 
liberals, to reject the idea that individuals need to be protected against the state, for 
instance, because they are far less likely to agree that this would be the only structurally-
immoderate tension between the individual agent and the totality of the state. Realists are 
more republican in their thinking, it can also be said, because they agree with Machiavelli 
that human beings will want to participate within the public formation of their own state 
(regardless of whether they belong to a minority or a majority); they will be believing 
that their natural will towards public participation can moderate and mediate artificially-
induced tensions.58
Realists argue that the political tensions between individuals and ‘the’ state are 
often much less severe than those between some participatory groupings and some other 
parties within the entire system of states. With Aristotle and Hobbes, additionally, realists 
find that human beings should be considered highly-sociable animals, searching for 
public recognition: they are members of complex natural and social systems, rather than 
the isolated individuals of a state of nature. These naturally-social animals are constantly 
willing to recognize the public authority of some statespersons, but also to express 
concerns that many other persons may be illegitimate actors. Statespersons are thus never 
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thought capable of constructing their own, their individual superiority: they are 
developing their authority in relationship with their inferiors. Because this relationship is 
not to be confused with a “division”, then, the relationship’s inherently-functionalist 
purpose is to guard the participatory autonomy (the political freedom) of both the 
superiors as well as of the inferiors (or, of both the rulers as well as of the ruled, as 
Arendt refers to the same groupings).59
Realists do not ask how much money these statespersons should spend to be 
elected, but what they should actually be doing to continue to be recognized as such 
sovereign persons—by their subordinates. The tradition of Roman Law scholarship 
would have held more in common with realism than with liberalism, in this respect, as it 
asked which persons should be observed as active participants in their state, and how are 
their sense of duty, and their virtues, are herein to be honored.60
This Chapter shall not rehearse the question of how modernists and classicists 
ended up with their own recipes on how to mix the state’s defining ingredients. The 
above notes were presented only to suggest that the liberal recipe recommends bountiful 
usage of territorial and nationalistic, rather than of republican and pluralistic ingredients. 
The liberal recipe recommends states to recognize other states on the basis of abstract 
norms such as territorial integrity and jurisdictional supremacy, rather than of their actual 
participatory autonomy. It was also suggested, more critically, that the liberal recipe has 
been distasteful: it depends on too many ingredients such as individual and national 
interests. Liberal-democratic nation-states, in part consequentially, have too often ended 
up in undeclared armed conflicts and civil wars that were fought to defend private 
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interests and exclusionary motives. Sadly enough, the specter of a global civil war 
continues to project itself along lines determined by such private and material interests, 
held by majorities and minorities alike, and often promoted by means of their ethnic 
identities or their consumer needs—rather than along lines alternatively opening up a 
domain of greater political equality and of their concrete sense of public autonomy.61
Modernistic, nationalistic, territorial conceptions of statehood are most favorable 
towards norms such as homogeneity and singularity. The issue is that these conceptions 
react unfavorably towards practices of political autonomy, constitutional heterogeneity, 
and organizational pluralism. This is the thesis that shall have to be defended in this 
Chapter, mainly because the norms of the twenty-first-century society of states tend to 
remain norms infused by modernist conceptions. The last decades have ascribed a less 
definite meaning to the modernist conceptions of sovereign statehood, as nationalism 
appeared increasingly illegitimate, it should be added, but this was less often the result of 
the economy of newly-constructed identities and national norms than it was of a natural 
affirmation of perennial norms and ethical laws.
To wind up, classicist (or: republican) realists see no reason to deny that the idea 
of human rights may enhance the juridical importance of each individual citizen, in 
relation to the state. But human rights are a norm, as realists will have to add, because 
these rights can best be used as a normative justification. Human rights are essentially a 
type of justifications for or against the use of public authority. In the many instances that 
human rights-violations did occur, therefore, condemnations based solely on human 
rights would still be normative and moral abstractions: they would be samples of word-
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power without also having to be supported by sword-power or, that is, by concrete 
applications of sovereign authority.
With the exception of the right of assembly and the right to organize politically, 
few specific other rights are necessarily grounded in a concrete practice, in one legitimate 
type of public action, or in one authoritative form of political activism. Human rights are 
instead norms of freedom, but they are not necessarily also resulting from free (self-
organized, self-authorized) constitutional practices. Of course, human rights are now a 
significant piece in the puzzle of recognizing states and statespersons, and of recognizing 
them as equal sovereigns, as Mikulas Fabry has elucidated. It also has indeed become 
increasingly difficult, at least for realist puzzle-solvers, to differentiate between states and 
non-states solely on the basis of their capacity for and their own rights to “self-
determination”. For, until into the nineteenth century this hitherto-rarely-invoked right 
would rarely have been needed to be invoked as one of the standard criteria of 
sovereignty: it was often believed to be a rather self-evident criterion of the complex self-
authorizing relationship between autonomy and supremacy. The right to “self-
determination” would still be invoked in ‘awarding’ diplomatic recognition to those 
provinces that were allowed to organize popular plebiscites before they could decide to 
be incorporated by the Napoléonic Empire. Nevertheless, this presumed right began to 
lose its earlier connotation of popular autonomy, particularly after Bismarck succeeded to 
incorporate a few principalities in a manner that would make plebiscites redundant.62 It 
was thus not long after the Revolutionary Era, in fact, that the right to national autonomy 
began to gain its late-modern connotation of “territorial integrity”. But, as Fabry asks, 
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“should territorial integrity ... continue to have decisive normative superiority over self-
determination—either for the sake of stability or multi-ethnic democracy, or human 
rights, or some other externally identified goal?”63
Together with Machiavelli and Arendt—but also with Aristotle, Cicero and 
Polybius—republican realists hold that rights to autonomy cannot be divorced from other 
civil, or human rights. Yet, these two types of rights differ qualitatively because human 
rights are without any political essence: they are legal ideals, and abstract norms. Yet, 
these rights-norms do somehow represent themselves in relation to concrete processes: in 
relation to the state’s constitutional, self-organizational processes.64 Even if progress is 
made in formally and jurisdictionally expanding the normative sphere of human rights, 
thus, every state’s constitutional degeneration remains a systemic organizational process 
that nonetheless must include such progress. The cycle of degeneration is not inevitable, 
however, as it can undoubtedly be slowed down by revolutionary and freely-participating 
people: by autonomous republics. Machiavelli’s Fortuna-metaphor suggests, therefore, 
that the cycle may at least be ‘mastered’ or be ‘arrested’—however temporarily.65  Still, 
this puzzle has been created by only two parameters. One, all states undergo similarly-
necessary processes of corruption. They may contribute to the destruction of living 
species, to cycles of violence, and to wars (there is plenty of empirical evidence for such 
a structuralist view on what states do). Two, all states may also reach free and rational 
decisions on how to reorganize their relations of ultimate authority, how they should 
value their own republican autonomy, and how they should restore their least-corrupted 
constitutional powers (there are many opportunities for rational statespersons to decide to 
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diminish the prospect that they themselves end up contributing to structural violence and 
injustice).66
To conclude, the research question is how and why statespersons choose to plea 
either for or against the protection of human rights-norms—and thereby how and why 
today’s (predominantly secularist) liberal-democratic ideologies so often fail to serve 
statespersons in their task of protecting such norms, both empirically as well as 
rationally. These ideologies have indeed too long been appearing to help states overcome 
a condition of anarchical “violence”—and as if they have been bringing “licentious and 
mutinous people ... back to good conduct”—when in fact these same ideologies have also 
been instrumental in the prevention of any “greater remedy”. However, in using these 
words, Machiavelli remains optimistic about the possibility of an alternative or of a 
“greater” solution to the problem of constitutional degeneration. But he also expresses his 
pessimism with regard to the prospect that any individual government leader would one 
day have become capable of remedying that problematic process of structural corruption. 
Hence, he adds, “if words [can] suffice to correct [the excesses] of the people, whilst 
those of the prince can only be remedied by violence, no one can fail to see that where 
the greater remedy is required, there also the defects must be greater.”67 This means that 
wherever corruption has become most excessive, the most decisive remedy is likely to 
will be applied. Further, the remedy itself can take on two inter-dependent systemic 
forms, or appear in two dimensions; the ruler may apply word-power, in the first 
dimension, and the ruled may apply sword-power, in the second. And, as Arendtian 
realists can complement Machiavelli, both dimensions should be understood to help 
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states maintain the relational (isonomous) authority that is shared by both rulers and 
ruled.
Each and every norm is an adjustable norm. Human rights-norms are especially 
difficult to adjust, however, because they are status quo-centric norms. A right to 
“territorial integrity” would be a clear example of a rights-norm that is intrinsically 
protective of the present-day distribution of territorial powers: it is a right most likely to 
be be defended by those making their pleas in favor of the status quo-structures. The 
problem for political realists is not how such a rights-norm can be more democratically 
defended, therefore, but how to learn from an author such as Machiavelli what it is that 
human beings have long believed to be informing the complex relationship between 
rights-norms and potential remedies to the existing rights-norms. In terms of finding 
remedies, Machiavelli is known for opening up opportunities and for creating chances. 
But can he also account for the question of how possible alternatives and of how 
remedies should help heal the relationship between, or even should help avert a divorce 
of popular self-legislation (autonomy) and governmental administration (supremacy)?
Political realists may have a strong ally in Machiavelli as they can agree that the 
longevity of the complex relation between individual rights-holders and supreme rights-
protectors is contingent on how their joint participation is to be honored: it is contingent 
on a republic’s “degree of reputation”. Once statespersons will have acquired a wider 
reputation for having “the greatest valor and prudence”, their authority will soon be 
sealed with so much popular legitimacy, and their people will begin to enjoy their 
freedom so much, that it may become nearly impossible for their enemies to attack 
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them—“except under the force of necessity”.68 With Machiavelli’s recommendation in 
mind, then, this Chapter Two starts to interpret Weber’s work on how free, self-
legitimizing, and prudent relationships between statespersons may be believed to take 
shape. Although abstract norms have conventionally been used to describe these 
relations, or to justify recognitions of statehood, Machiavellian (and Weberian) realists 
would rather point at the contingency of these norms—by calling on (republican) people 
to not grow too dependent on their rights-norms and to continue to be acting decisively, 
spurning “irresolution”, and to be avoiding the “middle way” as well.69
Ambivalent Sovereignty as Relationship between Structures and Organizations
Ambivalence: (1) simultaneous and contradictory (as attraction and repulsion); (2) 
continual fluctuation (as between one thing and its opposite).70 In following with this 
dictionary-definition, ambivalent sovereign authority can be said to be a mode of 
authority that is publically contradicting itself, but without having to undergo any 
historical progression or regression. Per the dictionary, also, sovereign authority’s 
contradictoriness is “simultaneous.” Authority’s contraries either simply present 
themselves separately but simultaneously or they have a functioning relationship like the 
one between attracting and repulsing. In case they have a relationship they would have to 
be in flux. The notion of “fluctuation” indeed implies that any contradictory affairs, in the 
relations between states, would ultimately be inherent to their authority. It is inherent to 
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their sovereignty that certain functional opposites are in a self-perpetuating relation with 
one another. But why should political theorists trust that this relation of opposites is 
infinitively coeval and perfectly simultaneous? Should the correlative 
opposites/opponents not come to achieve a perfect balance, an ideal equilibrium, or a 
final synthesis? Or, would such an achievement have to believed to become oppressive 
and licentious—as Weber already cautioned theorists about?
As a theorist of constitutionalism, which puzzle did Weber try to solve? He must 
have known that Hobbes had recognized that the discovery of ambivalence—within 
relationships between sovereign authorities—opened the gates towards another mystery, 
which is the apparent absence of any idealist, abstract, artificial, or positive equilibrium 
within these same relationships.71 The Master from Malmesbury suggested that covenant 
and government are continually at odds with one another—even though they are related 
to each other within his concept of sovereignty. Each sovereign state harbors a mystery, 
then, because it remains bounded both by a covenant—which, in contemporary parlance, 
is called a constitutional or a civil law tradition—as well as by an executive government. 
He could at this point have agreed with Alan James: a constitution is “the essential 
foundation for [any] government, at any level.”72 But Hobbes would not be as likely to 
have argued that the constitution is “essential” because of its contradictory relation with 
the state’s government: their complex relationship is not a causal relationship.
Hobbes’s puzzle contains pieces on which a constituted state (government) can be 
seen to both bind and unbind, repulse and attract their own constituents (their 
constitutional laws), and to be doing this simultaneously. Hobbes tries putting the pieces 
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together so that it seems as if the combination of the state and its constituents is well-
integrated, wholesome, and univocally just. Yet, Leviathan never completely negates that 
combination’s two-dimensionality. The combination of both all constituent power 
(potesta sin popula) as well as of government authority (summam potestam) is a complex 
combination which is neither fully self-binding, nor can it completely unbind itself.73
This means that there is no such thing as either governmental or constituent sovereignty: 
the combination of the two contraries of government and constitutionalism, rather, should 
be considered the first precondition for sovereignty’s emergence. It suffices to say, for 
now, that Hobbes respected the notion of mysterious fluctuations emerging from within 
this internally-contradictory combination.
Weber’s sociological theorems and his signature views on human nature are 
relevant to why Hobbes’s dual sovereignty-puzzle should be said to necessarily remain 
incomplete. To recapitulate what this could mean, political-theoretically, Chapter One 
has shown that IR constructivists may have been trying but also have failed to complete a 
U-turn that could have led them back to Nature.74 One leading constructivist IR theorist 
was mentioned to have started this turn, but to have left it unfinished. Wendt’s social 
constructivism was thereby shown, moreover, to have kept the discipline’s attention away 
from natural systems theories.75 Rather than to study how systemic, dynamic 
equilibriums are recurrently emerging in Nature, structuralists and constructivists still 
hold sway over the IR discipline by classifying almost all such emergent and systemic 
equilibriums as if these would form the signs of regress or progress: they would be signs 
of a historical surge in human rights and other such progressive norms and identities.
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Habermas displays his bias as a structuralist idealist when he concludes that states 
are moral agents. States are similar to rationally-motivated agents who must, over time, 
have been choosing to assert their norms—by overruling any sort of dynamically-
emergent authority other than their own norms and identities. This means that the agents 
would increasingly have been overruling and outstripping their own organizationally-
embedded status as the members of past constitutional balances or past military 
alliances—possibly including the NATO alliance, for instance—or that these agents
could even have been replacing this embedded status with their delegation of power to 
transnational governmental apparatuses such as the EU.76 In sharp contrast to Habermas, 
advanced political realists argue that almost regardless of such transnational delegations, 
peoples may also hold habits, customs, and beliefs in common and that all these habits 
can equally as well begin to outstrip and modify the various state delegates and state 
agents—even if these habits would have to be dismissed as irrational or amoral.77
Advanced realists further argue that there is no historical progress, unless it would 
be thought to be some abstract ideal. Any signs of progress are, therefore, far too abstract 
and far too one-dimensional to be believed meaningful. The structural process through 
which rights, norms, and rights-norms may or may not emerge is therefore a process that 
cannot be understood without observing them within their complex relationship towards 
concrete government organizations and other systems-organizational dynamics. Realists 
insist, apparently, on the two-dimensionality of the relation between structural identities 
and norms as well as their joint organizational form.78 With few exceptions, nonetheless, 
most IR theorists hold either an idealist or a liberal or a structuralist bias: they hold that 
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structures consisting of individual agents and their identities must always be structures 
capable of choosing to create progressive change. But ecological and socio-biological 
dynamics as well as any naturally-systemic or closed organizational forms remain often 
under-theorized by these theorists.79 Realists object to their bias, however, alternatively 
concluding that social agents cannot be ranked above the dynamic systems within which 
their own structure of all individual agents remains embedded. For, the systemic 
organizational changes, in Nature, may be believed to be of more-than-equal 
significance.80
Especially the variant of IR theorizing known as “managed liberalism” is, as Ernst 
Haas refers to it, strongly biased. It tends to account for any changes by classifying them 
as having been caused by state agents, or by a rise or a fall in any specific state structure. 
Only states can either grow in power, or wither away. Yet, the disadvantage of “managed 
liberalism” is that it cannot be used to theorize occurrences of “turbulent non-growth”, at 
the level of international organization. It also cannot be used to theorize the state’s 
positive effect on the non-growth and growth of other states—whether growth is 
understood in terms of competition or not.81 Liberal constructivism creates its own blind-
spot, then, when it no longer classifies signs as being nested, organizationally, within 
long-standing international institutions (diplomacy, arbitration, war) and their general 
constitutional authority. By simply classifying such signs as signs of progress, managed 
constructivism cannot see the difference between normative structural progress, in all 
kinds of matters of government, and the organizational dynamics that transcend these 
same matters constitutionally.82
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Changes to matters of state agent identity are usually regarded as outcomes of a 
socialization process: these changes are regarded as forms of structural learning. The 
notion that both agents and structures have nested themselves within a closed 
organizational formation, however, is rarely as often considered as subject to change—
either regressively or progressively.
An entire class of so-called IR structuralists (almost regardless as to whether their 
class consists predominantly of constructivists, neoliberals, or neorealists) has never 
admitted that the system of states is ambivalent: the relations between states are 
embedded within an unchanging formation, which is also sustaining itself in flux. Lars 
Skålnes suggests that this is the paradox of structuralism: it is a “neorealist quandary”. 
Specifically the neorealist and neoliberal structuralists, further, deny that systems may be 
evolving ambivalently. They see no reason to argue that systems may be taking both 
irrational as well as rational routes, towards ultimately indeterminable stations. But the IR 
system comprises not only structures: it also comprises the dynamic organization of 
alliances, balances of power, and dual authorities. Structuralists tend to downplay the 
complex relation between qualitatively-different structures and organizations: they would 
find it difficult to accept the theoretical notion that this relation remains in flux. That is, 
few IR structuralists will accept the notion that dual sovereignty is a relation, specifically, 
which is in continual transmutation—and that the mutations of the complex relation are 
contingent and aleatory.83 But the case of the NATO alliance, and its interferences in the 
Balkans, proves otherwise—as Skålnes demonstrates.
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“[A]lliances [do] shape state interests and thus the … behavior [of member-
states].”84 Skålnes implies that the surge in the number of NATO (North-Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) member-states, after the Cold War ended, cannot be explained by 
categorizing NATO as a new, unprecedented type of international treaty-organization. 
NATO symbolizes instead a higher level of systemic complexity. Member-states have 
been nested within the organization, which attained its constitutional integrity because it 
proved itself capable of excluding the political enemies of its members. NATO’s 
bombing of Sarajevo, in particular, was not only a demonstration of the West’s supreme 
government capabilities: it was also a concrete case of political enmity.85  During 
NATO’s military operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, then, this relation of 
enmity affirmed the constitutional behavior and thereby the autonomy of NATO’s 
members. This implication seems coherent with natural systems theories, because the rise 
in the number of member-states can now be said to have followed a nonlinear pattern of 
nesting behavior. Nonlinearity, tipping points, and bifurcations within all sorts of 
Eurasian and Balkans relations of authority were being expected following the NATO 
attacks. Following the NATO air raids, thus, the system adapted itself organizationally by 
giving shape to behavioral mutations and patterned contingencies.
Contrary to the case of the European Union, the case of NATO much more clearly 
demonstrates that the structure of government agents and their interests is subject to a 
constitutionally-transcendent organizational dynamic. Whereas the EU consists mostly of 
an abstract government structure, replete with bureaucratic departments and 
administrative protocols, this structure does not comprise the same sort of constitutional 
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authority as the more concrete sort that instead allows NATO members to attack non-
members. Not the EU, but NATO is a treaty-organization which does depend—for its 
ultimate authority—on its own politically excluding of non-members. The loyalty of the 
NATO members can simply be tested whenever a common enemy has been identified. 
They obey NATO’s transcendent right to command them. NATO holds constitutional 
authority: its sheer presence modifies and transmutes the formation of behavioral patterns 
among members as well as among non-members, in other words. NATO does not only 
comprise a substantive structure of agents and their interests.
Neorealist structuralists, like Kenneth Waltz, refer to military organizations such 
as NATO as if they are state tools: they can help state agents to exercise force on other 
agents. Waltz seems correct to have argued that treaty-organizations continue to exist 
simply because there is no external forum in which they can, reasonably, exchange their 
preferences. Their “force” more often than not prevails over “reason”. Against liberal 
idealists, he then also points out that “[d]isputes between individuals are settled not 
because an elaborate court system has been established, but because people can, when 
necessary, be forced to use it.”86 Henry Kissinger, likewise, argued that foreign policy-
making is informed by an economy of force, by substantive power differentials, but 
certainly not always by rational behavior. Realpolitik-advocates such as Kissinger argue 
that existential oppositions between state agents allow these agents to use force, thus, but 
that these oppositions do not allow agents to accept the notion that they themselves have 
been embedded within authoritative treaty-organizations.87
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Structuralists additionally argue that statespersons can make rational predictions 
about each other, and how they will act, because of the threat of anarchical violence. But 
they have hardly developed an argument that statespeople also empirically believe they 
should be responding to their own rational, as well as to their non-rational expectations. 
Or, structuralists have failed to make the case that what people believe, or which 
constitutional organizations and religious traditions they abide to, does “shape” their 
behavior.88 To the extent that the IR discipline remains biased, in the structuralist 
direction, the discipline is tightly holding on to an anthropomorphic conception of how 
empirical, concrete, commonsensical behavioral patterns (traditions) transcend the entire 
structure of agents and their interests. Anthropomorphic conceptions tend to privilege a 
structure consisting of government agents, but not of the constitutionally- and 
ecologically-irreversible dynamic organizations of the IR system as a whole.89
IR’s disciplinary privileging of a realm of structures and agents, as opposed to a 
realm of contingent constitutions and commonsensical authority, is to some degree due to 
a neo-Cartesian separation of these two realms from one another. This analytical 
separation, reminiscent of an inverse Cartesian mind-over-matter dichotomy, is also a 
separation endangering the above-mentioned and rather mysterious union of correlative 
contraries.90 Haas must have seen, however, that this threat is in great part being created 
by the notoriously-misleading expectation that international customs will only make 
rational choices that can “constrain” rather than that they also, simultaneously, “facilitate
learning.” Haas never suggested that social learning outstrips structural constraints. 
Instead, he plainly helps reminds IR theorists that the two processes of organizational 
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facilitation and structural constraint occur simultaneously. Moreover, the two processes 
of controlled habituation and transcendent facilitation often oppose one another. “To be 
able to learn means taking advantage of the most permissive, the sloppiest, side of habit.” 
That is, the learning process implied by the open structures of “rational choice” both 
opposes, normatively, and yet is also a process entirely made possible by its own “social 
embeddedness” (or: by its own public participation) in the “permissive” realm of 
organizational habits and autonomous customs.91
Weber’s Constitutionalist Theory: Ambiguating Political Sects
Ambivalent sovereignty emerges from within interactive and interdependent 
societal relationships. In the canon of political thinkers, these relationships have been 
believed to allow sovereign persons to be recognized. These are not only relationships of 
individual agents towards their government leaders, therefore, but particularly also 
relationships between groupings and how their constitutions were being recognized by 
other such groupings—because the latter type of relationships are then thought to be 
analogous to those between the group’s interior or substantive logics, whereas 
constitutional organizations are thought to be closed off by an exterior world of formative 
appearances. Moreover, these complex relationships cause structures to be formed, and 
agents to learn to adjust their behaviors towards one another, as these are web-like 
relations that actively embed both structures and agents within a transcendent or a cross-
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structural sort of organizational dynamics. In other words, a sovereign actor’s legitimacy 
is neither entirely structural nor entirely organizational and yet may emerge from a 
somewhat-mysterious and complex relation between the two dimensions of international 
politics. 
Advanced realists like Weber have gathered that this complex relation could very 
well be a dialectical relation: as how Socrates once understood the dialectical method to 
give birth to cognitive reorganizations, so can Weberian political realists come to 
understand this method to help them cogitate and recognize sovereign persons. Besides, it 
may also hold that this method falls in line with methods used by systems theorists, who 
can propose that complex relation is really a relation between constituent parts, or 
between partial dimensions, first, and the transcendent whole that is believed to include 
and yet also to appear from among these parts, second.
Sovereign persons are a kind of corporate leaders. As fiduciary corporate persons, 
they have the skill and the virtue to include and yet transcend their members. If the 
proposition were to hold that sovereign persons apply dialectical methods, then most 
sovereigns will have to have experienced a minimal degree of solitariness. But as leaders, 
they will also have to have appeared in a world of solidarity and honor. The sovereign 
leader’s mastery of the relationship between an interior forum of solitary thought, first, 
and an exterior forum of pluralism and solidarity, second, can then somehow allow this 
leader to be recognized as an equal among others. Political-theoretical and specifically 
Weber’s understandings of this complex relationship, as the next sections propose, should 
help affirm how the equal sovereignty-principle should or should not be applied—within 
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the IR world. Weber, as can and will now be argued, joins both Socrates (through Arendt) 
and Machiavelli in arguing that the sovereign’s virtù is dualistic: it itself is a symbolic 
expression of a complex and of a possibly-productive relationship between private 
thinking and public appearance.92 However, the problem for (international) political 
theorists is how not corrupted by virtuous authority can in fact emerge from within 
(rather than that it should be assumed identical to) that strange relationship.
Max Weber, according to Peter Baehr’s reading of his work, often insisted that 
“absence of self-mastery at home is related to a chaotic global presence.”93 In his study of 
sect-societies, Weber was resolute on this point, as well. The interior life, of each sect-
like grouping, remains somehow related to its exterior dynamics. He argued that 
particular instances of self-mastery, and of expressions of piety, remain interdependent 
on how associations and societies will generally behave. In studying societies consisting 
of sects, then, he basically went so far as to argue that interior self-disciplining tends to 
coincide with the exteriorization of public authority—without that both self-discipline 
and authority will ever achieve a full union.94 The internal and the external forums will 
not collapse into those of one sect, grouping, or society. How did he observe the two 
dimensions to be resisting their own unification?
Weber’s concept of civil society coheres with how Socrates cared for the 
Athenian constitution. This seems to make sense, because Weber’s love for the German 
constitutional republic (Weber had been instrumental in composing the text for the 
Weimar Constitution) may have been inspired by social organizations not much more 
sophisticated than those of the ancients. Like their concept of society, which was so often 
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used to reference not the marketplace but the assembly, for instance, Weber’s own 
concept refers to the “sphere of struggle, competition, [and] contestation”—in the words 
of one of his most able interpreters, Sung Ho Kim. It must be added that, in Max Weber's 
Politics of Civil Society, Kim detects several reasons why Weber’s “well-known tripartite 
ideal-type of traditional, legal, and charismatic authorities ... pertains not only to political 
power and its legitimacy, but also to the typology of social organizations in general.” 
“[S]ocial associations are hardly conceivable”, in external forums, however, because 
Weber’s typology contains a remarkable tension between the “social associations” 
themselves and their empirical external conduct, or: between associational abstraction 
and societal concreteness, but also; between both abstract legal reasoning and the 
traditional social conventions.95
“Not all civil society is normatively desirable [because] ... some forms of 
associational life [may facilitate] ... ‘passive democratization’ by the bureaucracy.”96
Weber indeed fears, together with the ancients (Aristotle, Plato), a democratization of 
government structures. Wherever merit became the main qualification for holding office, 
more officials from more social strata would be admitted to the bureaucracy or to the 
public service (a more accurate description). Thus, democratization would correlate 
stronger with an intrusion of the private sphere into the public sphere because, by 
admitting the ‘lower’ classes to government entry-exams, these classes gained 
opportunities to monopolize “socially and economically advantageous positions.” Their 
remuneration soon thereafter would no longer express their living in adherence to ‘codes 
of honor’ but much more that they alone knew how to work on behalf of their own class, 
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or their own party—in, for example, securing high offices for the party barons. “Thus, 
[passive] democracy seeks to replace the arbitrary disposition of the hierarchically-
superordinate ‘master’ by the equally arbitrary disposition of the governed and the party 
chiefs dominating them.” But Weber adds that ‘active democracy’, to the contrary, has 
the advantage of preventing the ‘master’ (regardless as to whether this corporate person is 
a monarchy or an aristocracy) from determining the criteria of bureaucratic merit. Even 
though ‘passive’ intrusions may be dangerously self-interested, ‘active’ involvement of 
the ‘lower’ classes can prevent the government departments from turning into a 
“privileged caste”, thriving on excessive “secrecy” (as opposed to congresses and their 
“ostensible publicity”).97
Civil society seems to be a two-edged sword. For, if this word refers to 
democracy, it certainly may cut both ways. It may then determine how the government 
functions (in that it promotes the rise of self-interested partisans), as well as that it may 
create a constitutional balance (in that it prevents a total monopolization of privileges and 
prerogatives by one ‘caste’). Not unlike civil society, democracy appears to have 
ambivalent consequences. Democracy has both governmental-structural as well as 
constitutional-organizational effects on the complex relationship—between, indeed, those 
who hold governmental power and those who might be exercising their constitutional 
authority. Even more interesting, according to realists, is that another similar two-
dimensional form of ambivalence shines through from within the case of Calvinism. 
Weber establishes that Calvinist sects were redefining, or modernizing the meaning of 
democracy. They had been among the first to have rejected the Roman Catholic notion 
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that “[any] church member is eo ipso a member of the parish of his local community”. 
They refused to any longer apply that Roman organizational principle, of the church 
covenant, and replaced it with a baptism-centered principle which allowed them to more 
arbitrarily open and close their local structures. 
Protestant congregations were structured by the individual’s “confession of faith, 
and profession of good will”.98 Confessions allowed the Calvinist sects to interiorize their 
moral ends, as well as to thus avoid the opposition between interior assessments of moral 
goodness and external forums in which ‘the’ good common would be established by all. 
As a consequence, this interiorized idea of sect-morality began to diminish the chances 
that sect-members would obey the exteriorized, public modes of associational authority. 
Calvinist ideals were not sectarian, yet they did end up constraining the moral ends of the 
state to a sectarian and later onwards also to a national type of territory.99 The historical 
processes of rationalization and democratization that followed the Protestant Reformation 
were always processes most beneficial to interior structures of statehood, in the sense that 
they became based on a quantifiable level of “homogeneity” as well as on such a “degree 
of bureaucratization.”100 But, Weber warns, a quantifiably rationalized bureaucracy had 
much earlier been one among several preconditions for “[t]he disintegration of the 
Roman Empire”.101 Thus, the level of bureaucratization can (under certain conditions) be 
raised until the point has been reached at which the emergence of a qualitatively-different 
organizational form of state may be detected.
Arendt joins Weber: both issue warnings against social rationality’s (or: civil 
society’s) double-sidedness. To be acting more energetically and more democratically, on 
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the ‘inside’ of things, may well cohere with more passive and more bureaucratic actions 
on the ‘outside’ of things. Once democracy had been delivered to the German people, 
after the Second World War, Arendt wrote in similar cautionary terms about democratic 
associations as that Weber after the First World War had done about the rise of Protestant 
congregations.
Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism helps IR theorists understand why the 
immeasurable bloodbaths of the 1940s were sequels to the breaking up of a treaty-
relationship. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, despite its secret clauses, had at least 
moderated the tension between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. It had regulated 
their access to a sphere of influence, and thereby maintained the balance between them. 
Germany’s 1939 invasion of Poland tore up the Pact, and eradicated its relational 
authority. The absence of ultimate authority most-heavily contributed to the massive 
killings. Arendt’s point is not that Moscow and Berlin were acting selfishly, but that their 
diplomats now started to act in isolation from one another. Self-righteousness and 
solipsism made it thus inconceivable for statespersons to apply their imagination, and to 
newly make sense of concrete political relationships. Solipsistic thoughtlessness, or the 
absence of a sensible community, forms one of the main factors in explaining the 
displacements and the random killings—as Arendt went on to argue throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s.102 The European Jews—as well as many Russians, Poles, Germans, and their 
Slavic (suspected) collaborators—were massacred not because it would have to have 
been in anyone’s best rational interest to do so. They were massacred because the 
rationalization and bureaucratization processes had made it possible for states to 
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decriminalize their own arbitrariness.103 One of the unintended consequences of the 
processes, as it were, had been that people had begun to place too much trust in the 
supremacy of their state—as they had lost their belief in their constitution-authorizing 
autonomy.
Totalitarianism is not to be confused with sheer state supremacy, however. 
Instead, it consists of a normalization of, and a justification for actions that 
commonsensical persons would otherwise have found reason to condemn as abnormally 
licentious, arbitrary conduct. The twentieth century remains the most controversial 
century, but this is not because totalitarian states managed to stay in power, for so long, 
during the Cold War. Rather, it is controversial because the ideology that seems to have 
‘won’ both World Wars as well as the Cold War is an ideology that paints totalitarian 
enemies off as having been illiberal. The ‘winning’ liberal ideologues fear supremacy 
more than they assert their autonomy. Liberal philosophers serve as advocates for anyone 
who attacks the state’s ultimate authority, in their mistaken joint expectation that such 
charges could someday lead up to a world liberated from the idea of state supremacy. 
Neo-Kantian philosophers, in particular, are battling the state by means of their 
Democratic Peace hypotheses.104
But what the liberal neo-Kantians have been unable to observe is that they are 
only charging against one of the two dimensions of sovereign authority. In doing so, they 
are dichotomizing the relation between supremacy and autonomy. They are often 
separating private citizens who have reason to fear the state, in one dimension, from the 
foundational onus for autonomous constitutional practices, in another dimension. Two-
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dimensional sovereign authority has rapidly been losing its ambivalence—in that it is 
now far less being used to give meaning to beliefs in the state’s supremacy (it is used to 
condemn these beliefs) without additionally respecting the meaning of the public’s 
autonomy and self-regulative powers in relation to the functional powers of 
governmental supremacy.
Arendt’s oeuvre demonstrates that international public law cannot be used as a 
trump-card against states suspected of totalitarianism.105 Public law and state supremacy 
are two principles deeply related to each other, although they are also being enlivened by 
two qualitatively different modes of authority. Separating public law from the state and 
its private interests would be equivalent to trying to split apart the two different modes of 
sovereign authority. Public law-norms may help prevent state failure, but they should not 
be applied to override the system of state sovereignty if this could again come to threaten 
the public’s sense of autonomy (and of commonsense, as well). The UN Security 
Council, in particular, should not invoke international law in order to make decisions to 
the effect that it could cut an existing sovereign state up into a set of functional powers 
without any transcendently-autonomous constitution to call its own.106
To return for a moment to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Hitler’s breaking the 
Pact not only drew Stalin’s ire. This event also helped Churchill to start a “foggy war”—
which consisted of a few small skirmishes and raids during the last months of 1939. The 
goal behind his “war” was to prevent Hitler from opening a Western front. England’s 
goal was thus quite certainly not (yet) to also liberate Poland, Austria, Slovakia, nor to 
somehow come to the aid of the Russians, the Balkans, or the (formally British) 
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Ottomans.107 This would suggest that during the months before the Netherlands and 
France were being invaded by Nazi Germany, a significant attempt had been made to 
restore the Balance of Powers—on one side of Europe. But on the other side of the 
Continent, both the charismatic Nazi as well as the Soviet violators of the Pact claimed to 
be holding Lady Justice’s formidable sword in their own hands.108
In the absence of any effort at balancing, in the East, it became possible for two
governments to apply their sword-power indiscriminately. In other words, whereas the 
Churchill-Hitler relationship was certainly a relationship of enmity, it was at least a 
sufficiently-tense relationship in order for it to be believed potentially productive. For 
example, when Rudolf Hess finally arrived in England, he had not so much fled from 
Nazi Germany as that he had come to revive the relationship and restore the balance—
albeit years too late. By contrast, the Hitler-Stalin relationship was not an actual 
relationship: the Eastern front was anomalous in that both of the parties here lost their 
supreme authority. Yet, they simultaneously strengthened their (secret) police functions 
and their managerial capabilities.109 Military organizations were left to their own devises, 
usually with little more ‘instructions’ than to never retreat or to always fight to the death, 
so that the supremacy-dimension of the military hierarchy would either fade away or 
would usually have lacked its sense of legitimate authority. Add to this the Nazi 
government’s secret directives and how these managed to increase the arbitrary and the 
licentious killings, and a more complete picture shines through of a war in which the two 
European fronts were having opposite effects on the meaning of justifiable conduct. Not 
Churchill’s forces but, of course, Stalin’s armies ‘won’ the Second World War. But 
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Churchill, in alliance with Roosevelt, nevertheless ‘won’ the peace. For, although he was 
the least charismatic of the war leaders, his strategic successes can still mostly be 
attributed to England’s extraordinarily “economic conduct” of the War.110 And as Weber 
remarks, “charisma rejects all rational economic conduct.”111
Weber did argue that sovereignty is ambivalent. Sovereign states give citizens the 
means they need. States levy taxes on goods and services; they regulate markets. They 
provide in an orderly, or in an economic distribution of goods. But statespersons also 
legitimize their conduct is less rational and even in non-rational manners, such as through 
their charisma. Weber is relevant to IR theorists because he conceptualizes the self-
organizing and yet agonistic relation between the legal-rational and the traditional-
charismatic modes of sovereign authority. Both modes emerge from within the relation 
between society and bureaucracy, or between constitutional autonomy and government 
supremacy, as well. Yet, neither one of the two modes adequately defines the relation and 
concept of sovereignty.
Weber’s concept of dual authority refers to dialectical oscillations between 
two overlapping groupings, both of which serve as the components of a transcendent 
political relation. These groupings cannot be separated. In other words, it would be 
impossible to decouple sects from states, clergy from clerkship, and “charismatic” from 
“bureaucratic domination” as well as that it will be impossible to try to separate 
“training” from “office”.112
To wind up, the manner in which legitimate authority rests on a self-energizing or 
a self-producing dual foundation is very much a method of combining persuasion with 
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decision—and constitution with administration. For Arendt, however, this dual 
foundation would only have been made possible because the former component 
(persuasive constituent powers) were sporadically causing revolutionary events (such as 
the events of 1905, 1918, 1956, and 2011).
Weber seems less convinced that the former component only expresses itself 
occasionally. Rather, he would argue that precisely these revolutionary events can neither 
be reduced to “one of the [universalist] ... elements of political modernity, democracy,” 
nor to a democratic people’s resistance to a bureaucracy’s “aristocratic-particularistic 
nature”. Democracy and oligarchy, or democratic constitutionalism and bureaucratic 
administration, are two elements which have to maintain an agonistic relationship with 
each other, rather. This relationship, quite mysteriously, however, can adequately 
integrate its own two foundations. Democratic universality and aristocratic particularity 
are believed to remain integrated, in order to productively (dialectically) overcome 
sufficient of their mutual differences, and to thereby prevent civil society’s associational 
life (“sectarianism”) from becoming fractionalized by professionalized political strata 
(“bureaucracy”). As Kim finds, in order “to prevent sectarianism from escalating into the 
overall disintegration of political society, ... sect-like associations can [and should be 
trusted to] actively promote the integration.” Especially the Calvinist sects are in the 
business of opening up access to the administrative apparatuses, furthermore, so that 
these apparatuses will generally come to have less incentive to cause friction, 
fragmentation, and conflict among the sects of a civil society. But in order for this self-
stabilizing and self-integrating movement to succeed, both of the two components 
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(sectarian society and political society) have to be able to maintain a symbiotic relation. 
This notion of symbiosis introduces one of the most remarkable, among Weber’s, 
conclusions, which holds that “Puritan sectarianism should not be suspected as being a 
disintegrating force [within the state]: Weber [instead] asserts that it may provide [it 
with] ... important nuclei for a stronger kind of political integration.”113
Recognizing the Three Terms of Authority in Accordance to Weberian Realism
The conventional wisdom among International Relations scientists has held that 
structures are causal factors: they cause agents to recognize each other, as states. The 
self-help structures of IR are the most substantive reason why nation-states tend to 
compete for the goal of constructing their own political identity. Geopolitically-
determined strategic advantages can thus help explain how states proliferate, and how 
they differentiate themselves. The close-to-two-hundred states in today’s world have all 
been capable of constructing their own national identity, or at least their own fiduciary 
corporation and legal personality, precisely because their natural borders or the linguistic 
affinities among their populations were comparatively most advantageous to them alone. 
Modern states would successfully construct their own (national) identity or their legal 
personality (jurisdiction), then, for a reason: they had been capable of surviving wars, and 
of competing against other claimants of political authority. 
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This is the viewpoint of IR structuralism, but it is is easily confused with 
rationalism. First, structuralism (both in its constructivist and neo-realist forms) holds on 
to the idea that states are survivors of international warfare, in the absence of third parties 
and other external forums such as the League of Nations and the ICJ. States were created 
as states because their structural capabilities and institutional conditions, in one way or 
another, allowed them to defend their interests and identities against a number of other 
states—or against non-states, as well.114 States can thereby have been defending 
themselves more or less rationally, but the point is that they will continue to try to do this 
because they are relatively most-capable: they function most effectively, compared to any 
of their potential contenders. In contradistinction to structuralism, rationalism is defined 
as a free application of reason—which means that reason is either applied as “basis for 
establishment of religious truth” or as “source of knowledge superior to and independent 
of sense perceptions.”115 After all, only either gods or minds are nearly-absolutely free.
Arendt found that ultimate authority cannot only have emerged from day-to-day 
structures consisting of identities, interests, wants, and other necessities. Ultimate 
authority does not even have to emerge from a rational need, nor from a causal choice. 
Rather, it may neither be seen to help establish a non-rational “religious truth” nor to 
separate itself from people’s “sense perceptions.” As most modes of authority tend to do, 
the ultimate authority of the state emerges from political freedom. Realism’s question is 
how this freedom can be experienced (as outlined in, especially, Arendt’s On 
Revolution).116 Structures are certainly a sort of preconditions to freedom-experiences, 
but they are not the causes behind free and common perceptions. The latter free and 
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sensible perceptions are actually better understood as judicious interactions: they are to 
be analogized to commonsensical experiences. This means that structures are probably 
necessary but certainly not the only preconditions in understanding how authority is 
freely being organized by natural-born persons. For, free political participants tend to be 
persons who, like the Romans (Arendt takes Augustine as her example, but Polybius 
would have worked too), will refuse to separate their more rational constitutions from the 
merely memorable and thus also from the possibly non-rational realms.117 The ancient 
Romans would have lived in a public culture which reserved adequate specific moments 
for rational thought, for the contemplation of memories, and for leisurely dialogue in 
general. In this culture, people did not understand these reserved moments as part of their 
“left-over spare time”—into which leisure would only be transformed during the late-
modern era, however unfortunately—but as deliberately-created moments “of holding 
oneself back (schein) from the ordinary activities [of satisfying] ... daily wants”.118
But, years before Arendt accused the totalitarian state of no longer have held itself 
back from structures of wants and needs, and of having artificially separated its rational
cogitations (ontological objectivism) from the people’s free and commonsensical 
perceptions (epistemological inter-subjectivity), also, Weber made the case that “the 
march of bureaucracy” had become unstoppable after it had managed to transpose 
(Römertum’s) sources of “patriarchal authority.” “Bureaucracy has a ‘rational’ character: 
rules, means, ends, and matter-of-factness dominate its bearing.”119 By rationalizing 
government, and by thus opening up their bureaucratic government structures to 
‘rational’ experts from all social classes, most (Eurasian) cultures began to separate 
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reason from sense. In other words, they began to separate mind from matter and might 
even have ended up placing mind over matter. These Cartesian governmental cultures, in 
the process, lost much of their constitutional authority—which had been, for so many 
centuries, grounded in the patriarchal and the personal realms of life. Moreover, 
rationalized government departments gained capabilities that allowed them to contain 
“personal authority” by dispersing it throughout, and by anonymously helping to 
construct, unit-like nation-states. Although these unit-like states form important structural 
parts, in most conventional IR models and theories, Weber is disappointed about each 
state’s loss of another part: of personal charisma.120
Weber’s realism may not be as advanced as Arendt’s, which alternatively 
distinguishes governmental arbitrariness from political irresponsibility, but it at least 
understands the responsible, charismatic person to serve as one of the three elements of 
authority. Beyond both sense (body) and reason (mind), Arendt refers to a sensus 
communis but Weber underscores the vitality of a third element of charisma (spirit). The 
scientific laws after which the system of states has been modeled, thereby, should not 
tacitly supposed to obey reason: they are not strictly rationalist laws. Also, they should 
not be expected to appear solely in the necessitous structuralism-dimension, but always in 
a second and freer dimension as well. As Arendt indicates, theorists should rather try to 
come to understand “what relates two things”.121
The conventional IR model provides incentives, to states, to be recognizing their 
own equal sovereignty by only applying a structuralist criterion: population and territory. 
The problem with this criterion is that it objectifies status quo-geopolitical interests. It 
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presents itself as an independent and even rational measure of sovereignty, while the 
criterion would actually have to be declared invalid in cases in which sovereign states are 
recognizing each other as if they are equals. In other words, it may seem easy for IR 
theorists to argue that states became states because they held territorial supremacy, or 
because they can control localities, but their argument is only valid in the presence of 
states that function as if they were units. If territory and population would be all it took 
for a state to become a recognizably sovereign state, then each state would be sovereign 
to the quantifiable degree that it would also have to have a single population and a 
measurably-unified or a congruent set of territorial domains. If anything would appear 
otherwise, then this state’s government could decide to either arbitrarily occupy and 
colonize other domains, exploit peoples in other states, or it could be unjustly 
disrespectful towards the grand plurality of how all the “two things”, of both territories 
and peoples, relate to one another. Or, this state could cause a divorce in, by analogy, the 
world’s body-mind relationships. The question to be asked, now, is which third element 
is (to be) relating the structural-physical expressions to the rational-metaphysical worlds 
of legitimate sovereignty.
Sophisticated political realists admit ambivalent relations and complex
interdependencies into their thinking about their dual sovereignty-thesis. It must now be 
argued that Weberian realists can come to see the relations between civil society 
(associations, sects, civil law-courts, and so on) and state actors (diplomats, soldiers, 
transnational arbitrators, and so forth) from a non-rationalist angle without having to be 
irrational. The relations themselves could consist, for example, of neither rational nor 
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irrational but of rather mysticist relations instead.122 Also, Weberian realists can argue 
that these relations were never developed in accordance to quantifiable and linear models, 
so that other IR theorists may have to be advised to begin their inquiries (into the dual 
foundations of their subject) by rediscovering the tensions between two modes of 
political authority.
In his lecture Politics as a Vocation, Weber concludes as much as that political 
authority cannot be recognized unless human beings will have agreed on the criteria they 
want to be using—to, also, recognize a complex relation between those who authorize 
and those who hold authority. Thus, the lecture suggests that sovereign authority cannot 
be recognized by solely describing where the borders of “a given territory” lie. Another 
determination is to be made. Are government institutions also capable of resorting to 
“physical force”—in case they would need to protect their domain?123 Territoriality 
cannot be separated from control over the means of violence (their monopolization). But, 
what has often been forgotten by IR structuralists, Weber then points to a third criterion. 
Do citizens also have faith in the persons who are deciding to resort to “physical force”, 
on their behalf? Are these persons also legitimate statespersons? This is the third standard 
of sovereign authority: who should decide? Should either charismatic patriarchs 
(‘masters’) or bureaucratic officials (‘experts’) be recognized as legitimate actors, trusted 
and believed to be serving the people’s domain?
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Yesterday’s Norms, Today’s Rational Rules, and the Exceptional Decision Authority
In concurrence with the original words of Politics as a Vocation, sovereign 
authority is best defined by a three-fold process. For, like all other possible modes of 
authority, it is only legitimate to the extent that it encompasses these functional domains 
of politics: (1) traditional rules and customary laws, or “the authority of the eternal 
yesterday”; (2) statutory laws and administrative competencies, or the authority of the 
“legal statute, and [of] functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules”; (3) the 
decision-authority of those persons who may make exceptions to traditional rules as well 
as to legal statutes. The latter, and somewhat-mysterious, kind of decision-authority is to 
be considered as “the authority of the extraordinary [person’s] ... charisma”.124
In recognizing the sovereignty of other states, none of the above ‘domains’ may 
be divorced from the other two. They are to be seen as interdependent criteria, coexisting 
not only among states, but also in the countless relations between states and civil 
societies and their own associative lives. Without a conjunction of all these three criteria 
of authority, “social associations are hardly conceivable”. As Kim adds, Weber’s 
“tripartite ideal-type of traditional, legal, and charismatic authorities ... pertains not only 
to [the sovereign state] ... and its legitimacy, but also to ... social organizations [inside 
and outside that state]”.125 Problematically, the interdependence of these three ideal-
typical ‘domains’ has proven itself extraordinarily resilient to generalization and 
theorization: who knows when should one ideal-type be expected to apply, and when 
another? Three brief comments, about each of the ideal-typical legitimizations of 
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authority, and thereby about the three standardized domains of sovereignty theory, should 
now be made in order to facilitate prospective IR-theoretical readings of Politics as a 
Vocation.
First, the ‘domain’ augmented by the eternal yesterday will, from here onwards, 
also be known as Term (1). It apparently refers to the first foundations or to the broader 
legislative traditions within which states tend to embed their authority. Typically, 
statespersons represent their decisions and policies as falling in line with these traditions, 
including their jurisprudential and common law practices. People of antiquity referred to 
these broader traditions as the mos maiorum, as their ancestral customs, or as their civic 
faith (it is all about what people will believe to be the law of the land).126 It is literally 
possible to have faith in parliamentary procedures or in representation principles. For 
example, both delegation by district and proportional representation are principles of 
political legitimization. These principles are normatively inseparable from jurisprudence, 
customs, or even from a certain fidelity towards constitutional laws.127
Weber understands the legislative (parliamentary) principles of authority to have 
collegiate and conciliar sources. The Roman Catholic variant of conciliarism gives only 
one example of how the natural law is usually believed to inspire a religion’s self-
organizing principles.128 Schmitt may have concurred with Weber in finding that Term 
(1) authority stems from the tradition of Roman Law as well as from the the councils of 
the clergy. Parliamentary representation roots in both natural as well as in canon law.129
The eternal yesterday is a criterion of Term (1) authority. It may be the most creedal and 
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least rational of the three terms of legitimization, as it does not seem to be applicable to 
more than one tradition at a time.
Second, authority can have been augmented by functional competence and 
rationally-applied rules. This type is generally understood as the administration of law, or 
the authority to interpret the present-time meaning of rules. This mode of authority is 
mainly legitimized by the executive powers of government. Term (2) authority can be 
recognized by using a standard of evaluation applicable to those who are more or less 
sufficiently competent to administer policies and statutory laws. Bureaucratic apparatuses 
exemplify this rationalized type of authority. They apply positive laws to specific cases, 
and will in the process either be strengthening or weakening the general applicability of 
legislative customs.
Politics as a Vocation suggests, furthermore, that Term (1) customs may be 
contended, and may even be negated, by those who are responsible for administering 
Term (2) rules. But Weber did not have a penchant for separating Term (1) from Term 
(2) authority modalities: legislative authority and executive powers are treated as 
inseparable.130 As Mogens Hansen finds, it is unlikely that the idea of a ‘separation of 
powers’ has anywhere seen the light of day: in practice, constitutional Terms (1) and (2) 
have everywhere remained highly interdependent.131
Natural law-theorist John Finnis demonstrates the absurdity of any attempt to 
separate the more “speculative” from the more “practical” dimensions of authority.132
Term (1) “customary rules” have long emerged as “a substitute for unanimity”, precisely 
because they appeared to have remained so authoritative, while Term (2) responsibilities 
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have nearly-everywhere been believed to form a practical application of these 
“substitute” rules and, thus, of these customs. In the absence of full unanimity, 
compromises will have to be brokered with the existing powers. During the application of 
Term (2) responsibilities, it may be believed necessary for Term (1) functions to “in fact 
[help to] effectively settle coordination problems”.133
Compromise and coordination help integrate political communities: they should 
be practical and concrete in the decisive part while they in another part ought to remain 
speculative, memorable, and abstract. Finnis does suggest, furthermore, that two-part and 
two-dimensional authority is a kind of dialogical, dialectical authority.134 Although he 
does not specifically invoke the Socratic dialogues, his overall suggestion remains 
coherent with the notion that Socrates did exercise the sort of dual authority that 
paralyzes others, thus causing the dialogue-participants to hold themselves back, as well 
as that it provokes and persuades them to take part in (revolutionary) changes. Dual 
authority is taught to consist, in the dialogues, both of contemplation and of action. Yet, 
paradoxically, “Socrates had nothing to teach.”135
Before revisiting the paradox of Socratic dialectics, it can already be noted that 
neither contemplation nor action—and neither Term (1) authoritative paralyses nor Term 
(2) persuasive arousals—should become dominant, however, within the political 
community. Neither one of these two functions of politics must be allowed to dominate 
the other. As Weber lays out his case, in order to attain a self-balancing modality, of 
authority, the contrariness of the first two Terms should be respected. The natural law-
tradition (as Finnis summarizes its contents) helps defend his case: in matters of political 
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action and coordination, and of contemplating “the common purpose or common good of 
any group, [t]here must be either [abstract] unanimity or [practical] authority.” This 
‘either-or’ proposition is to be believed to remain “an underived principle.”136
Third, a comment should be made about Term (3), or about charismatic 
authority.Charisma has a function, in politics, but it is certainly not “underived”. Weber 
observes that the authority of charisma can best be negatively defined. It is a practice 
which cannot be understood without its conceptual opposite—which is the opposite of 
“rational economic conduct”, “expert training”, and “an ordered procedure of 
appointment or dismissal.”137 In late modernity, charisma was trumped by its opposite: by 
procedures and routines. In the part he simply entitled “Religion”, Weber mentions that 
the authority of both “revelation and [of] the sword [has] .... succumbed to routinization”. 
Even though both “the oracles of prophets [and] ... the edicts of charismatic war lords 
could [long] integrate ‘new’ laws into the circle of what was upheld by tradition”, both 
prophets and commanders nonetheless had to surrender themselves to the administration 
of “rules”.138
Weber’s observation appears to have pitted Term (3) charismatic authorities 
against the modern rise in Term (2) rules, or “codes and statutes” (legal positivism), as 
well as against Term (1) traditions. After all, Term (3) lost its power to integrate itself 
with Term (1) traditions, due to their mutual tendency to surrender their legitimization-
functions to Term (2) statutes and procedures. Yet, Weber also sees that “the charismatic 
hero does not ... deduce his authority from traditional custom or feudal vows of 
faith”.139Heroic charisma may not be deduced or otherwise be derived from Term (1) 
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customs, which makes it apparent that it is neither reducible to customary nor to statutory 
rules.
For the sake of brevity, Weber assigns no positivity to charisma-legitimizations. 
This is why these sections must premise Term (3) authority to neither only consist of 
Term (1) contemplative-legislative traditions nor only of Term (2) bureaucratic expertise 
and administrative action. Charisma emerges from its own opposition towards both 
contemplative as well as active powers—and, thus, towards both traditional customs as 
well as statutory administrative apparatuses. In again other words, charismatic persons 
emerge because then are taking exception to both the legislative norms of the past as well 
as against the executive decisions of the present; they somehow legitimize exceptions to 
abstract norms and concrete decisions alike.
Schmitt, a Weber-scholar in his own right, clarifies why personal charisma carries 
a non-dualist mask. He demonstrates that the personal exception should always be 
understood as an exception to two types of rules; to the “norm as well as the decision, 
[and yet it should] remain within the framework of the juristic.”140 Personal charisma 
illuminates itself through its potential of making a double exception to two types of rule, 
but which cannot escape from a third or a juristic type of rule. With Schmitt, realism 
holds that charismatic authority is a juridical modality of authority: it may only go 
beyond non-juridical rules while opposing them to—but, also, while possibly 
transcending—both the decision-rules as well as the norm-rules.141
Within the parameters of Weberian realism, Terms (1) and (2) refer to the two 
best-quantifiable sources of a legitimate government. In recognizing a state as a 
462
legitimate sovereign state, both of these two criteria can be used to measure the depth and 
the scope of its constitutional lineages. This may be done by examining the numbers: by 
counting the generations to have shared the same customs, by counting the soldiers and 
administrators who chose to be employed for the same common purpose, or by counting 
the funds they have been spending for certain causes. The nominal nature of (il)legitimate 
authority is equivalent to the nature of especially Term (2) decision-powers, but also to a 
considerable extent of Term (1) normative powers. IR analysts can simply try to count 
how many decisions (but specifically decisions involving the administration of funds and 
officers) actually cohered with the norms that were said to govern the individuals 
responsible for these decisions. 
What conventional IR analysts have rarely been able to do, or at least have not 
done well-enough, is to also study the qualitative differences within the relationship 
between customary legal norms and routine administrative decisions, between customs 
and statutes, or also between the political functions performed by respectively Terms (1) 
and (2). Yet, states do not become recognized as sovereign states because of their 
quantitative advantages alone. If that were possible, then thousands of miniature states 
(ranging from Holstein and Estonia to Palau) would never have existed for as long or as 
short as that they actually did—and non-territorial sovereign orders (the Order of Malta, 
the Holy See) should then have been expected to always have held significant bases of 
membership, which they do not (membership can be determined by examining the 
number of passports issued, which typically is very low).142 It also seems unlikely that all 
sovereign states would have to have less military personnel killed in action, or at least 
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relatively less than their non-sovereign contenders (France did not become any less 
sovereign because it suffered more military personnel losses than Germany did, during 
the First World War, for example). Likewise, it is unlikely that the government leaders of 
sovereign states had access to more tax revenues, per capita, than their non-sovereign 
opponents. Because these are all measures of a state’s nominal supremacy (government), 
such hypothetical measures can say very little about a state’s potential to authorize and 
legitimize its own actions (constitution).
Weberian realism holds that dual sovereignty is a compounded relation between 
contrary political functions. These functions may be reformulated so that they form a 
series of dualities: autonomy/supremacy; norm/decision; legislation/execution, and; 
tradition/bureaucracy. The components of each of these dualities have, respectively, been 
conceptualized as the Term (1) and Term (2) modes of dual or of emergent authority. The 
presence of a sovereign state, as an instantiation of emergent authority, is indicated by the 
relation between the two modes or the two components. This relation itself is made 
possible by a group of people, including and yet also transcending and making an 
exception to both Term (1) as well as to Term (2) modes. The question of who should 
belong to that group of persons, or to that political community, now, is a question about 
how sovereign states tend to be governed neither by Term (1) conventionalism nor by 
Term (2) nihilism. Because these two excessive mutations of the two components—of, 
again respectively, legislative traditions into conventional or thoughtless routines as well 
as of administrative procedures into nihilistic actions—are mutations inconsistent with 
the nature of dual authority. They are illegitimate.
464
Personal charismatic, or Term (3), exceptionalism is the most ambivalent of all 
three modes of legitimization because it consists neither of a state of imprudent 
thoughtlessness nor of untraditional acts committed for their own sake. But, in attaining a 
sense of the charisma-mode, why should neither one of the first two component-criteria 
of public authority be considered adequate in recognizing the state’s sovereignty—and 
why should its political dependency on participatory freedom be believed to transcend 
both of these first criteria?143 One of the soon-to-follow sections offers some remarks on 
the deeper meaning of political charisma, while continuing to validate the dialectical 
premise that this meaning may neither be remembered in the form of conventional norms 
(particularity), nor be deduced from positivist decisions (universality) alone.
Taking Neither the Utilitarian Nor the Deontological Approach to Sovereign Authority
Weber’s lecture brings into play two cases of statespersons, having to make an 
exception to the rules. As exceptionalism is studied both inside and outside the 
International Relations discipline, the cases should be highlighted in order to discover an 
ontological criterion of distinction. How to distinguish between the illegitimate and 
legitimate qualities of sovereign exceptions to the norms, and to the decisions of any 
given community? Politics as a Vocation is a highly instructive text, in this, because its 
two cases involve both decisive and normative modes of authority, the meaning of which 
depends on the notion of an exception. The below-offered interpretation renders it 
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meaningless to be obstinately trying to define only one of the three modes of authority 
(normative, decisive, exceptional) in isolation from the other two. Moreover, the 
interpretation suggests that none of these modes of authority may be deduced from a 
natural-born person’s character, nor from a group’s concrete constitution—without not at 
least having taken into account the context in which the other two modes are being 
legitimized.
Juristic institutions of sovereignty tend to integrate, at minimum, the two most-
nominal modes of authority: normative rules and decisive behaviors. Stephen Krasner 
writes that sovereignty is an institution which can be strengthened, quantifiably, because 
action can be made to cohere with and conform to a nominal set of “principles, norms, 
and rules”. “The greater the conformity between behavior and institutional rules, the 
higher the level of institutionalization.”144 But realists would have to object, because even 
if the SS troops had perfectly conformed their behavior to Hitler’s rules and directives, 
their actual actions would not have heightened the “levels” of Nazi Germany’s 
institutional integrity. (As Berlin’s normative principles grew more muscular, 
paradoxically, the SS became increasingly less a perceptibly-Christian and certainly also 
increasingly less a German military institution: several SS divisions had been recruited in 
occupied Europe.)145 Rule-conformity is not causally-related to institutionalized 
behaviors. It oftentimes forms one of the factors which contingently contributes to an 
institution’s disintegration. Also, state institutions do not always have to grow stronger 
(the SS grew institutionally much weaker as the World War advanced, for instance), but 
they can very well grow stronger despite the fact that their rules are believed to be 
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illegitimate—or despite the fact that people may simply yearn for more discretion, and 
for less norm-rules.
Weberian realism centers in the question of how politics ‘integrates’ or ‘crowns’ 
or ‘completes’ the contingent relationship between the norm and the decision. Both the 
legislative norm and levels of executive decisiveness are needed in recognizing the 
fundamental dimensions of political authority. But both these two dimensions, both the 
Term (1) norm and Term (2) decisions, cannot be understood without noticing a counter-
concept that transcends yet also includes them: the concept of a spirited Term (3) 
exception.
The above-presented subsection introduced Weberian realism by holding that 
spiritual and charismatic authority is in some respects an extraordinary mode. It alone 
emerges from its opposition towards two ordinary modes of legitimate rule, but has no 
positive contents. It emerges from a “zone of non-knowledge”, as it were, which would 
be the strange buffer-zone between these first two ordinary modes (as Agamben could 
have described that zone). Because the extraordinary mode of authority is made possible 
by an exception, further, it opposes norms and decisions without itself becoming a ‘new’ 
decision-rule (directive, decree, statute) or without itself turning into a normative rule 
(custom, routine, habit).146 Critically, this third mode is made possible by an exception to 
both these two rules—without becoming identifiable as either one of them. This 
strangely-exceptional condition or this unique zone of authority can perhaps best be 
compared to a commissural coincidence. For, it is not unlike the coincidental response of 
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the nervous system to the one moment in which body and mind are believed to be acting 
in unity.
The comparison to the unity of body and mind becomes also apparent in Weber’s 
writings on the national body and its sense of fairness and moral justice. “A nation 
forgives if its [private] interests have been damaged, but no nation forgives if its honor 
has been offended, especially by [those displaying] a bigoted self-righteousness.” Those 
who publically offend and violate the national body’s integrity, in other words, will be 
difficult to forgive: they will remain unlikely to encounter a charismatic statesperson 
willing to excuse their actions. But those who offend only the nation’s doctrine of justice 
should be far more likely to be forgiven. In the politics of justice, there are no moral 
(absolute) commandments. Herein, there are no “unconditional and unambiguous” moral 
precepts which must be “carried out everywhere”—as Weber cautions against Term (2) 
universality.147
Political authority is a relational (relative) mode of authority, so that it should 
remain impossible for any statesperson to either rely only on ethical rules or only on 
practical exemptions thereto. Rather, realist statespersons will find that—with the juristic 
realm—both rules and exemptions coincide. They are related to each other, despite their 
contrariness. Weber felt that a negation of this coincidence occurs neither in an abstract-
ethical nor in a concrete-practical dimension. Much rather, sovereign persons who seek to 
defend their state’s honorability will have to come to terms with the fact that they cannot 
forgive the self-righteous actors among themselves. Instead, their extraordinary authority 
will have to integrate both dimensions, in the sense that it should come to transcend and 
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include this curious coincidence of both concreteness (normative decisions) as well as of 
abstraction (decisive norms), or of both bodily (decisive) movements as well as of anti-
bigoted (normative) mental thoughts.
Weber’s warning to never ignore ambivalent authority consists of two cases, as 
was announced, each of which comprising a person who may make an exception to the 
precept of non-retaliation. The saint who turned the other cheek to his enemies did not 
decide to make an exception, obviously, yet when the saint’s self-preservation would 
have become a greater concern, he had to make the exception legitimate. Self-defense 
could be necessary, and yet would violate the moral non-retaliation rule. This self-
defense exception should nonetheless be made on non-consequentialist, ethical grounds, 
Weber finds:
This [first exceptional] command is unconditional and does not question the 
source of the other’s authority to strike. Except for a saint, it is an ethic of 
indignity. This is it: onemust be saintly in everything; at least in intention... [For 
only] [t]hen [does] this ethic make sense and expresses [it] a kind of dignity; 
otherwise it does not. For, [as] ... it is said: ... ‘Resist not him that is evil with 
force.’148
This first case is about the intention to not respond to aggression, but to suffer it, 
and under which conditions this intention remains moral. The case is a study in the 
wisdom, or in the practical reasoning, of the non-violent protester or the conscientious 
objector.
The second case of exceptionalism, as presented in Weber’s lecture, is a case 
study in the justice of certain actions. Again, a decision must be made on the exception. 
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This time it is about an exception to the rule that the statesperson must uphold the 
structure of “taxation, confiscatory taxation, outright confiscation; [and of] ... compulsion 
and regulation for all.” Taking property away from the citizens is, under ordinary 
conditions, theft. But the state may tax citizens by claiming it has exceptional
justifications. In legitimizing this state claim, statespersons should accept the rule to be 
that citizens must pay their taxes. Yet, once the state is over-taxing, over-burdening, or 
wrongly confiscating their properties, an exception will have to be made to this rule—and 
these wrongs will have to be amended. Without the will to make amends, and without the 
intention to enforce that exception, injustices will occur. As the state’s “[utilitarian] 
proposition [should] hold: ‘Thou shalt resist evil by force,’ or else you are responsible for 
the evil winning out.”149 This exception should be made on consequentialist and on 
utilitarian grounds.
Weber’s presentation of the two case studies in prudence and justice is 
ambivalent, however, because the two cases rely on qualitatively different norms. In the 
first, the norm is to not resist evil by applying counter-force. In the second, the norm is to 
resist an evil by force. The difference between the two cases is so small it remains 
difficult to perceive. Nonetheless, the difference becomes obvious once it is understood 
that the first precept has been formulated negatively: “Resist not! Unless life could be 
lost.” The second rule has been positivized: “Resist! Unless property can be kept from 
being confiscated.” The first precept is existential: either self-defense is necessary to 
prevent loss of a life, or it is not. Moreover, it is deontological. In contrast, the second 
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rule is a much more utilitarian rule: property is part of an instrumental relation between 
citizen and state.
Weber was well-aware of the qualitative difference between a loss of life and the 
deontic norm directed against it, first, and a loss of property and the consequentialist 
norm which allows such as loss under circumstances regulated by the state, second. The 
two cases cannot easily be measured along the same scale, therefore. First, the 
nonconsequentialist rule prescribes an intention which remains good for as long as an 
attacked citizen intends to act only in defense of human dignity and physical integrity. 
Second, the utilitarian rule involves a course of action rather than an intention. It is a 
different type of rule because it does not depend on the citizen’s intention-action 
assessment. It depends on the extent to which confiscations of property, or state actions, 
are also relatively normative actions—rather than whether they display either the state’s 
injustice or its justice.
Deontic justice principles may certainly be used to support utilitarian decision-
guidelines, and, inversely, utilitarian rules may also be used in making a non-
consequentialist decision on an exception to the rule. The possibility of such fluctuations, 
through which qualitatively different types of rule become mutually dependent, is key to 
reading Weber. His lecture’s gist holds that it takes experience to understand how some 
decisions on the exception will remain free from both deontic negativization (violences 
follow from absolute evil) as well as from utilitarian positivization (goodness follows 
from pursuing good ends). In other words, the lecture raises the question of how 
experience may be gained, how it can be learned to remain free from deontic as well as 
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from utilitarian doctrinal extremism, as well as how it may become possible to better 
recognize the different legitimizations of a rule, and of their relations to the exception to 
that same rule. Or, how can realists train themselves neither to err on the side of 
nihilistically applying consequentialist regulations (strict justice), nor to err on the side of 
blindly obeying deontic traditions (pure grace)?150 The answer apparently hinges on their 
reaching some level of maturity.151 It hinges on those matured, prudent people who have 
come to realize why “it is not true that good can follow only from good, and evil only 
from evil, but that often the opposite is true.”152
The argument, as here developed by reinterpreting Arendt and Weber, concludes 
that in politics neither utilitarian decisions nor nonconsequentialist norms should be 
allowed to exist by themselves—and that these decisions and norms are always to be 
opposed by their own exceptions. Utility and honesty, or prudence and justice as well, 
form two pairs of inseparable basic norms—but they cannot be understood in any 
meaningful way without understanding exceptions to their own normativity, or; without 
appraising their counter-concepts (dishonesty, imprudence, and so on).153
This far, Weber has helped realists to connect the absolutely good (deontological) 
intentions behind a non-violent movement, in the first case, to the utilitarian or 
necessarily evil act of levying taxes, in the second. He also connected these good 
intentions to the evil consequences they may have, as well as the necessary evil of 
taxation to the benefits the tax revenues may bring along.154 More importantly, he never 
denied that Term (1) legislative and Term (2) executive powers are inter-connected in a 
similar manner: legislation tends to be more deontic, while execution tends to be more 
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utilitarian. Yet, these two constitutional Terms may not be separated from one another, 
for that would increase the risk that they switch in value from good to evil.
With these cases in hand, Weberian realists can defend a systemic recombination 
and integration of two kinds of rule and the possible exceptions thereto. But besides the 
integrated zones there is also a non-integrated zone, which can be analogized to a 
commissural coincidence, and which somehow creates the politico-historical flow, 
appearing to move back and forward between: (1) norms; (2) decisions; (3) exceptions to 
(1+2). To better understand what sort of authority emerges from this non-integrated zone, 
or from this strange coincidence, it may not be unwise to now ask how Arendtian realists 
are to be reading the Platonic dialogues.
Weber on Legitimacy and Arendt on the Emergence of Socratic Love
The implicit conversation between Arendt and Weber flows from an explicitly-
shared grand-dialogical question: how may political authority best be legitimized? While 
Weber indexes three causes of legitimate authority (traditional, bureaucratic, and 
charismatic), Arendt shall complete a turn towards Socrates—whom she consults for 
additional guidance on the dual nature of emergent authority (on dialectics). She will thus 
learn from Socrates, but also from the ancient Romans, that authority somehow has to 
have emerged from and has to have been legitimized by an ultimate non-result. 
Particularly sovereign authority should be thought to have emerged from a dialectical 
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system; each sovereign human being may so be believed to follow a never-ending path, 
indeed, along which new beginnings can always be made.
Arendtian realism holds that each sovereign is an archetype—neither of “a god 
nor an animal”.155 Those mental artifices which are often being called gods, then, are to 
be combined with but can never be united with those bodily senses human animals share 
with all other animals. By the same token, concepts of goodness and other mentally-
conjured private intentions, or all the personal values and intentions hidden behind only-
seemingly the morally-best actions, are still also somehow to be recombined with actual 
publically-assessed actions—as well as with meaningful, honor-worthy, and public 
appearances. In matters of politics, in again other terms, it will usually matter a lot that 
each sovereign person’s private intentions should express a sense of responsibility 
(Verantwortung), and a certain knowledge of the possible effects of one’s personal 
actions as well. But no such body of private intentional knowledge should automatically 
also be judged to be a meaningful body. Each privately-held cause should rather also 
relate to a public, a commonsensical, or at minimum also to a rationally-coherent 
assessment of how that specific cause should appear confidently respectful of the ultimate 
meanings of life (life’s Gesinnung).156
How should sovereign authority be legitimized? It can be demonstrated, here, that 
Arendt was well-aware of a tension between legitimization-effects derived from statutory 
law and from general rights, on one side, and effects derived from traditional customs and 
the eternal conventions, on another. But even without demonstrating how her awareness 
of the tension ended up being put into print, she may be said to politicize the concept of 
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right itself. She constantly politicizes general (positive) rights, by comparing these rights 
to the specifically- transmundane sort of right: the right to have general rights in the very 
first place.157 Her comparison bears all the resonances of Weber’s comparison between 
Term (1) conventional habits and Term (2) positive values. And, in order to understand 
how beliefs in Term (3) charismatic authority are being formed, it would be wise to 
restart this inquiry with the complex relation between the world’s Term (1) transmundane 
conventions and meaningful habits as well as its Term (2) generally-positivized rights 
and laws.
Weberian realism holds on to a concept of legitimate authority which cannot be 
fully appreciated unless this concept is not also being compared to Arendt’s theory of 
rights-respecting modes of authority and, especially of how these modes symbiotically 
emerge from within a complex relation between qualitatively different rights. All rights 
are ambivalent. They have an organizational dimension: they function as social 
conventions and common law traditions. But rights also take on the form of positive rules 
and other legal norms, some of which may structurally contradict the existing 
conventions and traditions. Rights should not only be imagined to be the traditionally-
transmundane organizations, but also always sensed to be concretely-legitimized 
structures. The contrariness of these two dimensions, of rights, serves as a foundation for 
extraordinary and charismatic modes of rights-protective action. Of course, Weber’s 
liberal critics have a field-day pointing out that charismatic sources of right are 
potentially totalitarian: charisma could help create oppressive government structures. 
Before defending Weber against his critics—as he much rather maintained that 
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charismatic authority is intrinsically ambivalent, and that it may assert itself by protecting 
both irresponsible as well as meaningful kinds of rights, it must be noted that Arendt 
came to study fairly-similar ambivalences in Socratic thought—in order to build on both 
her earlier The Origins of Totalitarianism as well as on her Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil.158
Arendt intimates that the post-nineteenth century statutory positivization of moral 
values, as well as of legal rights, had coincided with a demise of self-organizational 
public processes and with an overall decline in political autonomy as well. Western 
states, including Soviet Russia and Israel, had certainly managed to integrate their 
imperialist needs with their ideological nationalisms.159 During the Interbellum, 
particularly in Russia and Germany, brands of nationalism were being designed to 
accomplish only one effect: to satisfy the basic needs of entire populations. Each state’s 
officialdom would increasingly be governed by national parties, rather than through the 
people’s participatory rights (as would, alternatively, had been the case in 1905 Russia 
and 1918 Germany). National rights, statutory laws, and legal positivism were so 
becoming the interconnected tools of state bureaucracies: they became the weapons in 
their administrative arsenals. This meant that two contrary processes were being united: 
the bureaucracy’s positing of the rules, and the democratic administration of the laws of 
the land, became structurally subservient to an all-or-nothing nationalist ideology. The 
rules were consequentially defined by what they were not: by their own not being 
nationalistic; by their being hostile to national unity. In Arendt’s words on the matter, 
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(particularly the German and Russian) states were fusing together “their own 
[un]seeming contraries: regulatory negativization and nihilism”. As a result,
the basic commandments of Western morality were reversed: in one case, “Thou 
shalt not kill”; in the other, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy 
neighbor.” And the sequel—the reversal of the reversal, the fact that it was so 
surprisingly easy “to re-educate” the Germans after the collapse of the Third 
Reich, so easy indeed that it was as though re-education was automatic—should 
not console us either. It was actually the same phenomenon.160
Drawing a straight line from Stalinism to Nazism to Anglo-American nationalism, 
in Germany—or, more precisely, to the liberal-democratic de-Nazification programs—
Arendt provocatively hints that these three doctrines are only reversing each other. In 
amplifying the “same phenomenon” they were lowering the volume of (republican) 
participatory rights.161 National citizenship and civil rights are useful, of course, but they 
are posited rights: they are abstractly-derived individual rights. As such, they tend to 
negativize that different kind of rights, which is the kind that groups of human beings 
may concretely begin to hold in common with each other. Since so many nation-states in 
the West have only been ‘reversing’ course, rather than to have made such new 
beginnings, they also cannot be said to have maintained a constitutional tension between 
the positivization and the negativization of rights. That is, they can only be said to have 
been treating right-bearers as the subjects for their ‘nihilistic’ national re-education 
(social indoctrination) programs, precisely because these programs are limited to 
education in ‘negativized’ rules (as opposed to civic action and political autonomy).
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Arendt’s quote suggests that even in Postbellum Germany there are no sovereign 
people. At the most, there would be only be state administrators and party officials—who 
are, nevertheless, failing to vicariously personify the political responsibilities of all 
human beings living within the German State.162 The people must have incapacitated 
themselves: they must have  accepted the structural neutralization of their own chances to 
participate in an open-ended political dialogue—not unlike the dialogues Socrates would 
rather certainly have willed to participate in.163 As the people thus surrendered their 
political rights, they individualized their citizenship rights. Although their political rights 
could in reality have continued to condition, and should have remained at least formally 
equal to, everyone’s citizen rights, the people ended up robbing themselves of their 
opportunity to also concretely sustain this relation of equality. The right to enjoy citizen 
rights, however, as Birmingham helps sum up, should have “as much to do with political 
representation and the possibility of of political action as it [so often] does with formal 
equality under the law.”164
What does it mean to participate politically, and to increase the chance of 
observing isonomy in action? This is what Plato asked himself, wondering who other than 
Socrates could have been an exemplary Athenian citizen. For, to be such a citizen is to be 
publically known as someone who participates in a discursive process of beginning anew. 
Birmingham describes this process of natality as follows: it creates “an ontological 
foundation of the political, but not an ontological politics; [yet], the [ontological] origin 
... of the political is not recoverable or accessible.”165 Arendt’s own answer to the 
question is aporetic: it sustains a strange tension between the republic’s ontological and 
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self-organizational process (which creates the possibility of “political action”), first, and 
the structurally-undiscoverable origins of that same ontological process (which are 
probably just the unknown origins of “formal equality”), second. Significantly, another 
aporetic relation—also evolving between the two dimensions of the republic—was 
examined by Socrates when he gave his performance in Plato’s dialogues but especially 
also in Symposium.
The figure of Socrates symbolizes each human being’s aporetic qualities. 
Everyone may be participating politically, and be reasoning discursively, yet these 
activities should somehow remain related to their own contraries: to the satisfaction of 
private needs and to contemplative mediation. Socrates would even have admitted he had 
difficulty performing both roles, but his actions nonetheless continue to suggest that he 
helped the Athenian people to slow down the corrosion of their venerable constitutional 
integrity. That is, he symbolically represents two of constitutional corruption’s worst 
enemies: the “electric ray” and the “gadfly”. Arendt observes that these two beasts 
symbolically represent the two opposite responses of the Athenian audience. While the 
(Socratic) ray paralyzes, and “may have a dazing after-effect”, the (equally Socratic) 
gadfly actively arouses “license and cynicism.”166 Apparently, Socrates’s roles paralyze 
and arouse. They are coinciding but in tension with one another.
Arendt also mentions that Socrates symbolizes the “midwife”—and that this third 
figure neither uses philosophy to paralyze, as Socrates now “teaches nothing and has 
nothing to teach”, nor does Socrates-the-midwife arouse the passions of the multitude—
as “he is not a sophist, for he does not claim to make men wise”.167 Alford mentions that 
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Symposium, the dialogue on love, vows to the importance of this third role: to the 
midwife.168 That role is herein performed by the same Socrates as the one who is being 
visited in Maritain’s natural law-theory. More critically, this is a theory of spiritual love. 
As may be remembered, in Symposium, the character called Love was said to have been 
parented by the extremes of both “[p]overty (penia)” and “contrivance (poros)”. But 
Jacques Maritain reads this dialogue as having introduced a third, or a maieutic mode of 
Love. He thus additionally suggests, with Socrates, that Love is neither poor and needy 
nor can she be tempted with artificially-enriched declarations of passion. She neither 
represents deprivation nor does she become emboldened by, or drunk with passion. She is 
born as a third kind of care in the sense that she combines both penia as well as poros, 
rather, without being reducible to either.
Maritain, according to Alford, understands Love as a figure maddened by her own 
inner contrariness; Love is “mad to create, to give ... [her]self”. “Love, for Maritain, is 
creative; [she] wants to [care for] ... the world, forge human links, foster children, family, 
communities.”169 In this respect, Love seems strikingly familiar to realism’s notion of 
spiritual authority—which is a spontaneously-covenanted mode of authority. For, this is 
obviously a ‘new-born’ or third mode emerging from some sort of relationship between 
both, yet also from neither one of, its own ‘parental’ foundations. This means that 
political realists may have had much more to say about the dialectical relationship 
between opposite foundations, and how dual sovereign authority emerges on top of these 
foundations, in spiritual terms. For example, Weber himself described spiritual or 
mystical love in terms of “[a] boundless giving of oneself”—as well as a public 
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expression of “genuine virtuoso religiosity”. Weber added this: “religion has [always] 
been an inexhaustible fountain of opportunities for artistic creation”. But the founts of 
most mystical religions also stand furthest removed from, and in clearest “opposition to, 
all functionality [and] rationality”.170 Yet, because these founts cannot be separated from 
rational knowledge, both ancient mysticism and modern rationalism somehow remain 
intertwined. The intertwined relation between natural rationality and mystical experiences 
is a relation that cannot be broken up, as would later be acknowledged by Arendt.
Arendt’s The Origins and Eichmann in Jerusalem—or, her reports on certain 
passive beliefs in the modern state, and in its over-rationalized bureaucratic 
apparatuses—were reports followed by words on Socrates but also by her On Revolution. 
In that work, Arendt made the case that the chances of political beginnings are generally 
enlarged by two main factors. First, the beginnings themselves continue to be believed to 
be ambivalent and open to interpretation. Second, the beginnings are spontaneous 
coincidences (never: separations) of both traditional affairs as well as of formal, rational 
institutions of stability.
Both during and (for a long time) after the American Revolution, for example, the 
Founding Fathers would have been believed “to transcend the ... tradition-bound 
framework of their general concepts [by simultaneously assuring] ... stability to their new 
creation, and to stabilize every factor of political life into a ‘lasting institution’.” 
Revolutionary events in “Russia in 1905” and “Paris in 1871” had been breathing the 
same air of self-assurance and self-restoration into the constitutional traditions and their 
concepts. But the events of the 1930s and 1940s were adding up to a systemic breakdown 
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in that relation between tradition and natality, or between revolution and stability. This 
would all only come to light, tragically, “after the downfall of Hitler’s Europe”—and, 
thus, also only after the world had suffered from “the extraordinary  instability and lack 
of authority of most European governments”. Yet, in having originally asserted their 
“hope for a transformation of the state, ... that would permit every member of the modern 
egalitarian society to become a ‘participator’ in public affairs”, according to Arendt, it 
had been the self-restorative (autopoietic) events of 1905 and 1871 that somehow had 
anticipated “the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia and ... the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956, both of which lasted just long enough to show ... what a [constitutional] 
government would look like, and how a republic was likely to function”. In these years, 
revolutionary worker councils had “sprung up everywhere, completely independent of 
one another”—and yet the new-born councils had also embraced various traditional 
principles, such as that “[popular] opposition [serves itself] as an institution of 
government.”171
How tradition serves the revolution is akin to how natality serves power. On 
Revolution is an attempt to solve the problem of how such seemingly-opposite 
institutional principles should coincide, without being fused into one all-overarching 
principle. “Opposition” between the principles, rather, should somehow be thought to 
help prevent the ascend of both a totalitarian and post-totalitarian (post-Second World 
War) principle of unitary statehood. The tension between the revolutionary multitudes 
and the worker councils, or between egalitarian inclusiveness and concrete participations, 
is a tension which allows neither one of the two sides to become reactionary and 
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overarching. But, tragically, as On Revolution announces (this Chapter’s epigraph), the 
twentieth-century public realm has too often been overrun and has too often been 
“overwhelmed by the cares and worries which actually [should have] belonged in ... the 
household”—but which should, alternatively, have remained “matters of [monistic] 
administration ... rather than issues which could be settled by the twofold process of 
decision and persuasion.”172 From this point onwards, Arendt’s theory of revolutionary 
change would proceed by following two major guidelines on how to assess the prospects 
for a constitutional government consisting of both the legitimate application of power 
(decision, supremacy, Verantwortung) and the confidence to protect meaningful 
participatory freedoms (persuasion, autonomy, Gesinnung).
First, “men” should be assessed as having been “born forfreedom”. Human beings 
constantly strive for this joint purpose—of becoming recognized as free, autonomous 
beings. In other words, each person should be thought to have been born to effectuate a 
“spiritual reconciliation” between one’s own needs and those of other political actors, 
rather than as having been born as an individual within a formal realm of equal liberty.173
Machiavelli also studied this human capacity to spontaneously effectuate 
reconciliatory  changes. According to On Revolution, Machiavelli would have understood 
such changes to occur as self-stabilizing constitutional restorations. Yet, Arendt adds the 
provision that he would have focused too narrowly on freedom’s appearances (its 
persuasive effects) rather than also on its spontaneous (decisive) power of self-
restoration.174 The Florentine Secretary had been accurate, she also adds, however, when 
he noticed that “admission to public business and power was due to [man’s] qualities
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[and to] ... a virtù which was all the more praised and admired as it could not be 
accounted for through social origin and birth.”175
Second, persons are born capable of mediating their own beliefs in freedom. 
Machiavelli, again, had rightly understood that conventional traditions may be 
transcended by new beliefs in freedom. But he was wrong to have expected that such new 
beliefs will become ever-more decisive with time—rather than to also have to continue to 
be inspired by a stable, persuasive, sanctified tradition. To be more specific, he had less 
followed the ancient Romans (Cicero) than that Arendt wishes he should have done, as he 
had not yet as well demonstrated “how to bestow permanence upon a foundation, of how 
to obtain the sanction of legitimacy for a body politick which [itself] could not claim the 
sanction of antiquity.”176 But, as On Revolution proceeds; “The act of founding the new 
body politick ... involves the gravest concern with ... stability and durability [and yet also 
raises] ... the high spirits which have always attended the birth of something new on 
earth.” “[T]hese two elements, the concern with stability and the spirit of the new, have 
become opposites”.177
These opposites should never be divorced from one another, Arendt goes on to 
argue, similar to how conservatism and liberalism cannot be understood unless they are 
seen to be forming intertwined strands of political thought. The hidden power of her 
simile, between these two strands of thought and the Socratic dialectic, however, should 
not be underestimated. For, the bond between the two strands is analogous to the 
dialectical bond between the idea of contemplation-inducing, or conservative paralyses 
and an action-provoking or liberal sense of unrest. Conservative philosophers risk 
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becoming hypnotized by ideal forms of equality and justice, further, whereas liberal 
activists could turn into cynical Machiavellists, only pushing towards “the new” within 
their own worlds. Between apathy and cynicism, then, Arendt  introduces her third notion 
of non-positivism, which is neither conservative nor liberal but realistic.178
In moving towards a ‘neither-nor’ concept of political realism, On Revolution
departs from, especially, Rousseau’s (or, by extension, Robespierre’s) positivist 
liberalism.179 Neither a mundane need for “stability” nor the transmundane “spirits” of 
freedom should be positivized: they should just not be turned into positive rules. By thus 
holding back, the need for “stability” and its natural opposite, the passion for “the new”, 
may come to coincide. The constitutional state may then encompass both opposites yet, 
still, their positive qualities should not be united.
This apparent paradox was not unfamiliar to natural law thinkers, such as 
Maritain, who mentions that Socrates was striving to reconcile rather than to synthesize 
two opposing principles. Maritain thereby suggests that political autonomy (freedom, 
natality) coincides with its own opposite: with a social dependency on supreme social 
strata (conventions, origins). For instance, everyone “possesses some measure of 
wholeness and independence, and hence dignity, prior to any involvement in society, 
while [also] remaining in a fundamental sense social.” All positive rights “come from 
natural law”, which includes the law that all human animals are nevertheless capable of 
negating their own positive rights. Hence, human rights (like all positive rights) “do not 
come from states [alone]”.180 They also come from natural persons, and thus actually 
from a dual sovereign. Alford summarizes Maritain’s thinking as having revolved around 
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the notion that every person may be believed capable of partaking in political 
dialogues—by spontaneously fostering and caring for “the natural law, and not [for] 
cultural relativism [or] a new Tower of Babel”:
In trusting in such dialogues, one is [instead] trusting that inclinationes naturales
[and private passions do] exist, and that they are roughly the same for all men and 
women, even as they often find different cultural and historical expression. This 
assumes, of course, that the participants in such dialogues are free to participate, 
unconstrained by force, fraud, or false-consciousness, a concept that still has its 
place. Until that time, it is well to [remain prudent and to] remember that 
sometimes—not always, but sometimes—one listens to the natural law best by not
listening to others. Determining when this might be is one of the hardest things in 
the world.181
Socrates was long believed to have been able to determine (even in his last days) 
when not to listen to, and when not to obey others.182 Arendt knows this, of course, as she 
repeatedly hints he was no ruler—nor was he being ruled. Much rather, he performed his 
role as midwife of the Athenian Spirit by specifying those conditions under which he 
would listen to others. Socrates is someone who only obeys his equals to the extent that 
he also trusts a natural law (that is, the law of the goddess Athens) to govern his political 
peers. He engages them through his characteristically-ambivalent manner of dialogical 
persuasion, while also knowing that these peers could at any time deprive him of his 
positive freedoms and legal rights, as a citizen. Socrates’s anticipatory knowledge is in 
this respect not unlike the kind of belief Jesus had in one original natural law (in God), 
while knowing he would be betrayed by his peers.183 But whereas the Son of Men and 
God the Father have been believed to be one and the same, at least Plato’s dialogues only 
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sought to recombine without ever fully uniting the two “apparently contradictory 
passions; for thinking and [for] acting”.184
As so many readers have gathered from the dialogues, private thoughts may run 
contrary to their own enactment: there is a fundamental tension between a person’s 
private needs and how these are expressed in public settings. The Socratic method does 
not help resolve this tension, but it does bring out its contours. It is called a maieutic 
method, thus, as it helps give birth to relations between functionally-contrary elements; 
between both listening to others and a passion for being heard in the public realm 
(political rights), first, as well as between thinking about private interests and how legal 
norms may best be designed to protect these interests (positive rights), second. Whenever 
the two relations begin to coincide, private and public realms also begin to coincide—as 
if they would belong to one compounded, yet dualistic realm. Thinking/action is merely 
one of the ancient names for this mysterious realm. Albeit “thinking” and “action” are 
dissimilar, it is through the virtue of prudence that they grow less separate and therein 
also into more identical opposites.185
Socrates unifies two presences. He is a natural-born man and an Athenian citizen. 
Arendt writes that he “remained a man among men, who did not shun the marketplace, 
[as well as that he] ... was a citizen among citizens, ... claiming nothing except what in his 
opinion every citizen should be and have a right to.”186 For the later Plato, man’s private 
logics must remain separate from and dissimilar to man’s own role as an ideal citizen: no 
natural-born man could be a citizen, with god-like virtues, although a well-censored 
educational program might help him go a long way.187 But Arendt’s Socrates allows the 
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natural man and the particular citizens to see their roles coincide. In Socratic dialectics, 
hence, their contrariness begins to have a perplexing effect, exactly because the degree of 
contrariness can somehow be balanced, almost gyroscopically, rather than that both of the 
contraries shall have to have been positivized into a third identity.
Near the beginnings and the endings of the Socratic dialogues, whether read 
serially or separately, doors towards new events (future or past) are being opened. 
Especially the younger Plato used these doors to suggest that the dialectical method has 
no first origins. The method is both autopoietic, dialogical, and yet gives birth to 
ideational concepts. To the degree that the method has become a tradition, it has been 
inoculated against the possible death of these concepts. Plato did not design each 
dialogue in the form of a building block reserved for, to briefly appropriate Alford’s 
commentary, “a new Tower of Babel, [nor for] mutual hostility [and] ...  mutual 
incomprehension.”188 Rather, the dialogues are meant to remain entryways towards a 
spirit of mutual comprehension and non-doctrinal thinking. Access to the dialogues does 
not require a formal education. Those few men who had felt stung or aroused by 
Socrates, and who then turned around to blame him for Athens’s moral corruption, 
however, would have been trying to close off access to these non-positivist entryways: 
they had been trying to change “the non-results of the Socratic thinking examination into 
negative results.”189
Socratic dialectics give birth to both a non-positive and a non-negative spirit of 
caring, and open-ended thinking. That is, Socratic thinking is “equally dangerous to all 
creeds and, by itself, [cannot be demonstrated to] ... bring forth any new creed.” It is 
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without final results, neither ascending to Babel’s cynicism nor descending towards the 
older Plato’s more reactionary tendencies. Plato’s The Laws (one of the last, and least 
dialectical, dialogues), for example, tends towards the extreme also known as liberal 
rights-positivization. Plato here aims to prescribe one medicine, which should be trusted 
to have both legislative and adjudicative functions, against two structural opposites. The 
opposites themselves are considered the afflictions of the city-state—as they consist of 
“poverty and wealth, one of which corrupts the soul of human beings through luxury, and 
the other of which urges it to shamelessness through pains.”190 The medicine against both 
poverty and over-abundance should not be applied by means of a middle class or also not 
by means of any other such “class of retail traders”. Every trader admitted into the polis
should, instead, remain “a resident alien or a stranger.” Property will thus be made to 
belong not to the individual citizen, but to the one polis that can include each “entire 
family, both past and future”.191 Not individuals but families bear property rights as well 
as all the other citizenship rights (especially the right to be protected against physical 
force, and to be punished only in accordance to magisterial laws). Further, the 
positivization of all of these rights consists ultimately of a process of expressing piety 
towards the ancestors. Anyone who fails to protect the rights of “some native inhabitant” 
becomes vicariously complicit to an impiety—and will have to “bear the curse of Zeus, 
who watches over kinship and fatherhood.”192
Plato’s The Republic, by contrast to The Laws, opens the book on conservative 
rule-negativization. Here it is said that the soul of the ideal city-state should not be 
believed to act “in opposite ways at the same time.” The main ways or the main units 
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within each political soul (desire/aversion; agreement/disagreement) consist, positively, 
of “complementary pairs”. But the “pairs” themselves also consist of mutually-
corresponding and mutually-dependent contraries which, however, cannot appear 
simultaneously into this world. Certainly, “[t]here must be congruence and dependence 
between the two units in the pair.” Yet, each political soul (which is, actually, the analogy 
“between soul and city” itself) should also comprise “an authentic third element”—which 
somehow animates, and which gives life to the first “two units”: to both “the reasoning 
part” as well as to the abode of “hunger, thirst, and sexual passion”.193
The “third element” is the most mysterious of the three, as it alone moderates 
between the two extreme positives (between reason and need) and as it does this by 
somehow negating their excessively regulatory tendencies. In this sense, the living soul 
of the polis itself may be believed to negate both the rules of poverty and of wealth, and 
both of need and of reason as well. Or, the living soul can turn two positives into two 
negatives. The potential of the soul, then, is that it may have opposite effects. One 
practical example of this is that the economic creation of poverty, within any given 
society, may—and is in fact likely—to both economically enrich and yet socially 
impoverish that society’s wealthiest strata.194 This means that the soul may be considered 
a constitutional ‘both-and’ relationship, relating positives to negatives. In this sense, it 
was originally being studied and reconstituted in The Laws, yet it also appears in the form 
of a ‘neither-nor’ relationship—specifically in The Republic. But the latter text’s double 
negativization may also lead Socrates towards a dialogical “non-result”, in that the 
dialectical method could also be closing its intellectual products off from the original (or: 
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from the least corrupted) soul of the polis. If the dialectical method were to never produce 
any uncorrupted ‘neither-nor’ relationship (no non-duality), in other words, then the 
immortal political soul cannot become visible to mortal beings either. They would only 
be catching a few ideas, or only a few glimpses of an externally-embodied political soul. 
As Plato’s metaphor clarifies, they would only be able to imagine the internal soul of the 
polis as if it were incorporated by a leviathan-like whale. The body of this “sea god” 
would then have to have lost some of its members whereas its other body-parts will “have 
been mutilated or worn down by the waves.” “[S]hells, ... seaweed, and rocks have grown 
upon him—so that he appears more like a beast than what nature first intended him to 
be.”195
Arendt is contemptuous of any creedal negativization of the political soul—which 
she, instead, understands to be be the spirit of a sensus communis. Especially Nietzsche 
had made the mistake of wanting to negativize Plato’s concept of the political soul, she 
finds, just as that Marx had wrongly negativized Hegel. Arendt finds thus also that both 
Nietzschean and Marxist philosophers too often arrived at their conclusions by applying 
“negative results ... with the same unthinking routine as before. [T]he moment [that the 
negative results] are applied to the realm of human affairs, it is [usually] as though they 
had never gone through the [non-dual] thinking process.” Hence, whereas the 
positivization of ideas may come to err on the side of routine and “conventionalism”, 
negativization is more likely to err on the side of creedal philosophies and “nihilism”. In 
this sense, “[n]ihilism is but the other side of conventionalism; its creed consists of 
negations of the ... so-called positive values to which it remains bound”.196 Nihilists fail 
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to approach the internal soul of the body politick, in other terms, because they cannot 
escape their own need to positivize and to routinely-protect rights. They habitually 
remain bound to their own conventions. Or, they continue to protect positively-defined 
rights and other legal values, seeing only some parts of their dismembered and worn-
down leviathan, without asking what the original nature of such rights and values could 
have been intended to become in the first place.
Arendt never tries to make the case that thinking engenders idealism and 
Platonism. She only warns that internal mental logics are too often used to negativize the 
world of law, and that such mental logics are then turning themselves into instances of 
unthinking routine. Internal or mental negations of the external world can easily turn 
themselves into positivizations of hierarchies of rules, precisely because they are bound 
to each other as mutually-corresponding contraries. To prevent that political actors land 
at either the conventionalist or the nihilist extreme, however, her overall argument favors 
moderation. Political self-moderation would have to happen through fresh applications of 
thought. As Arendt concludes: “thinking must always begin afresh”. “[W]hatever 
happens in life—and occurs to us while we are alive”—is always something open to 
change, or open to systemic bifurcations, for as long as that the world of creative thought 
has not been turned into an unthinking routine. Idealism comes in many forms, but what 
Nietzschean and other nihilist philosophers fail to grasp is that their completely-negated 
form of idealism would still have to be bound to idealism itself. 
The member states of the United Nations are increasingly invoking human rights 
and humanitarian norms as if these were the positive ideals all states should implement. 
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But contemporary political realists can learn from Arendt that even these noble positive 
ideals remain bound to particular histories of human rights violations. This still means 
that the violations are in their own turn also negating the ideal-typical humanitarian rules, 
of course, but it also means that these rules cannot be negated and negativized until a 
point has been reached that their original intention is no longer believed visible. The 
UN’s constitutional body of international human rights law is akin to the whale’s body, in 
that it is partially dismembered and disfigured and yet somehow appeals to its observers 
to return to its originally-dualistic foundations. For example,  the United States has made 
numerous economic trade-packages and military deals available to UN member states 
with less-than-acceptable humanitarian records. The aim behind such packages and deals 
has been to prevent them from joining the International Criminal Court and to maintain 
the status quo within the Security Council.197 The example clarifies that the positivized 
rules are often violated by private interests. The UN is falling short of its own ultimate 
purpose, which is to avoid that the Charter and the human rights conventions are either 
ending up being negativized by human rights-violators or that they are being positivized 
by orthodox rights-regulators who fail to understand that even the most-positivized and 
the most –reasonable rights will remain bound to privately-held interests and passions.
UN constitutionalism comes to life through a political soul. This soul combines 
contrary tendencies so that it is to be understood not as a monistic, but as a dualistic and 
as a non-dualistic kind of spiritual authority. This might mean that the inner and the most 
programmatic logics of the UN should remain contrary to their outer and least reasonable 
expressions. The private logics used by each UN member state’s foreign policy-experts 
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are the monistic logics of economics (household administration), whereas the public 
appearances of each state’s persons are also subject to natural law-reasoning and other 
dialogical-persuasion practices. A complex combination of both economic logics and 
reasonable persuasion is thus the one combination which can be recast as the 
dualistically-legitimized mode of authority also known as equal sovereignty—between 
member states.198
Administrative routines, regulatory customs, and denominational conventions 
may end up being rendered meaningless. This is most likely to happen when they have 
been separated from procedural applications, from exemptions to the rules, and from 
those who question their own confidence or their own faith. The act of separation itself 
must be countered, however, by means of some sort of dual authority: by creating the 
possibility of non-dualism in matters of sovereignty, without letting either the procedures 
or their applications become excessively monistic. Machiavelli is known to have 
mastered the art of avoiding excessive monism in the realm of politics. His art consists of 
an application of creativity (virtuosity, virtù) to the realm of necessity and need. Arendt 
rejects his applications of virtue, however, as remaining too dualistic and too 
dichotomous: Machiavelli’s creative applications of virtue would have remained both too 
“independent of the Church in particular, and of moral standards transcending the sphere 
of [public] affairs in general”, as well.199
However, in order for Arendt to recombine the world’s positive “moral standards” 
with their practical applications, she additionally finds—not unlike some neo-
Augustinian natural law-theorists (specifically Maritain)—that any realistic antidote to 
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the dichotomy of norm and fact, or of positive rights and negative violations, should 
consist of a dialectical method. Hence, Arendt samples at length from the Socratic 
dialogues in order to give a sense of meaning and purpose to the correspondence between 
norm and fact. As she writes, “meaning appears in Socrates’ language as love”. In the 
language of midwifery, love’s ambivalence is born from a negated dichotomy: it is not 
excessive need and it is not abundant reasoning, and yet love is born by including aspects 
of both. The language of love expresses this natural duality in the form of an 
organizational law: all the “people who are not in love with [the forms of] beauty, justice, 
and wisdom are incapable of [giving birth to creative] thought—just as, conversely, all 
those people who are in love with examining [others as well as themselves will] ... be 
incapable of doing evil.”200
Synopsis of Why Arendtian Theory Introduces Weberian Realism
The causes behind many of the twentieth century’s evils have never been 
exorcized from political history. Statespersons have tried hard to condemn the evils, and 
to dismiss them as having been caused by totalitarian irrationalism. But statespersons 
have also failed to restore the constitutional opposition from which a spirit of love 
emerges. It is as if they cannot have it both ways. 
Arendt pointed to this double failure after finding that too many German citizens, 
as well as many other Europeans, were failing to restore their constitutions to the original 
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opposition of powers. Arendt’s argument concludes that it is simply not good enough to 
say that the state’s power of rationalism contradicts irrationalism and other mundane 
evils. Rationalism must be revised, rather, or be checked by a qualitatively-different 
power of empirical experience. As rationalism and empiricism begin to balance their 
powers against one another, a third notion of commonsense emerges which then again 
includes both types of power. The premise is that being perfectly rational within the 
private sphere can very well form an affirmation of public irrationalism: of the banality of 
evil. Moreover, irrationalism can carry over into the relations between constitutional 
states—and should, therefore, be countered through fresh and prudent assessments of all 
the available options. Nevertheless, the question stands: how to understand the non-
integrated zone between original constitutions and corrupted governments, between good 
and evil, or even between rationalism and empiricism, also?
As an abridgment to the next subsections, Arendt’s argument helps realists to 
introduce Weber’s law of historical mutations. Weber will later be shown to argue that 
some mutations of the complex relation between contraries, such as the contraries of 
rationalism and empiricism, should not be tolerated. Rationalism may on some moments 
dangerously begin to mutate into solipsism and individualism (nihilism), while empiricist 
cogitations may turn into conventions demanding no critical thought (conventionalism). 
Weber would not use the same concepts as that Arendt did, however, but she agreed with 
his demonstration that rationalist logics should be theoretically counter-balanced by 
means of a private desire to appear in public. He himself could likewise have agreed with 
Arendt that must be within the realm of public appearances that rationalism may become 
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part of a commonsensical, or of a symbiotic sense-experience.201 Realism premises that 
rationalism can be trusted to remain a kind of practical thinking, just as that solipsism 
may be newly recognized as a respectable sign of solitude. But these two premised 
possibilities are conditioned by the notion that abstract ideals will have to be engaged 
through public/republican dialogues about the concretely-possible applications of these 
ideals.202
As did Arendtian, so does Weberian realism condemn the immoderate and 
imprudent applications of internal logics. Prudence emerges, rather, only when memories 
of the past are newly being mixed with a loving care for the future. That is, it is almost as 
if prudence emerges from a spiritual reunion of both empirical cogitations (memorable 
facts) as well as of ethical and rational alternatives (anticipatory norms). J. M. Robertson 
can be said to have seconded this connection between prudence and political realism 
when he hinted, on the eve of the Great War of 1914, that the average statesperson no 
longer understands prudence’s deeper meaning. Modern politicians had for too long 
positivized the historical missions of their own nations, without applying virtue and 
moderation to these positivizations. In this process, the modern nation-states had been 
losing sight of antiquity, as “for the ancients the fact of eternal mutation was [still also] a 
law of defeat and decay, while for [the moderns] ... it is [only] a law of renewal.”203
To be inquiring into how both decay and renewal tend to coincide, just as that 
irresponsibility and confidence often appear to have occurred together, is “one of the 
hardest things [to do] in the world”.204 These are constitutionally-opposite tendencies, in 
the sense that too much responsibility-taking may cohere with too little confidence, 
497
whereas too little political responsibility often accounts for over-confident and self-
righteous behaviors. Arendtian realism advances the notion that confident (antiquity’s) 
public actors have always performed checks on, and yet were constantly being checked 
by a mixed (Montesquieuan) constitution of formal responsibilities.205 Prudence, 
judiciousness, and commonsense may be most-optimally experienced within this 
complex constitutional relation of checks and counter-checks.
Commonsense, especially, can be trained by conversing with oneself: to act as if 
the soul has learned to converse with its own alter ego. By being together with oneself, in 
solitude, it then becomes possible to practice the art of judgment—in anticipation of what 
a plurality of others might hold to the contrary. This art should not be practiced in the 
form of philosophy because philosophers often, and often mistakenly, suppose it would 
be possible for them to arrive in a “community of Difference and Identity”. Hegel and 
Heidegger were idealists to the extent that they indeed supposed that the “contraries” (of 
Difference and Identity) could be integrated—and that these would then again help them 
maintain a single “community”. The neo-Hegelians would generally have supposed that 
“wherever there is a plurality—of living beings, of things, of Ideas—there is difference, 
and [that] this difference does not arise from the outside, but is inherent in every entity in 
the form of duality, from which comes unity as unification.” Political realists, by contrast, 
believe that no unity comes: Identity and Difference consist of coinciding and yet non-
unified “contraries.”206
Against neo-Hegelian idealism, Arendtian realism is a practice of dialectical 
philosophy.207 Thus, Socrates never unifies Identity and Difference, as “the Socratic two-
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in-one heals the solitariness of thought”. With this phrase of the “two-in-one”, realism 
vests thinking in a Socratic notion of solitariness, for it is this notion that comes to 
animate solidarity. A solitary statesperson does not hold monologues, but engages in 
dialogues: listening and speaking alternate. This statesperson’s outside world thereby 
“heals” him from his own propensity to hold monologues, even if he were to hold these 
monologues only mentally and only in silence. Arendt adds then also, for instance, that 
“it is not the thinking activity that constitutes the unity, [and that] unifies the two-in-one. 
[O]n the contrary, the two-in-one become One again when the outside world intrudes 
upon the thinker and cuts short the [internal] thinking process.”208
Thinking stems from consciousness, which is the actualization—“in its unending 
process”—of Difference. Consciousness is the process through which Difference 
becomes concrete, and through which Identity is healed from its own monistic 
tendencies. It is through this self-healing capacity that matters of consciousness begin to 
express themselves: multitudes  of individuals may now newly express themselves as a 
grouping of self-conscious persons. To retain this possibility of natality, the political 
actor should strive to acquire “the outstanding characteristic [state] of somebody who is 
[distinctly human] ... and neither a god nor an animal.”209 As On Revolution added, self-
conscious persons are relating to others because they have come to realize that their 
Identity is relative to their Difference. They are identifiable as neither absolutely good 
nor as radically evil (there is no radical evil, just as that there is no absolutely 
transcendental entity). Their relationship itself, as it was for the ancient Romans, “is 
merely what relates two things, and therefore is relative by definition”.210 Hence, their 
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relationship emerges through covenanting: through one long-existing mutually-
covenanted process of fresh and emergent authorizations, rather.
Why Washington and Jackson Exemplify the Coincidence of Freedom and Necessity
Max Weber knows that Niccolò Machiavelli’s theory had enlarged several 
windows with a view on the tension between constituted laws and constituent interests: 
between a republican government and the private interests included in each republic’s 
constitution.211 Weber also knows that Machiavelli’s is a sophisticated realist theory, as it 
draws out the distinction between the constituted and the constituent or between the 
necessary and the free dimensions of ultimate authority. The following subsections 
conclude that Weber’s concept of (sovereign) authority depends, similarly, on both free 
as well as on necessary legitimizations of the sovereign state. Chapter Three specifies, 
more importantly, that Weber’s concept comes probably a bit closer to Machiavelli’s 
theory of sovereignty than that even Arendt’s concept might have done. For, Machiavelli 
conjectured that both “consequentialist reasoning” and “strong ethical principles”, in the 
words chosen by Erica Benner, form the functional parts of a relationship conditioned by 
popular beliefs in ultimate authority.212 This is both a relation between two “principal 
foundations”, which can be observed under all constitutional states, thus, as well as that it 
is a reciprocal relation—as illustrated in Machiavelli’s The Prince—between every 
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state’s ethical-juridical and its utilitarian-military organizations: between “good laws and 
good arms”.213
One of Machiavelli’s students, Weber, lectures on the notion that (sovereign) 
authority is a complex concept. Authority usually sustains and yet may transcend the 
balance between arms and laws, or between utility and truth, between raison d’état and 
moral principle, as well as between deontic imperatives and utilitarian values. This 
subsection introduces International Relations students to the argument that if both 
Machiavelli and Weber are to be called realists,  they must also be sharply distinguished 
from one of Weber’s own main sources of inspiration: from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of 
the Laws. Montesquieu took a more idealistic route towards the problem of how the 
balance between mutually-opposing constitutional principles should be sustained. In 
addition, he took a less Roman than that he took a contemporary Franco-Germanic route, 
so that he ended up circumventing the Roman Law’s tension between discretion and 
legality altogether: to him, “the spirit of moderation should [exclusively] be that of the 
legislator”—as opposed to that of the discretionary executive as well.214 Before retracing 
his route, however, Weberian realism’s relevancy to the field of sovereignty theory must 
be demonstrated.
Weberian realism is generally—and its identification of mutually-opposed modes 
of authority is specifically—relevant to the scientific study of why some statespersons 
seem to lack leadership and why others end up being honored for using their “political 
imagination”.215 Realists believe that imagination and discretion are the preconditions for 
personal charisma. But charismatic authority is not a monistic mode of sovereign 
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authority, as it remains divided against itself by a more or less productive tension 
between two foundational opposites. Charismatic authority is thus a curiously symbiotic 
relation between these sorts of opposites: factual decisions and normative values; 
personal ethics and official responsibilities; private convictions and meaningful results, or 
between; a free choice of the government’s policies and the necessarily-constitutional 
purpose behind these policies. To put this in Machiavelli’s words: authority is somehow 
produced from the opposition between the freely-posited laws (leggi) and the necessary 
orders and purposes behind these instrumental laws (ordini).216
Weber’s argument is at its core a defense of the dual sovereignty thesis (DST). 
Weber argues that the opposition between the leadership styles of two U.S. Presidents, 
George Washington and Andrew Jackson, for instance, tends to perpetuate itself 
organizationally. The first President symbolizes those politicians who are living for the 
political realm. They serve the republic. The second, Jackson, typifies those leaders who 
seek private satisfaction from their political functions. Jackson had in fact been seeking 
private benefit from his political life, so that Weber has reason to call him the “chief of 
office-patronage.”217
The American government apparatus is led by an ambivalent mode of authority. 
The authoritative relation between the Office of the President and men such as Jackson 
encompasses a persistent opposition. Those exemplary men who live their life, 
unselfishly, for the Office’s dignity, must be distinguished from those who selfishly live 
from having access to the Office’s supreme administrative power. And yet, neither 
Washington nor Jackson alone can explain why this distinction—between an ethic of 
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republican/public service and the egoistic/private logics of natural-born men—informs 
such a persistent tension. The actions of both Presidents must be traced, rather, in order to 
exemplify the deeper tension between “[Jackson’s] ethic of ultimate ends, and an 
[Washingtonian] ethic of responsibility: [the two ethics] are not absolute ... but rather 
supplements”.218
As he invokes the Jacksonian-utilitarian and the Washingtonian-deontological 
modes of authority, Weber never spells out why these modes should supplement each 
other—other than that they, apparently, help define each other. So, why should one’s 
ethic of “ultimate ends” have to coincide with the other’s ethic of deontic 
“responsibility”—and why should both ethics be believed to serve the Office? Would 
Weber perhaps have implied that Term (1) power has to coincide with, and be 
supplemented by, a responsible and purposeful exercise of Term (2) administrative 
power? 
The latter speculation may be made to ‘stick’ if Weber indeed wanted to restrict 
Term (2) responsibilities to the work of “the civil servant”. The latter concerns himself 
(Weber refers to any such political actors as men) only with those responsibilities “vested 
in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if 
the order agreed with his own conviction: ... even if the order appears wrong to him”.219
This civil servant obeys the highest laws and protects Term (1) conventions—even if that 
requires him to negate his own interests. In this respect, he should be said to represent 
those famous-and-yet-anonymous commoners who—in Machiavelli’s Florentine 
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Histories—had assessed “their native city higher than the salvation of their [own] souls” 
(as Weber remembers them).220
The risk of doing so is, of course, that as the public servant becomes more 
competent and more of a specialist, he will start to subordinate his own Term (2) 
responsibilities to his Term (1) routines: he will lose sight of the original relation between 
responsibility and routine, or between necessity and freedom. Term (2) practical 
competencies now align themselves uncritically with Term (1) conventional routines—
rather than with “exactly the opposite principle” of Term (1) speculative thinking. Or, 
this Washingtonian specialist sees it as his duty to blindly serve the public good—rather 
than to also, at least on some occasions, speculate on how he could alternatively make the 
good depend on his own best interests.221
An inverse type of legitimization process may also begin to occur. In this case, the 
public official is taking his personal interests and his Term (2) responsibilities so 
seriously that many Term (1) conventions and customs are being ignored. This 
Jacksonian official bears “exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a 
responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer.”222 The latter official actually 
reflects the Protestant individual, who finds exterior justifications for his private 
responsibility “for what he does”—without making any reference to his interior 
obligations to also protect societal customs. This individual desires personal salvation, 
but thereto too often subordinates societal Term (1) practices to his private Term (2) 
confessions. This typically-Protestant official will even try to justify his individual use of 
“violence as a means”—as he will know that Luther relieved him from his “ethical 
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responsibility for war”.223 His conception of authority carries thus very private, 
confessional, and individualistic connotations: this state agent is more likely to see 
himself as a cog-in-the-machine: his functioning is instrumental to the functioning of the 
state, which heavily depends on his individual interest in self-redemption.224
Politics as a Vocation juxtaposes (Machiavelli’s) Washingtonian republicanism 
with (Luther’s) Jacksonian individuality. Yet, both of these ethics are also presented as if 
they form a coincidence of opposite functions—each of which, by itself, could be prone 
to excess. The lecture thus premises that some republican leaders could be acting 
unthinkingly when they contribute to a climate of demagoguery, causing 
“sensationalism”, whereas some of the more-individualistic leaders may simultaneously 
end up acting as vainglorious charlatans in their pursuit of a life of “dignity”.225
Realism is the methodological inquiry into what it means for sovereign persons to 
act in a manner worthy of public recognition. Realism is not a philosophical inquiry into 
what justice and morality is, therefore, but also into how these ethical ideals should be 
politically exemplified. It is in this sense that Arendt could have agreed with Weber, as 
she (like him) finds that citizen-statespersons should be respected to the degree that they 
are struggling in both having “[t]o think and to be fully alive”. Arendt adds: “Thinking 
accompanies life, and is itself the de-materialized quintessence of being alive.”226 Also, it 
was Socrates who exemplified the thoughtful and responsible actor. He evidently 
opposed the sophists’ abstract definitions of justice and piety, for instance, and yet took 
responsibility for his own actions.227 Socrates was constantly thinking through the 
consequences of his actions, and he therefore still symbolizes the coincidence of 
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consquentialist actions as well as of deontological intentions. Arendtian/Weberian 
realism is an inquiry into a coincidental relationship between a statesperson’s intentions, 
to always act conscionably, and this person’s courage to interpret norms and conventions 
accordingly. Its core premise herein is that the conscientious administration of the law 
(regulatory positivity), first, coincides with the personal courage to create exceptions to 
the law (authentic negativity), second, and that it is this strange coincidence that animates 
sovereignty.
How to Maintain the Tension and Why Realism Contains a Just War Theory
In the field of International Relations, it is often said that Weber created a 
typology of legitimization processes—and that this typology may be used to affirm a 
political belief in the nature of a balanced but complex world of strife and conflict. But 
the belief in the complexity and the interdependency of these legitimization processes 
itself has often been under-appreciated, and misunderstood. Sophisticated variants of 
political realism, which defend both Weber’s typology as well as the classic notion of 
dual sovereignty, can nonetheless help IR students make sense of an unexplained tension 
between the legitimacy of utilitarian practices and the legitimacy of deontological 
contemplations. Even though Giorgio Agamben suggests that a very similar tension is 
actually not so much a tension as that it has become part of a separation between human 
contemplative reasoning and some animal-like force of habit, or between reasonable laws 
506
and passionate discretion, political realism holds its grounds when it alternatively finds 
that precisely such a separation would be highly imprudent to pursue.228 Human laws and 
animal passions instead should be said to form one of the dualities (such as beliefs/needs, 
freedom/necessity, and laws/orders), and all dualities may hereby be believed to 
somehow allow their component units to coincide rather than to separate themselves from 
one another. This belief can be supported by both a realist method of arguing about the 
nature of human warfare and appeals to just causes, for war, as well as by a deep 
ecological theory about the complexity of Nature’s own dualities.
At least since the time of Hobbes, realism has been a method of validating the 
ancient argument that positive laws can be negated for the purpose of serving natural law, 
and yet they can also be included in natural law. This double possibility has been 
exemplified by numerous institutions, such as flagging protocols and the principle of 
diplomatic immunity, but also by wars: in each institution there is a natural pattern of 
self-organization that may negate and yet will also include the particular structures of 
international diplomacy and warfare. Although realism has often been suspected of being 
involved in power politics (Realpolitik), it actually holds that these particular structures 
and institutions tend to combine peaceful intentions with hostile actions. They thus tend 
to exclude neither the intentions nor the actions. For example, treaties cannot be said to 
have been legitimized unless the state parties have observed a mutual ratification of these 
treaties. The intention to respect the treaty must have coincided, in other words, with the 
mutual negation of potentially-hostile actions. The Rome Treaty, which foresees in the 
creation and jurisdiction of the ICC, for example, had to be ratified by an adequate 
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number of states before it could take effect. The ICC expresses these states’ intentions to 
remain appreciative of and respectful towards humanitarian norms and yet the ICC also 
may counteract—or, may act in political opposition to—the best interests of any of these 
signatory states.
To put this in Weberian parlance, multilateral Term (1) treaties—including the 
Rome Treaty and the UN Charter—are conventions which always have to have been 
ratified and legitimized by constitutional institutions within states, such as parliaments 
and courts. Therefore, the Term (2) state decisions are somehow legitimizing their own 
agreement/disagreement to the Term (1) conventions. With a stroke of the pen, a 
statesperson can both agree to respect the supremacy of each treaty-based institution and 
yet also express the state’s autonomy and freedom to participate in such an institution. 
Every state can so be said to have its own raison d’état: it has its own interest in agreeing 
or disagreeing to the rulings of the ICC or the ICJ, and to Security Council resolutions as 
well. Suspected criminal heads-of-states will have greater incentives to disagree than 
more peaceful statespersons, of course, yet their organizationally-transcendent agreement 
to the existence of institutions such as the ICC does still legitimize even their strongest 
disagreements. The fiduciary equal sovereignty of each of the ICC signatories or of each 
of the UN member states, also, is identical to their organizational Term (1) habits and 
normative routines. But the measurable and the structural differences between how 
various member states factually disrespect each other’s territorial integrity and 
jurisdictional superiority, however, are better understood as self-conscious and non-
habitual Term (2) differences. The Term (1) norm of the legal equality of all sovereign 
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states thus coincides with, and yet is contradicted by each particular state’s Term (2) 
factual immunities and positive liberties.229
Statesmanship consists of something more than, and often opposes brinkmanship. 
The liberty to take a decision in one’s own interests can certainly be applied to achieve 
the desired results: to optimize one’s interests. But this liberty to engage in Realpolitik
should also be combined—and be integrated as directly as possible—with one’s freedom 
to think and to reason with others: with one’s regulatory potentiality. In the case of the 
ICC, this moment of combination and integration was made possible by the equally-
legitimate authority of both Terms (1) and (2) within the relations between ICC signatory 
states.
Besides the ICC case, another example of equal respect for the legitimacy of both 
the normative Term (1) conventions and the instrumental Term (2) decisions, is the case 
of war: the co-authorization of norms and decisions has also been studied by just war-
theorists.230 Christopher Finlay, among these theorists, construes a line that forms a 
parallel to those having been drawn here-above. Finlay argues that both the just cause of 
war-norm and other such general war-law conventions (jus ad bellum) as well as specific 
decisions about the reason to apply a measure of armed force (jus in bello) are so closely 
interwoven, it would be almost futile to continue to analytically distinguish between 
them. It would make much more sense to accept Arendt’s cautionary remarks about the
“generative” and the “unpredictable” traits of all violence—than to continue to separate 
general just war-conventions from those acts of war which target specific states, from 
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violence suffered by non-state civilian victims, and from the violence committed by non-
state terrorist cells.231
Andrew Hurrell construes another line, but is likewise moving parallel to a route 
hitherto classified under the label of Weberian realism. In following that parallel route, he 
is claiming that the legitimacy of international institutions certainly consists of, what 
must be said to be Term (1), ideas about “process and procedure” and about “domestic 
constitutionalism” as well as about all those ideal and normative conditions under which 
states may reserve their “legitimate right of outside intervention for [transcendent] 
humanitarian purposes.”232 But this cannot negate the fact that multilateral treaty-
institutions are simultaneously being legitimized by what is known as their Term (2) 
degree of “effectiveness”: by their ability to persuade others to help them “provide 
effective security.”233
Just war-theorists have long been able to witness many of the oscillations in what 
it could mean to speak of legitimate forms of international security and warfare. Some 
theorists plea for stronger normative causes (jus belli), first, and others seem to favor 
clearer regulations of the practical decisions: they rather favor stricter limits on command 
responsibilities (in bello), second. Finlay, however, takes a cue from Arentian realism 
showing him that violence is meaningless. It may spin out of control, or it may arbitrarily 
victimize people. In violent events such as war, all people are potential victims: everyone 
is a bystander. This unpredictability-cue is taken by Finlay to suggest that earlier efforts 
at sharpening the philosophical distinction between the Term (1) normative-legislative 
and the Term (2) effective-executive dimensions of military authority have been fruitless. 
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It would be more fruitful, he argues, to accept a third “element of contingency” into the 
theory of war, therefore. With that third element in mind, he proceeds to look beyond the 
rational responsibility of those who commit violence: he also takes into account the 
experiences of those who become their victims. He looks also, to be precise, to the 
contingent relationship between the victims of violence and those who announced to be 
intervening militarily on their behalf. Whenever a non-state actor (such as the PLO or the 
IRA) has initiated acts of violence, which it proclaims to have been initiated in defense of 
its own group, then that actor’s cause should be treated as a cause of war. It should be 
judged in accordance to “a criterion of moral authority grounded in representative 
legitimacy.” Should the violent actor be believed to be a legitimate Term (1) 
representative of the group this actor claims to be defending? Or do members of the 
group express their discontent with the actor through opinion polls, demonstrations, and 
strikes—and should the actor perhaps not be forced to give up its right to use force?234
According to Finlay, Term (1) ideas about constitutional representation may be used to 
counteract the (non-state or state) actor’s Term (2) liberties and immunities: the actor 
may have to surrender its (semi-sovereign) “right to denominate enemy ‘combatants’.”235
In order for Finlay to reach this straightforward conclusion, which has been 
centered in the Term (1) idea of representative-and-therefore-legitimate authority, 
Finlay’s argument will have to be able to validate its own premise that there should be no 
silently-assumed analytical dichotomy “between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum
[theorems] ... grounding the non-immunity of combatants.” This premise forms, to some 
extent, a plea for the immediate integration of both of these two theorems. It is a plea to 
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construct a “pluralist” ethic of the representative use of force—under which the agent is 
to be represented by those who intervene of on that agent’s behalf. “[T]he moral agency 
of the victim [of the violence, will have to be written] back into [this] ... account of rights 
of assistance.” Against the usual preference for an analytical separation, Finley thus 
wants to create a more direct “relationship” (of legitimate authority) between the targets 
of non-state violence, on one side, and third-party state actors (having been authorized by 
the Security Council) who will somehow defend these targets from (terrorist) attacks, or 
who at least are obliged to assist them in effectuating their right to self-defense, on 
another side.236
During armed conflicts, the distinction between the rights of combatants and 
noncombatants often begins to blur. The practical dilemmas of Term (1) decision-makers 
then begin to interfere with the ultimately-meaningful Term (2) responsibility to 
intervene on behalf of those suffering from the use of armed force. All illegitimate (but 
specifically terrorist) violences, then, must be countered through a contingent relationship 
between the victims of the violences and those who may potentially begin to represent 
them by rejecting the utility of any sort of violence.237
Finlay’s study of just war-theory can still be further translated into the concepts of 
Weberian realism, as it helps evince that Term (1) deontological conventions should 
somehow be represented by and be integrated with Term (2) utilitarian decisions—
without that both the Terms should be losing their distinctive characteristics.238 But 
Finlay might have been mistaken to conclude that this moment of integration is made 
possible by a third-party representative, such as the Security Council, because each of the 
512
five permanent members of the Council (the P-5) usually have no stake in the political 
representation of most other members and non-members. Only when none of the 
permanent members vetoes a Council resolution to militarily protect the victims from the 
violences committed against them, can the UN begin to integrate and bring Term (2) 
decisions in accordance to Term (1) norms. In order to reach this moment of integration, 
however, the all-encompassing issue will not so much be whether the P-5 are normatively 
obliged to represent the victims as if the Council would form an independent third-party, 
as well as that it will be an issue of whether the P-5 believe that they are also factually 
obliged to take sides in the war. The Security Council is not an independent party, 
realism holds, but should come to believe it has an interest in becoming more partisan.
Hurrell, by contrast to Finlay, therefore sees sufficient reason to call the Security 
Council “a deeply-flawed and heavily-politicized body [if not only] ... because other, 
better forums simply do not exist.” Even NATO seems to him far more imperfect than the 
UN, so that the issue is less an issue of representational accuracy and other forms of 
“rational persuasion”—which are forms that remain always subject to “the destructive 
role of rhetoric”—than it is of legitimizing a transcendent and new “body [with] ... the 
authority to interpret and to apply the rule [on humanitarian intervention].”239
McGeer and Pettit have indexed several of the roles performed by political 
rhetoric. Because all use of language has opposite effects (a critical theme in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan), it is unlikely that rhetoric will ever fully eliminate those biases and those 
misrepresentations that result from—and that have so long remained inherent to—the 
ambivalent functions of linguistic, conceptual, and metaphorical expression.240 Yet, even 
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though political tensions may never be eliminated, due to the mixed blessing of human 
language, they may very well be moderated. Careful readers of Leviathan will find that 
efforts at moderation, or at self-regulation, should not be confused with efforts to justify 
any sort of cause of (civil) war. 
Schmitt finds that in war or in other such existential oppositions (in matters of 
political life and death), no justification should be represented in a moral light. There is 
no moral, and there is not even an economic justification for this existential opposition. 
Instead of expressing moral justifications, derived from material interests, any political 
actor (such as the sovereign state) should rather legitimize its performance through its 
own relation to another such actor (an enemy of the state). Sovereign actors are 
legitimized by their relationships to those they profess to counteract: to their political 
enemies. To avoid that sovereign statespersons would begin to appeal to moral and 
materialist values, nonetheless, Schmittian realism insists that their moral and immoral 
values should be constrained—by means to the transcendent relations between states, 
which are the relations of international public law.241 Moral doctrines and material 
interests should thereto be hedged, indeed, as statespersons will be politically re-
identifying the IR structure’s proper juridical boundaries (Grenzen).242 Geophysical 
borders between states can so come to be believed to remain juridical boundaries, at least 
to the extent that they—as Slomp has summarized this vital point in Schmittian realism—
are boundaries which, understood in themselves, are neither moral nor immoral but bare 
and existential boundaries alone: these borders between states are political, as if they 
have been recognized through a law of nature.243 Schmitt of course had tried to restore 
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Europe’s existential limits because he had been led to think that these limits had been 
artificially distorted and misrepresented by Anglo-American relativists and other 
positivist jurists, such as Kelsen. Against what he thought were meaningless distortions 
of the European public law tradition, Schmitt would set it as his purpose to negate any 
moral justifications for, and any moral causes of war (justum bellum). Moral doctrines of 
war can escalate the political opposition between two enemies, rather than that they will 
help legitimize their respective sovereign authorities. As Hobbes had already warned, 
(Schmitt herein followed Hobbes), states are routinely creating the conditions for their 
own “dissolutions”—as they will only be offering moral or ideological justifications for 
the “war by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon [they erroneously 
imagine] their right [to rule] dependeth”.244
To summarize the above argument (elements of which were presented by 
referencing Schmitt, Weber, and Hobbes), the quintessential moment in which both the 
authenticity of just war causes and other international treaty-based conventions can be 
freely assessed and be meaningfully interpreted, by responsible decision-makers, who are 
willing to also critically interpret their own decisions on such conventions, is a moment 
that should neither have been caused only by the conventions nor only by the decisions: 
these two terms cannot be reduced to one another, but form the parts of a whole moment 
that is greater than the sum of its two constitutive dimensions. In this transcendent 
moment, Terms (1) and (2) are both included in a realist methodology. Schmittian and 
Weberian methodologies help IR theorists to ask why states decide on exceptions to both 
Terms.245 In any respect, for as long as that two or more sovereigns should not have lost 
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their distinctive qualities and meanings, the sovereign states will have to be said to have 
remained in political and existential opposition towards one another. Through this 
relation of opposition, Term (1) rules and norms will in that relational moment again 
come to be thought to somehow supplement Term (2) interpretations and decisions, 
without that the Terms are being rhetorically distorted by each other. In the existential 
threat, there is little distortion. Terms (1) and (2) will have to maintain an open and 
directly-presented (rather than misrepresented) relationship with each other, then, in order 
for armed conflict to be moderated by law.
Weberian realists believe now, conjecturally, that the two Terms are in a direct 
and yet lawful relationship through which they can grow to respect each other’s 
opposition: this is the ultimate route towards a non-dualist concept of emergent 
sovereignty.246 Even though perplexing Term (3) non-results may persist, because of the 
oppositions between Terms (1) and (2) norms and decisions, these non-results can now be 
confidently trusted to remain adequately independent from excess—or from both from 
discretionary (executive) rule-negativism as well as from autonomous (legislative) rights-
positivism: from both organizational nihilism as well as from structural idealism.
Reintroducing the Research Question: Why Theorize Dual Sovereignty?
Does each sovereign state have a distinctive moral purpose or, rather, a single 
most-justifiable cause for its existence? Does each state have a duty to protect the human 
516
rights of non-citizens beyond, as well as within, its own borders?247 In the 2000s, several 
IR theorists found the answer to these questions dependent on the legitimacy of the state, 
rather than only on its functional capacity for cross-border interventions.248 Each nation-
state’s unique type of authority would have to depend on how its actions are being 
legitimized, abroad as well as domestically.249
One of the most-commonly-repeated IR answers has held that as the state 
competes for territories and resources, its actions must have been justified by others than 
the members of its own government. An independent external forum, regardless whether 
it is a free press or a transnational tribunal, must have legitimized the state’s sheer 
supremacy. This implies that the state in question will have to have been persuading a 
plurality of others before its actions and decisions will have appeared to be authoritative 
and just—as well as to be supreme and unequal. Without some sort of persuasive 
organizational process, it would be needless for anyone to obey the government. 
Persuasion and demonstration are preconditions, hence, in that they allow the state to 
explain why it alone may rightfully coerce entire populations. That conventional answer 
suggests, also, however, that legitimacy may be not much more than a moral justification 
for seemingly immoral state actions: it only seems to be a moral, ideological function of 
“crude coercion”.250 But as statespersons will always try to find moral reasons for their 
actions, populations are more often than not being teased or seduced into ‘playing along’ 
in their state’s competitive games. And, both the necessity of government (coercion) as 
well as the freedom to ‘play’ within its greater constitutional order (persuasion), now, 
begin to form opposite sources of legitimacy. The structural outcome of the world politics 
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‘game’ becomes thus more and more dependent on the two-dimensional legitimization 
process that relates the rulers to the ruled: politics is about the relation between contrary 
effects; governmental decisions as well as normative orders.
The conventionally-suggested IR answer, to the question of legitimate 
sovereignty, was formulated by Martin Wight: the power of government itself is never 
thought to be “self-justifying” so that power will somehow have to come to be believed 
to have been previously “justified by reference to some source [or order] outside or 
beyond itself, and thus be transformed into ‘authority’.”251 All legitimate governments 
consist of power, but not all power has been authorized legitimately. Before state power 
can be recognized as a legitimate modality of sovereignty, power will first have to have 
been transmuted into dual authority. That is, it will have to have come to cohere with 
both a higher law and the eternal yesterday, or also with—what Hannah Arendt describes 
as—both “the new law of the land and the old laws of morality.”252
The moment in which power has been transformed into a legitimate right to 
command, in other words, will be a moment in which government has legitimately gained 
(under the “old laws”) a right to legislate (the “new law”) but also the right to punish or 
the right to declare war. Even if government has never monopolized the right to use 
armed force, thus, it will nonetheless have to have been authorized to legislatively protect 
the population’s most-vital interests—and to protect these interests by means of the 
(threat of) violence it can possibly create. Yet, contrary to impressions made by Kenneth 
Waltz, on the IR field, the question of state legitimacy is not how little or how much acts 
of state violence can threaten or coerce various other states and non-states. In IR, the 
518
question of legitimacy is not merely a measure of externally-coercive capabilities.253
Rather, it is the Hobbesian question of how the state’s self-protective power is to be 
transformed into a sovereign mode of authority, by other sovereign parties. 
Quintessentially, power has to have been legitimized by a plurality of covenanting 
others—in order for it to be systemically transmutated into public authority. It were not 
the neorealists (Waltz) in IR, then, but it was Hobbes who asked how a government 
official should ask herself whether the execution of her power—especially if this power 
pertained to threats of killing or injuring—will also be believed, by sufficient others, to 
have been both legitimate as well as merely justifiable.254 The ‘true’ realist asks, 
therefore, which other non-government institutions (and constitutions) should be believed 
to be equally sovereign. Can non-government institutions be trusted to be as equally 
authoritative as that the government is powerful and as that the government legally 
personifies the existing distribution of power, as well? This is how Arendt rephrases 
realism’s question: which classic institutions (constitutions) should be imitated and 
restored, by political revolutionaries, so that these institutions can newly become “equally 
entitled to ... legal personality, [and] ... be protected by it, [so that they can begin to] ... 
act almost literally ‘through’ it[?]”255
The research question, to be answered in the next sections, is how power is being 
legitimized through the imitation of constitutional orders in which the right to have rights, 
which is nothing other than the right to bear a legal personality, was very difficult to 
violate. Political realists can press for better answers to this question, or at least for better 
answers than those to have been given by democracy-theorists such as Dahl, because 
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realists have reason to accept the dictum that civic religions can be seen to be forming, as 
an organizational process, the ultimate source for any constitutionalist tradition—
regardless as to whether that tradition will be empirically democratic or monarchical, for 
instance.256 Moreover, realists take a special interest in the Roman constitutional tradition 
because it is a republican tradition in which religious covenants and civic virtues were 
once being trusted to freely transcend the structures and distributions of force and 
power.257
Dual sovereignty pertains not only to the relation of equality between both 
government institutions and non-government constitutions—nor only to the equality both 
of moral justifications for the use of power, and of the authorizations and restorations of 
entitlements to use power. Rather, dual sovereignty pertains also to how structures of 
power and of force are oftentimes being used in relation to a common cause, which could 
possibly justify but which should not be allowed to authorize the structural use of force. 
If dual sovereignty-theorists and other realists are correct, then the monopolists of armed 
force (substantive power) should no longer be believed to act legitimately (formally and 
authoritatively) if and when they end up applying force disproportionally: against groups 
of innocent bystanders or to cause collateral damage. Realists may be correct, as Finlay 
also argued, to say that any decisions regarding the proportionality of force, in times of 
war (jus in bello), should remain always a function of a normative rationale for, and of a 
conventionally-accepted common cause of, war (jus ad bellum).258 Somehow there 
should be believed to be a transcendent purpose that can resist the use of structural force, 
to put the subject of this inquiry in a bit different terms.
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The question of political legitimacy may best be answered in reference to the 
common purpose and the ultimate moral cause of war, as Hobbes teaches. It may be 
wrong, therefore, to only be indexing the aggregate consequences of specific war-time 
decisions. The entire question requires also an answer less about who should be allowed 
and who should be empowered to apply specific “means of peace and defense” (for, in 
principle, all statespersons may apply these means of violence) than that the answer will 
equally depend on how sovereign judgeships are to be constituted—and how the judges 
can remain responsible for the coherency of “opinions and doctrines ... necessary to 
peace, [and] thereby [to] ... prevent discord and civil war.”259
The sovereign is a judge and preventer of ideological war. All civil wars are 
ideological wars because they tend to result from a failure to persuade others. To 
strengthen their power of persuasion, sovereign persons should be believed capable of 
acting in order to secure their own interests as well as to satisfy the ideological needs of 
others. Only under such conditions will Hobbesian sovereigns be able to legitimize their 
actions: they will have to convince and persuade others—so that they must be expected to 
seek allies in their wars against illegitimate violence (against seditionists, fascists, or 
terrorists). Interestingly, this further means that wars cannot be fought solely in order to 
convince others: they cannot be legitimately fought for doctrinal reasons, because then 
these wars would be mere civil wars (without any just cause). Thus, legitimacy can never 
be created by a coercive technique of indoctrination—because then it would immediately 
lose its persuasive appeal—although legitimacy is always dependent on an external 
forum. Indeed, most sovereign states have long acted on behalf of their own security as 
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well as of the needs of multilateral institutions such as NATO and the Security Council. 
The important lesson to learn, from Hobbes, is that no state may reasonably expect that 
its belligerent actions will be legitimized solely by its own inhabitants: each sovereign 
state will also have to appeal to a doctrine that can convince others of those just causes 
that they can all share.260
The legitimacy of statehood is usually referred to as something that may justify a 
range of decisions and actions—but it is also something political, in the sense that it 
cannot be revealed in a solipsistic and arbitrary manner. There will be no legitimacy if 
only one state were to try to justify its armed attack on another state’s “otherwise 
innocent just warriors”.261 If both states now profess innocence, there can be no just cause 
for any of their attacks: their violence must have become either retaliatory or random. 
Hobbesian realists argue, therefore, that these state parties should be trusted to appear in a 
forum or before a judge—so that they can freely accept a ruling on the justice and 
injustice of their conflict. By contrast, neo-realists have long suggested that sovereign 
authority has predominantly been legitimized by each state’s monopoly: by the fact that 
each state alone has both the capabilities as well as the right to wage war. Nation-states 
try to protect only their own vital interests, as they will define their strategic needs 
according to the political necessities of the moment. Neo-realists such as Waltz, 
additionally, suggest that statespersons settle their conflicts not until they will have been 
“forced” to accept third-party judgments and not until after they were “forced” to resort 
to an international law-forum.262
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Neo-realism’s answer does not contain the question of how a state’s sovereignty 
may either have been recognized or not—by the graces of a plurality of other sovereign 
states. This conventional answer simply presupposes that a state is being recognized 
because other states could do no differently: the others were coerced into recognizing this 
state, rather than to have been persuaded to share the same causes. Against neorealism, 
Hobbesian realism demonstrates that sovereignty is not just an endogenously-achieved 
right to monopolize the right to use armed force. It is also exogenous: sovereignty is, 
actually, first and foremost a matter of participatory freedom, and of agreeing with others 
on certain ethical foundations. The right to recognize others as equals, then, cannot be 
crudely enforced. Rather, some deeper belief will have to be shared, particularly in the 
notion that other states are equal participants in world affairs.
The downside of the conventional or the neorealist answer is that it can be used to 
justify an attack on any party, once that party is no longer recognized as an equal 
participant, without expressing any additional concern about the legitimate authorization 
of such an attack. That conventional answer can thus at worst justify, and at best also 
pretend to legitimize (but, not ‘truly’  authorize) one’s own attacks on those declared to 
be enemies of the state. Advanced (Hobbesian) realists will be certain to point out that 
this conventional answer cannot be used to understand why one state’s attacks should be 
legitimized, rather than the attacks of another state. Whenever two states declare each 
other to be political enemies, it will prove to be problematic to maintain that the sheer 
contrariness of their war is the cause of the war’s outcome. The notion that one state’s 
conduct was morally superior to that of the other, in other words, cannot be believed to 
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have caused the peace that ended the war. If that could be possible, then supremacy 
would always remain in the eye of the victorious beholder, as all sovereigns may then be 
writing their own historical record of why they applied coercion justifiably. There is 
something fundamentally unpersuasive about causal supremacy, in other words, as 
supremacy itself has in actual practices so rarely been legitimized and authorized 
monistically. Rather, supremacy has somehow always remained related to its natural 
opposite: to another, autonomous, endogenously-legitimizing actor who may very well 
‘play’ the part that represents all those who were vanquished in war.
One state’s actions—such as the identification of its enemies, the declaration of 
war, the detainment of traitors and other ‘hostile elements’—should be considered actions 
which will have intrinsically ambivalent effects on the relations between that state and 
other states.263 Sometimes, these actions lay the basis for an enduring and stable military 
alliance. At other times, they are part of the reasons why this state loses a war against its 
enemies. War and peace are narrowly-intertwined concepts, but the above-presented 
conventional (including the neorealist) answer to the question of the state’s moral 
purpose undercuts the contingency of political action: it is a bit of a tautological answer. 
A strangely circular argument creeps into the above answer, in other words, as it forces 
itself to turn towards philosophical justifications for the one moral purpose that makes 
each state into a uniquely sovereign state. For, in other words, if this moral purpose 
should indeed consist of the dictum that the legitimate sovereign does not wage unjust 
wars against other states, and wins only those wars in which all enemy states were acting 
immorally and in violation of the just war-theorems, then this purpose would all too soon 
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turn itself either into a form of victor’s justice or into an idealistic and possibly 
nationalistic (anti-historical) abstraction. Even more dangerously, perhaps, this moral 
purpose would contribute to a monistic rather than a relational conception of what it is 
that makes the state into a sovereign state. And, the equality of sovereigns would become 
a meaningless phrase.
Weber and Arendt have been helpful in plotting a course towards realism’s 
warning against the nationalist and idealist tendencies inherent to any public 
legitimization process. On one side, they advised that statespeople have an obligation to 
remain skeptical, but not necessarily to also completely distrust any abstract 
idealist/ideational legitimatizations of their own authority. On another side, realists advise 
statespeople to consider it wrong and imprudent to only concentrate on the concrete 
necessity of their ultimate authority: doing so would only help them to justify and 
conserve the status quo (government), while it would force them to ignore those 
alternatives and those possibilities that might still help them to initiate new participatory 
(constitutional) modes of freedom.
The conventional answer limits the scope of legitimization processes to a 
structure of functional powers. It limits legitimacy to matters of government and 
governance, but excludes legitimacy from the question of how people participate more or 
less freely in their self-organizational processes. The above-presented answer can, 
therefore, hardly survive in a scenario of great tension between the organizational 
assertions of participatory freedom and the status quo distribution of powers and 
functions. Yet, unfortunately, this conventional answer remains fashionable among 
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structuralist, neoliberal, and neo-Kantian IR theorists. As these theorists carry on with 
their power-oriented and hyper-secularized definitions of statehood, they thus too often 
pass by on the complex relationship between both the spiritual love of popular freedom 
(autonomy) and the functional distribution of government powers (supremacy). Neo-
Kantian IR theorists, especially, can be said to have remained stuck with a profane or a 
mundane conception of how individual liberty relates to power, and to thus have 
neglected the sacred and transmundane dimension of shared participatory freedoms 
(which, by contrast, would certainly not have been as severely neglected by Kant 
himself).264 So, how should the complexity of relationships between merely mundane 
politics and more transmundane participations be newly identified—and how should the 
weight of secularism be lifted from many IR shoulders (on the assumption that even Kant 
was not a secularist)?265
Rather than to argue either that IR complexity has been completely secularized by 
political scientists, and rather than to hold that IR and sovereignty are properly a 
theological subject, as well, advanced realists have reason to conclude that sovereignty is 
neither only a secular nor only a divine mode of authority. Ernst Kantorowicz concludes, 
for example, that sovereignty is part ministry and part mystery. Sovereignty, particularly 
in late-medieval Europe, would both represent mundane laws as well as that it 
symbolized the transmundane but arcane law of the Christ.266 In addition, Max Weber 
often refers to both the materialist and the spiritualist dimensions of sovereignty, quite 
similarly, as the twin dimensions of the clerk and the cleric. The clerk holds the 
bureaucratic and the cleric the charismatic type of authority—both of which interact to 
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such an extent that symbioses may begin to emerge from the complex relation between 
the types. In other words, it has long been known that administratively-rational choices  
(power politics) are somehow being complemented by a non-rational belief (religiosity), 
and that it is from both choices as well as from this belief that a symbiotic mode of dual 
sovereignty may emerge. Prior to examining such symbiotic relations between structural 
choice and spiritual belief, and how these relations shape the system of states (or how 
they inform realist concepts of legitimate authority), a few more remarks should follow 
on why Weber himself never propagated any conceptions of strictly rational, or purely 
ideational authority—and why he instead feared that such conceptions could have anti-
symbiotic effects. For, as he warned, these conceptions could elicit the idea that any war 
is a “just war” and thus create a “crusade against [any perceived] evils”.267
Although IR students have for several decades been taught to use an 
anthropocentric definition of sovereignty—as state power would be resulting from 
rational choices, as only individuals would be capable of deliberately structuring their 
own government affairs—precisely this definition excludes the notion that human beings 
may also hold dear to non-rational and spiritual beliefs: that they may have ‘higher’ 
loyalties, equally defining the contours of their state (these beliefs have often been 
referenced as national solidarity and constitutional patriotism).268
Structural IR outcomes have too long been captured by anthropomorphic 
definitions of measurable power differentials and degrees of superiority, as opposed to 
also by systemic definitions of emergent authority. Undeniably, individuals are capable 
of making informed choices, and individual statespersons often aim to act as rationally as 
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they can. But this idea of human rationality is anthropomorphic. The aggregate outcomes 
of all individual choices, and how these outcomes often consist of environmental and 
ecosystemic catastrophes, are not included in this idea. Yet, statespersons are commonly 
believed to have a ‘higher’ responsibility in judging the validity and reliability of the 
information they will be using in finalizing their choices. If they mostly make 
anthropocentric judgments, they are likely to ignore the systemic consequences of these 
choices. They would probably be moralizing only their own seemingly-rational, 
discursive reasoning (they may blindly trust the idea of electoral rationality, for example). 
Or, their choices would likely give rise to governmental hyper-rationality and solipsism 
(imprudent habits), or they may even exaggerate the tension between individual 
rationality and highly-irrational aggregate consequences (a tension also known as an 
unintended feedback loop). But the conventional definition of aggregate structural 
outcomes, of individual choices, hereby excludes the existential fact that human beings 
are social animals and that their societal relations should also be believed to remain 
deeply embedded within an infinite web of natural and ecosystemic interdependencies 
(for example: food chains).
The definition of sovereignty should refer to more than the outcomes of history. It 
should not only be a measure of structural comparisons because it simply is not just a 
measure of how “different kinds of conflict of interest” have factually evolved. For, if the 
concept were reduced to only such a measure, then it soon ends up being used as a moral 
justification for past causes of war.269 W. G. Runciman’s (Weberian) chapter on power, 
alternatively, suggests that sovereign authority-definitions should also help people make 
528
sense of the qualitative difference between “inducements and sanctions”—rather than in 
to only help them compare interests in terms of their quantifiable compatibility. 
Runciman rather inquires into the “distinctive” difference between the three modes of 
legitimate authority: between the “modes of production, persuasion, and coercion; that is, 
[the modes] ... of distributing and exercising economic, ideological, and coercive power.” 
Because coercion and persuasion tend to coincide, however, and because “hominid 
evolution” has always contained “both co-operative and antagonistic relations”, realists 
should cherish their knowledge of how human beings conform and adjust themselves to 
their dualistic relations. Runciman helpfully suggests that a phenomenon such as social 
conformity is a precondition for evolutionary modification, or for the mutation of the core 
(ideological and coercive) types of power. Power mutates and evolves. Power is 
malleable, as Foucault has shown, so that patterns of human behavior may either be 
“imposed” or “acquired”—and so that the difference between a necessary imposition and 
the free acquisition of power is a contingently-emerging difference, although the 
difference itself may certainly be sustained by the mass media or by national language 
policies.270
Realist theorists ask not since when, and also not why human power mutates. 
They do ask how the qualities and the types of power are constantly mutating and 
adapting. They side with Foucault when they ask why human behavior is neither only 
instrumentally coerced, nor just voluntarily acquired.271 Or, they ask which chance 
factors in the composition of power may correlate strongest with either coercion or 
persuasion. Additionally, they understand that all types of power may be systemically-
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transcended by emerging modes of authority—which are modes somehow believed to 
remain deeply embedded in the social nature of human life as a whole and not just in 
particularly-adaptive powers, and also not just in ideological and coercive powers alone.
Weber’s definition of sovereignty has often been cited to refer to a monopoly on 
coercive powers. But such citations are unhelpful because they present coercion as if it is 
ruled out by persuasion, whereas social life actually teaches that both functions of power 
constantly coincide. The conventional citations also spread unawareness about Weber’s 
richer concept of sovereignty authority—which, as he would say, contains a “paradox” 
and which at minimum also contains a “tense relation” between the two ideal-types of 
cleric and clerk, or ideology and coercion, or between its own religious-intellectual and 
rational-bureaucratic dimensions.272 This paradox has been ignored by conventionalists, 
as they have led many IR students to expect that states must fail as soon as they surrender 
their control over the means of coercion. But there are countries where the means of 
organized violence are not controlled or were never monopolized by one institution of 
government. Rivalries between armed crime syndicates, local and central police 
institutions, and/or the branches of the armed forces are common in many countries.
The state is not sovereign because it holds a monopoly on coercion, although it 
can be useful. Specific government institutions may very well have monopolized their 
power in order to be recognized as bearers of sovereignty. But this does not mean that the 
power over a jurisdiction is also the sort of power that must define sovereign authority. 
Rather, to have power means usually only that the government can enforce its own right 
to police territorial domains, or at least also its right to prosecute certain individuals 
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within the borders of these domains. But the government’s monopolized power itself is 
less defined by a legitimate authority, worthy of international law-recognition, than it is 
by the effectiveness and functionality of its institutions.
Weber is sensitive to the idea that sovereignty cannot be defined by only one sort 
of jurisdictional régime. If any given individual rights-protection régime has been solely 
determined by its coercive powers, this would not add up to a jurisdiction. In order to 
reach that total, shared legal values and norms of justice should be added as well. Instead, 
all jurisdictions also have to have been established by means of a type of power probably 
most-accurately described as the legislative type—but which happens to be the most 
amorphogenetic type of power. For, Weber describes all power (Macht) as something that 
is “sociologically amorphic.”273 This suggests that power cannot be understood without a 
correlating contrary. “Sometimes, the counter-concept of power is: law.”274 In order to be 
able to recognize jurisdictional supremacy, that is, the necessary formations of coercive-
executive power will at times have to have been countered by a persuasive-legislative 
type of power. The protection of individual rights cannot become a concrete project 
unless both types of powers will coincide: governmental power (execution) should at 
least sometimes be opposed by constitutional law (legislation). The lawful right to 
constitute power, or to monopolize power, therefore, should also be defined as a right to 
oppose the bearers of this monopolized power. Power itself remains ultimately form-less, 
however, because its political importance has to have been determined by both those who 
centralized (founded) and those who are decentralizing (opposing) it—and this 
determination is a matter of functional effectiveness, and much less also of its taking on a 
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particular institutional form. Weber’s own concept of the relation between form and 
function, or respectively between the constituted powers of a status quo-régime and the 
constituent right to oppose that régime (as is now to be demonstrated), remains 
consciously ambivalent.275
Weber’s concept of legitimate authority (legitime Herrschaft) should be thought 
to remain unchangeable—unlike Foucault’s idea of power.276 The premise is that if 
power is acquiescent and ideologically malleable, then authority is to be grounded in 
disagreement and anti-ideological skepticism. Authority’s own legitimacy is perpetually 
being doubted and contested. Authority contains a relationship between (and, usually, an 
association of) both the rulers and the ruled, thus, so that both parties will attempt to 
question and judge each other’s appearances. Yet, their mutual relationship emerges, 
often quite mysteriously, from several processes of “social evolution”.277 Weberian 
realism conceives sovereignty as both a cause and an effect of these processes. As David 
Runciman helps point out, the concept of sovereignty refers then to only one strand 
within the whole web of associational and societal processes. Yet, the web as a whole 
cannot be reduced to each of its parts—nor to the sum of all the relations between 
individual sovereign states. The concept rather refers to “an association that cannot be 
identified with its members, its constitution, its powers, or its purposes. In law, such 
associations are known as fictions.”278 But in power, the same associations are often
known as self-balancing organizations (the balance of powers, constitutionalism, 
diplomacy).
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From the viewpoint of a Weberian realist, multilateral treaty-organizations (the 
UN, ICC, IMF, and so on) cannot be considered real carriers of sovereign authority. They 
may hold considerable powers and execute numerous governmental functions, but their 
powers are mostly being organized by an un-authorized principle of balance. Their 
powers are therefore not necessarily legitimate: there is not always also a public space 
and an external forum in which these powers can be organized in any other way. 
Applications of power are still to be scrutinized and legitimized by skeptics—at least, in 
order for any authority to emerge from among the applied powers.
Hobbes knew that the sovereign person is in part a fictitious person: all such 
persons are believed to have equal rights, even if they are not equal in terms of their 
needs and interests.279 Sovereignty is thus a fiduciary form of equal personhood—just as 
well as that it is a corporate body represented by unequal natural-born persons. 
Sovereignty is dualistic: it divides its two components, of the natural-born bodies and 
fiduciary legal persons, or of the powerful bodies and possibly-power-authorizing 
persons, against one another. This means that each individual sovereign can choose its 
policies more or less rationally, yet every actual choice should also be believed to have 
been equally worthy of legitimization—before this sovereign can also be recognized as a 
free participant in the whole IR system. State governmental choice is not identical to, is 
often opposed by, and yet should be authorized by constitutional legitimization processes: 
this is the paradox of dual sovereignty. Although Agamben suggests that the sovereign 
state has been turned into a surveillance state, and that this state’s authority has become 
already so monistic that it can often no longer be recognized through the resistance of its 
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potential enemies (neither friends nor enemies can “guarantee” its recognition, he wrote), 
Weberian realists have opened an alternative folder—about the dialectical method of 
recognition, and about how this method remains vitally important in promising and in 
covenanting for the purpose of recognizing state enemies—especially in this era of 
surveillance sovereignty.280 It is important and it is high time to return to Weber’s method 
of recognizing political legitimacy.
Restoring the Constitutional Order by Holding back from the Sphere of Private Power
Advanced political realists, steering clear of the conventionalist road, should 
move towards Weber as they visualize what it means to live in a state exercising not a 
monist but a dualist mode of sovereignty. Weber’s image of democratization, especially, 
is an image of how a liberal-democratic government’s abstract representational logics can 
oftentimes have counter-productive effects. In this sense, democracy is a form of 
government which can be premised to have two or more contrary effects on the 
organization of legitimate authority. The structural outcomes of government-
democratization tend to be organizationally ambivalent and oftentimes also morally 
ambiguous.
Weber’s own realism starts at the point that modern, liberal, and democratic states 
have merely been carving out a niche within the organizational constellation of societal 
functions. They have not succeeded in transforming these functions and powers into a 
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legitimate mode of authority. Instead, the democratic states have diminished the need for 
contested functions and mutually-opposing powers, as they often would pretend to 
represent all powers equally. The egalitarian ethos of the bourgeoisie, in these states, has 
thus had an incredible effect on what individuals may reasonably know. Egalitarianism 
has rationalized their world of information and science.
Fascinatingly, Weber adds that this rationalization of science and this 
proliferation of “rational empirical knowledge” is simultaneously pushing religious 
beliefs “from the rational into the irrational realm; ... only today does religion become the
irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.”281 Democratic rationalism is one of the 
polity’s logical abilities. It is a logic that can be and that is being used to push “the 
religion of salvation” or, rather, that pushes political beliefs into “an other-worldly 
salvation” and out of the realm of science—and thereby also out of the realm of what 
may be humanly known.282
The “increasingly tense relation” between the rational logic of democracy or 
between this “logic of art” and the metaphysical sciences is a tension which echoes into 
that other relation: between the this-worldly structures of representation (power) and 
other-worldly moments of deliverance and judgment (authority). The latter relation has 
never seized to exist: it is the subject of the so-called perennial philosophy; of the study 
of a paradoxical tension between this-worldly powers and (scientific) faculties, as well as 
the trans-worldly (metaphysical) sources of legitimate knowledge.283
Although Weber does not refer to this rich relation in the same manner, he often 
adds—as he does in and around his section “The Political Sphere”—that “an everlasting 
535
tension exists between the world and the [other-worldly] ... metaphysical realm of 
salvation”. Weber identifies this tension in terms of its opposite effects: in metaphysics it 
is effectuating the “disenchanting [of] the world”, but in the modernized and the
rationalized cognitive structures of this same world it is also accomplishing an 
enchantment of the other-worldly realm. This opposite effect usually occurs because 
access to otherworldliness is being reserved to intellectuals (priests and mystics, but also 
to lawyers), so that any newly-formed social stratum (such as a trading class, or the 
bourgeoisie) will try to expand access to the metaphysical realm. The newly-forming 
classes acquire now their own “aristocratic religiosity of redemption”. The more 
structured their “thinking about the ‘meaning’ of the universe becomes, the more the 
external organization of the world is [then being] rationalized [by these classes], and the 
more the conscious experience of the world’s irrational content is sublimated.” The 
sublimation of this everlasting tension itself will now be believed to have been 
accomplished not by the intellectuals and the mystics, but only by a minimal number of 
charismatic and absolutely ‘enlightened’ (extraordinarily ‘sublimated’) persons: by 
“Buddha, Jesus, or Francis”. Yet, when the newly-arrived are thus restricting the number 
of external forums in which (sacred) charismatic authority may legitimately appear, they 
are also limiting access to group sublimation tactics—as only deified (or: extra-human) 
persons are now believed to once have transcended the “everlasting tension”.284 Non-
dualist restorations of this paradoxical “tension” are, now, in the late-modern era, no 
longer believed a real possibility. But, revolutionary realists may want to ask (as well as 
that Buddhists and Christian believers may do), why not?285
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Against the tendency to rationalize and to equalize human beliefs, as well as 
against the tendency to politically restrict the number of instances in which people 
believe in the authority of their own constitution’s non-rational and spiritual 
transcendence, Weber’s writings suggest throughout, there remains a deep need to return 
to these instances and to the actions of the non-dualist mystics as well. For, these 
extraordinary persons might not have been as extraordinary as that the bourgeoisie and 
the Protestant sects are imagining them to be. Rather, these persons (the Buddha, the 
Christ) were more likely to have set an example to many human groupings. For, they 
succeeded in legitimately combining opposite powers—such as the powers of choice and 
belief, and of rational interest and non-rational legitimacy—and they might even have 
done so in the sense that their opposite-combining actions appeared to be both 
constitutionally and symbolically meaningful and were, therefore, thought to be 
“sovereign”.286
Decades prior to Foucault, Weber thought that the rise of the democratic state was 
an omen of violent things to come. Although Weber did not specifically theorize the 
violence that is silently committed by the surveillance state, Agamben does follow 
Foucault in looking at this state as if it is a late-modern and hyper-rational innovation.287
The surveillance state came into being during the 1870s, when biometric data began to be 
collected—including but not limited to fingerprints, racial qualifications, phrenology and, 
now, the information digitally retrieved from iris scans and facial recognition software. 
Surveillance techniques expand the distance between the conscious self, first, and how 
this self appears to others, second. In the process, a self-conscious citizen will be losing 
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control over her own relation to how her sense of selfhood appears to various pluralities. 
The government becomes an anonymous benefactor of this loss of control, as it 
accumulates images and other data of this citizen’s body. But together with this 
rationalization of the civic body comes the loss of metaphysically-sensible, or also the 
loss of commonsensical cogitations of how persons should be believed to integrate their 
bodies and minds.
Agamben argues that surveillance-democracies often diminish the richness and 
diversity of the life of the body politick. These democracies distance themselves from 
their own bodily life, often by reducing it to the “naked life; [to] a purely biological 
datum”.288 They encapsulate their own conscience by means of surveillance data and 
other social markers, while they increasingly use these markers to identify “the perfect 
senselessness” of the political life in itself.289 Agamben hopes to prove his point with this 
claim: the naked life, constantly subjected to democratic surveillance, is increasingly 
being depoliticized. This life cannot be recognized as either legitimate or illegitimate: 
neither friends nor enemies can “guarantee [its] ... recognition.”  Not natural-born 
persons, but only those with citizen rights are recognized by the surveillance state. Only 
citizens are recognized, yet this is no longer done through any natural experiences. It is 
no longer necessary for political actors to be able to sense one another’s experiences of 
conscientiousness, ethical character, or social integrity. Rather, as Agamben puts it as 
follows: “Not even my ethical capacity to not coincide with the social mark that I have 
nevertheless taken on, can guarantee [my] ... recognition [by either friends or 
enemies].”290
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In contrast to Agamben, political realists hold that recognition is always an 
option: social markers can always be resisted by ethically-acting persons. It is true that 
recognition of an individual citizen cannot be guaranteed to coincide with that citizen’s 
data markers, but this does not have to mean that the general difference between moral 
and immoral, legitimate and illegitimate experiences is no longer being recognized by the 
state as a whole. The norm of “self-determination” is an integral and permanent feature of 
every system of states, because even long before President Wilson presented his Fourteen 
Points speech were states and statelets being recognized as politically autonomous 
entities.291 It is simply untenable to argue that the grand historical coincidences of this 
general norm with all sorts of specific territorial markers (1815, 1945, 1991) will no 
longer be recognized once life in the surveillance state has commenced. It is historically 
improbably that these coincidences will no longer give birth to legitimate sovereignties, 
only because or only once life will have become bare and naked as a result of the 
government’s informational monopolization of all sorts of citizen right-markers.292 The 
whole purpose of waging a war or a revolution against the surveillance state, usually, 
instead, is to begin to recognize an alternative coincidence of opposites—and thus also 
another coincidence of both the legal norm (law) as well as of various social markers 
(power). The research question is why people will perennially be recognizing this new 
coincidence as the source of their legitimate authority.
Theorists as diverse as Dunn, Arendt, and Schmitt find that the causal purpose of 
political revolutions is to advance people’s publically-shared opportunities, not to secure 
and protect their private needs and their private properties alone. The purpose of political 
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action, instead, is to be empowered—which means that power is to be transmuted into 
authority. In this transmutation, people publically recognize the opposition between 
different powers, between values and marks, between norms and decisions, or between 
citizenship rights and the marks and measures of their bare life, as well. Schmitt thought 
about these oppositions as if they were part of one self-perpetuating tension between 
‘natural’ enemies.293 Yet, these enemies would also somehow have to have been 
politically legitimized and socially recognized, by each other, so that they should not 
have to remain beholden to their mere “economic demands” or, as John Dunn puts it, to 
their own “economic rationalism” (that is, realists find sufficient reason to argue that 
sovereign enemies should be believed capable of politically deciding to recognize each 
other by resisting the doctrinal, or the orthodox Marxist, norm that “future production 
must in due course be rationally organized”).294
Arendt gives out several reasons, further, in support of her claim that republican 
states and sovereign persons should not be thought about as democratic representatives. 
Historically, it has been much more typical that statespersons were being selected with 
respect to their integrity and their ethics—rather than only with respect to their power to 
represent a democratic majority or any other outcome of a democratic election. Roman 
antiquity forms a historical period which still exemplifies such republican selection 
protocols, as it helps demonstrate to the world why statespersons should be selected not 
according to economic but “according to political criteria; for their trustworthiness, their 
personal integrity, their capacity of judgment, often for their physical courage.”295 For, 
these “political criteria” were always matters of belief: they were attributed to other 
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actors through shared spiritual (or, literally through: metaphysical) experiences. The 
danger of modern, liberal democracy  is that it pretends that such experiences have 
already been invalidated by each individual’s rational choice—and that the classic 
“political criteria” have to be substituted accordingly. Some orthodox Marxist 
philosophers—or most of the neo-Hegelian utopians, rather—have then also tried to 
substitute the classic “criteria” of encountering political coincidences with a doctrinal 
measure of progressive social order, which is a measure based on self-interested choices 
and no longer also rooted in beliefs such as popular beliefs in a fiduciary degree of 
integrity and judiciousness and courage. This is how Dunn speaks, in silent agreement 
with Arendt, about the twentieth-century gradual rise in the number of formally-Marxist 
democracies: “For the first time in history [have] ... unremittingly secular (non-sacred) 
social orders ... shown themselves militarily capable of survival in the international 
environment.”296
Representing others does not yet translate itself into having a sense of judgment 
and courage. To serve the people as a democratically-elected representative is a function 
of a normative social order: it is a function of how ‘private’ choices have been made, by 
means of a secret ballot.297 But for one be successful as such an anonymously-elected 
representative or delegate does not yet also mean that one is also successful as a judicious 
‘public’ person. It only means that one adheres to a basic norm or procedure of 
government, but not necessarily also that one will be believed to be deciding on political 
issues (possibly involving relations and recognitions of enmity) in a conscionable and 
legitimate manner.298
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The question of legitimate representations, by the state, and of how the state is 
recognized through such representations, is a question of how ‘private’ self-interest will 
and should be translated into ‘public’ opinions and agreed-upon doctrinal beliefs. Both 
the state’s public and private spheres will have to have been constitutionally balanced 
against individual desires and needs. Arendt thinks that, in late modernity or in the 
twentieth century, people have begun to forget why, without this balance, constitutional 
corruption occurs. Yet, she warns, corruption has always been believed “much more 
likely to arise from private interests than from public power”—and that this belief should 
not be said to have disappeared simply because the twentieth-century world has been 
experiencing “rapid and constant economic growth [and therein also] ... a constantly 
increasing expansion of the private realm”.299
As the sphere of democratic and economic choice has expanded itself so 
relentlessly, leisure has become less political. Less time is now being spend on public 
activities and, above all, less time seems to remain dedicated to those activities of setting 
out to restore “an ideal order” or at least those that “set out to imitate as best [as humanly 
possible] ... revolutions of an earlier date” (in Dunn’s words).300 Time spend on 
revolution should, in a deeper sense, remain time reserved for constitution-restorative 
action. Yet, again, it will have to be a kind of leisure that generates two mutually-opposed 
tendencies: change and conservation; the power of reason and the authority of 
tradition.301 It generates (Arendt’s) “twofold process of decision and persuasion”—
without interferences from any of the typically economic “worries”.302
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In a moment of modern individualism, leisure came to be defined both as time 
spend on self-gratification and as a luxury. But in a coinciding moment, of republican 
constitutionalism, leisure would still have remained defined by efforts to live a judicious 
life, or by people’s trying to understand how and when their public service demands 
austerity as well as a negation of economic luxury. Republican leisure (from the Greek 
scholē) stands thus in direct opposition to the tendency to surrender one’s time to socio-
economic and financial worries (a-scholia). In The Life of the Mind, Arendt adds that the 
more public sort of leisure is not to be confused with unused time. In the ancient 
republics, “[s]cholē is not leisure time as [the moderns] ... understand it, [which is as] the 
left-over spare time, ... but [as] the deliberate act of abstaining of holding oneself back 
(schein) from the ordinary activities determined by ... daily wants”.303Leisure can now be 
understood as a virtue: it can be the art of holding oneself back from mundane wants and 
worries. By trying not to deal with the miseries of day-to-day life, it may become 
possible to freely participate in the twofold process of deciding and persuading, of 
commanding and legitimizing, but also of equally respecting the “legal personality” of 
both dimensions of this complex political process.304
However rudimentarily, Aristotle suggests that wherever people enjoy leisure, 
they must somehow have borrowed this leisure-time from their power of “empire”—or 
from their economic spheres—in order for them to judge one another. This is why lesser 
privileged people, who “have no leisure for their duties”, tend to “make poor 
magistrates”.305 Arendt agrees that good judgeships are made by people who can find 
time to hold themselves back(scholē). These people do not need to be rich, therefore, but 
543
they should not have to be worrying about their bodily needs and their basic capabilities. 
Rich people are to be distrusted, by republican people, because abundant wealth suggests 
a failure to hold back. Republican leisure does not oppose all needs and passions, but 
only those demanding excessive satisfaction. Recreational play (by the few) and the 
satisfaction of basic necessities (by the many) can both become excessively addictive 
activities, so that leisure should be dedicated neither to oligarchical nor to democratic 
causes—but, rather, to preserve everyone’s isonomy.306 As one commentator clarifies, 
people should not be using their leisure to derive satisfaction from their private interests, 
but from their representing themselves within the public realm: their leisure is best 
expressed in devoting themselves “to friends, and the city.”307 In any exemplary republic, 
Arendt agrees, “to act out leisure ... was the true [purpose] of all other activities, just as 
peace, for Aristotle, was the true goal of war.”308
The attitudes of two U.S. Presidents, Washington and Jackson, were in one of the 
previous subsections said to stand in opposition to one another. Yet, Weber suggested 
these attitudes could also limit each other: private necessity and public freedom cannot be 
separated from one another, as the latter should imply a relative moderation of the 
former. President Washington defended of course a republic of estate-holders: he had 
favored “a commonwealth administered by ‘gentlemen’.” To the contrary, Jackson lived 
through times of great economic expansion, which had endangered a (Washington’s) 
yeomanry culture. Under Jackson’s administration, the American government became 
vulnerable to democratic/ochlocratic private impulses so that it soon resembled a 
“plebiscitarian ‘machine’”—as Weber adds—which operated in accordance to the twin 
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demands of private interest and “office-patronage.”309 Jackson exemplifies the modern 
state’s surrender to a clientèle of great a-scholia.310 But republican (and particularly 
Thomas Jefferson’s) concepts of leisure (scholē) would rather have been marked by their 
ancient connotation of performing a service to the eternal benefit of the commonwealth. 
As Arendt adds, President Jackson’s modern concept was no longer applicable to 
representations of “political happiness [as] an image of eternal bliss.”311
By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it had become 
abundantly clear this would not be a century of unlimited expansion in the social, 
economic, and the financial spheres. The amount of fictive capital, which is the sort of 
capital that consists of financial credit and of speculative interests without any 
substantive counter-value, was already estimated to have risen to over eighty percent of 
all capital in the world. But such a statistical estimate would have been incomprehensible 
to Washington, Jefferson, and even to Arendt. To any republican mind, it would have 
seemed a serious abuse of political time to try to shore up an entire sector of high finance 
by solely increasing the value of bank-loans, of credit, and of fictive capital.312
Worries about high finance should not be accepted into the public realm. To 
recapitulate the lesson of leisure (scholē), although it is inevitable that differences in 
financial wealth—created by merit and trade and enterprise—will persist in almost any 
society, this does not mean that these differences should ever be exaggerated by the 
decisions of statespersons. Instead, their fundamental task should be to relegate worries 
about income inequalities, global credit-flows, and financial imbalances back to the 
sphere of micro-economics. These worries are in essence nothing but worries about basic 
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needs, so that the true task of the republican statesperson is to promise (and, where 
possible, to guarantee) that everyone will have equal leisure to participate in one’s own 
public affairs: this is the principle of isonomy; the freedom not to have to worry about 
housing or jobs or nutritious food. In even more concrete terms, the lesson from the 
above is that republican governments should be asking their richest constituents to pay 
taxes—both on their non-essential consumption patterns (luxury taxes) but particularly 
also on their capital goods—so that the plurality of all other constituents can find equal 
time for their pursuit of “political happiness.” Consequentially, the system of states as a 
whole ought to be representing its constituent parts by allowing them to equally satisfy 
their basic needs—to the extent that all these parts will be enabled to exercise their 
sovereign authority through two powers: the power of an anarchical democracy as well as 
through the power of official authorities. That is, sovereignty emerges both through the 
constituents’ functionally-organized resistance (their classicist revolutionary potential) to 
as well as through the formally-vested structures of capital and legality (property rights, 
assemblies, tribunals, and so on).313
The theoretical difference between neo-Hegelian (utopian) Marxism and ‘new’ 
republican realism is a difference of how encounters with complex relations between 
freedom and necessity should be interpreted.314 More succinctly, the lesson of leisure 
(scholē) is that every human being is in principle free to appear in the public realm with a 
proposal to negate everyone’s dependency on the satisfaction of basic necessities. If 
leisure is to remain virtuous, hence, no unequal time may be dedicated to public affairs. 
But as only natural-born persons can decide how they should dedicate their leisure, and 
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what it means to have equal time to discuss and decide on particular policy-proposals, 
only they may be believed to be bearers of their own legal personality. Private business 
corporations cannot, at least not for the same reason, be allowed to use their artificially-
constructed personality in order to participate in the public realm. Structurally, it is 
impossible for capitalist corporations to decide how to have leisure and how to secure the 
leisure of others. In addition, capitalist business corporations should not even be allowed 
to donate some of their profits to charity: this would be a non-capitalist function of a 
business corporation, and private charities must therefore be kept out of the public realm 
(of course, corporations may very well be taxed on their profits, because the purpose for 
the taxes can be decided on by isonomous human beings).
Freedom and necessity have rarely been divorced from one another, but even 
when they were presented separately, freedom nonetheless would be used to oppose and 
thereby prevent necessity from intruding on the republic. This is a perennial principle, 
applicable to relations between neighbors, between wards, as well as to those between 
nation-states. Also, the principle is so simple that Arendt would respond incredulously 
after being confronted by the harbingers of a democratic student movement who were 
assuming (falsely) that necessity can intrude on freedom because it somehow derives 
from freedom. Arendt warns them that they are thus confusing the power of freedom with 
the violence of necessity—and so she clearly says to them that “violence cannot be 
derived from its opposite, which is power”. “Violence can destroy power [but remains] ... 
incapable of creating it.” Indeed, rather, both violence and need are most likely to appear 
in all those spaces wherein power and participation have been gravely jeopardized: these 
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are mutually-negating opposites. Both the force of necessity and the republican process 
of participation should be believed to resist one another, therefore, in other terms, rather 
than to be following some neo-Hegelian assumption: they have never efficiently 
“develop[ed] into each other”; there simply is no evidence of any third synthesis.315
Contrary to the assumption that structural violences and economic necessities 
would somehow derive from the processes of public participation, republican realists 
argue that they do not derive but oppose each other—politically. No concept of 
substantive satisfaction can derive its meaning directly from formative happiness, in 
again different words, because political happiness is not a substance. It is an 
organizational process of holding back from, as opposed to of giving in to substantial 
structural needs. This process of happiness may legitimize how these structural needs are 
being satisfied, perhaps, yet the satisfaction of needs in itself does not also have to 
legitimize the process of publically attaining happiness. Instead, public happiness and 
private needs are ruling in conjunction: they form a co-rulership, in the sense that they 
have to be integrated in accordance to another revolutionary (Washingtonian-
Jeffersonian) dictum which, as Arendt mentions, is the dictum of “spectemur agendo—
‘let us be seen in action’, let us have a space where we are seen and can act’”.316
The rulers and the ruled are never empowered equally, as structural injustices and 
inequities have always persisted. But this empirical fact does not warrant the assumption 
that the rulers and the ruled would one day no longer rotate their duties and their offices, 
and would then no longer serve as co-rulers. Realists argue, rather, that rulers and ruled 
can very well share a common space, where they will be seen to act together—as Arendt 
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would have put it. To save the ruled from their own “inattention to public business”, she 
argues in On Revolution, for instance, they will have to have been provided with adequate 
political opportunities to rule—and to, thereby, remain able to always restore the 
constitution they share with the rulers-that-be.317 The U.S. Constitution could not 
continue to provide such opportunities, tragically, because it had made no provision (at 
least, not sufficiently so in Article 5) to maintain that mysterious tension between the 
satisfaction of late-modern America’s socio-economic needs and the political freedom of 
early-modern America’s “townships and the town-hall meetings: the original springs of 
all political activity” and “the original sources of ... public happiness.”318
The pro-democratic liberal theorist Robert Dahl informs his readers that 
competing private interests are often the springs of public happiness. But these readers 
have to feel disappointed, at the hands of the above-presented realists, as these found that 
the sum of all private interests cannot be derived from, nor should it ever become 
identical to the democratic process of opinion-formation.319 Competition should not occur 
within the private, but in the public realm, as Aristotle believed as well, which is a realm 
that simply cannot be equated to its own democratic tendencies.320 The public realm can 
also very well have aristocratic tendencies, for example, because democracy and 
aristocracy and monarchy are all forms of government—and they might have been 
divorced from a constitutional process of government-authorization. Yet, only the public 
realm as a whole has always formed and substantiated its own sources of legitimate 
authority (as every public realm is a coincidence of government structures and 
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constitutional processes), whereas democracy must still borrow much of its legitimacy 
from some exogenous degree of willingness to resist governmental oligarchy.321
To conclude, acts of opining and of appearing in the public realm or of 
experiencing the happiness of publicality, are part of an organizational process with a 
“twofold meaning”. Firstly, publicality means that people are generally willing to refrain 
from worrying about how they should be investing money in their individual futures or 
how they should be spending their private spare-time in a consumer society (a-scholia). 
Secondly, it means that day-to-day government affairs are being executed for a common 
purpose and in equal respect of everyone’s proposals concerning the possible alternatives 
to this purpose (isonomy), as well as in respect of an apparent tension between the 
executive apparatus and its own transcendent purpose. The state’s government affairs 
such as consumer and corporate tax policies, or how international financial institutions 
should be regulated, therefore, should be allowed to be resisted by the people as a whole. 
This mode of resistance is ‘naturally’ conjectural, in that it is a coincidence of both “the 
pursuit of [private] well-being as well as [of the] being a ‘participator in public 
affairs.’”322 Private needs and public affairs are not mutually exclusive, that is, but their 
resistance allows them somehow to remain symbiotically related to each other.
These sections press for a meaningful answer to why relatively few persons 
participate in the recognition of other sovereign states—and how more persons can 
dedicate more time to a revolutionary reorganization of the relations between states. This 
reorganizational process will be never-ending, yet should promote peace and stability 
through the right to be recognized as a member of a state with a legal personality: equal 
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sovereignty is the equal right to organize and to so also authorize and legitimize the 
structures of force and power. Recognition of equal sovereignty may very well depend on 
liberal norms and legal values, but the political issue is how these values and norms are 
being substantiated by groupings of people who can publically and demonstrably hold 
themselves back from all those who are in their stead continuing to cause inequitable, 
unjust, and coercive consumption-motivated substantiations. Both legal values and basic 
needs can all too easily be used to justify and celebrate social surveillance-centric 
conventions—and such celebrations would diminish the chance that these values and 
needs are newly being legitimized by sovereign decisions over, and by new isonomous
exceptions, to such conventions.
Transcendent Conversions of Revolutionary Groupings and their Dual Authority
Must political groupings, because they are comprising diverse partisans, tolerate 
significant “gradients” of power inequality and structural injustice? Few political 
groupings have a tolerance for “hierarchical extremes” and yet power has been unequally 
distributed across the globe. Distributive structures of power are highly unequal, yet 
many structures have been organized to diminish their own injustices. This apparent 
paradox stems from an evolutionary process that has led human beings (at least more than 
half of the global population) from a nomadic and pastoralist towards an urbanized 
existence. “[F]airness and reciprocity”—or a low tolerance for artificial, extreme 
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hierarchies—has always increased the nomadic band’s chances of survival.323But in cities 
it becomes far more difficult to comprehend how hierarchies are being maintained, as 
traditional notions of kinship and sacrality are herein being displaced by state apparatuses 
and their own modern ideas about the level of social orderliness and tolerable levels of 
injustice and inequity.
Five-year old children can understand fairness very well: they can ‘naturally’ 
ascribe, to the actions of other human beings, their own beliefs about cultural conventions 
as basic as equality.324 Admittedly, unequal and hierarchical groupings have persisted for 
decades, despite their having relatively low chances of long-term or of cross-generational 
survival. But with the onset of urbanization, as Weber taught, also, commerce and trade 
came to provide a new impetus to hierarchies based on individualism—and, therefore, to 
hierarchies based less and less on ‘natural’ beliefs in and ascriptions of equal freedom.325
Prior to the 1960s, in particular, extremely hierarchical groupings were usually 
comprised of the commerce-oriented and colonizing states (including Portugal, Britain, 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands). Territories forced into the various international 
trade and commercial export cultures, had for decades been losing their resources to 
colonialists. Ever since non-industrialized countries had been invaded by the colonial 
cultures, their populations suffered intensely. In India, they suffered from great famines 
directly resulting from the invasions. Before the end of the 1940s, it had become widely 
known that the British export culture had slowly been starving India’s pastoralist rice-
farmers, as well as that this culture had been too dismissive towards indigenous 
groundwater-storage techniques.326 As another example, of indirect colonialism; almost 
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half of the owners of Cuba’s sugar plantations were, by the 1950s, American. Their sugar 
export interests proved to be as unsustainable as British exports, however, because “the 
landless rural laborer” soon stood up for her equality—in solidarity with small bands of 
revolutionaries.327
Revolutionary seditionists and other such rebel groups cannot simply try to 
maintain the existing distribution, and division, of powers. In order to attain their 
purpose, they will also have to respect a new modicum of equal access to power. The 
nomadic origins of the human species  engrained in groups a healthy respect for the 
equality of their members, but also for non-member neighbors. Yet, urbanization appears 
to have, at least partially, numbed this sense of equal respect. Both the abortive Bay of 
Pigs invasion, of Cuba, by American-sponsored troops and President Eisenhower’s 
decision to withdraw certain sugar quota, can be listed among those events that came to 
indicate a renewal of equal sovereignty. The events demonstrated it was becoming 
impossible for the government in Washington, D.C. to continue to maintain any sort of 
neo-imperialist hierarchical relation with places like Havana.328 After 1959, both the U.S. 
and Cuba would thus have to come to terms with the fact that they both required another 
sort of conference of political legitimacy—in order for them to continue to be recognized, 
as sovereign actors, both inside and outside the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin. 
Even if states are enemies, in brief, the fact that they are recognizing each other’s 
existence as sovereigns is in itself already a promise about their equal right to 
sovereignty. States can have equal rights to be legitimized by others, simply because it is 
part of ‘human nature’ to ascribe such equality to each other—as, possibly neighboring, 
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groups of human beings. (These facts of recognition and legitimization shall again inform 
the opening sections of Chapter Three, on Machiavelli and his theory of revolutionary 
action).
Each faction and each group has a ‘natural’ stake in the political transmutation of 
its own powers, into a mode of authority expressive of their relatively equal rights. 
Powers, including each group’s ability to use physical and armed force, are ‘naturally’ 
prone to become acknowledged as the parts of some equality-legitimized mode of 
authority. Historically, most such equality-legitimacy-possessing groups were the kind of 
groups that tried to provide civilians with goods and services other than only basic 
security, and other than only those conditions that guaranteed the group’s mere 
subsistence.329 These groups had also encountered, more often than not, great difficulties 
in meeting “the start-up costs of rebellion”: only the type of groups that would easily 
meet these “start-up costs” were groups that quickly gained control over, and that then 
sold or exported a scarce resource (oil, gold, diamonds). As these latter few groups were 
thus comparatively cheap to start, however, they also were becoming least likely to 
succeed in providing goods to non-members.330 For these opportunist rebel groups, there 
would be no incentives to be “shaping identities, mobilizing networks, and building 
ideologies”—as Jeremy Weinstein has empirically substantiated this finding.331
Ugandan and Nepali insurgents, respectively in the 1980s and 1990s, received 
wide-spread support from civilians upon having respected their equality—and thus upon 
having created legitimate political identities for themselves as well. In contradistinction, 
other rebel groups would clearly fail to accomplish their political goals, throughout the 
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1990s—since they were growing dependent on external revenues, generated by selling 
valuable resources, rather than on the indigenous population. They would then take too 
few opportunities to maintain internal discipline. Thus, their failing to police their own 
rebel cadres is the type of failure that helps explain the brutalization of wars in Angola, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Indonesia. Weinstein refers to such civil wars as 
“opportunistic insurgencies”—because any force for disintegration and social 
incohesiveness would herein be justified by “short-term material incentives.”332 The 
result of the overall process has been a series of civil wars with “high levels of 
indiscriminate violence.”333
Yet, in Uganda, the National Resistance Army (of 1981) cultivated a strong 
identity based on its considerable support network. It also supplied health posts and 
sanctioned any “rebel misbehavior.” Civilians freely gave the NRA shelter, food, and 
information.334 Similarly, when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) began to 
organize an autonomous armed movement, in 1996, it became highly successful in 
soliciting contributions—either through extortion and robbery or simple taxes. The rebel 
cadre had often been selected from “student populations and trade union members” 
before being schooled in “Maoist doctrine”.335 By maintaining a strong sense of self-
sufficiency, furthermore, the Maoists could manage to provide many Nepali people with 
those services the monarchical state had, up-to-that-moment, failed to deliver.
Despite having brought power structures back into the dynamics of organizational 
self-legitimization, what Weinstein has not explained and what can probably never be 
empirically explained, however, is why the cadres of groupings such as the Cuban 
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Communists, the NRA, and the Nepali Maoists are themselves believing they should 
remain cohesive in their support for—and that they should thus authorize the actions of—
their own leadership. So, which sort of self-organizing degree of charismatic legitimacy 
would their leaders have to have enjoyed in order for them to become sufficiently 
successful in persuading non-members to either join their cadres or to at least tacitly 
support their common purpose? Why should particularly these cadres—as opposed to 
those suffering from opportunism or otherwise at least from a ‘resource curse’—trust 
their leaders and why should their whole web of relations, between followers and 
revolutionary leaders, be believed worthy of recognition as equal sovereigns?
The complexity of the IR system, with its great diversity of associative relations 
between the ruled and their rulers, is constantly being defined by political theorists. The 
results from Weinstein’s empirical research, into how these relations tend to attain 
stability and legitimacy, even among the most radical revolutionaries, are results which 
can be used to redefine the world’s actual international recognition practices. In 
recognizing the statehood of some revolutionaries, but not of other seditionists and 
separatists, the Great Powers of the world can become more self-conscious of the criteria 
they are applying and which ones they should be applying. The legitimacy of new states 
and the illegitimacy of failed states is not effortlessly determined, by either theorists or 
diplomats, yet the difference itself prompts a conceptual judgment best expressed in the 
grammar of dual emergent authority.
During the Cold War, international recognition practices depended much on what 
it meant for an aspiring state to co-operate with either one of the Super Powers. The UN 
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Security Council would then often be instrumental in the ‘hand-over’ of the supreme 
authority, from a European state, to the revolutionaries of one rather than of another 
newly-decolonizing territory. The Security Council would typically facilitate and then 
authorize the world-wide recognition of equal sovereignty, within those territories that 
were now no longer being physically colonized. But the Council only took on this role 
because the Super Powers were aligning their own interests with those of the 
decolonizing governments. Especially the U.S. government would prompt its allies on the 
Council (Britain and France) to curtail threats emanating from Moscow by surrendering 
imperialist claims to ‘their’ under-modernized or ‘their’ poorly-industrialized 
territories.336
In the field of international theory, social constructivists as well as various 
Democratic Peace (DP) theorists—have tried to argue sovereignty recognition practices, 
during the Cold War, were the result of morally-justifiable ideals. The practices would 
have been the structural outcomes of new moral values, of new national identities, and of 
new justifications for a post-colonial order—rather than that they were the effects of an 
organizational process of alliance-brokering and systemic bipolarity.337 Social 
constructivist theorists have also, typically, found that the moments of decolonization, in 
themselves, would somehow have helped to create a radically-integrated constitutional 
basis for the complete structure of statehood.338 As one of them (Philpott) writes, the 
presence of this constitutional basis cannot be explained otherwise than as having been 
effectuated by a new anti-colonial moral convention “analogous to the British 
[C]onstitution, which ... carries formidable consensus.”339 But this analogy is misplaced: 
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it ignores the historical fact that the British Constitution is embedded in an imperialist, or 
in a commercial culture—and that this culture has had tremendously harmful effects on 
the fates of (previously) colonized peoples. This Constitution was too often being used, 
indeed at least until into the 1960s, as a moral justification for the exploitation of those 
whose political freedom had been subordinated to the commercial aims of the British 
Crown—and it was, also all too often, certainly not carrying a “consensus” among 
starving people in India or in Kenya.
Upon having written about a seemingly self-reinforcing process of consensus-
substantiations, similar to how the above theorists observed it, as if it were an ongoing 
social construction of post-colonial values and even post-hierarchical identities, Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri have been committing the fallacy of political prophesizing. 
They have been failing to give enough reasons for their prediction, or for their prophesy, 
rather, that the social construction of normative liberties and of post-colonialism will 
continue to proceed—and that this process will eventually reach a point of synthesis.340
That is, they are essentially claiming to have foreseen the integration of both the right to 
command as well as of the structures of functional power, or: of both political authority 
as well as of economic functions and other powerful needs. To put it in their own words, 
this coming synthesis would consist of a moment in which the “complete compatibility 
between sovereignty and capital” will have been achieved, and in which both “economic 
production and political constitution” will have become so closely aligned that the 
world’s economic conventions must be said to have become integrated into one 
consensual constitution.341 It is “within” sovereignty, Hardt and Negri further indicate, 
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that its “transcendence of command” may either be integrated with structural power, or 
that it may even have become replaced by the “transcendence of [its] ... function.”342
Arendt’s On Revolution and Weber’s Protestant Ethos are core texts in political 
theory, but they must be newly interpreted—the lend support to realism’s disagreement 
with constructivist idealists, such as Hardt and Negri. These texts give meaning to the 
particularities of equality-legitimization processes, in passages hitherto grossly neglected 
by IR and DP constructivists. Yet, realists can alternatively be reading these passages 
with an eye on equality’s own ‘natural’ and commonsensical authority—as well as to 
demonstrate that sovereign states are being recognized, as such, not just by means of a 
single convention, by analogy of some democratization-of-social-identities process, nor 
because recognition would have to follow from a normative “consensus” (on the meaning 
of equality). Instead, realists object, states are first of all being recognized through a 
complex combination of both ideas about a (structural) “consensus” as well as of contrary 
decisions that have been guided by the (organizational) Balance of Super Powers. 
Sovereignty is less a ‘gift’ or a ‘hand-out’ from one state’s government to another than 
that it will have been recognized because one particular party’s right to authority 
(“command”) must have been legitimized through an organizational balance: through one 
particular grouping’s concrete and formative experiences in relation to other groupings. 
Realists find that the recognition of dual authority also, always, must follow from a 
spontaneous restoration of the balance (isonomy) between different groupings and their 
different constitutional organizations: between both the formative right to command 
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itself, first, and all the particular substantive, and organizational legitimizations of that 
right, second.
During the 1960s, to continue the example, such a spontaneous constitutional 
restoration took on two distinct forms. It would be a process that had been formed by the 
two opposite organizations of both a globalizing and a liberalizing capitalist economy 
(afterwards also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’), as well as of all those planned 
economies that had remained ideologically-affiliated with Moscow’s socialist 
modernization programs. Realists acknowledge that the constructivist indications of an 
integration of both forms may certainly be valid, but they add that these are both still very 
much commercially-oriented economic forms. Realism’s acknowledgment is thus not an 
indication of a future integration of both these structural forms and organizational 
functions—nor of both structural commercial needs as well as of political authority. 
However agonistically, rather, both structural needs and organizational authorities cannot 
exist but if they sustain their open-ended mutually-inspired opposition.343
Weber taught that commerce places a cultural premium on individualism, and that 
all commercial hierarchy-creating groupings (a category that includes imperial 
colonialists) are groupings which in all likelihood must somehow have lost the political 
grounds for their own freedom and their own equal right to authority. People living in 
social and economic hierarchies are likely to have felt a numbing of their ‘natural’ 
aptitude for ascribing equality and inequality to others, especially ever since commercial 
cultures first started to colonize their moral, ideological, and democratic high grounds. 
But “economic development” has at the same time remained a process without any strong 
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“affinity” (Wahlverwandtschaft) with political and possibly democratic ideologies: the 
struggle between economic structures and the right to equality and public authority is an 
open-ended rather than a synthetic struggle.344 Weberian realists have plenty of reason, 
therefore, to be raising the question what ‘natural’ spontaneity (participatory freedom) 
means—because they respect its agonistic character, not because they expect the struggle 
can come to an end. The paradox is that although peoples ‘naturally’ believe to have a 
right to equal sovereignty, this right in itself cannot herald the end to their agony. The 
right itself cannot be totally integrated with the fact of their living under conditions of 
societal and hierarchical stratification by means of which this same natural right is always 
again being exercised according to beliefs in its very existence or, that is, “according to 
[free] choice, political competence, or political trust.”345
How is it that very young human beings are able to spontaneously ascribe the 
difference between equality and inequality to actions of other human beings, but that 
societal stratifications and cultural conventions also seem to numb their sense of 
spontaneity? This Weberian (and Rousseauan) question applies, also, to the paradoxical 
terms under which the equality of a constitutional balance can be ascribed to the system 
of states.346 It is in this systemic sense, then, a question of how people may spontaneously 
express their beliefs in equal sovereignty as well as of how political realists may express 
their skepticism about their liberal and constructivist counter-parts—who are still failing 
to re-read Arendt’s words on precisely which sorts of revolutionary phenomena may be 
classified as spontaneous emergences of (dual) authority.
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Arendt wrote that the spontaneous acts of authority’s self-balancing and self-
emerging, within the IR system, are acts motivated by a passion to restore the “rank and 
dignity of opinion[s] in the hierarchy of human rational abilities.”347 She theorizes this 
passion for the restoration of constitutional “dignity”, also, because she understands it to 
be both a spontaneous and revolutionary as well as an authoritative passion: she trusts 
that the powers of “passion” and “opinion” can ‘naturally’ remain balanced against 
“reasons” and their public authority, so that unbalanced needs and desires can freshly be 
condemned—as possibly having become too irrational and opportunistic, or too 
licentious or tyrannical.348
Acts of spontaneous association are acts that are being recognized along criteria 
of equal treatment and natural rights to self-organize. Political groupings and civil 
associations will usually appeal quite directly to the equalities, natural rights, and ethical 
consciousness of their members. But the dynamics of cohesion and constitutional 
longevity, within each group, mostly depend on how its members will judge and will 
express their beliefs in the complex and seemingly paradoxical relationship between the 
necessity of group conventions and their own equal freedom to participate in the setting 
of such conventions.349 In brief, acts of association may spontaneously and contingently 
manifest themselves in two opposite manners, also known as the manners of the power of 
freedom and the force of necessity. But the opposition between both manners is less 
paradoxical, according to advanced realists, than has sometimes been assumed by the 
constructivist and the liberal philosophers. As Dunn might say, the opposition is 
politically-constitutional and can therefore not just be ‘thought away.’ Even though the 
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opposition is subject to contextualization and historicist forms of rhetoric, hence, it 
should not just be objectified, synthesized, or also not be fully transcended in order to 
avoid any and all rhetoric—because making any such ‘moves’ would be like ‘doing 
away’ with the political art of judgment and prudence.350
The main question, in the above sections, has been how pluralities of groupings 
(should) ‘naturally’ confer legitimacy onto their own governmental conventions. The 
subsection now at hand continues to answer this question by further discovering from 
which sort of tension a more judicious, prudent, and indeed legitimate modality of 
(sovereign) authority may emerge. Discovering means, in this context, another visiting of 
Weber’s oeuvre and work on charisma—as one of the three sources of legitimacy.351 The 
positively-defined sources of legitimacy are administrative rationality and various norms 
and conventions. The relation between these first two sources has been theorized, in the 
above sections, as resisting a separation between the sources. The relation expresses itself 
in an agonizing and perplexing tension between any group’s Term (2) rational structures 
and government apparatuses, and that same group’s Term (1) constitutional organizations 
and eternal conventions. These two sources of legitimacy can be positivized, furthermore, 
precisely because they lend authority (which is an intuitive right to command) to 
qualitatively unique components of the realm of political happiness.352 That is, because 
the components differ so much from one another, in qualitative terms, these components 
must be posited in conjunction to each other before they can be said to also legitimize the 
state’s sovereignty. Both are positive prerequisites in the recognition of political 
groupings.
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But as the fates and the images of revolutionary movements as diverse as the 
Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal or the Kurdish Resistance 
(PKK) illustrate, there is no universal truth that can describe the relation between a state’s 
government (the administrative powers) and any revolutionary resistance against that 
government (the public contestation of its constitutionality). Each revolution will give its 
own shapes and colors to this complex relation—between the two sources, or between the 
components of, dual sovereignty. The particularity of each revolution and of each state’s 
constitutional heritage may not be used to write any general objective laws about their 
futures. What is in their revolutionary futures should be trusted to have been presented 
within their pasts. Weber and Arendt have shown, moreover, that the diversity and 
particularity of states and other such political societies can very well be theorized without 
ever expecting any objectified future synthesis to occur within their relationships.353
Realist theory holds simply, and humbly, that a society is beginning to ‘govern’ 
its own life, as a political actor, in the same moment as that it quite invariably also begins 
to transcend both its government’s rational structures as well as the sort of normative 
self-constitutional processes it shares with many other such structures. One possible 
example of this moment of both transcendence and inclusion is how government experts 
(clerks) often imitate the insignia and mores of a traditional religious culture (of the 
clerics), but that the powers of both the administrative experts and the religious leaders 
must begin to coincide in order for their dual authority to emerge—from, by transcending 
the qualitative difference between, indeed, both rational experts and traditional leaders.354
The two sources of legitimacy then remain necessary, but also will become insufficient in 
564
order to genuinely understand the subjective purposes and common symbols of the 
sources’ “tense relation”—or, also, of both the insurmountable “tension” and the 
“paradox” between any given society’s governmental supremacy and its constitutional 
equality, between its structural needs and its political leisure, as well as between 
respectively its Term (2) bureaucratic-rational and its Term (1) religious-intellectual 
dimensions.355
Because the Terms (1) and (2) dimensions may mutually negate each other and 
because of the opposition between the two positive components of dual authority, that is, 
it is as if realism’s subject matter consists of two positives and one negative. Realists 
argue that most people are able to take notice of the two positive substantiations as well 
as of the negative relation between these substantiations of their own ultimate authority. 
But this negative relation would also have to be considered the most mysterious of 
realism’s three subjects. It appears to  maintain itself as a balance between abstract 
conventions and concrete decisions, or between the conventional beliefs in the equality of 
needs, first, and the state’s unfair protection of material needs, second. Much research has 
been done on the tipping point at which an unstable tension turns into a stable balance, or 
when the balance of powers has stabilized itself by transcending both of its component-
powers. Among IR realists, these research efforts have remained inadequately aligned to 
sessions in natural systems theory, however. The platform for future chapter sections 
shall be build from this sense of inadequacy, in the field of IR theory, and the ensuing 
misalignment between the study of natural systems and conventional realism.
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Weber’s Concept of Charismatic Authority: Personal and Official; Private and Public
Republican thought has long helped both the ruled and the rulers in their efforts to 
co-appear within a world of states. Republicanism is a language of public judgments, in 
this sense, rather than of ‘playing’ the interests of citizens against those of their 
governments. This language continues to be spoken in reference to any sort of difference 
between prudent and imprudent, as well as between exemplary and fraudulent types of 
political action. It may even be said that republican virtues express the profoundly human 
need for social self-moderation—and that they herein tend to have an organizationally-
moderating effect on the tension of the Janus-like appearance of both freedom and 
necessity. Some sort of third space is necessary before people will spontaneously begin to 
command respect, dignity, as well as in which everyone “[will be] seen and can act” 
(spectemur agendo).356
Both Weber and Arendt, applaud the virtues because these would help create 
spaces in which people can begin to prevent inordinate, opportunistic double-sidedness 
(which is marked by hypocrisy, fraud, force, and so on) and thus appear to be acting both 
politically and legitimately.357 From Weber’s perspective, the moderation and 
legitimization of any actor’s authority may take place in several possible (third) spaces 
and levels of social organization.358 But, he also limits the spaces, because moderation 
and legitimization are merely occurrences of only one of three processes. Specifically 
charismatic leadership, however, forms then the third of these processes—while Term (3) 
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charisma itself derives neither from freedom nor from necessity alone. It may neither be 
derived from opinions and norms, nor solely from needs and decisions. Charisma is 
exceptionally ambivalent, in the sense that it in their stead emerges from beliefs. The 
dictionary considers beliefs to be conditions or habits of placing “confidence” in a 
person. Also, whereas faith is always defined by “certitude”, beliefs “may or may not 
imply certitude in the believer.”359 Political beliefs in a charismatic person, therefore, are 
a group’s habits of either possibly or of possibly not experiencing sufficient inner 
certitude while placing confidence in that person. Weber’s Term (3) legitimization 
process may or may not be experienced by a group which has some sort of extraordinary 
trust in its leaders. How does this process begin to take place, in which (third) spaces, and 
then why there?
It is time to open a last parcel of secondary literature on Weber’s theory of 
legitimate authority—which was packaged by Baehr, Kalberg, and Kim. How has 
Weber’s theory been understood by these writers, how can beliefs help people judge the 
contingent relations between private necessity and public freedom? Why should group 
leaders be trusted to have rightly judged these relations, also, as well as those earlier-
mentioned relations between an ethos of mean-ends utilitarianism and an ethos of 
responsible purposefulness? To answer these questions, additional study must be made of 
personal charisma, which Weber contrasts to office charisma. Could it be true that 
Weber is, like Arendt, another systems theorist who taught that the personal and the 
official coincide in the realm of sovereignty—without losing their opposition?
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According to Sung Ho Kim (author of Max Weber's Politics of Civil Society), 
“office charisma appears mostly in the context of its antinomy to ‘personal charisma,’ 
which [Weber] holds to [be] the only genuine form of charisma.”360 Office charisma 
appears in bureaucratic institutions. It also appeared among Catholic clerics, whom 
derived charismatic authority from their public service. The importance of clericalism 
and monasticism is that it gives a higher or a metaphysical purpose to the world, through 
service, although the existence of this purpose ended up being denied by the Puritan 
sects. The Protestants attacked the monastic orders because they would have appropriated 
this purpose to satisfy their self-interest. Protestants responded by turning each of the 
members of their congregations into potentially purposeful persons: charisma was no 
longer being reserved for the religious orders and other such groups; it was turned into an 
individual form of confidence. Although it was expected that individualized charisma 
could liberate people, it also became increasingly oppressive. It became dogmatic, and 
therein morally negative (bitter). 
Personal charisma left a different taste than that office charisma did, 
however, in that it gave more and more people a chance to enjoy the positive (sweet) 
comforts of conventionalism. But as office charisma had been positivized by the Puritan 
sects, as it were, they had inadvertently taken the “first step to the evaporation of 
charisma, or to its routinization.”361 President Washington’s office charisma would have 
to have been positive, for example, because he had been the American Cincinnatus. He 
had voluntarily returned to his own estate, at the height of his power, which made it 
possible for other so routinize and legitimize the Presidency—as opposed to its personal 
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authority. But President Jackson’s personal charisma had been morally negative as he had 
failed to transcend the aggregate of individual clients and their interests and as he had, 
thereby, abided to the conventions of corruption and license.
Weber understand quite well that political charisma tends to have contrary effects: 
it may taste official (bitter) or personal (sweet) or it may taste as a mixture of these 
effects. It is possible to speak of charisma, now, as a coincidence of opposites—because 
it tends towards both the personal (Jacksonian) as well as towards the official 
(Washingtonian) dimensions of sovereignty. The negative-personal and the positive-
official dimensions continue to present themselves within this rhetorical format of a 
coincidence—throughout Weber’s oeuvre. With Arendt’s aid, it can now be argued that 
charismatic leaders tend to hold themselves back, and to limit their powers, as their 
authority comes to depend on a group’s beliefs (in the legitimacy of their official as well 
as of their personal authority). Yet, the larger question must be whether their self-limited 
powers are not also too prone to becoming personally self-serving and self-interested—
and whether they are not thereby again paradoxically undercutting their own freedom of 
participating in officialdom, of public service, and of the (what Kari Palonen sums up as) 
“political trust.”362
Caesarism is the word Weber uses to describe self-interested charismatic rulers. 
These are politicians who use their charisma to accomplish more private aims than to 
serve and maintain the trust of the public. This type of rulers can be recognized in
“contingent circumstances, and [is often believed] capable of [expressing authority in] a 
variety of manifestations”.363 Further, Caesarism shares its diffuse attributes with several 
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of the democratic (or: ochlocratic) sources of charisma, as these tend to manifest 
themselves under fluid and imbalanced circumstances as well. Such democratized 
sources and structures will especially manifest themselves in conjunction with the type of 
“great personality” Antonio Gramsci described when he invoked Cromwell, Napoléon I, 
and Napoléon III. (Gramsci here circumvents the case of Robespierre: the one 
charismatic leader, he says, to have arbitrated over a “situation characterized by an 
equilibrium of forces, [yet] heading towards catastrophe”.)364 Peter Baehr reads onwards: 
“Caesarism [understood as the personal] ... form of charisma is simply the democratic 
corollary of an overarching and inescapable iron law of leadership”.365
The conceptual opposite to Caesarism may or may not be believed to be an 
antidote to personal charisma and its democratic (ochlocratic) corollary. This opposite, 
official charisma, may at some times but not at all times be believed to emerge from a 
‘naturally’ self-regulating, self-limiting, and purposeful relationship between the leader 
and her followers. If it can be recognized as a mode of official charisma, however, then 
the office-holder will have to have been publically recognized on grounds of her legal 
personality—and this abstract form of personality itself will again have to have been 
based on a sort of natural law on the meaning of competency as well as on command. The 
problem with the tension between personal (Caesarist) and official (bureaucratic) sources 
of charismatic authority is that it is a problem of how actors may find the strength, 
ultimately within themselves, to moderate this tension. Before wrapping up how political 
realists trust this mysteriously self-moderating tension to emerge, in the relations between 
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constitutional states, a few paragraphs should be dedicated to how Weber and Gramsci 
might have, tacitly, agreed on that prior tension between person and office.
In respect to ambivalent authority, Weberian realism is not an explanation. It 
offers a mere method of inquiry. Why and how should sovereign statespersons be 
believed able and willing to maintain a qualitative difference between deontological 
reasoning versus the utilitarian force of empirical interests? This method is a method of 
inquiring into the deeper nature of their relationships, through which both emergences 
and causes—or both deontic faculties as well as utilitarian interests are to be observed as 
having remained integrated, without that they lost their qualitative distinctiveness. The 
method thus helps integrate both “subjective ethical decisionism and objective 
consequentialism.” Or, to use Kim’s words, the method may be used to seize 
opportunities to integrate the self-interested force of a “consequentialist ethic” with the 
reasonable force of “ethical decisionism”—and to do this to an extent that integration 
process itself begins to moderate any of the prospective tensions between the two 
forces.366
The integration process is a constitutional process, further, in the sense that it 
maintains a healthy tension between qualitatively different forces or between two 
constitutional powers. In this, the process may potentially become more symbiotic than 
that it will have to remain antagonistic.367 Yet, what current-day realist theorists have not 
yet been able to agree on is what it actually means to identify genuinely symbiotic 
relations between diverse statespersons. It is worth taking a moment to read Michael 
Bakunin, to clarify this problem. His writings had challenged Weber’s iron law. This law 
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had held that a coincidental combination of both democratic and plutocratic powers 
could, in the long run, begin to sustain itself: democratization forces would perpetually be 
opposed by the forces of the rich, the military, and the bureaucracy.
In one of his theoretical essays, Bakunin explicitly criticizes political realism. 
Ceasarism has according to him, at least historically, remained an omnipresent force for 
tyranny. It should therefore not be linked to the prevalence of democratic governments, 
regardless as to whether these are indeed more vulnerable to being infused with personal 
charisma (tyranny). The idea that both Bismarck and Napoléon III could have represented 
a “popular government”, or would have had a democratic leadership style, is an idea that 
can easily be falsified by looking at their own actions. Instead, according to Bakunin, the 
difference between “Emperor Augustus and his successors”  (which include Bismarck 
and Napoléon III) is very small. In fact, Bismarck would have been as “obvious” a tyrant 
as that Augustus had been, Bakunin suggestively charges. Also, he writes that, after 1815, 
Caesarism had taken:
the path of the state, military, and political despotism, camouflaged and 
embellished with the broadest and most innocuous forms of political 
representation. [Until] 1815, however, that path was as yet completely unknown. 
At that time, no one even suspected the truth which has now become obvious to 
even the most stupid despots, that [their] so-called constitutional forms, or forms 
of popular representation, do not impede state, military, political, and financial 
despotism.368
Bakunin argues that the label of Caesarism should immediately be detached from 
the nineteenth-century idea of democratic and representational progress.369 Caesarism is 
less administratively benevolent, and less democratically representative, than that was 
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still being imagined. Hence, the label should only be allowed to be attached to personally 
charismatic styles of government—regardless as to whether these styles were being 
supported by any specific constitutional form of the state. Ideologically, militarily, or 
financially: no form of state should be thought to support a tyrannical government. Weber 
certainly would have disagreed with Bakunin on this point, if he had read his argument, 
because Weber clearly contrasted the drives of Augustus and especially of Napoléon 
Bonaparte, the self-crowned Emperor, to Bismarck’s more limited and intra-
constitutional ambitions. Bismarck’s governmental forces would have been limited, at 
least to some degree, by a constitutional mechanism of popular representation.
Weberian realism does not deny that Bismarck’s burdens of office and his 
obligations to the confederate parliament had never impeded his personal charisma.370
But in sharp contrast to Bismarck’s own back-holding authority, it had only been 
Bonaparte who had advanced his personal-charismatic authority, althus Weber. As Baehr 
reads Weber, the Bonapartist mode of authority (Caesarism, that is) should be analogized 
to “the gravedigger of parliamentary government or, more mildly, its antithesis”. 
Nonetheless, Weber’s argument was “unusual” for its time in that it had evidently 
recognized that Bonapartism, even if it had not always been expressed by the official 
figure of Bismarck, could nonetheless well have persisted “within a parliamentary 
system, and that both Caesarism and parliamentary government could be articulated 
successfully”—simultaneously.371
If Baehr’s reading of Weber is correct, then Weber must have disagreed with 
Bakunin’s argument that there is no genuine difference between governmental forces and 
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constitutional forms of state. First, Weber and Bakunin may agree that personal charisma 
is anti-pluralistic, and incapable of self-limitation. Second, Weber argues that Bismarck 
exemplifies a way for personal charisma, in the form of Caesarism, to be transmuted back 
into official charisma and thus remain integrated with electoral-democratic, and with 
parliamentary-representational institutions. While Bakunin fails to differentiate personal 
charisma from official charisma, by suggesting that both types of authority are harmful to 
any government, Weber builds the case that personal and official types may continuously 
coincide. Although one of the two types should be believed to negate the other, in terms 
of their respective legitimacy and illegitimacy, Weber does not go along in dismissing the 
idea that official charisma is the sole source of legitimate authority. For, Weber still 
suggests that Bismarck’s dual sources (personal as well as official) of charisma form the 
twin dimensions of the German confederation’s Term (3) self-legitimization.
Gramsci supports not Bakunin’s but Weber’s case by recognizing that the tension 
within Term (3) political charisma is a tension between the people’s constitutionally-
formative processes and the self-interest of government office-holders. As Gramsci 
writes, this tension expresses itself in conflicts between “respectively a generically 
progressive, and a generically reactionary force”. Within the force-field of authority 
recognitions, also, he sees a progressive phase that can begin to transcend “the 
catastrophic phase”. Democratic personality cults can thus  become epochal, as they may 
begin to form and constitute another State. On the other side of the same force-field, 
reactionary officials may try to reconstitute the old State. But, contrary to the democratic 
cults, these reactionaries cannot sustain the qualitative difference between constitutional 
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powers. This would explain why “[t]he Caesarism of Napoléon III was merely, and in a 
limited fashion, quantitative: there was no passage from one type of State to another”. In 
another similarity to Weber, who, as a realist must have trusted that both progressive-
official and reactionary-personal forces are moving towards one mutually-sustained 
balance, Gramsci also concludes that the impact of each of the two qualitatively-unique 
types of forces will remain relative to the impact of the other force. The two types cannot 
escape their “equilibrium”; the mutually opposing tendencies should, rather, be be 
believed to ultimately render themselves “historically effective by their adversary’s 
inability to construct [itself], not by an inherent force of their own.”372
Realism holds the position that the force-field within a constitutional state will 
never reach full equilibrium: ‘organic’ asymmetries between progressives and 
reactionaries remain persistent. This further implies that both democratic parties and 
aristocratic sects are an élite form of government association: they are both part of a 
particular government, rather than that they are an universally-recognizable constitutional 
form: “democracy and aristocracy can be in tension with each other, and yet they are so 
not because of the latter’s particularism as opposed to the former’s alleged 
universalism”—as Kim views this position.
Tension exists not because a democratic government would be universalistic, 
however, but because both democratic as well as aristocratic governments are no more 
than partial components of the constitutional state as a whole. Democratic institutions 
such as parliaments and party-cartels will, in other words, remain part of a process of 
constitutional representativeness—and vice-versa: a self-ordering process of 
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constitutionalism is part of the institutions and forms of government, regardless as to 
whether they are factually democratic.373 This helps explain why, even in formally 
democratic states, the Junker figure “still persists”. According to Weber himself, the 
Junker-aristocracy had ascribed a democratic status to its own form of government: the 
Junkers saw themselves as equals. They had applied both a democratic idea, of having 
equal rights to govern, as well as a selective and exclusionary idea of who could (not) be 
admitted to their constitutional micro-republics.374
To the extent that personal and official authority might be blending together, 
realists must press for answers as to whether a particular office-holder has found the inner 
strength to be holding herself back from the individual-serving sources of charisma. The 
problem of inner strength can be solved by trusting that even though people’s confidence 
in the state official’s inner strength will never be complete and final, as their confidence 
must not be confused with blind faith, people’s confidence will still somehow have to 
stem from their systemic or their ‘natural’ potential to levy criticisms and resistance 
against the official. Both parties will have to dedicate themselves to their more or less 
artful and more or less judicious recognitions of their ultimately-common modes of 
authority. For, from amidst a plurality of opinions and judgments, regarding these 
common modes, a rank-ordering process emerges: the “rank and dignity” of variously-
contending modes of authority will spontaneously be established through the process of 
applying what Arendt refers to as the human being’s “rational abilities.”375 Yet, of course, 
rationality remains contingent to social opinions and biases.
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Victoria McGeer and Philip Pettit, in their index of “sticky judgments”, mention 
that biases are much more structural than is often believed—and that biases express 
themselves in all sorts of habits such as solipsistic opportunism and irrational estimations. 
These ‘habits-of-mind’ form a significant contributing factor in about five problems of 
misjudgment and misrepresentation. One, most human beings are soloists because they 
are likely to negate “valid arguments” only because these might seem “at variance with” 
their own opinions. Two, humans are generally likely to repeat “the fundamental 
attribution error” in that they will ascribe the good behavior of others to environmental 
factors (to fate). The same “error” leads them to over-attribute their own moral habits to 
their personal dispositions (to their skillful mastering of Fortuna). Three, “dispositional 
biases” which expand one’s own perspective (literally) over that of another person, tend 
to remain very difficult to negate: perspectival empathy requires extraordinary “self-
regulation”. Four, human encounters with chance itself, or with other such matters of 
social probability and improbability, are at variance with “the vividness of a scenario” 
(this type of bias is often manipulated in scare tactics or ‘negative’ political 
advertisements). Five, even matters of exactly equal probability cannot be understood 
(the equality of two or more chances remains unrecognizable to most people, in brief) 
because these matters also cannot be represented outside their own social contexts and 
linguistic frameworks (unless they of course could indeed only be presented in a purely 
statistical mathematical model, which however would be extremely rare).376
To wrap up, the modal relationship between a person’s private interests and her 
official capacities is a relationship open to contingent representations, contextual 
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justifications, and rationalizations. This means that public rationality is subject to how 
private needs and interests have been framed and contextualized. It is subject to 
contingencies which cannot be separated from the fact that the relationship forms itself a 
potentially-authoritative tension. It may always come to be represented in one rather than 
in another moral language, even though it itself is also a ‘naturally’ ambivalent relation. 
Moral languages and contextual representations are, usually, forms of bias: they often 
claim and pretend to have authoritatively moderated the modal relationship between 
private and public—or, otherwise, to have morally or at least justifiably mediated this 
same relationship.
The bias inherent to all linguistic moderation—and to public judgments of all 
speech acts seemingly aiming at self-moderation—is a bias which may always function in 
two directions, however. If interests and needs are said to have grown excessive, the 
needy person will be distrusted because of a perceived threat: because of her potential 
licentiousness. If formal official routines are represented as having become oppressive, 
on the other hand, the official who is believed responsible for these routines will 
suddenly be disbelieved because it has already been said she is only making necessary 
(banal) choices, without thinking through what the possible or the critical alternatives to 
these choices might have been. However language pretends to moderate the tension, thus, 
linguistic expressions of personal charisma will often be perceived as arbitrary 
(excessively liberal), to put it a bit more concisely, while expressions of official charisma 
may at the same moment be judged to have remained dangerously solipsistic (excessively 
necessitated).
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Political realism owes to Weber its conjecture that the tension between means and 
ends, or between available structures of power and the unintended consequences of 
applying these structures, must remain a tension which cannot be fully mediated and 
which cannot be adequately moderated either. A void remains in between means and 
ends, although it would under most conditions be in a statesperson’s best interest to 
profess to have transcended perhaps not the void but at least the tension in itself. The 
person can begin to do this by publically representing this tension in such a manner that 
the two possibly-excessive effects of consequentialism will seem to have been negated. 
Although the negation process itself will never be finalized (it remains historically 
contingent and dialectically open-ended), the person may very well begin to learn to 
moderate paradoxical tensions—specifically by taking heed to the case of how earlier 
generations of Catholics and Protestants, according to Weber, understood both the form 
and function of this negation process.
Recapitulation of the Case for Political Freedom and the Contingency of Charisma
Puritan sects epitomized the, world-disenchanting, rise of official charisma. Upon 
severing the intricate connection between official charisma and the monastic orders, they
would have democratized and rationalized the sources of charismatic authority. Unlike 
the monks and nuns of the Roman Church, the sects had objected strongly to any 
representation of charismatic authority—especially if it could suggest its own all-
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inclusive, universally- nature. As the Puritan sects instead pretended that charisma was no 
longer clerical and official in terms of its authority, they began to treat the bearers of 
charisma as individual persons. Not the office-holder, but the particular person thought 
she had been selected by one of the Puritan sects, on the basis of her personal qualities. 
This is how authority, in the modern age, could become a personal calling and would 
reject mundane phenomena. Protestants would need to reject clericalism because it was 
too mundane for their taste: not because it was too metaphysical but because clericalism 
was too impersonal, too anonymous, and too state-centric. In rejecting the old orders, 
remarkably, the sects ended up inversing their own world: as they refused to sustain 
Catholicism and the publicality of universal religiosity, they ultimately ended up 
personalizing and privatizing and thus also rationalizing their own religious 
denominations.
In contrast to Protestantism, Machiavelli had still taken a mundane and this-
worldly approach towards publicality, and towards the republic, as he believed in “that 
spirit of proud worldliness ... of those Florentine citizens who, in their struggle against 
the Pope, had held ‘Love of their native city higher than the fear for salvation of their 
souls.’”377 Later onwards, the Protestants started to internalize and individualize this 
caring love for their native polities, and they would thus replace their spontaneous care 
for the public realm with a confessional structure of sectarian powers. Consequentially, 
they came to turn public/republican authority into a much less mundane, and into a much 
more abstract rational category than that they initially had probably intended to do.
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Weber helps realism in developing its case that office charisma should remain 
equal to personal charisma, rather than be trumped by it. As was shown, alongside a 
Socratic spoke in the larger dialogical wheel, realism is a method of believing and of 
understanding the political realm as if it perpetually transcends a series of dualities. 
Particularly sovereign authority is premised to remain a dual mode of authority: its 
foundations may at any time begin to negate each other. In distinction from realism, 
various types of liberalism have over time been endowed, mainly by a predominantly 
Protestant culture, with an ideal of monistic authority. Liberals thus too often expect that 
social justice and rational truth can only be represented by means of one legal structure, 
by means of one unitary authority—or, as well, only by means of one distribution of 
monopolistic power.378 Realists, with Weber’s aid, can then object that authority and 
power are qualitatively different, although contingently-affiliated dimensions of the 
sovereign state—and that neither authority nor power should be thought to be absolutely 
unified: they cannot be fused into one synthesis, for example. Authority remains an 
abstract form of organized command, rather, and power could be said to always have 
been a structural function; power and authority  may certainly begin to coincide, but their 
inner tension remains quintessentially negatively-defined and immeasurable—because 
this is simply not a tension that will play itself out within only one scale of political 
change. Similarly, as Kantorowicz might have read Weber, office charisma and personal 
charisma each belong to one of the two dimensions of sovereignty, neither one of which 
is adequate to understand the legitimacy of the tense relation between these dimensions 
itself.379 The tense relation defines the personal and the private as part of a non-official 
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structure of power, and the official as a realm that possibly remains public and non-
personal.
To continue to recapitulate, Weberian realism avoids tautological definitions of 
sovereignty, more importantly, because the dualities (private/public, personal/official, 
mundane/transmundane) are not believed to consist of dichotomies: the components may 
be distinct but they also are, instead, inseparable. They are the dimensions and parts of a 
system. To clarify, any given individual office-holder will  have certain practical 
competencies. These competencies form her Term (2) executive powers. These powers 
are likely to coincide with her most effective abilities (her rational faculties). But she also 
has certain dispositions, biases, and other habits-of mind through which she tries to adjust 
her behavior to a dominant cultural or historical track record (her conventional path-
dependency). This office-holder’s Term (1) normatively orthodox powers, in brief, may 
conflict with her Term (2) executively rational powers.
In politics, the contingent possibility of conflict and agony should be approached 
in a balanced manner, through which legitimate Term (2) powers can be believed to be 
equal to the power of the Term (1) legal and normative traditions. A conscious sense of 
balance may help prevent either the Term (1) or the Term (2) dimension from becoming 
dominant, and thus allows for a moderate degree of self-regulated and possibly 
charismatic behavior. Weber takes offense to the Puritans, however, because they would 
have tried to work on their liberal agenda by eliminating the typical official’s Term (2) 
competencies: their sects would often have assessed these competencies only as if they 
would have consisted of their own Term (1) norms and standards. But by thus 
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interiorizing Term (1) conventions, the Puritan sects had also failed to maintain the 
critical distinction between Terms (1) and (2), so that they subsequentially lost their 
balanced posture. Weber warns this could have meant that the public realm was giving up 
its autonomy, as it was collapsing into the sphere of the confessional norm of the 
denomination and into the efficiency of the household, as well. It was not long afterwards 
that Schmitt feared that even the state was surrendering its public authority to the rules of 
the economy, to legal property, or to other such private spheres of allegiance. 
Liberalism’s surging “self-assertion”, over the state, however, had mainly been owed to 
its “lack of self-awareness”—or, to be more precise, to liberalism’s own inadvertent 
failure to sustain the historically-contingent opposition between “legality and 
legitimacy.”380
Sect-members, worrying about their own salvation, individualize the public realm. 
Their individual satisfactions, at the aggregate level, contribute to the republic’s 
disintegration.381 In not thinking through the unintended structural consequences of their 
individualism, sect-members are becoming  “empathetically unimaginative” (to 
appropriate a phrase by McGeer and Pettit).382 Weber discovers why the rational 
monopolization of metaphysical conventions, by the Calvinists, contributed to a loss of 
publicality and plurality. The Calvinists were isolating themselves from their native 
republics, deeming them corrupt, so that their other-worldly confessional experiences 
could somehow be turned into intrinsic sources of moral goodness.383 In matters of state, 
this came to mean that the public official could be expected to act like a sect-member, 
working only towards her own salvation by exercising “systematic self-control, [standing 
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only] before the inexorable alternative, chosen or damned.”384 By gradually turning the 
state into this either-salvation-or-damnation binary, the sects were increasingly turning 
the bureaucracy into an exclusive club—for their members only.385
Puritans imagined themselves capable of passing a “strict test of admission, 
usually decided by a ballot of [the sect] members.” Consequentially, they saw themselves 
as “aristocrats, by virtue of [their] proven quality”. By thus individualizing their 
metaphysical lot, they ended up negating the mundane dimensions of their condition—
and of their state. In this aspect, their doctrine would on the one hand continue to have 
anti-clerical effects, and on the other be turned into a pro-individualist form of 
confessionalism. They distinguished themselves along these two ways, as Kim writes, 
“from both the Catholic Church and the political state.” Yet, while the Catholic Church 
had extended its religious domination “outward, ... eager to incorporate [both] the saved 
as well as the damned”, the Puritans devised all sorts of elections and other formalities to 
excorporate the sinners from their associations.386
In the Protestant era, possibilities for a mundane and civic “practice of other-
worldliness” diminished dramatically. Specifically Calvin succeeded in bringing a hyper-
individualized sense of other-worldliness into the political theological schools.387 The 
result of his effort, however, would be excessively positivistic. That is, Calvinism chose 
to give much more ground to legal positivism than had been done by the Church: it tore 
the source of rules and regulations away from the external sense organs and from natural-
born bodies, as well, as Calvin had deemed them the “natural vessel of sin”.388 American 
theologies followed Calvin, then, to the extent that they also ranked the internalization of 
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other-worldly confessionalism above and even outside both Catholicism’s as well as 
Machiavelli’s external forums of sensible this-worldliness. By ranking the source of legal 
authority above and outside the legitimacy of natural and bodily self-consciousness, 
American Puritans stepped to a Cartesian tune. Like Descartes, they were dichotomizing 
as opposed to respecting the productive tension between body and mind, sense and 
reason, external concreteness and internal abstractions, or also the tension between the 
realm of public appearances and a self-conscious existence.389
Weber’s index of legitimatization processes stems from his palpable respect for 
the tension between Calvinism (sectarianism) and mysticism (monasticism). The first-
indexed legitimization process includes mysticist norms, such as self-sacrifice, while the 
second includes administrative decisions.
The above paragraphs, on Weberian realism, were reformulations of how and why 
a third legitimization process may emerge from the tension between ideological Term (1) 
norms and discrete Term (2) decisions. The emergence of Term (3) exceptions, to both 
these norms as well as to these decisions, can now be concluded to have remained 
contingent to what Schmitt understood to be an intersubjective relation between Term (1) 
conventional norms of correctness and Term (2) truth claims. Reinhard Mehring 
describes very much the same phenomenon when he writes that, from Schmitt’s 
perspective, authority emerges from the tense relation between unincorporated structures 
of Term (2) “rationality” and the institutional incorporation of Term (1) “bodies”. 
“Within the constitutional state, political decisions have no particular claims to [rational] 
truth [alone]: they are only valid thanks to the authority of those [institutional] bodies 
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making the decisions. The notion of ‘truth’ is politically superfluous, insofar as it must 
always be linked to questions involving the strategic correctness of the instrumental 
rationality of decisions.” Mehring continues: “the authority of decisions [results from] ... 
the authority of the institutions behind them.”390 But it is also of critical importance to 
note that “decisions” (minds) and “institutions” (bodies) can best be understood as if they 
are, historically, resistant towards one another’s excesses. Political freedom emerges 
from this mutual sense of resistance, because it is not unalterable but open to natality, 
rather. For, in scrutinizing the free appreciations and the free acts of legitimization of a 
Term (3) charismatic person’s authority, it will be fundamentally important to remember 
that “there is no irreversible historical contingency of a political awareness of [the] 
principles [of freedom]”.391
For IR theorists and (war law) jurists, remnants of charismatic authority 
persistently appear within the broader organizational and quite possibly also within the 
official process through which any person of authority may have made certain exceptions 
to the rules. These exceptions can have been made both to positive legal norms as well as 
to negative discrete decisions, yet Schmitt argued that such exceptions may become 
newly legitimized without that they themselves have to have been grounded in either the 
legal norm or the personal decision. In other words, these exceptions neither have to 
remain grounded in an historical trace of irreversible decisions, nor in any other 
irrevocable basic norm of law. They are exceptions, instead, decided on by sovereign 
persons whose mutual enmity transcends both their discrete decisions as well as their 
most basic norms. By contrast, Kelsen would postulate that every constitutional state’s 
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basic norm is a ‘logical necessity’ in terms of its power to structure all the legally-
derivative norms. The basic norm (Grundnorm), as it seems to Kelsen, remains separate 
from both discrete decisions as well as from the many legal values and conventions it 
subordinates.392 All that the general (Kelsenian) jurist can know, therefore, is that this 
norm itself cannot have been presupposed by any other norm: it is a norm, but there are 
no higher norms for human persons to embed this basic norm in: somehow, it must thus 
have to have been analytically separated from any Term (1) conventions.
Both Weber’s and Schmitt’s arguments hold, however, that even the most basic 
norm must remain in relation with conventional norms as well as that it must have been 
resisted by a decision, just as how every decision must in return again resist one or 
another norm. Yet, this does not mean that the two terms are negatively-defined: 
decisions are not non-norms, for example, as they should rather be believed to have been 
authorized through their adverse relation to norms. Weberian realism is an inquiry into 
the chances that sovereign decisions are actually sovereign exceptions: that the ultimate 
or the Term (3) exception will have to be interpreted both as a non-norm as well as a non-
decision. Realism is a theory of the notion that sovereign exceptions are to be made by 
those charismatic authorities whom Weber prefers not only to be self-interested private 
citizens but whom he equally prefers to be disinterested public servants. In contrast to 
Kim, and in order for Weber’s dual preference to remain theoretically coherent with the 
above case for political realism, office charisma cannot be understood to be completely 
antagonistic to personal charisma, as both are equally “genuine”—albeit, indeed, 
contrary— “form[s] of charisma.”393 But then again, how may charisma’s two contrary 
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“forms” (norm-preservers, decision-takers) newly begin to coincide by virtue of that 
ultimate spirit of political freedom (at the hands of the exception-makers)? Or, how may 
both the solidified Term (1) conventional norms as well as the fluid Term (2) routine 
decisions be transcended by, and yet be included in, the sovereign’s Term (3) actions?
Participatory freedom consists of a holding back from private interests, and 
breathes a sense of self-moderation and humility. But free political action is ambivalent. 
Once agents will begin to lose the level of group power that they needed to hold 
themselves back, and once they will uncritically be falling back into their routines, their 
liberties turn into their liabilities. Official rights and public modes of participation, then, 
begin to turn into personal rituals deprived of their ultimate meaning. The protection of 
liberties is then entirely a routine, rational, individual burden. For, even institutions of 
great liberty can end up being attended to as if they were empty rituals—without anyone 
feeling obliged “to share their original metaphysical implications.”394 The type of tyranny 
Weber refers to as Caesarism results from democracy’s intrinsic but intolerable tendency 
towards precisely such a hollow ritualization and meaningless routinization of how 
individual liberties are protected. To the extent that it is being informed by not the official 
but the personal dimension of charismatic authority, that is, Ceasarism thrives on 
democratic passivity, conformity, and norms of basic unanimity.395 And so, it again 
follows that public service and tyrannical normativity are coinciding opposites, just as 
that participatory freedom and economic necessity form such opposites.
Finally, Protestantism’s priority is to satisfy individual or confessional needs. 
Protestant societies are generally more likely to stimulate individual contestations than to 
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give metaphysical meanings to common participations—and they are, thereby, also more 
likely to individualize and routinize the sphere of political freedom. Late-modern states 
with a confessionalist bias, in other words, have a propensity to rank both the individual’s 
liberties and other transmundane ideals above the free realm of mundane participations 
and common obligations. Weber was not alone in having detected the root cause of this 
bias for confessionalism, however, because numerous classicist realists (revolutionary 
theorists, in the Arendtian sense) came before and after him, examining the historical 
conditions for a constitutional restoration. Among these realists were Machiavelli and 
Gramsci, dearly cherishing those anti-Caesarist republics of which the constitutions were 
believed capable of legitimately transcending the instrumental tensions between rich and 
poor, but also between means and ends.396
The Calvinist ethos is not limited to a specific era: it represents one among several 
historical tendencies to award more “instrumental meaning” to the individual’s equal 
liberty, internally experienced as “an end in itself”, than to the political freedom to 
participate in an externally-shared space. As this ethos became prevalent in American and 
liberal-democratic cultures, the “pursuit of grandeur”  turned into a personal instrument. 
Honor was now condoned as a personal attribute, but no longer as classicist realism’s 
criterion of public judgment. Weber seems to have concluded, from this tendency to 
individualize “grandeur”, that Protestant statespersons (clerks) were only mimicking the 
crusaders (clerics). For, as Kim reads Weber, the Protestant leaders ended up making 
highly similar attempts “to crusade against ‘evils’ ... in what they perceive[d] to be a ‘just 
war.’”397
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Political freedom is being threatened by those historical tendencies that may end 
up internalizing and privatizing the criteria of war, justice, of the justice of war, and 
political ethics. Yet, these self-internalization tendencies are far from arbitrary. They can 
be witnessed within chaotic orders and ambivalent relations, rather, in the sense that the 
tendencies will have contingently grounded themselves within a historical tension 
between internal and external fora. This tension is reversible, not teleological. This means 
that the ambivalent relations themselves are, therefore, not as fluid and as random as they 
might seem. Rather, it is possible for prudent statespersons to close these seemingly fluid 
and disorderly organizational processes, and to close those organizations through which 
charismatic authorities tend to become publically and externally recognized. This closing 
of organizations can newly occur through the revolutionary opening up of existing 
structures and of skewed distributions of power.
Researchers in IR should attend to ambivalent orders, and to the prospect of 
closing the world’s organizational processes, however, by premising that these orders and 
processes belong to one natural system: to a system of sovereignties rather than to a 
structure of socially-conditioned national identities.398 The system as a whole can then 
also be premised to transcend and yet include those contingent conditions under which 
adequately dualistic sovereignties may newly emerge—as opposed to the conditions 
under which monistic and Caesaristic forms of charisma are being preserved. What is 
hereby meant to be expressed, by realist researchers of the world’s system of dual 
sovereignties, furthermore, is that it has remained advisable to think of sovereignty’s 
contingent preconditions as if these have been divided against themselves (as if by a 
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‘slash’), so that the first lesson in IR theory should hold that sovereignty may simply not 
freely emerge in the absence of certain historically-contingent or also not in the absence 
of certain necessary historically-constitutionalized tensions: internal/external; 
Calvinist/Roman; personal/official; private/public; rationality/dignity; 
bureaucracy/charisma, and; legal norm/discrete decision. For, sovereignty is the 
legitimate sort of government authority that can be believed to foresee in an exception to, 
and thus in the transcendence of, each of these contingent-and-yet-constitutionalized 
tensions.
Conclusion: Combining Natural Systems Theory with the Dual Sovereignty Thesis
Political realism’s approach towards naturally-regulated and naturally-symbiotic 
relationships is a more attentive and more advanced approach than those previously taken 
by neo-Hegelian constructivism and neo-Kantian liberalism.399 Only realism approaches 
the interrelated and self-regulative symbioses of all life by respecting their inner tension 
or, also, by recognizing the symbiotic sort of contrariness that their own interrelated 
existence presupposes.400 Especially the neo-Hegelians, but many Kantians as well, 
follow a trail towards a single synthesis of both mind, or “objective truth”, as well as of 
the movements of the body politick and its “freedom”.401 One of the most disputed 
expressions of authority, in the study of international politics (of sovereignty, hence), 
remains grounded in the difference between this all-unifying synthesis and merely an 
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inner tension: the balance of powers. In accordance to realism, the balance itself is no 
mesmerizing myth of unity and reconciliation. It straightforwardly is, rather, the 
productive emergence of legitimate authority, from within a self-moderating and a self-
regulating structure of competing powers.402
In International Relations parlance, this simply means that—even in anarchical 
conditions—sovereign statespersons will consciously validate, or will publically begin to 
hold in common, those timeless criteria of authority that to them will appear  to have 
remained in sync with rationally- and originally-created institutional agents, structures, 
and balances of power. Yet, these same persons should also be conscious of empirical 
facts which may demonstrate that their actions and their words may simultaneously be 
resisted by natural counter-emergences of authority as well.403 Both the structural criteria 
as well as the naturally-constituent counter-organizations, in brief, are elemental in 
sovereign authority’s integral emergence: this ‘both-and’ realist argument is the 
fundament for dual sovereignty. It comes as no surprise, now, that the fundamental ‘both-
and’ condition for sovereign authority has long been legitimized, more or less 
symbiotically, by a law Thomas Hobbes would have called natural (a law even present in 
the state of nature, thus) and Carl Schmitt would have classified as jus publicum 
europaeum.404 The act of balancing powers, by extension of this law, would have to be 
publically witnessed in conjunction to Nature’s own emergent authority—as well as in 
conjunction to how the sources of auctoritas remain divided against themselves.405 In this 
sense, as certain Marxian realists have argued, as well, the notion of balance is commonly 
believed to identify flux: a general and systemic phenomenon of perpetual internal 
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oppositions. This balance cannot be analytically separated from the countless laboring 
and ecological structures (at least not from their functionalist eco-rationales), simply 
because the systemic phenomenon as a whole will commonly be believed to somehow 
transcend, natural-organizationally (eco-empirically), any specific balance and cycle of 
life.406
The world of IR is, as Naess helps theorists summarize what it is that turns this IR 
world into a systemic phenomenon, capable of integrating itself as if it were “not a thing 
in an environment but a juncture in a relational system without determined boundaries in 
time and space.”407 This world somehow integrates and regulates itself through more or 
less equal sovereign authorities, yet authority itself emerges “not [as] a thing” but only 
from within historically-contingent junctures and nodal formations of particular balances 
of powers and particular constituent powers. In other words, sovereign authority’s self-
organization should ultimately be believed to emerge from amidst an open-ended 
empirical structure of contending powers, nodes, relations, constituents, identities, and 
interests—and yet this whole process of emergent self-organization itself cannot be 
reduced to the structure of powers and interests that it dynamically embeds.408 The whole 
is greater than the sum of partial powers that it embeds.409
This last dictum applies not only to IR theory and it derives not even only from 
natural systems theory: it returns in (complex) Gestalt theory as well as in Jungian 
psychology, but has found its most meaningful metaphorical expression in the Gaia 
hypothesis (Earth emerges as if it is one organic whole, greater than the total of all the 
parts it embeds).410 By here applying the dictum—that is, by obeying the law that the 
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whole of IR’s subject is perennially being greater than the sum of its constituent parts—to 
the grand debates that have been waged between IR theorists, up until now, however 
preliminarily, it may become possible to agree that the IR discipline must maintain a 
dangerously anthropocentric bias for as long as that it cannot accept each state’s own 
being embedded in a transcendent whole of relational sovereignty.411 The current section 
focuses less on how beliefs in wholesome relational as well as emergent modes of 
sovereign authority have been affirmed, by various IR theorists, however, than on how 
these common beliefs themselves might be springing up from amidst generally open and 
open-ended balances and structures of power.
Because the open structures have sofar been premised to coincide with closed 
organizational dynamics—in following with how natural systems-theorists have written 
about a similar tension between open structures and transcendent organizational forms—
current IR theorists could stand to benefit much from learning how some closed common 
beliefs in emergent (or: achetypal?) organizations of sovereignty would have to coincide 
with the open structure of powers.412 Fritjof Capra writes, for example, that life’s own 
creativity and ingenuity and adaptability can teach (other) systems theorists how “new 
structures and new modes of behavior [are absorbed] in the self-organizing process.” But 
life’s creative and adaptive virtues themselves, he helps add, cannot (or: cannot yet) also 
explain why “new structures” should be coherently absorbed in and yet be transcended by 
open organizational processes—within a system “far from equilibrium, characterized by 
internal feedback loops, and described mathematically by nonlinear equations.”413
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Political realism gives meaning to imbalanced interdependent relations between 
equal sovereigns and their unequal powers, to the degree that realists will premise that 
encounters with a structural sphere of feedback loops and imbalanced vortexes and 
forces, in brief, should be considered as encounters organizationally stimulating human 
ingenuity and prudence.414 Balancing is not simply an act of maintaining absolute 
equality, a final and stable equilibrium, nor is it an act of international justice. Balancing 
is rather a matter of cleverly thinking through how the political adequacy and natural 
stability of various partial relations of interdependency may best be respected—in 
accordance to the self-organizing qualities of the system as a whole. It is in this respect 
that the realist approach leads much further back in time, than the liberal path does, 
because it leads all the way beyond antiquity: it precedes even Heraclitus and his thinking 
about a self-organizing flux.415
Realists avoid the (needlessly complicated) liberal idea that the implications of 
modernization and rationalization should add up to a definite end; they avoid the idea that 
the world is becoming historically progressive and irreversibly modern. Realists such as 
Hobbes and, especially, Machiavelli were themselves inspired by political theological 
arguments—some of which concluded that the world bears witness to God’s Creation 
(Nature, in other words). These realists may not have read, but they certainly had heard 
arguments similar to those made in the theological sources of their time—by authors as 
various as Augustine, Bonaventure, Valla, Nyssa, and Ubaldis or Padua and Dante as 
well (some of these authors became only much later known as political theologians). Of 
course, particularly someone like Dante took a mysticist direction, but the point is that 
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each and every of these authors still very much tried to preserve and celebrate the notion 
that Creation is cyclical: Creation is in a systemic sense of flux. Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that realists who were still, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, hearing arguments in favor of systemic flux might have been realists who quite 
deliberately avoided any path leading towards the idea of one historical and philosophical 
idea of raison d’état (one rational telos).416 Actually, the idea of a single raison d’état
remained by and large an alien or offensive idea to not just these classicist realists but to 
other advanced realists as well, including Schmitt and Morgenthau.417
Only by the late nineteenth century would theorists proclaim their neo-Hegelian
orientations, or otherwise try to argue for a definite synthesis in the prospective relations 
between particular states and universal democratic values. Before the seventeenth 
century, however, virtually no authors seem to have thought that any synthesis could be 
the work of human beings alone: any union of contending powers and contrary faculties 
would, instead, have to have been God’s (eschatological) functioning. Something must 
have changed dramatically in the European world paradigm, over the course of less than 
two centuries, therefore, because political authority had by midway the twentieth century 
often been imagined to be singularly human. No longer the power, but the devastating 
and destructive authority that states were said to be borrowing from their nuclear missiles 
and their weapons arsenals, then, was now imagined to be an uniquely progressive mode 
of political authority.418
The method by which ingenuous beings are exploring the materials, and are 
building the weapons, for their last war, strictly speaking, is only a function of why they 
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may believe that their methodological ingenuity has to be transformed into a morally 
justifiable and politically authoritative faculty. That is, the methodological how-
dimension of sovereign authority tends to remain part of a materialist-functionalist 
structure of more or less destructive powers, and sovereignty’s why-dimension is 
spiritualist. From the qualitative degree of contrariness between materialism and 
spiritualism, then, various moral norms and legal values may begin to emerge. Societies 
thus emerge because they share norms and values, particularly in the aftermath of armed 
conflicts. To the extent that norms and values have been shared and communicated, more 
or less symbolically, among groupings, their societal jurisdiction can be recognized. Yet, 
no jurisdiction may be recognized unless its positive laws can potentially be counteracted 
by its ‘natural’ opposite; by a rebel group or any other such antagonist.419
What Schmitt found is that this antagonist itself cannot be recognized, at least not 
on political as well as on juridical terms, unless the act of recognition and identification is 
performed existentially.420 This means the act will have to be performed as directly as 
possibly, by threats to the life of human beings, or to the people as an existential whole. 
The people become sovereign in the moment they decide on the exception: this is how 
they may become equal to the enemy of their own sovereignty.421 At the heart of the 
problem is, however, the indeterminacy of who decides. The people may have remained 
an unrepresented ‘natural’ multitude of individuals, and it may be impossible to attribute 
any sovereign decisions to them: nobody in particular will then know through which 
ultimate organizational process sovereign authority coincides with, and yet also only 
partially conforms to the powers and the laws of nature.422
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Machiavelli perseveres with his case that the mundane powers of nature stand in 
relation to their own conformity with transmundane laws of nature—even though this 
relation itself is contingent, and never perfectly orderly and harmonious.423 Machiavelli 
also insists that, according to Antonio Negri, mundane powers are never ideally 
reconciled with the transmundane—and that “the Heraclitean flux of becoming” (and of 
“freedom”) can never be stopped, although the “flux” itself is not a myth of eternity 
either.424 As is seen, very clearly, by both Padua and Machiavelli, the freedom of flux is 
no unique foundation for emergent authority. It is one of the many possible foundational 
relations, rather, between the power of particular statespersons and a closed 
legitimization process that again transcends and includes this power.425Authority emerges 
from  the power of the contraries and the constitutional antagonisms within human 
nature, so that sovereignty’s emergence itself can be thought about as one of the 
countless nodes or loops within a much greater self-organizing web of mutually-opposing 
powers and contending interests.426
It is time to revisit the core question: how do the holders of sovereign authority 
manage to remain related to a complex whole of powers, and why should this complex 
whole be believed to be transcending and yet somehow also include all the sovereignties 
of the world? The question is itself premised on the notion that the system of 
sovereignties includes both parts and wholes: that it is a complex web of political action, 
similar to the web of life itself.427 The question’s fundamental premise is that sovereign 
authority has been sustained by a relationship of contrariness between parts and wholes 
but also between both of the self-interested, rationalized, and biased (mundane) as well as 
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of the self-regulative and self-constitutive (transmundane) dimensions of Nature. So, how 
can IR’s lenses be sharpened to the effect that non-realists will from here onwards also 
visualize and acknowledge the validity of the dual sovereignty-thesis (DST), as well as to
acknowledge that the DST less consistent with liberal IR theorems than it is with the 
domain of realism and natural systems theory?
The following chapter sections help realists to defend the DST against liberal 
definitions of the relation between power structures and emergent authority, but also 
against individualistic (non-relational) ‘definitions’ of sovereignty. Although liberal 
definitions may have their own social-scientific utility, they tend to over-affirm and over-
determine sovereignty’s individual, secularist, as well as its anthropomorphic effects on 
life’s ambivalent meanings.428 Expressions of care for the life-world (the political 
biotope) are to be matched, definitely not to secularism, but much rather to a spiritual 
belief that this life-world’s autonomy is being endangered by forces also known as those 
of liberal utilitarianism and individual rationalism. Or, which spiritual belief in sovereign 
authority should assist realists in diminishing the risks of solipsism and strict 
consequentialism? Casting a longer glance at deep ecology can help elucidate why liberal 
definitions have been too solipsistic and overrated and why they, precariously, tend to 
reduce sovereignty’s original ambivalence. But this glance may have to be directed 
beyond deep ecology, even, as it has been alleged that deep ecology tries to justify the 
fascist behavior of a few sects within the environmentalist movement.
Nature is ambivalent, but advanced realists share with deep ecologists a special 
concern with Nature and its autopoietic qualities and trends—usually out of fear of 
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Nature’s destructive powers. Arne Naess cites the Bible and, more specifically, the 
complete text’s deeply spiritual notion that “[N]ature bears witness to God”.429 Nature’s 
countless ecosystems, which comprise all food chains but also all climate-dependent 
modes of self-organization, are the sort of systems that have been portrayed (indeed, in 
the Bible but also in other sacred texts) as complex combinations of both the profane and 
the sacred, and of both the physical as well as of the metaphysical realms. Several of 
Naess’s references to the dualism of these realms bolster his case that autonomy and 
individuality belong in Nature’s metaphysical dimension, but should never be valued as 
the dominant and certainly not as supreme within this dimension. For, there is another 
dimension. The human species is not only governing itself because of its autonomy, at 
least not within his deep ecology-argument. Rather, members of the species only 
independently govern their societies through an extraordinary kind of second-dimension 
authority: this is the kind of authority that lets them believe they are Nature’s supreme 
guardians, responsible for sustaining her creative powers as well as for containing her 
destructive powers. Necessarily, Nature governs societies and human beings are 
caretakers and moderators of her inner tensions—but, deep ecologists will usually try to 
add, this means that humans are not Nature’s own caretakers. Humans may often pretend 
that their societies and their nation-states are autonomous entities. They are then 
pretending that each state forms one independent “man”—as opposed to a mere homo 
artificialis. But, as the Bible evinces, Meinecke is not the only realist to have cautioned 
that such a pretentious attitude stifles “human ingenuity”.430 The pretentiousness (vain-
gloriousness) of the species forms an offense against the ecological law of self-
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organization that the species is not Nature’s ultimate guardian. All that the species can do 
is to moderate the tension between Nature’s powers.
Naess is a highly-qualified deep ecology-thinker because he is also a natural 
systems-theorist, respectful of all the overlapping layers of relational authority—as well 
as of how these layers consist of complex and yet also dynamic combinations of both 
material and spiritual experiences. When Naess climbs a rocky slope and sees a little 
flower basking in the day’s sunlight, for example, he attributes a spiritual meaning to the 
flower’s physical experiences: that flower is enjoying itself. Such observations clarify 
why human beings cannot take final and why they cannot take only material ownership 
over any of the layers of relational authority. Such an analytical isolation, of only one of 
the two dimensions of the layers, should instead be believed to diminish the complexity 
and diversity of the whole encountered layer: it would, in this example, rob the relation 
between Naess and the flower of its intrinsically-spiritual experience. Authority is 
relational in the sense that it has, perennially, been believed to symbolize and analogize 
Nature’s ambivalence. Relational emergent authority is to be thought immune against 
human pretensions suggesting that authority’s properties can be identified as physical  
independence or in material forms of solipsism.
“The Earth does not belong to mankind”—but to whatever it is that is commonly 
believed to be meaningful and good. (This is not to suggest that God and mankind can be 
separate agents in terms of their taking ownership of natural resources, by the way, as this 
suggests quite the opposite; it is wrong and ecologically unlawful to take ownership over 
Creation.) Also, all life to ever have been “created is good, and more wisely arranged 
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than anything mankind can create, and more diverse [too].” As Naess continues, even the 
authors of the Bible have indicated that “human beings must answer for their activities on 
Earth”. All their authority is deeply but never strictly profane and temporal (for, not even 
Nature herself is of course purely non-temporal). In light of all modes of dual authority, 
the main natural law-function of the species is simply to serve as a (however temporarily) 
“guardian, administrator, [or] steward”; its function is “[to] moderate”.431
Certainly Naess has a much closer affinity with Spinoza than with Hobbes. But 
the latter would not have been far from the mark, set by ecological systems theory, when 
his Leviathan concluded that ‘the law of Nature’ holds that any actor’s natural function is 
to well-represent all human activities on Earth. It is within the actor’s political obligation 
not to represent her private opinions and words, but to “own” the words and actions of all 
people she represents. The people may be considered the authors of an ambivalent world-
play, as it were, but the actor herself should be believed constantly responsible for—and 
aware of how she will represent—the human nature of these authors. The human actors, 
hence, are to be given duties and official rights (those of a “guardian”, “attorney”, or an 
“overseer”, Hobbes calls them) rather than that they are to neglect their eco-political 
activities.432
Instead of delving deeper into Hobbes’s Christian legacies as well as his Roman 
Law-inherited concepts of representation and guardianship, another domain should now 
be explored: can realists also share, with Naess, the deep ecological notion that human 
beings have a higher obligation and should there-under be applying their public authority 
for the purpose of guarding and preserving Nature?433 Which notion of a higher 
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responsibility, to represent Nature, might political realists have shared with materialist 
theologians—who might, also, have insisted on a Christian duty to preserve and protect 
not just human but all life on Earth?434 These are all issues of how tensions and 
antagonisms might best be interpreted, be moderated, and which theoretical methods 
should be used in then speaking about any threats to the preservation of all life. 
Explicitly the issue of how human societies may diminish the risks they are 
themselves posing against (by destructing) the goodness of Creation (Nature), is an issue 
Naess reframes as an issue of how these societies may newly begin to restore the balance 
of powers within Creation and its particular ecosystems. Societies should be restoring 
rather than separating their own powers from one another. If one society is more 
destructive than another, for instance, the other will have to sustain relatively more 
creative powers.435 Once the creative and rational powers of both societies again will 
begin to interrelate with their empirical powers, or with the common power of their 
senses, and once all powers are again being applied in relative moderation, the separation 
of both kinds of constitutional powers has become increasingly improbable—and 
Creation is believed to have become less distressed.436
Nature is ambivalent: human life contradicts and often antagonizes animal life, 
despite the Biblical charge of human stewardship for all life. For human beings, Nature is 
both rational as well as sensory or sensible—and Cartesian positivists among them may 
even add that the rational elements can be separated from the sensible elements. From 
perspectives possibly believed to have been taken by all other sentient beings, Nature is 
strictly sensible and possibly also commonsensical (some mammals and certain insects 
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can sense the stability of their common group formations, and can even judge 
commonalities in their own appearances). But note that, due to either the Fall from a state 
of nature or due to any other such anthropocentric biases, non-human Nature is rarely 
imagined to also be rational. Still, biases cannot prevent Nature, at least not empirically, 
from restoring its own original constitution to the extent that Nature as a whole begins to 
act as rationally as that humans do—according to both several theological realists and 
Christian ecologists. Far less contentious would be their joint claim that Nature evidently 
strives towards self-balance, self-organization, and self-authorization through a complex 
web of life—or through a web, thus, consisting of various complex relations between 
both rational and commonsensical, both material and spiritual, both mundane and 
transmundane dimensions.
IR analysts and positivist legal theorists have long gone against the grain of what 
realist statespersons believe what it ought to mean to be representing (and guarding) 
people’s relational, constitutional, and dual authority. Yet, in arguing a case reminiscent 
of deep ecology’s, realism takes much more seriously the preservation and restoration of 
Nature’s constitutional complexity as well as its (for social animals) dual authority. 
Nevertheless, realism’s case stands of falls with its concept of duality—and how it should 
be represented (by guardians), and how authority should emerge from within hosts of 
dualities. That is, the void within dual authority cannot be stuffed out by only and simply 
calling it an ambivalent relation: realism will have to do more than this. More marks must 
be given to dual authority’s source of ambivalence and ‘indetermanence’—as Ihab 
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Hassan has designated, not dissimilarly, the source of a tense relation between cultural 
modernization and a more postmodern concept of life.437
To give more marks and to further inquire into dual authority, and the void that 
engenders it, realists may always read Hobbes. He designated a class of statespersons 
which would be able to prudently distinguish, through speech acts and other 
representative actions, between “the natural seed of religion” and the “true ground of any 
ratiocination”—or, in only slightly other wordings, between the mental faculty that 
grounds itself in “any ratiocination” (contemplation of words) and the “natural seed” of 
metaphysically-shared sense experiences (action and movements).438 While making sense 
of their sense experiences, Hobbes finds that statespeople should use their faculty of 
reason—so that they may coherently represent both the people’s words and actions, and 
both their ecclesiastic doctrines and civil law actions, all in accordance to their covenant 
with God’s ultimate authority.439 The indetermanence of this ultimate covenant, 
nevertheless, “crushes” neither the social nor the political dimensions of sovereignty. Or, 
contrary to some (Negri’s) dismissive suggestions that Hobbes would forcibly have 
trampled over the social sphere, the covenant actually “crushes” neither the power of the 
social sphere nor the right to command of the political realm—but sustains their 
symbiotic “interrelatedness”, instead (this notion of human covenantal self-sustenance 
can follow not just from Hobbes, but also from observations by Naess).440
IR liberals can protest that if realists were to stick both with a Hobbesian covenant 
as well as with deep ecology’s organic interrelatedness, they could finish in a fascist 
world. They could take their ecological and biological analogies to the extreme, and use 
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them to retrieve their own justifications for the destructive tendency of fascism as well as 
the superiority problem of racism.441 Three counter-objections should be filed.
First, biological fascism waxes out of a capitalist model of individual competition 
(‘survival of the fittest’).442 Liberalism has failed to study how individual human beings 
compete, otherwise than as in relationship to a fixed state and a limited government. 
Liberalism tends to study the individual only in relation to an economy of rights, and 
particularly in relation to seemingly meritocratic property rights, even though this 
economy remains a typically capitalist and quantifiable economy. Liberalism thus ends 
up pushing any non-profitable and irrational choices back into an environmental 
background of maladaptation. The bias of liberals is to be too rational. But on a more 
realistic side of the story, Karen Liftin has introduced the Gaia hypothesis into the IR 
field, to their contrary, by demonstrating that relational complexity represents both non-
rational and rational, and both spiritual as well as material elements—and, yet, also 
cannot be scientifically reduced to either one type of elements.443 Further, she herein 
offers to help other theorists in creating extra epistemological opportunities to recombine 
natural-scientific materialism with political-interpretive spiritualism without forcefully 
dichotomizing, but also without collapsing these two fields of inquiry onto each other.444
That is, IR theorists already have had help in reformulating the core question of how 
sovereigns ought to be representing a deep ecological moment of “non-dualism”, in 
various respects, so that these sovereigns may again better avoid any dichotomizations of 
the human mind versus the animal body—and other such pitfalls.445
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The second objection is even more tragic because it involves not a missed 
opportunity within the theoretical field, but in the field of international political practice: 
statespersons at Kyoto and later, in 2009, at Copenhagen stumbled and fell ‘nose first’ 
into their own failure to moderate several climate crises—because they, as they usually 
had done, acted singularly as the negotiators over, rather than also as the stewards of 
Nature. Their biases, or minimally the biases of the wealthiest negotiating states, 
consequentially led all states to have to deal with the global climate and global 
temperatures as if these were determinate “things” in an external environment. As the 
number of draughts and the extinction rate, among countless non-human species, both 
continue to increase it must be asked whether ecologists such as Naess were not right all 
along: average global temperatures should alternatively be believed to present human 
beings with an index of the life-stages of one all-transcendent complex web as well as of 
the critical stages of a “relational system without determined boundaries in time and 
space.”446
Global temperatures seem to present themselves perhaps in a “mathematical 
language”, in Capra’s words, but it is impossible to speak meaningfully about these 
temperatures without any biochemical context. In themselves, temperatures are only part 
of a quantitative measure. This should have taught statespersons not to try to negotiate 
any limits to that measure—when they already know that the measure itself is resisted by 
a qualitatively limitless process. Temperatures are actually very poor, although perhaps 
well-quantified, analogies for a creative process which demands constant human care—
lest this same process were to be pressured, by human carbon emissions, into causing 
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greatly destructive effects on life’s deepest and ultimately unlimited life-force and, thus, 
also were to destroy a force that includes the human potential to enjoy taking part in 
complex processes such as “fermentation, photosynthesis, nitrogen fixation, [and] 
respiration”.447
The third objection to liberalism holds that the Gaia thesis can be defended on 
realist grounds, by holding on to the notion that all public authority ultimately emerges 
from (human beliefs in) a transcendent system—and that planet Earth is only the 
archetypal self-transcendent system. It is absord to hold that the system exists of one race 
or one generation of human beings, as each genetic (racial or generational) characteristic 
is in a process of perpetual transmutation, and thus caught up in an aleatory process. It is 
up to chance, ultimately, whether statespersons may enjoy either less or more legitimate 
authority, not simply because other individuals constructed their authoritative offices and 
institutions for them, but especially also because their authority will have to find 
physically-organized expressions amidst contingent and open structures of power. 
Authority will therein have to represent, again, popular beliefs in a homeostatically-
balanced transcendent system. The Bishop of Volterra inspires awe as he uses words and 
reveals his insignia: an exemplary instance of the physical expression and homeostatic 
transmutation of the people’s recognizing of public authority. It is Machiavelli’s instance 
of of how gravity finds both a physical and a symbolic expression: for, the man’s gravitas
is a common mode of dual authority.448
The Gaia thesis can prompt realists, by contrast to liberals, to inquire into 
the spiritual belief that the people may act as if they are one biochemical whole. This 
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belief may be organized around that the integral and wholesome cycles within the 
people’s existence should come to express the people’s most ‘natural’ or homeostatic 
purpose. Due to their individualistic bias, nevertheless, liberals often fail to believe that 
‘the’ people may hold experiences in common and that human beings are appealing to the 
most balanced and orderly among these experiences whenever they try to inspire one 
another to act. Yet, people do regularly revolutionize and reconstitute the balances and 
the homeostatic constitutions of their own groupings—in revealing and even in just 
intuiting the presence of the wholesomeness and integrity of these groupings. Beliefs in a 
transcendent whole are one of the constitutionally-necessary preconditions in order for 
offices and institutions to evolve—to the degree that the holders of these offices take 
seriously their vicarious responsibilities.
Belief is no artificially-constructed political experience so it would be 
scientifically unrewarding to try to deconstruct or to individualize it. Rather, belief is an 
intuition specific people may or may not be holding in common—in general. Zimmerman 
complements the Gaia thesis by situating it within “deep ecology theory”, in part to 
circumvent the anthropomorphic tendency to individualize and isolate specific 
experiences and sources of political change.449 Those working within the IR field can 
very well examine repercussions of deep ecology theories by asking how these theories
find validation both in social-scientific research, because of their analogies to self-
limiting and biochemically-open structures, as well as in concepts used to give meaning 
to Nature’s organizationally-unlimited spirituality. For, it has become apparent to several 
IR theorists that sovereignty should be a kind of relational authority in the sense that it 
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can neither be found in limited spaces nor between congruently-situated territorial 
units.450 Sovereignty is constantly developing, or so it has for centuries been believed, as 
it appears to be breathing an unlimited spirit of self-organization.451
These three objections are more than just objections against the simple equation 
of state sovereignty to individual autonomy (in part also known as the ‘domestic 
analogy’), mainly because they help overturn the liberal model of revolution. Negri 
commits a liberal fallacy, for instance, when he argues that revolution is something that is 
created by individual constituents and their associative powers. That is, revolutions are 
the outcome of constituent powers, not of an authoritative restoration of one complex 
relation between both limited/constitutional structures of the state as a whole as well as 
the unlimited/developmental organizations of the state’s constituent parts. For Negri, to 
the contrary, revolution appears when the latter parts have negated the former whole. 
Revolution consists of a postmodern synthesis of both “necessity and freedom” and this 
synthesis will have been accomplished once the dialectic of Marxist materialism has 
become a completely social dialectic.452 That is, Negri argues that the sphere of 
necessities and needs will at that point have been negated, and absorbed, by a process of 
social association as well as by a process of the “constituent power of capital”. For as 
long as this process can continue to absorb its own antagonist, which is actually the 
transcendent authority of politics, a social revolution will appear to perpetuate itself 
immanently and indefinitely. “[T]he force of associative productive labor increases [now] 
at such a rate that it begins to become indistinguishable from social activity [of the 
revolution] itself.”453
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As an afterthought, on condition that revolutionary change can appear into the 
world as a synthetic form and the continual negation of political transcendence, as well, 
then why are counter-revolutionary changes possible? Negri’s revolutionary scenario 
hardly contains the risk of the alternative possibility: that human individuals and their 
constituent powers end up being newly transmuted by institutionalized authorities 
proclaiming a singular right to be protective of their shared legal personalities and 
political representations. In that event, the gravity of a self-closing form of organizational 
change will have been validated and yet been resisted by the opening up of all too many 
singularized revolutionary functions of constituent power.
To better come to grips with this paradox of both human and political change, at 
the moment, this notion must be better contained: legitimization and resistance co-appear. 
Moreover, they perpetually co-appear in a complex systemic phenomenon because they 
spring forth from these dualities: constituent/constituted; form/function; 
unlimited/limited; mind/body; organizational/structural; open/closed, and; 
metaphysical/(in)organic. Human beings differ, in this sense of dualism, far less from 
their own animal nature than that they are, usually prejudicially, imagining—not only 
when they simply and only imagine themselves to be ‘enlightened’ and ‘modern’ but also 
when they were to solely plan for a ‘postmodern’ scenario—dominated by constituent 
powers. Akin to how the physical and taxonomic differences between wolf-packs, 
beehives, or schools of whales cannot be studied without asking why so many sorts of 
animals can intuitively believe that they should organize themselves to form packs and 
schools in the first place, so is it impossible to ask why political dissipative structures 
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such as states are being formed without also asking why these same states are commonly 
believed to perform sovereign and yet egalitarian organizational functions. In terms of 
both the how- as well as the why-dimensions of its research method, then, political 
realism reminds the IR discipline that this world still consists both of revolutions and 
coups, of both singular successions and pluralist secessions, and particularly also of both 
peacefully-managed structural bifurcations and diplomatic organizations of existential 
enmity.
To conclude these concluding remarks, the ever-deeper relationship between 
Nature’s contrary dimensions is in actuality a mutation from open powers into closed 
organizations of authority. From as early as Heraclites, the mutative potential itself has 
been believed to be a life-force: it is a potential flowing from oppositions embedded 
within the web of life. With the aid of Heraclitus, realists have observed that, politically, 
this same potential springs forth from a void. The void is less a riddle than it is a paradox, 
however, as captured in this Heraclitean fragment: “[both] for fish drinkable and healthy 
[and] for men undrinkable and harmful.” The ocean is not unlike political language: it has 
opposite effects, and much may depend on whether language is used and absorbed by the 
rich or the poor, ruled or rulers. The most prejudicial and anthropomorphic effects, 
however, should be prevented from proliferating—in order to more carefully protect the 
phenomenally diverse meanings of the ambivalent tension and the complex relation 
between the opposing powers, of both the ruled and their rulers.
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Against People’s False Trust in Multitudinous Opinion-Formations
Anti-totalitarian (liberal) philosophers of contemporary revolutionary action have 
made the mistake of placing too much trust or, rather, of placing false trust in the social 
formation of democratic opinions—merely by means of their idealization of rational and 
unbiased human groupings.454 Certainly, some such philosophers and scholars, usually 
when following Michel Foucault, are calling for a reappraisal of ‘political existentialism’ 
as opposed to the social sphere of biases, prejudices, and beliefs.455 But his notion of 
biopower, and more generally also of the specific meanings of corporeality and 
physicality in politics, is not inseparable from the general notion of an intellectual 
mind.456
Foucault has been immensely influential, also within the IR field, although some 
have tried hard to “forget Foucault.”457 But particularly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
continue to agree with the Foucauldian school of ‘existential’ philosophy that modern 
states are disciplining “the body” even though they, alternatively, seem to have concluded 
that this is predominantly a problem of the intellect—and therefore, also, a problem best 
be solved by an abundantly liberal intellect. Of course, any insufficiently self-conscious 
intellect can cause the body to suffer, as most of the advanced (republican) realists would 
comfortably concur with Hardt and Negri. The logics of the mind are indeed often to fault 
for the disorganization and fragmentation of social bodies. Also, people will indeed often 
have to change these logics if they were to be growing more conscious, intellectually. 
Especially against the logics of state sovereignty, people will thus have to grow conscious 
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of the Foucauldian idea that the state’s discipline is actually not exterior to, nor 
transcending their minds. Rather, it is often the case that the state’s disciplining of its 
constituents remains “absolutely immanent to the subjectivities under its [mental] 
command.”458 That is, it can well be the case that the state as a whole is turning into “a 
totalitarian machine”—by subjugating, enclosing, and imprisoning its constituent parts. 
Against this “machine”, Negri reasons, it would then again have to become possible for 
the social sphere of these parts to suddenly reveal itself “as the space of biopolitics.”459
Far more disputably, additionally, many Foucauldian philosophers are calling 
attention to an utopian as well as “antagonistic” tendency in Machiavellian thought. 
Negri argues that Machiavelli, in The Prince, had tried to explode the monarchical state 
from within. By having revealed “the contradiction” at the heart of the body politick (or, 
the tension between the body’s “arms”), Machiavelli attempted to create a binary choice 
between either “the monarch” or the “constituent power”—as he hoped that his 
presentation, of such a choice, should strengthen the (Italian) people’s Renaissance, their 
utopian resistance, and that these choice-makers would so only further deepen their 
“consciousness of the crisis [in the monarchical states].”460
Moreover, Hardt and Negri attend to a moment in which not just the Renaissance 
and the early modern states, but also the postcolonial states are no longer so much 
disciplining their subjects, as that their subjects create self-disciplining technologies. The 
intellectual, communicative, and cultural functions created by the subjects themselves 
are—at least in the postcolonial and postmodern era—less often being performed by the 
state’s administrative powers than by “partial and hybrid formations”. Foucault would not 
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yet have fully understood how the postcolonial process of hybridization is causing a 
capitalist culture, and cultural identities, to constantly subvert the state’s transcendent 
functionalist powers.461 States must therefore not just be criticized for having remained 
hand in glove with a capitalist system, and with its powerful administrative controls over 
the population’s physicality, but also for voluntarily incorporating themselves and their 
citizens into the intellectual idea of “Empire” as well as into an “universal notion of 
right”—while simultaneously depoliticizing many of their more immanent corporeal 
differences. The issue of postcolonialism and postmodernity is that, among and within 
states, differences are progressively being considered as “cultural and contingent, rather 
than biological and essential.”462
In the current moment, consumer capitalism is being facilitated by 
“communications industries” deriving profits from their differentiations between 
culturally liberal, or rights-bearing individuals and their own immanent identities. These 
industries are drawing the legal contours for partial formations and subjective identities, 
which then end up being used as the lenses through which state subjects view themselves: 
this is how they become inclined to “discipline themselves.”463 That is, social disciplines 
and corporate controls are less transcendent than that subjects view them as 
“communicative” functions—in the sense that multitudes of subjects choose to support 
them by conversing about their preferences.464 As some commentators have noted, 
however, Hardt and Negri did not mention that such conversations cannot escape the 
brute fact that their inherently preferential form of consumerism, even if consensually 
communicated, still implies the economic exploitation of others.465 Yet, these authors of 
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Empire stand uncorrected on their point that as consumer-subjects are increasingly 
choosing to discipline themselves, communicatively and by raising awareness about their 
economic choices, these subjects and their capital will be “increasingly integrated into the 
minds and bodies of the multitude[s].”466 “[C]ommunication technologies” are 
increasingly forming the “prosthesis”—and the “lens through which [they] redefine [and 
reintegrate] ... bodies and minds themselves.”467
As minds are being integrated with bodies, and as “the self-disciplining of 
subjects” is becoming their legal right in itself, it would be silly to continue to argue that 
the state is all-controlling and all-policing its subjects.468 Instead, the lesson Hardt and 
Negri draw is simple:  states are not fulfilling their socio-economic and pro-egalitarian 
responsibilities whenever they are trying to remain in the business of, however 
communicatively and consensually, protecting individual property and similar consumer 
rights alone. To be acting responsibly, states will also have to surrender both their 
singularity and their transcendence to their subjects: only then may multitudinous and 
immanent powers take the place of sovereignty. This is how immanent powers inspired 
by their own autonomy—as well as by their “mythology of languages”—may negate the 
state’s transcendence.469
Hardt and Negri stretch too far when they argue that Machiavelli and Marx would 
have anticipated a consensual choice for the state’s disappearance—or that they both 
would have attempted to cause an explosion of “modern sovereignty”, and of its interior 
contrariness as well, because they would have believed that such an explosion could 
“open the space for an alternative society.”470 Instead, it is far more probable that they 
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presented immanent powers and transcendent states in combination because they did not 
expect this explosion to be real: it was a myth. For instance, Machiavelli clearly accepts
the reality of constitutional contrariness: it is engendering, not exploding sovereignty—
primarily because he also sees sovereignty in (non)dualistic, rather than in monistic 
terms. The contrariness of bodies and minds is the foundation from which (non)dual 
sovereignty, and from which ultimate authority and supreme care may emerge, and it 
would be a mistake to suddenly try to negate the existence of the foundation itself. It is a 
mistake to subvert the body politick to a multitude of minds, as well as that it remains 
wrong to try to subvert activism to contemplation or, for that matter, participatory 
(regional) republics to a unified (Italian) multitude. 
In Multitude, but also in Empire, Hardt and Negri are leading readers on a wrong 
path when they follow Machiavelli, or when they misinterpret him, rather, because his 
work cannot support their conclusion that bodies appeal to minds to resist their own 
disciplining and exploitation, and that therefore minds will choose to counter-discipline 
themselves and therefore seek integration with bodies. Machiavelli would have suggested 
that minds are becoming ever-more conscious and militant—which again would allow 
immanently-mindful militants to appropriate their own “productive intelligence” by 
merely weaving together the “[postmodern] threads of immaterial labor-power.”471
Particularly Empire’s promise of a ruptured overcoming of the world’s 
materialism, as well as of a consciousness-raising progression away from exploitation, by 
means of the immanence of the multitudes and their opinions, remains a questionable and 
problematic promise. Machiavelli himself could easily have criticized anyone who makes 
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such a promise, as  evident from the passages in which he cautions against the utopian, 
and “erroneous,” opinions typically presented in “any deliberative assemblies”. Even in 
the best democratic assemblies, hence, “preference is given to what common error 
approves, or to what is suggested by men [or, for that matter, by the culture 
industrialists?], who are more desirous of pleasing the masses than of promoting the 
general good.”472
Probably sympathetic to this Machiavellian criticism, Condorcet presented his 
Jury Theorem to the world. Cass Sunstein’s reading of the, admittedly confusingly-
written, Condorcet Theorem shows that all “large groups can go astray and [that] crowds 
will be foolish rather than wise, not in spite of the Theorem but by its own logic.” 
Sunstein’s studies—of how Internet rumors, the blogosphere, and how focus groups all 
tend develop their own opinions, are studies strongly suggesting that any democratic 
deliberation is bound to have “some kind of chilling effect on false statements of fact”. 
Although “crowds can be extremely wise”, this does not absolve them from their 
persistently endorsing of falsehoods—which they do “not in spite of the marketplace of 
ideas but because of it.”473
Empire’s presupposition holds that when multitudes organize themselves, they 
give preference to an explosion of the state from within itself.474 The many will naturally 
favor sovereignty’s implosion, and this preference can also become immanently clear to 
them. But this means that the preference itself must thereby remain incapable of being 
wronged by any transcendent modes of authority. In accordance with Machiavelli and 
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Sunstein, however, it appears that Empire’s is not an empirical but an ideological (and, 
yes, an orthodox Marxist), as well as a too subjective presupposition.
Hardt and Negri’s empirical premise is less edgy than their raising the prospect of 
some ideologically non-transcendent opinion-formation process. That is, at least 
empirically, Cold War history does indeed continue to clarify that economic exploitation 
is political domination, and that modernization and neoliberal programs are
comparatively most beneficial to national élites and international oppressors.475 It is also 
correct that the “decolonization process” that took effect between the 1940s and 1970s, 
was not moral progress but was actually stimulated by “the spread of the disciplinary 
régime throughout the social spheres of production and reproduction.” President 
Roosevelt’s socio-economic New Deal programs had been used to posit liberalism 
against socialism, for instance, yet both of these ideologies would remain part of the same 
“disciplinary model”—and, even before the 1960s protestors could wake up, it had 
already been revealed to the world that a “single model” had been designed to suppress 
and limit its “enormous potential for liberation, [as produced by] ... subaltern 
populations”. The United States-variant of the “disciplinary model,” especially, had thus 
allowed transnational corporations to disconnect “the mediation and equalization of the 
rates of profit ... from the power of the dominant nation-states.”476
States can certainly be faulted for their irresponsible management of the global 
capitalist system, as Immanuel Wallerstein has shown.477 Each state does depend on its
own shell of sovereignty for reasons other than to survive strictly political dissent: the 
state also depends on this shell and the international legal structure so that it can remain 
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unaccountable for exploiting others economically: for its corporate neo-imperialism. 
Wallerstein is a systems theorist who outlined the topic Hardt and Negri now describe as 
a “geography of uneven development”: he thereby helped predict the rise of “anti-
capitalist forces” and the fall of the nation-state unit; of capitalism’s unit of “central and 
guiding support”.478 In contradistinction to this prediction, it should not be forgotten that 
perhaps not the national unit, but that relational sovereignty has certainly been a 
persistent feature of inter-state relations. World systems theorists have grounds to 
demonstrate—to the effect that not nations but sovereign states have long facilitated, in 
Lane Bruner’s words, “hundreds of experiments in constitutionalism”.479 One of the most 
vital among these experiments, nonetheless, remains Renaissance Italy—as was reported 
by Machiavelli.
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93 Baehr (2004: 160).
94 For Weber’s notion of sects, of and the civic sphere, compare Kalberg (2009) to Pettenkofer 
(2008).
95 Kim (2004: 92; 87).
96 Kim (2004: 176).
97 Weber (1946: 242; 240; 233).
98 Weber (1946: ch. 12; 452, n. 8), from the Chapter “Protestant Sects and the Spirit of 
Capitalism.”
99 Kim (2004: 176).
100 For example, Weber (1946: 209-210).
101 Weber (1946: 210-214).
102 Arendt (1951). Consider, further, Scott (2002). 
103 Arendt (1951) finds that because the state had been licensing the chiefs of the secret police 
(Himmler, Beria), to legalize the ‘killings’ of innocent and the ‘detainment’ of randomly-
arrested people, warfare’s methodical extremities were being ‘normalized.’ Arendt 
(1965) repeats this finding when she points out that SS-administrators (Eichmann) had 
been licensing the Jewish councils to collaborate in their ‘Final Solution’ programs.
626
                                                                                                                                                
104 Consult, in a defense of these neo-Kantian ideas in IR theory, Babst (1996), Doyle (1986), 
Gleditsch (2008), and Ikenberry (2009). For assessments of (the lesser liberal, and the 
lesser pro-Democratic Peace-motivated) forms of attack on such ideas, see Chandler 
(2009), Cristi (1998), McCormick (1997), and, perhaps, Lipschutz (2008).
105 In particular, Arendt (1943), (1949), (1965).
106 This author consulted, especially, Berman (2006), Pattison (2007), Roach (2005), and 
Robinson (1996).
107 For example, Churchill (1950).
108 See, for a parallel way of thinking about historical ‘progression’, Bain (2007). Also, in 2010, 
Russia admitted that Josef Stalin had ordered tens of thousands Polish military men to be 
shot: the Kalin Massacre. For additional historical context: Joshua Rubenstein, “The 
Devils’ Playground.” Review of Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, by 
Timothy Snyder (Basic Books, 2010). The New York Times Book Review, 11/28/10, 24. 
Also consider, for another adjustment to the formal history of European totalitarianism, 
Maïa de la Baume, “Vichy Leader Said to Widen Anti-Jewish Law.” The New York 
Times, 10/06/10, A6.
109 Tromp (1995: 192-194) suggests Stalin’s Soviet Union was probably less unified by 
charismatic legitimacy than by a transitional government, which could best be described 
as a managerial or a corporative dictatorship. 
110 Consider, for example, that England’s domestic forces were among the most efficient in the 
world—either because they fulfilled relatively more specialized functions (as navy sailors 
or air-force pilots), or because they could depend on legions of Commonwealth soldiers 
willing to supply them at, but also to fight on, the frontlines. 
111 Weber (1946: 247).
112 Weber (1946: 247; 317).
113 Kim (2004: 79; 74).
114 Schweller (2006), Waltz (2001), Wendt (1999).
115 Merriam Webster’s Collegiate.
116 Arendt (2006).
117 Arendt (1978: vol. 2, 117), Fritz (1954).
118 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 92-93).
119 Weber (1946: 244-245).
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120 Compare, also, Sørenson (1998) to Wendt (1994).
121 Arendt (2006: 181).
122 Mysticism is a path towards both knowledge and understanding, but particularly neo-
Platonism did admit onto its path these four complex relations: (1) only P, over Q; (2) 
only Q, over P; (3) either P or Q; (4) neither P nor Q. Relation (3) could be said to inform 
the Buridian’s Ass dilemma, because this dilemma transforms relation (3) into (4), so that 
(4) could then be said to be the most quintessential of all four relations: it is the most 
intuitive, most free, and perhaps also the relation closest to natural law. Arendt (1978) 
briefly touches on the paradox of Buridian’s Ass.
123 Weber (1946: 78).
124 Weber (1946: 78-79).
125 Kim (2004: 92; 87).
126 See, further, Kinneging (1997) and Sellers (1994).
127 Manin (1997).
128 Finnis (1980). Also of interest may be Michelman (1997).
129 Consult, for example, Schmitt (1932), (1932b), (1996b) and Cristi (1993).
130 On one connotation attached to this ‘separation’ see, for instance, Bellamy (1996).
131 Hansen (2010).
132 Finnis (1980: 234).
133 Finnis (1980: 238; 246).
134 Finnis (1980: 103-105; 130) studies the relation between “the basic forms of good ... [and] 
their opposites” without admitting any “recipe or blueprint” of that relation: this is an 
elegant definition of the dialectical method, of course, although it would also very much 
have to be a maieutic (and, thus, Socratic) method.
135 Arendt (1978, vol. 2: 74).
136 Finnis (1980: 232; 69).
137 Weber (1946: 246-247).
138 Weber (1946: 297).
139 Weber (1946: 248-249).
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140 Schmitt (1985: 10; 19; 12-13). 
141 In his studies of the Weimar Constitution, Schmitt (2004), (2008), details the empirical 
preconditions for this paradox of acting beyond and yet remaining within the juristic 
realm. Unlike Fatovic (2008), Žižek (1999) remains among the few commentators to not 
have dismissed the paradox outright.
142 See, for the Order of Malta, Krasner (1999: 16; 232).
143 Schmitt (1985), (1976).
144 Krasner (1999: 56).
145 All authority is ambivalent, so the institutional authority of the SS should be found no 
exception. Heinrich Himmler was the highest-ranking SS officer, and yet he knew very 
little about what one of his subordinates, Adolf Eichmann, was presupposing that some of 
his directives and rules actually meant to help Germany accomplish. The latter would 
even be quite critical of the former’s capacity to institutionalize the SS: Eichmann 
suspected too many disconformities within the institutional relation between formal rules 
and actual SS actions, or between norms and decisions—as has been reported by, among 
others, Arendt (1965) and Mulisch (2005). In fact, Eichmann thought that Himmler was 
no ‘true’ Zionist and it was this perceived lack of institutionalization that would 
somehow have allowed Eichmann to argue that he should take it upon himself to 
strengthen the SS by ‘liberating’ Europe from the Jews—and by ordering their transports 
to the death camps. Institutional integrity is thus not only maintained by individuals who 
follow rules and directives, however, but also by individuals such as Eichmann who 
follow them much more strictly and much more literally than that others do. They 
themselves, however unintentionally, may therein again begin to contribute to the loss of 
all institutional integrity. The SS was also ambivalent in another aspect. For example, 
McMeekin (2010: 192; 362) reminds his readers of the fact that Nazi Germany had 
ideological, non-territorial ambitions with respect to the Muslim world. Men like 
Himmler and Hitler were sending resources to Islamic countries in exchange for both the 
Mufti’s cooperation in poisoning the water-supply of Palestinian Jews (a sinister plan 
which did not succeed because of the British victory at El-Alamein) as well as his 
delivering of “three mostly Muslim Waffen-SS divisions, which by 1944 numbered some 
100,000 recruits in all.” But, ultimately, this forms yet another example of how 
conformity to the rules—by the Mufti’s men—did not in any way strengthen the SS. So, 
as Nazi government officials began to create strong alliances based on their cooperation 
with both Islamic and Catholic conservatives, and as the alliance-members expressed 
great conformity to certain Nazi rules (leading to the actual rounding up of Dutch and 
French Jews, for instance), these same alliances were also oftentimes institutionalized to 
only a very limited degree (in Italy and Denmark, especially).
146 Agamben (2011: 114), (1998), (2005).
147 Weber (1946: 118-119).
148 Weber (1946: 119).
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149 Weber (1946: 119-120).
150 Kamen (2004) can be read to have illustrated this question with the case of the Duke of Alba, 
who took justice to the extreme, by executing all heretics in the imperial Lowlands, but 
failed to consider pardoning his victims.
151 Weber (1946: 127).
152 Weber (1946: 123).
153 As Schmitt also would have argued, according to Pankakoski (2010).
154 Weber (1946: 123).
155 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 187).
156 “Max Weber”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber 
(accessed 2009).
157 Birmingham (2006: 3) argues that the transmundane right, to have secondary or positively-
valued rights, is a right Arendt would have “found in the anarchic and unpredictable 
event of natality.” Realists have of course a strange sensibility about anarchy, however, 
so that it may be more to the point to suggest that the natality-right is chaotic and 
contingent rather than random and arbitrary.
158 Arendt (1951), (1965).
159 On the case of (and against) Israeli nationalism, compare Arendt (1965) to Mulisch (2005).
160 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 177-178).
161 Nizer (1944) was one of the vocal advocates for the de-Nazification program Arendt here 
rejects.
162 This observation is made possible in light of Arendt’s principled refusal to return to a 
‘liberated’ post-1945 Germany. For her studies of German war-guilt, consider Arendt 
(1949), (2003) and Buckler (2001) and Schaap (2001).
163 See, further, Arendt (1990).
164 Birmingham (2006: 59).
165 Birmingham (2006: 23).
166 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 175).
167 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 173).
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168 For additional interpretations of Plato (1970), see Planinc (2004) and especially Dorter (1992).
169 Alford (2010: 58).
170 Weber (1946: 347; 340; 341).
171 Arendt (2006: 221; 256-259).
172 Arendt (2006: 81).
173 Kohn (2000: 115).
174 Compare, further, Kohn (2000: 122).
175 Arendt (2006: 31, italics added, PT).
176 Arendt (2006: 194), mainly following Machiavelli’s Discourse on Reforming the Government 
of Florence. Kohn (2000: 122-123) seems to miss this critical reference, from among 
several of Arendt’s references to Machiavelli.
177 Arendt (2006: 215).
178 Ish-Shalom (2006) mistakenly accuses realism of being too conservative, because Arendtian 
realism clearly supports revolutionary anti-élitism. Further, Tjalve (2008) reads Hans 
Morgenthau (one of Arendt’s friends) to have neither taken a conservative-realist nor 
only a progressive-liberal outlook.
179 For some passages evincing her political realism (rejecting Rousseau’s “insensitivity to 
reality”), consider Arendt (2006: 80; 1-10).
180 Alford (2010: 59).
181 Alford (2010: 146).
182 For example, Plato, Apology (522b).
183 See, for more detail, Arendt (1990).
184 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 167).
185 By contrast to Hegel (1977), who, especially also in his Logic, would teach that the world 
consists of either identity or of opposition—rather than of such coincidences and 
similarities.
186 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 167).
187 Russell (2004).
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188 Alford (2010: 146).
189 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 175).
190 Plato (1988: bk. 11, 919b, 319).
191 Plato (1988: 919b, 319; 920a, 320; 923ab, 323-324).
192 Plato (1988: 881d, 278).
193 Plato (1996: bk. 4, 436c-437b, 131; 438ab, 132; 439d, 134; 441a, 135).
194 The comparative poverty of a population forms a cause of death, within that population, “the 
same way that behavior like smoking cigarettes does.” Nicholas Bakalar, “Researchers 
Link Deaths to Social Ills,” The New York Times, 07/05/2011, D5. For research entirely 
dedicated to world poverty’s double potential, to further structurally impoverish and yet 
also to organizationally enrich, consult both George Orwell (“The Road to Wigan Pier”) 
and a 2011 website created by Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo: 
www.pooreconomics.com.
195 Plato (1996: 611cd, 302).
196 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 175-176).
197 See, for example, Mahbubani (2003), Gordon (2010), and the stream of news reports on U.S. 
military and economic alliances with the Middle Eastern and North African states.
198 For instance, Arendt (2006: 81).
199 Compare, Arendt (2006: 26-27).
200 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 178-179).
201 See especially, for Weber’s theory of symbiosis, Kim (2004: 112-117).
202 See, particularly, Arendt (2003), Malpas (2010).
203 Robertson (1913: 471).
204 Alford (2010: 146).
205 Some commentators have argued that Arendt’s political theory was most-indebted to 
Montesquieu. However, the latter’s idea of mixed constitutionalism (his admiration for “a 
regimen mixtum”), according to Kinneging (1997: 215-218), was far from unique: it had 
been developed by Thucydides, Aristotle, and Polybius. It seems therefore less likely that 
Arendt was thinking as a Montesquieuan than as a classicist realist. 
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206 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 186-187). This author consulted several texts in which Arendt’s 
(Socratic) “two-in-one” is mentioned, and agrees that genuine dualities cannot be 
experienced by the individual, in the inside world alone. To be thinking is not only an 
endogenous (not strictly a mental) experience.
207 Arendt (1990), (2006: 123).
208 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 186-187).
209 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 187).
210 Arendt (2006: 181).
211 For two of his comments on Machiavelli, see Weber (1946: 124; 126).
212 Benner (2009: 342).
213 Machiavelli (1975: ch. 12), Benner (2009: ch. 11.5, esp. 446).
214 Montesquieu (2000: 29.1, 602). See, also, Kinneging (1997: 293-295).
215 For example, Viroli (2007: 477).
216 Consider, further, Gilbert (1999: 87-88), who faults Morgenthau for having taken Lincoln as 
his exemplar—as Lincoln would have remained too utilitarian and too “statist” in his 
outlook. Yet, Weber and even Machiavelli (and, thus, quite possibly Morgenthau as well) 
actually tried to argue that cases like Lincoln’s can only be understood in terms of the 
complex or rather the ambivalent relation between their utilitarian (a ‘codeword’ for their 
official) and deontological (personal) dimensions. Specifically for Machiavelli’s 
argument, however, start with Benner (2009: 6) and her clarification of the ambivalent 
decision all human groupings (all social animals) have to make, which is their decision 
“to establish their own laws and orders, leggi and ordini, through their own corruptible 
powers of reasoning.” During the rational process of how the decision on the leggi or on 
the good norms (which should be a decision taken in personal freedom) will appear, as 
well as how any decision on the ordini and the exceptions (either taken by necessity or by 
means of a juridical freedom) appears into the world, hence, it becomes apparent to most 
people that the relation between their “free will” and their natural need to impose “severe 
constraints” on otherwise “free agents” remains both ethically and politically ambivalent.
217 Weber (1946: 107-108).
218 Weber (1946: 127).
219 Weber (1946: 95).
220 Weber (1946: 126).
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221 Weber (1946: 115) would say that President Washington had had “a sense of proportion” (that 
is, “the decisive [political] psychological quality”), because “proportion” can make the 
difference between the overly “responsible” dilettante and the strongly “passionate” 
revolutionary types.
222 Weber (1946: 95).
223 Weber (1946: 124).
224 Weber (1946: 125) clearly adds that this (Jacksonian) machine is fueled by “depersonalization 
and routinization”—precisely because “discipline” is the premium Protestantism would 
award to those who had best held out on their “heavenly or worldly reward”.
225 Weber (1946: 98; 96).
226 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 178; 191).
227 Plato (1984b), (1996).
228 Agamben (2004).
229 On the difficult relationship between the liberty (rationality) of, and the legal equality among 
sovereigns, consider Dunning (1923) and Kooijmans (1964).
230 For the realisms that were practiced by Schmitt and Morgenthau, and how these contained a 
just war theory, Brown (2007), Jütersonke (2010), and Slomp (2006).
231 Finlay (2010: 307), Arendt (1970).
232 Hurrell (2005: 18; 19-20).
233 Hurrell (2005: 22-23).
234 Finlay (2010: 307-309).
235 Finlay (2010: 311).
236 Finlay (2010: 300; 294; 291).
237 All violence is by definition illegitimate, of course, but Arendt (1970), (20060, (1951) offers 
the proviso this is because it is inherently arbitrary.
238 See May (2007) as well as Finlay’s (2010: 298-302) invoking of a third theorem, the 
“principle of Lesser Moral Authority”, which he seems to use as a lens to better identify 
the pure opposition between the two conventional just war-theorems. Also relevant, for 
the connection to identifications of (Term (1)) just war-normative conventions, is George 
I. Mavrodes, “Conventions and the Morality of War”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 
(1975: 117-131, not further referenced, PT).
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239 Hurrell (2005: 24; 30).
240 McGeer and Pettit (2009), as well as Hobbes (1994) and (Pettit, 2008).
241 For a few relevant commentaries on Schmitt (1976), consider Frye (1966) and Auerbach 
(1994).
242 As Schmitt‘s Nomos der Erde (1997: 141) holds: “Woran erkennen wir diesen fürchtbaren 
Feind, dem gegenüber unser Recht keine Grenzen hat?” See, also, Palaver (1996). As an 
aside, the enemy (Feind) is of course never a foe, which would instead have to be a 
person with moral ideas. Instead, the enemy poses an amoral or existential threat to the 
state—rather than to a person with moral and legal standing, or rather than a citizen. Only 
this enemy can be a threat to any, and all human beings. Whereas a foe remains a moral 
or an immoral person, the political enemy threatens life itself—and, therefore, cannot be 
hedged or limited by legal means alone. As no enemy has a legal personality, yet may 
nonetheless be believed to be hedged politically, it may be wiser to speak in this context 
of enmity rather than of the enemy, as it is in a relation of enmity that the law holds no 
borders. Schmitt asks here why this is the case. Note, further, that Hobbes (1994) would 
have agreed with Schmitt: in the condition of relational enmity, people live in a  state of 
nature governed by law. Thus, even in the state of nature there will be a juridical 
definition of the attributes by which the enemy of this state should be respected and 
recognized. These attributes will become, then, part of the laws of nature, including the 
law of self-preservation. Since there has never been a state of nature without laws of 
nature, at least not according to Leviathan, the best way of recognizing the enemy is not 
give him demonic or monstrous names, as such an enemy would know no boundaries 
(Grenzen), and his names would again be abused by moralistic ideologies or 
ecclesiastical rhetoric.
243 Slomp (2006).
244 Hobbes (1994: 486).
245 On this exception, and its capacity to transcend the opposition between positive legal values 
and state powers, continue to see Weber (1968), (1993), Schmitt (1985), (1976), and to a 
lesser extent Schmitt (1990), (1995), (1997).
246 Alford (2010: 149, n.1; 158, n. 7).
247 Hoffmann (1981).
248 Kratochwil (1995), Hurrell (2005), Finlay (2010).
249 For additional reflections on the concept of (international) state legitimacy, see Mulligan 
(2005), Okafor (2000), or Føllesdal (2006).
250 Hurrell (2005: 16).
251 Wight (1994: 99), cited in Hurrell (2005: 16).
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252 Arendt (2006: 186).
253 By contrast, Waltz (2001).
254 Hobbes (1994: esp. ch. 28, 214) mentions that a legitimate government will have to protect the 
right to (threaten to) defend, to hurt, and to punish “another” but never to do any of this 
for or to oneself. Hobbes argues of course that such legitimate rights are compounded in 
the right to sovereignty (that is, the freedom to be legally incorporated and represented).
255 Arendt (2006: 98; 30) seeks to protect the right to carry a “legal personality” (“the mask of the 
persona”), consistent with the right to legitimately resist a tyrant (a ruler who fails to 
protect this equal freedom to be legally represented).
256 Dahl (1989), (1993), (1996).
257 The lead-role that is almost always being performed by constitutional fidelity (civic religion) 
is mostly appreciated by realists, such as Machiavelli but also Weber and Arendt (esp. 
1993), all of whom expressed a friendly interest in the Roman Law tradition. For two 
broader, more theoretical applications of this interest, consider Marshall (2005) and Levy 
(2009). See also, next to these constitutionalist realists, Buttle (2001) and Sellers (1994) 
for the Roman case, as well as Friedrich, (1964), Holland (2010), Maddox (1982), and 
Rossiter (1948). For the problem of global constitutionalism and its legitimacy, start 
particularly with Habermas (2008), Cohen (2008), and Onuf (1994). One shortlist of 
well-guiding texts on international democratization and comparative constitutionalism 
may include Brown (2005), Finch (2007), and Semitko (2005), Mair (2006) and Lowi 
(2009) and on a more general level also Friedrich (1968) and Howard (2003). 
258 Finlay (2010).
259 For these quotes, Hobbes (1994: ch. 18, 124-125).
260 Compare, also, Abizadeh (2011) to Fukuda (1997).
261 Finlay (2010: 299), referencing McMahan (2006).
262 Waltz (2001: 117).
263 It may be worthwhile to remember how a theorist such as Carl Schmitt would have said that 
this point begs the question: can the enemies of any state be recognized within each state 
by itself? For, enemies are clearly not believed to be friends of the constitutional state 
itself, for this reason: they are not believed to be a constituent part of that state. Once 
State F has declared State G to be its enemy, then F itself becomes by implication also the 
enemy of State G. This may mean that an enemy is to be found in a mutually-constitutive 
negative relationship: an enemy may not even have to be found in another state, further, 
because enmity (not: ‘the’ enemy) is rather to be found in an existential threat.
264 The group of neo-Kantians is not uniform. Generally, however, its members hold on to the 
idea that peaceful relations between states can be established by increasing the intensity 
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and frequency of such relations, because this would be how pro-democratic, commercial 
interests, as well as stable inter-cultural norms are being spread across the globe. The 
question, remains, however, to which political ground-norm such self-stabilizing or self-
pacifying norms should be compared. For more studies on Kant (1991), (2001), on his 
liberalism and specifically on his ‘perpetual peace-thesis’, consider Bottici (2003), 
Franceschet (2000), and Kleingeld (2004). Also highly-relevant, for current discussions 
about Kant’s status in liberal theory, have remained Nussbaum (1997) and Carter (1993).
265 Heyking (2005) reminds IR theorists that secularization is omnipresent in their field. But see, 
for the opposite angle, Luoma-aho  (2009). Also, by contrast to Williams (2001), see for 
several of the reasons as to why even Kant (1978), (1996), particularly, should not be 
considered to have been a secular liberal, see Firestone and Jacobs (2008) and Thompson 
(2001).
266 Kantorowicz (1955), (1957).
267 Kim (2004: 73).
268 Additional references to constitutional patriotism (fidelity) can be found in a body of work that 
includes Friedrich (1964), Michelman (1997), and Brunkhorst (2005), (2007).
269 Runciman (2000: 65). Consider also, for example, Parenti (1978).
270 Runciman (2000: 65-66; 85; 92). 
271 Michel Foucault. The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction. Translated by Robert 
Hurley (Vintage Books, 1990, not further referenced). Additionally, Cairo (2006) and 
perhaps Chandler (2009).
272 Weber (1946: 341; 332).
273 Weber (1968).
274 Tromp (1995: 153) further describes Weber’s concept of “amorphic” power.
275 Consider Onuf and Klink (1989) for a discussion of Weber’s concepts of power and state 
authority (Herrschaft).
276 Tromp (1995: 160).
277 For instance, Weber (1946: 242). Also, Tromp (1995: 163-164) and W. G. Runciman (2000: 
1-6; 190) pick up this Weberian connection between legitimate authority, specific “status 
development[s]”, and “what social evolution is all about”.
278 Runciman (2003: 29).
279 Hobbes (1994), Zagorin (2009).
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280 Agamben (2011: 50).
281 Weber (1948: 350-351).
282 Weber (1948: 347).
283 Huxley (1970).
284 Weber (1946: 341; 340; 357).
285 As an example of how some in the Buddhist tradition think about constitutional non-dualism, 
the notion of “the vicissitudes of life” has found various metaphorical expressions. The 
analogy to the rose is one of them: “soft, beautiful, and fragrant” and yet “full of thorns.” 
“To an optimist, this world is absolutely rosy; to a pessimist this world is absolutely 
thorny. But to a realist, this world is neither absolutely rosy nor absolutely thorny. It 
abounds with beautiful roses and prickly thorns as well”. Buddhist Missionary Society, 
The Buddha and His Teachings (Kuala Lumpur, 1988: 642).
286 Weber (1946: 316; 334; 333) uses “sovereignty” of course in a variety of contexts, but he 
seems firstly and most invested (as contrasted to the transcendental dimension) in the 
sectarian dimension of fateful associations or, rather, in “the sovereignty of the local 
sacramental community.” It is this context—of the state’s local associational capacity for 
inclusion (of both a profane particularity as well as of its sacramental universality), 
thus—that he defines the sovereign state in opposition, in fact, to the modern state which 
would have become near-completely monopolistic (universal). That is, only this modern 
state is the “an association that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.” 
But this modern state stands therefore still contrary to that first sovereign association, 
which did not also integrate or include “the punishment of evil” (eschatological 
judgment) among its administrative functions.
287 Foucault (1995) seem so be tracing the birth of the surveillance state back to the seventeenth 
century during which, he finds, justice began to contain elements of violence.
288 Agamben (2011: 50).
289 Rasch (2004: 87), citing Agamben (1998: 11).
290 Agamben (2011: 50).
291 Consult, for instance, Grant (1999), Fabry (2010), and Simpson (2004). 
292 Public declarations of war are of critical importance to political realists, because they tend to 
find that secretive military operations undermine the state’s legitimacy as well as the 
stability of the system. See, further, Donnelly (2000: 145-146), who argues that “norms 
of ... self-determination and non-intervention” coincide with the use of force, rationally-
designed to protect a state’s “territorial integrity”. Reasonable norms and military force, 
then, somehow coexist—ambivalently. The problem for IR theorists arises when neo-
realists claim that states have a legal right to use force, and liberal-institutional theorists 
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counter-claim that most states’ military forces already have come to obey by “basic 
norms” against territorial warfare. Against Donnelly, it is not so much a fact that only 
these norms themselves evolve, therefore, but much more that the relation between 
abstract international laws and concrete military action is itself a complex, systemic 
relation which occasionally opens itself up to internal modification (as happened in 1848, 
1945, and 1991).
293 In, for example, Kojève (2001).
294 Dunn (1972: 7-8).
295 Arendt (2006: 266).
296 Dunn (1972: 18).
297 On representation, see also Ankersmit (2002), Manin (1997), and Urbinati (2007).
298 Schmitt (1988).
299 Arendt (2006: 244).
300 Dunn (1972: 5; 232).
301 Arendt (2006: 189) speaks of the conservation of “the great Roman example”, by the 
revolutionaries of various eras. 
302 Arendt (2006: 81).
303 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 92-93).
304 Arendt (2006: 98).
305 Aristotle (1958: 1273a, 85; 1271b, 79).
306 Arendt (1970: 40), (2006: 20-21).
307 Kinneging (1997: 171, footnote).
308Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 92-93).
309 Weber (1946: 107-108).
310 See, further, Kelly (2003) and Christi (1993), (1998), but also Mouffe (1999) and Žižek 
(1999).
311 Arendt (2006: 122).
312 Bruner (2009).
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313 Bill Moyers seems to refer to a similar duality within the usage of power, but also to the 
present-day imbalance of powers. For, he speaks of a disequilibrium between both the 
vested pro-privatization forces of capital and democracy’s anarchical pro-publicality: 
“The power of money [now] trumps the power of democracy.” Interview by Amy 
Goodman, Democracy Now! (syndicated news broadcast), 06/08/2011.
314 For a select sample of the literature on ‘new’ republican constitutionalism, see Pettit (1997), 
Pocock (1975), Rigsby (2002), and Skinner (1998). Also of interest are Shklar (1990) and 
Spector (2004), taking diverging points of view on Montesquieu’s ‘new’ republicanism.
315 Arendt (1970: 56).
316 Arendt (2006: 127).
317 Arendt (2006: 230).
318 Arendt (2006: 231).
319 Dahl (1993) assumes that open but well-regulated economic markets form the primary 
precondition for democratic constitutions. Arendt (2006: 240-247) objects to this type of 
assumption by setting forth other criteria, such as a constitutional provision of direct 
constituent power (a provision validated by the town-halls, wards, and in other 
‘elementary republics’). For one proposal to re-erect such a constitutional provision, by 
making better ‘republican’ usage of the U.S. Constitution and specifically of its Article 5 
powers, consider Levinson (2006).
320 Skultety (2009).
321 Aristotle (1958).
322 Arendt (2006: 123).
323 Natalie Angier, “Thirst for Fairness May Have Helped Us Survive,” The New York Times, 
07/05/2011, D2.
324 McGeer and Pettit (2009: esp. 60-62).
325 For a summary, see Palonen (1999: 525-529).
326 Sen (1984), (1999), took the British-made Indian famines as a cue for his thoughts on freedom.
327 Dunn (1972: 216; 223).
328 Dunn (1972: 224).
329 Weinstein (2007: 38) helps explain why theorists should refrain from calling rebel groups 
“state-like entities”—but neglects possibly qualitative differences between “the micro-
politics of rebellion” and the state’s macro-politics.
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330 See, also, Ross (2004).
331 Weinstein (2007: 52).
332 Weinstein (2007: 305-311; 328-330; 342; 206).
333 Weinstein (2007: 198).
334 Weinstein (2007: 180; 175). 
335 Weinstein (2007: 304).
336 Philpott (2001: 211) mentions that “[t]he Soviets, like the Americans, were concerned about 
the alignment of the [mostly formerly British and French] colonies”. Yet, he also argues 
that the alignment was mostly an ideological phenomenon, or a struggle for “liberation”, 
so that anti-colonialism itself was not as much part of the Super Powers’ pursuit of 
“strategic interests”. Crawford (2001) seconds his argument. However, as Klein (2008) 
can help illustrate, the era of territorial decolonization did help set the stage for post-
territorial and economic forms of neo-liberal colonization; an effort led by Washington 
and the Bretton Woods institutions and, thereby, an effort most advantageous to 
geopolitical Western interests. Washington held the greatest comparative market 
advantages in the 1960s, so decolonization could only have expanded its own economic 
powers even more than the powers of its political contenders. Consider, further, Hardt 
and Negri (2000), Negri (2008), and Goldman (2006).
337 Babst (1996, orig. publ. 1972), Doyle (1986), and numerous other defenders of the supposedly 
empirical DP law (that democratic states are not ‘hostile’ and will certainly not go to war 
against each other), tend to subsume the individual cases to a general law—but they then 
do this without feeling obliged to also judge their cases separately. This means that they 
will have to try to arbitrarily (without criterion of democracy) draw their cases, of a few 
individual ‘friendly’ states, out of their historical context—within which the unique 
political relations of these states (that is, the relations among democratic as well as 
between democratic and non-democratic states) will have been formed. Outside that 
context, however, it remains almost impossible to understand what it means to concretely 
live in a country governed by a representative democracy.
338 Variants on this argument were made by, for instance, Wendt (1999), Nexon (2009), and 
Cronin (2003). Compare, further, Flockhart (2006), Rosenberg (1994), Ruggie (1998), 
Onuf (1994), and especially Williams (2001). For two (seemingly viable) alternatives to 
the idea of a socially constructed IR basic convention-argument, consider Hobson (2007) 
and Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000).
339 Philpott (2001: 23).
340 Hardt and Negri (2000), (2004).
341 Hardt and Negri (2000: 331; 41).
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342 Hardt and Negri (2000: 88).
343 See, perhaps, Breen (2009).
344 Compare, also, Palonen (1999: 531) to Runciman (2004).
345 Palonen (1999: 534).
346 See, for instance, Rousseau (1979: 146-147), who mentions that “natural pleasures” are 
spontaneous and immeasurable. To take pleasure in the equality of others and of their 
states, then, is to take pleasure in their being “together” in a common space—in which 
neither poverty shows its “hideous face” nor “pomp flaunts its insolence.”
347 Arendt (2006: 221).
348 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 167).
349 Arendt (1990), (1978). Compare, further, Kalyvas (2008).
350 McGeer and Pettit (2009: 47) accurately open their chapter with an observation by John Dunn, 
to the effect that the opposition between “the lightest breeze of reason” (rationality) and 
“psychological and political habits” (judgment) is extraordinarily “sticky” (the opposition 
itself cannot be imagined to come loose and go away).
351 Weber (1968), (1946), (1958), (1993).
352 See Weber (1946: 78-79) and Tromp (1995: 160-170) for discussions of legitimate authority. 
353 McGeer and Pettit (2009) may concur: this paragraph matches with their political judgments 
index.
354 Weber (1946: 241; 267) reserves his label ‘value-neutral’ for the sharpening of his 
distinctions, such as the on between “cultural” and “expert” (positivist) cognitions, or as 
between beliefs in different “world religions”. Hence, the label is used to refer to a type 
of knowledge, not to its contents.
355 Weber (1946: 341; 332).
356 Arendt (2006: 127).
357 The political public/private duality in Arendt’s (1993), (2003), (1978, vols. 1 and 2) mature 
oeuvre gradually takes on dimensions relatively underexplored in the IR theory field. 
Nonetheless, the public realm is herein described as the ‘willing’ to appear among others, 
and to partake in the sharing of sense experiences, whereas the private or the mental life 
is called ‘thinking.’ A similar but far more rationalist distinction had earlier been 
examined, in the Occident, by Arthur Schopenhauer (Price Essay on the Freedom of the 
Will) and in a different form also by Immanuel Kant (1965, Critique of Pure Reason). For 
a commentary, consider Theodor W. Adorno’s Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Stanford, 
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CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, not further referenced in this book). Note that 
Arendt clearly rejected the interiorization of the willing-thinking duality by 
Schopenhauer, and by Adorno’s Kant as well as she recombines interiority (of the
thinking being) with the concreteness of exteriority (the willingness to appear).
358 This subsection’s author generally consulted, among other secondary texts on Weber’s theory, 
Borchert (2007), Kalberg (2009), Kalyvas (2008), Kelly (2003), Kim (2004), Pettenkofer 
(2008), Pichler (1998), and Shaw (2008).
359Merriam Webster’s Collegiate.
360 Kim (2004: 85-86).
361 Kim (2004: 85-86).
362 Palonen (1999: 534).
363 Baehr (2004: 167-168).
364 Gramsci (1998: 219).
365 Baehr (2004: 167-168).
366 Following a free interpretation of Kim (2004: 117).
367 For the argument that symbiosis within the field of opposing ethics is both an actuality and a 
potentiality, see, further, Kim’s (2004: 117; 112) remarks that the two ethics cannot be 
actually united, even though they potentially coincide: “Weber indeed confirms that ‘[i]t 
is not possible to unite the [coincidence] ... of [consequentalist] convinction with the ethic 
of responsibility’”. “[His] claim of incompatibility [makes it deliberately] ... unclear
whether Weber ‘devalued’ the former against the latter. For a candid recognition of the 
logical incompatibility between two ethics does not necessarily, or at least not 
immediately, entail a moral claim that one of those two ethics was devalued by Weber.”
Rather, he did remind his readers “that the ethic of conviction originates from the ethical 
irrationality of the empirical world”. It is, Kim (112) seems to want to add, from within 
the strange “tension” between the intra-wordliness of a consequentialist conviction and 
then also of an extra-mundane sense of irresponsibility, that a “rational and meaningful 
cosmos” may potentially begin to emerge.
368 Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990: 114, 
not further referenced).
369 Compare, further, Bakunin (1971: 325-350; 161-174).
370 See Gramsci’s (1998: 219-223) appropriation of Weber’s formulaic iron law.
371 Baehr (2004: 162-163).
643
                                                                                                                                                
372 It is unclear to which degree Gramsci (1998: 223) follows specifically Weber’s theory, but he 
clearly writes about Caesarism in almost the same formula. See also, for a chapter which 
provides much historical context, Barclay (2004).
373 The representativeness of political institutions is co-constitutive of institutions such as parties 
or assemblies: it is a two-way street, in essence, because it occasionally requires the 
representatives and the representees to change places. Besides H. F. Pitkin, specifically 
Ankersmit (2002) and Manin (1997) identified valuable parts on the street.
374 Compare this notion of a mixed Junker republic, to Kim’s (2004: 88) more conservative 
reading.
375 Arendt (2006: 221).
376 McGeer and Pettit (2009: 58-64).
377 Weber (1958: ch. 6, 107), “The Religious Foundations of Worldly Asceticism.”
378 Compare, further, Mehring (1998: esp. 136).
379 Kantorowicz (1957).
380 Mehring (1998: 143; 133), (1989) and Schmitt (1932), (transl. 2004).
381 See, for example, Weber’s (1958: 167) impression that a whole world could be said to have 
disintegrated due to the Puritan aversion against “pleasure seekers”. If only these seekers 
of happiness were to be understood on Arendt’s terms, however, as spontaneously 
expressing their leisure (scholē), then they should actually be held responsible for 
integrating this same world—and, thereby, also for ethically integrating natural 
authority’s two dimensions, of both mundaneness and transmundaneness.
382 McGeer and Pettit (2009: 70).
383 Kim (2004: 41) adds, for instance, that Weber’s Calvinists have “no privileged private realm 
as a depository of meaning”; they have no “inner sanctum”, Weber argues, because they 
so fully engaged in exteriorizing the transmundane aspects or the extra-wordliness of 
their life.
384 Weber (1958: 115), (1946: 126).
385 Consistent with Weber’s impression at this point, a special issue of the Cardozo Law Review
(check ??? notes, PT) was dedicated to the ‘separation of state and church-doctrine’; this 
author gathered from the issue the ‘doctrine’ was introduced into American discourse by 
Protestant officials and representatives (WASPs) who were actually trying to exclude
others from their own positions of formal authority (Catholics, Jews, and so forth).
386 Kim (2004: 77; 71) references Weber (1968: 699-702).
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387 Kim (2004: 36) puts it well when he additionally mentions that Luther preceded Calvin in 
having opened the doors of the monasteries, thereby allowing their systematic rationalism 
to “penetrate all domains of life.” Luther thus indeed “prepared the way for Calvin’s 
more decisive formulation, which [in turn] gave birth to a new inner-worldly 
otherworldliness, or in Weber’s term, a ‘worldly asceticism’ (innerwertliche Askese).”
388 Weber (1968: 317-329), Weber (1958).
389 Descartes (1979).
390 Mehring (1998: 149).
391 Mehring (1998: 147).
392 Kelsen (1967b), De Angelis (2009).
393 Kim (2004: 85-86).
394 Mehring (1998: 147).
395 Baehr (2004: 167-168).
396 Consider, especially, Machiavelli (1966) and Gramsci (1988). Also relevant to the classicist 
realist case may be Kinneging (1997). Start, for Machiavelli’s part of the case, with 
Fontana (1999), Colish (1978), and Coby (1999). For Gramsci’s part, Buci-Glucksmann 
(1980) and Kalyvas (2000).
397 Kim (2004: 73).
398 In the IR field, compare this to Ermakoff (2009) and Campbell (1998), (1999), and possibly to 
Neumann (2003).
399 Negri (1999: 73-74; 12) provides additional assistance, specifically to Machiavelli’s realist 
theory, in clarifying why this theory cannot endorse a neo-Hegelian program of 
dialectical idealism: it cannot endorse those taking a middle position in defense of 
“metaphysical unity” or of “synthesis”—as Althusser (1999) could have concurred. It is 
in this respect that realism begins with Machiavelli.
400 Advanced realism shares this notion of interrelatedness (and self-organization) with Naess 
(1989: esp. 164-169).  
401 Hegel (1967: esp. pars. 358; 360, p. 222).
402 Wight (1966).
403 See, also, Little (2007).
404 Hobbes (1994: esp. ch. 13), Schmitt (1997). Further, Brown (2007) and Slomp (2006).
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405 It is unfortunate that Agamben (2005: 78; 84-86) tries so hard to situate auctoritas outside 
potestas, because his separation of the terms also suggests they would have two separate 
sources. He seems to be entirely correct that auctoritas “springs from life” (it is the life-
sap of the Roman Republic), as Agamben writes, but it would be incorrect to hereby 
conclude that the structure of life itself does not consist of contending powers and 
potentialities.
406 The question of how this common belief may (indeed: ‘somehow’) emerge, then, is indirectly 
answered by the Marxian tradition of political thought. In the “Eighteenth Brumaire”, 
Marx (1978: 611), (1978b: 530-531), parts from one of the central messages in his earlier 
“Critique of the Gotha Program.” In the former pamphlet, Marx agitates against 
capitalism’s entire “alchemistic cauldron”—but in “Gotha Program” he is defending its 
best alchemic and synthetic functions: he is here still hopeful that its internal “intensity” 
(the “antithesis” between mind and bodily labor) will have “vanished” once the workers 
will have taken over the “modes of production.” This has been taken to suggest that 
Marx, at least only in the later pamphlet (“Eighteenth Brumaire”), written in the 
aftermath of both the 1848 revolts and the 1851 Ceasarist reaction, would have 
understood that (capitalism’s) tension would have to persist rather than to reach one final 
synthesis. See, further, Althusser (2006a).
407 Naess (1989: 79).
408 Negri (1999: 306) suggests, in comparison, that the “creative force” (the sovereignty?) that 
embeds the structures of power should be believed to be the “living god” of the 
democratic multitudes. He therein neglects, unrealistically, their destructive force.
409 Continue with Naess (1989: 68-80).
410 Lovelock (1988).
411 For commentaries on the grand (IR disciplinary) debates, consult (in alphabetical order), 
Brecher (1999), Kratochwil (2006), Lapid (1989), (2003), Moravcsik (2003), Walker 
(1995), and Wæver (1997) but, also, Palan and Blair (1993).
412 Capra (1997: esp. 43-46) describes the work of complex systems theorists such as Ilya 
Prigogine and Alexander Bogdanov. Walby (2007) makes an effort of applying some 
theoretical concepts of complex systems to IR inequalities.
413 Capra (1997: 85).
414 Wight (1966) and Butterfield and Wight (1966) seem to admit that the balance of powers has 
systemic effects on the structural distribution of powers—but they ignore, sometimes, 
how the balance also, empirically, closes off its own organizational dimension. Yet, 
Machiavelli taught that the balance of powers is always a degree of organizational 
orderliness, and should be sustained by spiritualist as well as by structuralist and 
materialist practices. Sustaining the balance is a process that occurs, then, through dual 
practices of prudence. See Benner (2009). For another, more secularist study of 
Machiavelli’s prudence, consider Garver (1987).
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415 For instance, Plato (1990) studies the tension between the process philosophy of Heraclites 
and the Pythagorean possibility of limited but stable knowledge. Uždavinys (2004: 48-
51) lists the “Fragments of Philolaus”, further, which suggest that all things are like 
numbers. They are in flux: the limited and the unlimited things “participate” in one 
another, as do the odd and the even. For the notion of flux itself, consider also Capra 
(1997: esp. 42-43) and Rousseau (1979: 137). 
416 Meinecke (1957) might have realized this too late.
417 For Schmitt, compare Mehring (1989). For Morgenthau, Pin-Fat (2005).
418 Hans Morgenthau must be counted among the realist defenders of a world-state ideal, and of 
an ideal state to be used for all practical purposes, because he feared that human beings 
would otherwise succeed in finally borrowing Nature’s destructive powers (that is, 
nuclear weapons) for usage by nation-states: Morgenthau evidently sought to prevent the 
use of such powers in the service of the state’s authority, not to make these powers 
collide with such a mode of sovereignty. For additional references, consider Scheuerman 
(2011: 63-66; 111-112) and Craig (2008).
419 Contrary to Kelsen (2000, orig. publ. 1946).
420 Schmitt (1976).
421 Schmitt (1985 (orig. publ. 1922)). See, also, Negri (1999) and Kennedy (2011: 536-537).
422 Compare, specifically, Meinecke (1957) to Schmitt (1926).
423 For two studies of how Machiavelli sought to make the political world conform better with the 
transmundane or natural principles of order, consider Masters (1996) and Parel (1992).
424 Especially, Negri (1999: 71; 76).
425 See, furthermore, Marsiglio of Padua, Writings on the Empire: Defensor Minor and De 
Translatione Imperii. (Cambridge University Press, 1993, not further referenced, PT). 
For a very workable commentary on Padua, continue first with Alan Gewirth, Marsilius 
of Padua (Arno Press, 1979, not further referenced).
426 See, particularly, Machiavelli (1966).
427 For a few studies, which appear to be applying systems theory to the IR field, and sometimes 
touch on this theme of natural wholes which are transcending-yet-including political 
actions and relations, consider Brecher (1999), Buzan and Little (2000), Cudworth and 
Hobden (2010), Kessler (2009b), and Hollist (1981).
428 This paragraph’s rejection of individualist liberalism (in its modernist form, indeed) differs 
somewhat from (in being non-dialectical), and yet remains deeply indebted to Althusser 
(2006b) and Jameson (2009), and also to Connolly (2002), (2008), and Huxley (1970), as 
all of these authors are more respectful (than that liberal philosophers such as Habermas 
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would be) of the ambivalent coincidences of materialist and spiritualist dimensions—but 
also of the perennialist interdependency of political biotopes and their own civic 
religiosity.
429 Naess (1989: 184-185).
430 Meinecke (1957: 213-214).
431 Naess (1989: 184-185).
432 Hobbes (1994: ch. 16, 112-113).
433 Holland (2010) refers to Roman Law-legacies in concepts of sovereignty, including Hobbes’s 
concept.
434 Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) paves an entryway to the theological structure of realism’s 
ecological ideas. Continue to see, for some similarities within these ideas, diZerega 
(2000).
435 See, for instance, the “anti-nuclear and pro-nonviolent” agenda for NATO reforms, by Naess 
(1989: 160).
436 Naess (1989: esp. 78-80; 169-171).
437 The phrase ‘natural political realism’ is only used, here, to convey the message that positivist 
social scientific forms of realism, and especially the form of neorealism, should not be 
included among all those realisms which rather remain respectful of the natural negativity 
as well as that they apply themselves to the social positivity of politics. The natural 
complexity of the political is both negativist and positivist, meaning it is ambivalent, and 
thus also that neorealism’s scientific positivism is at a high risk of losing its sense of this 
ambivalency. Hassan (1993: 281) captures natural realism’s appreciation of ambivalency 
well when he introduces the word ‘indetermanence’. Hassan mentions ‘indetermanence’ 
can be used to make sense of, or to “designate” events which are showing two tendencies. 
First, they tend towards “indeterminancy” (particularly towards the self-transcending 
nature of institutional authority, it appears) and, second, they attend to “immanence” 
(particularly towards the inclusion of social institutions, althus this author). In Hassan’s 
own, rightly-chosen, words, these are “two tendencies [which] are not dialectical; for 
they are not exactly antithetical; nor do they lead to a synthesis. Each contains its own 
contradictions, and alludes to elements of the other.”
438 Hobbes (1994: ch. 12, 79; ch. 4, 31).
439 Hobbes (1994: ch. 42, 391) argued, famously, for example, that ultimate authority is dualistic: 
it is both ecclesiastic and civil. All the “Christian kings have their civil power from God 
immediately”—so that any “Christian commonwealth” will have magistrates whose 
authority is equal to that of the Pope’s bishops, in the sense that their judicial decisions 
have “no less de jure Divino mediato”. See, further, Dumouchel (2001) for the way in 
which Hobbes (1994: esp. ch. 16) believes this dual authority is being juridically 
648
                                                                                                                                                
personified. Of course, it has remained open to debate whether he actually intended either 
the covenant or the sovereign to exercise ultimate authority. However, if it were premised 
that the covenant is metaphysically represented by the legal personality of the sovereign, 
then it becomes more apparent why Hobbes also can be said to have held on to a 
medieval concept of dual (and ultimate) authority.
440 While Negri (1999: 109) thinks that Hobbes epitomizes an anti-constitutional theory of 
command, Naess (1989: 50) helps realists to argue that even a Hobbesian sovereign 
should be considered theoretically indeterminable: the sovereign’s covenantal authority 
rather appears to be in (Heraclitean) flux.
441 Whitehead (2011) rebuffs this form of protest, but only too briefly.
442 Hardt and Negri (2000: 192-193) are correct that capitalism thrives in a foreground culture that 
was first constructed “to fill the role that biology [once] played.” Or, capitalism indeed 
depends on a “theory of segregation” in the sense that its cultural exponents expect that 
even “racial supremacy and subordination [will only] ... arise through free competition 
[or at least through] a kind of market meritocracy”.
443 Specifically, Liftin (2003).
444 Liftin (2003), (1998).
445 Compare, especially, Zimmerman (1994: 21).
446 Naess (1989: 79).
447 Capra (1996: 225; 228).
448 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.54, 251-252). 
449 Zimmerman (1994: 31).
450 Lake (2010) hints, likewise, at the need for a new concept of relational authority. But, as it 
appears to this author, Lake’s concept cannot reliably define authority’s emergent and 
historically fluctuating properties.
451 One model of sovereignty’s constant developmental process has been programmed by 
Cederman and Daase (2006).
452 For a useful contextual review of Negri, see Kennedy (2011: esp. 486).
453 Negri (1999: 252; 259-260).
454 To their contrary, see Žižek (2001), (2006), (2008).
455 Begin with Foucault (1995).
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456 Foucault’s concept of biopower, according to Hardt and Negri (2000: 24; 29), “refers to a 
situation in which what is directly at stake in [state] power is the production and 
reproduction of [all] life”—and biopower, thus, should not only refer to the life of the 
body, but also to that of the ‘general intellect.’
457 Chandler (2010). Also see, however, Devetak (2008) and Hindess (2005).
458 Hardt and Negri (2000: 329).
459 Negri (1999: 27-28).
460 This summary spins Negri (1999: 51; 59; 99; 89) a little, but the spinning remains justifiable 
because the goal behind Machiavelli’s presentation of his so-called impossible dual 
combinations would have been to create a “rupture ... more real than synthesis.” The 
rupture is then the source of an alternative society, even though no dialectical synthesis 
will be achieved, says Negri. This reading finds some fundamental support in 
Althusser’s, yet, it is not entirely clear whether Machiavelli did indeed present the same 
antagonistic combination—of monarchical states versus constituent powers—as that 
Negri might here be thinking that he did.  
461 Hardt and Negri (2000: 27-30; 143-146), (2004).
462 Hardt and Negri (2000: 198-199).
463 Hardt and Negri (2000: 32; 330, italics removed from original).
464 Hardt and Negri (2000: 404-406; 395) suppose that there is such a group as a “multitude [that] 
affirms its singularity” and speak of “the biopolitical singularizations of groups”. 
However, it appears highly unlikely that human nature can be the sole foundation of 
biological, let alone political singularity. In all of Nature, in fact, is is simply impossible 
to encounter a singular grouping (this is a contradiction in terms), though it remains 
possible to say that multitudes are several groupings, each of which equally 
multitudinous. A similar point was made by Connolly (2004).
465 Žižek (2006), Connolly (2008).
466 Hardt and Negri (2000: 404-406).
467 Hardt and Negri (2000: 291).
468 Hardt and Negri (2000: 330).
469 Hardt and Negri (2000: 396) refer occasionally to “languages” but hardly explain why 
linguistic immanence should remain a mythological quality of the life of the multitudes.
470 Hardt and Negri (2000: 184), Negri (1991: esp. ch. 2). 
471 Hardt and Negri (2000: 408-409).
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472 Machiavelli (1950: D 2.22, 354).
473 Sunstein (2010: 103; 105-106).
474 Hardt and Negri (2000: 327-329) basically use Foucault’s image of the sovereign as someone 
taking a “transcendent position” supportive of the “capitalist state.” Against this image, 
the multitudes can be seen to discipline themselves by means of their immanent wills, 
inseparable from their “subjectivity”.
475 See, further, Bruner (2009), Gran (2009), and Latham (2011).
476 Hardt and Negri (2000: 244-251).
477 Wallerstein (101-103), also referenced in Bruner (2009: 87, n. 52). 
478 Hardt and Negri (2000: 334-335, italics removed).
479 Bruner (2009: 87).
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CHAPTER THREE
Loneliness is an attribute of our limited awareness, not of life itself.
—Götz Spielmann
The demands of a free people are rarely pernicious to their liberty; they are 
generally inspired by oppressions, experienced or apprehended; and if their fears are ill-
founded, resort is [to be] had, [by them], to public assemblies.
—Machiavelli (1950: bk. 1, ch. 4, 120)
Is it not impressive that one can oblige men to do all the difficult actions and 
which require force, with no reward other than the renown [and glory] of these actions?
—Montesquieu (2000: bk. 3, ch. 7)
When religion condemns things that civil laws permit, there is the danger that 
civil laws will permit on their side what the religion should condemn...
—Montesquieu (2000: bk. 24, ch. 14, 468)
When it is impossible to settle an exact balance between the constitutive parts of 
the state, or when causes beyond control go on altering the relations between them, then 
a special magistrate is established, as a body separate from the other magistrates.
—J.-J. Rousseau (1968: 4.5, 168)
[Schmitt recognizes] the gap which separates the “proper” authority of the 
Symbolic Law/Prohibition from mere “regulation by rules”. [P]aradoxically, the domain 
of symbolic rules, if it is to count as such, has to be grounded in some tautological 
authority beyond rules, which says: “It is so because I say it is so!”
—Slavoj Žižek (1999: 26)
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Mixed Conceptions of Legitimate International Relations
The dual sovereignty thesis (DST) comprises the straightforward proposition to 
no longer be trying to forcefully reconcile the popularly-legitimatized and the statist-
representational dimensions of ultimate authority. Internationally, because of the ‘natural’ 
tension between the power of popular legitimization and the power of state 
representation, diversely-mixed and variously-structured forms of power are tending
towards a modicum of order.Because of the qualitatively-different ‘nature’ of the core
powers of sovereignty, the thesis proposes, it may be believed that from the tension 
between these core powers an ulterior tendency towards public orderliness emerges.
Although many moral justifications and nationalist motives have been ascribed to 
power’s innate tendency towards domination, the realist hypothesis is that even this 
tendency is part of human nature (among several others).Power can create not only 
dominant leadership styles: it can also create organizational orderliness and other 
dynamical innovations. In this, power itself is analogous to ‘second nature’ or even to 
appeals to sheer commonsense, also. Some advanced realists and proto-realists have 
defended the DST in order to describe diverse legitimizations of the complex relationship 
between sovereignty’s two dimensions: power and law. Friedrich Meinecke, among 
them, holds that legitimate authority should be trusted to emerge through the interactions 
between constitutional nation-states, while at the same time pointing out that 
constitutional law and the power of nationalism are creating mutually-conflicting 
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tendencies. Any possible defense of the national interest will demand a certain discretion 
in foreign affairs, but constitutional norms will simultaneously require a populace to 
apply its “civic freedom [in order to] ... contest the primacy of foreign policy, [and to] ... 
‘struggle’ with it, in order to keep the latter within bounds.”1
The DST is the proposition that the complex relation between “civic freedom” 
and “foreign policy” appears not as a tension between exclusive categories, but as a 
tension capable of generating legitimate sources of sovereignty—without that this tension 
has to be superseded by one all-inclusive normative theory.2 Certain persons are 
constantly being recognized, as legitimate statespersons, by free citizens (under 
constitutions) as well as by foreign dignitaries (by other governments), and it takes both 
of these two modes of recognition to help them traverse into the realm of equal 
sovereignty. In other words, once statespersons have begun to recognize their 
commonalities, as sovereigns, they will also have to have recognized a perplexing tension 
between both their natural or geophysical inequalities (governments) as well as their legal 
statuses or their jurisdictional equality (constitutionality). One early variant of the DST is 
being formulated by Meinecke, who argues that Frederick the Great had misunderstood 
Machiavelli and, as a consequence, had falsely idolized the universality of public reason 
and the morality of raison d’état, also—while blinding himself against the vast empirical 
record of often irrational and fateful events. Yet, precisely these sorts of events have long 
been believed to cause sovereign statespersons to struggle against the historical world and 
even to have transcended the flux of History herself.3
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The DST cannot be isolated from empirical histories of how specific state rulers 
succeeded to be recognized by either their international counterparts or their subjects. 
The DST is supported, instead, by a general observation that common interests among 
most statespersons will somehow coincide with their their responsibilities towards the 
ruled. This observation urges them to engage in self-assessments, and yet also to apply 
their capacity for skepticism within an unpredictable public realm—rather than only in 
the sphere of reason and logic. For, this is intrinsically an individualist, and even lonely 
sphere. But isolation and loneliness are attributes of how human animals experience their 
own “limited awareness, not [attributes] of life itself.” Görtz Spielmann adds (although 
only implicitly also to the DST) that scores of perfectly rational human beings, when 
given the chance, would want to let their minds wonder off into states of loneliness and 
fantasy: into states of hoping to eventually live in their “magical illusion” of remaining 
“separate from the world”—whereas, in actuality, “[t]his separation is just an invention”.4
In a world of social animals, no statesperson can be said to act prudently if she is 
not also willing to avoid loneliness and concretely participate in politics. Every person 
should thus participate in the public process, and so learn to recognize the ambivalent 
tension between the contrary forces within her own political constitution. In one 
dimension of the constitutional state, and of statespersons, also, there are the rational 
interest and the private concerns. This is the most lonely and most other-worldly sphere 
of the two. In the other, there is public service and the assignment of official duties. This 
other dimension demands participation as well as a concrete and worldly sense of 
solitariness, which may be expressed by holding oneself back from the more abstract 
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other-worldly sphere. These two dimensions do not so much split the typical state 
constitution or statesperson apart, however, as that they help her to integrate the 
utilitarian effectiveness of her interests with the responsiveness of her service to the 
public.5 Both Meinecke and Weber can be said to have been Machiavellian realists, 
furthermore, because they well understood why the DST is best defended by integrating 
both of these dimensional forces, without denying that they contradict one another—and
without denying that one force transcends and yet includes the other.6 The next-following 
sections shall demonstrate, with Machiavellian realism, that successful statespersons have 
to show themselves to the world as capable of constantly recombining and re-integrating 
consequentialist policy rationales with greater deontological responsibilities.
International Relations theory is a field of inquiry into the meaning of 
sovereignty, yet the field continues to under-estimate and under-appreciate the depth of 
sovereign authority’s contradictory dimensions. Yet, Weber spoke clearly about how its 
legitimacy remains an ambivalent affair—if not only because sovereign authority has to 
have been legitimized by both official and personal, as well as by both rational-legal and 
normative-conventional processes. In contradistinction, the IR field seems to have 
separated these processes from one another. Structuralist neorealism highlights the axis of 
rational choice and the need to take self-interested decisions, while institutional 
neoliberalism describes an axis of international conventions and multilateral values. 
Neorealism insists on the grave inequality in the power of states, hereby, while 
neoliberalism professes to respect each state’s equal right to participate in multilateral 
institutions. One of the typical IR problems has remained, therefore, that both neorealist 
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and neoliberal activities co-exist without that the field has been able to agree on the 
location of a third point in which their respective axes would have to be crossing each 
other.7
Those who have spend much time looking at IR theory, as a single scholarly field, 
have been likely to experience a strange optical illusion.8 From one angle, states seem to 
be pursuing their national interests—possibly at a very high cost to their populations. If 
states must disturb the balance of powers to maintain their national security, in brief, then 
each individual state will try to reach its own point of Pareto-efficiency in doing so.9
From another angle, states appear to be taking their responsibilities towards each other 
very seriously. They are sincere and open towards one another, especially as they help 
spread democratic values and engage in commercial relations—but also as they take part 
in transnational institutions and arbitration mechanisms.10
What neither neorealism nor neoliberalism has managed to account for, 
nevertheless, is the possibility that democracy may not have been spreading because of 
the rational pursuit of national interests nor because of obedience to normative 
transnational liberties. Present-day democratic procedures might simply have been 
implemented because of certain historical imperatives, rather, which then helped 
individual statespersons in transcending their seemingly contrary interests and liberties. 
Democratic procedures, such as those used in the UN General Assembly or by the 
International Court of Justice, have often ended up being followed because of the 
contingent nature of historical events. It is likely, thus, that statespersons would have 
acted differently if they had known beforehand which resolutions the General Assembly 
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would end up adopting or which advisory rulings the ICJ would end up publishing. These 
outcomes could not always have been anticipated, by statespersons, because of their 
limited horizons on the tension between their decisions and the conventional norms. 
Even the most democratic procedures are, in themselves, neutral procedures. In 
the relations between states, critically, every procedure may be simultaneously binding 
and non-binding. The conventional procedures will usually be experienced as binding: 
they will have been legitimized by the ‘eternal yesterday.’ But decision-makers may at 
any time try to defect from such conventional régimes, as even their defections (or: such 
efforts at freeriding and bandwagoning) may ultimately be judged to have been just as 
democratic as those procedures that were designed to prevent such decisions. In breaking 
with a certain international law convention, decision-maker X may effectively be obeying 
the democratic will, and an expression of civic freedom, within her own nation and its 
immediate neighbors. This new defection could thus also help render, hypothetically, 
statespersons P and Q more autonomous than they had been previously. But decision-
makers X, P, and Q may with exactly the same action also be violating the democratic 
will of a cross-national majority of statespersons A through N. More concisely, 
neorealism and neoliberalism take their own angles—on the democratic legitimization of 
state action—but because neither one of these angles can show the how X, P, and Q 
either are violating an international law believed to have been governing A-N or are 
creating a new law potentially governing and supported by X and O-Z, the problem of 
historical interpretation kicks in.
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Both the structure and the organization of historical contingencies demands much 
greater attention, from IR theory, and this is the point at which political realists—from 
Machiavelli to Arendt and from Hobbes to Schmitt and Meinecke—can lend considerable 
aid. The case of how ambiguously and how varied the responses have been to both UN 
and NATO armed interventionism, which tends to present itself under a humanitarian 
banner, illustrates the broader need for their aid.11 After all, even if the General Assembly 
were to reach its decisions in accordance to perfectly democratic procedures, this does 
not mean there will be no historical option for the Security Council, or for the P-5 therein, 
to render these same procedures hollow. For example, even if the conventions on 
sovereignty conventionally prohibit NATO member states from militarily attacking other 
states, or from carrying out lethal bombardments over the (Former) Yugoslav Republic 
without a legal cause, for instance, then this does not mean that the prohibition in itself 
cannot be rendered meaningless by NATO in order to enforce quite another convention 
of sovereignty: the equal right to declare war. The Arendtian kind of realism that was 
practiced by Iris Marion Young, of course, can still help IR to understand why bombing 
others without a just war cause is not only contrary to bombing them by using 
humanitarian ideals to justify a war. The problem is not simply one of contrariness, for 
the first action is only a structural form of violence, which can still be more or less 
justifiable, but; the second is also organizationally illegitimate regardless as to whether it 
may indeed be morally justifiable.12
Realism teaches there are always two sides to IR stories. But the story of 
sovereignty, in particular, continues to evolve: it is available to statespersons both as a 
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shared conventional norm as well as a right to decide on their own best interest. 
Sovereignty is ambivalent, indeed, because on one side does it remain part of the 
international law tradition. The ICC (International Criminal Court), for example, further 
institutionalizes the regulatory universality of the law. Neoliberalism correctly holds that 
the ICC provides a modicum of final legal recourse. On sovereignty’s other side, the ICC 
prosecutor may only act on condition that prosecutors and judges within a particular 
target-state are failing to do so. As neorealism can hold, just as accurately, the ICC is in 
essence a permanent war-time tribunal. In order for states to be recognized as sovereign, 
by the ICC, they will have to have been declared victorious: they must have proven, quite 
possibly on a battlefield, their ability to control substantive structures of power. In order 
for the ICC to be able to shirk the equality of head-of-state immunities, therefore, it will 
have to rely on the military power of its member states and especially also on the 
structural co-operation of the Security Council. Neorealism tends to consider the ICC as a 
tool in the hands of its most powerful creators. The signatories to the Rome Treaty 
(which created the ICC) would thus only be using the Treaty to their own advantage: they 
will try to appoint arbitrators who can help them make the world safer for their own 
material interests or their own corporate investments.13
Are ICC members facilitating and multiplying democratic values or have they 
created an additional weapon within the arsenal of their global oligarchy? Can the 
legitimacy of institutions such as the ICC, the WTO, and the EU court system be 
perceived in terms of two contradictory dimensions? Can legitimacy emerge from certain 
intensities within historically-interpreted fluctuations, including the ambivalent flux that 
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is home to both democratic rules and oligarchical forces: both law and power? The DST 
is premised on the notion that legitimate authority is dualistic—and that it, in actuality, 
does emerge from the intensity between both effective governmental functioning (power) 
as well as of the grand formations of constitutional states (law) within which multilateral 
institutions have been embedded. But the DST also premises that under the conditions of 
equal sovereignty, there can be no power vacuum. There will have to be some party 
somehow exercising more or less effective governmental supremacy—even when the 
multilateral institutions themselves may demand one of their members to surrender a part 
of its territorially-defined field of power and control.
Neither neoliberal nor neorealist explanations for transnational governments and 
multilateral juridical governance can satisfy the problem of power vacuums. But 
advanced realists do demarcate a perpetual tension between law and power, or also 
between the highly-normative international legal conventions and Great Power political 
effectiveness and national interests. To return to the ICC case: the Court’s echoing of 
national agendas is paired to the Court’s own support for legal conventions. But the act of 
pairing itself betrays a curious tension which, unfortunately, has left little to no 
significant traces within a longer series of theoretical essays on political legitimacy in 
IR—published by Føllesdal, Steffek, Buchanan and Keohane, Krasner, Lake, and 
Wilson.14 Perhaps these traces have only been too difficult to track, but it appears these 
authors have little in common with advanced (DST-based) realism; none of them simply 
accepts the existence of paradoxical tensions between legitimate sovereignty’s two 
dimensions. Yet, their two mainstay explanations can be taken in isolation from one 
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another, and can then even be said to reflect either one of these dimensions. Whereas 
advanced realism holds that the two explanatory streams should be flowing together into 
one delta of legitimizations, of sovereign authority, thus, the IR discipline throws up 
dykes to separate the streams.
Chapter Three, currently under investigation, consists of a number of spokes. 
These spokes consist of the standard IR theoretical explanations; neorealism and 
neoliberalism, but also of social constructivism. Each of the spokes is assumed to connect 
to a nave of advanced realism, and of dual sovereignty, which has remained invisible to 
IR’s naked eye. To uncover this nave, elements of natural systems theory can serve as 
conceptual tools. Chapter Three shall, as was announced in earlier sections, mainly be 
formed by a reading of Machiavelli. His works (The Prince, Discourses, Florentine 
Histories) have been the works of a Renaissance systems theorist who was applying 
certain concepts and who gave meaning to a flux of opposites within History as well as to 
the flux of Nature. Machiavelli used a conceptual tone that allowed him to harmonize 
several systems theoretical tenets—such as the dualities of life, the organizational balance 
of politics, and the structural diversity and integrity of power—with his psychological 
character studies of Roman Antiquity’s Numa and the Florentine Renaissance’s Lorenzo.
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Legitimizing Opposites: Remarks on the Realist Method Developed by Meinecke
The field of International Relations has been slow to accept the fact that political 
realism originates not in the social sciences but in methodological tenets first developed 
within the historical field: Machiavelli, for one, was a political historian as well as a 
political theorist. At its core, realism has therefore very much remained a method of 
historical interpretation—and particularly also a method of describing the truly never-
ending dynamics of how culture and politics, or how popular cultural values and political 
interests, but also how both human rights norms and nationalist decisions might have 
begun and how they may once again begin to traverse.15 Fundamental to the immediately 
next-following paragraphs will be the overarching research question as to how and why 
the tension between such norms and decisions should be legitimized or, when needed, 
moderated—and by whom.16
In part, realism has continuously been shaped by its own negative response 
towards Continental liberalism (a category that encompassed various socialist 
philosophies) as well as by its disapproval of fascism within the historical study of 
international jurisprudence.17 For, various neo-Napoléontic government reformers had, 
several decades before the end of the nineteenth century, been professing their allegiance 
to the total rationalization of each individual’s liberty—and, thereby, to the rise of one 
cosmopolitan society reverential towards human rights.18 But German proto-realists such 
as Meinecke and Schmitt implicitly and explicitly responded to these neo-revolutionary 
reformers by siding with certain members of the conservative establishment.19 The proto-
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realists in fact came to agree, with these conservatives, that the state would somehow 
have to retain an existential as well as a juridical responsibility towards the nation as a 
whole: a responsibility which should perhaps not break with any specific human right, 
but which should at least generally and effectively transcend the state’s own individual-
centered philosophies of raison d’état.20
In another part, realism is also being informed by its originally negative response 
towards conservatism—and especially towards the seemingly reactionary variant 
espoused by the the neo-Hegelian historians Treitschke and Ranke.21 The latter would 
have idolized the unitary nation-state by allocating exaggerated rational powers to its 
national structure, while paying no heed and even while paying no respect to its usually 
irrational conduct or, as well, to the empirical record of the state’s manifold 
disintegrations.22
Principally, Meinecke can hardly be considered sympathetic towards Hegel’s 
conservatism, as will now be illuminated. Although endorsing some Hegelian concepts, 
he actually does reject Hegel’s tendency to try to synthesize, as opposed to be 
intensifying, the many possible “antinomies of human life.”23 Hegel would have made the 
mistake of diminishing the vital tension between the, seemingly irrational, life in the state 
of nature, and the supposedly rational and supposedly civil state of social legitimacy. IR 
theorists today may come to learn, from this anti-conservative strand in Friedrich 
Meinecke’s thinking, that it is a strand that was woven into three distinctly post-Hegelian 
themes. And, each of these themes would thus, further, end up being incorporated into a 
genuinely Machiavellian modality of political realism: the duality of the powers of 
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rationality and of non-rationality; the sociability paradox, and; the tension between the 
natural life of all human beings and the particular personality of the particular nation-
states governing these human beings.24
According to Richard W. Sterling, author of Ethics in a World of Power: The 
Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke, from which this section shall now draw, the realist 
method made it possible to index “concepts of nation and humanity” as if these would 
have come together to represent one “polarity of opposites.”25 But because Meinecke had 
also so often been painted off as an exponent of both a Machiavellist and a German form 
of Realpolitik (power politics), how have Meinecke’s own three themes actually cohered 
with Machiavelli’s method of historical and political interpretation? Which are the 
possible similarities between their theoretical thematic studies, including those of 
Bismarck Prussia in post-1848 Europe as well as of Medici Tuscany in high-Renaissance 
Italy? By rereading Machiavelli’s own thoughts, throughout several of this Chapter’s 
sections, the latter question will have to be answered.
First, Sterling relays how Meinecke apparently refused to accept both the idea of 
one universal human body, governed by one natural law, as well as that he would have 
dismissed the equation of “social order with rationality and disorder with irrationality.” 
Any political society’s “inherent components” may have to be believed to include both 
“reason” and “fortuity”, instead, but also to comprise respectively both “order” and 
“disorder”, as well as both “humanity” and “nation”, so that anyone taking history’s 
judgment seat can be believed responsible for having to have spawned a complex 
combination of both dimensions—and of both “insight and bias” as well. Even more 
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important is now Meinecke’s lesson that any judge of historical and political events will 
ultimately find herself judging some very complex and archetypal tension, which itself is 
being profoundly impregnated by “the conflict between the sovereign nation and the idea 
of the world community”.26 The latter conflict is a perplexing conflict between national 
autonomy and the “imperialism” of the universal, European, or the Hegelian world 
state—because it resists its own objectification: it is not a structural conflict open to 
universal laws of reason, alone. Rather, this conflict is open to political judgment. But the 
faculty of judgment is neither to be exercised by means of induction nor only through 
deduction. That is, neither ‘concrete particulars’ nor ‘some universal theorem’ should be 
expected to dominate in any judiciously-crafted report of the world’s diverse 
“subjectivities”. For, prudent judgment demands the exercise of a mind capable of 
mastering “relative and not absolute truths.”27
Second, every nation-state suffers from a sociability paradox: “social proclivities 
[are] not ... strong enough to create societies without the aid of historical and 
environmental forces transcending the [aggregate of] individual[s].”28 Although each 
sovereign state will have been formed by a sociable and societal whole, transcending the 
sum of its individual parts, this system cannot simply be believed to have become so 
strong and so resilient that its individual parts may no longer also again begin to be 
organized and reorganized and revolutionized by ever-greater “forces” (such as those 
unleashed by the French Revolution). Meinecke’s systems theory, as Ethics in a World of 
Power explains in greater detail, had been provoked by the force of foreign interferences: 
by a multitude of idealistic, progressive revolutionaries. This suggests that the systems 
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theory is conservative. For, it is a reaction against their idealistic idea that one great 
historical antithesis would somehow have separated the need for an “authoritarian state”, 
constantly coping with the “exigencies of foreign policy”, from the liberal state of the 
French Revolution, and thus also from the Revolution’s European or cosmopolitan 
consequences.29
Against the perceptibly too widely-expressed idea that the separation of national 
power from individual liberty would prove itself beneficial to a prospective German state, 
perhaps because this antithesis should somehow be expected to cause a synthesis and thus 
again advance German unification, Meinecke argues that the unity of (or: autonomy for) 
the Germany people will not so much be facilitated by a measure of their world’s 
synthesis into one nation-state as well as by a degree of their state’s constitutionality. 
Hence, only the constitutional German state should be believed capable of sustaining 
sufficient tension between Europe’s cosmopolitanism and its own nationalism, or also 
between equal individual rights and the primacy of foreign policy. For, foreign policy is 
still to be conducted by means of ‘guardianship’ or by a ‘dictatorship’ of the popular 
trust. “He argued that the conduct of foreign policy was the most basic and delicate of the 
state’s functions, and that it must be [relatively] free of pressure from mass passions.”30
In brief, this argument led Meinecke to his conclusion that the autonomy of the parts is to 
be included, and yet also to be transcended by the supremacy of an internationally-
recognized ‘guardian’—who is then again believed to take care of the sum of all rights, of 
the parts, and to thus also to respect this sum as if it were to form one national whole. 
Nevertheless, this circle is incomplete. The system remains ambivalent because the 
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constitutional state, hereby, spirals back towards a mixed conception of its own 
sovereignty—vulnerable towards both excessively-conservative nationalism as well as 
towards full-blown cosmopolitan liberalism. The state is ambivalent in the sense that it 
throws up a “Janus-like barrier” which then maintains a paradoxical tension between “the 
individual and humanity, [in] ever tending to control the one and deny the other.”31
Third, Meinecke helped establish a catalog of the various tensions between the 
life that is concretely being lived, within nations, and the life that should be lived for the 
sake of abstract ideals: for humanity. “[N]ation and humanity” would have to have been 
formed from one metaphysical union, and yet they will have to physically sustain 
themselves through two conceptual and historical “dimensions”, or through two distinct 
“opposites” also. Each of these two “dimensions” is plainly “indispensable to the other, 
for the existence of each was possible only in the ‘creative tension’ generated by its 
opposition to the other.”32 But, largely following Fichte, Meinecke then insists that this 
tension itself is to be maintained within a constitutional nation-state and not in a world-
state, and not even in one European union. Much rather, as Sterling adds, the “super-
individual personality” of the internationally-recognized nation cannot so simply be 
excluded from the “human personality” and legal rights of all of this nation’s individual 
members. “Meinecke’s arguments for the primacy of foreign policy [must still prevent 
the masses from interfering in the] ... complex business of maintaining the [nation-
]state’s external well-being. Yet, at the same time he strove from greater mass 
participation in political life, and he insisted that the [constitutional] state recognize its 
citizens as ends in themselves, and not simply as instruments of state power.”33
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In pondering these few quotations, the question arises whether Meinecke might 
not have been a republican realist. Like Max Weber, he does not seem to treat individual 
citizens as mere means, solely satisfying the state’s supreme ends—as he also finds that, 
especially, individual soldiers should also always be thought to be motivated by their 
political participations in the whole of human culture and history.34 The tension between 
the consequentialist treatment of the individual citizens, on one side, and the 
deontological ethos of paying respect to those participatory powers that include but also 
transcend the individual constituents, on another side, is self-perpetuating. For example, 
Bismarck would have been instrumentally protective of many individual Germans, who 
often believed he was their ‘necessary Moses’, and yet ‘his’ Reich had in the same 
moment remained relatively unstable: it had failed to compensate for its own “lack of 
popular participation”.35 Although a full summary of Meinecke’s political method will 
not be as brief as the above attempt to here present its basic three tenets, Sterling does 
help advanced realists in identifying the great paradoxical tension between the “perfect 
objectivity” implied in that Hegelian idea of a national raison d’état, first, and the 
constitutionally-imperfect “subjectivity of every individual”, second.36
In order to answer the research question—of how any of the countless and 
historically contingent tensions between humanitarian values and national interests, or 
between international norms and raison d’état decisions—should be legitimized, less all-
encompassing questions should first be asked. For instance, was Machiavelli a 
Meineckean historian or is Meinecke’s theory even more deeply Machiavellian than that 
he himself might have realized?
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IR Theory, Rawls, and the Proper and Legitimate Tension within Dual Sovereignty
Before reading Machiavelli, this section shows why the IR discipline can benefit, 
to a greater extent from DST realism, specifically in its scholarly attempts to determine 
the proper distance in between the two main dimensions of ultimate authority—and, 
thereby, in between both the powers and the laws of the constitutional nation-states in 
this world. Finding the right distance can prove itself critical, in the sense that too wide a 
gap between the two dimensions could make either one almost invisible—and could thus 
also make it impossible to recognize states as legitimate states. This whereas too narrow a 
gap could collapse sovereignty’s two dimensions onto one another, and make them 
indistinguishable: this would perhaps make it well possible to recognize new states, but it 
would also create misunderstandings about how and why they would historically have 
become states. If power and law have collided, then it is impossible to say for sure for 
which cause a state-like entity first sought recognition—as a sovereign state. In other 
words, the tension and the distance within a meaningful concept of sovereignty should 
neither be so great that its dimensions will be isolated from one another, nor should the 
separation be so small that they will be fused into a different dimension altogether. 
Hence, how may IR theorists try to conceptualize the contingently-appearing, 
proportionate and proper, and especially also the legit tensions between sovereignty’s two 
sides?
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Føllesdal has developed a very simple variant of the DST with the aim of 
preventing a further analytical separation of both power from law. He makes an inventory 
of the dimensions of the legitimacy deficit or, in other terms, of the gap that is believed to 
exist in the relationships between statespersons and civil society, specifically in Europe. 
He does not ask why so many Europeans would experience a full divorce between their 
needs and the actions of their party representatives. But he clearly does ask what IR 
theory may be able to learn from this experiential gap between the two groupings. In his 
answer, Andreas Føllesdal lists four concepts of what it has come mean for statespeople 
to be recognized, by ordinary citizens, as belonging to one and the same legitimate 
political order: the EU.37
Steffek’s chapter—entitled “Legitimacy in International Relations: From State 
Compliance to Citizen Consensus”—appears in the same bundle as Føllesdal’s inventory 
of causes contributing to a legitimacy deficit. The chapter additionally introduces the 
theoretical issue of how IR legitimacy should, ideally, become an universally 
recognizable facet of state authority. Both Føllesdal’s and Steffek’s chapters take the 
normative angle—giving priority to a societal consensus rather than to a political 
compromise, and to norms rather than to decisions. Their cursory references to Weber 
help the authors bypass Weber’s far deeper appreciation of authority’s two-
dimensionality (normativity/decisiveness; law/power).38 Yet, only Jens Steffek’s chapter 
depends on a liberal theory—as opposed to empirical data on EU legitimacy deficits. The 
chapter is deeply enamored by John Rawls’s “link between individual beliefs in the 
validity of certain principles, [or] societal consensus, and political legitimacy.”39
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Political legitimacy poses not a question of equality and liberty alone: it is also 
poses a question of autonomy and power. Neo-Kantian IR theorists may very well admit 
that less-than-ideal states do exist, and that even the most liberal state must to some 
extent be ignoring its own best national interests.40 But neo-Kantian and other liberal 
theorists who are following John Rawls usually add to this admittance that liberal states 
should eventually be denied their “traditional rights to war and to unrestricted internal 
autonomy.”41 Although realists may argue that any such conception of “unrestricted 
autonomy” forms a contradiction in terms (autonomy is a type of self-regulation, so it 
cannot be unregulated), Rawls does defend hereby a rather morally justifiable point: 
“outlaw states” have to be limited and, when possible, sanctioned. No state should have 
to wage war on another state, because no single raison d’état can legitimize such a 
violation of the equal liberty-principles of all states. 
After the 1940s, for example, the current EU member states gradually re-acquired 
their autonomy by subjecting themselves to democratic procedures that could guide them 
in interpreting tenets of their shared international law tradition. And as EU members are 
still becoming more autonomous, as Alexander Wendt holds, they are also becoming 
more likely to treat each other as equals: to lawfully restrict, thus, their internal 
supremacy.42 Rawls and Wendt can agree, in this respect, as their theories suggest the EU 
was formed as a model of liberal statehood: its members surrendered their national 
identity and their “unequal exchange relationships” in order to construct “new identities”, 
mostly based on their legal equality.43 Two points must be made, about Rawls, before 
commencing with the issue of IR concepts of political legitimacy and how their meaning 
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may neither only be reduced to the effectiveness of a national government’s powers 
(neither to its actual powers of supremacy and autonomy), nor just to the individual’s 
obedience to cosmopolitan and constitutional laws (formal equality).
The first point concerns each private individual’s rights. Individual equality forms 
the basic source of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, yet few individuals in the world have ever 
believed that they were absolutely equal—either in terms of their cultural or their 
spiritual affinities—to most other individuals. Rawls holds that every individual ought to 
be at full liberty “to decide for himself or herself” on matters of religious expression and 
spiritual significance.44 Every statesperson, by analogy, ought to be at liberty to choose 
her own ideology—as long as it is not a dogmatically illiberal ideology. Each state’s 
religious and ideological preferences, in brief, can and should be protected by means of a 
right to make private choices: the state’s political preferences should be dictated by 
private choices, made by individual citizens, not the other way around. Religious 
fundamentalism is too political and therefore also too illiberal, hence, if not only because 
it will somehow have to have become the choice of government rather than only of the 
individual. By definition, state religions cannot be in sync with the wills of the citizens. 
Rather, they typically form an attribute of “expansionist societies of whatever kind”—as 
opposed to of “a society of well-ordered peoples.” In the end of this Rawlsian analysis, a 
political society is only liberal and decent to the extent that (at minimum in matters of 
belief and laws on religion) each citizen will have been democratically allowed to 
“decide for himself or herself”.45
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Raja Bahlul demonstrates that “Islamic thinkers will want to ask [Rawlsian 
analysts] whether liberal democratic practice is the only legitimate interpretation of 
democracy.”46 In the tradition of Islamic political thought, human beings cannot be 
reduced to being “either ‘private citizens’ or ‘political citizens’ [because] ... the correct 
classification is one that distinguishes between believers and non-believers. Religious 
belief is politically relevant. Not only that, but it plays an integrative function that resists 
all attempts to turn religion into a private matter.”47 The function of the Islamic state is 
not to be protecting each individual’s liberty equally—but, quite to the contrary, to be 
asking for labor and service in proportional accordance to each individual’s unequal 
capabilities. Does this mean Rawls considers a political society such as Iran to be 
dogmatically illiberal, even though this society’s general protection of individual rights 
and specific duties “takes place within a broad consensus on the need and necessity for an 
Islamic régime[?]”48 If this is Rawls’s consideration, then his theory remains inapplicable 
in places other than a few self-acclaimed secular societies—such as France or post-
apartheid South-Africa. But states as diverse as Saudi-Arabia, Italy, and the Netherlands 
do maintain their own state religion—not entirely unlike how China’s ‘religion’ is called 
one-party communism. It is in such states part of the “broad consensus” that each 
individual’s religion may well remain subject to legitimate political discourse: the choice 
of religion in most states, in historical fact, has never been a private choice.
The second point is informed by the problem of how government structures have 
to try to remain reasonable, and thereby also decent and legitimate. This problem is the 
source of Rawlsian liberalism. In Theory of Justice, one of Rawls’s most notorious dicta 
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holds that “justice is denied whenever equal liberty is denied without sufficient reason.”49
But must democratic governments provide reasons why they would want to deny that 
every individual’s liberties are equal to those of every other individual? If every 
discretionary government decision and if every possible exception to the rule of law 
(think of: police profiling) were to be accounted for, then government would soon seize 
functioning. It would lose its effectiveness. Yet, Rawls writes that there have been 
extremely few cases in which “sufficient reason” was present to abrogate equal liberty: 
these were all cases in which abrogation was “necessary for preserving equal liberty 
itself”.50
He adds that this exception always needs to have a neutral effect on the liberties 
of others. It may not be left to the government itself to judge whether a negative effect on 
the liberties of the many citizens exist, in taking away the liberty of a few others or of a 
few non-citizens, however, because the power of government also needs to be checked by 
means of a constitutional law. Yet, by ranking law above power, Rawls repeats Kelsen’s 
fallacy: he ends up putting the government at risk of being neutralized by law. 
Unfortunately, as O’Neill mentions, Theory of Justice is on this point of neutralization 
“strangely silent about the predicaments of outsiders, and about the justice of a world that 
is segmented into states”.51 The risk for Rawls is that almost any grouping could be asked 
to define itself without having to draw a political distinction to outsiders or enemies. The 
grouping should provide what it itself deems to be a sufficient reason and justification for 
the protection of the status quo, for example, only to actually help protect the freedoms of 
the many—and to do so in the name of necessity—by depriving the few of their basic 
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rights. That is, too many self-interested justifications can be given for the necessity of 
abrogating the rights of a small minority of people—if these justifications are then indeed 
predominantly being used to protect the liberties of a self-elected democratic majority. 
State supremacy may used, in other words, as a justification for the state protection—and 
for as long as supremacy seems to stand in the service—of the majority’s autonomy.
Rawls is a theorist of the contractual structure of powers, not of the organizational 
closing off and transcending of this contractual structure. This becomes particularly 
evident in passages in which Rawls dismisses religious authority as source of 
organizational legitimization. In this dismissal, he separates the contractual structure, in 
which persons act as separate individuals, from the transcendent web that includes this 
structure by legitimizing the actions of these persons.
According to Alan Ryan, Theory of Justice was based on “the separateness of 
persons” and designed for “people in competitive conditions”.52 Ryan critiques Rawls for 
here having failed to distinguish between separate individuals and how these same 
individuals ought to belong to real societies, or to really sociable groupings. It is too easy 
to provide only a theoretical defense of equal liberties, and thus also of the individual’s 
obedience to the law, but never pay heed to any calls for tacit obedience to the status quo
distribution of power. That is, obedience to the law is not always a good thing—
particularly not if principles of liberty remain “contingent upon” the uneven status quo
satisfaction of needs. Rawls is of course correct that government officials should not be 
acting completely contingently upon “existing desires or present social conditions”—and 
that their actions may on numerous occasions best be checked, instead, by their strictly 
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respecting of people’s equal liberties.53 However, there can be certain circumstances 
under which some officials cannot be checked by anyone’s remaining only respectful of 
every citizen’s liberties. “Citizens who are sincerely convinced that some act of 
government violates justice in a serious way, certainly may and sometimes must disobey 
the law as a way of calling attention to the violation and asking for reconsideration.”54
Finally, what Rawls hereby fails to recognize is that the existing distribution of power 
may remain skewed towards the rich, so that what is legally theirs may not really be 
legitimately theirs.55 Yet, in his own exposition on property rights, Rawls denies that the 
equal right to property may have to be protected through the transcendent legitimacy of 
natural rights.56
As these points show, the state envisioned in Theory of Justice is a liberal rather 
than a national state. Its government is to be embedded within a constitution law which is 
protective of individual liberties, needs, and desires. It is a state that values the individual 
citizen higher than the civic participant as it ranks private beliefs over public authority, 
competition aver solidarity, and legal rules above the need to command. Slavoj Žižek 
once referred to such a liberal state as lacking in terms of its, “tautological authority 
beyond rules”.57 In this, it remains a “fantasy-space within which a community organizes 
its ‘way of life’ [as] its mode of enjoyment.” The fantasy-state would be mediating each 
community’s most basic desire by representing that desire as if it had been informed by 
each individual’s highest-valued source of pleasure. The problem with this state, as 
realists are apt to point out, however, remains that its basic desire, “insofar as it is 
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always-already mediated by fantasy, can never be grounded in (or translated back into) 
[the authority of] ... ‘true interests.’”58
Žižek comments that the liberal state’s individualistic undertone has made it 
easier to dichotomize fantasy and reality, equal liberty and actual inequality.  The poor 
and the subjugated are so being pushed back into an artificially-engineered 
“background.”59 From a Rawlsian perspective, it seems as if the poor have not been 
provided with sufficiently free choices. They would not have been allowed to decide for 
themselves, as rights-bearing individuals, and this is why they have not (yet) appeared in 
the foreground of the world. But from the counter-perspective of Žižek and Young, a 
darker side of human nature reveals itself through the liberal dichotomy.60 Both the 
unprecedented freedom of choice and the type of structural overconsumption—which 
includes the consumption of luxury foods as well as of food stuffs subsidized by Western 
states, for example—has negative consequences for the equal liberties of poor people 
anywhere in the world.61 But by focusing on freedoms as if they belong only in the 
foreground, or only in Western societies, agents whose liberties are already being 
protected in the foreground of this world will have no ‘truly’ existential interest to also 
act in direct solidarity with agents in their own background environment. It would not be 
a solution to the problem of overconsumption to simply be doing as Rawls says by 
viewing oneself as a legislator, solely interested in “following public reason”.62 One 
should also be able to expand public reason, for example by making discretionary 
decisions or by making exceptions to the status quo procedures, so that public freedom 
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can newly begin to include background private beliefs, however prejudicial these might 
be, as well as to continue to ground pre-existing public reasons.
By placing public reason in the foreground, Rawlsian liberalism protects the 
status quo, which is maintained by individual-centric forms of consumerism, rather than 
that it stimulates any criteria of alternative and of ecological experiences that people 
“should look upon with joy.”63 Liberalism views a need for liberty or a norm of equality 
as “something which is attained”.64 Equal freedom is thus reduced to something that has 
“utility or benefit”—rather than that it, as Naess finds, is also understood “to protect the 
richness and diversity of life for its own sake.”65 In IR, Wendt and Friedheim use the 
liberal conception of state power as they presuppose that all power should be 
subordinated to individual consent.66 What they do not see, however, is that their 
conception of state power has no intrinsic meaning: they only value it as something that 
is worth less than state liberty. As neo-Kantian theorists, in brief, they are fully 
committed to their criterion that the equal liberties of each state should be respected in 
such a way that these liberties can in themselves help limit each state’s powers and other 
such structural forces. After all, liberties can optimally satisfy each agent’s desires.
Rawlsian as well as neo-Kantian IR theorists have valued liberty higher than 
power, just as that they valued autonomy higher than supremacy. Nevertheless, even 
Immanuel Kant himself would not have treated autonomy as if it could somehow present 
itself on a site much higher than any specific inclination towards supremacy.67 To him, 
autonomy was never a “special achievement” of the independent individual or of the free 
state, as Onora O’Neill has argued. Rather, autonomy was always thought of as one of the 
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faculties that any human being could be sharing with others—because they would have to 
have believed their autonomy’s legitimacy to be a common principle. “The capacity for 
autonomy goes with the capacity to act on principles even when inclination is absent, 
with being able to adopt maxims of action that do not sit well with our desires.”68
Moreover, their faculty of autonomy may help human beings to newly authorize and 
legitimize their state—without that it would have to have been defined in relative 
separation from the supremacy of the state. Positive autonomy and positive supremacy 
are, therefore, not to be thought of as mutually exclusive: they symbiotically impose 
themselves onto each other, rather. As O’Neill helps clarify this point, the autonomy and 
the authority of public reasoning processes are both “neither imposed nor anarchic: [b]y 
elimination, [autonomy’s authority] must be self-imposed.” Moreover, “[autonomy’s] 
authority and [state] toleration are interdependent.”69 They just cannot be as easily 
separated from one another as that Rawlsian philosophy suggests.
Rawls’s “link” connects the socio-economic consensus to individual beliefs.70 But 
this “link” should be able to endure a stress-test. The above-presented two points of 
critique, however, make it unlikely that the “link” can withstand those pressures that 
might have been created by ideological enemies and political subordinates. Yet, Steffek 
uses Rawls to suggests that the validity of the “link” itself would no longer have to be an 
issue, and that the social consensus on the primacy of individual liberties continues to 
arise “from (or be rooted in) a pattern of normative beliefs.” His chapter assumes that 
states will over time start to form a stronger pattern of such beliefs, amid of which the 
social consensus is derived. Steffek does follow Rawls, thus, when he writes that the 
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consensus is valid because it derives from the rational choices, made by states. The 
separate states will rationally have submitted their ideological powers “to the rules of 
international law, and [to] the decisions of international organizations”—so that a less-
than-tacit moral social consensus has arisen as a result of their rational choices. States 
voluntarily subordinate their powerful wills to the general will of international treaty-law 
and of various transnational institutions, also, because it is in their rational interest to do 
so.71
After casting a second glance on Steffek’s Chapter, it seems as if it also agrees 
with Rawls’s critics that a state’s rational interests may not be really its best interests. The 
Chapter then criticizes the ideal of a consensus, as Steffek starts to take on his neorealist 
role. He now also argues that compliance with treaty organizations must not be confused 
with moral normativity or legal positivism. Compliance with transnational institutions 
(including, of course, the ICC or the WTO) is in many instances beneficial to self-serving 
states. Compliance is usually not even consensual—just as that the social consensus itself 
may not be majoritarian either. This means that any state leader could very well try to 
abide by the consensus of a specific treaty-organization merely because her state might 
depend on stronger states for certain favors. Or, her own state as well as the states of her 
equals may be relatively weak, and have been “bullied and bribed into accepting 
normative commitments which they [would otherwise] ... not really endorse.” Within 
organizations which may seem to be formally consensual, such as the WTO, “coercive 
socialization” occurs much more frequently than is usually being realized.72
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Steffek takes both the Rawlsian and the neorealist angles on legitimate state 
authority, thus suggesting that a consensus on sovereignty can be achieved by both 
persuasive and coercive means. Legislative rights (autonomy) and executive forces 
(supremacy) form two interconnected dimensions of how sovereignty has actually been 
organized—and they, simply put, may not be disconnected from one another by ranking 
only one far above to the other.73
Ambivalent sovereignty’s dimensions also pose a concern for Føllesdal, who lists  
four conceptualizations of these dimensions: procedural legality; societal compliance; 
problem solving, and; normative justifiability. Føllesdal hints that the first two 
conceptualizations, legality and compliance, usually mirror one another: “authorities are 
legally legitimate insofar as they are ... exercised in accordance with ... appropriate 
procedures; [t]hey are socially legitimate if subjects are disposed to actually abide by 
[these legal procedures]”.74 Perhaps unwanted, but his hint makes it possible to shorten 
the list. On one hand, legality and compliance appear on this short-list as a matter of 
following proper procedures, or of obeying and implementing treaty articles. Legality and 
compliance can therefore be said to belong under the legislative dimension of legitimate
authority (that is, of sovereign autonomy). On the other hand, the residual two 
conceptualizations, of problem-solving capacities and of moral justifiability, seem much 
more a matter of legitimate authority (commissarial supremacy).75 Problem-solving 
techniques, as well as normative justifications for the decision to use such techniques, 
may both be collapsed into the rubric of instrumental effectiveness. Thus taken together, 
the latter two conceptualizations form sovereignty’s executive dimension.
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Føllesdal finds that executive agents, or EU policy-makers, have widened a 
legitimacy gap. They failed to comply with basic procedures, failed to solve problems 
fairly, or may not have solved certain problems at all. Yet, as a practical matter, EU 
citizens believe they should have been solving “common problems, be they economic 
growth or monetary policies, [creating] peace ... or a sustainable environment”. 
Nonetheless, even if policy-makers were to have solved their problems in a seemingly 
impartial and fair manner, this would not have to mean that their legitimacy has 
increased. The shift in popular perception will have begin to take place on a second 
condition as well. For, time’s arrow may have left lasting traces on how the EU’s 
administrative functions are being assessed by the general public. One reason why time’s 
arrow should be taken into account, then, is that the two dimensions of public authority 
are usually awarded meanings, and are usually seen from different angles—by the same 
audience. Much depends herein on the paradigms, preferences, and prejudices of this 
general public. The public ultimately judges how the tension between the legislative and 
the executive dimensions should be seen and interpreted, how strongly context-dependent 
it seems to be, and how it is seen to depend on the relative proximity of the dimensions 
themselves. Thus, sovereignty’s tension and two-dimensionality requires the public to 
have at least some experience in “the art of seeing”.76
Brussels has normative responsibilities towards individual EU citizens, yet 
Brussels is only a liberal representation of their needs and desires. As such, Brussels has 
little to no political relations with other economic power-houses such as Washington and 
Tokyo. Political relations between EU members and the non-EU world are primarily 
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being maintained by means of their national capitals. By consequence, most EU foreign 
policies will have differential effects on “affected parties”, whereas other policies may be 
less hierarchical and more pococurante. Yet, the fact remains that when one particular 
issue is not explained in terms of both policy-effectiveness and EU responsibilities, or 
also not in terms of both its executive and its procedural impacts, chances are that the 
“affected parties” will disagree. They become less likely to agree on an issue they 
otherwise “would have or could have accepted” in the form of a meaningful 
compromise.77
Føllesdal and Steffek help IR theory to make broader inroads into the study of 
historical and moral ambiguities within the relationship between individual citizens and 
administrative agents, but also between well-reasoned private initiatives and public 
policy-based discretions (legislation/execution; autonomy/supremacy; law/power). The 
trick in encountering and theorizing this complex relationship is to show how it consists 
of two dimensions—and how both dimensions form a Gestalt. It is common to believe 
that the tension between them cannot be seen, unless perhaps one observer would be 
capable of fully switching her perspectives from the one dimension to the other. Yet, 
failures to perform this trick or to perform this Gestalt switch have remained common, 
especially among those who follow one of the conventionalist trends within the IR 
literature.78
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Machiavelli’s Recognizing of Legitimate and Exemplary Statespersons
Who should recognize, and who should aspire to be recognized as ‘the 
statesman’? Hans Morgenthau commends statespersons who practice, by contrast to those 
who only philosophize, the political life.79 He cautions against persons growing too 
reliant on moral philosophies and nationalist ideologies.80 While stepping in Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s shoes, he co-defends the latter’s thesis that the constitutional state is best 
rejuvenated by men-of-action rather than by men-of-contemplation alone.
In The Prince, men-of-contemplation make poor statesmen. They generally lack 
the training and the means necessary to acquire “their position”—as well as to continue to 
compel “the unbelievers to believe” in the legitimacy of “their position”. Hence, both 
good arms and good beliefs should be present before recognizing an exemplarily-
legitimate statesperson. They should be gilded into an intricate, hybrid, and powerful 
combination—as can learned from Savonarola’s failure to have founded his sovereignty 
on military arms, as well as on the support he factually drew from popular beliefs.81
Foundational changes tend to be generated by worldly leaders, however, rather than by 
clerics or priests such as Savonarola. The latter may have preached passive humility, 
expecting changes to just have been caused by divine forces alone, but he lacked 
sufficient prudence to overcome physical disorderliness within the Republic of 
Florence.82
Machiavelli’s critique of the many humble but inexperienced authorities of his 
day would eventually be followed by Montesquieu’s, to some degree. The French 
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Magistrate, like his Italian predecessor, applauded well-rounded and experienced 
statespersons. But he identified many of them as jurists, rather than as princes. Although 
both authors admired the civic spirit of the Roman Republic, only Machiavelli remained 
considerably more Roman in his outlook than Montesquieu would ever become. That is, 
only the Florentine Secretary remained less idealistic than Montesquieu, further, 
specifically because he not dichotomized but recombined the two dimensions of political 
authority. Statespersons have a tactical interest in good armaments and fortresses, just as 
much as that they depend on the people’s juridical beliefs and religious laws, as both are 
necessary components in sustaining good orders.83
Machiavelli more ardently returned to Rome’s treaty-based constitution, as the 
most illustrious and most powerful combination of two contrary parties, while the more 
progressive French Magistrate looked (far beyond Rome) to a modern and more liberal 
state in order to justify the rulership of the middle class: political rule by judicious 
gentlemen.84
To appreciate the subtle nuances in Montesquieu’s argument, and how that 
argument differed from Machiavelli’s, it is sensible to ask why these nuances retain their 
relevancy—particularly inside the domain of IR theory. One of the ‘godfathers’ of 
twentieth-century realism, Morgenthau, practiced IR theory against the backdrop of the 
Cold War.85 He repeatedly came out against the mainstream’s political-scientific 
conventionalism, which he thought to pose a barrier against the necessity of civic 
activism. The U.S. foreign policy-establishment had isolated itself, which again 
prevented it from exercising its ethical responsibilities towards the world as a whole. And 
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there is historical evidence for this: the U.S. failed to prevent the escalation of the carpet 
bombings of South-East Asia, which culminated in the leaking of the Pentagon Papers by 
a RAND employee, as well as that it failed to break the Jim Crow laws, in the American 
South, which in part led U.S. corporations into their ‘unholy alliance’ with apartheid 
South-Africa.
As how Arendt would condemn the apathy and resignation in Postbellum 
Germany, so did Morgenthau find America’s passivity appalling. His support for the anti-
Vietnam War protest movement, for instance, can only be understood as part of his 
attempt to counter societal complacency.86 He broke with conventional and conservative 
wisdoms in U.S. policy-making, usually for the purpose of reintegrating policy-makers 
and academics with IR’s world-of-action and real IR inequalities.87 Morgenthau did not 
go so far as to replace conventionalism with nihilism, however, as he seemed content to 
be acting in a civic spirit with both an ideological as well as a skeptical component, and 
in a spirit which integrated a patriotic passion with material support for critical changes.88
Morgenthau’s practicing of political realism might very well have been inspired 
by Weber, but Weber could not have avoided Machiavelli’s observations about an 
ambivalent tension within the constitutional state. Morgenthau oscillates between 
endorsements of liberal ideals and critiques of rather similar moral ideals. But his 
oscillations have rarely been situated within realism’s dialogue with Machiavelli. The 
next sections shall help identify Montesquieu as only one participant, and Machiavelli as 
the main partner in this longer dialogue—to the extent that the latter endeavored to 
describe the dialogue itself in terms of a dialectic between universal laws and particular 
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powers.89 The last sections of this Chapter, in addition, identify Machiavelli as having 
applied an apparently-Socratic dialectical method as he refrained from over-determining 
the complex ethico-political combination of laws and arms, as well as of participatory 
freedom and political necessity: of virtú and necessità.90
What remains noteworthy about classical realism (a label under which 
Morgenthau’s theory has been indexed) is that it takes a Weberian sociological approach 
towards historical events.91 Classical realism follows Weber, and yet it never goes so far 
as to adopt two of Weber’s own main sources of inspiration: classical realism avoids 
getting into, to be precise, the differences between Montesquieu’s neo-classicism as well 
as Machiavelli’s constitutionalism—even though both again would have owed many 
insights, as Weber knew, to the culture of ancient Rome (Römertum). Morgenthau and 
Weber are known to have helped shape the future of IR theory, yet why are so few IR 
theorists going off the beaten track in order to discover that Weber’s own sociological 
method had been greatly informed by Montesquieu, who in turn was attacking 
Machiavelli?92
This and the next sections compare Machiavelli’s to Montesquieu’s concepts of 
republicanism and constitutionalism. IR theory stands to gain a lot from studying these 
concepts, as well as the modes of public authority they help identify. These concepts and 
modes have remained relevant, thus, if not only because they were always intended to 
recognize the legitimate authority, or even to identify the mere exemplariness of 
‘statesmen.’
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Machiavelli’s theory is a theory of an exceptional personality, believed capable of 
rejuvenating all civic life. In The Prince, especially, Machiavelli endorses the actions of 
an amalgam of historical statesmen.93 Those great men who had succeeded in bringing 
discords to better-balanced arrangements, or those who had brought the people back to a 
state of equilibrium, such as the men of the Medici-clan, taken together, also form one 
complex ideal-type of a great leader.94 Machiavelli’s amalgamated exemplar typically is 
said to have brought prestige to the republic, to the degree that it consists of both those 
men who were seen to have defeated the enemies of the state as well as of all those less-
illustrious men who were so “good and sensible” as to have moved “public assemblies” 
in order to correct the state’s earlier wrongdoings and errors.95 This means that some men 
should not be honored, and the Florentine Secretary commends learning from their 
mistakes. One such a negative exemplar is the charismatic Cesare Borgia, who had 
defeated many of his enemies and yet failed to remove the seeds of his own downfall.96
Sometimes Machiavelli’s exceptional, complex, ideal-typical statesperson seems 
too perfect to be true. Perhaps he is non-existent? Machiavelli is critical of every, more or 
less charismatic, statesman he introduces (he gives one, well-known, reference to a 
candidate stateswoman).97 The Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue is in its essence a work 
dedicated to the very few (unnamed) statesmen who once recognized that the “demands 
of a free people are rarely pernicious”. These were the men who would have recognized 
that the liberty of a republic can best be warranted by freedom—and, therein, by 
legitimate public participations. The freedom of the common people has in these 
republics been legitimized by demands “inspired by oppressions, experienced or 
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apprehended”, rather than that they will have been—as tends to be the case among 
nobles, instead—animated by their “[excessive] ambition or by illicit proceedings.”98
Machiavelli thought it impossible for a single person, and even for the most 
exemplary statesperson, to restore the republic to its ancient glory. And even though that 
goal may be unattainable, or just impractical, it should not withhold the statesperson from 
acting coherent  with republican principles. The purpose of the statesperson is to restore 
an ancient balance. It is true that by the time Machiavelli began to formulate his theory of 
history, to appropriate Joseph V. Femia’s words, “[t]he delicate balance between Italy’s 
five principal [statelets] ... was [already] destroyed.”99 The loss of balance in, and the 
ruining of Italy’s IR system certainly had made it nearly impossible to detect the old 
cornerstones on which a new Italian republic should be erected. Nevertheless, Gramsci 
reads Machiavelli as holding out hope that a new form of leadership could emerge. For 
Gramsci, this becomes the Communist Party of the 1920s. For Machiavelli, this form 
would have been composed by a leader capable of uniting the principal statelets, 
including the key cities of Florence and Venice as well as their surrounding 
countrysides.100
Machiavelli’s call for a great unifier or a near-perfect statesperson, in the last 
chapter of The Prince, can according to theorists such as Gramsci and Althusser not be 
heard without not also listening to the overall message of the Discourses.101 That message 
holds that even the best statesman will never attain legitimate authority—unless he 
assigns a guardianship over the constitution neither only to the commoners, nor just to the 
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nobles but reserved it for those who can “tolerate the differences that will arise between 
[both parties]”.102
This clarification resonates elsewhere as well. Neither Moses nor Romulus, the 
two most likely candidates to be selected as Machiavelli’s exemplarily-great personality, 
will actually be left to stand. Instead, Machiavelli comes to the conclusion that these two, 
and many other, candidate-exemplars only partially represented the qualities he deems 
necessary for political success. The free republic should then also be governed by a 
constitution which, rather than to be governed by only one individual who can fully 
tolerate and respect the differences between the qualities or the humors of the people as a 
whole. Certainly, Moses possessed good laws, Romulus made good use of his 
armaments. But it is the recognition of the differences between these elements of good 
laws and good arms, as represented by respectively Moses and Romulus, and by 
Lycurgus and Theseus, however, is what shall result in the state’s success and its popular 
legitimacy.103
One critical point within the above clarification involves the differences between 
the demands of the (usually well-armed) nobles and those of the (generally law-abiding) 
commoners that forms the most productive type of action—particularly in the intra-
constitutionalizing of any “agitations” between these two popular elements.104 In taking 
the people’s stance, as the eminent Renaissance-scholar Quentin Skinner sees it, 
Machiavelli must have recognized they have by their own nature been divided, against 
themselves; they bifurcate into the same two elements as those which in Rome had been 
presented by the Senate and the Tribunate, and for good reason: so that “the laws that are 
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favorable to liberty [shall] result from the opposition of these parties to each other”.105
So, who should assess the proper intensity of this opposition, and how should it have 
been organizationally moderated, in its oldest and purest form?
The two mythological founding fathers, of both the Judeo-Christian as well as of 
Roman antiquity’s republican realms, were shown to differ so much from one another
that their endeavors should not be seen in isolation from one another.106 Each of the great 
personalities is part of an amalgam (as Moses has another element to contribute than 
Romulus, for instance), which then again symbolizes a vital albeit amalgamated 
foundation to the republic’s constitutional process. But it is only because of those people 
who are so wise that they can recognize the emergent differences among the different 
types of foundational-ancestoral lineages that constitutional success will be attained. 
Again, who are these people?
Machiavelli’s premise holds that certain qualitative “differences”—and especially 
the difference between the respect for good laws and the use of good arms—should be 
tolerated, for as long as these differences will be played out within the reconstitution, or 
within the restoration of an original state. Many commentators have asked why Rome 
would have to have formed this original constitution. The answer may still be found in 
the difference between a Romulus and a Moses. These are certainly not the only two 
archetypical figures, for Machiavelli knows of course that their successors, Numa and 
Joshua, were hardly any less-effective princes. He also knows that Moses had not been 
solely responsible for creating a state (which he suggests should be believed to have been 
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“ordered by God”, rather), and that Romulus might not even have been Rome’s actual 
founder: Æneas was.
With this in mind, the gist of his argument becomes very simple: the Roman was 
superior to the Hebrew State because of the original condition of its people. The Republic 
of Rome had been, from its inception, “free and independent”, while Moses became a 
great leader only after he could have had acknowledged his people’s prior oppression 
(“by the Egyptians”). Moses had the comparative disadvantage, thus, of having been able 
to serve as a founder with divine legislative—powers after he had been forced, by 
historical necessity, to serve as the military commander who would organize an escape 
from “servitude”.107 Also, both the Roman and the Christian-Judaic commonwealths were 
founded on the mixed use of good laws as well as on good arms, evidently (Moses had 
also been a warrior, and Numa also a priest) but the Roman people had had at least no 
prior history of enslavement.108 It is for this reason that Machiavelli will argue that the 
Roman constitutional founders were superior to Moses—in having immediately and 
directly confided the guardianship of their constitution in the hands of the people as a 
whole, and in never having had to experience enslavement by their enemies.109
In this reading, any agitation, quarrel, and turbulence within the relations between 
the Senate and the Tribunes of Rome would always have to have remained part of an 
intra-constitutional affair—which, then again, further clarifies why this ancient Republic, 
representing all Roman citizens, should be believed the greatest symbol of legitimate 
authority.110 Not a single most-gifted individual, but a constitution that can guard the 
(often contrary) qualities of a plurality of all citizens, in his stead, will have to serve as 
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the ultimate spring in the ongoing rejuvenation of civic life. Thus, in co-representing two 
(or more) contrary elements and qualities, a complex constitutional exemplar emerges. 
This constitutional exemplar entertains sufficient legitimate authority in order to avoid 
the problem of having to plot “a precise middle course” between opposing elements and 
quarreling parties. Without having to waste time on planning such a “middle course”, this 
exemplar itself should be believed to maintain a constitutional “equilibrium” between the 
representatives of the commoners, on one side, and those who view themselves as the 
great, on the other.111
The above conjecture brings in the next issue. Apparently, Machiavelli believes in 
the existence of a constitutional exemplar which contains, or which unites two opposites 
within itself. Yet, he is also routinely being read to have been a pagan and as having 
rejected any (Christian) theological exemplars. It is then concluded that a prophet like 
Moses could never have been among his heroes, as Joseph M. Parent has (mistakenly) 
tried to convey.112 Although Arendt bluntly holds Machiavelli to have been a secularist, 
for instance, his original notion of a unity of opposites coheres actually rather well with 
Christian mysticism.113 Could the Florentine Secretary then not nonetheless have been a 
believer in the Christ, who unites human laws with divine justice, and who also 
represents the ultimate complex of opposites?114 The primary question to be answered is 
what his actual beliefs were. If these were Christian, then that may help explain why no 
human individual and no mortal ruler ever is shown to exemplify the ultimately 
legitimate mode of government—which would, indeed, have to be divine.115 Moreover, 
that also explains why Italy’s savior should not consist of a single man, because it is a 
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plurality of citizens and leaders which always ought to respect, and venerate God, even if 
only as a way to practice their civic virtues.
The Dialogue: May Montesquieu’s Idealism Destabilize Machiavelli’s Realism?
Like Machiavelli, Montesquieu looks back in time, to antiquity. But unlike the 
(former) Secretary, he does not only celebrate the Republic of Rome (Römertum).116
Montesquieu seems much more willing to also acknowledge the ‘good laws’ of ethnic 
communities which historically preceded the soon-to-become nation-states of his own 
era—such as England, France, Germany, Japan, and Turkey. In this, his The Spirit of the 
Laws delineates a tidal change which separates moderns from ancients, and Christians 
from pagans.117 Another incongruence between the two theorists is that only Montesquieu 
praises the old middle classes—especially for having created moderate and civil 
associations. The ancients might have been more public-spirited, had probably greater 
participatory freedoms, and in Rome indeed even had retained the right of accusation, but 
he also realizes that most of their constitutional laws did not last into the modern 
Christian era.118 When placed in comparison to other civic religions, moreover, 
Christianity is according to him furthest removed from “pure despotism.” It commands 
caring “love”, and wants only “the best political laws and the best civil laws for each 
people”.119
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From Montesquieu’s point of view, English constitutionalism excels in 
establishing political and civil laws. In that tradition, the relation between civil society 
and state would have taken on the form of a stable contractual agreement between the 
estate-holders and their political representatives.120 Other eighteenth centuries states, but 
especially France, should therefore follow the English example, he suggests, so that the 
independence of their own gentry will likewise be fostered. The reality, across Europe, is 
that expanding middle classes have been acquiring a greater stake in civil society, so that 
they in particular should be allowed to ‘contract’ the advocacy of their commercial 
interests ‘out’ to their political representatives. The more stable the contractual agreement 
between society and state, the hypothesis holds, the greater the political autonomy or, 
rather, the “liberty” of the middle classes will become. The English constitutional 
tradition is  the most stable—as it best displays “how to take advantage of each of these 
[three] great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and liberty.” For, even though 
Henry VIII once issued some “vague” laws, to protect his own lineage, that tradition 
clearly binds society “with few [commerce] treaties, and depends only on its [civil] 
laws.” “England has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its 
commerce.”121
Montesquieuan theory advises the (French) constitutional process to be centered 
in the old middle class, of the estate-holders.122 This means the new middle class, of the 
traders, should learn to mimick the aristocratic process of self-moderation. The issue is, 
however, that they should  less practice moderation for the purpose of maintaining their 
austerity than for advancing their own prosperity. Republican extremes are believed to be 
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mitigated, and a peaceful state is believed to be maintained, in fact, by their self-
expansive commercial activities.123
In what now can be explained as having formed his realist objection to 
Montesquieuan or to neo-aristocratic commerce-based constitutionalism, Schmitt, in his 
The Concept of the Political, repeats Hobbes’s argument that the relation between society 
and state should not be used as a contractual or even not as an instrumental, but should 
rather be understood as a dualist politico-ethical relationship (which also would have 
been known to the ancients as a sacred covenant, but definitely not as a commercial 
social contract).124 Hobbes had indeed argued that this dualist relationship cannot be 
completely contractual.125 The relationship should, alternatively, be thought of in terms of 
decisions coherent with natural laws. Hobbes had still turned to laws of nature for 
guidance, in exceptional circumstances, thus, so that sovereigns could learn to make their 
decisions on the exception in ways that would cohere with their natural, and not with 
their commercial interests (Hobbes’s turn shall have to be spelled out in Chapter Four).126
Schmitt knows Hobbes to have argued that the sovereign must be recognized as 
someone with a complex legal personality—meaning the sovereign is not only cognizant 
of the legal rule, nor only of the administrative exceptions thereto, but of both. The 
sovereign neither only consists of the legislative powers, nor only of the executive or 
magisterial powers responsible for making any exceptions—when necessary—and, yet, 
mysteriously integrates all these powers.127 Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty is thus also 
neither egotistic and individualistic nor absolutely consensual and unified: neither 
multitudinous nor singular.128
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Schmitt’s pro-Hobbesian objection has drawn scores of criticism, especially 
during the last decades of the twentieth century. Jürgen Habermas criticizes this 
objection, not infrequently, for instance, while defending his own notion of a semi-
contractual, consensual, and liberal relationship between state and society. Society should 
not so much apply natural law as well as that it should use reasonable means to control 
the state. In every liberal society, the citizens, as Habermasians will hold, should 
themselves decide how they want to pursue their private ambitions, and protect their 
liberties from interference. Basically, the citizens are rational agents to the extent that 
their ambitions will not be offended by the public realm. Public officials, also, should 
thereto shun differentiations of the sum of all private interests from the public realm as a 
whole, as the public realm simply represents each of these interests.129 Unfortunately, this 
Habermasian interruption has hardly helped ‘translate’ citizens’ self-interests into public 
activities—unless the ‘translation’ is mostly conducted by electoral rather than 
participatory means, and unless individual liberty outstrips popular-sovereign 
authority.130 It shall now be demonstrated that the Habermasian and Montesquieuan 
points of view are congruent to one another, as they both tend to make the complex 
agonistic relationship between private and public invisible.131
Before digging any further into the ground on which both the Montesquieuan and 
the Habermasian liberal theories have flourished, it must first be noted that these theories 
are hardly consistent with the core tenets of political realism. Hobbes as well as 
Machiavelli prepared their own tenets in opposition to aristocratization/oligarchization 
processes. These realists appear to have followed Aristotle as they sought to maintain the 
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dual foundations of constitutional authority by observing how, while they were thus 
moving in the opposite direction from such possible oligarchization processes, the 
democratization process should be positioned at a relatively higher ground. There are 
always two mutually opposing processes of societal (dis)organization, Machiavelli is 
adamant, and their constitutional relationship is internally turbulent. Reputed realists have 
thus long acknowledged the significance of agonistically-related societal organizational 
processes and which, as shall here be proven to be the case, are processes logically 
inconsistent with the liberal image of one broad middle class-centric republic.
Montesquieu’s Mistaken Idealization of Moderate but Never Passionate Magistrates
Montesquieu makes a severe mistake in equating individual rights to individual 
demands in equating liberty to commerce, and in giving preference to the commercial 
interests of a class of nobles over the powers of those popular classes trying to make 
opposite demands.132 This mistake has been repeated by various liberal idealists. They 
also give preference to the interests of what they argue is a moderate middle class, but 
what really is some sort of commercial aristocracy, on the one hand, over the ultimate 
public authority of the people on the other, on the other. Even more appalling, from the 
perspective of popular sovereignty theory, is the fact that these liberal idealists might, 
thereby, even if unthinkingly, be condoning a process of societal oligarchization. 
Anyhow, in the end it was wrong, as must now be shown, for the French Magistrate to 
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have ranked the interests of a new commercial aristocracy (and possibly also of its 
oligarchical legal values) above the naturally symbiotic relations between austere nobles 
and the people as a whole.
The French Magistrate must have known his own philosophy was breaking away 
from the direct constitutional relationship between opposite societal-constituent 
processes, whereas particularly Machiavelli had still favored such agonistic processes in 
his stead. The former knows exactly what he is doing differently, thus, when he 
philosophizes that whenever “all the posts” of the state’s “executive power” would have 
been placed in the hands of one party, and when the “legislative power” would then have 
to have ended up in the hands of another party, “hatred between the two parties ... 
endure[s]”. In that classic scenario, individual citizens “would [too] often change 
parties”, forgetting “both the laws of friendship and those of hatred.” Without a power in 
the middle, Montesquieu here implies, these individuals isolate themselves (or, perhaps, 
form factions) because they no longer remain “fair or sensible enough to have equal 
affection for both [the executive and the legislative powers].”133
Yet, Machiavelli had written: “[I]n every republic there are two parties, that of the 
nobles and that of the people; and all the laws that are favorable to [intra-constitutional] 
liberty result from the opposition of these parties to each other”.134 He responds with 
these words to the age-old question of which type of sovereign authority should be 
applied in order to moderate the opposition between the main two powers—or the two 
partisan processes. As the Secretary soon afterwards writes, still in reply to that question; 
“No more useful and necessary authority can be given—to those who are appointed 
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guardians of the [constitutional] liberty of a state—than the faculty of accusing”. It is this 
power of accusation that ultimately allows these appointed officials to vent the any “evil 
dispositions” (these dispositions are also known as the two constitutional powers’ “ill-
humors”), as they might otherwise begin to flow from factionalist tendencies—and from 
either a sentiment (“humor”) for oligarchization or for excessive ochlocratization.135
Montesquieu often seems to want to concur that Machiavelli’s humanism had 
helped authenticate the constitutional function of the common people. The French 
Magistrate also seems to agree with the Secretary on the importance of the Republic of 
Rome and its exemplary laws. The Roman laws had generated a public-spirited citizenry, 
constitutionally capable both of commanding and obeying, so that these laws initially 
better preserved the liberties than those of most other known states could have done.136
But Machiavelli had been wrong to have applauded the ancient Roman constitution, 
however, for having spread out the power of accusation: Rome “permitted [too many 
citizens] to accuse one another.”137 Rome’s equal distribution of prosecutorial powers 
expressed too much confidence in the common people, so that Montesquieu suggests (in 
Book 6, Chapter 8, of The Spirit of the Laws) it actually contributed to Rome’s diffidence 
and downfall. By opening up access to the state’s unique prosecutorial authority, the 
ancients actually weakened their state more than they could have anticipated.
Montesquieu finds that Machiavelli’s Romans would eventually have betrayed 
their own “boundless zeal” (their public assertiveness) by surrending their “authority” to 
most of them (resulting in their fear of each other, and in a general state of feebleness).138
He is far more hesitant than Machiavelli to endorse the Roman idea of giving every party 
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an equal share in the power of accusation, as even virtuous Romans themselves had 
become corrupted by joining a “band of informers”.139 Once the ordinary citizens had 
taken “the power of judging”, as well, away from the senators and the knights, they 
gradually began to lose their individual liberties.140 As vigilantes, these citizens now were 
forced to prey for verdicts most likely to win them the favor of one overlord or of one 
knight, rather than another, regardless of whether any senatorial and magisterial authority 
would have been exercised in the matter. The meaning of Rome’s civil laws had long 
been determined by magistrates, admittedly, but it would only be for as long as that the 
common people had elected the “patricians” to become the “[final] arbiters of the 
government” that they had remained free from “flatterers”, therefore, as well as from the 
“weakness of [their] license.”141 (Especially Book 6, Chapter 8, helps formulates a 
liberal-idealist objection to Machiavelli’s egalitarian image of his exemplary Republic of 
Rome.)
Montesquieu apparently fears that a republican state may grow too restrictive of 
individual liberty. It will tolerate too many false accusations. His logic is that equal 
prosecutorial powers will diminish everyone’s liberty, and therefore bring about 
constitutional decline. When all may accuse all, no one can decide. No one can judge 
which band of calumniators should be favored over which other such band. 
Egalitarianism in matters of sovereign authority breeds non-freedom, in brief, and must 
therefore be constrained by autonomous institutions.142 From the French Magistrate’s 
own point of view, furthermore, civil liberties are best protected by legal norms—and 
these norms themselves are best decided on by “magistrates”, and with the aid of an 
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“attorney for the party of the public”, as opposed to by “tax-collectors” or to other 
privately-motivated parties. In effect, only trained and impartial lawyers may be trusted 
to work vis-à-vis any democratic/ochlocratic forms of favoritism.143
The French Magistrate certainly joined the Florentine Secretary’s plea for civic 
rejuvenation. But there are two differences to be found. First, in casting a critical part of 
this plea’s aside, however, the Magistrate also hoped to contain the spread of certain 
powers among all citizens. Vickie Sullivan underscores why he herein refused to join his 
intellectual predecessor: unlike Machiavelli he would hold that the preservation of civil 
law traditions should not be entrusted to citizens with an equal right to be appointed 
prosecutors—but rather to a far more select group of magistrates and attorneys. To 
moderate prosecutorial transgressions, and to mitigate the factionalist use of adjudicative 
powers, Montesquieu thus tries to undercut the constitutionally-balancing effects of 
(Rome’s) legal parity principle.144
He assumes that if all may accuse all, then factions (of informants) will begin to 
form. Montesquieu reasons that the legal parity of all citizens will be weakened once they 
would be allowed to irritate and antagonize each other, and their appointed officials alike. 
The state must therefore centralize its prosecutorial powers, so as to prevent itself from 
defaulting to an extremely antagonistic régime—rather than into what Machiavelli 
believes would remain a moderate or a well-mixed agonistic régime.
The latter realist concludes there are several ways to preserve the civil law 
tradition without risking factionalism. A healthy tension between the republic’s opposite 
constitutional humors, and between private citizens and their public servants as well, 
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actually, will be warranted within any republican government which appears to be 
“putting an end to calumnies”. For, factitious calumniators may emerge where 
accusations are not being constitutionally admitted, and they may particularly also 
emerge “in private dwellings.” Factitiously-organized informers, in other words, are the 
most likely violators of the public law tradition, as they “require no witnesses, nor 
confrontings, nor any particulars to prove them, so that every citizen may be calumniated 
by another, whilst [legal] accusations cannot be lodged against anyone without being 
accompanied by positive proofs and circumstances”.145
Second, the other difference between Montesquieu’s and Machiavelli’s notions of 
constitutional self-moderation depends on religious self-regulation. This difference can 
best be retrieved from their thoughts about passion, emotion, and ambition.146 Passion, 
specifically, classifies as a religious emotion. It defines as one’s limited suffering of 
one’s fate. Passion, more than ever during the Renaissance, would also have to have been 
considered a fateful state of agony. The humanist from Florence argues that passion and 
agony can both be regulated and mitigated.147 Those citizens who can regulate their 
passions are literally those who can take their fate in their own hands, or those who can 
hold themselves back from their leisure interests. Citizens who can publically display 
their mastery over the wheel of fortune and fate are, testifiably, virtuous citizens and 
more prone to abide by constitutional laws as well.148 Machiavelli refers to them as 
possessing virtù.149
He is known to have been among the first of his generation to redefine virtù in 
classicistic, rather than Christian terms. And, it is indeed possible to read his work as 
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insisting that civic virtuosity requires self-mastery. This part does cohere  with other 
ingredients of Machiavelli’s classicism, more importantly, such as temperate government, 
constitutional balance, and legal parity. What the Secretary not so secretly admired about 
the Republic was that she took her public law- and civil law-decisions based on equal 
virtue. Constitutionally, virtú is thus to be understood as a decisive mode, as well as a 
legal moderation of partisanship.150 Machiavelli’s virtuous leaders are said to have 
mastered, and coped, with their passions. Nonetheless, they are passionate partisans 
rather than emotive antagonists. This subtle dispositional sense of self-mastery (of 
‘holding oneself back’) was not only a Roman theme, however; it also is a theme 
informed by Machiavelli’s Christian religion.
The problem with Christendom is not that the common people are losing their 
religious beliefs. The issue for Machiavelli is rather that leaders no longer maintain their 
people’s (Christian) religion “according to the principles of its founder”: it should 
therefore again become “the duty of princes and heads of republics to uphold the 
foundations of the religion of their countries, for then it is easy to keep their people 
religious, and consequently well-conducted and united.”151
As Erica Benner interprets the issue, the well-regulated republic is a public realm 
within which citizens remain religiously disposed to respect the law. In fear of what 
could become their ultimate fate, citizens are taking religious care to uphold their “oaths, 
customs, and laws”. Machiavelli’s argument that the people should sense a certain “fear 
of God’s wrath” is, still according to Benner’s interpretation, validated by the symbiotic 
relation he detect between such fear and people’s “respect for principles of human 
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justice.” “Whether one calls it fear of God or fear of justice, this reasonable kind of 
[respect] ... is necessary to sustain any civil [or republican] orders”.152
Montesquieu both agrees and disagrees. In agreement with Machiavelli, he 
suggests that “religion should not give [the people] ... an overly contemplative life.” He 
warns that the “Stoics” probably became, and that especially the “Mohammedans [have] 
become speculative by habit”. The latter made themselves  “drowsy by religion.”153 But 
in disagreement, the Magistrate refuses to treat religion as a necessary condition in 
sustaining the civil law tradition. There is no such thing as a civic religion: 
Montesquieu’s religion depends on beliefs that can be expressed separately from any 
civic fidelity to laws or to constitutions. For example, “religion can sustain the political 
state when the laws are powerless”.154 Political and republican orderliness can very well 
be sensed, thus, at least by religious citizens, even when civil laws are not being 
sustained. “In the states where wars are not waged by a common deliberation and where 
the laws have not kept for themselves any means of terminating or preventing [wars], 
religion establishes times of peace”.155
The French Magistrate argues that Christianity is constructed around much more 
than a “dogma”; it is an well-established religion because it can give hope. It gives hope, 
on peace and on recognition, but not on “a state that we feel or that we [can] know”. It 
only leads people to “spiritual ideas”, in brief, which remain ideas of assistance to 
statespersons in avoiding “enmities”. But Christianity in itself does not lead them to act 
more gently—or also not to become any less lawless and any less “indifferent” in their 
actions. For that to occur, people will additionally need to be led by civil laws sufficiently 
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consistent with their beliefs and ideas. Contrary to Machiavelli, Montesquieu hereby 
insists there will “always” remain inconsistencies and defects in any possibly-imagined 
connection between civil laws and religious ideas. “When religion condemns things that 
civil laws permit, there is [always] the danger that civil laws will permit on their side 
what the religion should condemn”.156
The above-detailed two arguments allow the Magistrate to conclude that there is 
no naturally symbiotic relationship between religious beliefs and the public law tradition. 
His conclusion instead separates private passion from legal values and denies that they 
form a productive relation. Passion runs, from his viewpoint, not only contrary to liberty.
Religious passions and individual liberties also may run in isolation from one another, 
and if they do not then perhaps they should more often do so—according to Montesquieu. 
He rather merely expects a well-organized religion—and especially a religion which can 
inspire hope, as indeed the Christian religion does in his book—to assist states in 
moderating their conflicts.157 But any sudden changes in religion must be feared to create 
conflict.
Reminiscent of Machiavelli’s argument that the presence of a religious 
organization (culto divino) provides the state in its need for stability, and give it a 
necessary sense of security, so does the Magistrate commend religious hope and piety 
when he suggests it will give people a sense that they belong to their state and to its own 
“climate, laws, mores, and manners”.158 Yet, while pious people will love this sense of 
belonging, atheists can speak only of what they fear about it.159 Interestingly, 
Montesquieu would never refer to himself as an atheist and yet he goes on to express 
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considerable fear about the possibility that a religion is changed or that it will motivate 
“rebellion”. Magistrates have to fear, and may even end up being “intimidated” by, 
religious people’s choice of “martyrdom”: a choice similar and possibly as fateful as the 
one to introduce Christendom to Japan. Magistrates should fear cases in which religious 
organizations try to mix their beliefs, or where doctrinal issues are at stake. (In such cases 
as those that had been presided over by the Inquisition, it would clearly have been 
impossible to try to, and “useless” as well, “to convince” anyone of the issue whether the 
Christian faith shares any tenets with the Judaic faith, he adds).160
Religious passions were according Machiavelli always necessary for a lawful 
state, whereas Montesquieu fears them and considers them both inessential and irrelevant 
in sustaining the law. Many laws can exist without religious support, as they tend to do 
whenever the people are afraid of their own (despotic) lawgivers. Neither peace nor 
commerce treaties need have been infused with civic religion in order for them to be 
sustained, moreover. Some religious or, in fact, all Christian republics can very well 
function without such treaties. Along the horizon of advanced realism, nevertheless, is 
this not a foregone conclusion? Is the French Magistrate not at fault? Does he have a 
valid warrant to be dichotomizing that old relation between private spiritual beliefs and 
public institutions of power?
The critical difference between the exponents of the Classicist Renaissance and 
the Neo-classicist Enlightenment is that, for the latter, ancient Rome’s constitutional 
processes are no longer thought to be outstanding—as well as that the intense relation 
between the constitutional foundations of spiritualism and materialism, or of civic virtue 
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and participatory freedom, are no longer believed to be a necessarily productive and 
symbiotic relation.161
Montesquieu’s Liberal Constitutional Structure Must be Neutral or Fail
There is one key separation between classicist and Aristotelian lineages of 
thought, on one hand, and Montesquieu’s favoring of a modern republic that can 
independently moderate itself, on another. This separation becomes apparent in the 
notion that classicists such as Machiavelli think that the state is home to an intra-
constitutional opposition between two qualitatively-different and contrary processes, 
which balance one another, whereas Montesquieu favors a republic equipped with a third 
or a gyroscopic mechanism. This mechanism must consist of an adjudicative power 
calibrating the proper relation of the legislative and executive, but also of the democratic 
and the aristocratic processes of representation. But the question remains: should this 
adjudicative power be considered loyal to the monarchical representation of all citizens, 
regardless of wealth, or mainly to a commercial aristocracy, with sufficient wealth?
The capstone lesson to be learned from the above comparison between 
Montesquieu’s and Machiavelli’s exemplary republics has been that the latter’s republic’s 
administrative apparatuses are being checked by a people, as a whole, as well as by their 
interests and their passions. In Montesquieu’s republic, by contrast, economic interests 
trump religious passions.
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The people have in Montesquieu’s republic been turned into a population with 
competing needs—and are agents not unlike Rawls’s self-legislators. They form a group 
loyal to their own state’s norms, climate, and they belong to the same jurisdiction. This 
suggests that only some of the people can be responsible for managing the limits to this 
jurisdiction. Only the few are in fact being expected to balance the powers of the state 
against those of other states and other parties. Moreover, the executive powers of the 
monarch, as well as the commoners, are to be checked by the rising middle classes—so 
that any clashing interests should be regulated by their control over the third, adjudicative 
power. In this modern republic, institutional checks on power are made possible by 
middle classes because they will have learned to obey commercial norms and economic 
decisions, further, rather than by any given person’s decision to near-spontaneously 
appropriate either a military technique or to appeal to religious and juridical organizations 
(which had always been, as Machiavelli demonstrated, however and after all, the 
fundamental political decision to be made).
Peaceful relations between states are best made possible by free trade and 
corporate enterprise rather than by the international public law tradition or by the 
complexity of constitutionalism—as IR theorists defending the Democratic Peace (DP) 
hypothesis would be fast to concur with Montesquieu. But from a more realist and a more 
classicist republican perspective, the stakes are higher than that both Montesquieu  and 
the IR field acknowledge. Specifically from Machiavelli’s perspective, indeed, the 
balance of powers is a matter of legal and not economic parity. The balance is not 
maintained by any third arbiter but by a governmental constitution believed and trusted 
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capable of equally integrating two types of power. Besides, this republican perspective 
shows a duality of organizational principles, and especially a duality of executive and 
legislative powers, to be moderated by means of equally allocated juridical-prosecutorial 
powers—not by the creation of a new adjudicative type of power. Machiavelli gladly take 
this perspective, showing, for instance, the Romans had to have had very good reasons  to 
avoid neutrality and to never take “any undecided middle course in important affairs”. 
(“All princes and republics should imitate [them!]”).162
The central question now becomes who should adjudicate between the first two 
powers?  Who should be deciding any conflicts between the legislative and the executive 
powers, and on behalf of a neutral magistracy or judiciary? In important respects, this 
question demands an extra answer to whether Montesquieu’s notions of checks and 
balances should even be thought admissible to the IR domain. The implications of 
admitting these notions of the balance of power, and of applying these notions to the 
relations between sovereign states, may either be thought harmful or benevolent.
Importantly, the balance of power itself is increasingly being maintained with the 
added support of a new adjudicative power—taking the shape of international tribunals 
and special prosecutorial and special military police interventions. Within the parameters 
of the DP hypothesis, the ICC and these interventions are clear measures of democracy’s 
success. These new powers are being created with additional support from the 
Montesquieuan conclusion that a well-financed and well-educated population will not 
belong to its own jurisdiction unless it has managed to appoint a sufficient number of 
magistrates to rule out any arising conflicts. These magistrates do not need to have any 
711
religious beliefs; they only need to maintain a third mechanism that can help the 
population to maintain peace within their state—but also in the relations between their 
state and other states, especially in the absence of religious unity or in the presence of 
ideological warfare between sovereign states.
The present subsections of Chapter Three shall rise with Machiavelli, and with 
Weber, in resistance against Montesquieu’s liberal states and inter-states structure. These 
political realists are rightly skeptical of the modern tendency to award final authority to a 
separate magistracy. Even though an intermediary magisterial power may be useful in 
preventing the outbreak of conflict, and especially of doctrinal conflict, this does not yet 
warrant (Montesquieu’s) conclusion that the state’s ultimate authority should be 
concentrated in the selfish hands of a commercial élite—rather than to emerge from an 
authoritative opposition to this élite’s interests. In clarification, it shall be demonstrated, 
now, that Montesquieuan liberalism tends to expand into an intrinsically élitist, anti-
democratic form of idealism. Theoretically, it cannot be considered supportive of the 
above-identified classicist realist practices, nor of realist recognitions of emergent modes 
of legitimacy and prudence.
Montesquieu argues that states tolerate each other due to their commercial 
interactions and interests.163 Commerce and competition flourish in the absence of 
international treaties, and help states to maintain the peace even better than that the 
international public law field can do. Domestically, states must also stimulate 
competition and prevent economic idleness. “[E]xcess of wealth” and other “disorders of 
inequality” should be avoided. In moderate commercial republics, excess is usually being 
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avoided because the “principal citizens [will here] ... engage in commerce themselves.” 
Rather than that they will exclude economic interests from their politics, principal 
citizens are here seen pushing their economic interests in ways that help them maintain 
their own equality. That is, they will form an élite group which then again enables them 
to avoid inequalities among themselves. They can maintain their liberties—if not only 
because this group itself has a moderating or an intermediary function within the 
constitution of powers as a whole.
The argument holds, for example, that an élite should give the state laws which 
shall “divide fortunes in proportion [to how] as commerce increases them; [these laws] 
must make each poor citizen comfortable enough to be able to work as the others do, and 
must bring each rich citizen to a middle level such that he needs to work in order to 
preserve or to acquire.”164 Commerce flourishes under solid property rights and moderate 
inheritance taxes, Montesquieu premises hereby, so that both the commercial equity 
principle as well as the civil law tradition are regulated by one and the same third-party 
juristic assemblage.165
Montesquieu assumes laws can be designed to reflect a spirit of merit. The harder 
the  traders work, the more they can bring themselves to the “middle level” of society. 
Because everyone at this level works about equally hard, none of them will reach the 
level of excessive wealth. The balance between this trader class and the other classes 
gyroscopically callibrates itself, in addition. It is in the nature of the trading business that 
the more the traders will work, the more they need to acquire profit from their exchanges. 
The more investments they make, the more dependent they become on maintaining their 
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business, and the more loyal to their own state they become as well, Montesquieu 
assumes. By contrast, neither the poorest nor the richest strata of society are trying to 
make returns on their investments—if they invest at all. Comparatively, these classes 
seem unwilling to take financial risks, afraid as they are of any commercial impulses, as 
the French Magistrate expresses concern.166 They depend so little on economic 
competition, that they fail to cultivate their political virtues. As opposed to those taking 
commercial risks, those suffering from sheer insufficiency or abundant luxury challenge 
societal virtues and undermine the state’s authority.
The rich should not feel too comfortable and the poor not too envious, so that both 
may be represented by and incorporated into a commonwealth. This is what most 
classicists would agree upon, including Machiavelli and Hobbes. Montesquieu takes 
another step, however, by introducing his liberal assumption that economic 
competitiveness can be proportionally awarded by the market itself. His political 
economy is thus an economy of proportion. The political middle will see to it that the 
market functions fairly, and that there is merit to profitable returns. This middle forms a 
new meritocracy, tempering any dispositions towards disorderliness. Or, in other terms, 
the meritocratic singularity of the middle level mediates the mutual dependency of rich 
and poor, patricians and plebeians.
More problematic, however, is the liberal projection that the middle will therefore 
mediate in any conflicts between those fighting for their civil rights, first, and those 
having a greater interest in protecting the state’s administrative (and adjudicative) 
responsibilities, second. Montesquieuan liberalism projects the typical trader, but 
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especially the maritime trader, into the role of constitutional guardian. The consequence 
is that the trader must somehow be believed to know how to defend his individual liberty 
by also taking his corporate responsibilities seriously, and to (presumably therein) 
prevent conflict. As Montesquieu concludes, this trader will somehow have learned to 
depend on his accounting skills, on investments in future exchanges, and so forth. In thus 
having learned to effectuate his liberty as an individual, his “education should attend to 
inspiring [law].”167 More accurately, private merit both inspires and precedes public law 
in importance.
The Spirit of the Laws sets itself to the task of closing off at least two societal 
entries: those leading towards misery as well as those towards luxury. The text marks 
these entries as constitutionally prohibited. The new middle classes must consist, rather, 
of individuals who are engaged in constitutional “tempering, modification, 
accommodation, terms, alternatives, negotiations”.168 One of the historically-exemplary 
constitutional middle levels remains the Roman Senate. No mention is made of the 
Tribunate or the Decemvirs, even though it must have been familiar terrain for 
Machiavelli’s readers to find the latter more harmful to the commonwealth than the 
former.169 Thus, solely the senators of Rome are said to have refrained from handing out 
“immoderate penalties [which could] ... terrify men’s spirits; ... with [their] moderate 
penalties [instead], there would be both judges and accusers.” Institutions such as the 
Senate would not reach a final verdict easily, also, providing time for negotiations and 
settlements between accusers and accused, as the latter always retained their right “to 
depart [Rome] before the judgment”.170
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All this means, basically, that besides the prosecutorial and the adjudicative 
powers, even the power of pardon should be concentrated in the state’s most senatorial or 
most aristocratic institutions. If anything commendable has to be said about Rome’s 
constitution, it concerns not its relation between Senators and Tribunes (its 
bicameralism), nor their austerity. Rather, the hidden assumption holds, it must concern 
Rome’s financially heavily-invested aristocratic élite, which had the most lose from any 
poorly accommodated and unsettled legal cases.
The French Magistrate carries on praising the political independence of the 
constitutional middle. “[D]isorders of inequality” will eventually be replaced by “a 
middle level”, he suggests, because of the latter’s continuous vigilance.171 Socio-
economic inequality may be ‘translated’ into political equality, in other words, on 
condition that the ‘translators’ themselves can neither affirm idleness and poverty, nor 
luxury and abundance.172 Material excess and scarcity are related to, presumably 
respectively, “hospitality” and “banditry” in a sense that they appear also on two sides of
the same coin.173 Rather than to take this double-sidedness for granted, Montesquieu’s 
middle class-bias makes him suspect its moral ambiguity and its proness to political 
insecurity. The state cannot become independent if the political relations between 
(presumably free and hospitable) patricians and (necessarily thieving?) plebeians will not 
also become more monistic.
The last question to consider is whether Montesquieu’s liberal theory may not 
have assigned the task of determining the political purpose of “civil right” to a wide 
aristocratic, but simply to a narrow oligarchical middle. For, his conception of the middle 
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level is what really seems to guide him in defining how the executive and the legislative 
powers should be allocated in a rational proportion to each other—rather than to sustain 
each other through their qualitative opposition.
If the Magistrate intended (French) constitutional law to become more monistic, 
he probably also intended the monarchy’s discretionary interests to be newly checked by
an impartial adjudicative power enshrined within not the democratic multitudes but 
within aristocratic associations. Governmental rules should come into being through an 
adjudicative third power, which remains associated to the executive but may leave 
legislative power out in the cold.174 The point is this: the least democratic side of Spirit of 
the Laws materializes in how the text imagines the selection of ideal statespersons. They 
are being selected to maintain the forms of certain senatorial-juristic assemblages, but it 
remains unclear why precisely these statespersons’ qualifications (their calculative skills 
and willingness to take financial risks) should there-within be believed to serve 
aristocratic rather than oligarchical ends. Moreover, why are entrepreneurial skills so 
definitely the right qualifications statespersons should have in maintaining not only 
internally, but also externally peaceful relations?175
Anti-totalitarian and Arendtian realists submit that political leaders can be 
recognized as legitimate statespersons to the extent they are not economically motivated, 
and that they will not aim to become skilled entrepreneurs. Qualities such as 
commonsense, integrity, caution and even such as physical courage are, alternatively, 
said to be political virtues. These are not socio-economic values. The list of such 
economic and liberal market-based values would have to include, much rather, 
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individualism, egotism, consumption, luxury, and a willingness to take chances. Virtues 
are legitimate virtues because they can be instantly recognized by anyone, anywhere, 
while market-values can be privatized, and are in the eye of the beholder. Virtues require 
no intermediary assemblages, as they are validated by and recognizable to the many, 
while values can only be measured by individuals who believe in a third juristic power’s 
neutrality. Money, to take Simmel’s well-known example, depends for its value on what 
any individual will believe that it is—because each individual is trusting in the 
independent but fiduciary third powers (monetary markets, central banks) that would 
magically have attached these values to money itself.176 Yet, not one value and not one 
price of money can ever be held in common by the many, because then all the coins and 
bills would have become instantaneously valueless.
Arendtian and Machiavellian realists argue that political virtues can be recognized 
by all social animals—regardless of their economic status. Social animals tend to believe 
that there is no need for a professionalized apparatus to prosecute, pardon, or preside over 
private law- and civil law-cases. From their perspective, hence, liberal theorists would be 
incorrect in hinting—as Montesquieu hints, indeed—that for as long as that intermediary 
assemblages and third powers will have been “made [in]to the rule, ... the depository of 
mores [will be obeyed].”177 This sentence wrongly suggests that a constitution 
encompasses only the rule and the norms (the mores), and that any exception to the rule 
either may safely be ignored or might have to be decided on by those with the greatest 
profit-incentive.
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To reiterate, Montesquieuan idealism and the commercial DP hypothesis both 
indicate, to the domain of international political theory, that whenever a balance of 
powers has been accomplished it should be managed by means of professional, 
independent, rationalist adjudicators. The adjudicators can take it upon themselves to 
police the world, promoting the idea that they alone are in the final end responsible for 
managing the proper balance. Whenever statespersons themselves were to attribute false 
values to others, or begin to engage in doctrinal warfare, or commit calumnies, as the 
French Magistrate’s hypothesis hints, they must be punished by an independent third 
power. Such punishments would decrease the risk of evaluative over-stretch and inter-
doctrinal imperialism—including, especially, socio-economic colonialism. And, juristic-
punitive assemblages could increase the chances for prosperous states to maintain peace 
among themselves. Yet, it is critical that IR theorists become conscious of why third 
assemblage-neutrality could promote peace, and commercial interests have to promote a 
systemic balance. Are liberal idealism’s above-presented reasons as good as Aristotle’s? 
Prior to reassessing this question, the immediately-following section consists of a 
theoretical reconsideration of Montesquieu’s propensity to be practicing monistic 
constitutionalism.
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Montesquieu’s Adjudicative Power Diminishesthe Reality of Non-Dualist Republics
Baron de Montesquieu is notorious for having introduced a third power to the 
history of political thought: the adjudicative power. To split this power apart from the 
executive, or from the monarchical power, however, Montesquieu must hold that the 
monarch will supposedly only bestow honor when honor is due—when the monarch can 
be checked by magistrates. Otherwise, the king may still want to pursue too much honor: 
the majestic glory of conquest.178 While making this introduction possible, Montesquieu 
first copies the one section from Aristotle’s political theory in which honor had been 
presented as an object of discord, before proceeding to reduce any surplus of honor-
seeking by means of another kind of surplus: by means of seeking wealth from trade and 
industry. 
The problem is that Montesquieu so forgets to mention that Aristotle had 
actually believed that— besides honor—profit can be just as much an object of 
constitutional discord and decline.179 By fine-tuning and by sometimes objecting to 
Radasanu’s 2010 reading of Montesquieu’s 1748 L’Esprit des Lois, this section must now 
demonstrate the French Aristocrat was less favorably disposed towards both Aristotelian 
and Machiavellian and Hobbesian methods of properly identifying the two main objects 
of discord and decline, than has previously been thought.180
The thesis defended in this section holds that by professing his ignorance towards 
the issue of excessively profitable interests, as forming one of the two possible sources of 
constitutional imbalance, and by only celebrating states he supposes to remain centered 
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around the other source, of honor, Montesquieu is no longer cognizant of a foundational 
and dynamic duality. His post-classicistic method of analysis severs the foundational 
relationship between two qualitatively different sources and between two different 
functional parts of the state’s constitutional balance: material gain and immaterial honors. 
The hypothesis holds that his method, therefore, must not continue to be applied in 
making sense of complex, dynamic, and dualist relationships between self-interested 
individualism and honorable goods. Rather than to help hold the positions of classicist 
realism, the French Aristocrat was already mounting an attack on realism in order to 
make way for a trade-oriented but also for a constitutionally-monistic form of 
liberalism—which, however, must now be shown to have alienated itself too much from 
many earlier theories about the dynamic dualistic relationship between both individual 
interests (including possibly excessive desires for material gains) as well as the state’s 
common power (as expressed in terms of its honor, exemplariness, and goodness).
Henceforth, this section demonstrates that Montesquieu, wrongly, neglects 
Aristotle’s warning against the “disproportionate increase of [any constituent] part of the 
state”—as well as that he neglects the (Aristotelian, classicist) realist warning against any 
suddenly-increased application of the pressures and principles naturally corresponding to 
the two “prevalent” constituent parts within almost any form of state.181 Against 
Montesquieuan idealism, political realism holds that the principles of honor and profit, or 
the springs of public recognition and private wealth, in again somewhat other words, are 
not only organizing and ordering principles. They are also to be understood as the proper 
aims of the two main parts of which almost all states have been historically constituted. 
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The two objects respectively correspond to each state’s (numerical) parts, to the many 
and the few, as well as to the functional (qualitative) difference between these parts.
Later paragraphs shall additionally demonstrate that, precisely because all states 
must eventually go into decline, the two parts/principles of their constitutional orders 
should nonetheless be kept in balance, so as to slow down the process of decline. 
Whenever growth occurs, therefore, these two constituent parts/functional principles 
should continue to be proportionally represented. This means that a just representation by
the constitutional state, of the people’s interests, can be confidently believed to at least 
temporarily halt the process of corruption. Yet, eventually, all constitutional states (by the 
way, Aristotle had not suggested the monarchy must be considered as a sufficient 
component of any constitutional state) will come to suffer the consequences of their own 
greed: of the pursuit of material interests by their leading office-bearers, as opposed to 
their pursuit of public esteem and honor.182
Political realists propose that the brute fact of decline should never prevent 
statespersons from trying to arrest the ongoing acquisition of materialism, and to put 
taxes on those acquiring natural or inanimate spoils. The process of material spoils and 
interest accumulation will have to be arrested, but not negated. It will have to help to 
sustain an adequate balance between this first type of pursuit itself, as well as the pursuit 
of honor. The purpose of the state, according to realism, is to maintain balance between 
“laws of nature” as well as “laws of honor”, as Hobbes would have said—and as he 
would still have said in agreement with Aristotle’s Politics as well.183
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In this respect, Hobbes’s Leviathan follows Aristotle’s observation to the letter: 
no (constitutional) state can be constituted from some “chance body of persons, or in any 
chance period of time.”184 Every (sovereign) state, as Hobbes writes and adds to 
Aristotle, alternatively has to have been constituted by a deliberate covenant of every 
person with every person. This covenant may neither have been closed by or with God, 
nor may it result solely from an individual’s volition.185 Hobbes’s sovereign covenanted 
state is a state, rather, only to the extent that it is no longer contingent on the wills of 
other states—but that it can autonomously perform two self-moderating, or two self-
balancing functions. The state is a sovereign state to the extent that it has begun 
performing the two functions of both procuring “the safety of the people [as] ... obliged 
by the law of nature”—by allowing every citizen to engage in “lawful industry” as well 
as by “judging the necessities [of their state, and] ... levying money and soldiers when ... 
necessary”—as well as immediately hereafter also honoring and executing “good laws to 
which individual persons may apply their own cases.” To properly perform this second 
function, the sovereign shall appoint “teachers” and readily apply “a general providence, 
contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and [honorable] example.”186 That is,
every state, at least when seen from Hobbes’s classicist and realist point of view, is to be 
a functionally two-dimensional in order for it to retain its sovereignty: it should obey both 
the laws of natural necessity, which involve the laws of force and taxation, as well as that 
it has to ‘teach’ individuals to voluntarily honor their own customs and civil laws, and to 
just try to act honorably in general.
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Montesquieu belongs to a later generation of less ‘realistic’ philosophers. He is 
identifying the state as a sovereign state on condition that it can mainly perform the 
second function Hobbes had identified: to count on the population to live by its customs 
and civil laws. Ideally, the state should count on obliging citizens to voluntarily obey the 
laws of honor—and, as Montesquieu’s winged phrase goes—citizens should ideally be 
counted on to be obeying these laws “with no reward other than the renown of [their] 
actions”.187
Of course, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws was once a standard guidebook 
for every jurist with legislative ambitions. It is a book written for nobles and traders who 
need to know how courts will adjudicate cases involving conflicting legal traditions. 
Throughout, the work assumes that the court adjudicator will be part of an aristocratic 
power, complemented by a monarchical executive power (a police force). This mixed 
state can manage to remain moderate—to the degree that it will respect both the “various 
loci of power (nobility, monarch) ... and the parlements: the all-important depository of 
laws.”188 The work could therefore quite well have been titled, alternatively, “On the 
Spirit of the Legislator”—which in reality is only the introductory subtitle of Book 29 of 
Spirit of the Laws. For, after all, the possible alternative spirit—of the executive power—
hardly receives as much discussion as the adjudicative and legislative power: it is almost 
as if Montesquieu wants to ignore the first dimension of Hobbes’s state; the dimension 
that is naturally or even physically protective of the people’s safety and trade.
Especially in Book 29, Montesquieu seems to have set out to demonstrate—as 
Andrea Radasanu suggests he did—that the noble legislator’s sense of moderation must 
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be understood as something that should be practically attainable. Legislative self-
moderation is actually to be imagined as a practical sense of adequacy. Indeed, he does 
argue that the legislator should therefore mostly learn how to moderate his desire for 
perfection, and his desire to accomplish universal justice as well.189 But then this issue 
arises: what should be the criterion of legislative and constitutional moderation? If the 
moderate legislator errs, should it be on either the side of regulatory universality or the 
side of the different circumstances of every civil law case? Whose acts and which kinds 
of moderation best help maintain the state, and the balance of powers as well?
While keeping in mind that twentieth-century realists (Arendt, Schmitt) have been 
highly suspicious of those who would want to allow economic activities into politics 
(because material conflicts too often, and too easily upset the balance), it will here be 
argued that Montesquieu instead saw economic activities as a source of national glory. 
He describes a monarchical economy in which honors and titles are being bestowed on 
warring nobles: this idea of public recognition should apply to other intermediary groups 
as well, and should thus become the organizing principle of the state as a whole.190 Not so 
much the stakes that the noble citizens have in their own physical safety, but much more 
their honors can so come to serve as the main object of Montesquieu’s ideal state’s 
progress.191 But by viewing himself as a modern liberal who is hardly suspicious of this 
economy of honors, Montesquieu made the grave mistake, unlike Aristotle and Hobbes, 
to not also consider the sphere of commercial profits and material losses as an equally-
significant and equally-problematic source of political corruption.
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It may be known Montesquieu’s moderate legislator serves in two capacities 
which, in twentieth-century states, have often been separated. As a trial judge, he is 
responsible for interpreting and deciding on the countless differences within the body of 
jurisprudence and civil law. As a formulator of positive laws, however, he may 
simultaneously pursue the possibility of the universal application of the civil law: of local 
legal customs. Some theorists argue that simultaneity in the applicability of both 
universal and particular laws will benefit the state’s survival. For example, in arguing that 
the legislator is primarily an ad hoc adjudicator, and cannot be making “tremendous 
changes” to the local laws unless he were to first respect the particular “temper of a 
people” (particularity), Radasanu hints and probably also mistakenly presupposes this 
moderate legislator may only act in the absence of the ideal of legal uniformity.192
Radasanu suggests the moderate legislator would in some respects have to try to 
be a structural realist, guarding vigilantly against monarchical agents and their 
universalist desire to create strong regulatory applications of the laws of honor. She is 
also right to point out that, in Book 29, Montesquieu defends pieces of legislation that are 
respectful of diverse customs. Every legislator must heed himself against “ideas of 
uniformity”, the French Magistrate writes here, by at least making an effort to uncover 
the presence of such ideas within “the police (the same weights), in commerce (the same 
measures), [and] in the state (the same laws and the same religion in every part).”193
Contrary to the suggestion that Montesquieu warns against legislative 
universalism and monarchical honors, he is doing quite the opposite. The legislator’s 
sense of prudence and his respect for different legal norms are to be viewed as his most 
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important qualities, he says. This could, therefore, very well mean that he actually 
suggests that prudence must be subordinate to the purpose of legislative justice. Prudence 
could merely be one of the many qualities that serve the state in maintaining universal 
justice, to better decrease its internal political diversity, and to thereby increase its legal 
uniformity—which again benefits economic competitiveness.194 This is why the prudent 
legislator should help formulate the material reasons of state, but not try to protect the 
state’s general laws at any cost. Rather than to use laws to protect the state’s, and the 
monarchy’s domains of luxury and other such monopolistic investments, for instance, he 
should be applying those laws that protect the diversity of norms and conventions 
(mores). He should apply universal laws when the “commerce of economy” is at stake, 
but respect particular local conventions to the extent that they support “commerce” as 
well.195 At one point, Radasanu nicely acknowledges this guideline as well: “Commerce, 
whatever its drawbacks, seems indispensable for spreading agreeable manners and curing 
destructive prejudices. While others might attribute the spread of civilized and peaceful 
mores to Christianity, Montesquieu gives the lion’s share of credit to commerce.”196
Nevertheless, the pure diversity of mores (tempers, customs, and non-positivist 
legal norms) is not an unqualified political good.197 The diversity of biases, as they will 
come to light in interpreting the legal status of competing interests, can weaken the state. 
The biases and tempers particularly favorable towards commercial interests may be too 
weakly, to be too excessively pursued. Further, rather than to tolerate too much diversity 
and too many “seditious men” the state may only survive if it can rely on a “small 
number of wise and tranquil”, “most prudent”, and “principal” men.198 Montesquieu 
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repeatedly hints—in Books 20, 21, and 29—that he fears that the diversity of laws and 
beliefs may become so great that justice, or equal treatment, can no longer be 
warranted.199 His legislator must therefore learn to see himself as an equal among equal 
citizens, rather than that he should try to be an executive judge or a conservative clerk 
who will apply only one state’s body of law. Or, he must firstly imagine himself as acting 
in the service of regulatory uniformity before secondly applying laws to each distinct 
case in fact. “[T]he greatness of [his] genius [is found both] in [his] knowing in which 
cases there must be uniformity and in which differences.”200
Radasanu is oblivious towards Montesquieu’s dualistic observation, even though 
he clearly presses for greater simultaneity between legal uniformity and local customs. 
But she then rightly argues that “[Montesquieu] is looking for the mean as it concerns the 
political good, while Aristotle speaks of the mean in relation to virtue and especially 
moral virtue.”201 Yet, this is not exactly how Montesquieu was reading Aristotle’s 
Politics. Rather, he reads Aristotle as if it would have been empirically possible to create 
“a large middle class” of nobles, capable of politically substituting—in Aristotle’s 
words—both “unmixed oligarchy” as well as “extreme democracy”. By hoping that 
oligarchical ambitions will be checked by monarchical honors, the French Magistrate is 
also hoping that democracy will no longer remain a notable counter-power. This seeming 
agreement with Aristotle suggests it would have been unthinkable for the French 
Magistrate to ask the ideal legislator to politically separate his own prudence completely 
from the Aristotelian moral and legal virtues. To the contrary, however, the Magistrate 
actually asks his moderate legislator to try to exemplify both moral virtue (to respect 
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regulatory universality and legal uniformity) as well as to cleverly defend his own best 
interest (his particularity as a political agent). The problem with this demand, as 
Radasanu forgets to mention, however, is that Montesquieu’s demand further abuses the 
Aristotelian concept of the mean. Montesquieu assumes here that the concept not only 
refers to morals, or to individual moral virtues, but can also be politically represented by 
the few, by the nobles, or by those in between the king and the many—and by their 
aristocratic intermediate powers.202
Yet, as a political realist, Aristotle clearly warned his own readership (including, 
the apparently careless, French Magistrate) about the dangers of using the concept of the 
mean in order to justify the use of power by one group or another. The concept cannot 
justify only the nobility’s access to intermediary offices—against any other group’s equal 
potential to fulfill the state’s intermediary offices. Aristotle embraces the notion of 
balance: both the nobility as well as the masses should enjoy an equal stake, if not only 
because this notion of proportion emerges from within—and is in the ‘second nature’ 
of—every constitution. The empirical reason for this sense of constitutional parity 
suffices because, as Aristotle says, there “has never been established” a state 
representatively expressing the mean, middle, or “mixed type” of power. In every state, 
either “one or [the] other of the two main [groups of power]—the owners of property [or] 
the masses—gains the advantage [and] oversteps the mean.”203 It would be unjust and 
imprudent to nonetheless try to stimulate “heterogeneity” within the masses, to be sure, 
but this precept must certainly also never prevent statespersons from respecting the 
modicum of qualitative dissimilarity between their two main groups of power—or, from 
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perhaps not respecting but from always recognizing this void between their constituent 
parts.204
Aristotle expresses great caution about how statespersons should represent the 
number of possible objects of dissension. In maintaining political stability, more 
critically, he takes care to reduce this number to two: “profit” (or “loss”) as well as 
“honor” (or “disgrace”). He would thus clearly not yet have established a third and 
intermediate object (contrary to Montesquieu’s program, which starts with such an object 
of power). For Aristotle, both of these objects (of perceived injustices) may form one of 
the two causes of political discord. The first cause of discord is exemplified by those 
seditionists who have “an attitude of mind” most favorable towards their own 
“superiority”: they are reasoning they have been receiving “no advantage over others (but 
only an equal amount or even a smaller amount) although they are really more than 
equal”.205 Seditionists of the other type are more predisposed to take part in a democratic 
reasoning process, “which arises from their thinking that they have the worst of the 
bargain in spite of being the equals of those who have the advantage.”206 Briefly, 
oligarchs tend to perceive justice as being weakened by the decision to reward parties 
with equal treatment, and democrats as if justice must be strengthened by the same 
decision. Yet, democrats and oligarchs both view justice as a Gestalt. They view the 
same phenomenon from contrary angles. It is thus not unlikely that oligarchs will prefer 
to see the emergence of a proportional form of justice, or equity, whereas Aristotelian 
democrats would give preference to redistributive justice.
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Among the most likely causes of sedition are a “disproportionate increase” or the 
creation of some sort of “dissimilarity” between the oligarchical and the democratic 
elements of the state. In such an unbalanced constitutional state, “election intrigues [and] 
willful negligence” may further contribute to the seditious tumults.207 To prevent this, 
Aristotle recommends a state-form capable of mixing the points of democracy with those 
of oligarchy, so that it can remain “based on the middle classes: ... the most stable of all 
the forms.” For, constitutions cannot endure if they would be based “on either the 
oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality”.208
The French Magistrate cuts and pastes the one part in Aristotle’s theory that 
presented honors as objects of discord, but ignores the part in which profits were said to 
be no less such objects. Those who accumulate wealth are honored because they do so: 
their wealth should not have to be expected to become a source of tumult and decline, 
primarily because Montesquieu builds few safeguards to prevent aristocrats from turning 
into oligarchs. His influential philosophy thereby moves towards a blind spot, no longer 
observing Aristotle’s cautionary precept that wherever “the rich become more numerous, 
or if properties increase, [even] democracies turn into oligarchies and dynasties.”209
Montesquieu’s overall philosophical tendency is to positively appraise the conflation of 
democratic and aristocratic wealth, so that there will be no considerable differences 
between types of wealth and how these types should be publically honored. Commercial 
wealth is best acquired when laws have been universalized, with sufficient respect for 
particular cultural traditions and local customs, so that legal uniformity will again 
promote the prince’s honoring of equally-accumulated wealth. This ideal state honors and 
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executes those laws that will best promote the trade of the middle class, because “the 
profession of equal people” consists of extensive, international commerce.210
Then, because the French Magistrate agrees on the merits of Aristotle’s second 
(honors), and not on those of the first causes (profits) of constitutional corruption, he 
essentially discriminates against democratic equality. Dangerously, however, within this 
agreement there remain very few points standing in the way of oligarchical equity’s 
ascend. The Magistrate’s endorsing of the justice principle that had so long remained 
connected to the constitutional aristocracy/oligarchy principle, obviously, turns him less 
into a progressive realist than into a conservative liberal.211
These last paragraphs emphasize the Aristotelian insight that all states suffer from 
their own accumulation of profits, and particularly from the wealth that is being conferred 
on office-holders. Even the best monarchical states—according to Aristotle’s influential 
and preeminently realist theory—tend to pass over into a sort of aristocracies. Kings will 
become greedy, and their peers now seek equity (distributive justice). The new 
aristocratic peerage-régimes, held by “a [limited] number of persons of equal goodness,” 
must themselves again fall prey to oligarchies. Historical experience further proves that 
the newly-formed oligarchies will with time become tyrannies, and the tyrannies 
democracies.212 It is also of critical importance to note, as Aristotle’s theory indeed does 
note, that the dynastical monarchy “is not in itself a constitution” because only, instead, 
democracy and aristocracy are constitutional in the sense that their powers may also be 
mixed with—and because they have the power to commission non-hereditary forms of 
“permanent military command”.213
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By means of contrast, Montesquieu’s monarchies  are at a low risk of losing their 
“upper hand” to “the people.” In monarchies, “things are very rarely carried to excess” 
because they are committed to regular interventions by various “intermediate dependent 
powers”—or, as well, by various orders and magistracies aiming to invigorate (and to 
make heard) the general laws of the land.214 Princes who are seeking glory, by means of 
their independent powers, will thus still be checked by all the various orders that were 
created from amidst the middle classes. The idea is that the princes, or that the state will 
honor the middle classes for making material gains, so that the middle classes themselves 
will only seek intermediary powers and will thus again limit their gains (they will not be 
ostentatious in displaying their wealth so that they will still be honored).
Literally, Montesquieu faults Aristotelianism—as he will obliquely refer to this 
school of political thought as “Machiavellianism”—for having “accompanied the 
destruction of commerce”. This school would have given so much leeway to political 
assemblies, in which ordinary persons may in extraordinary times begin to rise to the 
occasion, and which were assemblies and councils that had wrongly tried to exclude 
commerce from politics: “Machiavellianism” can only lead to revolutions and violent 
coups against the state.215 As a constitutionally conservative as well as an economic 
liberal, Montesquieu is thus very skeptical towards Machiavelli’s republicanism, which 
from his own viewpoint had too mysteriously checked the state’s discordant tendencies 
by means of a free and ambitious individual: by the person of exemplary political 
virtù.216“Ambition is pernicious in a republic: [i]t has [only] good effects in monarchy”—
Montesquieu explains his skepticism.217 In a popular republic, which he thinks must be 
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governed by a principle of democracy, ambition generates and attends to excessive forms 
of individualism. Here, “ambition enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice enters 
them all.” In such a republican place of unchecked individual ambition, speech will be 
too confused and indefinite: “What was a maxim is now called severity; what was a rule
is ... constraint; what was vigilance is ... fear.”218
But in monarchical states, in which the executive power has been supplemented 
by the hereon-dependent adjudicative power of the nobles in the middle, and in states that 
remain far removed from licentious or Machiavellian republics, individual ambition will 
have been checked by an economy of honor. Only here, public honor can and will be 
observed for the aim of checking individual virtues and individual ambitions alike.219 “In 
monarchical and moderate states, power is limited by that which is its spring: ... honor.” 
The mere citing of the laws of honor herein thus always results in “obedience.”220 In 
these states, furthermore, individuals can pursue their own interests to the degree that 
these actions will have honorable effects. As one commentator sums up, Montesquieu 
trusts that individual citizens can herein “[voluntarily] pursue their own good while 
inadvertently doing what is good for the whole body politick.” 221 Their free wills, hence, 
dominate their potential respect for natural necessity: the individual wills to abide by the 
laws of honor, in this liberal state, dominate the laws of nature. In viewing this facet of 
the liberal state it evidently appears as if the state tends to be a monistic power: the public 
honoring of private interests is herein no longer predicated on a relationship of natural 
contrariness. 
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Also in sharp contrast to what Hobbes and Machiavelli had earlier believed 
possible, the idea of individual interest has together with the French Magistrate become 
the sole source and object of public recognition. There are few other objects of honor, 
besides profit and income. The result of this modern ranking of economic gain before 
political honor, then, means that the laws of nature also cannot be judged to somehow 
have remained equal to or above the objects of public recognition. Laws of nature are 
now forming intolerable sources of discord, for they have to be either coherent with or 
separate from the laws of honor. Because individual interests are now to be measured as 
if all individuals are principally equal, before the monarchical laws of honor, further, 
tumults must no longer be believed constitutionally fruitful. Discords between 
qualitatively different constituent orders are now seen as discords that could challenge the 
liberal measure of equal profits for equal trades.
This, then, is Montesquieu’s contribution to the history of liberal thought: 
individuals can be treated and honored as equal citizens, not for their political but for 
their economic contributions to the commonwealth. Or, human beings can treat each 
other as equals because this is what a monarchical state will have taught them to do, 
primarily by having honored their profits and by having stimulated their trade with others 
inside and outside their own commonwealths.
For Montesquieu, all states must hold their own legislative power, rather than to 
divide it among two social groups. They should hold this power so they can more 
efficiently regulate international commerce, and do so in such a way that public virtues 
will be measured by means of silver: pecuniary rewards are measures of peaceful conduct 
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and economic assimilation. Over time, individuals will then become financially and 
economically more accustomed to their own liberal actions, at least to the extent that they 
will also deserve their incomes from personal trades. This places Montesquieu linearly 
opposed to the realist precept that most citizens would not want the commercial classes to 
set the state’s legal standards. Realists are rather cautious about tolerating profits as a 
measure of goodness, within the public realm of honors. Realists such as Machiavelli and 
Hobbes still wanted the people to be able to exercise another, more immaterial kind of 
self-legislative power. They would also want the people to act as if they are themselves 
the covenanting parties from which the sovereign state emerges. It is not that the state 
teaches them to become progressively-more peaceful covenanters, but that they are the 
state of peace.
Opposed to Kelsenian/Montesquieuan liberalism, Hobbesian/Machiavellian 
realism holds that peoples are groupings with an innate need to be free. The concepts of 
necessity and of freedom that form two parts and two kinds of their constitutional 
sovereignty, however, are concepts that contain an importantly-critical tension. This 
tension allows and animates the groups to participate in their own public affairs, and even 
to serve in revolutionary assemblies when needed—as if they were all coming together to 
serve as their own monarchical magistrates, and as if they could all remain respectful of 
their inequalities by means of the laws of honor as well as their laws of nature.222 But the 
tension itself cannot be transcended without that it should not also have been included by 
both laws and both powers of the constitutional state: the tension cannot be eliminated by 
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means of a third power. Instead, it sustains itself non-dualistically—or, so it should be 
trusted, by republican realists with a bend for pacifism.
Democracy vs. Oligarchy is not Montesquieuan Constitutionalism
Who holds, and who should be holding, ‘authority beyond rules’ in a case in 
which one U.S. Presidential candidate is to be lawfully selected for the highest office in 
the state? As the winner of an election, such a candidate may legitimately carry the titles 
of commander-in-chief and President. The candidate’s election is believed to express the 
people’s vote of confidence in both their president as well as in their own authority to 
decide on the difference between what it means to be winning and losing an election. For, 
in the end it is really the people’s (or, actually, the Electoral College’s), decision who 
should hold their state’s supreme executive power. It is not the decision of any third party 
or any neutral court, at least not under the U.S. Constitution. After all, if the people were 
to fail (and should the Electoral College be indecisive), then it still remains the function 
of the people’s representatives in Congress to reorganize the election. For, only 
“Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they 
shall give their votes” (Art. 2.3).
The U.S. Constitution does and yet does not treat the President’s Office and 
Congress as co-equal branches. In some respects, the document does speak the classicist 
language of giving equal regard to both sides, to both the executive and the legislative 
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faculties of government. Yet, in other respects the Constitution affirms the need for a 
third power. Even though the rules on elections should be settled by the legislative 
branch, most other rules and laws are subject to judicial oversight by a third court. This 
Supreme Court holds “original jurisdiction” in America’s diplomatic affairs and over 
disputes between the States, and should hold “appellate jurisdiction” over all other cases. 
Yet, its own jurisdiction in these appellate cases still falls “under such regulations as the 
Congress shall make” (U.S. Constitution, Art. 3.2).
For the purposes of the following argument, it is less important to know how legal 
scholars have debated to which extent the Supreme Court may freely ignore the 
intentions of the other two powers. What has been less debated is that the Court is 
actually never considered equal to either the executive or the legislature. The balance of 
powers is to be maintained by two equal powers, or otherwise by three unequal powers. 
Again, the issue that has received too little or no attention is not to which degree these 
powers are independent and separate, but how many there should be in the first place. As 
noted in the previous subsections, Montesquieu looked for a third power which may 
trump and which, at least economically, should even try to absorb the other two. 
Machiavelli did not. Could he rather have meant that the two powers, or the two lungs 
within both the constitutional law and of the civil law traditions belong to one and the 
same body politick? Or would Machiavelli have meant to argue that these lungs may only 
expand by breathing in the air of Aristotelian (pre-Cartesian) discourses?
In his Politics, Aristotle suggestively argues that by giving “equal property” to 
two qualitatively different and oftentimes mutually opposing sides of the state, this state’s 
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constitution will stand a better chance of maturing as such (of preserving its government). 
“[M]utual discord” might not be circumvented completely, but by applying this legal 
equality principle to cases demanding a decision, a modicum of civil justice might 
nonetheless be achieved. The “equalization of property” would be unfeasible, for 
instance.223 Realistically, virtuous citizens will have to train themselves how to prevent 
the rise of excessive property-claims or of other materialistic demands. Aristotle’s 
argument rings familiar: it resonates in Machiavelli’s combination of virtù and 
necessità.224 As shall be demonstrated throughout the following paragraphs, this 
combination does not fall far from Aristotle’s tree—on three grounds.225
First, Aristotle’s Politics perhaps became a canonical text because it also is a 
moderately democratic text. In comparison, it seems Spirit of the Laws took an anti-
democratic path. Politics more clearly identifies democracy as the régime that naturally 
emerges among poorer peoples. Their governmental preferences are expressed either 
more confidently or more superstitiously than those of richer peoples. This is in great part 
why they will trust their fellow-citizens to be more or less equally capable of governing 
them, and why they take the equal allotment of offices seriously. The poor will, as a 
matter of fact, select their magistrates by means of a lottery. Politics then defines 
oligarchy as a government dependent on property requirements. These selection 
requirements tend benefit richer peoples, as property-owners generally like to think that 
the wealthiest among them will also be the politically most successful among them.226The 
critical point to observe,  however, is that a modicum of balance will also emerge among 
most peoples. Those responsibilities and those offices that were (democratically) 
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assigned by lot, and those offices that were (aristocratically) elected by secret ballot 
should be witnessed in conjunction, and in balance, within one and the same politeia.227
Second, the competition between democratic and oligarchic factions can be 
actively moderated by law—as Machiavelli would come to concur to the broadly-
Aristotelian discussants.228 Without any moderating rules, civil war may not be far from 
the horizon. As Montesquieu, but unlike Machiavelli, still suggested; without such a 
balance, there can be no aristocratization, which means there can be no third and 
seemingly-impartial mechanism to prohibit either excessively oligarchical inequities or to 
check excessively ochlocratic weaknesses and disorganized opinions either.
In an aristocracy, the key rule holds “that the magistrates are not [to be] paid or 
appointed by lot”. Aristotelian thinking is in this respect also a form of pro-aristocratic 
political thought, as it aims to rule out fate and randomness. By creating confidence in a 
specific mode of competition—in the secret ballot, and thus in juridical-technical as 
opposed to socio-economic competition—an aristocracy would supposedly be able to 
flourish on the basis of merit and honor rather than of random participation. Only under 
an aristocratic government should the polis as a whole obey those who have been trained 
to advocate in court. Only this makes it possible for all factions to respect, also, the “rule 
that all lawsuits may be decided by any body of magistrates, and not some by one and 
some by another”.229 The adjudicative powers of the best polis should neither be 
democratically allotted nor should they be held by one elected or salaried judiciary, but 
these powers should be exercised within all juristic assemblages and through all legal 
venues—as Politics details.
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Steven Skultety rightly reminds Politics’s readers that, “[f]or Aristotle, 
competition among citizens does not creep into politics as conditions deteriorate, or 
because citizens have no star by which to guide the polis, but rather because a certain 
kind of competition is a desirable feature that virtuous citizens should promote in the best 
of cities.”230Politics aims either to lay out the conditions for the best of the city-states, 
which is the same as saying that it tries to identify the best in and of the city-state. These 
conditions are made possible by the competition for honor. Spirit of the Laws, to the 
contrary of Politics, promotes competition in terms of socio-economic status and the 
(added) value gained by (hard) work. As Skultety appends, Aristotle’s political self is 
never “competing because of greed, [and rather only] ... for the rational esteem of prudent 
peers”. Whereas Montesquieuan competition creates economic differences, and requires 
little cooperation (each individual trader hopes to outshine all others), ideal-typical 
Aristotelian modes of competition are well-regulated (by another honor code). In 
Aristotle’s polis, the people will be in “agreement on ethical norms”—as “political 
friendship and civic like-mindedness (homonoia) are [not] intended to squash 
competition in well-functioning cities. Homonoia is a condition ... which [maintains 
civic] disagreement and difference”.231
Can it be argued that, from Aristotle’s perspective, Montesquieu’s liberal agenda 
failed him? On the premise that Aristotle observes civic differences rather than 
antagonistic disagreements to emerge from within the tense relation between democracy 
and oligarchy, it can already be concluded that if he admits a third power it cannot be an 
internally egalitarian power. Even if Aristotle admits a third power with aristocratic 
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qualities, then these still cannot  prevent this power from remaining divided against itself. 
All these qualities help do is to allow the courts give neither preferential treatment to 
poor nor to rich, because every court should equally open the floor to all parties. By 
contrast, Montesquieu’s theory of the middle level is constructed around the assumption 
that individuals at the middle level will try to expand their power at the expense of both 
the democrats and the oligarchs. This expansion of the middle then causes the state to 
become constitutionally and internally more monistic, while it may externally become, 
through its trade with other states, more monopolistic.
To understand the message of self-moderation is to understand that high levels of 
distrust towards the needy and the poor are consistent with a state’s anti-democratic 
caliber. This is not to say that liberal theorists always favor anti-democratic ideal states. It 
is only to say that the essentially liberal message of Spirit of the Laws cannot be 
comprehended without comparing it to and without studying other canonical works, such 
as Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories.
Machiavelli was probably not familiar with, and yet his work remains much 
closer to Aristotle’s Politics than that Spirit of the Laws would do. His Florentine 
Histories is critical of both the common people as well as of the great nobles, urging both 
parties to participate in the life of their republic—by simultaneously maintaining their 
civic differences.232Spirit of the Laws departs both from the Florentine Histories and 
from Politics, however, in trying to neutralize the commoners. As Skultety showed, 
astutely, the Philosopher himself would never have believed that by neutralizing the 
democratic elements the remaining element will transmute itself into a monistic state—let 
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alone into one commercial aristocracy. In fact, Aristotle is outright dismissive of retail 
trade. Such trade is a-scholia. Politics (Book I, Chapters 9 and 10) shows that trade 
should not be believed “naturally a part of the art of acquisition.” That is, commerce 
should not be believed to help the state acquire goods. What traders do for a living is to 
exchange goods “at the expense of other men; the trade of the petty usurer (the extreme 
example, ... [which derives from and thus remains] connected with retail trade) is hated 
most, and with most reason”.233
Aristotelian-Machiavellian constitutionalism distrusts those who have made 
exchanging goods into a career.234 Those earning their living from trade are suspected of 
having skills harmful to the republic.235 The poorer democrats should not come to rely on 
any social contract with their oligarchical counterparts. Those with the greatest 
commercial skills are likely to be hated, and any agreement with them would almost 
certainly erase any productive tensions. If not due to changing historical circumstances, 
why is Montesquieu so optimistic about brokering an agreement among intermediaries 
whom, he thinks, at their self-expanding middle level, shall eventually erase even the 
most rigorous socio-economic differences among themselves? The next section shows 
why Machiavelli rejects such optimism—wishing any intermediaries to be “slain”.
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Why Machiavelli Concurs to Aristotle, not to the Aristotelian Mean, by Having the 
Ephors Slain
The process through which political stability may be recognized, and through 
which state durability is believed to be acquired, is a relational process. It is an 
organizational process, also, that transcends the partial powers and capabilities of a 
plurality of states. Through this complex process, sovereignty emerges. Sovereign states 
are performing certain functions within the process. They function as actors with 
relations to most other parties, yet their performance is not always public. Rather, it is 
also a performance between private states and their own interests: a private competion, or 
a duel, about the durability of each of their constitutional powers. The outcome of the 
competition, as classicist realist theorists argue, is dependent on a secondary process: 
recognition, or the observing of some degree of organizational complexity within the 
structure of constitutional power itself. 
This secondary process of recognition is difficult to grasp. The question in this 
section is why this transcendent process of organization and recognition can so often be 
found to depend on the will to obey the state officials. It depends often on the motivations 
for supporting, or the confidence people have in, their state. For example, low confidence 
is typically caused by either too much diversity or by too little complexity within the 
constitutional state, for it to meet the demands of the times. Confidence is also generally 
expressed through a relational legitimization process, which is a process that allows 
political scientists to refer to civic religions and how they take shape within a mysterious 
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collective consciousness (or: a common sense-experience, perhaps), regardless as to 
whether the civic religious doctrine (or: ideology) itself is to be called Christian or pagan, 
and fascist or liberal. 
The gist of relational recognition is rather simple: a stable, durable, and 
sustainable state will also have to be supported by many more or less pious, faithful, and 
loyal (or: commonsensical) people. Citizens have to religiously intimate their support for, 
or to faithfully imitate, those actions they believe to be most good, most virtuous, and 
most exemplary.236 Sometimes it is possible to see that a constitutional founder is being 
venerated: a great man (no women are mentioned, at least not by Hobbes and 
Machiavelli). This man’s actions are manifested in not his private values but in legitimate 
self-legislative actions.
Who is the mysterious person whose legislative actions should form such a core 
criterion in public authority’s legitimization and international recognition? Whose 
mythical laws are one of a kind, in terms of their goodness? Are such laws worthy of
being lauded by later generations of people, of ordinary citizens, so that the state’s 
continuity will form sufficient reason to situate itself on a par with those laws ‘given’ by 
exemplary men such as Lycurgus and Solon?
Puzzlingly, Machiavelli refrained from saying anything memorable about a third 
Great Legislator, Moses, probably because he could not find as many shortcomings in 
Moses as he did among the other candidates for the position of holding a venerable, 
imitable, and virtuous mode of authority.237 Hence, theorists should ask Machiavelli how 
he would want to rank the virtuous exemplars he so casually mentions, and why he seems 
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to find fault with each of them (including, even, Moses). Few would dispute that he did 
use certain criterions in recognizing legislative action as being exemplary—but much 
controversy persists about his argument that legislative action should be self-serving: it 
should immediately be recognizable as its own self-sustaining purpose, he said. The 
recognition of and care for legislative foundations should instantaneously be charged to 
the many, or to a great plurality (Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 9). Because balanced 
constitutions are then instantly also becoming sustainable constitutions, and because it is 
still impossible to create a permanent balance, how should the difference between 
legislative virtues and individual egoism, or between orderliness and chaos be 
recognized? And, if the difference can be fully recognized, how does that moment of 
recognition form a valid IR criterion?
This section shall, in finding answers to these questions, demonstrate why 
Machiavelli has good reasons to remain much closer to Aristotelian constitutionalist 
thought than to liberal idealist philosophies. His proximity to the ancients has of course 
already been acknowledged, throughout the secondary literature, as he is often disparaged 
for having supported Rome’s definition of dictatorial authority, as well as for his 
penchant to be delegating power to a single executive officer: a prince suspected of 
becoming both dictatorial and absolute. In the modern literature, thus, Machiavelli’s 
classicism is commonly said to hold on to these tenets: first, “everyone is everyone’s 
potential enemy”—to appropriate Hans Freyer’s words—and, second, that the first tenet 
applies to describe all structural levels of organization. Randomly-situated “energy-
centers within a lawless space” are not only occasionally being established in “between-
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state”-worlds, but also in the world of “private law”-societies.238 But, then again, who 
should this officer be, who so energetically and magically introduces order and 
establishes laws? Which one Great Legislator should he be, mimicking Rome’s 
republican energies while serving a supra-anarchical Empire?
In his Discourses, Machiavelli hesitates before he begins to applaud Rome’s 
princes. He early-onwards mentions that “[Sparta’s] Lycurgus, beyond doubt, merits the 
highest praise.” Next, he suggests that the Athenians’ Solon merits as much honor. For, if 
Solon had not overlooked only such a small number of good laws—“to maintain the 
government against the insolence of the nobles and the license of the populace”—and if 
Solon’s administration had not remained a bit more opposed against the disturbing 
imbalances in the relation between nobles and people, in other words, then he would 
almost certainly have become able to help prolong “the duration of the government of 
Athens”.239
In drawing an initial contrast, Arendt points out that the most exemplary founder 
was neither believed to be Lycurgus nor Solon, but Æneas: Rome’s ultimate lawgiver.240
Virgil would have taught ancients and classicists that Æneas had been the actor 
responsible not for newly founding Rome, but for re-establishing Troy’s and thereby also 
for revitalizing Rome’s constitution.241 Yet, where does this leave Romulus’s regulatory 
actions which, as Machiavelli himself hints, are as worthy of imitation as Æneas’s 
venerable Trojan laws? In the matter of establishing good laws, to the contrary of the 
matter of using good arms, however, Machiavelli argues there never was a mortal man 
who could have held the type of exceptional power that would have allowed him to frame 
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a constitutional state solely “for good ends” (order, justice). But this argument raises 
tensions, anyhow, because Machiavelli also never disagrees with the Aristotelian and 
Polybian constitutional cycle-theories according to which monarchy is the best-regulated 
régime. In fact, he clearly concludes that the best-constituted state should, “as a general 
rule”, have to have been founded “by only one person”—and, therein, by the one utmost 
“sagacious legislator of a republic”—so that Rome, indeed, cannot have been 
consecutively founded both by Æneas (whom he himself never mentions) as well as 
Romulus (whom he eagerly introduces). On condition that only one man could have been 
responsible for creating her laws, Rome would have to be perfectly-constituted. Why, 
then, would Machiavelli like his readers to believe that the fratricidal Romulus was her 
founder, by glossing over Æneas’s significance?242
Although Machiavelli does make a pass at dismissing the exemplariness of 
Romulus, even absolving him from “blame” in the deaths of men he killed (“Remus and 
Tatius”), he also does not seem to think Romulus would have been Rome’s founder. He 
would not have been the one Great Legislator whose example should be imitated the 
most. Other exemplary constitutional law-founders now come to his mind, instead. For 
instance, Sparta’s Cleomenus had probably been the very first to have combined his 
authority with the people’s desire to restore, and to maintain “strict observance of, the 
laws of Lycurgus”. The main reason why Cleomenus never acquired a state as durable 
and glorious as those founded by persons like Solon, as Machiavelli’s Discourses on 
Livy’s Decalogue explains, is that Sparta would simply be unfortunate. It was not in her 
constitution’s fate to govern others—but for the few Spartan citizens themselves. 
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Cleomenus’s Sparta was being “attacked by the Macedonians” before he could have 
completed his “just and laudable” project—which included his availing himself of the 
“opportunity to have all the Ephors slain” and to, thus, have eliminated the intermediary 
institution of the Ephorate.243 But, why should the Ephorate—or, why should what in 
Rome amounted to the Decemvirate—have to have been eliminated, and why should 
Cleomenus’s act not have been a cause of corruption, and of poor legislative action on 
top?244
Machiavelli has thusfar been working on a shortlist. First on the rank-order stands 
either Lycurgus or Moses, while Solon takes second place, and Cleomenus (in 
almosthaving gained the same reputation as Lycurgus) seems to take third. Romulus now 
falls to the side of the road, thus, or so it would seem. The main difference between him 
and the others is that he mostly held on the state’s executive, rather than that he also gave 
Rome her legislative powers. This would make sense to readers who know that these 
powers had been given to her by Troy, but Machiavelli feels no obligation to inform them 
there-about. This ommission gives way to a qualitative difference between types of 
power, as evinced by another comparison.
Romulus is said to have been unlike Numa, his successor, who in his stead faked 
having access to a legislative type of power infused with sacrality (a spiritual law).245
Numa now takes over Romulus’s fourth place. The ranking consequentially mainly 
begins to consist of legislators rather than also of executors—whose regulatory actions, 
supposedly, ended up being imitated and implemented for centuries to come. In order for 
an action to become law, observance has to be cross-generational. Lycurgus had initially 
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come in on first place, after all, because his laws had taken so long to become corrupted. 
Though Cleomenus might have been necessary to preserve their venerable purity, 
Sparta’s laws met the longevity-standard best. Yet, the ranking itself remains a bit 
strange. Rome’s Numa’s laws would much more regularly be amended, and yet Rome’s 
legal tradition is nonetheless believed to be of superior virtue. Both Sparta’s and Athens’s 
constitution would have been relatively far less great, as the Discourses consistently 
shows.
For which reasons would the Florentine Secretary have gone through these 
meticulous comparisons, of half-a-dozen or so great personalities, most of which 
Romans, and why did he allow Romulus himself to fade away from his first short-list? In 
the last chapters of The Prince, it had also only been Romulus who suddenly disappeared 
from the list as well. Could it be because his powers were predominantly executive? He is 
also said to have created the Senate, which held a legislative sort of authority; can there 
be no legislature without executor? Moreover, Moses and Lycurgus were of course state-
founders, and therefore would have to have been the first executors of a popular will. The 
gist of these awkward comparisons seems to be that they all held mixed powers. (Yet, 
Moses’s power was mostly sacred; Romulus’s profane; Lycurgus’s durably legislative, 
and; Cleomenus’s imperfectly restorative.) Each individual, however, lacked diversity 
within his mixed power: each presents himself as a negative example. Thus, it has been 
shown that the exemplary founders are all non-exemplary, or at minimum imperfect. 
Perhaps the highest rank of the list of mortals must remain incomplete? Upon that 
realization, Machiavelli’s Discourses finds this:
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[A]lthough one man should organize a [constitutional] government, ... it will not 
endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single 
individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of the many, for [in that 
process] it will be sustained by the many. Therefore, as the organization [and re-
establishing] of anything cannot be made by many, because the divergence of 
their opinions hinders them from agreeing as to what is best, yet, when once they 
do understand it, they will not readily agree to abandon it.246
He appears awfully confident that “divergences of opinions” (or: high degrees of 
public-discursive disorderliness) are among the first preconditions for the good 
republican life. But these divergences are non-violent. This begs the question why 
Cleomenus’s III slaying of “all the Ephors”, and whyRomulus’s killing of his brother 
Remus, would be pardonable. Once such fratricidal modes of disorderliness will have 
been admitted into the republic, after all, the persons responsible for maintaining 
orderliness and balance might themselves have fallen victim to he violence. Machiavelli 
suggests that neither one individual (neither Romulus nor Cleomenus) is infallible, yet 
both should be praised for  having taken on the noble burden of reorganizing the state, 
especially in times when their use of force could become permissible ex post facto. Their 
decision to commit violence, also, could apparently not have been entrusted to the many.
Nonetheless, only the many will have to “understand” why the violence should 
have, and why the violence actually will have to be pardoned—for as long as it serves an 
utilitarian end. Although single individuals will on occasion be bypassing and violating 
important laws (the fratricide prohibition, for instance), in order to bring back an older 
constitutional tradition, a plurality of the people is deemed better-able to administer 
newly-restored laws. It seems as if, by shifting moral agency from the individual to the 
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many, Machiavelli made a perplexing pass. He was hoping for a constitution 
transcending utilitarianism through proactive and deontic public discourses, as Benner 
has argued, but also through a civic religion.
Althusser agrees with the main premise of the argument: Machiavelli makes in 
fact a case for civic religion as being “the precondition for military and legal obedience, 
[as it] through recourse to ‘God’s authority’ induces the people to accept the introduction 
of new [sovereign] institutions”. Even though this civic religion functions as a system of 
support, for new assemblies and new militia, it also integrates these kinds of institutions 
and thereby again forms the good constitution as a whole. Religiosity thus animates—if 
not always by love then at the very least through fear of ‘God’s authority’—the 
transcendental authority of an ambivalent sovereign constitution and it does so in ways 
far more “constant” than those of human virtue. In opposition to virtue, which tends to 
become part of the state structure, rather, religion can somehow begin to organize 
revolutionary constitutional changes. Religion is a self-organizational kind of authority. 
By contrast, individual virtue remains part of an structure “exposed to the vicissitudes of 
the political existence of an individual who might not only die, but also commit 
blunders.”247 Althusser’s reintroduction of the tension within the duality of structural 
power/organizational-religious authority (that is, of the Romulus/Numa duality) serves 
the realist hermeneutic in that it showcases how deeply the Roman principals “must have 
[had] a dual nature”—in order for them to become politically animated.248 In brief, all 
this means that the principal ruler, by necessity, should have been able to freely conjoint 
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two contrary practices (force/consent or, say, rex/Imperium) within his own sovereign 
constitution.249
The earlier-mentioned passage from Discourses (Book 1, Chapter 9) discloses a 
critical difference between the mere use of religion or the mere use of arms, first, and the 
transcendent and legitimate use of religious laws/good arms, second. Control over the 
armed forces may under certain circumstances be understood as having been good, and 
may so even be forgiven, by the many. Paradoxically, executive forces may be exercised 
outside the norm and yet also be believed to have remained within the boundaries of 
popularly-supported laws—if control over these forces is eventually, although 
retroactively, returned to many of the people.250
Schmitt would not have disagreed: the executive’s decision may legitimately 
move outside the legal norm, and yet it remains within “the framework of the juristic.”251
Too little has been said, before this moment, about who is framing the juristic—or about 
how many people are reauthorizing, or retroactively approving of, such an only 
seemingly completely extra-legal decision.252
Machiavelli’s chapter on the Office of the Dictator is the principal source of the 
paradox—and may even today be studied to account for the distribution of power in 
‘dictatorial’ countries such as Pinochet’s Chile or Libya and Burma/Myanmar.253 The 
chapter holds that any citizen who is trying to become “exceedingly rich and [who has] ... 
many adherents and partisans” is among the most unlikely to come to the Dictatorship. In 
any free republic, such a citizen would certainly be “looked upon as dangerous.” 
Machiavelli knows that cynics will now ask why he remains so confident. That is, if he is 
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so sure of his case, then why does he want to invoke the Romans’s wisdom to have 
additionally restricted this type of Office? In other words, if an excessively oligarchical 
tendency is already being distrusted, then why should the “mode of electing the Dictator” 
comprise three additional checks?254
First, the candidate was to be “appointed only for a limited term”. Second, he was 
to be nominated “by the Consuls”, so that they themselves would not object to having to 
“submit to his authority, the same as other citizens”. Third, he should “do nothing to alter 
the form of the government, such as to diminish the powers of the Senate or the people”. 
As Machiavelli’s next chapter adds, the Tribunes had always retained their “full 
authority” (like Senators and Consuls)  while guarding the Dictator. These checks were 
necessary, then, because the many could nonetheless have been “induced” to obey a 
dangerous man. Thus, the risk simply exists: the multitudes could end up being “induced 
to give [him] this power imprudently ... in the [same] way [as] in which the Roman 
people gave it to the Decemvirs.” By means of drawing a contrast to the Decemvirs, who 
did give powers to themselves and did take the powers from others, however, Machiavelli 
here implies that only the Dictator “cannot give power”. His Office alone would have 
held absolutely no substantive, and only nominal power. “[F]or power can easily take a 
name, but a name cannot give [or take] power.”255 As a supreme executive only in name, 
hence, the Dictator would have been allowed to resort to extra-legal measures—simply 
and only because his Office nominally symbolizes a fully intra-constitutional balance, in 
the sense that only his Office is constantly being checked by all other constitutional 
departments.
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Machiavelli’s chapters on the Dictator as well as on Romulus now reach the 
conclusion, as has been underlined by the above-presented reading, that treacherously-
oligarchical tendencies are not to be condoned. So, the Dictator is an executive officer 
who has been made to bear nominal responsibility for the exercise of the state’s supreme 
command authority, in times of necessity, but who also may still substantively express 
such tendencies. These officers would thus have to be considered as a curious kind of ad 
hoc field marshals, who may murder and plunder—not because there are any nominal 
norms allowing them to do so, but because there are substantive decisions to be made that 
force their hand into doing so. Their freedom is guided by necessity.
Nonetheless, abuses will ultimately either have to be criminalized or be pardoned 
by political departments equivalent to today’s prime-minister and parliament. This further 
means the Dictator can only violate criminal law- and civil law-conventions, but simply 
cannot publically attack these departments, for then he would have become not only a 
tyrant but an usurper as well. There is something deeply mysterious about his inhibition 
to become an usurper of constitutional powers, however, which leads back to the 
paradox. The puzzle is based on these pieces: first, a Dictator is in name the most 
tyrannical ruler, because he represents the utilitarian aspect of state security; second, this 
type of formally-elected general’s substantive actions will for some mysterious reason 
always have to remain ethically unjustifiable; third, these actions can end up being 
forgiven and will thus end up being justified if, and only if, there is also a popular belief 
in their deontic (that is, their naturally lawful) purpose. The third tenet expresses a sense 
faith that the purpose will transcend the utility of the means-to-an-end action. State 
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security and merely useful armaments may so come to form the first terms that are 
simultaneously being transcended by the third term of an ulterior good or a peace 
agreement—as the difference between each of the terms is somehow believed to have 
been inspired by the divergent opinions of the many.256 In conclusion, apparently, 
Machiavelli’s defense of the Office with the single-utmost discretion has to be hedged by 
the notion of diverging public opinions, and by greatly-diversified interpretations of the 
constitutional law that transcends-and-yet-includes all other forms of law.257
The conduct of supreme authority has long been thought to consist of, at least 
until after the eighteenth century, as if it were a nominal, formal, and highly-ritualized 
affair. Only civic participation in adjudicative processes was thought to substantiate the 
relation between the supreme executor and the ultimate legislator. Machiavelli says very 
little about which single man would have been this legislator, probably because it was not 
a single man in the first place. As he criticizes each of the candidates he himself 
introduces, not one gains the best lawgiver-title. Discourses (Book 1, Chapter 10) opens 
then also as by means of Machiavelli’s admitting that “[o]f all men who have been 
eulogized [by him], those deserve it most who have been the authors and founders of 
religions; [as only] next come such as [those to] have established republics, or 
kingdoms.” That is, because Machiavelli has only examined those men who would have 
re-established political entities, most praise should actually go towards either Moses or 
Numa because they would hereby at least have blended their political supremacy with 
their sense of the sacral. Nevertheless, even these men were essentially political re-
founders, of course, and “not authors ... of [new] religions”.258
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Machiavelli must therefore not even have had Moses and the Hebrew prophets in 
mind, but perhaps rather the Prophet Mohammed—as Ronald Beiner argues that 
Rousseau would come to share his tacit respect for this founder, as the latter had been an 
“armed prophet”. Nonetheless, on the above-mentioned premise that the civic religious 
order is more wholesome and therefore transcends the political foundations of the state, 
in terms of its sustainability, it now becomes much more probable to conclude that the 
Secretary here especially also refers to Saint Paul, as the latter had literally ‘authored’ 
religious pluralism without having to have created a worldly kingship (and, as is already 
known, Machiavelli is willing to talk as a ‘republican’ at any time, so that he certainly 
gives as much political preference to pluralism as that he seems to be doing 
spiritually).259 While it may certainly be argued that Machiavelli and Rousseau had 
thought Mohammed to have been a great founder, they must also have realized that the 
Islamic blend would nonetheless have been tainted by its own second-rank dependency 
on an actual kingdom; the Caliphate. This should have raised the issue whether or not 
their own Christian blend had not also been corrupted by the mundane power of the 
Papacy, of course, but Machiavelli wriggles himself out of this dilemma by condemning 
this type of power. On one hand, he will praise the Christian Mystics. Prior to the era 
during which the popes would go on to become mundane magistrates, Saint Francis and 
Saint Dominic had still lived such exemplarily austere lives that they had been breathing 
a “new vitality into what Christ founded”.260 On the other hand, in the chapter on “The 
Importance of giving Religion a Prominent Influence”, Machiavelli further articulates 
why, inside Italy, it was just the Papal Tribunal, or just “the Court of Rome [that had] ... 
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destroyed all piety”, and that thus had failed in its duty “to uphold the foundations of the 
religion”.261 By clasping these points together, it becomes possible to see why 
Christianity suffers from monism within the sphere of Roman Church power, so that 
Machiavelli’s dual sovereign shall newly have to attend to a coincidence of spirituality 
and legislation within which the wordly administration of power will retain its austerity 
and self-discipline, and thus also sufficient contrariness in its relation with the other-
worldly Christian republic. 
Further, one of his interpreters, Benner, argues that he would have tried to rank 
the mundane legislative powers, of the people, over and above the equally mundane 
executive powers, of a prince. There is a kind of legislative, and deontic mode of 
authority that somehow restrains generals and magistrates—and prevents them from 
becoming oligarchs. Benner also could concur that the identity of the Great Legislator is 
never being revealed, at least not textually. Again, even the long-surviving constitutional 
laws of Lycurgus were eventually corrupted. Having been issued all at once, these laws 
ultimately failed because the people had not been disallowed from amending and 
adjusting them. Thus, not the temporal or constitutional singularity of the laws, at least 
not for Machiavelli, but the heightening of their deontic and their pluralist caliber is what 
creates better prospects for long-term survival. No single individual has ever mastered the 
art of creating incorruptible laws, for this reason, and the main reason Rome could have 
approximated such laws, is that its laws were ‘given’ by the many. Before she too 
degenerated, then, at least every Roman citizen is still believed “equally” capable of 
expressing his opinions on the laws. Only in Rome’s civil law-centric constitutional state, 
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in other words, is it the case the “the people [as a whole], having heard [the opinions or 
accusations from] both sides, may decide in favor of the best.”262 Yet, if Rome is 
incorruptible because she was governed by the people, who regularly amended her 
constitution, and diversified the duties of her officers, then what gave the Romans their 
confidence to all this so well?
It should be remembered that, in ancient Rome, legislation is adjudication. 
Legislative departments such as the Senate and the Tribunate were vested in an 
adjudicative and indeed retroactive function: in determining the Republic’s deontic 
purpose—so that their legislative actions were simply trusted to also have proactively 
transcended-and-yet-included any potential conflicts between executive powers or, so it 
was trusted by the many. The administration of laws was thus not only a utilitarian affair, 
but also has to be trusted to continue to cohere with some future and deontologically-
spiritualist public purpose. Therefore, as the above block-citation must be read, there 
simply is no single Exemplary Legislator who is both present in the past as well as in the 
future (not in Machiavelli’s Rome and not in the Renaissance world either, with a very 
small exception being tolerated for the Christian Mystics, such as Saint Francis: an 
exemplary natural law self-legislator).263
To summarize the above, everyone who has ever gained some name—in having 
founded a state, or in having amended a constitution—must have been someone who had 
successors, who would be able to sustain their work, with the ulterior support of the 
many. The Republic of Rome offers management lessons in the sense that Romulus 
required Numa to continue his work, and in the sense that Numa then himself required 
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the many to believe that their concept of the good (the gods) would be transcending even 
the division of powers, and even the executive guardianship of their own constitutional 
law, while also including his own guardianship. The formal guard of the Dictator, also, 
was included by this same paradoxical complex of private goods and prudence, or of both 
personal discretion and public constitutionality as well. The legislative power of the 
many can thus continue to be ranked far above the extra-legal powers of even the 
Dictator, as in fact all power for such an officer has be considered strictly nominal. The 
Dictator’s power is true power, because it is social power, and cannot be substantively 
individualized and singularized. Supreme power thus really involves a leap of faith 
towards the individual, and it was this leap that proved itself key to Rome’s executive 
power’s success. In short, in Machiavelli’s Rome the people as a whole would have been 
employed in piously dividing themselves up along plural, diverse, functional offices.
Citizens served not only as civil court-jurors but also as executors and in Rome’s 
“armies”—and, just as vitally, Rome would also never have opened her doors to 
“strangers”, so that neither a single ruler nor a foreign clique could ever dictate 
respectively her internal and her external affairs.264 Rather, the monarchical-senatorial or 
the executive order was made to coincide internally, so that it was their complex 
coincidence that breathed in a republican pluralism-principle, within the path of time’s 
arrow, as it were. This notion of path-dependency is the ultimate reason why not the 
oligarchs, but the many were believed responsible for sustaining the Republic’s original-
and-therefore-good laws. Further, only the many were here believed unwilling “to 
abandon” their best civil law traditions, so it hardly mattered which consul, general, or 
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which prince should execute their laws on their behalf.265 What matters, instead, is that 
the latter individuals would always try hard to appear to be siding with the many, rather 
than the few.
Who Legitimately Combines the Aristotelian Few with the Machiavellian Many?
Whose constitution might have managed to combine the hierarchical claims of the 
few, of Aristotle’s oligarchs, with the egalitarian tendencies of the many, and of 
Machiavelli’s people as a whole? That timeless question now becomes this one: in which 
respect were the exemplary executive officers in Machiavelli’s works also allowing their 
powers to coincide with those of the common people and their regulations? Was Rome’s 
form of a constitutional dictator really that different in comparison to the modern, liberal 
form of the executive branch?266 On condition that the supreme command over both the 
armies and the militias, or the highest executive office, can indeed be filled by a single 
person, and on condition that this person’s singularization of sovereignty becomes 
effective in terms of certain discretionary actions, then who is to judge whether such 
actions were either arbitrary or just, tyrannical or righteous? Aristotle and Rome’s Livy 
were not so far removed from modern democracies in that they confronted Machiavelli 
and his dialogical successors with the same question. This question may now be 
translated into the issue of who has greater virtuosity and judiciousness: those officers 
representing and serving the many, or those who represent the interests of the few? 
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From the above introductions to the Roman Republic, it was gazed that 
Machiavelli prefers such a translation to be as accurate and especially also as direct as 
possible, so that no oligarchy for the few can be created, and so that this single sovereign 
official can more easily be charged by the many (or: by the democratic forces) to only 
administer such laws as that they, all together, are willing to sustain—as being the 
popular and thus also the good laws. In short, it appears that the execution of war law and 
criminal law is to be concentrated in the office of a few supreme commanders, while the 
guardianship of the constitutional law itself is to be dispersed among pluralities of many 
citizens. Fascinatingly, the Secretary’s dualistic methodological distribution of public 
authority (as both held by many and by few) is reminiscent of Aristotle’s Politics’ choice 
of distribution, so that this text will now be read as an important source for additional 
answers.
Aristotle’s political theory is often being misunderstood. Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics are (probably too) frequently being cited, compared to Aristotle’s 
Politics, in attempts to classify various ethical actions as if they are also politically the 
most exemplary actions that Aristotle could have imagined. Of course, it should be 
acknowledged that Nichomachean Ethics is an important text because it positively-
defines those actions which betray the superior education and virtuous cultivation of the 
actor. In ordinary parlance, Aristotelianism must be said to treat virtue as a matter of 
cultivating a positively-valued taste: virtue is clearly open to training and cultivation—
rather than to indoctrination and misperception. Yet, as most tastes tend to do, they 
deteriorate. As Gilbert Ryle reads the text, deterioration of memory could mean that 
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virtue “can be lost”—just as that “[m]ost grown-ups have lost the enthusiasm for playing 
hide-and-seek, and some cease to enjoy tobacco and poetry.”267 Nonetheless, Ryle also is 
among the select scholars who rightly realize Aristotle never intended for virtue to be 
lost, deteriorate, or be forgotten. Virtue involves ethical judiciousness, as well, instead, or 
the permanent and near-to-innate capacity to distinguish right from wrong.
In the realm of action, Nichomachean Ethics identifies three human faculties: 
“sense perception; understanding; desire.” On the theoretical premise that “desire” may, 
for the following moment, be taken out of this triadic truth, it can already be concluded 
that from this point onwards only the bodily senses and mental understandings must 
remain. Both body and mind, or both passion and reason, in again other words, are the 
two faculties through which all humans learn, and learn to cultivate virtue. As the passage 
in Ethics continues, virtue is experienced by those making the decision to somehow 
equate passion to reason. “[V]irtue of character is a state that decides”, furthermore. 
Therefore, any decision has to be recognized as exemplary and excellent whenever the 
reasoning that preceded the decision itself was equated to the passion or the interest that 
motivated this decision in the first place. This move, or this equation conveys two 
additional sub-points.
First, virtue involves a decision which involves a legitimate actor. Hence, virtue 
involves active-executive rather than strictly legislative authority. Second, the notion of 
equation itself does not have to mean, as has sometimes been assumed (mistakenly, 
however), that reason and passion should be identical. If they were identical, then all 
decisions would be right and just. There would also be no time’s arrow, because applying 
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reason to passion would no longer demand any difference between the a priori
expression of passion and any a posteriori applications of reason and commonsense to 
that expression. Past and future would collide, at least in this case that they were assumed 
identical and of the same mental disposition. In any event, it is more likely that 
Aristotle’s notion of reason is a matter of execution and application than that it is a matter 
of being exactly the same as his notions of passion and sense experience. Without any 
structural tension between the two, there would be no need to theorize the dynamical 
learning, or the imitative process.
Aristotle must have grasped the importance of time’s arrow, although he rarely 
spells out what he meant to say about the arrow. Yet, the Philosopher does find that 
reason has to be have been steeped in past experiences. While passion tends to be 
proactive, reason always also seems to be retroactive as well. He quite clearly added to 
the above that any decision will either (mostly) have  been infused with “desire”, or it 
will (mostly) have to be combined with “understanding” and “thought”; “and this 
[contingent coincidence of both] is the sort of principle that a human being is”.268
Aristotelianism has proven to be one of the most influential theoretical methods of 
treating politico-ethical questions, infusing the work of Aquinas as well as of most 
natural law scholars. According to many interpreters of the Aristotelian method, such as 
Hans Kelsen, this method consists at its core of the finding and calculating of the mean 
between facticity and ideality. Kelsenian Aristotelians would thus be thinking themselves 
capable of situating virtuous actions in between the passion and reason or, more 
precisely, in between the facts of life (Sein) and how the political self should be living its 
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life (Sollen). That is, the virtuous decision is to be found in the exact middle between 
right and wrongs, justice and injustices, or between excessive opportunism and moderate 
assertiveness (public courage) as well. Under a Kelsenian interpretation, indeed, the 
virtue of justice would be the golden mean, the result of splitting the difference between 
the extremes.269
Kelsen writes that Aristotle intended to use his equation as the mean average,  as 
he would have developed a “method of determining the moral good or virtue as a quasi 
mathematical-geometrical operation”. “To determine the good is ... the same problem as 
to determine the middle point of a straight line”—Kelsen notes.270 Were this Kelsenian-
Aristotelian method applied to the study and theory of constitutions, then each individual  
constitutional power should be said to oscillate between right and wrong, corruption and 
moderation. The just decision-maker is someone who, like Kelsen writes, will exactly 
determine on which middle level the oscillations can be found to have reached a perfect 
equilibrium. A perfectly stable state is a just state, yet the assumption must be that right 
and wrong and justice and injustice are situated on a transitive continuum. The most 
stable point, in the middle of the line, may only be determined and may only be used as 
guide for action if there is no qualitative difference between the extremes and if all 
possible points are connected along the same line.
In taking a few steps back, and in returning to the question of what it is that makes 
the state into a sovereign state, the great personality suddenly becomes a much more 
critical figure. On the assumption that Kelsen has been entirely correct about what it 
means to apply the Aristotelian method, Machiavelli might have been applying this 
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method in assigning the political spill function—of determining the constitutionally 
proper middle point between few patricians and many plebeians—to a figure such as 
either a Lycurgus, a Romulus, or a Moses. These figures would have, even though 
rhetorically and ideal-typically, symbolized what it means to split the difference between 
the few and the many. On the same assumption, as well, Machiavelli’s ‘great statesmen’ 
were capable of assigning justice because they were no longer searching but because they 
had already found the middle way. Their judicial organizations were then somehow 
anterior to their decisions and their characteristic virtues, such as justice. According to 
Kelsen, briefly, an exemplary statesman or a good judge will have to rely on this type of 
‘neo-Aristotelian’ convention.
In stark contrast to the above (essentially Kelsenian) reading of Machiavelli, 
Femia reads him to have found that “[t]he ‘middle way’ is to be studiously avoided”.271
So, with Femia, why does Machiavelli never seem to adhere to the Kelsenian method? Is 
it true that not only Machiavelli, but that even Aristotle himself, perhaps, understands the 
popular guardianship over the civil laws and over the legal parity principles, to be 
anterior to the executor-administrator of justice as well as to the singular decision-making 
judicial organization of the state? Or, to appropriate another legal theorist’s words, does 
Machiavelli perhaps not simply understand “arbitration [to be] anterior to judicial 
organization[?]”272 And, before answering these questions, what is really at stake?
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Recapitulation: Realism’s Elimination of Third-Power Politics in ‘Bush v. Gore’
Political realism is one of several methods of inquiry into sovereign authority’s 
ultimate two-dimensionality. In comparison to other methods, realism provides more aid 
to IR practitioners and other analysts: it provides them with extra reasons against 
monistic sovereignty. This means that a country’s sovereignty should not only be 
recognized on grounds such as a unified population or territorial integrity, but that there 
is another reason to consider: how legitimate is the, usually tense, relationship between 
constitutional and governmental authorities? The realist argument holds that differences 
within this relationship should be respected. More specifically, realists observe the need 
for both a rational or constitutionally-transcendent purpose (a sustainable peace or a just 
war cause, for example), in one dimension, as well as the empirical instrumentality of 
structural and governmental powers (decisions contingently-formed by tactical 
necessities), in the other dimension.273 The now-to-be-examined two spokes, in a larger 
dialogical wheel, consist of a recap of the realist argument as well as of a case-study 
(presented in order to test that argument), of the 2000 American Presidential election.
First, to recapitulate, realism inquires into how sovereignty emerges from a 
dynamical intensity between two qualitatively-different powers. These powers maintain 
the structural balances between, and the allocations of many desires and interests. But the 
powers themselves may also be used by conflicting parties in all sorts of historically-
contingent manners, so that it can be said that these parties are ultimately believed 
responsible for a transcendent organizational closing of the balances and allocations they 
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include. Any shift in the balance of powers, or any change in the status quo-distribution 
of powers, thus, may be attributed to (and may be religiously believed to be) the work of 
transcendent sovereign authorities. Even in times of peace, these authorities can be 
believed to somehow maintain the agonistic and inherently unstable self-organizing 
relationship between the two powers. Henceforth, the gist of the realist method of inquiry 
is that structurally different and contrary powers must be presumed to relate to one 
another—through the organized relation and intensity perhaps better known as equal 
sovereignty.
Furthermore, compared to legal positivists, political realists read Aristotle to have 
been an agonistic theorist—and to have been better attuned to the struggle within 
constitutional polities than often presupposed.274 His Politics made the legitimate, or 
virtuous interdependence of contrary powers audible. On that note, the abstract values of 
the educated few as well as the concrete virtues and interests of the many were said to 
remain interdependent. With Aristotle’s voice in mind, that is, but also by continuing to 
listen to Meinecke, advanced realists may argue that national and socially-constructed 
identities are abstractions.275 Which is the cause why they should neither be separated 
from, nor be collapsed onto the many concrete differentials that often isolate personal 
qualities and that even can force individuals to compete only for their economic interests. 
The virtue of a national or a political identity expresses itself firstly in an action, in an 
animated decision, although that decision may secondly always be contradicted by 
abstract volitions or by a general will (the ‘will’ functions herein as an interest, desire, or 
a need).
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In listening to Aristotle and his negative definition of virtue (being neither entirely 
concrete, nor only abstract), realist statespersons will realize that they have to push 
themselves to remain prudent. And with Machiavelli, also, they will have to learn to 
anticipate that in order for any state to be recognized on the basis of its concrete qualities 
and unique material interests, to be understood in terms of its political self-sustainability, 
its agents should always try to act as decisively as possible against irrational, 
immoderate, or unjust expressions of socio-economic interests. Arendt has argued, after 
all, it would be erroneous for any state agents—including ordinary citizens—to 
apathetically presuppose they are normatively disabled, and that they are somehow being 
ideologically prevented from, building “a world for their posterity, ... to outlast their own 
mortal lives.”276 Alternatively, citizens should act as realist statespersons who believe in a 
prior-constituted transcendent purpose, or in some peaceful sort of natural law, which 
they all have in common with those future generations that depend on them to renew and 
restore their own beliefs in that purpose.277
Second, the difference between Machiavellian realism, on one hand, and 
Kelsenian and Montesquieuan liberalism, on another hand, will now be examined by 
means of a brief analysis of the legal case in which the U.S. Constitution was understood 
to be formed on the basis of three separate powers, rather than of only two qualitative 
powers and one third mode of adjudicative authority. Machiavellian realism shall be 
shown to undercut this liberal understanding of (American) constitutionalism, mainly by 
eliminating the liberal need for a third organizational power. The complex relationship 
between the two contrary powers, which is fundamental to any human constitutional 
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structure, should according to realism be a relationship from which authority merely 
emerges rather than that it should separate itself in the form of a third power.
Yet, liberally-oriented analysts have normally defined constitutionalism’s higher 
purpose to be a real power. They define the constitutional state in terms, then, of the 
concrete power of a neutral third party or an independent judiciary. Liberal analysts often 
view it as their task to forge some shared social identity or a single collective interest, for 
example, in order to strengthen a unified nation-state. They assume that, in this process, 
the opposing parties can reach a middle ground. The parties adjacent to this ground will 
have to reach a consensus, and create a middle power in order to arbitrate their 
differences. This liberal assumption must also hold, therefore, that all parties will firstly
be interested in their own socio-economic, and only secondly also in their legal equality. 
But, as will be argued, Machiavelli appeals primarily to a politically sustainable, and only 
secondarily to a socio-economically egalitarian constitution of powers. He thereby 
appeals to a spirit of civic-mindedness, or to participatory reasoning—rather than to the 
need for equal liberties or, also, rather than to any other neutral rights-protection régime. 
Against the conventional assumption, as shall now be detailed, Machiavelli’s Aristotle 
(as opposed to Kelsen’s Aristotle) best aids realism in invalidating liberalism’s tripartite 
power scheme.
In his dissent to the Bush v. Gore decision, which ended the 2000 presidential 
election process, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens wrote that “the identity of the loser 
is perfectly clear.” To express his disagreement with the way the winner, Bush, had been 
selected, by his Supreme Court colleagues in the majority, he designated “the nation’s 
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confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law” as the election’s real 
loser. The federal courts, he argued, had had no business in determining the outcome of 
the State of Florida’s vote tallies. By having stepped behind the people’s back—or, by 
having diminished their “confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state 
judges”—the petitioners (and the majority of Stevens’s colleagues) had allowed the 
federal government to tilt the constitutional balance.278 The antagonistic attitudes of both 
the Republic Party (favoring candidate George W. Bush) as well as the Democratic Party 
(candidate Albert Gore), in brief, had not raked up this election’s legitimacy deficit: it 
was the federal judiciary itself.
To recognize the difference between illegitimate and legitimate modes of federal 
authority is to recognize constitutional self-moderation: it demands juridical temperance. 
In the case of Bush v. Gore, the federal government lost its legitimate authority by 
preventing the people themselves from organizing a “constitutionally adequate recount” 
of the (disputed) ballots. By simply calling such a recount “impractical”, the federal court 
system was making “an untested prophecy”, wrote dissenting Justice Ginsberg. It was 
acting imprudently. The agonistic intensity between the parties was being channeled 
unwisely, as the Supreme Court’s majority sided neither with the Presidency nor with the 
Congress, but with a faction—against a now merely semi-sovereign people.
Stevens and Ginsberg, as well as Souter and Breyer, hardly disagreed with the 
majority’s calling the 2000 election an event of an “uniquely important national 
interest.”279 Their dissents demonstrated that no national and no federal governmental 
interest should be believed identical to the political and constitutional purposes of the 
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country as a whole. Every interest is part of an open-ended structure, rather, that includes 
the federal government and the courts as well. Or, even the meaning of ‘the’ national 
interest can be moralized and can be opened up, and closed off, by particular parties and 
factions. This reality makes it absolutely impossible to ascribe one meaning, over and 
above another meaning, to the “national interest”—unless a third criterion might have 
been recognized of prudence (of moderation, restoration, and self-aware balancing).
The dissenters on the Supreme Court were acting as Machiavellian/Arendtian 
realists: they found that the constitutional law tradition adequately prohibits the Court’s 
own interferences in politically-organized relationships, rather than in some partisan or in 
some civil law-structured intransigent conflicts. To be precise, federal courts have no 
business deciding State-organized elections, for only the States are political organizations 
responsible to the people as a whole. In this sense, conflicts between the States or 
between the States and the federal government ultimately cannot be decided by the 
Supreme Court alone. Rather, the States should in such conflicts try to consult the 
legislative power—which happens to be their own extraordinary power of being able to 
represent the wills of a plurality of ordinary American voters.
Especially from an Arendtian perspective, as Bonnie Honig sees it (she actually 
spreads less of Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution than of a message from Franz 
Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption), the tension between the Court decision and the 
norm of representative pluralism is a tension worthy of awe and respect. Because the 
tense relation between decision and norm, or between the federal courts and the States, 
could be interrupted, it should be understood as a fragile and agonistic relation. 
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Nevertheless, awe and dignity and authority may all emerge from  contingent 
intensifications of the relation. This possibility of emergent authority, hence, is inspired 
by the tension between the status quo government’s adjudicative-interpellate power and a 
prophesized popular counter-interpellation believed to be offering “the balancing 
perspective of a life lived otherwise”.280
Had the voters believed, and had they told themselves the story that they were 
going to act in concert—potentially by refusing jury duty, going on strike, and by 
assembling in their roles as ultimate constituents rather than only as individual voters, 
and to at least be able to form such counter-interpellate protest movements until the votes 
had been accurately recounted, for example—then that story would have been “an 
interruption” of the “binary of norm-exception itself”. Their exemplarily interruptive 
story, Honig adds, would have been about a miracle, signaling to “the people’s role in 
popular prophecy—and [to] the central importance of their receptivity to [state] 
power.”281
Not the courts, but rather the voters and the electors, who are ultimately all 
equally beholden to their own sovereign States, should believe they can make a 
miraculously exceptional decision. The electors and the American people can come to 
such a decision if they stand in a sufficiently ambivalent tension towards the States’ 
representatives in the legislatures and in the U.S. Congress. The people should believe 
themselves sufficiently capable of recognizing the validity of (and of justly deciding on) 
federal electoral outcomes. Honig’s concept of the prophetic people, acting as a concerted 
whole, sustains the ambivalent relation between electors and electees, as well as between 
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the conventional norm and the popularly-experienced possibility to decide on the 
exception to that norm. The “interruption” Honig imagines cannot be found at the middle 
point within this relation, and therefore also not by depending on norms set forth solely 
within juristic state assemblages or similar legal-technocratic organizations. Instead, the 
relation is to be interrupted, so that a voiding of such assemblages remains within the, 
however miraculous, realm of actual possibilities. That sort of interruption itself is to be 
decided, more critically, by a prudent application of (Arendtian) methods of 
recognition—particularly because such methods have to consist of strikes, marches, 
boycotts, and non-violent resistance. Methods of recognition, involving recognitions of 
legitimate authority, thus, tend to consist of popular and concerted assessments of how 
aspiring electees, or how the campaign teams and the political parties, rather, are 
substantively agreeing to disagree. This kind of agreement to disagree is ultimately not to 
be assessed as a procedural, legal, or juristic-technical but as a substantive political-
constitutional agreement—which derives its meaning from ‘the prophetic story people are 
telling all of each other’. That story is about the utilitarian possibility to make an 
exception, in order to affirm the deontologically direct relationship between the American 
constituents and their state’s constituted, executive powers—rather than that, as it in fact 
came to do, this story would have to be about their individually sharing in a supposedly 
identical (national) interest.
The paradox of politics holds that the relation between people and state, between 
legislation and adjudication and execution, must be contingent. The stability and the 
intensity of that constitutionally ambivalent relation must contingently depend on a 
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specific kind of actions and interruptions (or: “interpellations”, as both Althusser and 
Honig think is the right word).282 Whether it makes sense for any adjudicator, mediator, 
or for any specific political party to try break up the directly self-binding (self-concerted) 
relationship between the people and their state government, for as long as that that court’s 
or that party’s formal duties consists of remaining independent of that self-binding 
relationship, is thus something that cannot be assessed—or, at least, not unless the 
contingency and potential of the relationship itself would have been taken into full 
account. As the four dissenters in Bush v. Gore already quintessentially clarified, it is not 
their task to interpellate on that relationship, but the whole people’s. It would be a great 
wrong if they began to see themselves responsible for either breaking apart of for 
mending the relationship—even if such decisions were to take place in cognizance of 
their own Supreme Court’s most-fully neutral, intermediary, and most-perfectly 
independent (Kelsenian) basic norms.
Yet, classicist realism should be granting the five U.S. Justices in the majority that 
they were correct in their finding that the electors are actually not consisting of an 
integrated group of people, but of the States. After all, the States are being represented by 
the Electoral College. Through this indirect system of representation, the electors have 
organized themselves to create disproportional margins for the victors. The States have 
been arranged as ‘winner-take-all’ districts, so that each district’s elector’s functional 
responsibility is to help create a ‘zero-sum’ outcome. The Electoral College’s design 
neutralizes the direct relationship between the people’s ultimate legislative and the state’s 
supreme executive power (between constitution and government, in other words). Yet, 
775
this sense of the Electoral College’s own partisanship still does not have to mean that the 
States are not also primordially being represented in Congress. Pointing to the Electoral 
College’s intermediary status, as the Court majority did, can only be done to validate the 
idea that the electors are simply not identical, and are not even beholden, to neither the 
individual voters nor to the parties supporting the individual presidential candidates. The 
point is well-taken, thus, only if it is understood to mean that the electors (including any 
possible institutional variants of electoral colleges) are to think themselves primarily 
loyal to the constituencies, the States, rather than to federal courts and departments.
Realists such as Honig, but also such as Schmitt, would argue that the States themselves 
do not need to remain neutral, but are free to be representing the votes of the sovereign 
people in any way they wish to determine—within the bounds of federal election laws. 
Because these laws have been made by the U.S. Congress, in this case, however, any 
pointing to the responsibility of the Electoral College to decide an election must be 
considered moot. Only Congress represents the sovereign people, and their legislative 
power, ultimately, so Congress should be interpellating as much as that the people do—
even if it concerns an interpellation on the adjudicative-executive power. In brief, the 
Court’s majority was probably right to find the Constitution simply “does not grant the 
people of the United States the right to vote for the electors; [t]he States can choose the 
electors any way they want”—as one commentator summed up the Court’s majority’s 
position.283 Nonetheless, even then, this finding is irrelevant. The equal sovereignty of the 
States should primarily have been recognized to be a direct relation between the 
prophetic story of the acting people, first, and the equal representation of the States in the 
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U.S. Congress, second. It is this dual relation that epitomizes public legislative 
authority—and, even though the relation contains a void, is is only this relation that can 
provide a normative balance against the executive discretion of the Electoral College, and 
perhaps only afterwards also inside the federal court system.
To interject a theoretical question: could a legal positivism-oriented interpretation 
not nonetheless have assisted the dissenters in Bush v. Gore? Could a more positivist line 
of interpretation not have been instrumental in giving the American people additional 
confidence in the federal magistrates, and other such executive office-holders? A 
positivist interpretation of the case would be absolutely certain: this type of interpretation 
would dismiss both as illogical and illiberal the entire idea of a potentially miraculous, 
yet natural-legislative or systematic-regulative balance between the norm and potentially-
made decisions, including any decision on the exceptions to the norm.
David Dyzenhaus comes pretty close to taking this positivist line, as he argues 
(although not in the Bush v. Gore context, but in reviewing Bonnie Honig’s book), that 
the concept of a void, within the self-balancing relation of contrary powers: (1) should be 
rejected because it seems better, to him, to be accepting Carl Schmitt’s own impression 
“that the exception is [identical to] the norm”, as if it is a far more valid impression of the 
tense relation between decisions on the exception and those on the norm; (2) is a concept 
that should not be applied to be justifying the use of the legislative power, by the state, 
“as an instrument toward illiberal ends”. To add up points (1) and (2), the concept of the 
void simply should never index a paradox of the political. The liberal state of Dyzenhaus 
cannot be divided by two different and mutually-opposing powers. The only thing this 
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liberal constitutional state—which is a state that may offer third-party judiciary reviews, 
of all legal norms—can validly authorize is the use of power in accordance to legislation: 
the exception-decision must accord, and perhaps even be identical to the legal norm. This 
leads, of course, to a third-powered collapsing of the legislative onto the executive 
powers. In fact, this adjudicative act of collapsing is what every liberal-democratic state 
not only may but also should be trying to do. Realists would be wrong, therefore, to only 
apply their concept of a void to cases in which they think the “blessing of legal 
authorization is [instead being] bestowed on the legally uncontrollable exercise of 
discretion”.284
Ellen Kennedy indicates that, specifically in Honig’s 2009 book, “something 
crucial about [the] agony ... experienced by a whole people has been lost or forgotten.”285
But Dyzenhaus would not be able to agree with Kennedy’s suggestion that perhaps Honig 
insufficiently allowed the people as a whole to transcend, and yet remain agonistically 
related to their own more or less discrete and discretionary government institutions. Such 
a paradoxical void between popular authorization, first, and uncontrolled government 
discretion, second, is—from the viewpoint taken by Dyzenhaus—not only an illiberal 
void. To him, it is something deeply illegitimate and unethical as well. He indeed finds 
that the balance of legality and discretion, and of norm and exception, is to remain an 
intrinsically lawful or an intra-juristic balance—primarily because it will have to remain 
“subject to review and revision”. But does review itself not imply the presence of a third 
power, or a neutral intermediary other than any discretionary institutions and thus also 
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other than both administrative departments as well as legal courts?286 Like Kelsen, 
Dyzenhaus never argues who the third reviewer should be—other than a court.287
Dyzenhaus supposes that there is a third intermediary power which both could 
never and should never be formed by a self-legislative, proactive, and possibly 
miraculous power: by the non-dual powers of the people as a whole. His supposition is 
thus that the balance of powers should be situated along a continuum: the balance 
between executive and legislative powers is merely a separation, in fact, because the two 
powers can be identical in terms of their qualities: they should be identical in terms of on 
straight line of lawfulness and legitimacy, connecting them. Without a void between the 
qualitatively-different executive and legislative powers, positivists like Dyzenhaus must 
argue that the complexity of law/power consists of one continuous line. It runs straight 
from the law’s excessive normativity towards power’s absolute decisionism.288 The 
argument is similar to Kelsen’s maneuvering.
Kelsen drew the line of law/power by synthesizing both ends, so that they would 
form one basic norm. The basic law transcends, and yet separates itself from any 
decisions of power. The decisions, whether they are exceptions to the state’s hierarchy of 
legal norms or not, are all to be taken by a unified state—governed by one norm. In this 
state, Dyzenhaus argues, the judges can be trusted to remain “committed to liberal 
legalism”.289 Kennedy accuses his neo-Kelsenian “legalism”, however, of taking a too 
restricted view: those who take this view (a group which could even include Honig, 
Kennedy hints) too often content themselves to have declared “emergency a ‘paradox’ 
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and leave theory at that, [whereas Negri] ... pushes [political theory] ... to acknowledge 
the contradiction as real.”290
The problem with neo-Kelsenian views is that they imagine no “contradiction” 
between the authority of law (autonomy) and the authority of power (supremacy). 
Magisterial authority forms in their books very much an independent, unbiased, third 
power: in a Kelsenian court, power is its own source of authority. There is no void 
between the court’s official modes of authority (autonomous courts), first, and any of the 
structurally-flawed partisan powers of the wider world (supreme and subordinate 
powers), second. Instead, magisterial authority may somehow be deduced and derived 
from concrete conflicts and existential power differentials—by simply following the 
highest legal norm of a unified society. In the position opposite to these views, however, 
(Schmittian) realism holds that even the most-basic legal norm must have been derived 
from a series of verdicts situated within particular subordinations, power differentials, 
and socio-economic prejudices. Jurisprudence is not impartial. Any legal norm has 
ultimately been derived in accordance to a structural difference in power allocations, 
rather than only from a single “logic of normative predicates”. Hence, Kelsen’s “deontic 
logic” remains open to self-interested interpretations—which are probably being 
professed by those with the most political power, as Bobbio writes. He adds that Kelsen’s 
confidence in the basic norm excludes too many consequentialist considerations and 
other anticipations of value differentials. Kelsen too studiously “avoided value 
judgments: [he has] ... constructed a juridical system that could be filled with any 
780
[normative] content. [His positivist theory of] ... law can be applied to both the United 
States and the Soviet Union—to totalitarian systems and to democratic ones.”291
Bobbio is correct about legal positivism’s failure to recognize the political 
concreteness of its own sources of validity. There is no legal norm which is not somehow 
being contradicted by (not ever-higher legal norms but) concrete structures of 
government. Honig properly adds that there is no meaningful legal norm without the 
“fecundity of undecidability”, just as that there is no meaningful “daily rule-of-law-
generated struggle” without political tensions between qualitatively-differently-
functioning powers. Human actors will have to believe they can organize themselves and 
that their subsequently-organized constituent powers can eventually become responsible 
for the concrete “regulating, commanding, and policing that the rule of law postulates”.292
But Kennedy seems to want to radicalize both Bobbio’s and Honig’s realisms by 
returning to Negri, who foresees a permanent revolution: the constituent power of the 
human actor continually collapses into, and yet triumphs over the world’s concretely-
constituted powers. In that eternal moment, “political liberation and economic 
emancipation are one”.293
Theoretically, it is unnecessary to radicalize political realism as it stands. Realism 
cannot be faulted for not trying to synthesize politics and economics, as it may at any 
time open new inquiries into the possibility that economic interests are corrupting 
politicians. Realism may inquire into the chances that no legal norm, and no moral 
justification would be adequate to counter a process of corruption. Hence, it is possible to 
think of conditions in which there is and should be no synthesis: in which qualitative 
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contrariness remains between concrete interests and abstract morals, or between derived 
and basic norms, also. Whereas the positivists objectify the law’s normative universality, 
realists express caution about particular contingent appropriations of even the law itself—
for a more or less symbolically-meaningful transcendent purpose. Liberal positivists may 
have good reasons to deny the validity of a symbolically-transcendent purpose, but they 
are unlikely to account for the merely sensory spontaneity and the intuited religiosity 
inherent to this purpose. Whenever positivists admit to the existence of a purpose beyond 
the basic norm, this purpose turns from wine into water; it turns from a spiritual into a 
material and from a solitary into a solipsistic quality of the law. This turn creates a self-
validating normative hierarchy, but it cannot sustain the tension between spiritual-
legislative and material-executive powers. Realists can remind them, nonetheless, of the 
harsh fact that human suffering is extraordinarily intense and deeply ambivalent: the 
agonistic tension between human powers simply cannot be eliminated. As Paulson 
reminds Kelsen’s positivist followers, his theory of law wrongly denied “the very 
possibility of any [dual relation] ... between facticity and normativity, between human 
being and ‘imputative’ legal [norms]”.294
Schmitt critiques Kelsen by restoring the tension between norm and fact or 
respectively, also, between rule and discretion. Kelsen’s objective norm (Grundnorm) 
was intended to follow from Kant’s categorical imperative. But even if that basic norm 
was given by God, it would still not be universally and objectively applicable. The 
Kelsenian conception of justice would have to be capable of explaining every fact, as it 
uses the facts to derive the norms from these facts. But no plurality of existing norms can 
782
be singularized to the extent that each norm will have been matched to its own point 
along a continuous line of facts. Kelsenian positivism mistakenly presupposes, then, that 
the ground-norm manages to retain its singularity. As well, it presupposes that all the 
derived legal norms can stick to this one ground-norm, because adjudicators and 
legislators are sufficiently rational in comparing the norms to the facts of each case.
Rawls argued that every citizen may act as her own legislator, and may seek legal 
recourse when needed, so that both the civic-legislative and the civic-constituent power 
will have been fused together—in a just world. Kelsen argued a similar case: the 
hierarchy of all possible legal values can be grounded in one normative imperative, so 
that the citizen’s confidence in the legislative process will result from another and more 
factual hierarchy of constituent powers. In this ideal world, neither for Rawls nor for 
Kelsen, there is no political intensity left within the complex relation between the legal 
values and the factual conditions of the state’s constituency. In this seemingly just world, 
thus, as Schmitt figured out, there can be “no transcendent subject of pouvoir constituant, 
no natura naturans, no eminent legislator to which the state’s highest authority [may] ... 
be traced [back].”295
Positivism has no account of any “transcendent subject” whom people will 
believe ultimately responsible for restoring the IR system: for its self-organizational 
functions. Positivism in IR threatens to eliminate the tensions within this “transcendent 
subject”, and thus fails to admit to the existence of a dual sovereign subject. By 
singularizing legal norms, it ends up singularizing nation-states even though—in 
empirical reality—there are no singularly-unified states. Sovereign states are far more 
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porous, as their authorities are often intermingled through the primacy of their foreign 
policies, than is so often being imagined by liberal positivists. Empirical studies show 
that statespersons not only seek to be legitimized in reference to a domestic process of 
reasonable law-and-order-structuring, but that they also seek to maintain their authority in 
relationship towards equals beyond and outside their own states. As positivists fail to 
analyze this relationship of equal sovereignty, they are failing to identify a natural and 
self-regulative dynamic—as well as a dynamic of how authorities ultimately are believed 
to emerge from cross-tied human groupings bearing both legislative as well as executive 
powers.
The hypothesis of this section is that neo-Kantian liberals have less ground to 
stand on, than realists, whenever a systemic break-down occurs—in domestic politics as 
well as in foreign policies. One such a break-down occurred during the 2000 election 
cycle—in which the people, as a whole, seized to fulfill their role as eminent legislators. 
This caused an imbalance between the executive-adjudicative power (government) and 
the people’s exceptional-legislative power (constitution). These two components of 
sovereignty, in other words, were being surgically separated before the Supreme Court 
(although not by the hands of the dissenters). This led to a systemic failure in the sense 
that the natural tension between two different powers had been lost, and no authorization 
could ensue from this tension. Hence, the George W. Bush administration would be 
mired by legitimization crises because it had never respected the tension between the 
legislative-normative and the executive-decisive powers, allowing the latter to undermine 
the former.
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The DST helps defend the above-presented hypothesis in that it compares the 
balance between the two constitutional powers of government to a dynamic balance 
analogous to the one between the two human faculties of rule-based reasoning and sense-
based intuitions. The duality of legislation/execution is an analogy for the system of 
reason/sense (or, as well, of rationality/practicality, justice/prudence, and 
government/constitution). In this respect, the DST should be consulted in order to 
illuminate why the state ought to be guarded by the plurality of natural-born electors as 
opposed to by a basic norm. Pro-DST realists have grounds to advise the  authorities to 
take a stewardship role and to help guard the balance between their original legislative 
authority (as originating and organized in a popular whole) against the executive-
adjudicative structures of power (as identified and regulated by institutions, interests, and 
norms). In moments of crisis it should become apparent that the electors and their 
descendants, by grace of their own ambivalent human nature, believe that they 
themselves are defined as the sovereigns. By contrast, the functions of the electees are 
then likely said to be defined—as the electees themselves have now been chosen less in 
accordance to statutory law than because of a societal or a treaty organization—by a 
wholesome plurality of people.
It cannot be denied that the U.S. Constitution suggests the electees should be 
elected by the States and by their Electoral College, rather. But this suggestion itself 
already sufficiently implies that the sitting electees as well as any prospective electees are 
to bind their wills to those of the sovereign people, as represented by the States, before 
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that they may try to collect the will to administer the decision of any third party, 
including any high court.
Any realist calculation of how the risk of a constitutional break-down should be 
lowered, to conclude, ought to demand a clear presentation of the complex coincidence of 
both (rather than a clear choice between) orderliness and chaos, or in this case also 
between the national interest (the necessity of having an active executive officer) and 
Election Day’s chaotically-made choices by individual voters (their electoral freedom). 
Necessity and freedom continuously coincide, and in matters of popular sovereignty, 
decisions should always fall out—at least if taken within any natural law paradigm—in 
favor of pluralism and publicality, and therefore also in favor of free voter choice.296
Second, and more critically, when everything else hangs in the balance, the choice will 
have to be made to directly consult the States, which are really legislatively-sovereign 
groups of people, possibly organized through popular assemblies, before also executing 
the third and intermediary power of any court verdict. Only in this critical manner can 
ambivalent authority be legitimately restored.
The (IR) theoretical repercussion of the Bush v. Gore case study is that 
ambivalent authority can very well be re-analyzed, and be reframed in terms of the DST 
(dual sovereignty thesis). Norms and decisions can coincide, can can productively 
coincide within DST systems. In the context of systemic bifurcations and social 
differentiations, the DST aids in weighing off positivist against negativist interpretations 
of the ethical functioning of government, then, as it can be used to discover fallacies such 
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as Kelsen’s legal positivism’s fallacious assuming there is only a continuum or only a 
quantitative difference between norms and decisions.
On one hand, legal positivist (Kelsenian) interpretations emphasize that decisions 
and verdicts are derivatives created from basic norms. But because these interpretations 
fail to see any qualitative difference between decision and norm, they tend to prioritize an 
ideal decision-maker’s executive authority. Due to this comparatively greater importance 
of the executive, but also of magisterial government functions, legal positivists must 
almost automatically de-emphasize the legislative significance of apparently randomly-
drawn votes—and of the use of lotteries to select office-holders and jurors as well. In 
voting processes, positivists also tend to prefer equal liberty over equal merit, and 
individual interest over personal virtue. On the other, negativists tend to want to 
publically restrict the individual’s liberties. They often deny there is any validity to the 
idea that the individual is free to choose her representatives, and that the state is 
ultimately sovereign in terms of who represents whose interests. States have the 
legitimate responsibility to limit opportunities to those who desire to come to hold office, 
and should carefully scrutinize candidates, for instance, or should be honoring only those 
candidates who wisely and actively participate in the public process.297 For realist 
negativists, then, there is a far greater premium to be placed on the productive relation 
between the plurality of voters and the State that represents their interests, than that there 
is for legal positivists.
Last, this theoretical distinction between positivism and negativism intersects with 
the old, Arendtian, philosophical distinction between respectively conventionalism and 
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nihilism. In again somewhat other words, political realism recognizes dual authority by 
drawing sharp distinctions between two types of methods: one method analyzes the 
distance between positively- and hierarchically-ordered legal norms; the other aids in 
assessing the qualitative difference between legal norms and concrete interests. 
Conventionalist positivists will mostly rely, in justifying power, on norm-based 
organizations such as courts and other intermediary associations, whereas skeptical 
negativists are more likely to defer to the concrete authority of the people as a whole. To 
conclude, negatively-formulated exceptions to legal norms may either be prudent and 
virtuous, or they may not be, but the proper difference between prudence and imprudence 
is in the final end still to be decided by an honoring of popular over partisan interests, and 
naturally also of recognizing plurality- over artificed singularity-principles. 
Introducing Rousseau’s Caring Third Magistrate: The Tribunate
Rousseau’s various political works were intellectually indebted to, and yet made a 
completely new case as compared to both Montesquieu’s and Machiavelli’s. Rousseau’s 
works have also continued to attract attention because they betray their perplexingly 
democratic-pluralist ambitions all the while embracing a sovereign-singularist power, 
executed by one supremely representational institution.298 That is, a strangely 
Machiavellian and certainly very ambitious plurality of wills, or all the wills of the two 
major elements, is at times, at least in these works, being regarded as a plurality that can 
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somehow be integrated with what seems to have been Montesquieu’s liberal mid-level’s 
will; the infamous general will. So, how is this integration to take place, and by whom is 
it to be institutionalized? Does the Rousseauan notion of integration create sustainable 
mid-level institutions, mirroring Rome’s Tribunes, perhaps, and are these indeed also 
representative of the general will?
Realism-inspiring theorists ranging from Aristotle to Machiavelli call for 
prudence in anticipation of constitutional tensions, and possibly also of discordant 
tumults between the democratic and the oligarchic government-organizing principles. 
However, as a modern liberal, it would be Montesquieu (followed by the American 
Framers) who most definitely implied that a constitution without such tumults will have 
to be one guarded by a single middle class—and therefore also much lesser by the 
democratic than by the oligarchical principles.
Rousseau agrees with each of his precursors, then, when he writes that 
democracy, taken by itself, would be too “liable to civil war”.299 Democracy reverts into 
a warring multitude, into a “blind multitude”, at least for as long as that it is not being 
guided and checked by a natural counterforce.300 Yet, for Machiavelli (and oftentimes for 
Hobbes as well) democracy should not as simply be believed to revert into such a violent 
and imprudent multitude. Its natural counterforce should therefore also not be an 
oligarchy, but should rather be the spiritual authority of the many and of a public plurality 
that includes the oligarchs as well as the democrats (see: Machiavelli’s intentions in the 
Discourses, but also Leviathan’s third part).
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Now, Rousseau especially agrees with Montesquieu, however, in recommending 
that the guides of the multitude and the protectors of democratic rights do not have to be 
democratically-selected themselves; they do not have to be beholden to Machiavelli’s 
popular ‘bottum-up’ pluralism. Rather, they may very well belong to a hereditary ‘top-
down’ aristocracy, even though he knows that this would have to be “the worst of all 
governments” (as Aristotle had already said about dynastical oligarchies as well, of 
course). Hence, he then concludes that (together with Montesquieu), preferably, the 
counter-part of democracy should be formed by an elective aristocracy, which he finds 
“the best.”301
To circumvent the dilemma of either getting stuck with a dynastical aristocracy or 
with an elected democracy, Rousseau’s The Social Contract appears to have vested the 
supreme responsibility for the self-regulation, and for the regulation of any constitutional 
tensions between democracy and aristocracy, in a third institution. Rousseauan 
responsibilities for self-moderation seem to have been given to a tertiary ‘compound 
person’, as it were. This ‘person’ should somehow be putting up a fence against 
democratic tendencies towards disorder, chaos, and civil war—preferably by managing 
aristocratic elections. Neither democratic nor oligarchical, then, this ‘person’ is still 
somewhat akin to the mysteriously idealistic Great Legislator, whose orders alone “can 
compel without violence.”302 To understand the meaning of that third institution, 
therefore, is to understand who this ideal-typical (and seemingly transmundane) 
Legislator ‘himself’ might have been. Is ‘he’ on the hand of the few, or the many, or of 
both?
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The figure of the Great Legislator and its general will has stood accused of being 
unrealistic, and even as uncaring, in ‘his’ relation to individual commoners and their 
fates. Yet, as an exemplar of human virtue, ‘he’ does seem more down-to-earth than is 
usually being realized. That is, even though Rousseau’s ideal Legislator usually appears, 
in the secondary literature, as standing above the laws. ‘He’ must for now be given the 
benefit of the doubt and be asked how ‘he’ expects to serve and guard the constitutional 
law tradition. The Great Legislator may issue commands, Rousseau replies, yet these 
cannot be thought to have any intrinsically constitutionally-corrupting effects on the 
natural order of men.303 The Legislator’s command responsibilities have been grounded 
both on his own ideal “nature, and [on] the constitution of the world, the physical order 
[he sees] … all around”.304 In other words, Rousseau grounds this Legislator’s 
sovereignty, essentially on ‘his’ own supra-societal nature and on the “nature of man … 
in society”, as Tzvetan Todorov’s reading helps clarify. Despite being very clear, 
however, even that reading still leaves open two possibilities. Either the Legislator is a 
figure whose power can be positivized, and whose ideal nature can be defined as forming 
a supra-societal set of legal norms, or ‘he’ functions as a negative examplar, 
demonstrating only what prudent statespersons should refrain from doing.
First, although it is hardly being spelled out in so many words in The Social 
Contract, the text does combine the dispositions and wills of multiple natural-born men, 
first, with one trans-generational and ideally-elected (aristocratically-compounded) 
Legislator. Yet, it often remains unclear, at least from the text of Social Contract itself, 
whether that Great Legislator represents either a middle way or an antinomy. If Rousseau 
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had been searching for a sovereign whose position was to mirror the neo-Aristotelian 
golden mean, then why should this perfect middle-point not turn into an antinomy? If the 
sovereign is indeed the positivized representative of the middle way, then legal positivists 
can claim Rousseau as one of their own. Specially Kelsen would then have been able to 
claim that the Legislator was never intended to serve as a third ‘person’ and should be 
deanthropomorphized—in order to be more accurately transformed into a ground-norm. 
On the assumption Kelsen could be correct in making precisely that claim, and if 
Rousseau had indeed understood the Great Legislator as an ideal ‘embodiment’ of a 
single ground-norm, however, then Schmitt would ask: who really decides on the 
meaning and purpose of this single norm? Or, who can really decide whether either a 
Kelsenian basic norm actually applies to Rousseau’s own vision of how concrete 
constitutional oppositions should be transcended, by means of such a norm, or that these 
oppositions continue to fester because all the norm can do is to help moderate them?
Second, another possibility might be that Rousseau’s design for his Great 
Legislator was inspired by Machiavelli’s ideal prince-legislator. The next-following 
section drives home the point, however, that this ideal prince never existed. It will be 
shown that even Lycurgus and Romulus were only individuals, whereas the actually 
foundational and the actually revolutionary modes of authority will always have been 
sustained through the judgments of a plurality of people. Only the many, and only the 
people speak with a divine voice, as Machiavelli added.305 Anyhow, it thus remains a 
possibility that Rousseau’s Legislator-design was based on a compounded ‘figure’ in 
order to give it such a voice. This voice expresses such authority, despite being so 
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ambivalent (pluralistic-and-yet-singular), that it facilitates constitutional integration 
without that the words it speaks can be positively defined. The Legislator speaks neither 
of legislation nor administration, neither of legal abstraction nor political concreteness, 
but only the incomprehensible language of a well-balanced and well-integrated 
constitution that mysteriously transcends both such contraries (and that, for Machiavelli, 
also spiritually integrates them).
To cut a long story short, Rousseau’s problem follows from the assumption that 
democracy creates civil war, but that this tendencies may be remedied by elections of the 
best gentlemen. Subsequentially, electoral aristocracy and representative democracy 
become identical, as there needs to be no tension between the two elements. 
Constitutional sovereignty has become monistic. If monism is a problem, which it is for 
DST realists, then this problem is now being enhanced, however, by the notion that 
without tension there will also be no need to believe in the authority of a singular state. 
All that remains are the elements, which disperse themselves again before the general 
will of the mythological Legislator. As Honig sees it, Rousseau’s complex Legislator 
must therefore have been based on the paradox of politics.306 Of course, Honig would be 
correct to find this paradox’s first premise holds that democratic men are civilized men in 
a counterintuitive way: they live in cities, which corrupts them and makes them prone to 
wage war. The second premise of the paradox holds also that, indeed, despite their 
civilizational accomplishments, these same men will continue to yearn for an uncorrupted 
identity. They realize they have long lost their unspoiled natural identity, and will thus 
continue to try to combine their civilized personalities with their original, natural state.307
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As Todorov adds, they seek to return, as it were, to naturally living their “life, in 
solitude”, and to continue to experience their sociable nature by means of only “some 
interaction with others.”308
To illuminate, moderately sociable beings must be respected as those humans who 
have learned to hold themselves back from their own corrupting (urban) tendencies, and 
to strive to again become more solitary (rural) beings. The ancient Roman peoples had 
still formed a class-less whole, in this aspect, as they would all equally have honored 
solitariness, austerity, and virtue—if Rousseau must be believed. “[T]he simple and 
laborious life of villagers was preferred to the loose and idle life of the Roman bourgeois, 
and a man who would have been nothing but a miserable proletarian in the town became 
as a tiller of the soil a respected citizen.” Servius, one of Rousseau’s ideal-typical Roman 
legislators, had additionally made a type of electoral reform possible that would honor 
rural virtues. Citizens were assigned to newly-created voter-districts, rather than that they 
continued to vote in accordance to ethnicity (“racial distinction”), which in turn shifted 
political leverage away from the “four urban tribes”; Severius had had good reason to 
have added “fifteen ... rustic tribes, because [the latter] were formed of inhabitants of the 
country, arranged in so many cantons.”309
Of course, it is the tragedy of Enlightenment politics that the modern bourgeois 
still desires to be like an ancient yeoman, but cannot succeed in fulfilling that desire. The 
moderns are doomed to fail: they simply cannot integrate their urban, social, and 
economic interactions with their rural, solitarily-developed, political philosophies. When 
Honig’s interpretation of Rousseau’s political theory detects another version of this same 
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paradox, the paradox itself is however also still being interpreted by her in the form of a 
pure dilemma, with only two premises. Contrary to Honig’s impression, it appears more 
than likely that Rousseau himself entered a third premise into his tragic account of human 
nature, now, which would have to have been his own premise of the void: the void left by 
that tragic failure to integrate the contraries that permeate both a class-based modernity, 
first, as well as the ancient and ideally class-less world of the Romans, second. Likewise, 
the organization of respectable as well as moderately sociable modes of authority is a 
process beholden to tragedy.
Rousseauan authority may only be actualized in the present-time, in the current 
civilizational time, even though it demands the solitariness and reflexive prudence of the 
forgone and less-corrupted time. Without possibility of politically analogously integrating 
the two moments, authority will have to be institutionalized in the form of a novel, third 
judiciary. The paradox is now apparently no longer a dilemma, but a trilemma; in being 
without the corrupting vices of sociability as well as being without the freedom of 
absolute solitude, who can possibly be responsible for integrating these opposite states—
and thereby also break the spell of the first two premises? As shall soon become apparent, 
it is from within the Great Legislator’s inner duality that a neither-positivist-nor-nihilist 
representation emerges: a third magistrate who is to be taking on the form of a Tribunate. 
But, how?
To circumvent the trilemma of his own making, of where sovereignty should 
ultimately be vested, Rousseau traces Montesquieu’s ideas about an intermediary level. 
Likewise, The Social Contract imagines this intermediary institution to be holding the 
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state’s third, adjudicative power. The notion of balanced relations, between contrary 
powers, oftentimes remain very obscure, in Social Contract, yet the text opts for a 
Tribunate—in Book 4, Chapter 5—as exemplifying the one intermediary power which 
relates to all the other powers. The Tribunate is not so much presented as the institution 
which exercises the legislative power as that it should hold a robust type of executive 
power, designed specifically in order to defend the constitution against its own 
corruption. In guarding the constitution, this robust power must be believed to be “more 
sacred and more venerated than the prince who executes law, or [than] the sovereign 
which legislates.” In ancient Rome, after all, the Tribunes had uniquely “wielded neither 
sacred nor legal authority”. Instead, their authority would have to have been situated 
exactly in the middle: in between, firstly, the legislative power of the (sovereign) people, 
or the electorate and, secondly, the executive but sacred power of their own (princely) 
government. (Rousseau does not waste time specifying whether their government also 
comprised any dynasties, princes, priests, consuls, dictators, and senators.) To reiterate, 
only the Tribunes had to have been selected by the common people to serve as 
intermediaries between themselves and their own government. That is, Rome’s Tribunes 
were very much like Sparta’s Ephors, in the sense that both types of officers had the 
most-venerable power of neither having to execute nor of having to legislate, but of 
moderating (adjudicating). In fact, as Rousseau appends, the Tribunes had fulfilled a 
function identical to the one of both “the Council of Ten ... in Venice [and] ... the Ephors 
of Sparta.”310
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Contrary to Machiavelli’s skepticism towards functionally intermediary powers 
(see the next section), Rousseau essentially argues powerful institutions such as the 
Tribunate and the Ephorate had been inoculated against both ‘bottom-up’ corruption and 
‘top-down’ Caesarism. The argument’s suggestion is that neither the executive 
government nor the people as a whole, and that neither the prince nor the electorate, 
should therefore be allowed to exercise the ultimate intermediary authority. Instead, only 
the magisterial Tribunes will be strong enough to maintain the middle ground against any 
corrupting (oligarchical and ochlocratic) tendencies. They alone can help settle the 
balance between these tendencies. This submission of intermediary strenght is detailed in 
one of the key sentences, of the Social Contract, which is the opening sentence of 
Chapter 4.5: “When it is impossible to settle an exact balance between the constitutive 
parts of the state, or when causes beyond control go on altering the relations between 
them, then a special magistrate is established, as a body separate from the other 
magistrates, to put every element in its right balance and to serve as a link or middle 
term—either between the prince and the people or between the prince and the sovereign, 
or alternatively, between both at the same time”.311 In brief, because the people, even if 
they would be capable of acting as a single sovereign, may turn into a multitude, and 
because they are all too often being “misled (and only then [do the people] ... seem to will 
what is bad)”, as well as because government officers may find their own rule “lapse 
either into despotism or into anarchy”, a third magisterial component should be 
separately established.312
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Rousseau’s design includes a “special magistrate”, thus, or a similar kind of 
“intermediary body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual 
communication; a body charged with the execution of the laws and the maintainance of 
freedom, both civil and political”.313 This is the Tribunate, guarding both the civil and the 
political freedoms of the state. More problematically, Rousseau’s intermediary, special-
magisterial Tribunes are thus also defending both the rights of common citizens at the 
same time as that they are protecting the interests of the less-common bourgeoisie. Do 
these middle-level Tribunes really have the inner strength to resist their own liberal, 
oligarchical, self-interested, and solipsistic tendencies? Does Rousseau not tie the mice to 
the cheese?
The most problematic implication of this constitutional theory is that Tribunes 
(or: Ephors) will have to be extremely self-disciplined. They have to be of outstanding 
character—in order to remain disposed towards functional neutrality; as mediators and 
adjudicators, they should have the discipline to neither side with the many nor with the 
few, and neither try to legislate nor to command. They will have to form an aristocratic 
platform, rather, as they are bringing about “moderation among the rich and contentment 
among the poor”. (Yet, in consenting to Machiavelli, Rousseau now also adds that “strict 
equality [is] ... out of place; it was not observed even in Sparta.”)314
The most outstanding, most virtuous men are to be mediating civil societal 
differences so that the state will better represent the general will, henceforth, but the most 
problematic point to discuss is that these men may on average be much richer than the 
common men, and thus be more likely to use the latter for their own ends. As almost all 
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representational processes will have to be channeled by these men, they, these Tribunes 
must somehow not only act as adjudicators but also as all people’s deputies. Nonetheless, 
Rousseau rejects the option that some deputies should act on behalf of the many, and 
some of the few, as his bicameralism remains extremely weak. The principle of 
bicamerialism holds that whenever the people’s electoral-legislative power has been 
divided against itself, a productive form of synergy will occur, because then neither part 
of the legislative department will be as easily corrupted. Rousseau deliberately refrains 
from specifying which type of relations he would prefer to see between Tribunate and a 
Senate, or between the House of Commons and a House of Lords. Rather than to make a 
plea for bicameralism, thus, regardless as to whether this principle is applied to a 
congress or a parliament, Rousseau’s must simply hope that his design of the Tribunate 
will be good enough to both mediate between unequal class interests—as well as to 
represent them. Is his design good enough to also represent all class interests? He admits 
it never can be.
Class inequalities will persist, for time to come, so that in any state the rich and 
the poor elements are probably believed to be represented, ideally, in conjunction. In 
reality, however, they cannot be represented. The Tribunate’s responsibility would, thus, 
not be to represent all the elements of the people, and even not to be voicing their general 
will, as it should merely try to partially represent such a will. After all, only the 
unrepresented sovereign people themselves should be believed to be wholesome and 
integral. Rousseau introduces another variant of the paradox of politics with this image of 
an unrepresented sovereign people, at this point, however, because he now busies himself 
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arguing the sovereignty of the whole people is only a fiction of the imagination: an 
abstract ideal. In reality, the people’s ultimate authority, indeed, “cannot be represented, 
for the same reason that it cannot be alienated: its essence is the general will, and will 
cannot be represented; either it is the general will, or it is something else”. The result of 
this either/or argument is that the Tribunes can never be really representing anyone, at 
least not in the fully political sense of the word: they can only serve as “the people’s 
deputies”.315 The wills and interests they may defend merely are the numerical 
aggregates, the many intersecting pluralities; these wills of all do not form any 
transcendent whole. Here, in the paradox of political representation, then, does the state 
encounter a persistent void between the wills of all and the general will.
In the ideal world, it should not matter a dime whether the individual Tribunes are 
poor or rich, democratic or oligarchical in orientation. Theirs should remain an institution 
through which the whole is to be represented, even though the idea of creating a 
representational mechanism for a wholesome people is absurd. But is Rousseau’s solution 
for the real world adequate? He must prey the Tribunes will not usurp power and will 
always choose to remain mere agents, because in “the moment the people adopts [them as 
their] representatives, it is no longer free; it no longer exists.”316 Further, as the people are 
only sovereign during an election, and as this is the only time their government functions 
as a direct agent of their will, by implication, Rousseau’s theoretical presupposition must 
be that socio-economic class carries no weight during elections. Machiavelli would have 
thought of this as an invalid presupposition...
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To reiterate the above, for Rousseau, institutional-constitutional ‘orderliness’ is 
best understood as some sort of Aristotelian relationship between the powers of electoral 
aristocracy and those of representative democracy. In Rome, this relation was adequately 
dualistic, as Machiavelli also teaches. At least, it had remained dualistic until the 
Decemvirs first defied the sovereign people when they—as Social Contract Book 3, 
Chapter 18, points out—“tried to retain their power in perpetuity, by no longer allowing 
the comitia [and, thus, also not the electorate] to assemble.”317 Usurpation and corruption 
are only natural, at least among the executive departments: it is here all too often 
forgotten “that the holders of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its 
officers”. Rousseau adds that the legislative power, of the people, should therefore 
always be allowed to “appoint them and dismiss them as it pleases”. But what in the first 
instance shall differentiate and separate the corruption of the executive Decemvirs from 
that of the “intermediary magistrates” and the adjudicative Tribunes, and which injection 
supposedly innoculates the latter’s but not the former’s virtue?318
The answer to that question will never be found in Rousseau’s political writings. 
It is found both in fate and nature, as well as in both freedom’s sacrality and the laws of 
nature.319 The natural sources of human virtue remain contraries, and will remain so into 
perpetuity, as these are the dual sources of both civilization and solitariness, of both 
pluralism and of individualism, civil society and savage egotism. Rousseau believes that 
people are both individualistic and egotistic, as well as that they are naturally caring and 
charitable towards others. Some social interactions and political institutions express a 
predominantly caring and responsible attitude, but most will not, so that the Aristotelian 
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problem has remained. On Rousseau’s own assumption that all political institutions are 
mixed, how can these institutions be prevented from degenerating and committing either 
ochlocratic or oligarchical excesses?
Rousseau issues simply a few variants of the same paradox, of the two either/or 
powers. For, even after introducing his Tribunate as candidate for the third power, his 
political theory never tells anyone why this candidate alone should be so good to arrest 
the degenerative surges of the first two powers. The dissimilarity to Arendt and Weber 
could not have been greater, as the latter speak of the kind of human capabilities which 
are neither metaphysically free nor physically predetermined. Care for the world, 
commonsense, and judicousness are capabilities they, themselves, would probably have 
expected from a Tribunate.
To clarify, in contemporary parlance, the activities of incessantly ‘social 
networking’ and pursuing a business career, for instance, would according to Rousseau 
have to be tempered by a ‘naturally-determined’ inclination to also remain solitary, pure, 
and above the fray. The city-dweller who resorts to artificial friendships would thereto 
have to be taught moderation, austerity, and to learn how to discipline his passions. But 
because he has no criterion to discern the difference between indulgent, promiscuous 
‘networking’, and the need to return to a natural state of solitude and self-reflexivity, he 
nonetheless falls in a void. He fails to recognize what it is he may have in common with 
others. Grains of empathy are prevented from growing into a sympathy, and into a care 
for others. Hannah Arendt and her reader, Iris Marion Young, by contrast, find that this 
care for others and this love of the world spontaneously emerges from all such 
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Rousseauan naturally-social connections, and from many other such naturally 
relationally-bipolar dynamics of sociability.
Arendt finds sociable citizens have always been able to learn to be alone with 
themselves, to be mere human animals, just as that Socrates already exemplified the 
Solitary Citizen. Socrates’s disposition and sense of virtue ensued from his being solitary, 
rather than solipsistic, and from his participation in the commons (see: Chapter Four). 
Not all men will be able to become such good but solitary citizens, however, as cities 
may continue to grow in size and as bands of social animals are likely to continue to be 
reduced to a mass of anonymous individuals. Yet, if Rousseau introduced the Tribunate 
in response to problems of asocial anonymity, egotistic individualization, and political 
singularization then, even if conceivably unsuccessfully, then he still deserves praise for 
having tried to diminish the old paradoxical tension between singularities and the 
commons.320
In conclusion, Rousseau’s constitutionalist project shares a few features with 
Hobbes’s project as well. To the degree that his project maintains a productive paradox, 
centered around two types of power, it was mirrored in Leviathan. In Rousseau’s 
experience, this book was certainly the single foremost attempt to integrate totalities of 
individuals with the body of the people as a whole. Leviathan had of course been 
Hobbes’s attempt to temper the tensions between the totalities and the sovereign body of 
the whole, which transcends and yet also includes these totalities. By synthesizing the 
totality of individual interests with the common good which is called sovereign, or a 
‘mortal God’, Hobbes claimed he had found his own way out of a conditional trilemma—
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before Rousseau could have done so himself. Hobbes’s claim is that the sovereign will 
have to be both singular and plural, so that the sovereign judges all people equal before 
the immortal God. Whereas Rousseau’s indebtedness to Montesquieu confused him, to 
the extent that he wanted to keep economic inequalities in place rather than to separate 
them from the political body—it was Hobbes’s eschatological notion of a sovereign 
judge, additionally, that had allowed for a stronger concept of political equality.
Walker argues Hobbes would have sought to let an extremely rational Legislator 
take full precedence over the total sum of individual desires. All those individuals who 
live a Hobbesian political life, would have been compounded by a rational Leviathan
believed capable of moving “from the hierarchical [or totalizing] incorporation of 
particularity, into an overarching universalism—while also preserving the possibility that 
[their] particularity might still be reconciled with a reconceptualization of what [this] 
universality entails”.321 Unlike especially Montesquieu and Rousseau, however, Hobbes 
would also have looked less for inspiration at the particular constitutions of antiquity and 
more up to the universal laws of Christianity. Hobbes must thought he could find a way 
out of the Legislator’s paradoxical inner dualism by simply not allowing the universal to 
become too universalized. By giving physical contents, and a concrete existence, to the 
Leviathan’s ideality, Hobbes ruled out the universalized conception of the universal as 
such—while nonetheless retaining it within its particularity.
The next-following subsections will return to Machiavelli by clarifying that he, 
already some time before Hobbes, had managed to combine the universal and the 
particular components within his own concept of sovereignty. Like Hobbes would try 
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after him, Machiavelli would also have rejected the notion of a third intermediary. Even 
though Rousseau and Montesquieu necessitated such a notion in the form of respectively 
a Tribunate and a bourgeois middle class, Machiavelli might have found the answer to 
the question as to why it is wrong to rely on such a third power in the constitutional 
middle. To maintain agonistic dualities, rather than antagonistic forms of competition, at 
the heart of every sovereign republic, Machiavelli merely feared excess and hoped for 
moderation.322
Certainly, Montesquieu was the theorist who took a first step beyond both 
Machiavelli and Hobbes by expanding the state’s capacity to form one integrated whole, 
as well as to rule out populism and licentiousness. Along the way, the Magistrate came to 
rely on representational mechanisms, however, just as that he had to suppose that his 
tertiary juristic assemblages were in fact representative of the middle level of all citizens. 
The problem with his dependency on a representational mechanism in the form of a 
tertiary intermediary level, remains of course that it undercuts any political ultimacy of a 
sovereign jury or an authoritative judge. A jury or a judge represents either the people as 
a whole, or it sides with one of the parties and now the people no longer exist. As 
Rousseau undoubtedly criticizes Montesquieu, in the very hour that “the people adopts 
[its] representatives, it ... no longer exists.”323
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Stabilizing Machiavelli’s Constitution and Aristotle’s Politics
In times of (civil) war, the parties will be forced by their environments to put their 
freedom at risk. The parties themselves may also either be incorporated in the 
vanquished, or by the victorious state. Because this risk is contingent on each party’s 
freedom to obey the other party, however, they will both understand they must ultimately 
come to face one another, as enemies. Without recognizing the terms of their enmity, 
they will not also be able to one day decide on the terms of the peace.324 This decision 
shall then take on the form of a treaty, which will not be supported by parties and 
factions, but is believed to demand loyalty from many people. This sense of loyalty is a 
sense of constitutional fidelity, or a kind of faith and confidence in the whole system of 
treaty laws.
Contrary to neo-Hegelian constructivists (Wendt, Philpott), the decision to sign a 
peace treaty is not the outcome of a linear process. Linear historical progress does not 
exist, even not if it were episodical, according to classicist realists. Instead, peace treaties 
are temporal restorations of one original balance. Or, all peace treaties remain subject to 
one law of nature, which means the people eventually shall lose their faith in them. 
Hence, a complex combination of natural necessity and popular confidence and freedom 
is a combination that, always, has informed the ambivalent process through which it was 
decided how states are to be recognized and how their popular freedoms are best to be 
preserved.
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For example, peace treaties fell always within the systemic type of constitutional 
balance that both the Roman Law tradition as well as Machiavelli himself would have 
decribed as a civic partnership. This partnership had, in Rome, been nothing but a treaty 
of mutual understanding between the juridical order—which comprised diverse senators, 
tribunes, magistrates, as well as the dictators or kings—and the people, or the political 
order as a whole. Yet, even Rome’s basic treaty was imperfect because it could too easily 
be amended to include, and eventually be corrupted by, a third group, of Decemvirs, 
whose power should have been excluded from its beginnings: these officers became 
“overbearing”; they could have abrogated and nearly did completely cancel “the 
senatorial order”.325 In Sparta, for similar reasons, Lycurgus would have intended for the 
partnership to exclude the third power of the Ephors, as they had been responsible for 
killing the king.326
Today’s field of international treaty-law can easily be analogized to that public 
law/civic partnership-based tradition, rooting in the ancient Occident. This tradition in 
fact still has its anchor resting below the surface of ancient Rome’s societal practice of 
treatising.327 Yet, why should classicist realists also actively try to restore this 
methodological practice to its former glory, as Machiavelli once did try to do?
War does not need to be and rarely is decided fairly and paritably, just as that 
most civil law cases are probably not being decided equally—but in favor of the 
conventions governing a status quo power distribution, and other vested interests. 
Alongside a previously-examined spoke of the wheel, the fields of both International 
Relations theory and comparative constitutionalism were entered through the portal of the 
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essentially undecided 2000 election of G. W. Bush to the U.S. Presidency. Due to its 
tumultuous nature, this election should immediately have raised the diplomatic 
community’s eyebrows. Rather than to have recognized the Bush-Cheney campaign 
team’s claim to electoral victory, most Western and non-Western states alike could have 
argued they had more than sufficient reason to question the lawfulness of some of the 
team’s actions, such as its complicity in the disciminatory removal of names from voter 
rolls and the digital manipulation of voting machine records (as happened, again, in Ohio 
in 2004). Nonetheless, internationally, all states recognized that the Bush government had 
a sovereign right to, legitimately perform its part in, the American Presidential lineage. 
Why was this government recognized as presiding over a legitimate state?
Again, classicist realism offers a skeptical method of indexing the reasons why 
the international community wrongly turned a blind eye towards Bush and Cheney’s 
upsetting of the constitutional balance between the Presidency and Congress. Under the 
U.S. Constitution, after all, the 2000 and possibly also the 2004 elections should have 
been decided by Congress, as opposed to by the 2000 Supreme Court’s injunction on the 
Electoral College, while the Floridian recounting process was in midstream. The current 
section shall continue to demonstrate it would very well have been possible for sovereign 
states to ‘withhold’ their international recognition for the Bush-Cheney administration—
at least, on the basis of a Machiavellian constitutionalist theory, and in reference to an 
Aristotelian systems theory as well (as the section currently at hand shall clarify).
The organizational power of the Supreme Court, also, has to be dismissed as 
being too liberal and too pro-Montesquieuan, and as therefore creating an anti-democratic 
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intermediary institution. After all, the Supreme Court majority would significantly upset 
the balance of powers by depoliticizing the relation between the victorious Republican 
Party and Albert Gore’s Democratic Party. Rather than to let this relation take its course 
in Congress, the Court took on the robes of a third power by intervening, and by shifting 
the source of ultimate public authority towards an essentially non-political organ, the 
Electoral College, rather than to any of the potentially-convened popular assemblies or 
State legislatures. On the premise that the Democratic Party in this election did represent 
the underpriviliged and poorer electoral segments (which it, however sadly, probably did 
not really do), hence, it will now have to be asked why intermediary verdicts in general 
are violations of both Machiavelli’s as well as of an Aristotelian constitutionalist (IR) 
theory of legitimate authority.
To return to the Discourses: when Machiavelli announces that Sparta’s 
Cleomenus had done almost everything right, in almost having restored the Lycurgean 
order after he had taken his chance “to have all the Ephors slain”, it should be asked why 
he excludes them from the balance of power. It is implied that had it not been for 
Cleomenus’s lack of a sustainable foreign policy and for his state’s disrespect for the 
freedom of the surrounding republics it had conquered, he could have restored the 
balance between his executive power and the autonomous power of the many (Spartans 
as well as their league of republics).328 Machiavelli’s negative examplar thus forms a 
rhetorical warming-up for his game against intermediary constitutional institutions, 
however, such as Ephors and Decemvirs.329 More remarkably, conceivably, he is here 
partaking in a grand neo-Aristotelian discourse. Such discourses have received 
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considerable attention from a range of Western political philosophers but, as Benner 
points out, Machiavelli placed both Aristotle and Plato on a pedestal at least as high as 
that of Lycurgus.330
Aristotle’s discursive significance was apparent to Jean Bodin and Thomas 
Hobbes, for example, to Charles Louis de Montesquieu and, not much later, to Jean-
Jacques Rousseau as well. Each of these philosophers came to identify a basic tension 
between rulers and ruled which overlapped with the tension Aristotle had found within 
the constitutional relation between those who hold executive-magisterial offices, and 
those who select persons for these offices—in accordance to law and tradition. For 
Aristotle, this relation translates into an irreconcilable difference between the oligarchical 
and the more democratic officer-selection procedures.331 Rulers have for a long time been 
recognized, and have long been thought able to decide on political matters, simply 
because their decisions had to have been legitimized by either the richer oligarchs or the 
poorer democrats. Aristotle argued the rulers will either have to have been selected, and 
legitimized, either by the few or by the many, or (as usually happened) by some 
indeterminable number that will neither be prejudicial towards the few nor towards the 
many, but that creates symbiotic combinations of the two groupings.332
Numerically-determined governmental elements are, in most states, less critical 
for survival that elements selected on the basis of their virtues and merits. The final 
responsibility of selecting and legitimizing the government, therefore, should rest by 
those who understand how virtuous and just decisions should be recognized. When the 
few elect, and are being represented by, the few who rule them, the interests of the ruled 
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and the rulers will probably be aligned. Also, the concentration and accumulation of 
“property” among the few will then be considered comparatively more important, at least 
to these few, than to the many democrats which have no stake in government. In this 
case, the few tend to become oligarchical. They will try to acquire, according to Aristotle, 
increasingly sizeable shares of “constitutional rights”.333
The few usually award themselves with their own political (including their 
voting) rights, and do so by positing a measure or rather a mixture of “property-
qualification” and “personal rule”: a form of rule which risks becoming hereditary and 
dynastical—to most Aristotelians’ utter dislike.334 However, in other states the many will 
be ruled by the many, as happens when offices are made to rotate frequently and when 
officials are being selected more or less randomly. In this state, the governing interests 
are now defined in terms of the citizens’ basic needs, and of their “want of sufficient 
means”.335 To serve in office or to take part in popular assemblies, after all, takes in 
democratic economies often too much time away from the household, so that some 
compensation for officials and jurors will herein be in order.336
The problem with Aristotle’s Politics is that it defines constitutions by their self-
corrupting tendencies. Constitutionally democratic rulers are defined by a democratic 
necessity, or by a dependency on the masses to voluntarily participate in public affairs. 
This whereas oligarchical rulers are defined by their oligarchical interest to first satisfy 
their private interests, by accumulating property. It is almost as if both types of rulers 
entertain ‘tautological authority’, hence, because the democratically-selected rulers are 
supported by democrats and the oligarchically-elected by oligarchs. The double tautology 
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lies at the heart of Aristotle’s Politics, as many other philosophers have read this work. 
This section shall first compare Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and then also Rousseau in 
terms of how they operated with respect to the constitutional tension between these two 
self-defined types of rule. How did their own ideal states cope with this dualistic, or 
rather doubly tautologically-defined, modality of legitimate authority?
The classic Aristotelian distinction between the democratic and the oligarchical 
elements  is still implicit throughout Machiavelli’s political theory. The Florentine 
Secretary distinguishes between commoners and great persons, yet is cognizant of a 
tumultuous but productive relationship between these two constitutional elements.337 To 
maintain this relationship, he commends those rare great persons who took positions, 
towards the common people, which he then transforms into “the bedrock of his acount of 
political legitimacy.” Erica Benner reveals, further, that Machiavelli goes on to shape his 
own notion of the state’s legitimacy, beginning and ending with a highly energetic 
popular will. “[P]eople should be regarded as fully free agents”.338
His Discourses on Livy’s Decalogue articulate why firstly the many should be 
respected, in terms of their freedom to hold even the highest offices, and only secondly 
the few.339 The ordinary citizens of a free republic should also, hence, be allowed to 
authorize their own laws and their own orders. The dignity and duty of even the greatest 
office-holder should be treated as equal to any other man’s freedom. As Benner indeed 
reads his Discourses, the two sides in this equal relation should be”co-responsible for 
upholding civil laws”. Only the most imprudent statespersons would fail to acknowledge 
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the many, for “people who are not asked to authorize the laws and orders they live under, 
are unlikely to feel responsible for them.”340
Montesquieu’s theory beats a different drum, holding that the constitutional-
republican system flourishes mostly on condition of social stability, provided by the few, 
as well as in prohibiting any potentially productive relationship with the many. Like 
Aristotle’s oligarchical element would be certain to have done, eighteenth-century 
patricians should also try to expand their share of executive-adjudicative power. Yet, how 
will their presumably conservative views indeed help them prevail over the ordinary, 
democratically-oriented plebeians?
Montesquieu’s intentions seem good: he wants to prevent democratic-and-thus-
immoral license (ochlocratization).341 Yet, it was Machiavelli who much better 
understood that not the supposedly immoral nature of the many, but the political relation 
to be taken towards these commoners must be discussed. If the state’s dignitaries only 
seek out the most advantageous positions in order to distort this political relation, they 
will end up reverting a free republic into a tyranny. Moreover, they so become more 
likely to lose their state to either the population or to foreigners. Machiavelli cautions the 
few that the popular humors, or the “popular judgments, ... can [easily] become corrupted 
by [their] excessive ambition”, as he could gladly have admitted to Montesquieu. But he 
simply will not agree that this risk would also warrant the patricians’ searching for and 
administering of policy responses outside “established orders and [popular] laws”.342
In what appears to have been a linear conversion of Machiavelli’s, Montesquieu’s 
case restricts popular support for the established laws. Rather than to first provoke and 
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then defy oligarchical idleness, the French Magistrate does not even define the difference 
between oligarchy and aristocracy.343 He simply opens his case by defying democratic 
procedures, or by subverting the self-regulatory interests of the many.
This Montesquieuan priority becomes most noticeable, in The Spirit of the Laws, 
when democracy is being defined as a monistic type of monarchy (quite possibly 
following Hobbes’s notion that democracy and sovereignty are, ideally, one and the same 
source of legitimacy).344 The sum total of votes should, in an ideally-democratic plan, 
count as equal to one absolute monarchical will. For, in a democracy, the “[people’s] 
votes ... are their wills.” Democracy’s first procedural problem, however, is that the 
people’s votes are being cast by lot. Votes could be drawn from  a black bag filled with 
colored balls of equal size, for example, to guarantee a random allocation of offices.345
Yet, Montesquieu suggests that there can be no unifiable, and certainly no absolute will, 
because the distribution of colors is always uneven. Under such conditions, he implies, 
there can be no random and thus no singular popular will. Votes drawn from some classes 
have always been made to carry a heavier weight than those of lesser-qualified classess 
(as even “Solon [rightly] divided ... Athens into four classes”). Some classes, “of certain 
eminent men”, will just have to exercise more “gravity” than the others.346
This creates a second problem. In democracies—including ancient Rome, for 
instance—the relative weight of the tribal committees, in the ballot-drawings, would 
always have been kept a secret.347 Consequentially, “the principal people” would in such 
democracies have had inadequate information about their own preferences, so that they 
could not have enlightened the “lesser people” either. Possibly, this hig degree of 
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electoral secretiveness then even caused their failure to organize themselves in “a senate” 
(which could of course have allowed the nobles to rule, as equals, over the interests of the 
“lesser people”). This abomination, at least according to Montesquieu, should be 
overcome by disallowing any voting by secret lot—and by publically allowing “voting by 
choice, [which] is in the nature of aristocracy.”348
Montesquieu’s tragedy is that whereas he hoped to aristocratize the republic, his 
efforts did not decrease the risk of government oppression. Only in the late-nineteenth 
century could this risk be decreased by an overall democratization of the European states. 
The chosen means were similar: both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century movements 
favored extensions of suffrage rights, and more specifically of the vote by choice. But 
Montesquieu seems to have had too little trust in the secret ballot and, also contrary to his 
modern democratic counterparts, would never dismiss his pro-oligarchical idea that 
estate-holding men had to form an eminent electoral class. More importantly, he thereby 
disrespected common people’s intent to authorize their own laws—and to thus profess 
constitutionalself-moderation. The people, according to Machiavelli, by contrast, should 
authorize the laws executed by the people. Machiavelli in his stead believes the common 
people should be allowed to defend themselves, against the great nobles, by means of 
their legislative power.
Neither Montesquieu nor Machiavelli take an egalitarian angle in viewing their 
ideal republics: civic affairs should not be managed by equal human beings. Especially 
the executive power is to rest with the most virtuous, possibly noble, and preferably also 
moderately-richer-than-average officials. But while Machiavelli argues that the 
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legislative power belongs to all the participants in the state’s civic affairs, and ultimately 
to a free people as a whole, it is only for Montesquieu the case that the legislative power 
is also to remain divided between two, or even more, populational classes. Hence, it is 
only Machiavelli who does think that the people as a whole can express a metaphysical 
(God’s?) legislative voice. It is in this latter respect that he actually follows Aristotle, as 
well as the neo-Aristotelian natural law scholars, much closer than that the eighteenth-
century French Magistrate would ever do. Not only for Aristotle but also for Machiavelli, 
as will be argued in the following subsections, peace was indeed the natural end of any 
civil war-like tensions. Politics: “[M]ilitary pursuits” are among the many possible means 
to this natural end, but the end of peace itself is actually the “true end which good law-
givers should [pursue, as it encompasses] ... the enjoyment of partnership in a good life, 
and the felicity thereby attainable.”349
Why is Machiavelli’s egalitarianism ethically superior to Montesquieu’s? The 
simple answer is that it is about equal virtue, or equally meritocratic decisions, both of 
which somehow demand a public assessment. For Machiavelli, virtue is all about political 
parity. Yet, Montesquieu’s egalitarianism was also (as shown earlier) individualistic, and 
by and large about equal liberties. Virtue is mostly about socioeconomic independence. 
From the perspective of  Aristotelian scholars, as will now be argued, this makes 
Machiavelli’s theory of equal virtue more attractive. For, it is Aristotle who presumes 
that the two main elements within any state, usually, are “regarded as antagonists, 
[meaning that] ...  the rich and the common people are equally balanced”. Virtuous 
decisions are assessed by means of the standard of whether antagonists reached a 
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compromise, whether their tension was moderated, and how symbiotically agonistic their 
relations will remain.
Sudden political change, which could disturb the equal balance, is typically 
caused by the “preponderance” of either the common men or the prominent citizens.350It 
may be objected that Aristotle’s Politics hereby fell better in line with The Spirit of the 
Laws than with the Discourses on Livy because the latter text did not create an account to 
justify the constitutional need for a sufficiently rich, and outstanding populational 
element. Machiavelli’s Discourses’ contents could have remained too populistic, as 
liberal readers could indeed object. Admittedly, Politics had made it abundantly clear that 
any new rulers would have to try “a method of training [themselves in virtue], which 
ensures that the better [nobles will] ... have no desire to make themselves richer—while 
the poorer sort have no opportunity to do so.”351 And Montesquieu had of course, 
likewise, recommended that the nobles should not become excessively rich and that 
serious socio-economic inequalities are to be discouraged, by aristocrats.
Yet, not Montesquieu but Machiavelli really believed, consistent with Politics, 
that the great nobles will not become oligarchs for as long as they can train and educate 
themselves; virtuous men can take sides with the many, even if they themselves are only 
among the few. These men simply need skills, but not additional riches, so that they can 
ultimately, and in fact, come to act monarchically as opposed to plutocratically. 
Machiavelli shuns both financial inequality and economic equality much more than 
several other philosophers do, as he makes a plea for a republican type of equal virtue . 
Some, and especially the Germanic, republics never felt the need to have men with 
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intermediary powers “slain” because they just have none.352 Instead, the German tribes 
and cities appear to have only men with equal virtue and equal authority (which is 
something very different than equal capability), as they are free to obey who they want.
The Prince intimates that German cities “are absolute free [because they]  ... obey 
the Emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any other potentate”. These 
city-statelets have no reason to fear any foreign forces as they hold both good arms and 
good laws, such that “they all have the necessary moats and bastions, sufficient artillery, 
and always keep food, drink, and fuel for one year in the public storehouses. Beyond 
which, to keep the lower classes satisfied and without loss to the commonwealth, they 
have always enough means to give them work”.353 Freedom means equal consideration of 
the lower and the higher classes. Benner fittingly comprehends this passage to mean rich 
and poor naturally depend on each other, so that “the plebs” should never be used as 
“cannon fodder” and the “wealthy citizens” have the responsibility to provide in their 
provisions and their employment. “[A] well-ordered public economy, that ensures a 
decent living for all, ... is among the necessary foundations of a prince’s military 
power”—as she elegantly appends The Prince.354
Machiavelli’s Discourses advances the same case for equal virtue as The Prince
does. Chapter headings elucidate why equal treatment of the people as a whole—based 
on a sort of mutual respect for the people’s merit, work, and constancy—is 
extraordinarily advantageous to anyone exercising monarchical, military, or generally 
executive power over these people. As a first heading warns: “Public affairs are [only] 
easily managed in a city where the body of the people is not corrupt, and where equality 
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exists”. “In Germany alone”, it is said on the next page, “ancient virtue” has been 
preserved. Both equality and virtue must thus be witnessed to index what it means to 
govern over an uncorruptable people. For, only in the Germanic countries do “many 
republics exist ... in the full enjoyment of [their freedom], ... observing their laws in such 
manner that no one from within or without could [ever hope to] venture upon an attempt 
to master them.”355
Other chapters are titled as follows: “The people are more constant than princes”, 
and; “No [prince or] council or magistrate should have it in their power to stop the public 
[or popular] business of a city”.356 Next to reintroducing that dictum of ‘firstly the many, 
secondly the few’, the Discourses hereby clearly proposes to no longer solely imagine the 
many to be “uncertain and inconstant”—or, even worse, to imagine that only the common 
men are “inconsistent, unstable, and ungrateful”.357 It is in the same chapter that it is 
explained, much to the contrary, why “individual men, and especially princes may be 
charged with the same defects of which ... the people [have too often been accused]; for, 
whoever is not [regulated] by laws will [be likely to] commit the same errors as an 
unbridled multitude.”358 As errors are prevented by prudent applications of law, therefore, 
freedom and stability will be generated by the equal application of laws—to individual 
princes and rich magistrates as well as to the multitude of poor people alike. 
Constitutional states that suffered decline were typically states that, unlike Venice or 
ancient Rome, failed to equally divide their offices and functions among “gentlemen and 
commonalty”. By failing to give equal consideration to the two groupings, their 
constitutions came to lack “proper proportions, and [had] but little durability.”359 Virtues 
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such as constancy, sustainability, and prudence are usually being effectuated by the 
people, as a whole, rather than by a single individual or prince. Indeed, the people “have 
better judgment than a prince; and it is not without good reason that it is said, ‘the voice 
of the people is the voice of God’.”360
These chapters, of The Prince and the Discourses, run contrary both to the French 
Magistrate’s Spirit but also to Alexander Hamilton’s bourgeois thought.361 What can now 
be gazed from the cited chapters, much rather, is why the Florentine Secretary never 
intended to defend the liberal thesis that both patricians and plebeians should have equal
opportunities to advance themselves socio-economically, by joining a new middle level. 
They should first of all learn how to act more meritocratically in relation to each other, 
not by denying the natural fact that they exercise different political functions and 
different constitutional responsibilities. Said otherwise, a plurality of the people, as a 
whole, should learn how to bear responsibility for moderating these differences. The 
differences are to be maintained, but a mutual sense of self-moderating duality emerges 
now within the relation between commoners and nobles, in other words, also. The 
former, the poor, now help the latter, the rich, restore the balance (legislatively) on 
condition that the latter will prepare themselves (their arsenals, artillery, bakeries, their 
storage facilities) for any anti-revolutionary type of change such as wars and rebellions 
(executively).
Montesquieu concurs merely (as Hobbes and Rousseau would also do) to the 
extent that he remains more than just somewhat skeptical of hereditary offices—as he is 
certainly not as skeptical as that Machiavelli is.362 Anyhow, against hereditary titles, 
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Machiavelli is thus at least somewhat being seconded by Montesquieu’s definitions of 
merit and virtue as being republican passions. But Machiavelli went a few paces further 
than his later French counterpart, arguing that genuine revolutions are generally being 
supported by the people as a whole, not by a few classes of ennobled citizens—just as 
that they are also not only sustained by the poorer, allegedly unenlightened segments. 
Instead, Machiavellian revolutions are sustained by a dualist-relational system, and only 
these types of revolutions will have productive, purgatory results. Political changes such 
as these relational revolutions will give the commoners a chance to restore the 
constitutional equilibrium, so that ‘the great’ will feel motivated to renew their training in 
public virtue, which they can then again use in order to survive intra-systemic turbulences 
and fluctuations. The many commoners are often too passive, and stand too far removed 
from the public processes—so that when the many do suddenly begin to participate in the 
republic, a few great men will have to have the power to purge their ranks, be vigilant, 
and improve their own virtues. What remains so fascinating, at least for theorists shoring 
up canonical support for Machiavellian realism, now, is that this purgatory idea stems, 
albeit indirectly, from Politics.363
Here, Aristotle demonstrated that tensions between the poorer and the richer 
populational elements should be believed natural. These tensions will, in virtually every 
state, have been constitutionalized, so that the gap between the two main classes must be 
assumed to have been closed without that the two contrary elements lose their distinctive 
qualities. This gap makes it possible to speak of a constitutional balance of powers. 
Imbalance can occur through the excessive democratization/ochlocratization of the state 
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(most officials would be selected in a lottery, or by fate, or by chaos). Imbalance can also 
occur because aristocrats pursue only honor and glory, and thus turn into oligarchs who 
have grown dependent on their own factions (officials would maintain power by means 
of secret elections, partisan factions, and bribery). Yet, Aristotle added that both 
democracy and oligarchy have been caught up in a self-perpetuating tension—as 
Machiavelli and Montesquieu were not the first to have understood his work, and as both 
saw why public lotteries are more democratic and secret elections more oligarchic.364
The Machiavelli-inspired Gramsci identifies the mysteriously self-perpetuating 
tension in a different form. For Gramsci, the political question is no longer whether either 
democracy or oligarchy will be the dominant constitution-organizing principle, but 
whether either one of the two principles actively maintains the relationship—which is 
also the relation between “rulers and ruled, leaders and led; [for the] science ... of 
politics is based on this irreducible fact.”365 The constitutional relation between rulers 
and ruled, between poorer and richer groupings, should not be dominated or reduced by 
either one grouping. In a neo-Aristotelian and in a Gramscian-Hegelian, as well as in a 
Weberian, ‘science of politics’, the rulers and the ruled must recognize each other in such 
ways that they perpetuate a modicum of balance between their own interests. But, 
uniquely, Machiavelli elaborated and theorized the question under which conditions a 
transmutation or a revolution, within this balance, can be expected to occur.
As noted, Aristotle had made the argument that revolutions will not be likely to 
“occur when the elements  ... are usually regarded as antagonists [and when], for 
example, the rich and the common people are equally balanced”. Revolutions, however, 
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are extremely likely to  follow from the “preponderance” of either one of the elements. 
Under conditions of preponderance, either democratically-selected representatives or 
oligarchically-elected officers entertain privileged and supreme access to those deciding 
on governmental and civil affairs. Aristotle may still be interpreted as having made a 
liberal intervention against preponderance and predominance of either one element, as it 
were, by then introducing the one group of people he believes to be “outstanding for the 
excellence [of their character, and who] do not, as a rule, attempt to stir up faction; they 
are only a few against many.”366 This third group is an aristocratic and economically-
independent group, consisting neither of poor city-dwellers nor of wealthy merchants. 
However, the problem is that Politics hardly defines the contours of this third power, of 
this middle level, or of this ideal aristocracy, at least not much beyond merely intimating 
its excellence and its honorability.367
Arguably, particularly Machiavelli’s Discourses follows Politics in the sense that 
this text refuses to admit a third power or middle level. All power is divided against itself, 
as power is equally balanced among only the exceptional legislative-purgatory as well as 
only the regular executive-adjudicative functions of the people. The people are divided, 
also, but their partisan conflicts are not decided on by any uniquely-positioned third 
power or any high court, either. Rather, conflicts between the two main parties are 
decided by means of the civil law, which is identical to the constitutional law tradition.
Within the parameters of Machiavelli’s constitutionalist theory, by deciding to 
end a civil law process by appealing to the rights of a third power or to an extra organ, 
such as a neutral electoral college, any public court would have to have made a grave 
823
mistake. In such a decision, it would have to have bypassed, illegitimately, the direct 
relation between the two main constitutional functions. In ending the Bush v. Gore
litigation, the Supreme Court majority  would definitely make a similar mistake. On the 
side of the executive function, its verdict certainly seems to have lowered a degree of 
unrest and unease in Florida. But with the same decision, the Court also blinded the 
public and prevented the people from seeing and using their own Congressional 
authority. This blinding of the popular-legislative power strengthened the republic’s 
tendency to select candidates for office on the technical or strictly symbolic basis of 
creating electoral majorities at any cost, rather than on the legal basis of sustaining a 
deontic (paritable) constitutional balance.
The U.S. Supreme Court had declared that not the candidate with the most votes, 
should be the winner, but that the Electoral College could make up its own mind in 
determining the winner, thus effectively bypassing the constituent powers of the republic 
as a whole. This episode can be summed up as the case in which five pre-constituted 
minds, on the Court, were bypassing many constituent bodies represented in Congress. 
The relation between ruled and rulers was thus also being severed by the decision. After 
all, as the Court’s decision redefined the national interest by accepting the rationale that a 
presidential candidate should ascend to the Supreme Office as consequence of an 
intermediary third-party: the Court itself. This means that the selection of the executive 
function was no longer considered, at least not by the Court, as much a consequence of 
what equal sovereign states, both those assembled in Congress but also the international 
community of states, could have had to say in the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
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acceptance of a national interest-based rationale deprived the American people of their 
right to representation. The arbitration process was turned into an assertion of judiciary 
partisanship, with the complicity of Al Gore’s own legal team. Rather than to have the 
affected parties appear in public, and to assemble in the U.S. Congress, they apathetically 
accepted the authority of the civil war tribunal into which the Supreme Court would 
transform itself during the case.
To conclude this section, as they are trying to locate the anchor underneath the 
vessel of the international public law tradition, classicist realists argue that every (civil) 
war and every conflict comes to an end. At that point in time, both the winners and the 
losers have to have come together to establish a modicum of balance, within their 
prospective relations, by somehow appealing to binding agreements, which are actually 
constitutional agreements on how to fairly disagree. Of course, wars and other armed 
conflicts typically only rage on because each party is refusing to be the first to 
accommodate a better balance or a more optimal equilibrium.368 However, Machiavellian 
realists can add the important notion to this issue, of intransigent status recognition or to 
this issue of saving face—and thereby also to an issue which has, in IR, been over-
emphasized in importance, by social constructivists—that refusals to agree on a mutual 
interest in a peaceful balance are in essence also refusals informed by qualitatively 
different constellations of power.369 Whenever qualitative differences are being 
emphasized too much, by the respective parties, or whenever these differences are being 
morally or even culturally justified, the relationship between these parties becomes less 
conducive to peace.
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Machiavelli’s theory diminishes the risk of excessive discord by respecting the 
fact that different moral, cultural, and ideological justifications for peace and stability do 
certainly exist—as this theory responds to such justifications by identifying the 
primordially common, deliberative, and material interests in constitutional stability. 
Ideological cultural values and material political virtues are universally inter-dependent, 
and the most common mistake made by statespersons is that they will try to separate 
these two dimensions—and thus will undercut their own dual authority. Rather than to 
respect both their abstract  ideological values and as well as their concrete political 
virtues, statespersons too often fail to set their differences on an even keel—and, 
subsequentially, also fail to decide how paritably their own successors should judge any 
(international, civil) law cases.
Montesquieu’s Introducing the Pardon Power to his Anti-Democratic Structure
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws moves away from the ancient Roman 
variety of republican constitutionalism. This canonical text still cautions against the 
destabilizing possibility of constitutional decline, as all the ancients (Aristotle, Plato, 
Cicero, Polybius, Livy, and so on) had done. But the text of Spiritnewly identifies a 
modern, a third capacity to avert decline by means of organizational self-moderation. 
Contrary to Machiavelli’s work, which was inclusive of both the great and the 
commoners, Spirit designs this third capacity while perhaps inadvertently excluding poor 
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people and their revolutionary freedoms from the republic. In the text, the commoners 
and their egalitarian (or what are usually referred to as democratic) principles areactually
being gradually excluded from the compounded body of the people—and from their 
archetypal political personality as a whole. Is it indeed the case that Montesquieu’s liberal 
agenda forces him to eventually deny several political freedoms to the common people, 
and to even deny their private passions a place at the constitutionalist-republican table (as 
he is thus anticipating Habermas)?370
The Spirit of the Laws’s Book 6, Chapter 5, is the canonical locus for one of the 
most important clarifications of what it means to ‘arrest’ constitutional decline. To slow 
down the inevitable aging process from which all constitutions suffer, and to at least 
signal a halt against their corruption, Montesquieu argues civil laws must be obeyed and 
civil rights must be respected. Chapter 6.5 suggests it is wrong to teach the people how to 
make exceptions to the law. Exceptions might be necessary, in a case of simply 
unfortuitous circumstances. But even then should the exceptions be contained by political 
virtue, which is the statesperson’s sense of judiciousness. Also, this sense of sound 
judgment, in other words, should predominantly be expressed by those who are best 
capable of applying the rules in accordance to positive law, or the Digest. By implication, 
their sound judgment is best expressed in their exercising little discretion in interpreting 
clearly-posited legal norms and clearly-established legal conventions.
The discretion to make an exception to posited, positive legality according to the 
French Magistrate, should be centrally contained. He realizes that “the finest attribute of 
sovereignty ... is that of pardoning.”371 This is why state should limit their pardon powers. 
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Despots, to the contrary, would rather “go so far as to corrupt their own pardons.”372
Despots would basically disperse their pardon powers by accepting gifts in exchange for 
verdicts, which implies that they are failing to concentrate their power to make 
exceptions to the rules. There is no self-moderating rule/exception distinction under 
conditions of despotism.
The power of the pardon is a hallmark of sovereign authority. It appears as the 
one power closest to God’s mercy, of course, thus reintroducing an eschatological 
element to the equation. Anyhow, as was noted, this one power has to be the one most-
centrally situated power, within the highest organs of the body politick, so that its fallible, 
prejudicial, and discretionary disposition cannot easily be dispersed and desolidified 
throughout society—and so that its inherent tendency towards arbitrariness can continue 
to be contained by the constitutional state. Because this tendency can very well be 
contained and arrested, as Montesquieu beliefs, as a God-fearing man, probably, 
however, it is not arbitrariness by the magistrates, but licentiousness by the commoners 
that is to be feared the most—as the gist of Spirit holds.
But this fear of the common men is unjustifiable, at least from Machiavelli’s 
perspective. The French Judge neither wants all to the commoners to adjudicate their own 
legal affairs, as jurors, nor would he ever allow the great to decentralize their power of 
the adjudicative pardon. To put this preference in terms of Weberian theory, a 
Montesquieuan sovereign republic cannot solely be based on Term (1) conventional rules 
and habitual definitions of equities and rights, not should the Term (2) discretion to either 
confirm or deny the validity of these rules be allowed to form this republic’s sole basis. 
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That is, the tension between Term (1) rules and Term (2) decisions should be diminished, 
so that there will be less despotism: less licentiousness and arbitrariness. The flipside is 
that there will also have to be less democracy, or less government by the common people. 
This begs the question: who should judge the extent to which the tension is to be 
diminished? More importantly, who should arbitrate the judges?
The preeminent prerequisite for the success of a Montesquieuan constitutional 
republic is that not everybody may arbitrate. Only a select few persons should be “seen to 
be arbiters of judgments”—akin to how the Merovingian “bishops” once held sovereignty 
within their ecclesiastic jurisdictions.373 Succesful constitutional and organizational self-
moderation occurs only when the magistrates, not the commoners, have been trained to 
prevent their own “intermediate dependent powers [from being] reduced to nothing.”374
Montesquieu’s position is consistent with Kelsen’s: the tertiary intermediate 
powers, or the magisterial-adjudicative institutions, should be reorganized in accordance 
to an encompassing ground-norm that prevents these institutions from legal-normatively 
ending up as “nothing”. Montesquieu leads theorists away from his own follower’s, 
Rousseau’s, respect for paradoxicality, thereby, as he seduces them into imagining that 
the tension between political institutions is best diminished through the centralization and 
concentration of these intermediate  powers. The intermediaries, negotiators, and the 
judges are imagined to climb up the constitutional ladder, from a tertiary towards a 
primary position. But how feasible is the Magistrate’s proposed concentration of 
intermediate powers? Who should be holding final authority over those powers, or who 
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should be arbitrating over any eventually intemperable conflicts between the 
intermediaries themselves, and who judges the judges?375
The paradox of contrary powers, of law and decision, remains in effect, despite 
the French Magistrate’s best intentions to the disambiguate it. It has been demonstrated, 
thus, that the paradox of legislative plurality and actionable singularity has remained in 
effect—as Honig, and Schmitt, would also agree, with Rousseau—because if not the 
many, and if not the people as a whole may be called upon to arbitrate (in accordance to 
their own, natural pluralism), then what prevents the few from committing a coup against 
(from artificially injecting their own conceptions of singularity into) the body of the 
people?376 As Honig inserts, even if the law’s “universalism” and even if the judiciary’s 
“cosmopolitan norms” would have become perfectly sufficient to explain the world of 
facticity—and to make perfectly logical sense of the diversity of concrete issues 
involving “proximity, community, territory, and boundary”—then who should guarantee 
that such issues are not ending up being dismissed as not only “morally neutral” but also 
as “morally irrelevant”?377 Even if the intermediary powers were the strongest and most 
universally-applicable in the world, why should the neutral middle-level judges holding 
these powers not themselves get caught up in an amoral, meaningless flux of politically 
irrelevant and imprudent decision-making?
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Machiavelli’s Republican Systems Theory vs. the Liberalism of Neutrality
Constitutional states are both self-formative and capable of balancing: two 
characteristics that have allowed theorists to describe the system of all states as an 
autopoietic network; as a web of life, and as a living body politick.378
The system’s first characteristic has long been observed in the fact that no state 
has ever been formed on its own volition. Every state has to have been recognized, by 
other sovereigns, as forming an adequately legitimate political entity. This empirical rule 
is induced from the distribution of territories. Each entity has its own material reach, so 
that the rule of self-formation is also a result of capabilities-measuring, and of distributive 
risk assessments.
The second characteristic of the system of states is also sustained rationally, as it 
is embedded in each entity’s freedom to participate in international organizations and 
adhere to international laws. Despite the fact that material, social, and economic 
inequalities are being maintained in the world, states gain a modicum of freedom by 
following shared legal rules. Thus, international law is widely thought to govern the 
foreign affairs, but also some of the domestic affairs of all states. Nonetheless, such legal 
rules are normative abstractions of rational interests. The equal rights principle is not so 
much a principle, for instance, as that it is being used to retroactively ‘bestow’ 
international law-recognition onto moderately autonomous entities. Rather than that equal 
rights are being protected by international law-organizations, they are increasingly being 
used as a doctrine (such as the UN’s Resposibility to Protect, or RtoP, doctrine). This 
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rights doctrine is then used to justify inequalities, material unfairness, and skewed 
redistributions of wealth. Or, such doctrines are used as a tool to moderate conflicts 
between state actors, mostly for utilitarian rather than also for deontological motives. 
The equal liberty ideology has mainly been playing a retroactive role. Across 
historical eras, liberal ideology (because this is the justification for the absolutely 
unnatural idea that every individual enjoys equal rights) has performed the role of 
moderator, who is only using legal values to negotiat actors’ immunities and entities’ 
prerogatives. But because this legal actor, which is really nothing but the embodiment of 
(neo)liberalism, so often pretends it itself has a necessary role to play in order to sustain 
political discourse, and that it is not only irreplaceable in rational but also in sustaining 
empirical political orders, this legal actor can be concluded to have become too self-
righteous.
The first characteristic of the system of states, organic self-formation, has already 
been adequately-widely recorded in terms of the borders of territories, the unwritten laws 
of war, treaties of mutual understanding, and honor codes. It is a conventional and 
utilitarian characteristic. By contrast, in order for the second characteristic to be 
appropriated by an ideological actor, liberalism, this second trait of the system may 
certainly be considered part of a deontic process. But it is disingenuous for liberalism to 
also claim that its negotiations and regulations are absolutely necessary to guide, as well 
as to balance the world-wide political process.379
The system of states is empirically self-formative, as conventional realists have 
detailed much more extensively. Moreover, classicist realists, in particular, would not 
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dare deny that the same system is simultaneously also invested in the social construction 
of identities, and in the rational creation of legally-regulated balancing processes. 
Unwavering liberals would disagree with these classicist realists, however, when the 
former are arguing that legal regulation and rational balancing are institutions that inform 
the dominant variables in explaining IR. To liberals, the empirical self-formation process 
is less dominant, and less important than the rational self-regulation, and legal-normative 
balancing process. According to a classicist realist such as Machiavelli, as will now be 
demonstrated, both the material self-formation element and the ideational self-regulative 
element must be integrated without trying to strike the middle between the elements. 
These are simply to be presented as the two main elements of any IR system, during any 
era, and the political question the people as a whole should decide on, therefore, is how 
these elements may be brought together to generate sustainable symbioses and ethical 
synapses—but without losing their distinctive traits.
This political question has become all the more pressing because system 
instability results not only from war. Both dyadic wars and bilateral peace agreements 
have been losing much influence in terms of how the world perceives matters of stability. 
Although they have not been disappearing phenomena, because the United Nations 
Charter is in so many ways the most influential peace treaty to have ever seen the light of 
day, rarely can in the post-Cold War world any strictly bilateral accords or even not any 
dyadic forms of political enmity be discerned. The classic wars between two enemies are 
gradually, but also functionally being replaced by overlapping regional alliances, by 
alliances that ‘pool’ many of their executive powers, by UN-led military interventions, 
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the legalization of responsibilities to protect, by debt management régimes, and by trans-
state forms of international economic competition that callously violate Earth’s 
ecosystemic limits. System instability has thus increasingly become a multi-source and 
complex phenomenon.380
Tensions are building up through chain reactions and conflictual synapses, so that 
instability can by now already be said to result from individual patterns of behavior. The 
anti-ecological patterns of consumer behavior are patterns which are in great part 
diminishing biodiversity, at an unprecedented rate, and which are causing average 
temperatures to rise, draughts, soil salination, and fisheries to disappear. But whereas 
individual consumers may opt to ‘ban-the-bag’, and reduce the usage of disposable 
petrochemical plastics, or even follow the zero-waste movement, the most intense source 
of system imbalance is still the type of transnational corporate competition that was first 
being developed during the nineteenth century era of mining and other exploration rights, 
colonial land grants, and corporate imperialism.381 The UN was disallowed from legally 
regulating the behavior of transnational corporate enterprises, as it was basically asked to 
back off by the UN Secretary-General (Kofi Annan) and the U.S. government (Bill 
Clinton), so that far too few corporate leaders have been forced in court to take on a more 
serious responsibility to serve the commons.382 Rather, most are perfectly in their right to 
deploy extremely skilled consultants, lawyers, and accountants who are camouflaging 
their tracks, or who otherwise able to shift the burdens of their personal responsibility to 
‘the competition’. Grave but continual violations of the spirit of environmental and 
natural resources law, either by individual citizens or corporate enterprises (such as Dow 
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Chemicals and its gassing of people living near its Bhopal, India, plant or such as BP, 
poisoning essential micro-organisms in the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska), have become 
increasingly difficult to trace—both by treaty-organizations such as the UN as well as the 
general public.383
Republican systems theory generally disavows the oligarchization and 
oligopolization of power, in the sense that it specifically disavows—to use Machiavelli’s 
words—the use of “gold” (surplus capital) and the use of “mercenaries” (corporate 
enterprise) in securing the ends of the state. To have a strong state, which would have to 
be the state of a free people, and which function through its care for an integrated 
constitution of powers, this republican theory dismisses any course of action which could 
possibly create economic and financial wagers on the state’s future. A free republic is not 
beholden to the grip of the marketplace. Yet, in the current era, republican theory has lost 
too much ground to the liberal theorem that instead holds the good is individually-
determined. According to modern-day liberalism, the total aggregate of consumers is 
nearly identical to the specific consumer preferences of each individual. If there is a 
commons, or if there is a good, then that good will have to have been determined as 
efficiently as possibly—by both the aggregate market outcomes, and by the property laws 
and taxation schemes that mostly aid corporations to protect their operations on this 
market. Under social conditions determined by liberalism, the market becomes the state, 
and the state the market, because there is no sense of constitutional contrariness between 
the two.
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“[T]he market (or the state as its surrogate) has no higher goal than to realize a 
social condition where the greatest proportion of consumers have their preferences for 
social welfare satisfied.” Against this liberal theorem, as formulated in the environmental 
law primer by Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, this same book holds that it  should 
be considered perfectly possible to decide—on the ground of laws already passed in the 
U.S. Congress, and elsewhere—that Nature’s intrinsic diversity and “functional integrity 
[are a] ... necessary and primary component of the moral integrity of humanity.” For 
instance, the primer shows this type of decision may be applied in accordance to old civil 
law principles. These principles were traditionally based on “practical reason”, following 
Immanuel Kant, and could thus certainly have been applied to cases of land use and 
zoning—in order to help protect any possible local ecosystem (but particularly also 
protect it if the ecosystem would be “old-growth, or supports a unique biodiversity, and is 
relatively untrammeled”). Kant’s argument about justice is shown, further, to validate the 
premise that the “moral ideal of human integrity ... requires a sound environment and 
regulated use of resources, [serving] ... the essential needs of all generations”. This first 
premise simply means there is a practical obligation to protect Nature’s utility. The 
argument concludes on a more deontological note, however, as ecosystems are also 
wholes: not only practical needs-fulfilling resources. As functionally-integrated wholes, 
ecosystems have thus also “a capacity, ability, and purpose” that makes it possible to say 
they are transcending, and yet have been inclusively creating the conditions for humanity 
to thrive.384
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Without having to read Kant, his argument is apparently of service to the 
scholarly field of (international) environmental law (as it is used by Gillroy, Holland, and 
Campbell-Mohn), in a manner that may now be said to be almost completely consistent 
with both Hobbes’s and Machiavelli’s arguments that two types of realist ethics should 
somehow be integrated without losing their distinctive traits, as these two characteristics 
will nonetheless continue to appear mutually exclusive. That is, in these arguments, also, 
the integration of utilitarian and deontological ethics is believed to be a move consistent 
with the expanded use of civil law—both in extraordinary constitutional matters as well 
as in assessing ordinary property law cases.385 Hobbes’s application of a certain rhetorical 
trope, better known as paradiastole (among “the Tudor rhetoricians”), forms in and of 
itself such an argument in defense of the Roman civil law tradition. By augmenting the 
tension between opposite courses of action, such as those of pride versus honor, Hobbes 
was himself again following both Cicero and Aristotle (Hobbes had translated the latter’s 
Rhetoric).386
Hobbes used paradiastole, as his rhetorical figure, but his purpose was to establish 
a realist scientific method of integrating honesty and utility, and thus both empirical truth 
and rational interest as well (again, this would have been placing Hobbes’s distinction 
between natural passions and the laws of nature in line with Cicero’s categories).
To continue the thought-experiment with the sort of international law that might 
apply to the behavior of corporate enterprises, almost regardless of state borders, it is 
clear that the problem is about establishing jurisdiction—or sovereignty. At the current 
time, there are no international tribunals responsible for the adjudication of crimes 
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against Earth. There are no legal parties representing Earth. Even if there would have 
been such criminal/environmental law tribunals, in addition, there would remain few 
incentives for states to punish the largest polluters or at least to make them pay for the 
damages they incur on future generations. These generations simply cannot represent 
themselves, after all, because tribunals are by definition in the business of only 
retroactively determining the answers to guilt questions.
Because of the puzzle every international environmental lawyer faces, which is 
created by the absence of Earth’s sovereignty, the proposition should be made to begin to 
solve their problem by means of the legal parity principle. This principle could be used 
by conventional IR theorists as part of their studies of proactive state behavior, such as 
their studies of deterrence and balancing. IR theorists will then also need to revisit the 
concept of prudence, which points to proactive responsibilities and wise decisions. Who 
judges the wisdom and prudence of statespersons—and who should be doing so, on 
behalf of complex ecosystems and natural law? Before returning to Hobbes’s 
paradiastolic illumination of his civic science, the answer to the ‘who judges?’ may 
already be found in Machiavelli (who, like Hobbes, must have understood both Cicero 
and the various neo-Aristotelian, or neo-Platonist discourses quite well).
It shall now be demonstrated that the Florentine Secretary developed an advanced 
civic scientific method, which predates Hobbes’s realist method in that it already contains 
some paradiastolic tropes, in order to boost the Republic of Florence’s self-sustainability 
and auto-immunity. Machiavelli places much trust in his concept of prudence, or in virtú, 
further, because he argues this would be the one quality that can integrate the decision-
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making process while also continuously discerning between two contrary characteristics. 
And, applications of prudence reduce of course the contingent risk of a calamity (they 
help “master” Fortuna). Environmental welfare and ecosystemic well-being would, 
according to him, have to be seen as systemic qualities. These qualities can best be 
maintained by larger groups of people, who come together to decide how risks to the 
environment should be managed, which is to say to decide on how prudently their 
executive statespersons are acting.387 The question of how prudently state officials are 
actually responding to possibly calamitous changes and systems bifurcations, then, is to 
be solved by the people’s asking how their executives could alternatively have managed 
contingencies and how their adjudicators could and should have avoided the middle way 
in doing so.
The Harsh Nature of Power: Readings in Machiavellian Systems Theory
Are statespersons adequately prepared for future changes, such as armed conflict 
but also such as famines, draughts, and rising sea-levels? What does it mean to be 
studying contingency scenarios, and can statespersons be demanded to know how to 
respond to the many possibly-transpiring exceptions thereto? What type of power should 
they share? Machiavelli’s response is now obvious: priority must be given to body over 
mind, and to “matter over form”. History tends to corrupt “matter” and thereby leads the 
state into disorderliness—“unless there is a ‘return to beginnings.’” As Miguel E. Vatter 
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reads the (former) Secretary’s passages, they reverse ancient Greek’s philosophical 
primacy of the forms. Now matter passes into a position of primacy: “from being the 
primary source of corruption and disorder, matter has passed to be [historical disorder’s] 
primary object.”388
Machiavellian realism is a theoretical materialism. It helps the political theorist 
who prepares and coaches statespersons on the fact that some material and some actual 
sort of balance will have to be struck between ‘their’ powers. This power-balancing skill 
becomes evident among those statespersonswho at minimum know how to actwithin the
balance between functionally opposite powers. Thus, as these persons are often seen 
busying themselves formulating policy-responses to contingent events—such as intense 
kinds of climate adversity, terrorism, or perhaps to civil war as well—their ambition 
should never be to be ranking the forms (their proper interactions) above the materialism 
of power (the concrete contingencies of imbalance). They should not be running a 
legally-owned business or any other such a formal operation on their own behalf, for 
instance, as they should rather be sharing their powers in a concrete sense—with their 
peers. They are after all isonomous actors, as Vatter shows.389 Especially, they should not 
be letting the power of their rational (universalist) mentality dominate any empirical, or 
also not any of their commonsensical interpretations of (particular) series of unseemingly 
harsh and indiscriminate, contingent events.390
Realists agree with Vatter’s Machiavelli: human power is ambivalent, and yet the 
concrete materialism of power is what must be attended to before idealist or legalist 
forms of power can be conceived—by returning to the origins of these forms. Prudent 
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statespersons will be those who use their concrete power in deciding to act either in 
accordance to rational or even metaphysical precepts, as they are according their various 
individual interests to the good of most people, or they should act by reflecting on their 
training or on their experience with formal contingency plans. Yet, either/or decisions on 
the use of power are not always advisable. Exemplary statespersons should thus also be 
able to use political rationalism (utility) in conjunction with their empirical preparations 
in having long-observed the laws of nature (honesty). 
From within the dualities of form/matter and honesty/utility appears now another 
problem. This problem is that theconjectural sort of conjunction of the dualities itself will 
have to remain contingent since, paradoxically, it will never be perfect. For, it is 
impossible to fully return or restore their beginnings and origins: time corrupts even the 
most revolutionary constitutional beginnings. There is no escape from History’s 
degenerative impact on constitutionalism. Thus,the conjectural conjunction holds always 
on to some sort of emptiness within itself, better known as Althusser’s aleatory or 
political void.391
While he was part of a generation of authors redefining the problem of conjectural 
dualism, Machiavelli breaks in some but not in all respects with the fifteenth-century 
author Giovanni Pontano, among others.The latter had still taught that the good statesman 
has to have learned from History, and even from the study of metaphysics that he “must 
always administer something more than strict justice”—as Skinner indeed examines 
Pontano’s Ciceronian, early-Renaissance vain. Besides knowing how to execute “strict 
justice”, Pontano’s ideal prince must also have cultivated his surplus sense of “clemency” 
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(this sense consists of his knowing when to be making exceptions that confirm the policy-
rule, presumably), as well as his virtue of benevolence. (Note, however, that benevolence 
or liberality are at their depths still very much socio-economic values; they involve what 
is nowadays referred to as ‘government hand-outs’, and thus should take no immediate 
part in the relation between justice and mercy.) Also, cultivation of each of these virtues 
demands from this statesman that he will be holding on to his “faith with God, treating 
justice in that context as equivalent to piety”.392
The heart of Niccolò Machiavelli’s argument is less-far removed from this 
Ciceronian vein—in which human justice acquires ‘equivalence’ to divine mercy—than 
that Skinner might think. Skinner thinks Machiavelli’s prince is virtuoso because he 
wants to know when “to overcome the vagaries of fortune, and to rise to ... glory”. He 
would thereto let himself be guided “by necessity rather than by justice.”393 But, as the 
next sections clarify, this is not what Machiavelli argues: he does not say that necessity, 
or the harsh contingencies of the laws of nature, must somehow triumph over a mere 
human interest in just and fair relations with others. Instead he says that the necessity of 
History should be overcome by politically free actors. The corrupting effects History has 
on justice are to be moderated and yet affirmed by the freedom of discordant action. The 
duality of both justice and of mercy—or, in again other words, of both the executive 
imperative of maintaining social justice and of a semi-metaphysical adjudication of 
grace—should be allowed to coincide, somewhat mysteriously, despite their 
opposition.394This conjectural coincidence is analogous to the one of respectively utility 
and honesty, or also of consequentialism and deontic responsibilities.
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Other misreadings of republican systems theory have been offered by Benedetto 
Fontana and (by his source) Antonio Gramsci. Fontana’s reading finds almost every 
statesperson presented in Machiavelli to be acting as an egotist. Every person’s “critical 
orientation” is found to be inseparable and indistinguishable, therefore, from that same 
statesperson’s “empirical reality” and “experience”. There is “no hard-and-fast distinction 
between thought and reality”, according to Fontana (as Femia summarizes his reading).395
That would suggest that systems theory suffers from methodological monism, in which 
empirical experience and rational thought may be blended at will, whereas Machiavelli’s 
own theory (counter-evidently) should have been demarcating these two methods of 
understanding without denying their interrelatedness. Yet, on the premise that cognitively 
philosophical and cognitively political bodies of understanding are indeed interrelated, 
just as that contemplation and action should be, it may very well be concluded that 
Machiavelli did tease out several differences.
Joseph V. Femia may be read to have nicely summed up these differences, as 
republican systems theory at the same time should be expected to integrate the ideal 
statesperson’s “passionate commitment to certain political ideas” (and to certain 
nationalist ideals), with his “equally passionate attachment to objective methods of 
analysis.”396 For, as Althusser’s Machiavelli and Us alludes, Machiavelli always presents 
the two methods as equal negatives—and he presented them always in conjunction as 
well, so that the ‘true’ state’s power is neither strictly passionate nor only empirical, 
neither only strict nor only merciful, but rather simultaneously both abstract-merciful and 
concrete-just, or both idealist and materialist, and so on.397
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Foreign policy-makers, in accordance to both systems theory and classicist 
realism, should be proactive in such ways that they will manage to avoid extreme 
trajectories. In discerning the differences between what it all could mean if they were to 
act either only idealistically or only materialistically, they can come to reach better 
decisions. The research hypothesis is thus whether Machiavelli, as exponent of 
republican systems theory, supported the notion that decision-makers should neither only 
become dependent on rationally-designed but abstract blueprints (strict justice), nor only 
on empirically-observed idiosyncrasies (the human spirit of sociability). Proactivity and 
prudence, to these decision-makers, should rather appear as something that is contingent 
on a level of integration of both of these types of dependencies—and thus both on the 
rational and the empirical. At the inter-personal or at the meso-level, prudence means 
then also that individual statespersons should train themselves to recognize ambivalent 
tensions within, as well as that they should become able to publically express confidence 
in the prospects of integrating and restoring the natural equilibrium of both their state’s 
rationalist mentalities and its empiricist movements.
Further, at the macro-level of groups of statespersons, and in the relations 
between constitutional states, this need for integration (or: prudence) means that the 
balance between rational execution and natural law—or between humanity’s two 
constitutional powers—is to be thought of as a balance that will prove its resilience to 
sudden changes, and especially also to the variously-changing signs of international 
imperialism and civil wars. Henceforth, the issue for realist statespersons is not that their 
policies must reflect either only their rational-legislative foundations or only their 
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concrete observations of executive-adjudicative powers (strict justice), but that they 
create a stable blend of powers that will not degenerate and that will not negate its own 
inner contrariness—because such a loss of stability would be likely to result in the 
blend’s own powerlessness, and again increase the risk of war.398
In On Violence, Arendt warned that human power is integral and wholesome but 
may also easily be lost: it cannot be individualized. Power is never solipsistic, because if 
only one individual would come to be considered powerful, at the microlevel, then this 
would already have to be interpreted as a metaphorical sign of that individual’s 
powerlessness. Power is thus rather a macro-organizational form, naturally corresponding 
“to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert.” Also, it would impossible to 
observe power in the absence of power’s own natural relationship towards a people’s 
acting together, other than for the purpose of their self-empowerment (the potestas in 
populo-principle, as she calls it).399 Individuals who think their power is held in their own 
possession will eventually be confronted with the banality of their actions—and thus also 
with the harsh reality of power’s opposite element: sociability and commonsense.400
Machiavelli argues power is about social integration: it simply and structurally 
cannot be born by individuals. This raises the ante on realists; they must now corroborate 
their paradigm, by asking how power is organized. Because, if it is not an individual then 
who may organizationally maintain the balance of powers? Neither Caesar nor Alexander 
the Great and neither Scipio nor Hannibal had held their executive power without not also 
having been empowered—either by their infantry alone, or also by the peoples whose 
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lands they invaded and apparently would choose not to organize any militias against 
them.401
In conquering respectively Spain and Italy, Scipio and Hannibal took opposite 
courses of action, because one was loved and the other feared, yet they achieved “the 
same success”. As Machiavelli deliberately amplifies the message Livy had conveyed, 
Scipio would have acted with “humanity” and Hannibal had only been believed to have 
acted with “every kind of perfidy”, so why does he then argue that both generals had 
been able to cancel the “errors” they undoubtedly committed during their campaigns and 
gained great successes? The Secretary’s answer may seem so simple, but it is not. At 
instant sight, he gives merely an empirical explanation why these men would never have 
distinguished themselves either by “an excess of gentleness, or by too great severity.”402
[H]e who carries too far the desire to make himself beloved will soon become 
condemned, if he deviates in the slightest degree from the true path; and the other, 
who aims at making himself feared, will make himself hated, if he goes in the 
least degree too far; and our nature does not permit us always to keep the just 
middle course. Either extreme, therefore, must be compensated by some 
extraordinary merits, such as those of Hannibal and Scipio; and yet we see how 
the conduct of both of these brought them disgrace as well as the highest 
success.403
Indeed, at first view, the phrase “we see” indicates Machiavelli’s choice for 
historical observation. In the same pages, however, he also finds all human beings are 
rational beings: they will also have been animated by their self-interests. People not only 
love their republics just as that soldiers not only love and respect their generals, that is, 
because they also have a need for self-preservation. The two passions of love and fear 
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cannot be separated from one another, therefore, despite their proclivity to oppose each 
other—and thus also despite Machiavelli’s “fondness for strong antitheses”.404 Yet, as 
Femia adds, when this “fondness” is nonetheless so clearly being expressed in the Scipio 
vs. Hannibal case, it supports both a rhetorical as well as scientific technique typical of 
the Renaissance. That technique indicates several reasons why the Renaissance authors 
must have been confident they were gaining ethical knowledge while using both 
examples of the norms (make yourself loved, display benevolence, have mercy, and so 
forth) and counter-examples of the “exceptions that prove the rule.” Henceforth, in other 
words, Hannibal’s being feared is one of the several possible counter-objections or 
‘rescue hypotheses’ that allow Machiavelli to co-present actionable tropes. By presenting 
two alternative courses of action (including: being loved/being feared),  he leaves it to his 
audiences to opt for the best possible action.405 Critically, after they will have chosen 
from among the possible contraries, they must not waver.
To sum up these introductory sentences, realist systems theorists resort to a 
paradiastolic presentation of dualities—because they are warning against excessive 
polarizations and dichotomizations. When dualities are presented, they should instead be 
understood as coincidences of the organizational process and the structures this process 
transcends. This results into paradiastoles such as justice and license, or piety and herecy, 
but also such as execution and pardon, legality and discretion, or the dispositions for love 
and for fear. Each duality is of course in practical terms very difficult to discern, because 
the consequences of stepping into either one dimension of these ethically-authoritative 
dualities may be highly similar to those of stepping into its very opposite dimension. A 
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prudent statespersons will have to have trained her eye, or her method of recognition, 
therefore, in order to avoid confusing the full-mix hybridization of both the two elements 
with their conjecture.
With the aid of Benner, this section has sufficiently validated the above thesis 
that, as a realist, Machiavelli was correct to have little patience with all the different 
statespersons who forgot that their usage of the same element could bring them opposite 
results, depending on their own personal dispositions and social backgrounds. Likewise, 
statespersons would too often forget that the use of opposite elements may also have the 
same result, which is why the Secretary must have taught that Scipio, once again, was as 
“successful” as Hannibal; Scipio had used the opposite course of making himself beloved 
in a territory wherein Hannibal was being feared.406 What is critical to observe in such 
cases is that model persons, at least in matters of peace and justice, are not trying to be 
consistent with their own track records; they should not feel compelled to keep too 
narrowly to “the just middle course”. They are better off thinking it preferable to step into 
that one dimension that opposes their own disposition, so that beloved generals should try 
to become feared, and so that cruel statespersons will learn to make an effort to be 
respected out of loyalty. Generals who think they must only apply the element of fear (or 
of strict justice) to their advantage, for instance, under circumstances in which they are 
already being feared by their soldiers, might find themselves in a void, as their actions 
will now be perceived as excessive, and they will only go on to produce a monstrous 
form of powerlessness. Power is naturally harsh: it can suddenly be lost to a self-
indulgent course of excess.
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The Prudence Needed to Imitate Great States: Combining Action with Contemplation
Philosophy and politics should be coinciding within, without becoming fully 
united by, the republican systems theory that is the joint product of both Rousseau and 
Machiavelli.  
To revive the state, Machiavelli’s systems theory recommends a combination of 
both “action” and “study”. In Chapter 14, in The Prince, he approves of actions such as 
engaging in the hunt, of actively learning “the nature of the land” (“to better defend it”), 
as well as of all those acts likely to keep the body of citizens and the soldiers “disciplined 
and exercised”. As for “study”, and the “exercise of the mind”, however, he approves of 
“history”—because that field was studied by great men. It had allowed “Alexander the 
Great [to have] imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus.” It is “history” 
that can teach—as it did to Scipio—the virtues of “chastity, affability, [and] humanity.” 
“[L]iberality” is a fourth virtue to be learned from the contemplative life, but it should be 
restricted within the world of action. A training in the traditional Christian virtues, then, 
stands in the service of study, history, and philosophy. An alternative curriculum will 
have to serve activist decision-makers, as they have  to redistribute the property of their 
“subjects” (as Cyrus and Caesar had done, of course). These decision-makers must follow 
the commendable pathway of subordinating their spending patterns to their concern with 
maintaining political status and sufficient honor. Machiavelli: “[S]pending the [surplus] 
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wealth of others will not diminish your reputation, but increase it, [as] only spending your 
[individual] resources will hurt you.”407 Redistribution of goods and private austerity, in 
other words, are likely to help remedy any experienced constitutional deficiency in the 
first course on humaneness.
To resuscitate a state-like patient who has “neither inward peace nor outward 
repose”, however, Rousseau uses his own life as the definitive example. He does not use 
philosophy but action, at least on a par with philosophy, when he prescribes himself 
solitary walks. He mentions then also, in his reveries, how he had long tried, against the 
odds, to recover his personal state of “serenity, tranquillity, peace, and even happiness”. 
He finally succeeded to revitalize this state of peace, but only to a degree, and only after 
he had come to understand that philosophy alone could not have given him repose. He 
had needed to act by bringing joy to others, so that he finally understands why so often 
the measures other men may use, in their “judgments”, and in their “opinions, are merely 
the fruit of their passions or of the prejudices which spring from these passions”. Their 
degeneration and corruption results from a general failure to understand that men may 
merely “give themselves an appearance of impartiality” when they are called upon to 
express their “opinions”—while behind all these appearances they will try to make false 
accusations, and are “quite prepared to slander”.408 Nevertheless, who or what gave 
Rousseau the confidence to say that the wills of all are prejudicial and degenerative, by 
nature?
Machiavelli had greater confidence in the natural wills of all, saying that the many 
have a divine voice that should not be not-heard.409  He may not have been the only 
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classic realist to have immediately informed Rousseau about the need to understand the 
qualitative difference between the wills of a multitude and that single divine voice, 
resounding the general will, but he was certainly one of the very few authors to have 
reminded Rousseau of the cross-section of both this first difference as well as the various 
other differences such as those between appearances and realities, or between imitations 
and actions. As the Florentine formed thus more than just likely a vital background player 
in Rousseau’s play The Social Contract. (By the way, Chapter Three’s final examinations 
shall introduce Machiavelli’s own response to the paradoxes Rousseau created in The 
Social Contract, in the form of the former’s admiration for the Order of San Giorgio, if 
not only because Rousseau would hopelessly ignores his exemplar.)
Anyhow, it is critical to know Machiavelli’s philosophy followed on several 
points Cicero’s, just as that Hobbes would come to take the course of Ciceronian civic 
science, as both Machiavelli and Hobbes ended up analogizing an ideal constitution both 
to a complex natural system (the body politick) as well as to a humanly-created ongoing 
process (of recognizing sovereign authority). Philosophy and action, again, would thus 
always be analogized and would be coinciding, even, into a theory of a complex, multi-
level, constitutional system. This system would both be static and dynamic: fixed and in 
flux.410 To use another analogy, each level of the system expressed a degree of the body 
and one of the mind. In his own classic attempt to cope with issues of “discord” and 
“sedition”, Cicero had clearly argued that this constitutional system both reveals itself in 
its “physical shape” as well as in each person’s “mind”, which is like a “god”. “Know 
then that you [in your mind] are a god as surely as a [particular] god is someone who is 
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alert, who feels, who remembers, who rules and guides and moves the body of which he 
is in command—just as that leading God does for the universe.”411 It sounds as if 
Cicero’s concepts of alertness and experience (feeling, memory) were intended to give 
meaning to a sacred integration of body and mind.
Machiavelli must have held him in high esteem in passages such as the one in 
which he argues the Romans would never have avoided identifying the opposites before 
integrating them: “the Romans never took any undecided middle course”. In coping with 
the danger of sedition, rather, they followed a founder such as Numa, who had 
successfully integrated revelations with his command. They would thus have 
productively integrated the revealed particularities of their subjects, with their own 
universal rule and imperial guidance. When faced with the choice to either be proceeding 
“with cruel severity against the vanquished, who have surrendered,” or to be juridically 
incorporating them, for instance, they typically opted for the second course of action. 
This must mean they so asked formerly hostile individuals to become their equals: their 
citizen-subjects. Upon seeing such a sign of their mercy, the latter would in turn become 
more vigilant: their own obedience to the Roman Empire was to be “cheerfully 
rendered”. The Romans acted hereby in the name of their strategic long-term 
considerations for peace, however, simply because they had learned from history, and “in 
accordance with the example of [their] ... ancestors, [they should be] ... granting the 
vanquished the rights of citizenship”.412
In one sacred dimension, the constitutional state remains an ideal or a god. This is 
the case because, in the revealed dimension, the system cannot be said to be in perfect 
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equilibrium. Every state’s two capabilities will still display a minimal degree of enmity 
towards each other, and imbalance is real and regular. However, as an ideal state, that 
constitutional state’s characteristic propensity towards equilibrium is analogous to a 
divine voice and a venerable natural law, which all the individual human beings can only 
hope to obey. But belief is stronger than hope, and so human beings will in reality also 
have to find ways to express their distinct beliefs, confessions, superstitions, prejudices, 
and individual interests in ways conducive to public action, civic religiosity, and 
constitutional fidelity. 
Machiavelli never answers his own question who the state’s savior should be 
believed to be. He rarely refers to the Christ, or to Moses, for that matter, and in the final 
end seems to have given his scholarly preference to worldly actors such as Alexander and 
Cyrus, even above extraordinary legislators such as Lycurgus and Numa. So, he plainly 
never answers his own question who the ideally-imitated state’s resuscitator should be, 
perhaps precisely because he so well understood that even that individual will have to 
have personal prejudices and private interests. In comparison, only the many appear to 
him to be incorruptible. He celebrates popular pluralism, as only the many appear to 
exercise the impartial, unbiased sort of “judgment” that the state needs to survive, he 
argues, so that there is “good reason [to believe] ... ‘the voice of the people is the voice of 
God’.”413 As was demonstrated earlier, from Machiavelli’s perspective, it is possible to 
argue that “fear of God, or fear of justice, [is] ... necessary to sustain any [political] 
orders”.414 That perspective, on the political necessity of a civic religion (grounded both 
in a fear of, and a popular belief in Christ), may not have been shared by Naess althus, 
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yet it would be this deep-ecological systems theorist who further validated—and who 
further spread the popular belief in—the observation that all of Nature, including human 
nature, “bears witness to God”.415
All of nature, including human nature, has been created by God, so the 
constitutional laws that govern the constitutions of states are among the manifold 
assertions of God’s creative will. Humans ought to obey these laws, as if they are laws of 
nature, because ultimately all laws must have have been divined by one will—however 
unfathomable. Machiavelli agreed with this prescription. Contrary to what some of his 
detractors might say about him, he thus certainly did not draw any fatalistic or nihilistic 
conclusions from this notion, that constitutional states are God’s work, and that their 
externally-appearing autopoietic dynamics would therefore have to be imitated even 
though their structural essences remain immeasurable and incomprehensible. Also, he 
might not have read Nicholas de Cusa (Nicolaus Cusanus), for instance, and yet the 
Secretary was familiar with his political theology. He would certainly have agreed with 
Cusa that the ultimate exemplar, for men, should be believed to be God’s own worldly 
creativity. Of course, God’s imagination is limitless, yet his creative thinking may be 
humanly observed—and should therefore be imitated in its infinite variety. Creation’s 
diversity and self-regulatory capabilities are to be sustained, and to be guarded politically. 
For God reveals his own creativity in the flux of all things, as Cusa had found, as well as 
in the quintessentially Heraclitean notion that ‘no game game is played the same way 
twice’.416
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Both God’s justice and human license, or both divined norms and positivist 
decisions, coincide within each state’s characteristic disposition. The question political 
theologians are trying to answer is how they should try to understand this coincidence of 
what appear to be opposites; justice and license, right and wrong. Machiavelli answers 
their question to a limited extent: virtuous rulers will much better understand why they 
should give equal consideration to both opposites. Prudent rulers function as judges, 
establishing both the facts and the intentions, both the actions and the interests of each 
case. But they also are so prudent and wise not to ‘split the difference’.417 Contrary to 
positivized neo-Aristotelian analysts, who try to do exactly this, Machiavelli’s ruler-
judges tolerate considerable difference and disagreement among the parties. Why would 
they not want to join Montesquieu’s middle-level and Rousseau’s intermediary 
magistrates in getting the parties to agree as much as possible? Is Machiavelli so skeptical 
about the prospects of inter-class cooperation? Or, why has his work remained relevant 
anyhow, in today’s world? Two possible reasons for his relevancy should be examined.
The first reason is that Machiavelli himself believes the history of republican 
thought to be fraught with failures and tragedies—which is why prudent people learn 
from history. All states can be  shown to degenerate, and even Rome died (Machiavelli is 
quite explicit that that was due to her failure to master the Decemvirs, or to internal 
causes, basically). And in all states, at one point or another, balances have been disturbed. 
Civil wars may have broken out because the body politick’s natural passion for either 
tyranny or anarchy could not be constrained. Oftentimes it would also remain unclear 
who was to be believed responsible for placing the restraints on  that tendency towards 
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either licentiousness or despotism. So, when no one is thought responsible, Machiavelli 
warns in ways that are reminiscent of Rousseau’s more than Cicero’s, everything will 
become contingent and Fortuna will seem to align herself with license. She may either 
give a show of force (despotically) or, more likely, she may be turning herself into an all 
too convenient scapegoat, used by everyone individually to justify their own 
licentiousness (anarchically).418 If this second likelihood becomes a reality, then Fortuna 
can be concluded to also symbolize the type of twentieth-century relativism that shares 
much with totalitarianism; Fortuna has then aligned herself with rule by no one in 
particular.419
The second reason is that the current era has been marked both by individual 
consumerism and cultural relativism, possibly because any sense of political partisanship 
is being suspected. That is, the people’s political-ideological preferences are 
conventionally being dismissed as a blind form of nationalism, or an archaic form of 
patriotism. To prevent that these forms gain any social standing, decisions are said to 
have to be left to the policy-experts and the consumer market, above all. Experts will 
have received positivist social-scientific training, which supposedly makes their actions 
more conducive to the modernization of the state and the system of states. But even both 
modernization and relativism are in actual fact nothing else than individualism’s 
“offshoot”. Relativism is, as Charles Taylor argues throughout his oeuvre, an 
individualistic and self-centered ideology. He calls this modern ideology “the liberalism 
of neutrality.”420 Liberalism reduces the state, which it fears, to a politically neutral affair. 
State policies are expected to remain depoliticized and impartial, out of fear that they will 
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infringe on individual rights. Not states, not sovereign authorities, but only individuals 
are supposed to decide on what is good and just for them—say positivists.
In the twentieth century, under ambiguous conditions similar to those Machiavelli 
observes, a seemingly impartial type of liberalism would rear its head. Immediately after 
the Second World War had ended, IR institutionalism would take the position that policy-
planners should profess to be knowledgeable and neutral about the universal stages of 
progress. The post-Cold War problem became, however, that these stages had been less 
progressive than imagined by liberal theorists. They had not been consecutive, let alone 
universal. Policy-designers had for decades stopped taking seriously the paradoxical 
tension between their own illusion to be working on universally applicable policy-
designs, one part of their day, and on reshaping consumer-cultural conditions in distant 
lands, on the other part. The Vietnam War is only one case in point. No one seemed to 
have an acute sense of the paradoxical tension between the positivist models of change—
as measured in abstract (kill, eradication) ratios, developed by policy-makers in 
Washington, DC, and at the RAND Corporation in California—and the actual interests, 
living conditions, and political sentiments of the diverse peoples of South-East Asia.421  
And in another case, U.S. foreign policy-designs for a universal ‘green’ revolution 
effectively homogenized all sorts of agricultural systems, erased biodiversity, diminished 
eco-resistance, and increased economic inequalities.422 In these cases, policy-
universalism did not make peace with diverse cultures, agricultural traditions, and 
ecological particularities: it sought out modern liberalism as a tool to erase them.
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Neoliberalism is an ideology of individual neutrality: it holds that what is fair and 
good for the individual is the same as what is good for the state. In this equation, the good 
is private self-interest. The good is consumerism. Political power and political 
partisanship may thus end up being dismissed as uncompetitive and economically 
ineffective. The “liberalism of neutrality” expects the parties to converge; eventually all 
political parties will be aligned with individual interests, anyway, so policies should push 
for greater convergences. Resultant convergences and syntheses are expected to facilitate 
(what Arendt would have described as), after all will have been said, “the smooth 
functioning of the consumer society.” Yet, in resistance to consumerism and 
individualism, Arendtian realism takes sides. It gives active coaching on why “it goes 
against the very nature of [individual] self-interest to be enlightened.” And, it shows 
“what the res publica, the public thing, is, [and] to behave non-violently—and [how to] 
argue rationally in matters of interest”.423
This current subsection concludes, now, in defense of both republican systems 
theory and the Arendtian method, that more detailed illustrations of the above reasons 
need to be drawn. Such illustrations may help convey how and why modernization, and 
post-Cold War neoliberalism in specific, have remained such ineffective medicines to the 
troubles of the world. Neoliberalism is an abstract market philosophy which amplifies 
social inequalities even though it expresses the hope it can accelerate the IR system’s 
degenerative cycles. It pretends to neutralize the need for politics, and thus also 
neutralizes the people’s voice’s resonances in “the public thing”. Consequentially, 
neoliberalism has in effect become its own ideology of consumer access and accelerated 
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changes; it produces more of the same changes, rather than that it applies the opposite 
elements—such as those consist of pro-environmental zoning laws, barter trade, 
economies of happiness rather than GDP, of commuter bicycles, local agriculture, and 
Slow Food. Neoliberalism is merely a philosophy without a political element, as it 
separates the contemplative study of modern liberties from the human need for 
politically-actionable imitations of great constitutional states.424
Republican Systems Theory and Machiavelli’s Political Scientific Method
Niccolò Machiavelli announces to his readers, to Renaissance Italy’s peoples, he 
will be developing a theory to explain certain ambivalent, but cyclical dualities in their 
forms of government. He calls on natural systems theory to make better sense of 
authority’s ambivalent cycles of contrariness, that is. He sees governmental organizations 
as being both naturally degenerative, and yet also as open to being turned into more 
sustainable structures. Machiavelli analogizes his observations of government to laws, 
governing the natural world. The social world of government, which remains subject to 
often-unfortunate contingencies and great callousness, is thus to be analogized to the 
natural world in which changes are being caused by temptuous, and even impetuous
“rivers”. Yet, he is no fatalist: not all is necessitous. Government authorities may exercise 
their freedom and tame these “rivers”. They may decide to build “dikes”; their humanism 
859
and their idealism can so help them to slow down, and possibly to modify the course of 
the cycles within the natural world’s open-ended structures.425
The secondary literature on Machiavelli is a mess. By calling the Florentine 
Secretary an admirer of the great personality—and of the one individual capable of 
bending the course of history, and of wrestling and then keeping down the historical 
pressure of cyclical contingencies—most commentators still take for granted their own 
watered-down versions of Friedrich Meinecke’s neo-Nietzschean interpretation.426 Joseph 
Parent argues the single greatest person consists of Romulus, John Geerken of Moses, 
and Peter Breiner allows this same mysterious person to consist of an amalgam of 
exemplary men.427 Laura Janara lays bare a sensitive nerve—in the body of secondary 
literature—as she concludes that not a man, but that eventually it would have to have 
been Elizabeth I of England who best symbolized Machiavelli’s great personality, the 
dual sovereign, by appearing to be both temptuous and self-contained, both self-serving 
and virtuous, both feminine and masculine, idealist and realist.428
What too few commentators have agreed on, however, is that if Machiavelli 
indeed thought of the sovereign as a single person of exemplary virtue, that he would 
then have to have been an idealist. Clichés such as ‘let the best man win’ or ‘the president 
will be on the right side of history’ are expressions of idealism because they presuppose 
that one individual can take responsibility—not so much for planning to change historical 
outcomes, as for improving the future chain of events. In that case, Machiavelli’s 
historical idealism would have to be inconsistent with his political realism, which 
alternatively suggests it amounts to self-deception and possibly also to self-righteousness 
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for anyone to try to challenge the future. This further suggests that the conventional 
individualizations of any historical expressions of virtú are inconsistent with several of 
the most significant paragraphs in the The Prince. In Chapter 23 it is clearly said that no 
sovereignty consists of only a prince, absent any consultations with the state’s counselors. 
The power of the prince is not his own: it only emerges from his acting in concert with 
counselors.429 Prudent rulers are those who respect the natural limits to their own volatile 
ambitions, and will not hesitate to ask advise while organizing the state in order to reign 
in all those things that would otherwise “be ruled by [pure] chance.”430 Apparently, it is 
only ‘realistic’ to be prudent.
It shall now be demonstrated that Machiavelli’s concept of a complex republican 
system is inconsistent with idealist presuppositions such as the one that modern history 
progresses towards a convergence of interests, and that any government should work to 
aid history in bringing about such a convergence. By contrast to the modern type of 
government that is closing history off to chance, Machiavelli’s republican system remains 
both open to and yet is itself being limited by chance. This is the concept of a system that 
is open towards historical changes (future risks), but that also resists being ruled by 
contingent changes (its is not governed randomly). In this respect, the republican system 
still forms a rational-scientific rather than only a historical-empirical category, 
additionally, because it depends on rational actors for its general well-being as well as 
their own. The mutual dependency of the republican popular structure and the individual 
organizational actors is being analogized, indeed, to the mutual relation between the 
rational-metaphysical category of God, on one hand, as well as the seemingly irrational 
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and random category of Fortuna, on that other hand. Both categories are being included, 
by means of The Prince’s Chapters 24 and 25, into this one complex system. By contrast 
to the silent but caring voice of God, in history, Fortuna acts destructively and always 
spectacularly. She shows off her forces wherever a government had somehow failed to 
take “measures ... to resist her”.“[She] directs her fury where she knows that no dikes or 
barriers have been made to hold her.”431
Fortuna is not analogous to the river itself, contrary to some common 
misperceptions. Instead, she symbolizes all kinds of historically unnatural, excessively 
forceful, or even the energy-inefficient government actor decisions. Instead, the river 
itself follows a naturally efficient course. All that human governments may hope for is 
that they will have been placing their barriers in such places near the river that these will 
not have obstructed its natural course. Governments may only hope that that the river 
shall not break through the embankment system. This means the river itself represents 
both government successes and failures at the same time—in order for Machiavelli’s 
analogy to remain coherent—and it can therefore not be identical to Fortuna, who must 
only be faulted for a system failure.
The river is a distinctive methaphor for human nature, and for “the nature of the 
times”, more precisely, best understood as taking humans on a two-dimensional route. In 
the first dimension, two otherwise-similar officials can be seen to fail, despite only one of 
them having acted with considerable “circumspection” and the other with great 
“impetuosity”. The reason for their general failure is here that Fortuna took their actions 
upstream, or against the current: their decisions had been blocking the natural flow. In the 
862
second dimension, there are again two officials. Both of the “two men succeed equally—
by different methods, one being cautious, the other impetuous”. Even though only one of 
them had organized the system in the downstream direction, and the other made no such 
provisions, both were now untouched by the natural waves. That is, only in the second 
dimension were the officials’ decisions (to either build or not build better dikes) 
unopposed “to the times”. Their governments followed the natural course of time. But 
measures taken by the relatively more “cautious” government were still preferable, if 
Machiavelli’s paradiastolic presentation of the river is to be taken seriously, nonetheless, 
because these measures can be empirically tested. Imprudent inaction, by contrast, cannot 
be proven to have displayed “the utmost human prudence”.432
With respect to historical change, prudence is really a variation on both Pascal’s 
wager, and on that other dictum of proactiveness: ‘the best defense waged by going on 
the offense’.433 Any government’s attack against Fortuna’s forces is likely to reduce the 
chances that excessively unfortunate times will, however accidentally, later come to 
break through the state’s defensive system.434 The fact that bad times may arrive in itself, 
however, is not humanly mitigated.
Finally, Fortuna serves as a rhetorical trope to warn that individual 
organizational actors will try to scapegoat others. Rather than to be allowed to blame 
others for their own “insolence”, however, these individuals should be called on to make 
concerted efforts in maintaining a defensive republican system—which Chapter 24 
defines as a system that withstands the test of time because it will have been “fortified ... 
with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples”.435
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To put this more briefly, while most commentators hint that Machiavelli’s 
republican system is dominated by a great person or an excellent prince, the one source 
that should verify their impression, The Prince, concludes alternatively. The main mode 
of organization to be recommended in the final chapters of The Prince is a mode of 
fortification and embankment  that consists of different types of alliances, armaments, 
and juridical institutions. The guiding organizational principle never sticks with structural 
singularity, but always favors pluralization and diversification. As both the river 
metaphor and Scipio vs. Hannibal have so clearly expressed, each single course of action 
is as much open to success as it is to failure. Each action is aleatory. Yet, in imitating the 
natural flow of time, the flow itself may have to be diverted. For an officer to imitate the 
laws of time, then, is for him to reduce the chances of system failure, however 
temporarily. Interestingly, to increase the robustness of the system, Machiavelli 
commends with this temporal identification of risk management also all those officers 
who found the courage to dare to respect both the intrinsic diversity as well as the path-
dependency of the (IR) system. Rather than to be paddling against the current, 
government officers should simply make the wager with time’s degenerative nature and 
newly begin to respect its natural laws and thus begin to imitate its own diversity of good 
practices.
To gradually work towards a conclusion to this ‘reintroductory’ examination: why 
has Machiavelli’s wager remained germane to political science? Because that wager is 
such a well-informed wager. There are both empirical and rational reasons to take the 
leap, and to begin to believe that any political system is undergoing all sorts of tidal, 
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seasonal, historical, non-linear changes—and that it would henceforth be rash and blind 
to assume that humans can eventually stop these historical tides. Human nature is not as 
malleable as that modernization theorists might have assumed, including those 
commentators who (falsely) categorize Machiavelli as having been the first analyst of 
modern politics.436 Rather, he understood that human individuals are structurally unable 
to accelerate time. They cannot create linear changes to the system, to put it in slightly 
other terms. Today’s complexity theorists would not want to bet with Machiavelli on the 
issue that in their encounters with non-linerar change, prudence is simply more sensible 
than impulsiveness. Because it is. They would also have to agree with him that 
diversified organizations are more resilient to change, and that all systems degenerate 
over the course of time. In the paradigm of complexity theory, this means that all systems 
comprise interdependent and interconnected dissipative structures.
His republican systems theory allows the Renaissance realist to propose several 
scientific hypotheses. The first sentences of the Discourses on Livy inform the primary 
hypothesis. All human beings, even after they might have been awarded with ranks and 
have become well-positioned in government, are too “prompt to blame” others (Fortuna) 
for their own incompetence. This sense of human fallibility, and this lack of 
responsibility on their part, makes it of course very difficult to formulate any scientific 
laws about the structural nature of their government. Nonetheless, science should dare to 
set sail and gather empirical cases involving the possibilities to help introduce “any new 
principles [that] ... may prove [themselves] for the common benefit of all”.437
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Again, these “new” organizational principles are never being modeled after some 
ideal modernist design. These principles are reasonable rather than rationalist. As such, 
they are said to remain fully embedded within the series of time-tested, ancient, but also 
ancestoral organizational principles. It is for this latter reason that the primary hypothesis 
of republican theory finds, and has found additional validation in contemporary 
complexity theory. It is still possible to speak of a republican systems theory, briefly, 
because Machiavelli’s proposal was to study the laws of nature as if they governed a 
complex system. His proposal was humble and Christian in premising human fallibility.
Machiavelli’s civic religion is also a political science. It holds that the laws of 
nature are to be believed to govern the state, by pious citizens. It also holds that the state 
of the people forms an irresponsible, self-corrupting, self-degenerating structure. Every 
state is a dissipative and path-dependent structure, in other terms; disorderly by nature, 
and yet open to orderly changes at the same time. Yet, government organizations will too 
often and too easily end up being faulted (scapegoated, even) for having created 
turbulence. Or, they will be praised for having created turbulence when it allowed them 
to make short-term gains. As the primary hypothesis of the Discourses holds, rarely are 
they being praised for having generated a better long-term balance. This means any state 
government is also open to contingency and chaos.
Even though idealists may expect Machiavelli’s political science to propose to 
only give praise where praise is due, it actually never does. If any assessment of due 
praise should be made, it would have to be left to the greatest whole in the system, the 
people, rather than to any factions or counselors. The many are best able to assess when 
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their country is truly being endangered, and who should be exercising the responsibility 
for mitigating that threat to their country’s freedom. For, in these popular risk 
assessments, as Lentulus once took part in them, it will somehow always be found that 
“no considerations of justice and injustice, ... nor of glory or of shame should be allowed 
to prevail.”438
Anyone’s assessments of ideals such as glory and of anti-ideals such as injustice 
are deeply flawed: these opinions can only be used to destabilize government. But it is 
impossible to avoid such assessments and judgments altogether: they are also in the 
nature of political discourse, however fallacious they might be. Politically attributive-
organizational chaos will therefore simply have to be accepted: it is a necessary part of 
the life of the state, even though such chaos also somehow remains on a par with 
orderliness. The system of states therein not only consists of dissipative and path-
dependent government structures. It also functions analogously to other chaotic-and-yet-
ordered living systems, thus. These systems are “structurally open, but [may become] 
organizationally closed.” As natural systems theorist Fritjof Capra continues, they are the 
kind of (political) ecosystems that contain their dissipative tendencies while applying 
their self-stabilizing powers; thus displaying a “seemingly paradoxical coexistence of 
change and stability.”439 Like other living systems, constitutional states have the powers 
to appear to be acting in a stable, law-like, and self-binding manner, on the organizational 
plane, yet they always remain vulnerable to their own structural imbalances. 
Once they try to take away these imbalances, modern states will violate laws of 
nature.
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The Exemplary Mismatch of Corruption and Progress and Lorenzo the 
Magnificent’s Coinciding Opposites
In 1492, the Republic of Florence lost much of its autonomy. Lorenzo de’ Medici 
died that year. Despite being head of the most-influential Medici family, he had 
maintained the appearance of only serving as a citizen:not as holding supreme powers but 
as first among all others (primus inter pares).440 His commitment to civic equality had 
been laudable and honorable, but it was not as widely shared as it should have been. For, 
his death could not prevent the City of Florence’s becoming structurally dependent on its 
own inequalities—which were later exploited by surrounding principalities, such as the 
leaders of Milan and the Court of Rome (that is, the Pope).441 These other statelets and
principalities soon intruded on Florence’s civic life. In preventing the re-emergence of an 
executive as strong as Lorenzo the Magnificent had once been, Machiavelli implies, the 
statelets would essentially have allowed Italy’s public affairs to be explored by outside 
forces, including those of the King of France, so that the country became “ruined” and 
kept in “desolation” for decades to come—as the last sentence of Machiavelli’s Histories 
of Florence sums up.442
It remains open to speculation whether Machiavelli is here arriving at the 
conclusion that his beloved Florence’s loss of equal freedom had been fatal for the Italian 
system of states, or that it might have formed an opportunity to satisfy his deeper, more 
nationalist ambitions. Not just the Tuscans, as The Prince would conclude (Chapter 26), 
but all Italians might learn from their own past, after all. Constitutional restorations lay 
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within the realm of Italy’s possibilities. And, as the Discourses would reiterate that 
conclusion, ancient Rome’s constitutional foundations may still be brought back to their 
original glory.443 Is the Histories a work that is meant to expand on this ambitious 
perspective? Is the text so adding fuel to a fires of nationalism and modern state-oriented 
idealism?444
It shall here be premised that Histories of Florence’s underlying intention is to 
come to be read as a validation of classicist concepts of both freedom and prudence, as 
well as of the DST, but not of modern state-idealism and also not of individual rights. 
The private interest of all the specific citizens and dynasties, on one side, and the public 
good of Tuscany in general, on another side, are constantly being brought together by the 
author—following his own classicist pattern of scientific argumentation. In good times, 
the citizens and their republic are presented in unison. But most of the time, actually, they 
are seen to be contradicting each other, possibly violently. The presentations and the 
stories of Histories, including those about Lorenzo’s exercise of personal discretion to 
negotiate a peace with Naples as well as his simultaneously respecting of the popular 
orders, all add up to one case study on the problem of prudential authority. The topic and 
the thesis in such cases is consistently the same: oligarchs and democratic orders are 
shown to form a mixed constitution, empirically, so that the various personal interests 
ought to be integrated, rationally, with public law-organizations—without allowing either 
one to dominate the other, or without closing the distance between them. The grand 
balance of interests or virtues, in one dimension, and of court procedures and popular 
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assemblies (concioni), in another, is thus time and again being presented (in Histories) as 
the core of pre-1492 Florence’s republican freedom.445
The hermeneutical question which has not yet been answered, however, is 
whether these self-balancing and self-integration stories about Florence (and about the 
times until Lorenzo’s death, of course) are not also stories only being told for an 
idealistic, moralizing, progressive, and finally also for a modernistic goal. Did the 
narrator choose to be a utilitarian realist throughout Florentine Histories, trying to show 
that perhaps Florence’s descend had formed only a means to an end, and a necessary step 
along the way towards Italy’s national ascend? That narrator, Machiavelli, remains 
known as “the anti-deontological thinker par excellence”, and for having commended 
international conquest and political domination. So why should he reach the conclusion 
that Italy is “in ruins”, in Histories, while also reaching that other important conclusion, 
in The Prince, which exhorts the Italian people to find someone who can act both morally 
and progressively, and will liberate them from having to smell that other anti-
deontological stench of both “foreign invasions” and “barbarous domination”?446
In finding the answer, a secondary examination must be made. Why may 
Histories of Florence have defined civic equality differently than that The Prince does? 
Both texts reference the classic coincidences—including those of good arms/good laws, 
discretion/legality, and person/office—and both also seem to do so in ways coherent with 
the rich meanings their author attaches to his concept of prudence.447 However, if all such 
coinciding opposites must indeed be coherent with prudence, and with concrete action, 
then this could mean they are at the same moment being thought unnecessary for freedom 
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and equality, and for other such abstract norms. In taking this secondary exam, hence, 
political theorists should again take heed of the tension between equality and legal norms, 
on one side, and matters of discretion and decisiveness, on the other side.
Prudence is a responsibility. Its connotation remains closely-connected to a sense 
of duty (as the river metaphor clarified: one would be wiser to exercise one’s official 
duty, to fortify the state, than to wait-and-see until the floods arrive). This would mean 
the concept of prudence probably should be reserved to refer to a typically executive 
virtue, to an officer’s caution, so it indeed seems unlikely that the concept also should 
somehow refer to a legislative virtue, such as judiciousness and justice, as well. It does 
not even have to be an adjudicative virtue, probably, because the courts can only 
determine justice and guilt retroactively and, again, prudence is best exercised 
proactively. This lesson, as Skinner teaches, would have been one during which the 
Senecan, rather than the Ciceronian roots of the cardinal virtues were digested by 
Machiavelli.448 Also, this distinction between justice’s retroactiveness and the other 
virtues’ proactiveness warrants another conclusion: prudence is primarily a virtue 
depending on practical reasoning, or on commonsense, rather than that it is also an 
empirically-experienced virtue such as social conventions on fairness would be. On this 
Senecan- and responsibility-directed reading, prudence can now be concluded to appeal 
primarily to rational proactiveness, rather than to a juristic convention based on 
precedents and procedures alone.449 But does this reading automatically turn all 
‘Machiavellists’ into “anti-deontological” executive-oriented decisionists? Does 
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Machiavelli genuinely intend the state’s executive functions to triumph over the justice 
system, that is?
Erica Benner’s reply is that theorists should inverse the question and then answer 
it positively: her Machiavelli argues that the legislative power trumps the executive 
departments. In the ranking of all things virtuous, Benner’s Machiavelli finds that good 
laws ought to take precedence over good arms, and organizational orders over excellent 
officers. He would have tried to strengthen the older legal norms, then, in order to 
weaken the influence of new individual interests. “[T]he basis of both political libertà
and the vivero libero”, as she writes, comprises four pillars. The first pillar has been build 
by means of the public courts, using clear-cut evidentiary standards—and definitely “not 
private or sectional interests”—to reach their verdicts.450 The second pillar consists of 
“popular assemblies (concioni)”. In both of these organizations, “judgments” and 
“political choices” will have to be made. Therefore, Benner adds, the people should 
herein be allowed to meet in freedom as they “examine the merits of different leaders and 
policies, and thereby get prudent counsel”.451 But did the Secretary indeed prefer to use 
virtuous counsel and good legislation in order to stem the tide of egoistic individuals and 
corrupt officers?
Again, Benner’s argument holds that having a “good law” is of primary, and 
having “arms” and “government” are of secondary weight. In sustaining the state’s 
structural integrity, this argument would be consistent with making sure the legislature’s 
enjoys direct oversight over all the executive departments. Machiavelli would also have 
believed that the people should make “the law”, and that these legislative efforts should 
872
be seen as the state’s ultimate foundation—or, to be located before the state’s “arms, 
money, and government, not vice-versa.”452 Erica Benner’s justice-oriented theme may at 
certain locations be shored up by means of Quentin Skinner’s description of the 
philosophical link between freedom and law, on the primary side of things, and the 
mundane or material means of power, on the secondary. As Benner does, Skinner 
identifies a liberal theme of how the state is to be defined as a “free government”: that 
theme follows from the “courage to defend ... liberty”. In the project of “assuring any 
degree of personal liberty”, each citizen will indeed have to gather courage and cultivate 
virtue in order to avoid “servitude”.453
Nonetheless, republican systems theory critiques the liberal justice-oriented 
outlook of Benner’s argument—and forms a much better match for Skinner’s 
hermeneutic. Evidently, the former argument concludes that the legal-normative 
dimension was being positivized by the Secretary, at the expense of the concrete-
decisionist dimension. Skinner sharply comes around from leaving any such a 
philosophical impression, however, and sees justice as being far less significant than the 
other virtues. Machiavelli’s concepts of justice and virtue are clearly to be seen in the 
context of “essentially Senecan allegiances”. In sharing more than a few of these 
allegiances, Machiavelli followed his predecessors, who had ranked the act of creating a 
‘good and peaceable state’ higher than any deontological conceptions of justice—and, 
indeed, had essentially degraded justice to being the least significant of the four cardinal 
virtues.454 Skinner additionally reminds interpreters that both The Prince and Discourses 
on Livy breathe an atmosphere filled with “prudence, courage, and temperance”.455 Peace 
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and orderliness, as well as the actual freedom of “the community as a whole”, are herein 
being presented as deontological purposes outranking especially the quite possibly too-
abstract logics “of justice and injustice, clemency or cruelty”.456
Benner may object that the virtue of justice is not to be confused with the freedom 
of the state. That would be a valid objection, from the liberal point of view. Until now, 
Skinner indeed merely demonstrated that Machiavelli would never have believed that 
personal and interpersonal justice, when understood to be a virtú in part as well as in 
kind, would have been as critical as that prudence and courage were. Therefore, a virtue 
such as courage precedes even justice in ordering the personal life of the free citizen, 
admittedly, but it does not yet also have to have preceded the life of the officers of the 
constitutional state and its courts. Yet, Skinner inoculates his own reading against any 
such objections because Machiavelli would also not have believed that the constitutional 
state trumped the individual citizen—so that neither justice was, to himself, neither 
critical at the the macro- nor at the micro-level of structural organization. Why would he 
not have believed in differentiating between such levels?
The “essence” of Machiavelli’s theory, as Skinner reads, in response, rather 
expresses the republican notion “that the attainment of [state] ... freedom cannot be a 
matter of securing personal rights, since it indispensably requires the performance of 
social duties.” As noted earlier, social duties are responsibilities towards the state. These 
duties are to be exercised in order to defensively close off the various state organizations, 
and provide them with additional resilience against system change. Duties are thus 
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precautionary organizational modalities. Skinner’s interpretation concurs, distilling the 
pure republican notion from the much more liberal notion of duties, thus.
Liberal idealists may still say that ‘duties’ must be subservient to civil rights, so 
that the state will not infringe on individual rights. They may also say that ‘public 
services’ must be exercised on behalf of citizens, rather than the other way around, as 
Benner would say. To such liberal philosophers, the modern state will only be exercising 
its ‘duty’—to police the sphere of individual rights, and to protect the individual property 
of each citizen—if it remains separate from the people as a whole. The state should serve 
only as a means to an end, which means it must only protect the private interests of each 
individual as an individual against the state, rather than of all citizens against all 
citizens—according to most liberals.
Classicist realists (Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Arendt), in their stead, appear to 
have made the case that social responsibility should remain the “essence” of any 
republican systems theory, as it is a sense of responsibility that can best explain why 
anyone “cultivating the virtues” would not only be involved in “serving the common 
good”, but also and especially also would directly become involved in serving her or his 
“private ends”—as a citizen whose “ends” are equal to those of all other citizens (peace is 
one such end, of course).457 Republican theory thus neither admits any intermediary 
power access to the issue of equality, nor does republican theory try to break apart the 
common virtues from private ends. The state exercises duties-as-means and the citizen 
pursues rights-and-interests-as-ends within the same actions. All these contraries will 
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naturally, and hopefully self-consciously, begin to coincide once people have found the 
confidence to participate in a systemic self-coinciding process.
Why is a classicist and neo-Roman realist theory, of systemically-coinciding 
opposites, preferable to a liberal ideology of intermediary civil rights? The relation 
between the legislative power of the state and any allusions to individual rights remains 
relatively under-theorized, or so could liberals charge against Machiavelli’s neo-Roman 
theory. They can charge that the laws are herein neither being presented as prior, nor as 
posterior to the organizational levels at which these laws should be obeyed. Neither the 
legislation of the laws, nor their execution is thus considered the dominant factor in 
laying out conditions for peace.458 Yet, as was shown, this ambivalence should not 
discourage theorists because there might be a theological case in support of it. 
Admittedly, in the case of Rome’s peace, theology at first would seems inapplicable, 
especially in its Christian variety.
It was mentioned that a more sustainable peace had been made possible by the 
Romans, as well as that their republicanism had attained greater longevity, than the peace 
of their Hebrew counterparts, which would remain bogged down by a historical legacy of 
Egyptian servitude. The conditions under which the Republic of Rome had been formed, 
now, form therefore probably the best-operable model for systems theorists. Yet, both in 
the History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy and in the Discourses on Livy, even this 
Republic is being portrayed in ambivalent terms. After weighing off the benefits of a 
constitution founded by Romulus against those of of one by Moses, for example, it is 
here said that actually “the highest merit would [have to] be conceded to Numa.” 
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Romulus may have been able to hold on to the “military institutions, without the aid of 
divine authority”, and had even organized the Senate, but only Numa had surpassed him 
in additionally holding on to the people, as they would have believed him to “converse 
with a nymph”.459 Nonetheless, if Numa was the most virtuous statesperson, then why 
would Machiavelli have said almost nothing else about him, and constantly compare the 
Romans to their Christian Italian counterparts?
The briefest answer has something to do with what Machiavelli thinks a republic 
is: he appears to have thought about the Roman Republic as a people’s sovereign 
constitution or as a people’s beliefs in their own ultimate authority (Imperium), even 
though they have been divided against themselves. In Machiavelli’s neo-Roman 
republican theory, then, the most exemplary and most virtuous kind of authority is being 
portrayed within a mysterious frame: it is non-dualistic.460
The question of why classicist realism trumps tri-power liberalism is best 
answered in terms of the contingent and uncertain possibility of non-dualism, but what 
does Machiavelli mean when he speaks of the dual republic of San Giorgio (or: of 
Rome)? First, he does not mean the territorial and not even the modern state. In an 
eminent article, H. C. Dowdall mentions that Machiavelli’s The Prince never mentions 
the state in the monistic or present-day sense of that word. As evinced by the Latin 
translation, stato was herein rendered “not by status, but by imperium, principatus, ditio, 
and the like”. Of course, Machiavelli’s stato has meant various things to different 
interpreters, Dowdall says. But most Renaissance authors would have agreed that it 
asserted some idea of processual recognition: it asserted an “idea of standing or position 
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that [involved a] … relation, and therefore [also connoted] at least two things or [two] 
part[s] of a thing, as well as the aspect in which they are related.” Stato is thus to be 
considered not unlike sovereignty: it transcends a structurally-dualistic relationship, often 
occurring within one and the same complex system (or: within one complex identity of 
two kinds of relational power, as Joseph Nye can well-concur).461Stato appears not unlike 
Weber’s rulership (Herrschaft), additionally, encompassing the structured relation of the 
rulers to the ruled. For, above all the opening sentence of The Prince highlights that states 
are to be perceived in a relational manner—“as the dominions which exercise 
imperio.”462
Non-dualism is not a new concept, of course, as ultimate authority also has been 
said to flow from compounded or mixed sources: rulers mix with the ruled, as how 
prudence mixes with piety, and just as that constitutional institutions are combined with 
civic religiosity. But the problem is that the notion of mixing itself has been 
misunderstood. It leads to an ambivalent combination, of oftentimes contrary powers, and 
as such has created a backlash in the secondary literature, against Machiavelli’s suspected 
paganism and utilitarianism. Influentially, Leo Strauss was among those authors to 
intimate that his form of paganism would have to have been anti-Christian.463 But a 
closer examination of the following spoke can prove that Machiavelli instead used pagan 
Rome only as a temporary model, as he later replaced it with two Christian and yet 
deeply republican constitutions; those of the Republic of Florence and of the San Giorgio 
Order.
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Machiavelli’s History of Constitutional Distrust towards Governmental Power
The State of Tuscany under the leadership of the Medici clan—as described 
throughout the Florentine Histories—does not need to come to mirror Lorenzo’s own 
fate. Machiavelli’s contemporaries should learn from pluralities of mortal men, besides 
Lorenzo and his family, that constitutional humors may very well begin to newly 
coincide, despite their contrariness, both at the state-level and the meso-level of 
associational organizations as well as at the micro-level of the individual citizens.
The current section shall examine how this possibility of a new complex 
coincidence emerges. The section shows why Lorenzo the Maginificent forms one of the 
most important, but once again also an inadequate model for a coincidental, spontaneous, 
Italian resurrection. Both in terms of republican systems theory and in defense of the dual 
sovereignty-thesis (DST), then, this section shall introduce the next sections by premising 
that the ability to integrate contrary humors informs the most quintessential feature of 
power.
Classicist DST-supporters should take the moment of Lorenzo’s death seriously. 
Florence and Italy are both being shown, by Machiavelli, as instantly afterwards losing 
their sense of peace and orderliness. His story suggests also that Florence had been 
depending too heavily on Lorenzo’s commercial impulses—as the latter became reliant 
on impressing the other nobles with large building-construction projects, and perhaps also 
on using personal promisory notes, rather than international public law, of course, while 
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lending large sums of money to the leading citizens of growing urban centers throughout 
Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. Machiavelli sees these expansive financial and 
economic ties as being of less importance in accounting for Florence’s stability, than for 
her instability. As he indicates, these ties might have made the internal order of the 
Medici more successful, yet they had had no moderating effect on the Republic’s external 
problem of political factionalism. Either despite or because of the Medici acumen for 
wealth, Florence had thus continuously suffered from threatening “dissensions between 
the Colonnesi and the Orsini” as well as from “the war between the king of Naples and 
the pope”, as just two instances.464
Even before Lorenzo had become First Citizen of the republic, his character had 
drawn much praise. Over the course of time, Lorenzo the Magnificent came to enjoy 
“much favor both from Fortuna and from the Almighty, [as] his enterprises were brought 
to a prosperous termination, while his enemies were unfortunate”.465 After his glorious 
return from a difficult round of negotiations with Naples, and after other prudent 
emissaries had reconciled the City with the Church of Rome, Lorenzo would be praised: 
“extravagantly”. “[T]he spirit of public discourse entirely changed in Florence [as now] 
... actions [would be] ... judged by the success attending them, rather than by the 
intelligence employed in their direction”.466 This change in, and this privatization of, the 
mood of republican freedom would of course not have been Lorenzo’s own fault. It was 
simply part of human nature to so lavishly engage in hearsay, Machiavelli reminds the 
readers. The facts were rather clear, to him. Florence’s success had not only been due to 
Lorenzo’s daring actions. Of course, he somehow knew how to employ his virtue in 
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alignment with the times. He acted in respect to changing times just as how his personal 
characteristics had been integrated, evidently, as he had “united in him dispositions ... 
incompatible with each other”—as Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories concludes.467
This sentence makes it appear as if Lorenzo’s reputable wisdom derived firstly 
from his strong personal constitution, having united his own agonistic dispositions, and 
secondly from the historical fact that his administration had likewise been able to limit 
and moderate the antagonistic tendencies within the system of states. Florence’s creating 
a moment of dynamic self-moderation, then, must have brought discords perhaps not to a 
final end, but at least out into the open. Remarkably, the sentence also makes it possible 
to compare Lorenzo’s constitution to Numa’s authority—which was so deeply skeptical 
of (divided against) itself.468
Metaphorically, Numa had been as self-critical as Lorenzo would become. This 
implied comparison almost places Cosimo and Romulus (not: Æneas) on a par, by the 
way, as both ancestors were known for their incomplete authority. Nonetheless, the point 
is that the common people had trusted Numa precisely because he had these mysterious 
conversations with “a nymph”. Were the people gullible in relying on hearsay? Probably, 
the Secretary insinuates. However, he also finds that Numa’s sign surpasses Romulus’s: it 
had created a symbolic mode of opposition to their naiveté. “[T]he reason for all this was 
that Numa mistrusted his own authority, lest it should prove insufficient to enable him to 
introduce new and unaccustomed ordinances”.469 Machiavelli’s concept of authority 
betrays here its richness: Numatic mistrust is considered as a solitary form of skepticism, 
but also a sign of macro-constitutional prudence, which then again opposes popular 
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inexperience, as it fills the void of a much-needed civic religion and sense of public 
confidence.
Lorenzo’s ancestor, Cosimo De’ Medici, must still be introduced. He managed to 
assert “authority” in ways that had transcended, and yet also included discordant 
structures.470 Yet, much more so than Lorenzo, Cosimo is shown to have relied on 
institutional rules and modal procedures while bringing the Medici clan to greatness. He 
is said to have been benevolent, which means he was not afraid to give financial and 
institutional support to others, and to thus have maintained a modicum of public trust. 
But, contrary to Lorenzo, Cosimo (and Pierro) would not have had so much charisma that 
his (their) sign could have integrated any personal contrary humors. Rather, Cosimo 
would mainly have inspired confidence by expressing his own confidence in God’s 
absolute will—and thus never doing what Numa did, which was critically reinterpreting 
or even simply reimagining the divine voice, nor ever trying to critique his own 
philosophically-monistic fusions of the sacred and the profane, or of legislation and 
execution.
After Lorenzo had claimed his position as First Citizen, his actions drew much 
more praise than those of Cosimo ever had. Lorenzo the Magnificent would go on to 
enjoy “much favor both from Fortuna and from the Almighty, [as] his enterprises were 
brought to a prosperous termination, while his enemies were unfortunate”.471 It is crucial 
to note, as one of the final sections on this topic shall shortly demonstrate, that 
Machiavelli never says Lorenzo would have defeated his enemies. For example, after his 
glorious return from a difficult round of negotiations with Naples, and after other prudent 
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emissaries had reconciled the City with the Church of Rome, Lorenzo had been praised 
“extravagantly”. “[T]he spirit of public discourse entirely changed in Florence [as his] ... 
actions [were being] ... judged by the success attending them, rather than by the 
intelligence employed in their direction”.472 Perhaps it was not Lorenzo’s fault that he 
became so popular, Machiavelli here suggests, but undoubtedly it must have been merely 
human nature to attribute such extravagant honors. And, if that is the case, then why did 
the ordinary human being Lorenzo not allow the affairs of the City to be scrutinized more 
openly and more rationally? Is Machiavelli intending to say that Lorenzo was not as 
ordinary as that Machiavelli suggests?
The Lorenzo-paradox is that one fallible man may become a virtuous man, 
through a mysterious interaction with the people as a whole. It has often been suggested 
that Florence’s political freedom had been preserved due to some of Lorenzo’s daring 
actions. He appeared to have known how to employ his virtues in the direction of the 
flow of the times. The man’s knowledge is according to Machiavelli compatible with the 
virtue of the man’s character. For, evidently, Lorenzo had “united in him dispositions 
which seem almost incompatible with each other”.473 His constitutional dispositions, 
which he has as a social animal, are being united by virtue of his statesmanship, which he 
has as a charismatic animal. Lorenzo’s self-transcendence, and integration of his 
conflicted dispositions, turns the Medici ruler into the leader of a constitutional 
government. He brings psychological conflicts and cognitive disassociations out into the 
open, but then also transcends these discords. And, there is no final end to this process of 
self-transcendence—in theory. In practice, however, Lorenzo’s state fails to adequately 
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transcend naturally-discordant constitutions. The only conclusion possible is that he must 
have been wrong to have become so vain as to have tolerated the people’s passionate 
judging of only his most-apparent successes, without not also rationally opposing the 
exuberance of their assessments.
To the benefit of the Medici, Lorenzo’s signs of courage opposed several 
troubling signs of inexperience, appearing within his own character as well as within the 
City of Florence. These signs of opposition created merely a fortunate accident, as they 
are not said to have self-consciously sustained the contradiction between a confident 
leader and a lesser faithful populace, however. Even though the oligarchical sources of 
Medici power had long been checked by democratic assemblies, for instance, the above-
mentioned spiritual deterioration of “public discourse” eventually began to set in.474
Machiavelli’s thesis is that the process of checking power should be dualistic: the 
people’s spiritual imagination and the administration’s material worldliness form natural 
opposites, which is again why they ought to be intelligently and critically scrutinizing 
each other. That is, an intelligent, critical mode of balancing is likely to enhance 
structural integrity. This forms the main thesis that will have to be validated, by the 
Secretary. For example, not unlike his famous final chapter of The Prince, the Histories
treats the total sum of Italy’s individual leaders (Pierro de’ Medici, the King of Naples, 
the popes) as if it amounts to less than the structure. The structure is the greater whole, 
representing the people’s political potential, but has been organized by fallible 
individuals.475 The people as a whole are presented as forming more than the sum of the 
populations of the individual statelets. Briefly, the (Italian) whole never presents itself as 
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identical to a total sum of diverse principalities, duchies, or even not of citizens. All of 
these are simply examined as the constituent parts of a structurally imbalanced Italian/IR 
system.476 Even so, it is significant that Machiavelli’s systems theory disallows anarchy: 
the parts can certainly peacefully coexist within a free, and fully-balanced whole, lest 
they give up their imprudence and inconfidence.477 By thus disallowing violent anarchy, 
though, the theory should be understood as a defense of the DST as well as a realistic 
attack on the idea that all states are alike in that each fled from its own pre-Westphalian 
(or pagan?) conditions. In this expansive concept of history, the DST’s general 
applicability is also expanded to the whole, and the thesis itself is here thus transformed 
into dual sovereignty-theory.
Machiavelli’s DST gives guidance to anyone studying the qualitative difference 
between personal dispositions and political constitutions. In The Prince’s final chapter 
Machiavelli calls for a “great” or “a man of rare genius” to rise up.478  In Histories of 
Florence, such a man is shown to have died. But can this man’s Italy still be reborn 
politically, akin to both the cultural Renaissance as well as to the Resurrection of the 
Christ? As will now have to be demonstrated, Histories’ answers are consistent with 
natural systems theory. Again, at the aggregate level there are all sorts of factions and 
parties to be detected. Some of them have been supporting the Pope and others the 
Emperor; they are like the Colonnesi and the Orsini or, previously, the Guelphs and 
Ghibellines.479 As in that ancient Republic of Rome (the Renaissance’s most “desired 
form”), there are also plebeians and patricians.480 All of them are occasionally engaging 
in civil discords and political tumults: this is simply a structural feature of the system. 
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Yet, some men create opportunities for change as they begin to reorganize themselves, 
just as that centuries afterwards the Framers still said they were organizing the 
relationship between the Senate and the House of Representations.481
The point is that Florence’s constitutional reorganizations close themselves off at 
all civic life-levels. They will provide in a new measure of constitutional solidity by 
moderating the tension within civic, and virtuous relationships. Allowing too much 
fluidity would be likely to have dissipated these relationships. In other words, sufficient 
tension between state executives and the aggregate of all popular groupings should be 
maintained. For example, if officers were to have committed themselves to aggressive 
warfare, then the structure of the army should be reorganized so as to disincentivize his 
violence. Histories shows that personal discretion and the code of honor are then directly 
coinciding—without presenting the extra need for any third-party intervention.482
Moderation of tension is the deontological essence of Machiavelli’s theory: the people 
will have to act, and do their duty, in order for them to learn how to respect their own 
differences, in defense of their own sovereignty. In defense of their own political 
singularity, hence, they must respect a dialectical tension within their pluralism.483
Cosimo exemplifies not so much the singularity of the City as that he had 
respected the tension between his own House and the plurality of groupings surrounding
it. Particularly, he strongly held on to a diversity of formal checks which the patricians 
and plebeians would have been able, in previous times, to place on each other.484
Likewise, Numa had held on not just to the nobles, but also to the common people. The 
latter would have trusted him precisely because he appeared to have these mysterious 
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conversations with “a nymph”. Were they gullible or irrational? Probably, Machiavelli 
insinuates. However, he adds that Numa symbolically surpasses Romulus because he 
himself would also create a certain opposition to their naiveté. “[T]he reason for all this 
was that Numa mistrusted his own authority, lest it should prove insufficient to enable 
him to introduce new and unaccustomed ordinances”.485 The Numatic sign, of rational 
prudence, continuously opposes aspects of inexperience and fallibility: certainly not only 
among the pagans.
First Application of Machiavelli’s Methodology: The Non-War at Serezana
To recapitulate, the message of the last two chapters of Florentine Histories
shares a lot with the famed nationalism of The Prince’s final Chapter 26. Taken together, 
these chapters refer to one great political tragedy; Lorenzo’s death and the subsequent 
division of Italy. Due to a misreading of the flux of time, domestic conflicts were 
exaggerated. The statelets had missed a tremendous opportunity by not having 
reintegrated their old orders and republican institutions, as well as by not having 
reintroduced “unaccustomed ordinances”.486 Florence’s Medici were no longer 
performing their strategic spill function, within the peninsular balance of powers, so that 
all sorts of humors had come to grow like weeds. Therefore, it would be high time to 
freshly fuse orders and humors, institutions and passions, together. The material 
foundations of the statelets, such as their armies and fortifications (representing 
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fortitude), must somehow be matched to their spiritual-juridical foundations, such as 
open assemblies and court procedures (representing temperance).487 To do so, prudence is 
quintessential. This examination in Machiavelli’s Italian history shall first repeat how 
Genoa loses a certain land-title to Lorenzo the Magnificent, and then follows through 
with another story of why one of Genoa’s republican constitutions must be recognized as 
being structurally superior to those of any of the other peninsular statelets.
As post-1492 Florence had failed to do its best bidding on the balance of powers, 
the Secretary begins to look around for another example of a superiorly-integrated state—
either to serve Florentines or all peoples, categorically. In the pre-last chapter of the 
Histories, Machiavelli mentions that a 1486 treaty united “all the powers of Italy, ... 
except the Genoese, who were omitted as rebels against the republic of Milan and [as] 
unjust occupiers of territories belonging the Florentines.”488 This sentence provides an 
important cue on how to be reading the next-following passages. The sentence clarifies 
why the peninsular balance would have been kept by no other state than Florence or, 
rather, why only Lorenzo the Magnificent had been able to reclaim occupied territories 
and thereby save the one treaty that could be obeyed by all the statelets.
The Florentine Histories proceeds by substantiating the reader’s earlier 
impression that Florence’s last formidable civic leader, Lorenzo, succeeds by preserving 
the balance of powers. Two interlocking stories’ theses are worth underlining in 
clarifying why this balance is not a matter of justice. First, it was a matter of prudence, or 
perhaps a miracle, that no war would be fought with Genoa over the Serezana territory. 
Second, the mystical constitution of a Genoese syndicate may be believed to have 
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remained exemplarily integrated because it was never designed to be solely a just 
constitution.
The first story demonstrates that under courageous Medici leadership, the Tuscan 
government made serious efforts to pacify Italy’s Genoese insurgents, who for some 
reason had opted to remain outside the scope of the 1486 treaty terms. Lorenzo de’ 
Medici eventually managed to militarily stabilize Florence’s relations with the Genoese, 
however temporarily, after first having been forced to give up his City’s territorial claim 
to a fortress at Serezana. Lorenzo thus came closest to bringing peace to Italy, however, 
as the Serezana territory would be returned to him by its occupiers, without that he even 
had to make an effort to lay siege to the fortress. In addition, he had also brought peace 
and stability by wedding one of his daughters to the pope’s son. The marriage was widely 
believed to form a sign of mutual goodwill. But it would also have formed a republican 
subsystem, because it shows how well Lorenzo had by now mastered the arcane art of 
combining dynastical, structural self-interests with this most-stable juridical mode of 
organization: the marriage agreement. The reason why the marriage proved to be a 
strategic move was that Florence now received additional moral support from the Roman 
Church. Soon after, it is written that the pope expresses his desire for “the Genoese to 
concede Serezana to the Florentines”. The Genoese refused to concede, however, because 
to them it was not a moral question. Rather, a banking syndicate owned a mortgage on 
the Serezana fortress, and because this bank was a Genoese bank, supposedly, their state 
felt entitled to the property.In fact, they rather used ‘scorched earth’ tactics than to hand 
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Serezana back to Florence. Subsequently, they raised an army which shelled the fortress 
and “burned the town near it”.489
Machiavelli concludes from this first episode that both the Florentines and the 
Genoese misjudged the situation. The latter only relied on armed force, the former too 
much on the pope’s moral force. Both seemed to have ‘overreached’—each in only one 
of these two otherwise naturally-interlocking modes of virtue. After Genoa had burned 
the town to ashes, however, appearances changed. Florence was  seen as having a 
legitimate claim to the land. Only now did she issue a call for military assistance from her 
allies, which she apparently could not have done previously. Despite the fact Florence 
would receive no assistance, she would ask her army to begin to reclaim the fortress. 
Genoa’s excessive aggression had given the Tuscans legit cause to assemble “a large 
army”—rather than to succumb to “despondency”. It was critical that ordinary people had 
now become motivated to join the infantry. During their campaign, the Florentines 
gathered “fresh courage” from Lorenzo’s arrival in their encampment, upon which the 
Serezanesi suddenly and swiftly “surrendered to [the Florentines] ... without asking 
conditions”.490 Machiavelli concludes from their miraculous surrender: “The Florentines, 
after the war of the Serezana, lived in great prosperity until 1492, when Lorenzo de’ 
Medici died; for he, having put a stop to the internal wars of Italy and by his wisdom and 
authority, established peace”.491
The morale of the tale is that the Genoese had weakened themselves due to their 
heavy reliance on their army’s strength, as well as due to their successive failure to 
combine these forces with laws as good as those of Florence. Alternatively, the latter 
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laws had been infused with the people’s militancy (read: courage), as well as with Medici 
rationality (temperance), so that it had indeed been superior constitutionally-fused laws 
that would guard the peace (and: the balance of virtues). In other words, at the end of this 
peace process, courage makes an eminent appearance: Lorenzo’s field-expeditionary 
combination of cavalry and infantry (think: oligarchs and democrats). Prior to the end, as 
well, there is a display of temperance, by means of the pope’s moral authority. Fortitude 
and temperance now come together, then, and their symbiosis produces prudence (the 
highest-ranking of the virtues, at least in the Senecan tradition). In conclusion, even 
though the Genoese had a legal claim to their land, the balance of powers is not sustained 
by their equity but by exemplary instances of dutifulness. Justice has been trumped by 
prudence.
The Florentine Secretary routinely alludes to the idea that an over-dependency on 
one of the virtues might be developed. Tuscany’s people might have been wrong to make 
themselves depend as heavily on one type of citizen, as they would have done by relying 
almost completely on Medici charisma. It cannot be denied that Lorenzo’s mere visit to 
the troops had had the miraculous effect of creating peace. Obviously he must have been 
charismatic: public praise for his strength of character still finds repetition on Histories’s 
final pages. Yet, Machiavelli also remains skeptical as he instructs his readers, the 
(Italian) people, albeit extremely tacitly, they ought to be mirroring the virtues of their 
‘true’ enemy—rather than just those of Lorenzo. Who was this enemy?
On the premise that the primary enemy to Italian stability had, at least during the 
above-described episode, been the Genoese banking syndicate which technically had 
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owned the fortress, Machiavelli must have deduced much can be learned from this 
formidable opponent. Although it may never be proven that this Genoese mortgage-
holder had been the Order of San Giorgio (Machiavelli himself does not specify whether 
this is true), it remains a fact there was a banking syndicate that would have lost its title 
of Serezana, to Florence. This question of legal ownership is notable because the 
Genoese are not mentioned to have lost any considerable amount of men, as they simply 
surrendered the fortress, so apparently they had been unwilling to risk the lifes of good 
people in exchange for a mere legal claim.492 That would have to have been a virtue. Yet, 
they were also willing to lay fire to the town, to intimidate the Tuscans. The Genoese 
generals must thus have known how to appear good as well as how to appear evil, yet 
would make a miscalculation in not opening negotiations after the pope’s interpellation. 
No further indication is given that, after 1492, however, either Genoa’s actions or those 
of the Order of San Giorgio, which was seated in Genoa, would not also somehow have 
continued to contribute to Florence’s decay.
To sum up this first part of the examination, Lorenzo managed to integrate, within 
himself, “dispositions which [seemed] almost incompatible with each other”.493 This 
sense of personal integrity (Rousseau would have said it was his solitariness) became 
tangible when he appears in the field, before otherwise-incompatible knights and soldiers. 
Somewhat mysteriously, and near-miraculously, Medici integrity then turns into an 
instant precondition for the recombination of the various statelets and their humors 
(Naples, Rome, Milan, Venice, and eventually also Genoa).
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Machiavelli’s rhetorical alchemy here reaches a quintessence, after clearly having 
conveyed that Italy’s territorial integrity would depend less on equity, and less on 
individual values as well, than on a shared sense of prudence, or commonsense. The 
virtue of prudence is made to rank highest—because it can combine diverse and 
irreconcilable characteristics of a republican life.
The political possibility of recombining these characteristics has now been opened 
up in analogy to humanism’s conception of a rebirth open to all human beings—so that 
courage and temperance, personal discretion and institutional agreements, but also such 
as property law-claims and canon law-norms can indeed be reintegrated at any level of 
human organization. Further, although the structural balance underneath Tuscan 
republican life would eventually collapse, during the post-1492 decades, this fact never 
meant that the dissipative structure itself, in its entirety, had not remained open to 
reorganization. Some sort of dialectical conciliation was believed to remain a concrete 
possibility, attainable through commonsensical methods, applied in dialogues in which 
falsehoods were to be negated, and to be conducted by human beings confident to accept 
the outcomes.494 The theoretical issue is which method should be recommended in 
conducting the dialogue—in order for many human beings to stand a chance of defeating 
the enemies of any State (other than just Italy).
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Second Application of the Alchemist’s Methodology: The Order of San Giorgio
The second thesis hidden in Machiavelli’s alchemist stories, now to be examined, 
consists of the few sentences is which a particular Genoese method of political balancing 
is being lauded. Florentine Histories suggests that the latter statelet would have learned 
from the fiasco at Serezana, as the Genoese are never said to have resumed their 
hostilities towards any of the other statelets. It may safely be assumed that the citizenry of 
either Venice or Genoa would at some point in time, like Florence had done before them, 
begin to take on the function of system mediator and stabilizer, even though only 
implicitly. Lorenzo had been a roving diplomat (while visiting Naples and wedding his 
daughter to Rome), representing great energy and dynamism. As his alchemical opposite, 
the Genoese represent stasis. They take on only one dominant role: they either do, or they 
do not secure Italy’s stability—even though they probably did not form Machiavelli’s 
first choice to have done so. Anyhow, he never says they became a third party to any 
disputes. Rather, in particular, Genoa would have allowed one of its banks to flourish. 
But this was no ordinary bank: the San Giorgio financial corporation had been organized 
in such a way that its most reliable institutions and its best legal traditions (or: its 
constitutional laws) would have to have conveyed an unmediated dualist structure—in 
ways consistent with DS-Theory, as shall now be demonstrated.495
The Secretary describes the Order of San Giorgio as being governed by an 
unchanging constitutional law: the Order’s mission remained always singularly focused 
on the integration of “liberty and tyranny, integrity and corruption”. In any civic conflicts 
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or legal disputes, therefore, its mission would have to have consisted of assessing and 
adjudicating the proper distance between these contraries—as well as between the victor 
and the vanquished. It must have been extraordinarily committed to retain parity. Or, the 
Order must always have been successful in binding “the victor to the observance of its 
laws, which up to this time have not been changed. For as it possesses arms, money, and 
influence, [its laws may] ... not be altered without incurring the imminent risk of a 
dangerous rebellion.” Evidently, the Order of San Giorgio is a banking company which 
possesses both arms and money as well as good laws. In this sense, its complex 
constitution proves itself structurally durable—precisely because each promise would 
have to have been carefully scrutinized before it would have become binding. Out of fear 
of alienating the company’s clientèle’s rebelling, or otherwise defaulting on promises, as 
may now be speculated, the company chose to narrowly observe its own constitution. 
Fear of rebellion and constitutional law-fidelity became interlocking tendencies.
Machiavelli adds that the Genoese company presents a rare “instance of what in 
all the [contemporary] republics ... has never been thought of; exhibiting within the same 
community, and among the same citizens, liberty and tyranny, integrity and corruption, 
justice and injustice. [Yet, these dualities should have been thought of], for this [Order’s 
dual] establishment preserves in the city many ancient and venerable customs”.496
The Order of San Giorgio forms a study on how politico-historical disputes are to 
be thought open to arbitration—by the Order’s membership itself, as a self-critical whole. 
That is, these few sentences on the Order not say it has a separate adjudicative 
government system, and they certainly do not say its government system is neutral or fair. 
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They present parity as the system itself. The San Giorgio Order’s laws are maintained in 
such manner that the relative values of both justice and injustice, and of both freedom and 
despotism, can be communally exhibited and popularly assessed.497
The Order forms a paradoxical political entity—but is also quite clearly believed 
to have great virtue, by Machiavelli, as it appears to be capable of both discerning the 
difference, as well as of transcending the functional differentiation, between its two main 
faculties. The entity is presumably tyrannical in terms of its discretion, while being 
republican in terms of its lawfulness. Its capacity to absolutely simultaneously represent 
both of these contrary tendencies (tyranny/freedom, discretion/legality) remains thus 
quite consistent with the DST, with natural law theory, as well as with neo-Platonism.
Plato asks whether a good man should “ever [be believed to be] of two minds 
about the same thing? When it comes to action, is he divided against himself? Does he 
experience internal strife?”498 But, on Arendt’s reading of this question, it was not Plato 
but Socrates who had most exemplarily sought to answer it, by means of both his internal 
solitude—as well as through his active participation in common and in sensible, albeit too 
rarely in rational public discourses as well.499
Lee Franklin investigates the dialectical method used by Socrates, or especially 
also by the younger Plato. The latter misapplied the lessons he had been teaching through 
the voice of Socrates by trying too hard to rationalize public discourse. Particularly in 
Statesman, the young Socrates is being chided by Plato for having been insufficiently 
rational. He would not have adequately separated the parts of virtue, as a whole, from the 
different kinds of virtue. That is, there are partial forms of wisdom and virtue but there 
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are also different kinds of wisdom and Socrates must in this dialogue begin to take up an 
alternative to his traditional method of inquiry. Thus, he is being recommended to begin 
by discerning the parts and “to go along cutting down the middle of things, and that way 
[he] will be more likely to chance upon [the] kinds”—later, as well. Franklin finds that 
Plato remains “notoriously unclear [about] what it [here] means to divide down the 
middle; [as] the prescription calls for parity, of some unspecified sort between the species 
into which we divide.” All that is left, for the reader, is some strange void between the 
evenly-divided partial species and the qualitatively-different species. Perhaps this void is 
due to Plato’s blatant refusal “to explain the difference between mere parts and genuine 
kinds.” Perhaps not. It is only practical that species will mutate and split up into new 
species, yet at which moment are “mere parts” transformed into genuinely new “kinds”? 
Statesman should nonetheless be read as if Plato deliberately avoided “positing a [third] 
fit between the practice and the underlying structure of nature.”500 There is no final “fit” 
between, in other words, the bifurcating practices of nature and the structural 
differentiation between the many natural species—which include, of course, the natural 
species of human virtue.
Perhaps the case of the Order of San Giorgio should be studied in terms of neo-
Platonist thought. The Florentine Secretary can then not be seen going overboard with his 
strangely-juxtaposed dichotomies, as he is then not justifying this anti-middle way 
theorem at too great an expense to his self-integration imperative. Instead, in presenting 
the contraries in a series of such direct conjunctions, he is dividing them without positing 
a middle term between them. The “underlying structure” of the Order’s nature is 
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bifurcating into opposite parts, and then these parts become identified as qualitatively-
different kinds as well: it would be difficult to argue that political corruption and honesty 
should be measured along the same normative criterion.
The neo-Platonist methodological prescription “calls for parity” between two 
opposite terms. Methodological, dialectical temperance is best practiced by avoiding the 
need to posit a third “fit” within the void between the terms. Rather, by dividing the 
contraries, the existence of a naturally-dissipative structure is affirmed, all the while 
leaving its ulterior self-generation to chance. In this context, the case of the Order (by the 
way, it should be called an order or perhaps a syndicate since it was not solely a bank, nor 
only a members-based army) is being used by Machiavelli to give a final example of 
what it means for people to enjoy their constitutional integrity, both organizationally as 
well as structurally.
As positivists, people may attempt to rationally restore laws in order to secure 
their freedom. But people should thereto also restore the balance within the empirical 
structures and powerful institutions of law. Human beings can only try to differentiate 
between these two attempts, but this does not mean they will succeed in transcending the 
fundamental discord between the attempts (justice vs. injustice, corruption vs. honesty, 
and so forth). Hence, as realists, they should never believe that, within matters of sacred 
virtues and profane values, these two interlocking kinds of judgments form more than 
two parts. The Order is invoked, by Machiavelli, instead, as a Socratic call for humility. 
San Giorgio reminds people they are not the ultimate judges of their own affairs. If they 
were to create a third magistrate or a third fit between the corresponding parts of the 
898
natural structure, clearly in line with Renaissance theologies, they would be committing 
heresy.
In theory, Machiavelli’s neo-Platonism coheres well with his Christian 
eschatology, which prohibits mortal beings from taking on the divine duty of final 
adjudication. Ideal justice may only be understood as the sign of the Messiah, so that 
mortal humans may do nothing but as perfectly as possible imitate their own demi-
god/demi-animal rank-orders. By means of their own constitutional orders, by well-
ordering two kinds of organization. They cannot rule out either one of these 
organizations, also, because they mutually imply each other’s existence as the only two 
necessary components to approximate the whole. The sum of the two components is less 
than the whole, but there is no need for people to create a third ‘fit’.
To reiterate the above-said, the message is that tyrannical violences, for example, 
simply coexist with the public licensing and the regulating of tyrants. It is this 
coexistence that is symbolized by responsibilities and offices, including the constitutional 
dictatorships. The chance that certain violences may have to be committed is a future risk 
that certainly may be licensed, or may be sourced out to prudent dictators, without their 
automatically becoming licentious. In this respect, the Order exemplifies why 
constitutions should remain dualistic, rather than to split apart the relation between 
discretion and legality, or also rather than to dichotomize the Aristotelian relation 
between the commoners and the great. Instead, these two kinds of publics may never be 
torn apart, because they would then no longer be able to ventilate their frustrations with 
each other, and they would now pursue only their own worst tendencies. The ochlocrats 
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would venerate “customs”, but also false doctrines and status quo conventions, while the 
oligarchs would organize themselves around their materialism and other such causes of 
“corruption”.
In practice, the Order of San Giorgio would according to the Secretary be a well-
realizable ideal, as the next-following section shall lay out in more detail. The Order is 
not a distant or legendary utopia, but an orderly state, legitimately holding on to its 
authority for two reasons. On one hand, in securing the loyalty of its citizens (these are, 
presumably, the members who hold shares in the company), the Order represents them all 
as equals against all. Certainly, as individuals, each member will also have ready-access 
to capital and influence or also—as these words have been alternatively translated—to 
“arms, money, and government”.
Nonetheless, the members presumably hold their shares in these resources in 
common with all other members, so that the plurality of weapons, funds, and institutions 
must simultaneously have become self-bounded: this is an organizationally closed-off 
body. Yet, the inspiring message of its own structural duality also holds that this involves 
both a closed-off, and yet also a structurally-open—or a singular-and-yet-pluralist—
sovereign body. This is a body with two very different kinds of power, briefly put. Within 
that body, two kinds of power have been promising to maintain their parity—directly, 
without having to be creating any third power other than the venerable jurisprudence that 
includes both powers. Moreover, the hypothesis can now be developed that the San 
Giorgio syndicate is organizationally coherent with what the DST predicted that a 
sovereign body politick should look like. IR theorists should examine why the Order 
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should be believed to have integrated its utilitarian with its deontological ethics—without 
becoming an adherent of any third kind of ethic, yet all the while actively differentiating 
between these first two ethics. In examining the validity of this so-called tertium non 
datur-hypothesis, it may be sensible to now briefly consult Benner.
Benner refers also to “Machiavelli’s quasi-mythical San Giorgio”, arguing that he 
invoked the Order as a negative example. Some of the pressing constitutionalist issues of 
his time could not have been solved without understanding which kinds of power should 
be negated. The Order was thus really a mythical anti-ideal. Precisely because it 
remained a mere myth, it would have instructed his readers on the impossibility and 
impracticability of creating a similarly stable and durable state; this “ideal rejects [any] 
idealistic aspirations to build a city that transcends corruption, license, and the dangers of 
tyranny.”501
The gist of Benner’s references is thus it must have been an anti-model: it was so 
unrealistic that it formed the one final ideal that was not be imitated. After all, 
Machiavelli would have suggested that in San Giorgio any conduct detrimental to the 
ancient laws is being rejected, or canceled by these same laws. Unfortunately, Benner’s 
argument fails to create further clarification on the reason why Machiavelli would have
suggested to learn from this former enemy of the peninsular peace, from specifically this 
curious Genoese Order, rather than from any other European statelets or individual foes. 
Why does Venice, for example, not instead hold on to his ideal formation? One of 
Machiavelli’s clues (for his tacit admiration of the Order) can be found in the Florentine 
Histories’s account of how the Genoese people had long suffered from “dissensions”—as 
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these were at one point even being exaggerated by the Duke of Milan, who was failing to 
reign in “the Fregosa and the Adorna”—so that some of Genoa’s own great citizens had 
to decide to raise “the cry of liberty: it was wonderful to see how eagerly the citizens and 
people assembled at the word”, Machiavelli adds. “The Genoese, having placed the 
government in the hands of free magistrates, in a few days recovered the [Duke’s] 
castle”—whereupon they entered a free league with “Florentines and Venetians”.502
If the Aristotelian lineage in Machiavellianism is to be taken seriously, then 
constitutional longevity and durability are less a matter of individual action, after all, than 
that they are perennially emerging from within the agonistic relation between only two 
contrary, but interlocking components (humors). In Genoa, this relation had been healthy, 
presumably, since the moment her first citizens would have called on the people to 
exercise their own freedom and see to it that the foreign ruler (the Duke) was expelled.
If Machiavelli ever intended to describe any other state’s self-questioning and 
agonistic constitution than ancient Rome’s, that state would quite undoubtedly have to 
have been Genoa’s San Giorgio. Moreover, the absolutely direct parity of San Giorgio’s 
humors would almost certainly have been recognizable, at least to Machiavelli’s neo-
Platonist peers, as the methodological “injunction” (as Franklin describes it) to critically 
discern the proper distance between two kinds, and between the two “species that display 
some sort of parity, and internal coherence.” As well, the method of directly going down 
the middle of things (diairesis) would have seemed, to them, to differentiate kinds and 
species from parts and components. The former are organizational, the latter are 
structural elements of any political constitution—and, so, tension is sustained between 
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kinds and parts. Moreover, the method of not creating a middle but of going down 
between kinds and parts is a method of inquiry principally designed to avoid monistic 
measures of things, or continuum-based classifications. This method of inquiry, rather, 
premises that complex systems  are open to assessment, not by means of creating one 
“single division, or limb of a taxonomic tree, but [of] the entire taxonomy to which the 
[contrary] kind[s] belong”.503
Even though Benner’s pro-positivist interpretation may appear sound, it cannot 
explain why Machiavelli allows republican laws to simply coexist with tyrannical 
institutions. By contrast to that interpretation, DS-Theory hypothesizes that the Order of 
San Giorgio neither allows its republican nor its corrupt dimension to be observed as the 
single-most dominant factor in explaining its historical success. This is not a legendary 
Order, further, but an Order acting within the boundaries of what Machiavelli must have 
believed to be a neo-Platonist as well as a Christian mysticist tradition. The life in which 
civility and corruption, and freedom and tyranny, are observed to be oscillating and yet 
also to remain on an even footing—is, of course, comparable to the life of spiritual 
integrity. That is, this life is a mindful life, in which dispositional components such as 
body and mind, passion and reason, would be equally negated. These two components 
would herein have received their parity—as that sense of parity was during the 
Renaissance quite widely believed to have been revealed, also, through the non-dual lifes 
of the mystics and the monastics (Francis and Dominic again spring to mind).504 The 
Florentine Secretary probably saw himself as an advocate for a rebirth of Christian 
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monasticism, as he would disapprove of the crusades and the Order of the Knights 
Templar, as well.
To sum up the above, the San Giorgio banking syndicate reached an adequate 
degree of equilibrium between both its private interests and its ancient jurisprudence. The 
case of San Giorgio further intimates that this duality, or that these constitutionally-
contrary tendencies alternate within a complex, direct, unmediated relationship—between 
both the corrupt, unjust, and fallible executive officers and the free, just, and pious 
membership base. In again other words, the mortal individuals and the immortal body 
politick will have to be integrated as directly as was humanly possible. Despite a 
functional differentiation between the few and the many, and despite the overlap between 
all sorts of organizational levels of integrity and sociability, individuals may be 
incorporated into a company or an order with its own sense of personhood.505  In 
penciling this image of the Order in such bright DS-Theoretical colors, hence, 
Machiavelli was not only being merely realistic. He was also advocating for a two-in-
one, or for a non-dualistic constitution that would be shared by individuals as well as by a 
corporate person that, however, preceded Hobbes’s. The one aspect to have received
insufficient attention, this far, remains the practical applicability of the Order’s non-dual 
constitution.
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Honoring a Model Non-Dualist Company: The San Giorgio Order
The practical applicability of Machiavelli’s model, of the Order of San Giorgio, 
has not yet been studied—not here, and not in the IR field. Admittedly, there may not be 
any news under the sun, as realists say. Machiavelli may simply have been using this 
Genoese Order as yet another one of his many analogies to a Centaur-state. Indeed, his 
notorious references to the Centaur (a prince who is half-man and half-lion, for example) 
have already received more than scant attention.506 Yet, even if the Order does form a 
mere analogy to the Centaur—then how should its apparently-fictively, mystically-
hybridized, and yet also non-dualist constitution be understood to be functioning in daily 
life? Or, if San Giorgio is an utopian ideal (as Benner suggests it is), then why did 
Machiavelli suggest that this Order exemplifies Rome’s virtues even better than Rome 
had done herself?
To start with the answer the second of these questions, Machiavelli’s eclectic 
theory primarily takes the Republic of Rome as its most-imitable model of a dualist-yet-
integral constitution. Even in the Republic’s later imperialist stages, its constitution is 
said to continue to engender law and stability—both in its external public affairs as well 
as internally, according to the Secretary.507 During the above-conducted examinations it 
was argued, as well, that because the ancients had so piously held on to their modes of 
public worship (Romulus and Numa form a dyad, for instance, in that they are creator-
and-sustainer demigods), that they also felt sufficient confidence to work on the 
veneration (restoration, or on the re-honoring) of their ancestral constitution. After all, the 
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virtues of a few great founders were to be honored as if these men had been a divine sort 
of ancestors.508
It should be noted that during the Christian era, the connection between ancestor 
worship and the honoring of the great state-founder’s personal constitutional qualities had 
begun to fade, but only gradually so. (The case of Lorenzo the Magnificent shall here-
below be reintroduced in order to emphasize even his semi-divine status.) Even in 
Machiavelli’s time, thus, most urbanite or at least most literate persons would have 
known about the existence of numerous religious sects’ combining elements of 
Christianity with those of ancestor-veneration and paganism.509
Although the Roman Republic would during the Renaissance no longer have been 
the only venerable source of constitutional stability, within the human realm, it also had 
not been fully replaced by the material constitution of the Church of Rome. The idea that 
Charlemagne would have created one stable Holy Roman Empire remains utterly alien to 
Machiavelli and his peers, for instance. These men are, rather, taking their time looking 
beyond the standard-models of the ancient republics as well as of the organized Church 
and, especially, the monarchical features of the Papacy. Indeed, Machiavelli comments 
negatively on each of the most-memorable founders of the classic republics (Lycurgus, 
Romulus, Solon, and so forth); he appears to have distrusted these individual princes of 
old as much as some of the new prelates and princes, or at least much more so than that 
he would ever express any skepticism towards the (compounded) body of the (Italian) 
people. Only the people can be led to act by means of “the word” (by a call to liberty, for 
example), he repeatedly says, whereas monarchs and princes are led by force.510 So, what 
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sort of body of people does he actually refer to when he argues that “the faults of the 
people spring from the faults of their rulers”, that “the people as a body are courageous”, 
and even that their body is “wiser and more constant than princes”?511
It is more than likely that Machiavelli sought to complement the Roman Republic 
with another model-state, which should have a legally-incorporated body similar to the 
Mystical Body of the Church. Akin to how the Son of God forms a sign that combines 
coinciding opposites (that is, the Church combines the mortal body and the immortal 
spirit), as represented by the Church in its entirety, so may the Secretary have recognized 
the Order of San Giorgio as forming a similar sign. Again, due to his familiarity with the 
Christian juridical tradition of scholars such as Cusa and Ubaldis, but in having known 
Dante’s works just as well, the Secretary accepted that the Roman Republic-model alone, 
with its pagan forms of person-worship, could never again be reintroduced.512 As the 
Republic itself belonged to the past, he must rather have begun to look to an incorporated 
body that should miraculously exemplify not only ancient Rome’s, but also 
contemporaneous Christianity’s constitutionalist modes of ultimate authority. 
Again, what kind of body might the Order have formed? The Roman Law-
principles that survived the medieval period, or that had been re-established prior to 
Machiavelli’s familiarization with them, defined companies of men as legally-
incorporated bodies. Companies, at least in antiquity’s Rome, could have had equal legal 
status. It would have to have been a common practice for Roman officials to sell leases to 
the highest-bidding private companies, for instance, and to thus to recognize their equal 
bidding-rights, as organizations perhaps only comparable to medieval guilds. The 
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Romans’ purpose must have been to maintain public services in a relatively cost-efficient 
and accountable manner.
Before expressing his admiration for the Renaissance-model of the San Giorgio 
company, Machiavelli might have been reading about these Roman companies, or about 
the societates publicanorum, in Cicero. Yet, because Cicero says little about their 
functions, Ulrike Malmendier shall now be asked to explain why such companies would 
have been instrumental in satisfying Rome’s imperial ambitions. By contrast to the 
militias, which had been selected by the ‘tribal committees’, the companies would have 
been much more likely to have selected members on the basis of their functional merit 
and equal virtue. The record also shows they expanded relatively quickly, particularly 
after the Punic Wars, and this must again in great part have been due to their 
effectiveness in providing public services. The companies were also non-conform, which 
might have added to Rome’s constitutional resiliency. Indeed, Malmendier points out that 
the Romans were at Cicero’s time making use of three types of publically incorporated 
companies—which thus would have added considerable flexibility to Rome’s existing 
modes of authority.
First, Rome employed private contractors performing logistical and restoration 
services. These contractors kept temples, markets, or sewers in working order. Second, 
officials created complex leasing structures to protect ‘the commons’—and through 
which private parties were allowed to administer public goods. Private parties were 
granted leases that could include fishing, grazing, or mining rights, for instance. The third 
and last type of ‘private company’, as Malmendier writes, consisted of those 
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“publicani[which] ‘leased’ the right to collect direct (poll or land) taxes from the 
inhabitants of the provinces, and to collect indirect taxes (customs or dues).”513
These three forms of government business, as having been contracted to either 
one societas publicanorum or another, already took on firm juridical shapes sometime 
during the second century B.C. This is why Cicero’s or Polybius’s contemporaries would 
certainly not have been surprised to hear them refer to ‘shares’ individual citizens were 
buying in these publicani: most Roman authors must now be presumed familiar, even, 
with ‘stock-market jargon.’514
Arendt has been less attentive towards the societates publicanorum than 
Malmendier is, even though the latter clearly typify her own notion that the ‘public thing’ 
should functionally integrate the interests of each and all of the private citizens (‘share-
holders’), despite the agonizing tensions between these interests. On Malmendier’s 
reading, further, there is absolutely no suggestion that the societates were accumulating 
capital. It seems highly unlikely they operated like modern business corporations, which 
in their stead are under no legal obligation to reinvest their profits in the ‘commons’. As 
well, centuries prior to the Christian era, Roman Law-culture can be found to have 
condemned any signs of usury and capitalism (in modern parlance). Indeed, practices 
such as intemperance and luxury signal to a-scholia. Only virtus, rather than a-scholia, 
had to be practiced in every realm of life. In accordance to Kinneging, “the Roman idea 
of virtus [finds expression in] ... the regulation, the moderation of the appetites”. Such 
self-regulation and “[s]elf-discipline is a practice; a habitus”.515
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Roman Law surfaced from those discourses in which virtue and appetite, or 
practical reason and irregular passion, had been theorized to form mutually opposing 
tendencies—which, nonetheless, were being integrated by corporate communities, or by 
bodies politick. Both actual conduct and the idea of the law, and both the facticity and the 
normativity of action, within Roman Law-culture: these were the dualities that would 
have governed the dissipative structures  known as the societates publicanorum. On these 
grounds, Machiavelli speculates that such contraries had to be rationally co-present in 
any model company, but which he then also observes empirically present within the 
Order of San Giorgio. That means the Order is a concrete company, thus, rather than just 
an abstract juridical ideal.
Even though modern legal philosophy takes the view that companies are private, 
or for-profit entities, the San Giorgio company is no such entity. Rather, it retains an aura 
of mysticism; the paradox of non-duality blocks out the modernistic view that individuals 
are driven by their capitalist ambitions. Rather than to be a self-serving entity, the San 
Giorgio company is one among several historical political entities habitually disciplining 
itself. Its opposites are constant in the sense that they are believed critical of each other, 
and yet their reciprocally-critical relations are somehow also believed to have a practical 
application. These relations are virtuous (perhaps even autopoietic?) in a self-sustainable 
manner: the relations are becoming ‘second nature’ rather than to be forming either legal 
or quantifiable structures of power. The Order’s virtus would not have been legally 
constructed, by the members individually, thus, but by the achetype of an entire body of 
members, rather, so that the opposite humors balanced each other in this ‘naturally’ 
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virtuous manner. Nonetheless, the balance itself demanded self-discipline; the Order’s 
“virtus is not an inborn endowment”—as Kinneging may be read to have complemented 
the above concrete connections between self-discipline, virtuosity, and DST-
organizational (micro-meso) sociability.516 Companies would such as the Order of San 
Giorgio appear within the contours of Roman Law-thinking, in other words, because 
these companies are complex systems intrinsically worthy of admiration—and of 
becoming openly recognized and honored for their service as well. “Honor is the crown 
of [their] virtus.” “[H]onor demanded that a man sacrifice[s] his immediate impulses, 
desires”—without denying the existence of such “impulses”, of course.517 The 
compounded body of such men will be even better able to sacrifice its desires than any of 
its individual members, but also than any individual prince will ever be able to do, as the 
Discourses repeatedly clarify, so that the body’s structural integrity will be certain to be 
recognized for its superior sense of dignity as well.518  (It should actually be asked, were 
these company systems thus not in their entirety capable of living a virtuous life of their 
own?)
Revisiting the Centaur-Symbol: Honoring Another Non-Dualist ‘Person’
To now, finally, follow up on the earlier question: is the Order of San Giorgio not 
simply another metaphor for a Centaur—in the sense that both ‘persons’ hold on to some 
hybridized, dualist constitution or disposition?
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The Florentine Secretary writes that a prince who finds himself in extraordinarily 
adverse circumstances should have prepared himself, by having learned to act like a 
Centaur. Whenever he is althus being compelled by necessity, this prince should “be able 
to change to the opposite qualities”.519 The conventional list of virtues—as it consists of 
“mercy, faith, sincerity, humanity, and piety”—may still be useful, but Machiavelli 
additionally demands from the prince an ability to not only understand, but to also act in 
opposition to precisely these five noble virtues. The reason why the prince should train 
this ability is simply political, or structural flexibility. “[H]e must have a mind disposed 
to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of Fortuna dictate.” Moreover, 
the two “variations” he should expect to be encountering consist either of manipulations 
of the “law” (fraud), or they will have been caused by “force” (arms). Hence, he should 
know how to both “imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from 
traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves.”520 It shall here be argued that the 
Centaur is particularly instructive symbol in the sense that it symbolizes a complex order 
within which people will have learned both how to escape fraudulent agents and to 
defend themselves against enemy forces. To fulfill both functions, their systemic 
authority is to remain dualistic by nature.
Readers of The Prince have long wondered what it means to ‘personify’ the 
virtues of the Centaur-symbol. There has thus already been a lot of discussion about, for 
instance, whether either fox or lion dominates within their joint personification. Some 
have tried to close the discussion by pointing out that both of the two animals, together, 
only symbolize half the Centaur-man, so his decisions will still have to be made by a 
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rational human being. The animal-signs are not irrelevant, then, but the Centaur-man has 
not been fully corrupted by them either, so that he remains likely to choose good over 
evil. Others have gone a bit further, as they claim that the human part may only resort to 
either one of the two animal-signs at one and the same moment in time. Either only the 
lion or only the fox may be simulated, thus, so that they cannot simultaneously inspire the 
Centaur’s decisions. This secondary claim would seem consistent with the general theory 
that the middle course is to be avoided, and that only one animalistic tendency must be 
expressed as decisively as possible. But it would also mean that each animal may never 
come to form than more than one quarter of the complex symbol as a whole; at any given 
time, three quarters of the Centaur must then remain human. Machiavelli, if this claim 
would hold, will then have to have been a modern rationalist thinker because he would 
actually have restricted the weight of any animalistic desires within his general formula 
of how reasonably and how virtuously princes should act.
Vilfredo Pareto and, more recently, Joseph Femia have contributed to this 
discussion by having reconstructed Machiavelli’s image of the Centaur, as follows: every 
government will have to have been constituted “by a mixture of force and fraud, but 
normally [only] one or the other predominates: [a] régime led by ‘lions’ will prefer force; 
one led by ‘foxes’ will prefer fraud. The deficiencies of pure force and pure fraud, as 
mechanisms of rule, cause the two types of régime to succeed each other in infinitely 
repetitive cycles.”521 However, Femia’s image is too bleak: it degenerates constantly. 
This Centaur would create a paradox, of infinite regress: the ‘normal’ government leader 
is primarily a fox, until he will be replaced by someone who is primarily a lion, who in 
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his turn will end up being replaced by a fox. These princes are not so much leaders as that 
they go through the motions. They have no deontic responsibility to be acting decisively, 
as they all together would still get stuck along the dreaded middle way. That is, 
Femia’s/Pareto’s ‘repetitive cycles’ still form an average mean: this Centaur-state is 
neither being led by fox-men nor by lion-men, but by aself-polarizing blend of all of 
them.
The above discussion has gone awry, however, because it almost completely 
ignores the critical difference between the list of conventional or existential virtues, first, 
and the equally virtuous decision to appear to be making an exception to the list, second. 
When Machiavelli invokes the sovereign’s “opposite qualities”, he means to say that both 
conventional Term (1) qualities as well as the thereto-opposing Term (2) qualities may 
alway be retroactively assessed as having been applied in a virtuous and prudent 
manner.522 He simply does not argue, for example, that Centaur-princes should act 
viciously, impiously, or with cruelty—but merely says, rather, that they should determine 
the direction of the winds before making an exception that could help them restrict 
Fortuna’s leeway.
Further, the above discussion seems to have gotten stuck on its own notion that 
Centaur-princes are isolated individuals, without enemies. According to liberal 
discussants, the Centaur-symbol would have to form one isolated whole, which then may 
be split up into four parts. Yet, contrary to Machiavelli’s own text, this liberal image of 
the ruler as forming one individual whole ignores the facts of sociability as well as of 
contingency. Again, contrary to liberal or rationalist readings of The Prince, it appears 
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much more likely that the princely authority’s extraordinary actions should never be 
cyclically or continuously—but must always be fully— motivated by animalistic vices, 
whenever the flux of time demands it.
Animalistic ambitions may only be legitimately expressed when this is done in 
opposition to fluctuating evils. Rather than that such ambitions or desires are challenging 
an allegedly three-quarter human mind, they are to be understood as camouflage or 
dissimulation tactics. The fox simply stands for a sociable being’s nominal capacity to 
suddenly appear differently to his adversaries, and thus also to dissimulate, or to be 
regarded as a “great feigner”.523 So, every fox-man being stands in a world of fraud and 
‘appearances’—which is why he must have learned to adjust his actions accordingly, but 
also to only do so whenever, again, the times demand it. For the same reason, the lion-
man stands for the kind of prince who knows how to respond to a world of comparable 
forces and relative strengths. Machiavelli’s Centaur cannot be understood in terms of the 
proportionality of its parts, in brief, but forms rather a rhetorical trope and a pedagogical 
symbol which is being used to commend the one great person who can use all of his 
faculties in a lionesque manner, whenever increasingly more armed wolf-men are 
surrounding him, but who also can apply these same capabilities in a shrewd manner 
when he is suspecting fox-men might be conspiring against his rule.
At a higher level of organization, lion-men and fox-men cannot be in opposition 
to each other. These two types have not been invoked as interchangeable units or parts. 
They also do not succeed each other in long cycles, thus, but are rather thought to be 
lending their dispositional qualities to a state that will then be considered both eager and 
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able to make use of them. The dictum is here that any successful order will have been 
able to defeat its enemies at their own game: it will take a fox to deceive one. The 
Centaur symbolizes both a charismatic ruler, at the micro-level of organization, as well as 
a complex system capable of functional adaptations to any changes in its natural 
environment, at the macro-level. In observing this complex system, it may again be noted 
that the rational-abstract and empirical-concrete dimensions should retain a sense of 
balance. If the system were to become imbalanced because it is deficient of lion-men, for 
example, then the order as a whole would have to be nourished or over-compensated until 
these lion-men are again as available for service as that the fox-men would be. Against 
Femia’s remarks, neither one of the two animalistic dispositions will have to become 
predominant, thus, as both should simply be equally available to the order as a whole. 
The people will naturally try to maintain equilibrium between any two humors, so that 
neither one humor attains full predominance over the other. The Centaur symbolizes a 
self-organizing, self-integrating, non-dualistic government system.
Erica Benner’s sophisticated discussion of “human zoology” coheres to a certain 
extent with the DST, but not reliably so. Benner rightly reads the passage in The Prince
as expressing little and maybe even as expressing virtually no tension between humans 
and animals, or actually also not between the mindful-rational and the sensory-
experiential qualities of the republican life. On the side of the human animal, she argues 
that in recognizing traps and snares, citizens who are able to act like foxes are not to just 
rely on their sense of “sight”, but on their other sense organs as well: “Citizens need, like 
foxes, to use all their senses”. “Even when using lion-like ferocity, [therefore, they also] 
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... should guide this use with a keen sense of the snares involved, using powers of 
[recognition and of] conoscere that foxes have by instinct and humans must develop by 
their own efforts.” Machiavelli would not have wanted citizens to only use their instincts, 
however. He may have expressed some support for a human return to the animal 
kingdom, or to the state of nature, but he was as supportive of citizens who were relying 
on more than just their physical sense organs. On the side of the human animal, they will 
also have to learn to appreciate the rationality of their own laws, as Benner agrees, so that 
they have to have instructed themselves on how to develop their rational, discursive, or 
their metaphysical qualities—as well as their sense organs. Thus, Benner is correct to the 
extent that she find that natural beastly abilities, first, and human capacities for self-
regulation and self-legislation, second, were never intended to form “antithetical modes”. 
To the contrary, Machiavelli’s Centaur-system only gains in durability, indeed, once it 
becomes less of a dualistic system. Benner ‘realistically’ appends: “If human beings were 
naturally so good [and rational] that they did not sometimes need to use [animal] force to 
compel obedience to laws, then laws would not be necessary, any more than force.”524
Machiavelli’s honoring of the the Centaur-system is no dichotomizing trick: the 
aim of the move is not to tolerate physical force’s domination over mental shrewdness, 
nor vice-versa. Sense and reason, or physical and metaphysical cogitations, remain rather 
intimately connected. Indeed, the Centaur is used as a symbol of their mutual integrity, 
indicating the presence of a complex system of legitimate authority—which itself may 
again attain a higher degree of sustainability by virtue of its own contingent, and 
hopefully timely, integration of such two mutually-opposing humors. Benner would have 
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to concur: these humors remain situated within one system, having only the two 
legality/fraud and the discretion/force dimensions. She has not observed, however, that 
this two-dimensional system is jarringly reminiscent of the Order of San Giorgio-system, 
which has earlier been shown to likewise attain its authority by integrating two humors.
Neither good laws nor good resources must become so dominant within the 
Order’s system that they would no longer be equally available to its members. 
Particularly when changing times demand it, both laws and resources should be equally 
available, although they should not have to be equally applied. Furthermore, and in 
somewhat different words, the legislative-metaphysical and the executive-regulator 
faculties to be developed by the individual citizen-statesperson, as they had been 
developed within the San Giorgio-system, should quite similarly be able to check and 
reciprocate each other. Yet, Benner’s overall discussion admits no antithesis between the 
law-abiding citizen and his only moderately-more discretionary role as either a fox-man 
or as a lion-man. That discussion, by implication, will also not admit any productive 
tension between the system’s legislative and its executive functions. Upon having gone 
beyond Benner’s reading, and by having further compared the individual Centaur’s 
faculties—which remain so evocative of Lorenzo’s characteristic ability to integrate 
“dispositions ... incompatible with each other” as well—to those of the Order, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the Centaur-trope had been intended, by its author, to signal 
to a non-dualist system.525
Inside the system, reciprocal and productive relations between ‘incompatible’ 
humors as well as ‘incompatible’ cognitive faculties are being made possible by their 
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coincidences. The system itself is no ‘semi-mythical ideal’, therefore, but a concrete 
incorporation of the body politick, as an integral whole. The angular shifting back and 
forth between the great personality and the people is typical of Machiavelli’s complete 
story of the body politick. The above-narrated story about the compounded body’s non-
duality carries more mysticist-monastic than that it carries any legendary or idealistic 
overtones, moreover, so that the concept of non-dualism itself can be concluded to 
probably have attained its meaning from long-standing practices—rather than from the 
irretrievable past.
Evidently, albeit always tacitly, Machiavelli uses his concept of non-dualism to 
connect personal dispositional strengths to the constitutional state’s forms of self-
scrutiny. This type of connection has already previously been described, by Anthony 
Parel, among others, as consisting of a relation between various humors.526 To say this a 
bit differently, the dualities which inform the Order’s natural constitutionality 
(liberty/tyranny, integrity/corruption, justice/injustice) are not dichotomies, but more akin 
to conflicting moods, or to agonies. They are a sort of bipolar moods, but they do not 
connote schizoid pathologies. Machiavelli rather appears to have been thinking that the 
opposing humors are in an unstable state, yet maintaining equilibrium, rather—in ways 
that neo-Pythagoreans, and neo-Platonists, among others—would also have thought about 
the good man as being either in an unstable-yet-balanced state, or as being in a non-
dualist state, also.527 What gave him this belief, or this sense of confidence, however, that 
the state will not be dichotomized in a civil war—and that an equilibrium would be 
constitutionally maintained?
919
Machiavelli’s Subversion of Fortuna or Why the Florentine Tragedies Can Inspire 
Confidence
Beyond the narratives of the San Giorgio Order and the Centaur’s complex 
‘personality’ it is now time for a third and final narrative to be (re)told. This is the
narrative about the spirit that emerges from non-dualist constitutional states. 
Thatmysterious spirit is somewhat like a river, or the wind. It is both form and matter: it 
is both a mental idea and the physical movements it is believed to be causing. Its ‘matter’ 
may best be retrieved from the Florentine Histories, where Machiavelli reports on an 
infamous 1456 day filled with lightning and whirlwinds. But its ‘form’ must be attributed 
to the heavens and their inpenetrable intentions. For, it had nearly certainly been by the 
“design of the Omnipotent”—that Florence had been threatened that day. “[F]or had the 
hurricane been directed over the city, filled with houses and inhabitants, instead of 
proceeding among oaks and elms, ... it would have been such a scourge as the mind, with 
all its ideas of horror, could not have conceived.” The Tuscans suffered material damages 
from the hurricane, but had nonetheless believed themselves fortuitous; at least the 
people themselves were spared. Yet, the morale is they had understood the storm to have 
been a sign: “the Almighty” would have displayed his “powers” over the heavens as a 
warning of things to come. For, Machiavelli’s chapter proceeds by sketching how “the 
Florentines [had] continued tranquil during war”. Apparently, during a time of rising 
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turmoil, they had taken the celestial reminder to heart and—most importantly—they 
would have done so in quite a “doubtless” manner.528
Machiavelli sees no need to speculate about what the cause for the warning from 
the heavens might have been. He rather narrates about the hurricane in order to express 
his ‘true’ concern, which is that the Florentines of later decades were no longer 
interpreting such omens as calmly as they had still done in 1456. For instance, after 
Lorenzo died, in 1492, “the highest pinnacle of the church of Santa Reparata was struck 
with lightning ... to the terror and amazement of everyone”. The 1456 and 1492 storms 
form a rhetorical conjunction, to make clear that less than forty years after the first 
hurricane, much had changed. Now it had been only one strike of lightning that would 
already terrify: these Florentines now lacked confidence. By contrast, in the years 
following the 1456 hurricane, they had still quite confidently decided not to take sides in 
the armed conflicts that had devastated their relations with others and, particularly, with 
Naples. After Lorenzo’s death, thus, they must have realized how dependent they had 
become on his benevolence. For, as Florentine Histories concludes, they would certainly 
have had reason to fear germination of “evil plants, ... which in little time [would ruin] ... 
Italy”.529
Besides the above-theorized stories about Lorenzo the Magnificent and about the 
Order of San Giorgio, which involved respectively a commonsensical person and a well-
balanced constitution, this third narrative takes the people’s spirit of confidence as its 
subject matter. Over the course of just 36 years, as this third narrative suggested, 
Florentines had grown more superstitious, and less confident. Machiavelli’s 
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Discoursesmakes the case that, as one of its chapter headings announces, “the occurrence 
of important events in any city or country is generally preceded by signs and portents, or 
by men who predict them.” As in Histories, he says that one of the “celestial signs”, as 
everyone would be sure to remember, had been revealed on the day that “the highest
pinnacle of the dome of Florence was struck, by a bolt from heaving, doing great 
damage”: the lightning bolt had been portending the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici. “It is 
also well known how, before Pietro Soderine, who had been made Gonfaloniere for life, 
was expelled and deprived of his rank by the people of Florence, the palace itself was 
struck by lightning.” Machiavelli establishes then that he does not, and probably also can 
not, have sufficient knowledge whether such signs had been deliberate warnings issued 
either by “spirits” who populate the cosmos with their “superior intelligence”—or by 
other “things natural and supernatural”. What he can know, however, is that the signs 
were generally being experienced, and would be remembered as omens, as they had 
“invariably [been] followed by the most remarkable events.”530
The gist of this third story is not that the Florentines are superstitious. If they had 
been, they would of course have been able to cogitate malevolent spirits and other 
cosmogonic phantoms. However, Machiavelli’s Discourses clearly points out that he—
and, therefore, he implies, the people also—simply cannot know whether any such forces 
exist. Also, this section’s first paragraph shows that Florentine Histories establishes no 
other way to uncover the possibility of the existence of these forces than as in reference 
to “the Omnipotent” or “the Almighty”.
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Benner reads the same references as cautionary affirmations of human fallibility. 
People’s observance of heavenly signs, or other natural events, should serve as additional 
affirmation of their taking care to also observe their own laws. The general lesson the 
citizens may learn from an omen is, further, that they ought to rely on their intuitive 
senses: “heavenly causation” cannot be seen or heard, yet it somehow informs the 
historical chain of events. But what is intuition? Benner adds that Machiavelli would only 
have assigned such “an important role” to signs of causation so that he could amplify his 
call for “practical reasoning, [and for the] checking [of] presumptuous conduct and
hubris.” People should learn to recognize these omens, therefore, not only because they 
might announce future disruptions within the seasonal cycles of nature and history, but 
especially also because the omens call them to order by insisting on the importance of 
their laws and their “practical reasoning”. In this sense, the omens simply serve to remind 
them of the fallibility of their own rationality. They remind them “there are limits to any 
individual’s, party’s, or city’s power; that these limits should be respected ... and that; 
violating limits incurs disorders that may reasonably be represented as divinely 
sanctioned chastisements.”531 In brief, strangely enough, it is by means of their 
respectfully observing of the signs that human beings cannot change the chain of events, 
but that they can incentivize themselves to refrain from engaging in their own so-called 
“presumptuous conduct”. 
Benner hardly takes time to examine the issue whether Machiavelli is faulting 
false superstitions for Italy’s ruin. But he is. He is critical of beliefs in “spirits”, for they 
deprive the people of confidence. He also seems to be arguing that their superstition 
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would result from an excessive trust in the human mind, and from an excessive 
separation between the individual prince (the rational mind) and the nature of the people 
as well (the body politick). It is this philosophical-contemplative excess that causes, then, 
the rise of inaction and negligence and therefore also historical tragedies. The above 
sections have already worked out the premise that Florence’s own tragedy took place 
between the 1450s and the 1510s, and probably climaxed around 1492 (the end of Medici 
leadership). Machiavelli was also shown to have thought that the tragedy’s end may still 
be averted by organizing Florence and the other Italian statelets against a foreign 
invader—so that the pace of the entire historical drama, an of their joint decline, 
however, may still be slowed down. He invokes the history of the Roman Republic to 
clarify that great human ingenuity and extraordinary assertions of virtú were being 
displayed—to have created this same effect, of having slowed down the constitutional 
degeneration process. This point of extraordinariness is not to argue that Meinecke, or 
even Gramsci, were correct to have interpreted Machiavelli as speaking the language of 
the great personality in history (of Caesarism). 532
Rather, this is to argue that Machiavelli sought to describe popular self-
confidence in terms of a symbiotic tension. This is the tension between both 
individualism (mind) and populism (body), which he would alternatively have described 
as the intense relation between “industry” and “nature”. This productive relation is being 
exemplified, throughout his natural systems theory, not as much by the great few by 
themselves, as that it is cultivated through their own relation with the nature of the many, 
many people. An industrious people will thus have to know how to cultivate nature, 
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including their own nature, in such ways as to give all of them more comfort. In order to 
“defend themselves with greater assurance”, as Histories holds, for example, all of them 
have to be keeping their activities adequately spread out, and to be keeping “the 
inhabitants of a province properly distributed”.  A naturally industrious people will also 
know that “[w]ith cultivation, the [soil] becomes fruitful, and [that] the air is purified 
with [man-made] fires; [both] remedies which nature cannot provide.”533 Interestingly, 
Histories hereby treats the people’s industriousness as a method of accommodating
nature, rather than to master Nature. Industrious human beings are appearing as prudent 
persons: they cannot completely master human history (Fortuna), yet they may very well 
try to accommodate, anticipate, and remedy natural history—just as that they may be able 
to do by creating river embankments.534
Any careful rereading of Histories, conducted with this accommodation-premise 
in mind, is likely to help further demonstrate that human beings do exercise considerable 
influence over their own fates. Hence, Florence’s decline is probably, or at least in great 
part, the result of their own negligence. They should have been attending more critically 
to the perennial laws of natural history. Florence’s shortened life-span as a free republic, 
or any other system’s degeneration will not solely have been predetermined by the chain 
of events or by the wheel of fortune, in other words, but particularly also by human 
indifference and fallibility. Machiavelli’s “Almighty” may still be believed to have a 
hidden hand in extraordinary events, but Machiavelli’s God is also throughout it all 
believed to be the people’s God, and the people’s voice, which can only have meant that 
he is arguing that human beings have an equal say in how fast, or how slow their wheel 
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of fortune should be spinning.535 As Benner explains, the free will of each person may, 
and should, be directed in such ways that will help the people to accommodate the 
historical flux of Nature. The importance of free will is critical, henceforth, both in 
accommodating historical necessity and in simultaneously limiting the places in which 
(the ‘false’ goddess) Fortuna could possibly rear her head.536
Florentine Histories relays how and why the people of Florence had so steadfastly 
refused to accept military aid from the French, during their troubles with the other 
statelets and especially with Naples. The subliminal message is here that the people still 
had had a healthy fear that they could become dependent on mercenaries or on foreigners 
for their protection. In The Prince, Machiavelli explained why they should have been 
fearing such a dependency. “The armies of France are ... of a mixed kind, partly 
mercenary and partly their own; taken together they are much better entirely composed of 
mercenaries or auxiliaries, but much inferior to national [or native] troops.”537
Contrary to some of the other Italian powers, Florence had thus never invited any 
strangers to either aid in the City’s external relations or in governing her public affairs. 
As the Secretary additionally reports, still in reference to the year 1456, even the pontiff, 
Æneas, would have appreciated that Florence had maintained its course of autonomous 
action and its free will. Machiavelli reports no significant disturbances or irregularities 
under this pope’s leadership. He would even have canceled a previously planned crusade, 
which clearly signaled to his confident understanding that he needed to remain “free from 
the ties of private interest, [and should have] ... no object but to benefit Christendom and 
honor the Church”.538
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Machiavelli’s chapter on mid-fifteenth century Florence forms a captivating study 
on historically coinciding but mutually-opposing humors, such as religious freedom and 
private interest, or free will and historical necessity as well. The Histories chapter is 
particularly fascinating because it reiterates not a few core precepts of Renaissance, as 
well as of Reformation republican thought. Each of these precepts appears to have held 
that public leaders ought to breathe certitude. Under conditions of incessant warfare, most 
people will not know what the just and fair course of action has to look like. Simply not 
bending to the wills of the warring parties, however, would always be a good first precept 
for them to follow. Simply not engaging in costly projects such as crusades, second, 
would serve as yet another good guideline in preserving their ‘true’ public freedom (their 
res publica). Third, the Florentine Secretary stresses that all human beings can be equally 
mindful of the suddenly changing winds of time, or of any signs of the cosmogonic laws 
of nature. They do not need any extraordinary intuitiveness to become more mindful, 
however, as they merely need to stop separating their abstract contemplative logics from 
their concrete bodily sense experiences.
It is in all realms of life—both natural and ingenuous—that they should train 
themselves to integrate their faculties, and to serve as the “subtle interpreters of 
appearances” (and to become not unlike the great monastics, actually).539 In his 
references to the above-mentioned omens, for instance, therefore, Machiavelli must only 
have intended to call on the Florentines to again start practicing interpretive skills, or 
mindfulness (a practice that monasticism also connects, by the way, to non-dualism).
Immediately after their military defeat at Sienna, although this example is very implicit, 
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this narrator further holds that the people of Florence were not seeing any signs or 
listening to any rumors. They now finally began to judge the appearances of things, 
rather, “not only in private circles but in the public councils.”540
Political actors may easily be swayed by foreign adversaries or by private 
interests, yet they can follow the decisions of the public councils. These councils are a 
sort of assemblies with legislative-adjudicative powers. Machiavelli consistently 
represents these popular assemblies as having been ultimately responsible for the 
Republic’s fate—so that it were these assemblies that kept appearances of corruption at 
bay, and so that executive leaders would have been listening to, and would be carefully 
interpreting their voice. The assemblies tend to be more peace-minded than the great 
dynasties, also, as  evinced by these words spoken by an anonymous person to Lorenzo 
de’ Medici: ‘The City is exhausted and can endure no more war: it is therefore necessary 
to think of peace’. Machiavelli continues: “Lorenzo was himself aware of the necessity, 
and assembled the friends in whose wisdom and fidelity he had the greatest confidence”. 
They then decided that—in comparison to the Church of Rome, which often changed 
policies due to “the short reigns of the pontiffs”—the King of Naples formed their greater 
enemy, so that “the King’s friendship would be of the greatest utility”.541
To recapitulate, Lorenzo’s peers are here paying heed to the voice of a democratic 
assembly, after the Sienna defeat, and immediately before reaching their decision that 
they should firstly negotiate a peace with the concrete natural-material enemy, and only 
secondly also with the abstract logical-spiritual enemy of their state. Notice, however, 
that it was not the assembly alone that would have reached this “better judgment” (or: to 
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have spoken in ‘the voice of God’), but that this sense of “judgment” had been exercised 
by a complex combination of both the assembly’s representative (democracy) as well as 
the prince and his peers (aristocracy), since this prince himself had already been 
“aware”.542
The historically coincidental relationship between the twin elements of 
ochlocracy/democracy and of oligarchy/aristocracy forms the prime subject of 
Machiavelli’s systems theory. Remarkably, however, is that there is no mentioning of a 
third element other than of ‘true’ religion: civic religion ranks equal to, if not higher than, 
good laws and good arms. How can the theory then explain that many exemplary 
decisions—including Lorenzo’s confidently-made decision to negotiate with the King—
emerges without the narrator’s mentioning of any omens and without any new signs from 
“the Almighty”? Machiavelli is here apparently expressing his faith, not in a hidden hand, 
thus, but in participatory freedom, to be exercised through a complex constitution in 
which the interests of a republican assembly and those of a princely privy council will 
both remain open to stabilization and mutual alignments. It also appears that the 
theoretical difference between having faith in God’s voice and in the people’s 
constitution could not have been defined any narrower than that Machiavelli so tries to 
stabilize the relation between opposite elements. Yet, by contrast to “the Almighty”, who 
governs heavens as well as earth, there is still the issue of ‘false’ religion
Fortuna is a far lesser or, rather, she is a ‘false’ goddess, governing only on earth. 
She is the “angry river” who may be faulted for turning plains into lakes, causing 
everyone to flee.543 Yet, Fortuna is far from omnipotent. She takes on easily-discernable 
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appearances, in wars and other catastrophes, which can very well be countered by human 
ingenuity. It is also important to note that her signs have not even been created by the 
heavens (il cieli).544Fortuna’s signs are not lightning bolts, for instance, but floods caused 
by human negligence. Her signs are convenient scapegoats, in effect, for everything that 
“lacks any moral compass”: a lack that gives Benner sufficient reason to continue to 
examine Fortuna’s demonic side.545 Yet, is Benner not too liberal in her examination, 
dealing only with Fortuna as if she were a meddling and interfering regulator?
Political realists argue that not Fortuna but that the heavens are to be consulted by 
prudent leaders—as is especially shown throughout the Discourses. Roman generals are 
here often shown to consult the augurs before they make their decisions. Modern liberals, 
here-including Benner, would have to argue, to the contrary, that Machiavelli’s 
consultations of celestial signs serve only his underlying secular, liberty-affirming goals. 
The omens are only to be recognized “through a naturalistic analogy” because they form
mere rhetorical tropes: the omens would help good citizens to preserve their right to be 
prudent. In prudently deciding on their own directions, citizens should also be able to see 
through the omens, to dismiss them as mere signs, and thus to liberate themselves from 
Fortuna’s willfulness.
Realists will alternatively argue that the commoners should not so much to be 
seen to contradict Fortuna as that they should be confidently mimicking the direction 
‘desired’ by the heavens: by the natural signs. There is nothing wrong, according to 
realists, thus, if citizens were to believe in omens. Problems only arise if they attribute the 
omens to Fortuna’s will rather than to the heavens, governed by “the Omnipotent”. In 
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that case, they will be giving in to ‘false’ superstitions, and grow more likely to ignore 
both their ‘true’ (Christian) God as well as to neglect their duty to mimick the actual 
ecological laws of their country. Likewise, political realists would also be more likely 
than secular liberals to argue that statespersons should appear to be faithful to, by actually 
obeying, the laws of nature. Like any other animal (if, after all, statespersons are to be 
acting like Centaurs), in other terms, they must have the ability to sharpen their instincts, 
to shed their old ‘appearances’, to hibernate, to hunt, to familiarize themselves with their 
territory, and so on.546
The process of natural law-mimicry cannot be planned. It is a contingent process. 
Perhaps this helps explain why Machiavelli’s realist methodology does not use any third 
tools. The Secretary’s considerations of religion never introduce a substantive third 
element to the above-defined and the DST-defined popular constitution. Perhaps the 
tertium non datur-hypothesis also helps explain why the constitution can continue to 
contain a directly-agonistic relation within itself. As Histories instructs, once the two 
main types of government institutions (say, democratic assemblies and oligarchical privy 
councils) begin to separate themselves from one another, after all, they each themselves 
spontaneously begin to follow their natural inclinations, and again try to be reintegrated, 
despite their tangential antagonisms. They are usually already “aware”, thus, that their 
mutual relation should be moderated. Moreover, in order for this to remain a direct, or 
moderately agonistic, relation, rather, the two types will already have to know, 
intuitively, that they should occasionally be purified. This means that the main two 
government bodies will sometimes simply decide to purge themselves. Or, they will 
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“sometimes ... be purged of corrupting elements: ... ‘purging’ is needed to restore health 
to ‘mixed’ bodies”. As Benner accurately summarizes, it is through these self-purgatory 
actions that governments may—more than just only occasionally—come to see that their 
“bad conduct merits punishment; ... corrupt cities [will at times] need to be purged before 
they can be restored to ethical and political health.”547
Machiavelli does express a religious degree of confidence on the state’s self-
purging qualities. He appears to be placing a Pascalian bet: a mundane form of purgatory 
will eventually have transmundane constitutionally-restorative results. Obviously, 
Nazism’s ideas of racial purification and ethnic cleansing are entirely alien to him: he 
could not phantom such ideas.548 Femia adequately demonstrates why Machiavelli’s own 
ideas could never have justified, but were rather being distorted by, Italian Fascism.549
Rather, when he puts his faith in this purgatory-remedy, or in this vaccine that would 
somehow help inoculate his constitutional state against recurring evils, he is actually 
putting his faith in changing the humors within the state. The remedy may take on the 
form of a plebiscite, but it cannot taken on the form of factionalism.550
He also never argues that the end justifies the means—because the statesperson 
should always have the duty to carefully recognize a deontic purpose next to such a 
utilitarian justification for his actions. Machiavelli does not appear to have thought that 
either the good or the evil is inherent to, nor that good and evil dominate, the state and its 
various government institutions. He only says that when the two main institutions are no 
longer scrutinizing each other, and appear to be going their own ways, it will become 
necessary for these institutions to newly purge themselves of their old humors. To thus 
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begin to avoid excessive indulgences and to begin to moderate their own worst 
proclivities, both the institutions need to maintain well-mixed humors, as they might be 
needing these humors to be critically counter-balancing each other.
The historical purgatory-thematic, as theorized in the Secretary’s oeuvre, is 
reciprocal—and might come from below as well as from the top. According to Benner it 
can only be created from below, by individuals. Benner also seems to find that this 
thematic is initiated by popular checks on government officials, and thus primarily by 
liberal citizens who fear government interferences in their private lifes, for that matter. 
Conversely, it seems rather unlikely that Machiavelli would have restricted the origins of 
a balanced constitutional state to the Term (1) legislative assemblies, as his many 
references to free magistrates and responsible captains clearly suggest this state needs to 
be equally sustained by Term (2) executive officials. When Machiavelli declares his 
constitutional fidelity to both purgatory plebiscites as well as towards dialectical methods 
of self-scrutiny, therefore, he is quintessentially declaring his civic faith in a complex 
combination of Term (1) norms as well as of Term (2) decisions.
Cogitations of this complex combination will be exceptionally critical in times of 
war. The party which declares victory in a civil war should have the highest duty of 
maintaining the peace. Because the constitution is in its essence also a peace treaty, the 
victorious party may not imagine itself at liberty to exclude the vanquished party from 
their joint-and-therefore-constitutional republic.551 Also, Machiavelli regularly 
commends those parties which refrain from faulting the ‘false’ Fortuna for their losses; 
the people of Florence were afraid to lose Lorenzo, yet they did not fault Fortuna. Rather, 
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they interpreted the heavens.552 This distinction is crucial because it makes it possible for 
the people to hope. For Machiavelli, hope is a religious virtue, which testifies to the 
redeeming omnipotence and rich diversity of Creation itself. His realist method takes 
shape alongside his rediscovery of the Christian religion, thus, as he asserts his hope that 
fallible human beings can redeem themselves by portending to Italy’s potential greatness. 
(‘Renaissance’ may literally connote ‘rebirth’ but it also means ‘redemption’ in that it 
holds out the promise of having a future in restoring a more-innocent past.)553
Machiavelli counsels the Florentines and probably all Italians, as well, that they 
should remain steadfast in their belief and hold on to their hope that a more-natural mode 
of political authority may ultimately emerge. This section has examined where this hope, 
this confidence should come from. One of the places where their Christian belief in 
redemptive authority may come from consists of the shelves of secondary literature. It 
seems too few authors have ever returned to these shelves to read the article “Dante and 
the Setting for Machiavellianism.” Larry Peterman, this article’s author, argues that 
Machiavelli would have followed a few basic principles of Renaissance Christian culture. 
The Florentine Secretary would have well-understood how Christian theology had 
remained interwoven with “classical attitudes toward hope, certainty, and philosophy.” In 
following Dante, the Florentine also would not have thought of himself as a secularist or 
a modernist. Instead, he did engage in the study of the Catholic faith, but he did it in 
Dante’s manner: a deliberate choice no longer always acknowledged by the modern 
reader. Dante was not an early-modernist philosopher, and yet he had expressed great 
trust in the (only seemingly modern) notion “that humanity can bridge the gap between 
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hope and certainty.” Machiavelli displays a similar level of trust, as Peterman continues, 
in having realized that the greatest political-theoretical challenge he faced was the 
religious predicament—of how “hope [might] become ... identified with what is certain; 
certain goods, arms, and necessity.”554
Clearly, the two Renaissance authors, Dante and Machiavelli, together proceeded 
to create a forceful reminder (although some might still call it a wager) that they had 
several ethico-religious and politico-historical reasons to believe in the Resurrection. 
Despite the various signs of human fallibilities and political tragedies, a resurrected, re-
integrated, and free republic would therefore be able to live on—through a series of 
purgatory stages—not unlike how they believed that the Christ (never: Fortuna) lives on. 
That series of stages in itself allows, quite mysteriously, the contrary elements of human 
nature, such as the mundane and the transmundane, to sustain their mutually-beneficial 
relations. Good Christians should simply be taking care in observing these relations by 
means of an open-ended (or, indeed, aleatory-dialectical) method of historical 
interpretation—as Machiavelli confesses oftentimes even more extensively, by also 
interpreting Livy, than that Dante had already done before him.555
Applying Machiavelli’s Systems Theory to IR: Recognitions of Sovereignty
The idea of historical modernization is anathema to Machiavelli’s realism. From 
his classicist perspective, historical change is a perennial process of natural causes and 
935
effects. Men-made or modern progressions do exist, but they are not logical and non-
rational. Within the world of men, cause and effect are subject to the unforeseen: to the 
uncertainty of flukes and accidents. Yet, men-made change somehow remains contingent 
to natural, seasonal, and cosmic processes. History as a whole encompasses natural
history, and is eternal flux: a continuous chain of fluctuations, within which humans can 
have only a limited effect on their natural surroundings. “Not even the [g]ods or ... 
[F]ortuna stood outside the causal chain”—as one reader of classicist political thought 
sums up their position.556 The whole of History can effectuate change at any level of 
organization, including the world of the gods, so that History herself remains humanly 
unmasterable. As is the future, so is the past a mystery. To respect this mystery, realists 
like Machiavelli must argue that history neither can, nor should be humanly accelerated. 
Those who had tried, all failed miserably, as only a few 1960s realists or a few 
stucturalist realists may not concur to Machiavelli. 
Completely contrary to structuralist neorealists and modernization theory-realists, 
who did not have much hope but whose ideologies were clearly determined by fears of a 
communistic future, Machiavelli respects fear but also has moderate hopes. He cautions 
against ideological arrogance and other such forms of “hubris” in day-to-day conduct.557
Hope means to him that failure is still an option. Yet, failure itself is no reason for 
political nihilism. Harmful oppositions, or historical forms of ideological enmity, may 
still be ‘vented’ by human means, in accordance to Peterman’s Dantean reading of 
Machiavelli.558
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The above sections, already before having presented the Florentine Histories in 
another light, further corroborated realism’s—original Aristotelian, rather than positivist 
Kelsenian—argument that antagonism is being caused by an excessive dependency, 
within any civic system, either on the predominantly ideological power of the cultivated 
ideational competencies (of contemplative energies) or on the predominantly materialist 
power of habitually-informed mundane needs (on activist movements). Here is Histories’ 
own reformulation: “the causes of most of the troubles which take place in cities” have 
been created by either one of these two excesses: the desire of the nobles “to command” 
and the disinclination of the commoners “to obey”.559
In order to re-establish a healthy relationship between ideological and materialist 
powers, between magnificent nobles and ordinary people, or between military captains 
and common infantry, as well, Machiavelli here argues it should be (religiously) believed 
a human possibility “to equalize” their respective powers, faculties, and humors. History 
may be a perennially-cyclical process of causation, but this does not also have to mean 
that human beings should not be taking the responsibility upon themselves to ‘arrest’ 
excessive violations of the one constitutional rule that applies to all of them, equally. This 
one rule is the rule of the balance of powers, and Machiavelli has faith (or: religion) that 
no exceptions will be possible to this rule, unless they were to affirm the rule. Therefore, 
it is a constitutional duty to create some degree of parity and balance within the systemic 
processes of political history.
The section currently at hand shall demonstrate how contemporary, twenty-first 
century citizens may acquire greater confidence to sustain natural equilibriums, and to 
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exercise their constitutional duties. There are two aspects to such duties. First, these are 
duties to use power to scrutinize power. Any statesperson who proclaims to have found 
the direction in which history is progressing, thereby, should be scrutinized and 
distrusted. The state itself cannot be taken into either the oligarchical or the democratic 
direction, as both directions will lead to excessive discords. Instead, a very fine line 
should be drawn, and rather carefully as well, between the two sentiments of both 
excessive riches and extreme poverty, but also of command and obedience, as no 
constitutional state will remain sustainable if it were to escape into either one of these 
two directions.
Second, these are duties to avoid the option of ‘splitting the difference’. As 
Machiavellian realists will be sure to point out, a constitutional state such as the Order of 
San Giorgio remained sustainable because it was able to combine both of the two 
possible directions without calculating the difference, and without paving them over so 
that only one new direction would be created. Rather, the duties to sustain the 
combination do not allow human beings to enter into a perfectly consensual direction, as 
the “middle course” should be thought to have been closed-off. As Machiavelli warns 
every one of his readers (although he, indeed, dedicated The Prince strictly to Lorenzo 
the Magnificent), this combination itself is highly complex. The combination sustains a 
relation between both their “virtú” and their “honor”—and thus also to both their skill in 
preserving their individuality as well as their natural sociability or, simpler, both their 
integrity and their dignity.560
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Free statespersons may be able to ‘go down the middle’ of the combination itself, 
but they should not analytically separate its parts from one another. Indeed, Machiavelli’s 
classicist realism identifies statespersons, as equally sovereign, to the extent they will not 
be trying to make the sum of the parts equal to the whole by splitting them apart. They 
should also not be calculating a perfect mean average if they want to remain as equally 
human as their counter-parts. Remarkably, those realists who believe in Machiavelli’s 
ban on the middle course now have good reasons for the ban to be reinstated, specifically 
in terms of how twenty-first century-states should be relating to each other—within 
broader, historical IR system dynamics.
In between expressing their fears and hopes, and between their material interest 
and their ideological ambitions, statespersons may best maintain and provide orderliness 
to their international relations by autonomously ‘giving’ and ‘receiving’ diplomatic 
recognition to and from each other. Over time, these ‘exchange’ practices have been tried 
and tested, which has resulted in a few standards of recognition. But there is no single 
formula. On one side of the board on which theorists have sketched out the meanings of 
international statehood recognition, there are the Montevideo standards, which are 
generally-measurable or at least positively-defined criterions, while on another side there 
are social constructivist standards, which somehow give expression to those 
immeasurable practices through which cultural and national identities are being 
continuously and diplomatically constructed.
On one side of the blackboard, Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention 
defines statehood (or, more precisely, “international legal personality”) on the basis of 
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three key “qualifications”: (1) “defined territory”; (2) “permanent population”, and; (3) a 
“government” with the “capacity to enter into relations with the other states”. One of the 
most pressing and unresolved issues in the actual practice of international recognition is 
that the first two “qualifications” have grown to be much more dominant that the third. 
Recognition of types of “government”—and of their unique constitutional powers, 
abilities, and capacities—is thus generally considered the weaker leg in actual practices. 
This relative weakness has been reflected in the main theoretical categories of 
sovereignty, or also in the “two analytically distinct categories of requests for 
recognition”. The first category of sovereign entities meets all three subcriterions. The 
second category of political entities is formed “as a direct consequence of the threat or 
use of force by an external power, across international boundaries, [and these entities are] 
usually referred to as ‘satellite’ or ‘puppet’ states”. 561
These categories of sovereign states overlap a little, yet their differences are 
measurable. Those states that have very little autonomy, in terms of how they constitute 
their governments, and which are being threatened by “external powers”, as well, tend to 
be states such as the GDR, with measurably-less discretion over their foreign affairs and 
usually especially also over their military affairs.562 These ‘satellites’ are unlikely to pass 
the third subcriterion, therefore, as their government will either be unfree or it will mostly 
consist of only one of the two main constitutional components; it then only has to hold 
the executive-administrative power. Sovereignty,  at least in formal theories of 
international recognition, may either be unfree or it will be constitutionally monistic. But 
because both of these categorical types of sovereignty are so well-measurable and 
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extremely positivistic, in fact, at least in terms of their self-categorization, they represent 
nonetheless mostly the state’s executive control over a territory and a population—rather 
than also its unquantifiable degree of popular freedom and and political autonomy. 
Within the bounds of the first two categories, then, whenever a sovereign state has met 
the two first subcriterions, the question would therefore still remain whether it appears to 
be meeting them legitimately; are the people autonomous and do their institutions enjoy 
sufficient political parity in that respect as well? 
On another side of the board, social constructivism argues that if the categories of 
state sovereignty would primarily have been formulated in terms of which territories and 
which populations have their own boundaries, then the issue remains whether territorial 
borders actually represent the population, or whether they might be cutting across several 
groups and states. Are the boundaries representative? The conventional categories, thus, 
tend to create their own “logic of representation, [as] a boundary [herein only] ‘truly’ 
exists between sovereignty and intervention, and this boundary insures the distinction 
between these two terms”—as Cynthia Weber has pointed out.563
Sovereignty now defines itself as non-intervention, just as that military 
interventions or territorial conquests would have to be defined as non-sovereignty. That 
is, the non-intervention norm and factual statehood, together, form a tautology. By 
contrast to tautological representational logics, however, it is alternatively possible to use 
a “logic of simulation”, as social constructivists such as Weber have proposed. These 
constructivist theorists are correct that quantifiable measures of “sovereignty and 
intervention” should not be used interchangeably. Yet, they also do not want to argue, it 
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seems, that there remains a qualitative difference between sovereignty and intervention, 
or between ultimate autonomy and military supremacy. As realists, rather than 
constructivists, can now make the argument: it is simply impossible to gloss over the 
qualitative difference between concrete human (constitutional) powers and abstract 
international (non-intervention) norms. If states were to disregard the difference, indeed, 
to appropriate Weber’s own words, they could just be allowed to “respect no boundary, 
[as any possible] boundary between them must [then] be simulated in order to simulate 
the state.” That is, constructivists correctly argue that the conventional categories of 
representation mistakenly treat the sovereign state as a simulation, or as “a sign without 
referent”. But political realists would want to add that sovereign states should precisely 
therefore again be taking on their duty of recognizing “a referent” which they can all 
have in common, including possible referents such as “god and the people”.564
By contrast, from a realist perspective, the political problem of recognition is less 
being caused by the interchangeability of the referents than it is caused by the unique 
meanings statespersons create within their own minds. Statespersons frequently display 
hubris as they imagine they may attach their own meanings to these referents, and to 
explain these meanings in terms of their own nationalist traditions. Because statespersons 
are at the current time simply not treating each other as equal co-participants, thereby, 
and as they continue to play complicated mind-games within organs such as the UN 
Security Council and the General Assembly, they also cannot escape the tautological and 
hollow meanings of their own internationally-recognized legal personalities.
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The two sides of the board cannot easily be reconciled. On the constructivist side, 
there is no way to avoid meaningless referents: ideas such as those of Deism or popular 
autonomy would here have to be considered signs without referents, rather. States 
simulate their appearances towards each other by means of their hollow rhetoric—which 
then again neutralizes any potential for change, and which would merely be used to 
privilege the status quo-Powers. On the side of the Montevideo standards, territorial 
boundaries may likewise be fixed by those Great Powers that have the most to lose from 
any changes to the status quo. The many cases in which the Great Powers themselves 
failed to add strength to the Montevideo-standards because they remained too powerless 
to also formally change the status quo (in 1956 Egypt, or in 1979 Iran, for example), have 
formed cases that only added more proof to the fact that the former Imperial Powers can 
no longer use their forces at will, at least not to create new states, within their realms of 
influence—regardless as to whether these new states would become buffers, satellites, or 
dependencies. 
Hence, U.S. President Wilson was certainly not among the first to preserve the 
status quo by means of treaty-law, but he was the first to help codify the non-intervention 
norm, which is the reason why the current-day recognition methodology still owes so 
much to him. He worked on this norm at Versailles, shortly after the Great War had to be 
concluded in 1918. His work helped create the modern idea of a territorial integrity-norm. 
Indeed, this was the only norm to survive his Versailles visit as he already needed to 
recant this first ‘utterance’—of that other possible ideal-standard, of the national right to 
self-determination, however—by Fall 1919.565
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In order to maintain American standing vis-à-vis Europe’s Imperial Powers, 
Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to define non-intervention had also redefined, and 
delegitimized international military interventions. Wilson had thus become instrumental 
in the legitimization of prior territorial conquests throughout Africa and Asia—or at least 
in preventing them from becoming delegitimized by any one of the Imperial Powers. 
However inadvertently, Wilson diminished the chances that the African and Asian
peoples, many of whom had contributed to the First World War, would be claiming their 
right to political self-determination. Although many ‘commonwealth peoples’ had 
sacrificed during the War, in order to maintain the liberties and immunities of their 
imperial overlords in Paris and London, the latter were cruel and not interested in hearing 
any advice that these peoples should have political autonomy and be allowed to 
decolonize themselves.566
Wilson’s idea of a right to national autonomy, based on democratic suffrage 
rights, would by 1919 have seemed to have been a short-lived ‘go-it-alone’ strategy, and 
the idea was dismissed as empty rhetoric, at least with respect to its applicability among 
non-European peoples and non-Western ethnic minorities. Wilson’s ideas would solely 
be applied to justify the mass displacements of Eastern Europeans, and to thereby 
territorially-emasculate the vanquished (Germanic-language-speaking) nations. These 
applications essentially recreated what by 1939 would turn out to be, unfortunately, 
perhaps the most unstable balance of powers Europe had ever experienced. Wilson’s 
ideas thus actually helped maintain more, rather than less, political equalities in the 
world.567 The reason must be a pro-European bias. In 1919, for instance, the U.S. had 
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even helped block “Japanese efforts to introduce a clause endorsing racial equality into 
the covenant of the [League of Nations].” As Krasner describes, the abstract ideas of self-
determination and democracy were defended “even if this meant compromising [the 
concreteness of] autonomy.”568
Some structuralist neorealists, such as Randall Schweller, may want to argue that 
the world—at least after the Second World War—has grown accustomed to compromise. 
Autonomy has then merely become a relative degree of power, so that in effect there is 
no such activity as actual self-legislation. There are only varying degrees of international 
power and of inter-regulation. Schweller describes this as a world of “under-aggression”, 
since most states would have  made a rational choice to compete only in terms of their 
“relative power, ... composed of both material and non-material capabilities.” This could 
then explain why regional power-houses (Brazil, China, South-Africa) will not pursue 
absolute power over their neighbors, but will choose “to remain potential regional 
hegemons rather than actual ones.” But almost each one of the peripheral hegemons has 
gone through protracted border conflicts. The reason they are now respecting the 
territorial integrity of others is simply that they try to avoid confrontations with a few 
leading garrison-states, as the latter have sophisticated naval fleets and far more nuclear 
weapons. Hence, Schweller is wrong to so suggest that the self-constraint on the part of 
some has been a sign of “under-aggression”. For, it could then equally as well form a sign 
of “under-peacefulness”. In a situation of completely relative power, there can only be 
nihilism, and no concrete referent, regardless as to whether that referent itself would have 
to be peace. Self-constraint and self-regulation on behalf of peripheral hegemons can 
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carry no meaning, at least not in a Schwellerian world, thus, as even those ideas somehow 
have to remain relative to the qualitatively different powers of especially a central 
hegemon (the U.S. and the EU or, perhaps, Russia).569
By contrast to neorealists, classicist realists will regret that Wilson’s original 
conception of political self-determination has gained almost no currency. The concept of 
political autonomy is hardly being used to undermine the territorial-integrity convention 
that was established, with Wilson’s own assistance, in order to strengthen the relative 
powers of the victors of both of the World Wars. For, another one of Wilson’s ideas, that 
of eliminating the right of conquest, can still be said to actually have improved the value 
of the recognition practices that had already become current by the 1870s, when the 
‘Scramble for Africa’ had almost ended. This second idea has helped maintain a simple 
rule: states newly created by means of an external party’s use of force should no longer 
be recognized.570 As long as military conquest had been considered legal by the Imperial 
Powers, it had remained possible for a new state to arise within the conquered territories, 
legitimately, on the heels of the victorious Imperial Power. By 1919, the creation of such 
new states had been delegitimized, but this was more a practical necessity than it had 
been the result of a progressive Wilsonian norm. Also, classicist realists do not think self-
determination must be understood as a positive right subject to another basic right. 
Political autonomy is a decision, best made by a plebiscite or in a revolutionary assembly, 
and this decision cannot be subordinated to any other norm than its own normativity: the 
duty to protect the people’s autonomy, in other words, cannot be subordinated to a series 
of ever-higher norms. Classicist realists think, rather, that political self-determination is 
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part of only one structural type of norm (sustainability!), which then itself should be 
implemented by only two types of decision-making organization (the constitutionally-
dualistic state).
So, to return to Fabry’s question, if territorial conquest would by the 1920s no 
longer have been believed to form an applicable subcriterion, would this belief itself not 
also have further affirmed the comparative advantages of the then-existing Great Powers? 
Would the Wilsonian prohibition on the forcible creation of new states not actually help 
preserve the “territorial integrity” of the colonial empires, including the imperial 
influence of the United States itself—in the sense that Washington now no longer needed 
to fear any military conquest of Middle and South America? Fabry argues that “territorial 
integrity” has continued to gain “normative superiority over self-determination”, but he 
has not yet answered his own question as to whether this has happened “for the sake of 
stability or multi-ethnic democracy, or human rights, or some other externally identified 
goal”.571
To meet Fabry somewhere in the middle, another glance at Machiavelli’s 
recognition theory would be worthwhile. As was argued, the latter’s classicist realist 
method  was supplemental to a systems theory in which two qualitatively different 
powers engage in productive, healthy relations. These powers realize that their tendencies 
or their moods are qualitatively different, yet also are aware that they should continue to 
relate to each other, simply by virtue of their common human constitutionality as well as 
just to avoid excessive inequalities and violent disorders. It may also be remembered that 
Machiavelli’s theory does not fit very well with the category of 1960s realism, because 
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only Machiavelli’s notion of a complex system helps makes sense of crises and sudden 
changes by attempting to restore an original constitutional relation between unequal 
human groupings. The Cold War category, of modernist realism, rather, understands IR 
to have been one and the same realm throughout history: a realm “in which states were 
[always] involved in [conflicts] ... with each other (because that was the nature of states 
in an anarchic world); power was necessary to survive in it, or to continue to fight; all 
states were potential enemies, ... but the worst might be avoided by clever diplomacy and 
by virtue of the fact that all alike shared a similar conception of rational behavior”.572
Thus, in the frameworks of 1960s realism and in neorealism, just as well, 
statespersons are rational despite the fact that their ideas are overwhelmingly fatalistic. 
They make the rational choice to prepare themselves for the worst, so that they cannot be 
disappointed by the violently anarchical conduct of others. In essence, this would mean 
that these Cold War-persons have no hopes, and that they can share no common referents. 
Their rhetoric is egotistic, as it relies on pure signage without references to the common 
good, and without any references to their shared duties. Within the Cold War-framework, 
states would have little to no free will, also, as their need for survival (historical 
necessity) dictates the way in which they will use their power. In short, this 
conventionalist realist framework has been constructed from ideas such as that each 
state’s final destination has already been written into the historical annals, by some 
invisible hand, and that it is each state’s higher calling to prepare itself for this 
destination. This idea is typical of a Puritan and an American-sectarian culture, however, 
in which each individual state’s future is imagined to have been historically 
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predetermined, which then again somehow motivates each state to be as rational, as 
productive, and to accumulate as much capital as it can—within its lifespan. Within the 
field of IR theory, perhaps even more dangerously, this sectarian culture was transmuted 
into the 1960s idea of rational choice-theorems, trumping both empiricism and historical 
sociology. But whenever the rational dimension of DST would thus be tolerated to 
dominate the more commonsensical dimension, unfortunately, statespersons would argue 
that their ends were more rational than those of ‘less-advanced nations’, and that 
therefore their ends justified any means. These statespersons needed no deontic recourse 
to a common purpose.
Most realists agree with each other that the idea of undertaking a future territorial 
conquest is almost certainly being discouraged and sanctioned by those Great Powers 
with the largest weapons arsenals. By following the Wilsonian ban on illegitimate 
territorial conquests, however, conventionalist realists (Schweller, Waltz) have generally 
been expecting that each state’s chances of survival are determined by its own inherent 
capacity to make rational choices and to therefore avoid being counter-attacked by an 
more-powerful state. By reducing the chances of armed conflict, competing states will try 
to lock themselves into the existing balance, thus.573 Their aim will not be to restore any 
more-stable or any more-original balances of powers, thus, but to work within the status 
quo by preserving it. Yet, if this is the only aim in which they distinguish themselves 
from Fascist states, as Schweller argues it is, then IR will have be following a strictly 
utilitarian logic. This logic holds that most states will only try to expand themselves 
territorially if they can moderate their aggression and if their expansion helps them to 
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preserve the existing distribution of land and resources. As such a logic in fact consists of 
a ban, imposed by only very few of the militarily- and economically-powerful states, the 
issue arises why these very few states should not be treated as oligarchs with a Fascist 
agenda. Schweller concludes that Fascist ideas such as “national aggrandizement and 
purification” are inconsistent with realism’s more-cautionary idea “that economic forces 
are the prime mover of history.”574 Yet, it must be objected that such a conclusion 
wrongly tries to position material capabilities (economic historical change) over and 
above ideological capabilities—as opposed to trying to integrate the two different types 
of power.
By contrast to 1960s realism, however, early 1960s liberalism would oftentimes 
take a more dominant role. In terms of how America’s foreign relations were actually 
being conducted, both realists and liberals often agreed that economic markets would 
follow their own logic and would themselves create optimal distributions of goods, so 
that the battle-of-ideas would be won by materialist means. During the Cold War, mostly 
liberal policy-makers became adherents of a pro-privatization or a pro-modernization 
theorem, as they shared their optimism about the possibilities of proving to the world that 
America’s historical trajectory was progressively becoming the near-perfect trajectory of 
national self-determination.
The liberal progressives also expected the American experiment with national 
autonomy—based on private law, on property rights, and individual liberty—to continue 
to attract followers, in lesser modern states, and even to subsequentially become the new 
international legal norm. Individual interests and consumer preferences had already been 
950
synthesized during the 1950s, as American consumers started to reap the benefits of a 
mass-industrialized post-war economy. It was not just a reasonable hope, but had become 
the foreign policy-plan that “economies of advanced industrialized nations could continue 
to grow, and [their material wealth] be replicated without limit”. Michael E. Latham 
additionally mentions that this same modernization- and industrialization-plan’s 
unplanned-for ‘externalities’—such as rising social inequalities, under-nutrition, 
environmental degradation, and the energy resource crisis—would only be broadly-
identified by the 1970s, following publications such as The Limits to Growth, a study 
sponsored by the Club of Rome.575
Contrary to what liberal theorists might argue, the Cold War was no ‘blessing in 
disguise’  because it would have democratized the world. Next to having expanded 
individual suffrage rights, the Cold War era clearly also witnessed an acceleration in 
economic competition and consumer materialism at the expense of autonomy, austerity, 
sustainability, and ecosystemic symbiosis. Now it is taking the world too long to 
decelerate. ‘Conventional’ GDP-based standards and economic growth-oriented policy-
plans continue to form a curse on ‘alternative’ happiness standards. For example, rather 
than to have cultivated diverse seeds and breeds, and rather than to have respected 
complex ecosystems in the name of Earth’s deontological transcendence, (neo-liberal) 
policy-makers in fact broke down the laws and limits that for centuries governed the 
human food system. They were treating the human food chain not as a source of 
happiness but as a socially-separate mechanism, especially during the Cold War, when 
they argued they could make this mechanism run smoother by homogenizing output (by 
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subsidizing cash crops) and by standardizing the parts. Erroneously and immorally, they 
were thus expecting that the food chain as a whole would somehow remain identical to 
the sum of its parts. By subsidizing and protecting highly-mechanized industrialized agri-
businesses, moreover, they were valuing quantity above quality, and individual land 
ownership-rights above any any indigenous criterions that would instead have continued 
to respect peasant-farm autonomy.576
Classicist realists recognize limits at any organizational level, and within any 
relational power. Machiavelli’s method allows realists to respect these limits: violating 
[of such natural] limits incurs disorders that may reasonably be represented as divinely 
sanctioned chastisements.”577 Classicist realists do not accept the liberal framework of 
economic necessity. Instead, they call for the active exercise of freedom. Economics and 
politics are not running more and more in sync, but are actually being regulated by 
separate frameworks. Economics is being liberalized whereas politics is being 
oligarchized. More dangerously, these processes are no longer being observed to happen 
simultaneously, as they are tolerated to form separate historical trajectories.
However, if more statespersons were to examine their own idea of progressively 
linear synchronization (or: the idea of a telos) seriously, they could find out for 
themselves why this idea leads them down a teleological road—and why they will 
ultimately be disappointed by changing circumstances. Without sense of structural 
integrity, they will then resort to scapegoating anyone (Fortuna would only be the least-
worst scapegoat) besides themselves. No longer fearing they might have to listen to a 
952
“chastisement” by the popular voice, they can become so pretentious that they will 
blindly assume that the ‘golden mean’ (telos) is their only way forward.
Machiavelli argues, however, that any idea of a perfect mean is a simple excuse 
for statespeople to be resting on their laurels, and to no longer heed the signs. His 
warning against pretentiousness remains one of the most vital reasons why statespeople 
should be anticipating the future: those who take the past (of Sparta, for instance) as their 
only example will soon find themselves going down the dangerous road of disallowing 
any further constitutional amendments, and they will lack the kind of structural resilience 
(of a Rome) they might later need to cope with extraordinary contingencies.
Liberal philosophers with a penchant for historical syntheses would be wiser if 
they were trying to understand why they ought to scrutinize their own discursive 
references to golden syntheses, but also to the middle class and to equity and justice. The 
actions of most liberal statespersons, in particular, will be much better-respected if they 
were to embed their actions in referents, instead, such as the common good or the popular 
will. For, the latter referents can be rationally assessed in terms of a statesperson’s public 
respect for diversity and pluralism, or human eco-consciousness, whereas liberal 
references will be more prone to serve the ideological status quo on what it means to 
exercise legitimate authority. Indeed, what do liberal positivist theorists understand the 
meaning of authority to be?
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On Authority: Comparing Kelsen’s Legal Positivism to Nijs’s Negativism
Which innovative approach did Machiavelli choose to take as he conceptualized 
the sort of authority that may turn the structure of power into the structure of an 
autonomous and sovereign state? Clearly, Machiavelli did not choose to dwell by the 
legal forms and juridical values of positivism. In sharpening the contrast between legal 
positivism and his own method of political realism, instead, theoretical incisiveness 
towards Aristotle’s concept of constitutional statehood remains of vital importance. 
Aristotle’s notion of what it is that makes the state into a state, seemingly paradoxically, 
had combined democratic with oligarchic selection methods. Machiavelli finds this 
combination anything but perplexing, however, as he similarly combinesthe corruption of
executive power with the self-regulative or perhaps democracy-restorative power of the 
people as a whole. In this sense, he is ending up with a complex combination of both 
positivist or democratic as well as of negativist or oligarchical components. He respects
Aristotle’s concept of a constitutional state divided against itself. But he also parts with 
ancient Greek philosophy as he introduces a novel method of historical inquiry in which 
the mean, or a third power, is left out of the dialectical equation.
The idea of legal positivism is to Machiavelli very much about the forms. It seems 
from his perspective to be nothing but an abstract ideal. As such, it may seem 
invulnerable to corruption but it will also be stimulating philosophical solipsisms: it will
be stimulating anything but what political materialism demands.Machiavelli responds to 
the risk of corruption by ranking the state’s democratic potentialbelow the state’s 
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actualcommand authority. In this, for the purposes of methodological coherency and 
historical analysis, heis ranking the ideal or the democratic potential of a population far 
below the concrete competition: below material power. But what Vatter has not yet 
observed is that Machiavelli also does not go so far as to completely reduce authority 
itself to either one of the elements of this duality. Authority is still an ambivalent 
position, rather than that it is found on the side of either one pole. Machiavelli is a 
process theorist, herein, as he is suggesting that both poles are necessarily constituting a 
series of contingent or of freely-coinciding opposites—and thus also of: matter/form; 
movement/potential; revolutionary freedom/dictatorial command; self-
organization/power structure, and; political responsibility/utilitarian ends as well as legal 
positivism/conventional realism.
While Aristotle and Machiavelli would have recognized that men ranging from 
Moses to Caesar to Lorenzo had represented the oligarchical values of their states, legal 
positivists disallow any such values. They instead go through great efforts to subvert the 
power of noble commanders and the possibility of oligarchical discretion—to their ideal 
of democratically-established legal norms.
Hans Kelsen professes to hold a legal positivist philosophy. He expects the power 
of the state to have to be absorbed by, and to have to come within an ever-closer reach of, 
the normative reign of equal rights and similar legal norms.578 The government of the 
state is to be absorbed by constitutional rules, but is especially also to be integrated 
within an universally-applicable justice ‘system’. Positivists like Kelsen premise thereby 
that the more constitutionally-valid the rules are, the more likely they can begin to 
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comprise state power. As history progresses, each state will become part of a larger 
hierarchy, and be subjected to the regulatory or the normative values of one government 
structure. The structure maintains its integrity by means of one basic norm. Each state’s 
own norms can be ranked below this one ground-norm. Positivists thus also think of each 
state’s constitution as a hierarchical structure, and as an “essential foundation for 
government, at any level”—as the well-known description by Alan James holds.579
The pure theory of law, as designed by Kelsen, aims to bring international 
relations, between states, within the confines of a constitution of international law 
values.580 Kelsen’s theory paints a neo-Grotian image of international law. State rights 
thereby become secondary to international rights. In this image, specifically treaty law 
can be seen to include hierarchically integrated values, with the highest value being a 
basic norm also identifiable as a categorical imperative. Kelsen’s argument seems to 
hold, approximately, that international rights should be thought to include state rights. 
For example, while jurists such as Smend had presupposed that state rights could be 
organizationally integrated, by a political power, the positivist argument undermines this 
classic presupposition. Not the integration of power, but power’s total inclusion by a 
system of legislation and justice should be the proper purpose of legal theory. Kelsen 
literally asks why Smend would have wanted to suppose that the justice system will 
somehow prevent itself from “integrating” when it reaches the critical point of sufficient 
independence from state power. How could Smend be so certain that at the end of his 
integration process, both the political government will have been firmly seated and the 
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justice system will have remained far enough “outside the narrow integrating-scope” of 
this same political government?581
Legal negativists argue that not state rights but sovereign authority should be the 
recognized source of justice in the world. Carl Schmitt, who had clearly become a 
negativist during the years that he undertook his most vituperative attacks on positivism 
(1933-1936), argues then also that the factual order of all things sovereign should be 
recognized as prior to the normative contents of all sorts of rights.582 By implication of 
his oftentimes seemingly too negativist argument, the legal justice system must not so 
much retain its integrity under inherently abstract legal hierarchical conditions, as that it 
should herein make itself more dependent on a qualitatively different, but always 
concrete modes of authority. George Schwab initially had trouble introducing this 
negativist argument to American audiences. As he pointed out why it had vested the 
state’s ultimate authority in its making possible of the negations, not solely in the positing 
of legal norms, Schwab realized that possible negatively meaningful experiences hardly 
interested American theorists of a more objective or positivist bend. However, as Hobbes 
would have done, Schmitt’s subjectivism is not nihilistic. Rather, it clearly vested the 
state’s ultimate raison d’être in the decision “to maintain its integrity, in order to ensure 
order and stability.” “Like every other order, [as Schmitt himself sets out to demonstrate], 
the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm.”583
There are several ways to validate the negativist argument, most of which are 
historical. In 1879, for instance, Ernest Nijs had published a moderately negativist thesis, 
suggesting that if international rights were indeed allowed to trump state rights, as the 
957
positivist later came to argue they should, it would soon be impossible to recognize states 
and other public authorities which have remained without international rights. The 
standard example of a state which lacks, and yet pretends to enjoy universally recognized 
international rights is, of course, the Holy See. Even though Vatican City, today, is 
widely being recognized as a statelet with observer status at the United Nations, largely 
following rules which were spelled out in the Vatican’s Treaty with Mussolini’s Italy, the 
Holy See itself claims it enjoys sovereign authority regardless of its internationally 
recognized status. Even though the Vatican is not being universally recognized as a 
geophysical state, and is not even a state in accordance to positivist legal conventions, the 
Pope/See may nonetheless quite certainly claim sovereignty. Before Nijs would be read 
by Schmitt, in pointing this out he had already directed much scholarly attention to the 
Papacy’s unique claim to enjoy universally recognizable sovereignty—without holding 
any considerable geophysical power.
Though he is not known to have been a realist, Nijs’s writings suggest there is 
little need to consider the justice system as if it were a monistic hierarchy, apexed by a 
tribunal (the ICC is technically a tribunal), and as if it is thereby subsuming power to 
itself. “[T]he decision of differences and conflicts was not, [at least not] in ancient times, 
confided to magistrates holding their office by public authority, but to arbitrators chosen 
by the partners.” This observation means to him that, not only in actual historical practice 
but also ethically, “arbitration is anterior to judicial organization”.584 In a previous era it 
would have been inconceivable for arbitration to not be believed anterior to international 
permanent tribunals, althus Nijs. In another thesis he writes: “The popes of the Middle 
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Ages had tried to arrogate to themselves the part of sovereign arbiters of the world; they 
had wished to have themselves recognized as master of the nations.” In 1782 the Holy 
See turned its own status, or its own authority into a point of contention, arguing that 
because it had not been present at the 1648 Westphalia Conferences, it could also never 
have “recognized this Treaty.” It therefore retained its pre-1648 authority, regardless of 
Westphalian legal values. Nijs adds that jurists have for centuries been able to recognize 
treaties between churches and states, and that there is no reason why churches cannot 
enjoy “the positive and actual right of embassy”. Yet, under the argument of the pure 
theory of law there would be absolutely “nothing [making] ... it necessary to 
acknowledge that the Holy See has any international rights.”585
The earliest political realists were intimately familiar with Treitschke’s interest in 
the difficult question of German statehood, which harbored a strong tension between: 
first, federal constitutionalism and international equal rights and; second, Bismarck’s 
claim to enjoy discrete executive authority, which he mainly derived from the Prussian 
Junkers and their ambition to maintain a pro-monarchical middle level—sometimes 
almost regardless of the needs of the lesser Germanic statelets. This difficult question 
would have involved, thus, a complex relation between a negativist tendency in the form 
of Bismarck’s suspected Caesarism and the more positivist proclivity to integrate the 
German principalities into one legal hierarchy.586 Meinecke, Schmitt, and many others 
wrote within the discursive context of German constitutionalism, and well-understood the 
intensity of this Treitschkean historical dilemma.587 But they would also have understood 
that neither one of these two tendencies alone should guard the constitution.
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On one hand, if the confederalist positivists were to have become the dominant 
force in German history, then the constitutional law tradition could have been turned into 
an inflexible or an essentialist convention, and it would long have been resented by the 
monarchists and any other possible legal negativists. On the other, if the Prussian Junkers 
and the negativists among them were to have led Germany’s confederalist integration, 
without displaying regard for the wishes of the Southern regions and non-Prussian 
statelets, the constitutional balance of powers would have been upset or even have been 
broken. This two-sided historical consideration played of course an important function in 
how late nineteenth and early twentieth century jurists began to redefine their general 
theories of the republican constitutionalist domain.588
Stanley L. Paulson describes Kelsenian positivism as a method designed to avoid 
the constitutional law-embedded state’s “anthropomorphization”. This method prevents 
that government will become confused by the interest of individual human beings, “by 
means of a rigorous and pervasive application of [the] ... Sein/Sollen [is/ought] 
distinction”. Paulson mentions Kelsen admitted that applications of this analytical 
distinction may themselves become too inflexible, and that they then will prove “to be 
too much of a good thing, for ... the Sein/Sollen distinction commits [Kelsen] to a denial 
of the very possibility of any theoretical connection between facticity and normativity, 
between human being and ‘imputative’ legal relation. The ensuing ‘antinomy, as Kelsen 
terms it, is the price to be paid for a ‘pure’ theory of law.”589 Kelsen acknowledges 
further that his predecessors—such as Smend and Jellinek, basically—had held on to a 
void between human beings and their legal relations, which he argues is why they were 
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incorrect to claim their theories could help integrate the state’s realist-societal with its 
idealist-juridical side. To help break the circle these German jurists had created for 
themselves, Kelsen simply propositions to the normative dominance of liberal idealism; 
his theoretical assumption is that all relationships between human beings are by 
definition, and predominantly, legalistic relationships.590 Especially Jellinek would have 
made the mistake of allowing the realist-societal or human side to lead in the integration 
process, while this dimension rather should remain contained by, and be embedded in a 
hierarchy of legal norms. “Jellinek’s assumption that psychological or physical [or 
possibly anthropomorphical] data will yield normative results is precisely the kind of 
mistake that Kelsen identifies as a flagrant violation of the Sein/Sollen distinction. 
Paulson adds that “in Kelsen’s legal theory ... there is no [open] connection whatever 
between human being and legal person.”591
If the human being could be believed to be theoretically subordinate to the legal 
person, or at least indistinguishable from the legal person, then Schmitt must reject 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law. Schmitt argues that Kelsen’s dichotomization of being and 
person constitutes a false move. Schmitt also finds that juridical authority may only 
emerge from within a complex, but open-ended, and oftentimes indeterminable 
relationship between concrete beings and their own legal normativity. For Schmitt, as for 
Nijs, in addition, concrete methods of establishing order by means of arbitration may 
only be thought to have been effectuated if these methods also remained “anterior to” the 
abstract ways in which legal personhood usually ends up being institutionalized by 
seemingly neutral court systems.592
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Slavoj Žižek is among those who claim to have uncovered why the Schmittian, or 
the negativist, position shifted too far forwards. Schmittian thinking leans towards the 
present Sein (the is) of juristic authority—and thereby ignores the intent, or the will to be 
present. Thus, Žižek suggests Schmitt imposes, on the juridical field, his own principle 
that “order, the Dass-Sein of Order, has priority over its concrete content, over its Was-
Sein.” In an astonishing remark, Žižek then goes on to suggest that Schmitt was even 
more modern in his theory than Kelsen had been, as he would have placed not only the 
decision but also the exception before the normative content of the rule; “What is 
properly modern in Schmitt’s notion of the exception is ... the violent gesture of asserting 
the independence of the abyssal act of free decision from its positive content.” In 
Schmitt’s modern theory of law, “the Sovereign’s will [has to be] left to historical 
contingency”—and must thereto be completely freed from the legal norm’s positivism, 
althus Žižek.593
Žižek’s suggestive remarks follow from a misinterpretation of Schmitt. When the 
latter’s work is taken as a whole, contrary to Žižek’s partial reading, then Schmitt does 
not merely inverse Kelsen. His work does not simply substitute violence for normativity, 
it does not solely replace positivity with negativity, and it quite clearly maintains—rather 
than that it dichotomizes—the complex (Weberian) relations between decision on the 
normative exception and the decision on the legal norm. In Schmitt’s work, (as Chapter 
Four shall accentuate) the human being continues to be integrated with the protection of 
legal personhood, even though the process of integration itself is now believed to have no 
other purpose than to affirm the concreteness of matters of life and death (existentialist 
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politics) before this process should also affirm the abstraction of legal norms (positivist 
philosophy).
The research question now to be posed is how the concept of sovereign authority 
is to be interpreted without offending either one of the two main theoretical camps. Is the 
concept to derive its meaning from Kelsen’s call for a theory based on positivism? Or 
should Nijs’s writing be kept in mind, so that sovereignty theory rests on timeless 
arbitration assemblages rather than independent legal systems? May the recognition of 
sovereignties solely be based on a legal positivist theory, or will this theory then also 
have to agree with Nijs, and therein have to dissolve itself? 
In conclusion, it may be time for liberal positivism to force itself to affirm that all 
those political entities which cannot be universally recognized, also should not be 
believed to enjoy international legal personalities, and that it is already for this reason 
alone that prudent statespeople ought to be recognizing states in reference to their 
(singular) concrete constitutionalization of popular self-government (pluralism)—and not 
just by means of a tautological, single ground-norm allegedly representing popular unity 
(and especially not when, in fact, the ground-norm only simulates the unity of an 
oligarchical, Montesquieuan middle class).
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Conclusive Machiavellian Encounters with Heraclitean Change
Why is a statesperson who dares to ignore references to global justice, to an 
equitable synthesis, or to the modern middle class, more prudent than a liberal positivist 
who would rather imagine such (self-referential) signs to be upholding an essentially-
reliable basic norm? Or, why is the positivist who takes the middle road also embarking 
on a “most hazardous” journey—as compared to the realist statesperson who humbly 
professes the art of discerning Y-conjunctions and other systemic bifurcations? Is the 
liberal positivist perhaps taking utilitarianism too seriously, and thus also ignoring the 
risk of being (deontically, or even divinely) ‘chastised’ by an integrated group of 
revolutionary activists?
In his Discourses (Book 1, Chapter 26), Machiavelli rethinks the utilitarian 
dictum that the prince who has conquered a foreign city or province should shun the 
middle way and “organize everything anew”. The conventional dictum holds that this 
man must use his discretion to organize a radically new order of legality. Machiavelli is 
displeased by that formal lesson: Philip of Macedon had readily taken it so seriously, in 
his newly-acquired territories, that he ended up having to dislocate all “the inhabitants, 
from one province to another”. These internal displacement policies were “neither 
Christian nor even human, and should be avoided”—as the Secretary from Florence 
unmistakably concludes.594 In the next Chapter (1.27), he says that the Tyrant of Perugia 
took a similarly excessive way, committing incest and murder within his own clan. So, 
964
would it not have been wiser for that man, Master Baglioni, and for King Philip as well, 
to instead have opted for self-temperance?
That depends entirely on the circumstances, Machiavelli adds, because Baglioni 
was so tyrannical that when he was first confronted by Pope Julius II, who was visiting 
Perugia, he was at a loss on how to respond. Baglioni could easily have killed the Pope 
and thus have “secured for himself eternal fame and rich booty.” When he failed to do so, 
however, his “temerity and cowardice” became immediately visible. He apparently had 
unlearned how to act piously, at least in the presence of eminently good men, having held 
on for too long to his image of human beings as “neither utterly wicked, nor perfectly 
good”. As the Pope had been the first to act in a good and trustful manner, he was 
perplexed, and could no longer get himself to use evil in response.595
All other things considered the same, the exemplary statesperson will act 
decisively, and either assume human beings are “wicked” or “good” or rather, that they 
can be both consecutively (not: simultaneously). This statesperson has come to 
understand why the cycle of time is inherently dualistic—and why it should not be 
believed to lead to a ‘mixed way’ in which human beings are somehow assumed neither 
good nor evil. The state’s historical cycles bifurcate, and statespersons will be able to 
interpret the signs of such coming bifurcations so they can begin to act either accordingly 
or in opposition thereto. These persons are never commended for having tried to have it 
both ways by both aligning themselves as well as opposing themselves to the signs of the 
times. They are also never commended, at least not by Machiavelli, for triangulating their 
decisions or even not for forming X-crossings on the roads of history, for instance.
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It is in this theoretical context, of interpreting historical signs and other coming 
constitutional changes in terms of clear bifurcations and dual conjunctions, that 
Machiavelli advises to stay true to the following maxim, which he believes has been 
adequately supported by historical experience: “Peace begets Idleness; Idleness, Mutiny, 
and; Mutiny, Destruction”. He goes on by hinting that the cycle of time, implied in the 
maxim, is never-ending or seasonal, rather, because a qualitatively different peace will 
again emerge from destructive war; this is the peace of good laws. “Ruin begets Laws; 
those Laws, Virtue, and Virtue begets Honor”. Critically, these are coinciding opposites, 
and not syntheses. Machiavelli’s dialectic here seems quite non-synthetic. Instead, time is 
believed to proceed through a chaotic flux which has been ordered by primordial 
contraries, with among them grand dualities such as the following: peace/ruin; 
virtuosity/honorability; love of order/fear of disorder; orderliness/competition, and thus 
also stability/imbalance. Femia rightly described the seasonal reoccurrences, of these 
primordial contradictions, in processual terms. The contradictions form a “ceaseless 
process of deterioration and renewal”.596
In contrast to a Heraclitean concept of processual opposition, as may now be 
concluded from the previous discussions, the neo-Aristotelian as well as the 
Montesquieuan conceptions of historical change are positivist conceptions: they remain 
anchored in a third ground. This ground or third way, also, is being pursued by an 
aristocratic subsystem of justice—which is neither democratic and poor, nor oligarchic 
and rich. It is a juristic subsystem owned by the modern middle class. It is also a 
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subsystem centered around its own self-image of providing a measure of distributive 
neutrality—allegedly siding with neither rich nor poor.
Machiavelli’s Heraclitean concept of time (as shall now be shown) is neither 
democratic nor oligarchical in denotation—because it denotes, rather, a republican or a 
symbiotic combination of these contraries. The concept is being used throughout 
Machiavelli’s oeuvre, usually to give meaning to a more realistic present-day practice of 
constitutional virtue, but also to a more scientific method of observing how the men of 
the past would acquire their own virtue.597 Both the practice and science of virtue, then, 
shall demonstrate why sovereignties should be virtuous, judicious and ingenuous, in 
making themselves more resilient against historical contingencies—by recombining both 
the responsibilities of the great nobles as well as the rights of the commoners. (These 
rights and duties were exemplified by both Senators and Tribunes). The nobles should not 
believe themselves to be the sovereigns, also, thus, simply because they formally 
represent the nobles’ best interests, and also not because they enjoy their glorious 
standing, but only because they exercise a natural law-responsibility to do something 
more than to simply represent the few, by means of strict justice. The authority of the 
Senate is thus established by something more than distributive justice—and, actually, by 
its civic piety or by its fidelity to “education” (a euphemism for decorum) as well. Hence, 
Machiavelli writes Rome could never have remained an orderly republic, had it not been 
for the Senate’s setting of “good examples, [which were] ... the result of good education, 
and good education is due to good laws; and good laws in their turn spring from 
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[agitations and tumults]”—which themselves must then spring, it would seem, from the 
constitutional void in between nobles and commoners.598
The leaders of great states were also engaged in sustaining a complex 
constitutional system, which allowed in their arrest of a cycle of degeneration. That is, 
the state is to be combined, and remain co-presentable, with all sorts of individual 
interests and sectarian beliefs. The question of greatness is answered by how the state 
encompasses these interests—as it will have to reduce the risk of sudden shifts, from 
“Idleness” to “Mutiny”, for example, or any other such violent transitions. The state 
should find a way to include the anticipated shifts, and overcome the violences. Military 
commanders and executive officers, in such a state, understand that their actions have 
impacts on both the people, as a whole, as well as the relations between individual 
parties, on the many and the few, and thus also on both the democratic as well as the 
oligarchic constitutional components. More decisively, officers will have to prevent the 
rise of destructive clashes between the two elements, as these should be made equal
participants in performing the state’s civil-adjudicative functions. While thus imitating 
the naturally Heraclitean oppositions in time, sovereign officers would want to be 
confident that they can imitate History’s perennial bifurcations and diversifications.
Machiavellian realism is germane to many discussions in IR theory because it 
rejects the idea that historical and even moral progress can be established by means of 
executive policy-planning, alone. Executive officials should be proposing to make 
headway in restoring a more natural balance among the people’s faculties. Their actions 
are believed to be responsible once they will have managed to remain retrospectively-
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engaged, just as that the members of a jury would have to be deciding retroactively. The 
modern, social scientific appropriation of a progressive timeline would have been alien to 
classic realism’s alternative concept of a Heraclitean flux—which is strikingly similar to 
the tradition’s concept of legal parity. The problem with the modern appropriation of 
historical progress, however, is that it must presuppose the presence of a final end, or 
otherwise at least of a morally justifiable synthesis towards which progress will lead.
During the 1960s, as an academic subdiscipline, IR would grow enormously. IR 
scientists were spewing out their data in the form of development models, and especially 
in their models of historical stages, each of which had been designed for the aim of 
accelerating the end of the Cold War. IR theory, U.S. foreign policy, and foreign aid 
programs would get intertwined with social scientific planning—again for the aim of 
historical progress. These joint efforts to create a historically unidirectional convergence, 
as Latham has shown, make it possible to infer that the IR subdiscipline owes its 
existence to a large extent to its own modernization theory. The Center for International 
Studies at MIT, above all, would become the springboard for this theory. Closely-
connected to the U.S. foreign policy-establishment, the Center came up with designs for 
programs which were then implemented by the Agency for International Development 
(AID) and the State Department’s Policy Planning Council.599 Some such programs were 
fruitful, because even the ‘green’ revolution did initially raise agricultural productivity. 
However, the same programs also drove peasants off their land and into the slums. The 
fact that funding designated, by Congress, for these programs was more often than not 
being used to purchase armaments, was send into the coffers of dictators (Iran’s Shah, 
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Chile’s Pinochet, and Panama’s Noriega were only among the later generation), to their 
secret police operations, as well as into the bank accounts of well-connected landowners, 
who should instead have been pushing for redistributive reforms, caused of course more 
harm than good.
After the Cold War had ended, social constructivists in the IR field returned to the 
positivist idea of historical progress. In this sense, they returned to the 1960s rather than 
to the  Wilsonian idealists. Social constructivists such as Wendt do not speak about the 
need to maintain the equality of nations—or, at least not as much as that they are venting 
their sentiment that the final synthesis in the development of the current society of states 
will have to be a world state. Wend’s idea is that states are becoming more democratic 
and therefore also more representative, of their populations. Tribunals are become more 
effective in legitimizing treaty-organizations, so that it would be logical to expect that the 
states will eventually be absorbed into the successor-organization of the UN tribunals: a 
modern world state.600
Contrary to the constructivism, realism rethinks the various possibilities why, 
historically, all treaty-organizations might have remained imperfectly balanced. Contrary 
to Wendt, Habermas, and Crawford, also, Machiavellian realism does not see the need to 
ask which supreme tribunals and regional organizations are now in the business of 
replacing the UN. For, that type of need presupposes a neutral birdeye’s view of the 
world. It presupposes that philosophers may take a neutral position as they mediate 
between the possible parties to a future conflict, without at the same time having to 
restore the natural constitution that includes and transcends all parties.
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Machiavellian realism, however, still holds on to the viewpoint of such a natural 
and sacred (and probably both Christian as well as Heraclitean) constitution of the world. 
This constitution is to be restored by acting in neither regressive nor progressive ways, 
but rather by arresting and by slowing down the degenerative process. Machiavellian 
realism finds it more important to have success in reorganizing than in newly
restructuring the state. Only reorganization and restoration make it possible for the state 
to, as Eugene Garver seems to want to add, take itself back “into the desired form.”601
The issue is then also not whether constitutional states will automatically become more 
stable over time, or less, but that contingent destabilizing factors are to be anticipated—
following an innate desire for a cognitive integration of the logically coherent (natural 
law) and the experiential dimensions (historical study).
On one hand, and to conclude this section, because he was both an empiricist as 
well as a rationalist, by contrast to Fontana’s impression, Machiavelli was actually well-
able to retain a healthy dose of skepticism towards both of these cognitive processes—as 
this was the one type of dose other ‘mirrorers of sovereignty’ so often lacked. 
Specifically his concept of historical prudence, as emerging from within a void, would be 
something that others lacked. Even today, liberal constructivists—with their ideal of a 
modernizing state, automatically having to converge with an even-more modern world 
state—painfully lack any other, non-progressive concept of interpreting historical change.
On the other, Machiavelli’s empirical observations of Rome’s success story may 
hardly be said to have betrayed any sort of penchant for unidirectionally-retroactive 
historicism. Rather, Rome became a success because she had been free to amend her 
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constitutional laws, whenever she faced necessity, by continuously playing off the Senate 
against the Tribunes.602 From Machiavelli’s stance, it must appear that Rousseau would 
have to have made a serious mistake to suggest that his own ideal-typical Romans only 
have recourse to a Tribunate, rather than equally as well to a Senatorial Order. 
Machiavelli’s notion of republican complexity simply does not allow for such a synthesis 
of the two main institutional expressions of humanity’s natural constitution, as he 
alternatively deems their contrariness to be the ultimately relational source of all stability, 
into perpetuity.
Rephrasing the Question: How Should Realism Recognize Political Parity?
In today’s world of recognitions and misrecognitions, one of the most political 
issues imaginable consists of the direction sovereignties ought to be taking towards 
states-within-states, of ethnic minorities, linguistic communities, and even secessionist 
insurgents. Sadly, this issue has been neutralized by a liberal approach, which focuses 
almost exclusively on individual rights to remain free from government interference. 
Against that liberal approach, political realists have been reading Machiavelli in order to 
better understand the relations between richer and poorer communities. Yet, Machiavelli 
was not a communist theorist. He was simply trying to give his readers some cues on how 
they could best moderate, yet sustain the relation between rich and poor, patricians and 
plebeians. The answer he came up with, after all, was premised on their ultimate parity as 
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human beings. Parity is not legal equality, contrary to what legal positivists might argue. 
Parity is here the political treatment of unequal groups, and of naturally-opposite parties, 
to one and the same dispute.
Machiavelli’s all-too brief description of the Order of San Giorgio still forms his 
most important cue about his concept of political parity, as he applies this concept to 
methodologically and scientifically identify the components of his DST/IR systems 
theory. The above-presented cues and spokes, of these chapters’ larger wheel, have 
examined why this Order was so dear to him. First, the Order would have been 
contemporaneous to his beloved Florence, yet may have had greater success in holding 
on to its constitutional disciplines. The members of the San Giorgio Order must also have 
had more confindence that most Florentine citizens in the ultimate Creator of their natural 
constitutional laws. Indeed, Machiavelli finds they had more-ancient, more-venerable, 
and closer self-binding Term (1) as well as Term (2) conventions than, perhaps, even 
ancient Rome (because Rome fell prey to power-grabbing Decemvirs).
Further, as was spelled out, Machiavelli saw why the Order’s internal sense of 
parity and juridical conventions were all open-ended and dissipative structures, and not 
just legalistic institutions or technical rules which pretended to be aligned with the cause 
of history (with some telos). The San Giorgio citizen-jurors would thus have believed that 
their own conventions were venerable precisely because these constitutional law-
traditions had always remained open to amendment: their sacrality had followed not just 
from their longevity—as these traditions would instead have done in ancient Sparta, 
thus—but from their own willingness to participate in publically honoring them. A 
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similar effect may be observed in the common law tradition, where jurisprudence remains 
continuously open to re-interpretation. Yet, the theoretically-remarkable part of the story 
about the Order is that its structure also remains solid: the juridical tradition does not 
become fluid and dissipative, as it is also being closed by political institutions and 
constant reorganizations.
In republican systems theory, the future of the state’s executive departments 
remains open to chance, and to political discretion as well, structurally, yet the 
departments must at the same moment train their ability to remain self-bounded and to 
close their organizations off towards any enemies. For instance, they should be able to 
decide to close off their organizational bodies by invoking memories of a glorious past, in 
which a peace between all bodies would have been maintained. This is not some fascist 
or hyper-nationalistic ambition, however, but simply expresses Machiavelli’s desire for 
military commanders to maintain the peace among their troops, and for citizen-
administrators to engage in critically peaceful (self-skeptical, Numa-like) relations with 
citizen-participants. Competing administrator-accountants, competing financial lenders, 
armaments purchasers, and diverse member interests will still be circulating throughout 
the system in unpredictable and sometimes random ways. But precisely because the 
system’s Term (1) legal tradition and jurisprudential institutions are conjecturally-related 
to the same system’s Term (2) competitors, orderliness may be believed to be emerging. 
Whereas fascists would want to use Term (2) discretionary powers in order to subvert and 
usurp Term (1) lawful powers, Machiavelli’s republican theory counsels carefully against 
such usurpations. As Benner is certain to concur, Term (2) discretionary actions and 
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degenerating bodies, to be a bit more exact, are always to remain the co-constitutive parts 
of a chaotic force-field. The other co-constitutive parts are of a different kind, however, 
because they consist mainly of those who maintain Term (1) regulatory or ordering 
norms.603 Neither one of these two kinds-and-parts must be allowed to subvert the other: 
their common purpose is for political parity to become more sustainable.
To reiterate, critically, Machiavelli’s description of the constitutional state 
suggests that Term (1) legal norms and Term (2) discretionary decisions should be 
equally available—especially whenever the flux of time happens to become adversarial. 
The organizationally-closed Term (2) and the structurally-open Term (1) dimensions of 
this system should, thereto, both be able to scrutinize and check each other. Nevertheless, 
their two dimensions never collide, so that none of them defends its own interests and 
powers above all others: the two dimensions must remain sufficient parity in order to 
produce flexible responses to sudden environmental changes and to their joint enemies as 
well. Consequentially, no one should be allowed to form a Term (3) set of powers. 
Rather, all adjudicative powers should be equally distributed among the first two 
dimensions, of discretion and legality.
The Order is an exemplary sovereign statelet, furthermore, because it cannot be 
said to have resulted from a series of grand historical syntheses. Much rather, it 
symbolizes a (Centaur-like) mysteriously-dynamic coincidence of two opposite naturally-
occurring tendencies: animated and ingenuous passions and, also, the reasonable 
cultivation of the same passions; virtú and honor, that is. This processual coincidence 
makes it possible to distrust passions and to honor virtues, if not only because it is also a 
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coincidence of all the people. Legitimate charismatic authority emerges, thus, from all the 
people, and never from a faction. This anchoring function of the people is not to be 
thought universally applicable, however, and certainly also not a consensual function. 
Much rather, the people form a decisive role (not unlike the one that would have been 
assumed by a Centaur). Another example of such a critical popular role is the one which 
would be performed and symbolized, rather, by Elizabeth I, as she mixed both feminine 
and masculine forces into her public appearances—without representing neither only the 
people’s Mother Queen- nor only their Warrior King-archetypes.604 Dual sovereignty, 
thereby, is a performance in both political as well as in psychological alchemy (as Carl G. 
Jung would have understood ‘archetypes’ to be open to the methods of ‘alchemy’).
Furthermore, Pythagoras himself would probably have approved of Machiavelli’s 
argument, as he himself also refers to the complex form of a ‘two-in-one’ (non-dualism, 
that is). The mystic had used a similar concept, thus, to make sense of various paradoxes. 
Pythagoras and Aristotle themselves had of course later been joined by neo-Platonists 
who similarly used their concept, or their famous table of opposites, which listed all the 
great processual dualities: good/evil; limit/unlimited; singularity/plurality, and so 
onwards.605
Can the Order serve as a theoretical model for the human condition of integral 
sovereign authority, under which all citizens are equal to all other citizens even though 
they remain politically divided into two kinds of citizens? The totality of individuals is 
only then believed to remain less than the integrated civic whole, after all, when the two 
kinds of groups, or when the few and the many are being treated equally—despite being 
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different in kind. The few and the many are now the only two parts, components of the 
free, and constitutionally-republican state. Logically consistent with republican theory as 
well as with Weberian realist methodology, in other words, it can be concluded the 
members of the Order have to be imagined as obedient to the ancient, metaphysical Term 
(1) laws, yet capable of executing these laws by means of their generic, physical Term (2) 
powers. That the members will have to decide on the difference between Term (2) 
decisions that ran counter and those that did not cancel Term (1) laws, further, is reason 
for concern. But, as in the case of the Dictator, the members can very well make such 
decisions by taking into account time’s arrow or the river’s flux. The issue they are to 
assess is the proper distance, of the void, between the Dictator’s Term (2) decisions and 
the Term (1) legal norms of the ‘eternal yesterday.’
To rephrase the above conclusion, neither private intentions nor public decisions, 
or neither private arms nor public law, should trump in matters involving the Order’s 
authority. Machiavelli proves himself to be a political realist in the sense that he defends 
his systems theory against philosophical idealists who would in his stead have to argue 
for a middle way, or a perfect consensus between arms and law, or also between abstract 
intentions and concrete decisions.
Neither anarchy nor oligarchy, and neither licentiousness nor tyranny, 
consequently, can ever be believed to result from the still-mysterious relationship 
between their own dimensions. Rather, both dimensions relate to one another as if they 
co-exist within an integrated-and-yet-dualist whole, first, which transcends the total sum 
of their partial interests and powers, second. In accordance to systems theory, the Order 
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of San Giorgio’s structure will thus have to be declared “open” to all sorts of government 
influences and member interests. But the Order’s more-informal organizations remain 
“closed”. This could mean that the Order has been modeled after the human organism: it 
could be a humanly-incorporated civitas. As how Leonardo da Vinci and other 
Renaissance scientists would create ‘accurate’ models of human life, so would 
Machiavelli’s ‘true’ mirror for the sovereign prince not be formed by an individual, but 
by a living system, capable of great sociability and worthy of considerable honorability, 
as it had to have uniquely embodied the “paradoxical coexistence of change and 
stability.”606
Still Loving to Hate the State: Synopsis of the Case for Ambivalent Sovereignty
Which dimensions of sovereignty should be observed, and which criterions 
applied in assessing and observing the human qualities of each state, before states may 
generally become recognized as equal contributors to global peace? Many political 
scientists have little secret: they “love to hate the state”—to put their ambiguous attitude 
towards sovereignty in Paul Thomas’s words.607 What his description of their attitude 
implies is that political theorists love to ascribe “distinctness”, “indivisibility”, and 
especially “continuity” to the state’s lineages of power. As Jens Bartelson sees them do, 
they typically create such ascriptions of statehood in order to be better overthrowing 
these same foundations.608 Political and IR scientists will at first carefully posit “the state 
978
... as an object of political analysis, and [then go on to] presuppose [that the state serves] 
as the foundation of such analysis.”609
On that note, why have theorists not been able to escape their straw man-fallacy, 
and why have they not been able to emancipate their scholarly discipline much sooner 
from their own statist thinking? Why would specifically the Democratic Peace liberals, 
and the category of cosmopolitan idealists (inclusive of Held et al.) also, have so long 
continued to equate the moral ambiguation of the state’s national and territorial 
boundaries to forms of modernization and global progress—without ever studying how 
“the triumph of the state” actually took place within their own scientific discourses?610
The issue of the sovereignty of states has continued to create paradoxes—both 
conceptually and symbolically, as well as disciplinarily, apparently.611
This section tries to come up with an answer, not to how the modern state actually 
and historically was seen to have triumphed over other political entities, but why its 
uniquely dualistic sovereign mode of authority should alternatively become recognized—
both for utilitarian-pragmatic as well for deontic-political purposes.
Bartelson’s work aids IR theory in observing that disciplinarily-created concepts, 
definitions, and criterions of statehood rest on a few fixed ideas such as progress, perhaps 
in the direction of a world state. As a scientific discipline, IR’s scientific methods rest on 
ideas about the “futurity” of the state, or otherwise about its final supremacy. These ideas 
have usually been taken away “from the dimension of contingency, and [were then again] 
inscribed within the dimension of [historical] continuity”. Contingencies of and 
fluctuations in the state’s history were thus for a long time being erased, or nationalized, 
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as state jurisdictions ended up being territorialized within seemingly progressively-more 
stable borders. By force of ideas, and positive definitions of state-provided-for peace and 
justice, political theorists have so all too often ended up conceptualizing contingent 
events as serving the “[natural] antithesis of political order”. Especially mainstream 
liberal (neo-Grotian) theorists so became complicit in retroactively trying to unify the 
state’s collectivist and territorial lineages—in the name of global justice.612
In sharp contrast, realists argue that the discipline should not become hypnotized 
by how abstract concepts, but also be focusing on how concrete actions maintain 
antitheses. The issue to focus on is less an issue of how unity and dispersion, and order 
and disorder are analytically excluding each other. Orderliness and disorderliness, or 
justice and injustice, may certainly be thought to be conceptual opposites but they should 
never become separated while developing methods for concretely recognizing symbioses 
within the system of sovereign authority.
Admittedly, the scholarly discipline presupposes too often that disorder (anarchy) 
is the foundation of order (statehood), and the other way around.613 However, 
alternatively, realists find that the issue should become about how order and disorder may 
coexist in matters of state sovereignty. For, how else did the state attain its unique 
qualities, virtues, and powers other than by means of the type of sovereignty which 
emerged from within a more or less disorderly—but clearly not random—system? Is this 
system not harboring all those types of human powers that have so long allowed it to 
remain adequately responsive, as Machiavelli taught, towards apparently disorderly and 
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contingent events—constantly taking on an orderly or sovereign shape within its own, 
temporal and spatial, environments?614
(Machiavellian) realist IR theorists can respond to Bartelson’s question by 
pointing out that, in sovereignty, order and disorder co-exist. What matters is how 
practitioners can establish an adequate level of order, as it would simply be imprudent for 
sovereign states to try to artificially force themselves to only create order and peace—
especially if they were to try do so by retroactively reversing previously-established 
historical changes in populational and territorial borders. Such historical changes cannot 
easily be reversed or re-engineered, politically, as realists as diverse as Machiavelli, 
Bismarck, and Arendt all well-understood. Instead, political changes tend to be open-
ended, and aleatory. In politics, as Althusser would have said, the dices will always have 
to be thrown on an “empty table.”615 Political order is open to chance and fluctuation. 
Order arrives merely on the heels of disorder, and public authority only together with 
appearances of illegitimacy and suspicions of unjust behavior, rather than that 
determinations of order and authority must always take yet another historical step 
towards a future supreme order. Political order arrives together with disorder, and this 
tension emerges from a “political void”, indeed, as Althusser writes, within which “[n]o 
cause ... precedes its effects”.616 Hence, random chance does, historically, coincide with 
lineages of orderliness. So, why should this coincidence remain relevant to ethical 
recognitions of dual sovereign authority?
IR theorists have a fairly good sense of what the defining features of statehood 
are: territorial integrity or non-violability; internal jurisdiction; the power to close 
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treaties, and more. But they still have very little sense of why the community of states so 
habitually applies these features in the form of criterions, as it tries to validate the 
sovereignty and as it tries to legitimize the political rights of third parties such as rebels, 
independence movements, and secessionists. Why does the international community 
applies these criterions in some cases, but not in others? Should it self-select and self-
adjust its criterions of ultimate state authority?
States-within-states but especially also non-recognized states and other political 
entitities—such as Tibet, the 2011 Libyan rebels, various subpopulations on the 
Indonesian archipelago and the Transcaucasus, the multi-state inhabitants of Kurdistan, 
the Basques, the Sioux, and so forth—have remained underserved by present-day 
applications of the sovereignty  criterion.617 Also, Israeli citizens enjoy sovereignty to the 
extent their territorial rights have been sufficiently internationally recognized—despite 
the fact that they long had no constitution, but were governed by basic emergency laws—
whereas the Palestinians have a democratic state but no sovereignty. Georgia, East-
Timor, Macedonia and Croatia are all sovereign states. But numerous other semi-states, 
including “Krajina, Bougainville, Abkhazia, Tamil Eelam and Somaliland, have not 
[achieved general recognition]”—says Mikulas Fabry.618 IR practitioners at the UN 
Security Council level, and IR scholarship as well, still seem to lack access to a valid 
“theory of state-recognition”, evidently. Chris Naticchia fulfills this “pressing practical 
need”, to some degree, however, by opting for a practical utopia: by constructing a 
pragmatic criterion for recognition that could help restore “a world characterized by 
global peace and justice”.619
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On two scores, Naticchia’s argument is indispensable to the case for realism. 
First, the argument appears to conclude that recognition of statehood is a dualistic matter. 
The unlimited powers and immunities of all diplomats and statespersons, on one side of 
international recognition processes, should somehow coincide with the international law-
organizations that usually contradict and limit these same powers, on another side. 
Recognition criterions must not become “inefficacious” by only being applied to those 
few entities already holding virtually unlimited powers and surplus capabilities. If these 
powers allow them to internally maintain peace and justice, on one side, then these same 
criterions must not also be used to recognize the many less-powerful and possibly-
sovereign entities, as they will also be trying to become more active in “formulating, 
adjudicating, and implementing international law[s]”. Neither the few most-peaceful and 
most-stable nor the many lesser-ideal political entities, in other words, are to be 
recognized as equal sovereigns. For, any account that would solely list the liberal ideals 
of internal peace and civil justice as its sole measures, once applied to the real world of 
diplomacy and war, however, will always have to include a possibility for the “minimum 
to be lowered”. Alternatively, a pragmatic interpretation of the recognition criterion 
should pursue adequacy, as it can simply “drive [for] the minimum” number of 
recognizable states.620
Second, liberal philosophy assumes the presence of a “continuum” between the 
“fully just” and “severely unjust” outcomes of its recognition procedure. On this 
assumption, only the very few entities that actually “respect ... equal liberal rights and 
observe neutrality toward the good are [close] ... to fully just.”621 Yet, liberalism cannot 
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explain at which threshold, and at which minimum level, “justice carries ... independent 
weight. [Its justice criterion] can be adjusted to whatever level necessary to bring enough 
entities into the processes for formulating ... international law[s].”622 Against liberal 
idealism, political realism calls on statespersons to “exercise prudence” and to 
“negotiate” with both recognized and unrecognized entities in encouraging their “just 
behavior”—until, perhaps one day, a “critical mass” of legitimate authorities will have 
been reached.623 But rather than to redefine the just conditions for the tipping point or for 
the critical convergence, at which the minimally adequate number of entities will have to 
be recognized as legitimate sovereignties, and rather than to redefine these conditions as 
watered-down versions of some liberal or utopian ideal, political realism calls for a 
productive tension between violations of liberal ideals and prospective practices of 
recognition. Naticchia’s argument for the use of an adequacy criterion, further, nicely 
captures this realist notion of a productive tension. That notion would make it possible to 
concede, on one side, that “minimal justice should not be strictly necessary for [a valid] 
recognition [criterion]”. On another side, the same notion premises that “facts about 
injustice still ought to play a role [in this criterion]”.
In other words, rather than to define global justice positively, and rather than to 
situate it closer to the positive pole of a continuum, it would be more prudent to define it 
negatively. Consider this scenario: injustices and human rights violations have been 
committed by Entity Q against its own population. Q did so both before and after its 
sovereignty was ‘awarded’ by the international community of XYZ. Upon 
acknowledging this morally troubling history of the IR system, liberal idealists will 
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somehow have to compromise their ideal standard of recognition, and possibly even 
‘withdraw’ recognition. Their main option is to imagine a just system by decreasing the 
number of illegitimate states of Q’s low human rights-protection caliber. Political realists, 
however, can look for an alternative standard of judgment. They can say that Q’s 
sovereignty has been recognized, and that this allows States XYZ to renegotiate their 
relations with Q. For instance, Q would already have been admitted to the UN, on the 
basis of its promise to at least not violate critical conventions and international treaties. Q 
itself has thus promised to abide by minimal standards, and so its promises are to be 
taken seriously—not by threatening to retroactively withdraw recognition but by refusing 
to provide Q’s rulers with development aid, low-interest loans, and military equipment. 
Not Q’s sovereign authority but rather Q’s governmental promises to refrain from unjust 
action as well as to maintain a legal constitutional balance, in brief, should constantly be 
evaluated and negotiated by its equals in the UN: States XYZ.
Helpfully, Chris Naticchia clarifies his distinction between formal sovereign 
authority and actual promissory justice by arguing that these two dimensions may be 
treated as opposites. The formal sovereignty dimension of recognitions could and should 
be strengthened  legally (in terms of legal parity, equal status, and equal shares in UN 
suborganizations) while the number of injustices may simultaneously be reduced by 
creating cultural, financial, and military shifts in relations with unjust-yet-recognized 
states (by seeing these relations in terms of a negatively-defined global justice). That is, 
the legal recognition procedures, which tend to remain based on an ideal notion of equal 
treatment, should be made to coincide with the actual but largely symbolic recognitions, 
985
despite their contrariness. On this note, It may be believed entirely unrealistic to suppose, 
as liberal idealists might do, nonetheless, that legal recognition norms and symbolic 
recognitions will eventually have to converge. Or, it is unrealistic for such idealists to try 
to count States XYZ as “accomplishes in injustices [because they are] ... granting [legal] 
recognition to some unjust entities.” “[Yet] while it may be too strong to suggest that the 
international community [XYZ] is an accomplice in injustice, [hence], it still 
[symbolically] commits an injustice by recognizing unjust entities”.624
Recognizing Ambivalent Authority’s Emergence Amidst Political Flux
Political changes should not be allowed, at least not by prudent as well as ethical 
statespeople, to occur either only by cause of legal or only by cause of symbolic 
recognitions of authority. Legal and symbolic criterions of recognition should be applied 
simultaneously and freely, rather than by force of necessity. More wholly, realists such as 
Arendt, Machiavelli, and Aristotle would all have argued that those state authorities 
believed responsible for ‘causing’ just and peaceful changes will seldom have been 
galvanized by economic necessity—alone. Change should be expected to have been 
contingent on political recognitions of a balanced constitution, rather. Peaceful change 
tends to become recognizable, as an actual historical and political event, in admitting a 
minimal balance of powers. The formation of the system of states was a process in which 
justice and injustice coincided, so that it will be possible to believe that change was 
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somehow effectuated by a variety of apparently perpetual (im)balances between different 
dimensions of authority. These dimensions were, in the above section, identified as 
forming a combination of legal-ideal norms and symbolic-actual recognitions, or 
essentially also a coincidence of Term (1) legal norms and actual Term (2) decisions.
As Chapter One has shown, as well, via Arendt’s On Revolution, political change 
characteristically expresses itself when people create a critical mass in simultaneously 
recognizing legal and actual recognition processes. Through their creation of a sense of 
simultaneity, however ambivalently, then, they can establish their public authority and 
work on a restoration of a previous constitutional balance (a few exemplary such 
‘punctuated’ restorations occurred in 2011, not 1956 Cairo, and in 1956 not 1991 Prague, 
and also in 1905 not 1918 Moscow: they clearly did not occur as points along one 
continuum, contrary to Negri’s impression).625 Political change is due to the public 
authorities’ holding themselves back, due to peoples’ preventing themselves from strictly 
satisfying their private needs, and simultaneously also due to their holding up of public 
standards of what it means to sustain an older, more-original, and more-natural 
constitutional balance (as compared to the present-day one).626
Within the constitution and within the plurality of human powers, genuine change 
should be respected to the degree that it expresses some contingent restoration or some 
as-of-yet-unaccomplished constitutional rejuvenation. Realists do not believe that 
dynamic change should be forced to come to amount to a state’s single representation of 
any competing religious beliefs, nor an aggregate representation of any competing 
economic needs, financial establishments, and private interests.627 For, all of these needs 
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and interests will somehow already have been accomplished: they are not potential, but 
actual sources of power. Or, they will have to be thought of as already having become 
embedded in power, although not automatically so. If competition among interests would 
intensify, for instance, then the outcome will simply be more likely to serve plutocrats 
rather than democrats. Intensification of competition, caused by a representational 
singularization, could thus upset the balance, could create an unproductively immoderate 
form of change, and will almost certainly diminish the plurality and diversity principles 
that make politics sustainable in the first place. This risk has been, at least in the case of 
the U.S. Constitution and how American constitutionalism has been implemented, in 
ways generally more favorable to liberal plutocracy than to representative democracy, 
acceptably demonstrated by Charles Beard and Michael Parenti.628
According to the authors of the Beard School, the Federalist Papers were written 
and American constitutionalism was designed to make the state thrive on market 
competition, on the defense of the economic interests of the few, rather than on the 
alternative kind of competition which demands commonsensical assessments of more 
diverse political reasons. However, the market principle may be prone to harmful 
mutations—as it has remained very clear in Alexander Hamilton’s anti-democratic and 
predominantly-protective-of-commerce model of constitutionalism.629
Here is Hamilton speaking about the future U.S. House of Representatives: “Can 
a democratic Assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed 
steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the 
imprudence of democracy.” Because of the naïveté of their democratic opinions and the 
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impermanence of their private interests, the common people’s “turbulence” must be 
counter-checked by “the rich and well-born”—as well as by their deeply plutocratic 
Senate, hence.630
The Framers saw themselves as anybody but commoners. Yet, any political realist 
has to caution against their Hamiltonian, plutocratic conception of constitutional 
transmutation. From a realist’s stance, it were the Framers who failed to see that 
economic inequalities can rise beyond an irreversible point and that they should therefore 
not be preserved by the Constitution, but be moderated by rationally streamlining them. 
As Arendt would have noted, even the most turbulent discords will have to  be regulated, 
rationally, and be moderated publically as well (see Chapter Two).
But until that point will have been reached, it stays impossible for competing 
economic interests to be assessed prudently. Until then, they are probably being judged 
unwisely, inequitably, and imparitably—so that interests and needs, and concrete 
sufferings also, must remain relatively incomprehensible to those in the world of power 
and organization. Under a structurally inequal constitutional model, that is, entities will 
be doomed to hold on to their privateness, as they always end up powerless. They end up 
surrendering their free publicality and common sensibility to private necessity. In a time 
of rising inequalities each entity, and even each private household will so become only 
more likely to compete with each other household, and with its needs, so that their 
individual privateness ends up dominating each new round of competition, of all against 
all.631 The Framers’ disregard for Hobbes’s ultimate public authority is shocking.
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Aristotle, Polybius, and Machiavelli all understood that in all matters of 
representation it is the republic that may in the wink of an eye turn into disorderliness and 
randomness, as criterions of virtue and merit may be turned into those of patronage and 
wealth-accumulation. But, with Hamilton, the American constitutional model becomes 
the first (neo-Montesquieuan, in fact) model to deliberately equate the representatives to 
the property-owners (including, originally, the slave-owners, but also today’s corporate 
enterprises).632 This baked-in inequality still forms one of the reasons why the Bill of 
Rights offers no protection for social and economic human rights.633 More importantly, it 
is why the model remains geared to represent the societal level that can benefit the most 
from ‘third powers’: from powers neither representative-executive nor popular-
legislative. The Supreme Court and the Senate, indeed, are among the most powerful 
institutions in the U.S. as they help preserve the ‘middle level’—as well as the status quo
socio-economic inequalities that benefit all those in between all the ‘lower’ and the 
‘highest’ ends of the property-scale.634
Althusser could, again, as he was reading Machiavelli, have agreed with this 
Arendtian distinction between and coincidence of public order, which adapts itself to 
societal mutations, and private disorder, based on necessities. To him, the use of public 
rationality, by a plurality of human powers, is not to be expressed “in terms of the 
Necessity of the accomplished fact, but in terms of the contingency of the fact to be 
accomplished.” Historical change cannot be frozen by an invisible “Necessity”, but 
should always be understood politically, however, so that it remains “nothing but the 
permanent revocation of the accomplished fact by another undecipherable fact to be 
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accomplished”. Or, political change is something always setting “out from nothing, 
[because it is from nothing that] the infinitesimal aleatory variation [appears]”. The 
constitutional restoration is something emerges from the “political void”.635
There is still another way of saying that the (IR) discipline has good reason to 
love to hate the state. Instead of creating a mockery of, as Thomas does, its love-hate 
relationship with the state, it may be discovered that the concept of sovereignty should 
remain ambivalent.636 Instead of teaching that the terms of, with Bartelson, orderly 
statism and anarchical anti-statism are logically and mutually exclusive, the discipline 
may learn that both terms emerge from within a mysterious (Althusserian realist) 
“political void”. From within this “void” all sorts of variations emerge of the relation 
between order and disorder, in fact.637 That means also, for instance, that restorations of 
the sovereign state’s past are part of its future, just as well as that revocations of 
orderliness are part of contingent prospective disorders.
As the DST holds, the concept of ambivalent sovereignty is here to stay, so IR 
theorists perhaps simply ought to accept that (particularly Machiavelli’s) statespersons 
will constantly be believed to perform “a delicate balancing act” between what social 
systems theorists would be certain to describe as both randomness and path-dependency, 
or as between both socially-fluctuating “mutation rates” and more or less decisively-
taken paths of “selection”. States either can become corrupted and may even die because 
they are not adapting their powers to “too much mutation” (“error catastrophe”), or they 
can serve as reliable “[s]election operators” by taking their ultimate public responsibility 
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seriously—and select adaptive powers and policies, and thus to “function” moderately 
well in adapting to change.638
A final point to be highlighted in this synopsis of the argument is that human 
powers are to be, as was done earlier, understood as capabilities or faculties. The earliest 
realists already identified, among these human faculties, the capacity to express beliefs in 
the normativity of the eternal yesterday and to judge the decisiveness of present-day 
affairs. There are the faculties of legislation and execution, just as that there is some 
evolution of rules as well as of the making of exceptions. Moreover, there may be a 
possibility that the relation between rules and exceptions (to these rules) will have to be 
judged. From within these three types of human power (conventional legislation, decisive 
execution, contingent adjudication), following Max Weber’s political sociology, it was 
additionally shown that mutations may occur.639
That is, the relations between the human powers may mutate as, sometimes, the 
variation within and the distance between the three faculties becomes either too large or 
too small. Sometimes there is too much separation, and the executive power can no 
longer be checked by the others, for instance, and at other times the executive will have 
started to legislate by issuing far-reaching statements, orders, and decrees. Either way, the 
proper distance between the three core-types of powers should be assessed as one of the 
features of a complex system. Within the Weberian description of that system, diverse, 
but oftentimes also contrary, types of powers may engage each other in more or less 
symbiotic relations. And, as Arendt demonstrated as well, a third faculty of judgment 
gives associated human beings an opportunity, vitally, to use their common sense. They 
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can use their commonalities to publically discern between either corrupt and 
unproductive, or productive and symbiotic power-associations.
Executive and legislative powers, for instance, may herein come to coincide in a 
specific relation. This relation can be identified within almost any form of government—
and, yet, these two powers are rarely thought to be colliding. Unless they have been 
corrupted, as happens when a representative democracy turns into its opposite, into an 
oligarchy or a plutocracy, for example, the basic powers will check upon, and frequently 
oppose one another. Because of such relational oppositions, constitutional transmutations 
rarely take place because government satisfies the needs and wants of one party or 
another. They always take place, however, because the relation itself is being modified—
by the people, rather than by only one of its powers. The constitutional system may cope 
differently with an existing opposition, among powers or between parties, in any given 
environment, but the key to the differences is to be found in the constitutional relations 
and the political connections between actual powers.
To sum up, concrete events such as the neoliberal push for deregulation as well as 
the American-led march towards ever-more economic competition, as well as the 
systemic perpetuation of involuntary unemployment and inflationary pressures, all form 
important factors in accounting for some forms of change. But these events are also 
defined by needs and wants: they are matters of necessity, not freedom. As such, they say 
little about the way relations among human powers emerge from a “void” between 
necessity and freedom. This means that the void itself cannot be used to explain why 
revolutionary change took the shape that it did. But because necessity is never the only 
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factor in explaining revolutionary change—and cannot explain why change happened in 
the first place, or even not when it could be anticipated to happen again, and for which 
political purpose—it suffices to say that necessity coincides with and should be expressed 
simultaneously to freedom. Needs and wants alone will not account for the political 
system’s capacity to adjust its functioning to changing environments, and to prevent 
excessive mutations. The issue should thus also not be about how needs and interests 
mutate, hence, but how to moderate them so that the system of states can respond more 
prudently to those who distort their natural needs or who consume too much for their own 
good.
This imperative of prudent responses and wise recognitions can be used to solve 
many other problems, such as in determining whether unemployed people are struggling 
for the purpose of freedom or equality, whose orders general populations are truly willing 
to obey, and how well statespeople’s actions may help them confidently re-establish the 
original, constitutionally non-dualist balance.
Political Realism, Modernization, and the Case of the Protection and Party Cartels
Contrary to Bartelson’s social constructivist suggestions, changes in the system of 
states are not only in the eye of the (disciplinary) beholder.640 The appearance of changes 
in the system is not only vulnerable to disciplinary conceptualization and ideational 
abstraction. Rather, political change is also constantly being  legitimized by people’s 
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concrete actions. So, how are specific changes being legitimized: abstractly or concretely, 
or both ideologically and materially? Statespersons usually recognize political change’s 
own ambiguity, if they are wise. Indeed, prudent statespersons can discern the contrast 
between gradual and slow transformations and the sudden rise of new enemies, or their 
potential to use excessive force. But that does not mean that old foes, or their monopolies 
on the use of force, are comparatively less likely to cause sudden crises and swift 
changes. It only means that intra-systemic change itself is ambiguous. This ambiguity can 
be sensed in both how political parties tend to associate their interests while diverging in 
terms of ideologies, and how the United Nations has allowed a handful of large member 
states to protect their interests under the pretext of liberal humanitarianism.
Modern multilateral organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United 
Nations (its historical successor), have evolved ambiguously. The dominant type of 
change in the system, the modernization of treaty-law as well as international law’s 
multilateralization, is a type that since the eighteenth century has been diverging across 
many societies and cultures. This change has taken form in the gradual spread of legal 
values and international human rights, as well as that it has diverged into often-
unexpected rights violations and  swift concentrations of wealth and (military) 
surveillance technologies.641 The American vision of modernization, however, as well as 
the generally Western vision of “a world converging on liberal [and] democratic 
capitalism”, now more than ever, according to Michael E. Latham, have also been visions 
and prophesies, rather, which presuppose a future synthesis or a full reconciliation of 
“self-interest with moral mission.” “[E]conomic prosperity [herein invariably furthers] ... 
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the reach of the only [constitutional] system that truly served the cause of human 
freedom”, as many liberal and neoliberal theorists agree has to have been the American 
constitutional system.642
These twin visions of modernization has had a severe influence on how and when 
international recognition would come to be ‘awarded’ to aspirant-states. In the current 
era, not all political entities are sovereign states. The difference between the two is that 
the latter have ‘received’ recognition from the greater community of sovereign parties, 
while the other entities have remained unrecognized and, consequentially, enjoy almost 
no treaty-based equality.643 On the juridical-organizational side of matters of sovereignty, 
all states will somehow have been recognized by means of resolutions of the Security 
Council of the United Nations, as almost all states are now its member states, so that it 
may truly be said that every sovereign state can count on the International Court of 
Justice to maintain its international legal parity—if in fact every sovereign state would be 
generally inclined to resolve its disputes before the ICJ.
On the military-functionalist side of sovereignty, however, not all political entities 
have been recognized as sovereign states. Many such entities existed until long after the 
Second World War, and only a certain amount of them would end up being recognized—
mainly because neither the Soviet Bloc nor the United States and Britain, in the West, 
objected to recognizing their statehood. The decolonization process, as it accelerated 
during the 1960s, became possible because the West allowed it sooner than the East. 
Influential circles around the World Bank, and later around Allen Dulles, had by then 
already found that U.S. foreign policy should be packaged in the shape of development 
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and assistance programs, so that economic markets rather than arms races would decide 
the outcome of the Cold War. The criterion in matters of recognition (of sovereignty) had 
shifted, thus, by the 1970s. From now onwards, this unique status would mostly be ‘given 
out’ by the community of sovereigns, in other words, in relation to economic policy 
modernization programs and central banking credit-worthiness. In this sense, the general 
recognition criterion has gradually shifted from a treaty-based balance between militarily-
paritable (equally supreme) entities, towards economic and towards commercial-
contractual autonomy.
Within one dimension, in brief, the ideological juridical-organizational powers of 
the system were instrumental in the protection of human rights, the creation of the ICJ 
and ICC, as well as in at least verbally paying attention to the Responsibility to Protect-
doctrine. In sovereignty’s other dimension, however, the material military-functionalist 
powers of only a few states have continued to perform the system’s lead-roles, in the 
Security Council and NATO, as these states have especially also been active in managing 
international economic affairs—by means of the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, and World Trade Organization, among several other neoliberal-capitalist and 
multilateral treaty-organizations.644
This section shall demonstrate that political realists enjoy the extra benefit, 
compared to liberal and neoliberal theorists, that they can facilitate greater understanding 
of complexity and political dynamics by remaining critical of the pretentious 
democratization and modernization programs, especially when these programs were to 
conflict with their own dual sovereignty-centric systems theory.645 Realists can reach for 
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systems theory to explain more than a few of the only seemingly permanent features of 
the system of states (the balance of power, the struggle for recognition, the human 
sociability theme, and so a few more), which these realists will believe are features 
closely akin to the two basic faculties of all political entities—whether or not they will 
have been recognized as sovereign parties. The latter faculties are also known as the two 
types of power; the legislative and executive, or juridical-ideological and economic-
material types.
Further, it is well known in the IR field that political realism provides in the most 
parsimonious theory of change. This section finds that theoretical parsimony is precisely 
one of the reasons why realism, rather than liberal idealism, takes better caution in 
applying certain theorems and conceptualizations to actual policy practices—as well as in 
adjusting the purposes behind (foreign) policies to momentarily-changing circumstances. 
This better-developed skill, in other words, is what realists owe to their quite 
parsimonious (but not: minimalistic) theorization of the main moral purposes and the 
keystone legal justifications for internationally-recognizable state action.
Political realism has both been frugal and coherent in conceptualizing the political 
processes through which the IR system is commonly believed to evolve.646 Historical 
evolutions of the system do not occur regardless as to whether that belief is intrinsically 
consistent, moral, or legally justifiable—as these processes, instead, often violate that 
kind of belief. John Mearsheimer reiterates this point in another way. Liberal 
institutionalism’s invocation of several moral and legal rationales for the ascend of the 
grand multilateral organizations also, erroneously, invokes the image that these 
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organizations must “constrain states”. John Mearsheimer corrects liberals, thus, when he 
adds that international institutional constraints do “not [have] to challenge the 
fundamental realist claims that states are self-interested actors.”647 Moreover, realism’s 
historical attention span is less limited than that of liberalism, which remains a deeply 
modernist ideology, indebted to the Enlightenment era more than that it has learned from 
the totalitarian horrors of the postmodern moment. A tidbit more skeptical of modern 
notions of change, thus, twentieth-century realism simply cannot agree that the system of 
states as whole would somehow have undergone one great liberalization and one final 
democratization movement—in isolation from the as-valid historical possibility that the 
system just as well has come to experience much greater material inequalities or, rather, a 
more blatant oligarchization of power than ever.648
To reiterate, realism is better capable than liberalism of looking both before and 
after the modernization movements. It does not try to reduce political changes to matters 
of historical necessity, and simply accepts that the system as a whole is unchangeable—
because of the flux and the tension it contains. Yet, the most turbulent changes within the 
system should invite precautionary measures and careful adjustments in recognition 
criterions. Changes in the relations between the parts and the types, further, should 
always firstly be expected to occur because of how sovereign parties relate to each other 
as well as to other entities. The causes of change, within the system of states, are 
generated from within intensities, or relative oppositions of power (and from the 
recognitions of powers). Changes in authority, especially, emerge not from any 
oppositions to the whole, but from relative oppositions between the parts. Even present-
999
time oligarchies/representative democracies, and neoliberal capitalism, may have to be 
believed to belong to a passing phase. Its counter-phase has, constitutionally, never 
disappeared.
As realists ranging from Machiavelli to Morgenthau have cautioned, 
dynamic changes place never the system as a whole, but always place the balance among 
more or less paritable states at risk of shifting. It is because these sovereign states have to 
capabilities to align their interests with those of other political entities, however, that 
most shifts in the balance will create more than just some legal and moral ambiguity. In 
trying to cope with such ambiguations, specifically of the legal parity principle and other 
recognition methods, statespersons should learn to begin their analyses by weighing off 
the relative significance of the ideological power- and the material power-dimensions 
from which their own sovereign authority emerges. For, these dimensions coincide 
dualistically, and it is from their complex dual relation that authority emerges.649
Political realism’s position shall now be shored up by investigating two cases. 
The first involves the post-Cold War introduction of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect 
program, and the second the cartelization of modern political parties and of how they do 
business. In both the human rights-protection and the political party-régime cases, in fact, 
economic interests have been agglomerated and have been monopolized by very few 
large states.
The first case follows from the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
policy doctrine, which was crafted to reduce the chances of civil war-related mass 
killings. More specifically, the RtoP doctrine was crafted by UN member states 
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committing themselves to act against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.”650 Michael W. Doyle finds it has proven to constitute progressive 
political change; the doctrine would somehow have been “increasing [the] pluralism of ... 
the normative architecture of world politics”.651 Doyle also describes creation of the RtoP 
doctrine as a progressive evolution when he refers to the UN Summit of 2005, after 
which it would finally have formed a new “part of the [Security Council] arsenal”, thus 
professing the Council’s willingness to create “stronger protections for human rights.”652
Also, the policy doctrine expanded on the UN Charter (Chapter 7) by further clarifying 
and even “bending the meaning of [the phrase] ‘international threats to the peace’.” The 
Security Council thereby expanded its Chapter 7 authority, not in “acting on the basis of 
legal obligation—but [in] the use of ‘responsibility’ language [which] is approaching that 
of normative strength.”653
In the case of the Rwandan genocide, for instance, the SC would not intervene but 
at least it was clearly beginning to speak this language as part of its “legitimate 
international authority”. The UN had now formally denied that specific types of mass 
killings could always remain “a domestic issue”.654 The 2003 United States occupation of 
Iraq and Russia’s 2008 intervention in Georgia, additionally, were perhaps not legal, but 
these actions were nonetheless increasingly intended to be humanitarian in nature.655
They were thereby demonstrating much greater “legitimacy” than the previous military 
interventions by any of the Super Powers, or so Doyle suggests.656 Of course, he selects 
his cases as he sees fit, ignoring American drone attacks on Pakistani civilians and Israeli 
attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza strip (these were in effect being condoned by the SC). 
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In addition, but outside the range of Doyle’s own view, the Council’s long waiting (until 
mid-March of 2011) to adopt its first resolution protect the Libyan people from a despotic 
government and its well-equipped murderous mercenaries may not be used as an example 
of the RtoP policy’s progressive implementation.
Doyle proceeds to find that liberal theorists who hold dear to “principles of 
universal human dignity have provided [ample] justifications for overriding or 
disregarding the principle of nonintervention.”657 Those theorists who belong to socialist 
or realist schools would to a lesser degree have established similar grounds, to also take 
recourse to moral doctrines, while superseding “the domestic jurisdiction of states”. 
Particularly, these respective schools found grounds to call on sovereign states “to act in 
the name of the worldwide working class” (Soviet socialism) or to “permit 
intervention”—for reasons such as (as Thucydides already noticed the importance of) 
“imperial stability [or] reputational gains.”658
Doyle is both correct and incorrect. True: RtoP is not yet a vested international 
law, but may eventually become part of a generally binding multilateral convention. But, 
indeed, the doctrine does not enjoy the same customary following as the Geneva 
Conventions do, for example.659 False: RtoP should be thought a sign of historical 
progress, of moral right, and therefore a proper justification for SC-authorized 
intervention.660 Against Doyle, rather, none of the SC’s own doctrines are to be 
considered legitimate sources of international authority because the UN Charter can 
support these doctrines. In legitimizing the authority to intervene, alternatively, decisions 
should mainly depend on how a Council-authorized military mission’s (deontic) purposes 
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also match up with that mission’s (consequentialist) use of force. These are deeply 
political decisions, especially since the SC has remained an instrument in the hands of the 
victors of the Second World War and—despite their consultations with Germany, Japan, 
or India, for instance—these victors have rarely defined their purposes, as intervening 
powers, only in relation to the Charter-based legitimacy of their interventions. The 
legitimacy of their more or less powerful interventions was virtually always, rather, 
motivated by their interests as well.661
What is more important in assessing intervention legitimacy is how well the 
Security Council has been leading the UN system as a whole, and how well the UN has 
been adapting to an ever-changing environment. In contrast to Doyle’s impression, the 
cases of Rwanda, Iraq, and Georgia posited the SC’s permanent veto-carrying members 
(the P-5) in opposition to one another. In Rwanda, no agreement could be reached to 
intervene as—according to Samantha Powers, among others—the U.S. had deliberately 
chosen to bury the issue by not bringing it up for a vote.662 The matter of the sanctions 
against, and the eventual occupation of Iraq, also, caused a grave split between the U.S. 
and the United Kingdom on one side and the other three P-5 states on the other.663
Finally, Georgia created a serious stand-off between the West and Russia in respect to the 
latter’s sphere of influence—and was much related to Moscow’s general attempt to 
monopolize access to natural gas and mineral resources. Hence, none of these three cases 
helps analysts detect a positive correlation between an evolving RtoP doctrine and the 
humanitarian objectives of the Council. However, Doyle gives one more reason for 
emerging RtoP legitimacy: progress.664
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The assumption of progress does not aid (realist) theorists in pointing to a relative 
absence of progress. In other words, normative progress cannot be assessed by only using 
more  measures of progress, and especially not by referring solely to signs of historical 
progress (the end of the Cold War or the 2005 UN Summit, for that matter, seem 
progressive only in retrospect and subjectively).665 Of course, both liberals (such as 
Doyle) and realists (here including above-mentioned socialists) can validate their 
argument that Target-State Q’s jurisdictional autonomy and territorial integrity are 
relative—and dependent on the goodwill of the Council, and especially also on the 
goodwill of at least one of the P-5 States. Indeed, sovereign statehood itself has remained, 
to a great extent, relative to recognition by others.666 If State Q massively violates its own 
population’s right to life, this could always give liberal States reason to claim Q’s 
citizens’ rights need to be better protected against Q’s governmental intrusions just as 
that it can give realists more reason to find that stability must be maintained, or even that 
the honor and reputation of Q’s (former) allies could be at stake—for as long as Q is not 
prevented, by at minimum some of the P-5 States, from committing specifically heinous 
massacres.
What is imperative for the IR field to see, however, is that realists disagree with 
liberals about more than the motives as to why the Security Council would want to target 
Q’s criminal government. The proportionality of the intervention force is critical to 
realists, as they will have to be vigilant about maintaining a modicum of stability or a 
balance of powers. Liberals could argue, however, that because human rights are 
universal rights, any intervention force should imagine itself responsible for protecting 
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Q’s citizens as well as N’s or XYZ’s citizenries. The final criterion of liberal intervention 
analysts is equal liberty. Or, liberals think individual equality is a higher norm than 
supremacy over territory and population. Realists cannot agree on this prioritization, as 
they think that equality is ideological. It is an abstract ideal. Equal rights depend on the 
sharing of ideas, of legal values, whereas supremacy has a concrete and material impact 
on life within any given territory. In recognizing the legitimacy of any authority, 
according to most realists, further, the abstraction and the concreteness of that authority 
will have to coincide and intersect—without necessarily colliding into one another as 
well as, certainly, without forcefully prioritizing one above the other in terms of actual 
policy-decisions.
At this divergence of liberal and realist approaches, now, the problem has to do 
with Q’s jurisdictional autonomy. After all, if State Q exercises its legislative and 
adjudicative powers in separation from all other international and all other state parties, 
then it would almost certainly also not be making use of any of its constitutional treaty-
law ratification procedures. International law can now no longer perform any role in 
relation to Q’s constitution, and its jurisdiction would appear non-existent (at least from 
the perspective of powerful States XYZ, and as how these are usually representing 
themselves in the Security Council). Liberal idealists will argue, on one side, that certain 
rights are universal, even if Q’s jurisdictional protections of these rights has faded from 
view and even if Q has failed to protect these rights. Universality is key. Political realists 
will in such a scenario, to the contrary side of most liberals, argue that recognition of 
jurisdictional sovereignty (by XYZ) tends to follow systemic patterns, or natural 
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behavioral rules. Complex systems are critical. The rules or regulative patterns of such 
systems have little in common with the universality of a person’s rights, and much more 
with the practical question of whether there is also a duty to protect this particular 
person’s rights. Recognition of Q’s jurisdiction, especially, is according to these realists 
mostly dependent on the complexity of Q’s governmental adherence to Q’s constitutional 
laws. The obligatory character of international law (including the UN Charter, as 
potentially enforced by XYZ) depends hereby firstly on the degree to which one or 
another particular constitutional law will have remained in effect, within Q.
In brief, while liberals ask why individuals are not being equally protected within 
a failing jurisdiction, realists mostly raise the question why constitutional rules are not 
animating greater jurisdictional effectiveness. This is not a simple inversion of their 
respective perspectives, however. Realists distinguish themselves by raising an altogether 
different issue: they ask why the constitutional rule should hold that all powers should be 
balanced, and what happens if government fails to maintain this balance. Do people 
retain their right to reconstitute the government, or amend their constitution? May people 
decide on such an exception, and are they sovereign? Or, should they secceed to attain 
such status?
Another typical set of issues for realists, rather than for liberals, is that they think 
international treaty-organizations (including the UN, or NATO) structurally incapable of 
recognizing sovereign states and their autonomy (even after these organizations were to 
have developed the most normatively acceptable doctrines, such as RtoP). Liberals may 
assign great juridical responsibilities to multilateral treaty-organizations, but they are in 
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effect only bolstering their own idea of a world state while diffusion states’ political 
responsibilities for decisions involving autonomy or even secession. Ultimately, most 
realists will agree that not treaty-organizations but only states may legitimately recognize 
other states as equal juridical authorities, with their own jurisdiction, as only states may 
assess the regulatory effectiveness of other states’ constitutions of power—as to be 
understood in the wide sense of the word ‘power’, which is as a partial type within a 
complex system, rather than in its narrow or liberal sense, which would have to amount 
to likening ‘power’ only to force.667
On one hand, multilateral treaty-organizations have in themselves little to no 
equal legal standing, and no legal parity, in other words.668 Because the treat-
organizations are clubs rather than parties, and because they themselves are without equal 
sovereignty, their actions are immune from prosecution.669 These organizations are 
difficult to criminalize under international law, because they are the law. On another 
hand, sovereign states do have ultimate command responsibility, and may therefore be 
called upon before tribunals.670 With that in mind, political realists see ground to warn 
that the SC should not be allowed to intervene, militarily, solely on its own behalf, let 
alone on behalf of a liberal doctrine claiming universal validity. As all statespersons 
should do, the SC should avoid to find itself self-righteously claiming to be on the side of 
modernization, capitalism, or even of democracy—as, in fact, not even religious doctrine 
can do so.671
The second case involves the specter haunting many modern party systems. By 
taking one angle on this specter, analysts see the idea that each individual voter must 
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have a right to “liberal self-determination.” But by taking another angle on the same 
phenomenon, as Amartya Sen has shown, they see that an aggregate of voters has never 
managed to optimize its right to make a “democratic choice”; “self-determination” and 
“democracy”, therefore, are in a “principled conflict.”672 Substantially and materially 
democratic institutions, also, are by definition in conflict with most if not all individual 
rights and procedural liberties. It is this conflict, henceforth, that has actually been 
haunting liberal-democratic states.
One of the problems with the twenty-first-century model of the liberal state is that 
too few people know why this state should be believed to be a free state. Many, and 
especially many Westerners, have been taught that their own state is both liberal and 
democratic. From a classicist republican point of view, in whichever way this point will 
have been defended by the West and specifically the American tradition, however, there 
can be nothing particularly democratic about any state. Classicist realists found that 
majorities elected by secret ballots do not necessarily form the basis of a democratic 
government, for example. Plutocracies and oligarchies may justas well elect popular 
representatives, and they also can be governed by majority coalitions. Representative 
democracy is therefore to be reserved as only one of the possible names for a structure of 
government, rather than for the state. The difference between a government and a 
recognized states is that a government official may act within or without the boundaries 
of a constitutional dynamic.
But a state is always being recognized, and defined, by virtue of its own 
constitutionalism. It is thus, both theoretically and practically, utterly impossible to argue 
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that a sovereign state is somehow acting without any cognizance of its own constitutional 
dynamics or of its own conventional organization of its own types of state power. The 
UK, Saudi Arabia, and Israel may not have a written constitution, for example, but these 
states have nonetheless held dear to well-developed divisions of power and other quite 
robust constitutional dynamics. Were their government officials at some moment decide 
to act outside these dynamics, then their decisions per se will have virtually no bearing on 
how other states recognize their own state’s sovereignty. Such recognitions, as this 
section professes to demonstrate, typically, will only remain contingent on those actions 
that might fundamentally modify, or that might go against the very notion that each state 
holds on to its own unique constitutional dynamic.
The issue in this second case now becomes very simple to explain. In every 
substantially democratic state, the government actively represents not just the electorate 
but especially also the segments of the population most at risk of being politically 
disenfranchised. Yet, in democratic states it has not been uncommon for electorates to 
choose to be represented by governments which disenfranchised or exploited precisely 
these segments. The case in point remains 1930s Germany. The most cohesive segment 
of the electorate helped create conditions under which Hindenburg chose Hitler to head a 
government which then stopped organizing parliamentary elections, and which legally 
revoked many individual liberties, but never abolished the Weimar Constitution. In this 
obvious case, a substantively democratic form came in conflict with the idea of a 
functioning rights régime and its liberal procedures.
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Kenneth Arrow demonstrated also, more than a decade prior to Amarty Sen, that 
this “principled conflict”, between electoral democracy and formal liberalism, or between 
the substance and the procedure of political representation, is impossible to resolve. 
Modern and democratic electorates may enjoy near-universal suffrage rights, but nearly 
almost all of their other rights cannot be coherently agreed upon—at least not by 
themselves.673 In democratic party systems, the electorates can only choose between 
candidates, or in some other cases between parties. This is why all electorates are poorly 
prepared for the battle between various more or less liberal ideas. It is inherent to 
democratic elections that they have less-than-random effects; elections are in so many 
ways aristocratic/oligarchic self-selection mechanisms.674 For instance, voter segments 
typically start to split up, so that the original voter preferences end up being divided 
across candidate-representatives, and less-than-optimally democratic substantive 
outcomes are being accomplished despite perfectly democratic procedures. The 
seemingly orderly distribution of each of the votes, among all candidates, will thus be 
accompanied by substantively disorderly bifurcations. Simply put, the aggregate vote is 
being split between ideologically-similar candidates, which makes it possible for a third-
preferred candidate to win. This is called an ideologically intransitive outcome because, 
as Arrow detailed, the assumption must be that the candidates can be ranked in terms of 
only one transitive scale of ideological voter preferences.
Unless an election would consist of a new two-candidate run-off, with no prior 
public cognizance of the preceding campaigns, there will always remain a segment of 
voters that splits its vote up across a spectrum of candidates, which then can cause this 
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segment to lose to a narrowly less-divided segment. But, principally, it is predominantly 
the American democratic model, which promotes plurality voting (“one man, one vote”), 
and that is therefore most easily harmed by such vote splitting-outcomes, or by so-called 
spoiler-candidacies as well. The solution to the splitting-and-spoiler problem would be to 
promote an alternative electoral model, called range voting. Each candidate receives now 
a ranked score from each voter, so that the candidate with the highest average score will 
also be the candidate with the most support from the electorate as a whole. All voters 
have an opportunity to vote on, or rank, more precisely, every candidate (“all men, all 
ranks”).675
In any event, beyond Arrow’s paradox and Sen’s conflicting principles, another 
observation should be made about the contrariness of democracy and liberalism. In each 
of the known political party-régimes, thirdly, economic interests tend to concentrate in 
the governing parties. Interests are usually agglomerated around that core of political 
party-representatives who have the most influence in the policy-making process. Because 
of this concentration of so-called special interests, and lobbies, it is becoming 
increasingly less likely that political representatives, even in the most liberal 
democracies, listen to the popular will as a whole. The over-representation of specific or 
special interests, rather, disperses and vaporizes this will. In Rousseau’s words, the 
general will oxidifies into the wills of all, individually. One possible remedy to this 
vaporization, of the collective representation also considered as the common good, or as 
the commons, is in a liberal democracy of course to call for frequent elections, the high 
rotation of officials, and the disempowerment of parties.
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Yet, perhaps there is no commons at all. Perhaps there is only, at least even in this 
liberal representative model itself, a “political void.” As Arrow’s “impossibility theorem” 
demonstrates, all workable types of democratic elections will nonetheless have been 
doomed from the start, if not only because they are justifiable means to an unjustifiable 
end; to the end of representational necessity.676 If electoral representation is in fact an 
unjustifiable necessity, and if its logics are only tolerated because of the size of the 
modern electorate and the distances delegates must travel, then it is this impersonal sense 
of indirectness that most offends (classicist) realists (this is ultimately why they, 
sometimes being led by Rousseau and sometimes by Schmitt, have to attack modern 
liberal democracies, which from their viewpoint seem to have been overly necessitating 
their own moving beyond Rousseau’s more direct, more personal model).
It is particularly inside the U.S. that, at the federal level, topographical distances 
between representees and representatives are larger than inside many other sovereign 
states. Even though distance itself would pose a similar problem in other modern 
democracies, it can also quite easily be bridged by randomly standardizing limits to the 
number of voters eligible in district-based elections (to prevent unjust, disorderly
gerrymandering).677 Distance can also be bridged by means of the Internet. What neither 
smaller districts nor the Internet can help do, however, is to prevent ideological 
intransitivity and a biased incapacity to switch angles.678 Party-based ideological 
exceptionalism is, in other words, a constant risk in electoral democracies. The risk is still 
increasing, in fact, as elected representatives have across the board become much more 
willing to toe the party-line, but mostly so in the Anglo-American district-based electoral 
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model, by making exceptions to the general rule that they should serve as the primordial 
representatives of their own district’s general will. This heightened risk takes away the 
ultimate purpose of political action—which happens to be the simple purpose of 
sustaining a balance in the coexistence of randomly-selected voters and an orderly and 
merit-based representation of their wills (randomness is key to democratization, merit to 
aristocratization; both should coincide for a stable mode of public authority to emerge, as 
argued earlier).
In the current situation, there are few opportunities to exercise popular 
sovereignty, unless it would be as the randomly-selected member of a grand jury, 
perhaps. More specifically, few people in the world may act as jurors and even fewer are 
directly exercising the power of legislative initiative. The power of constitutional 
amendment  has long been restricted to very few citizenries as well (Switzerland forming 
one example, and the West-Coast States’ usage of U.S. Constitution Article 5-powers, 
another). Despite much talk about undecided, swing, and floating voters, the electorate in 
its entirety cannot be considered an independent and autonomous agent. The electorate is 
actually becoming more dependent on political parties as well as on the mass media, in 
effectuating change, than ever before.679
This new dependency is making it possible for the media to homogenize public 
discourse and for the parties to count every voter as a prospective affiliate. The 
subsequent homogenization of the electorate has come together with the cartelization of 
the parties. Especially the labor and socialist parties are now no longer counting as much 
on unions as that they rely on business owners as well. Besides, the only influential 
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political parties all aspire to govern. As they have thus been aiming to not only oversee 
but to also administer policies, however, they have been becoming catch-all parties. 
Messages are not tailored to each of the, but to any of the constituencies,  districts, and 
regions. As in the Americas, Europe and Australia have witnessed such catch-all 
messaging techniques, targeting transfigured images of electoral regions; voters not only 
anywhere but everywhere now seem less heterogeneous, less diverse, as well as less 
moderate than they would have appeared in the past.
The voter market in the United States has been so homogenized that the two 
parties only have to fight for marginal victories. In terms of messaging, and ideology, 
each party only has to seem a bit less bland, less homogenous, and less immoderate than 
the other party. In the meantime, the two parties can dedicate more and more time to 
accumulating campaign funds. Hence, whereas voters are becoming more dependent on 
parties, the parties themselves become more dependent on business corporations, 
financial contributors, and the ubiquitous special interests. Whenever ideological 
differentiation starts to take place, these special interests usually lose their motivation to 
support the one party which seems the most radical in its views. Although special 
interests do not literally control the political party, the latter can only ‘attract’ them, and 
can only make these interests ‘stick’ to its program, to the extent that this program 
appeals to anyone everywhere—and, thus, to no place in particular.
Party programs and personal platforms are being watered down, just in order to 
appear as ideologically temperate as possible (but always a tiny bit less so than the main 
opponent’s program). This phenomenon can best be explained in analogy to an imperfect 
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market, in which government policies are being supplied by parties which are all trying to 
belong to one cartel.680
As parties realize they would almost certainly start losing influence and 
legitimacy if they were to become monopolies, occupying all departments of government, 
parties will settle for uncomfortable but workable coalitions. On one side of this equation, 
pragmatism is valued higher than anything, by voters, so that parties will try hard to stay 
within their coalition-cartels without allowing the other cartel members to take too much 
advantage.681 Perhaps they will set up traps, for instance, in order to make their 
opponents within the cartel look slightly less pragmatic, or less willing to break gridlock 
and to solve national problems. On the other side of the equation, the cartel-parties must 
retain their incentives to disallow any free ideological competition. In order to ‘attract’ 
support from previously-unaffiliated societal groupings, including the many special 
interests, party representatives must supply them with continuous economic growth—and 
almost never with ideologically-motivated, or even not with any rationally-decided 
bifurcations.
In sum, genuinely popular participation in the political process, by groupings not 
allied with the large or with the generally governing political parties, has become 
virtually impossible throughout the West.682 Participatory movements must be said to 
have continued to lose ground to these cartel-parties—at least on grounds and issues 
involving the fate of the public realm. The latter parties are simply continuing to become 
ever-more capable of differentiating themselves, at least on the voter market, by means of 
their ideational branding and by means of their ideologically-driven platforms which, 
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cynically, then again help them guarantee the type of “gridlock” for which they can 
always blame the seemingly weakest party in the policy supply-chain.683
Ideological homogenization, political party-cartelization, and a consumerist 
economic culture within the major representative democracies have made it less probable
that the people themselves will at some point newly begin to decide on the format of their 
own constitution. Unless a political revolution occurs, in brief, the people are likely to 
continue to lose their participatory freedoms. They are then continuing to be satisfied, in 
exchange for their loss of free public authority, by post-materialconsumer values—as 
opposed to by both their ideological integrity and the coherency of their material-
existential needs. The tragedy of it all is that, pending on constant economic growth and 
pending on the continual satisfaction of the people’s basic necessities, the political parties 
will remain eager to trade in their ecologically-conscious virtues for voters’ consumerism 
and for ideological self-regulation for financial risk-taking as well. It is innate to the 
democratic parties that they opt not for political austerity but for excessive social 
inequality and economic volatility.684 The problem of party legitimacy and state 
authority, therefore, is a problem of how to ‘split’ the difference between—rather than to 
synthesize and unify—the contraries of both political decision and socio-economic 
distribution, as well as of both materialist realism and the ideologies of consumerism. To 
escape from the trappings of either tragedy or farce, materialist realists should help 
identify the difference within a contingent void.
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121 Montesquieu (2000: 20.7, 342; 12.10, 197).
122 Montesquieu’s (2000) own constitutionalism receives commendable attention in Samuel 
(2009) and Wood (1972).
123 Montesquieu’s (2000: 19.27, 328; 20.2, 338) argues, while looking extensively at the case of 
England, that the preservation of liberty depends on the commercial trade in, the 
development, and the “enjoyment” of “primary commodities”—as commerce’s “natural 
effect ... is to lead to peace”; a clear variant of the Democratic Peace thesis in IR, which 
itself has been defended by Doyle (1986), Russett (1993), (2009), and Russett and Oneal 
(2001). For one possible critique of the (commercial variant of the) DP hypothesis, see 
Houghton (2009).
124 Schmitt (1976), (1996).
125 Baumgold (2010).
126 Hobbes (1991), (1994).
127 For Schmitt’s theological reading of Hobbes, consult also Bendersky (1996) or Auerbach 
(1994) and Chen (2006).
128 Runciman (2003: 29) argues that Hobbes’s concept of sovereign authority derives neither from 
the people (too multitudinous) nor from their state (too unified): “The state cannot be 
identified with the group of individuals who make up the people, because people have no 
unity, and cannot act as a person in their own name. But nor can the state simply be 
identified with the sovereign power in the state, because the sovereign power is always 
embodied by an individual or group of individuals (‘an assembly’) who cannot bear the 
identity of the state simply as individuals.”
129 Habermas (1999), (2002), (2008) tends to position publicality (the ‘Öffentliches’) over and 
above private interests.
130 Informative are Brunkhorst (2005), (2007), Munro (2007), and Rasmussen (1990).
131 Compare, for example, Birmingham (2006: 146, n. 7).
132 One equation of public liberty and corporate commerce is being formulated in Montesquieu 
(2000: 20.4, 340; 20.13, 346); “the great enterprises of the traders are always necessarily 
mixed with public business.” A more contemporary issue is of course how the interests of 
corporate enterprises are to be mixed, and it appears therefore to either have been an 
exaggeration or a mistake for Montesquieu to thus suggest they must “always” be mixed, 
of necessity, with the state’s public affairs. There are many instances in which corporate 
enterprises are free to avoid customs officers (“tax-farmers”) and restrict the activities of 
other public regulators, he later admits. Yet, the Magistrate’s admiration for English 
corporations and trading houses knows few limits; among them, all “customs are imposed 
directly [and without interference by regulators, so that] there is a singular ease in trade: a 
1027
                                                                                                                                                
word in writing accomplishes the greatest business”. Rarely does he pursue his liberal 
agenda as clearly as in these passages. 
133 Montesquieu (2000: 19.27, 325-326).
134 Machiavelli (1950: 119) or (1996: 1.4).
135 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.7, 130-131).
136 Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 8.12; 6.4, 76-77; 6.15, 89; 12.8-12.10, 195-197 and; 5.8, 52; 
5.19, 69 and; 6.11, 84).
137 Montesquieu (2000: 6.8, 81; 6.5, 77).
138 Montesquieu (2000: 6.8, 81; 28.36, 588).
139 Montesquieu (2000: 6.8, 81-82).
140 Montesquieu (2000: 11.18, 182).
141 Montesquieu (2000: 8.12, 121).
142 It seems almost as if Agamben (2011) comes out against this Montesquieuan argument, in his 
reflection on Franz Kafka’s The Trial, as he clarifies why Rome’s most severe sanctions 
were reserved for those levying false accusations.
143 Montesquieu (2000: 11.18, 183; 28.36, 587).
144 Sullivan (2006: 269).
145 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.8, 135-136).
146 This author consulted on this point, among other texts, Fleisher (1972), Fontana (1999), 
Peterman (195???), and particularly also Sullivan (1993).
147 Merriam-Webster’s defines passion as a “state or capacity of being acted on by external agents 
or forces”, but also as “the sufferings of Christ between the night of the Last Supper and 
his death”. It appears highly unlikely Machiavelli (1950: D 1.2, 113) would have been 
unfamiliar with the double meaning of passion, as he acknowledges there are passions 
which tend to turn into “luxury” (indulgence) and those that breed the “timid” (the meek). 
That is, passion is both enacted by seemingly random external forces (by Fortuna?), or 
by (divine?) fate, and yet passion also connotes a regulated and time-restricted period of 
suffering. See, further, Benner’s (2009: 192; 195) argument that human nature consists 
here not only of the “malignant” types of passion, as humans also are passionately 
“responsible for making their own laws”. “Machiavelli wants virtue and the laws to 
regulate ambition and other human ... passions, not to eliminate them.”
1028
                                                                                                                                                
148 Compare, further, Parel’s (1992) treatment of Machiavelli’s own conception of fortune 
(Fortuna).
149 Fleisher (1972).
150 Femia (2004: 32). Virtù is for Machiavelli a complex practice, with many meanings, as has 
been demonstrated by Fleisher (1972), Garver (1987), and Benner (2009) as well. Its 
main meaning seems to overlap with his sense of a person’s capacity to publically display 
‘animated decisiveness.’ For an uncomplicated, straightforward account of virtù, 
however, use Mansfield (1995).
151 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.12, 150-151).
152 Benner (2009: 396-397), citing also Machiavelli (1996: 1.11).
153 Montesquieu (2000: 24.10-24.11, 466; 24.13, 468).
154 Montesquieu (2000: 24.16, 470).
155 Montesquieu (2000: 24.16, 471).
156 Montesquieu (2000: 24.19, 473; 24.17, 471; 24.14, 468-469).
157 It seems Montesquieu (2000: esp. 24.2, 460) saw moderation as the greatest value of religion, 
but this would mainly still concern only the type of moderation of Term (1) ‘mores’ and 
‘customs’—rather than of the ‘good laws’ Machiavelli had in mind, which were 
definitely also including Term (2) institutional and official practices.
158 Montesquieu (2000: 25.14, 493) and Benner (2009: 389), citing Machiavelli (1996: 1.11).
159 Montesquieu (2000: 25.1, 479).
160 Montesquieu (2000: 25.14, 492; 25.13, 490).
161 Femia (2004: 65) finds that Machiavelli’s “classicism was realistic.” He was indeed an early 
neo-classicist and it is also correct that the platform underneath his positions was that of a 
political realist. But he was not a realist because he would have thought, as Femia 
wrongly presupposes he did, fear to be the primary foundation of the republic—as 
compared to hope or a caring love. Femia: “fear ... rather than love or solidarity is the 
ultimate foundation of political order.” Yet, Machiavelli’s own work evinces that fear and 
love are dual foundations of constitutional authority: neither one foundation forms the 
ultimate emotive prerequisite for constitutional success.
162 Machiavelli (1996: 2.23) or (1950: D 359).
163 Montesquieu (2000: 20.7, 342-343; 20.1-20.2, 338-339) essentially argues that all “commerce 
... polishes and softens barbarous mores”. He concludes that “the laws of commerce” are 
capable of uniting nations.
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164 Montesquieu (2000: 5.6, 48, italics added).
165 When Montesquieu (2000: 5.5, 45) speaks about liberties or civil rights, he basically refers to 
the need for taxation as well to the need to “regulate ... dowries, gifts, inheritances, [and] 
testaments”—which are needs to prevent republics from becoming too democratic.
166 For instance, Montesquieu (2000: 20.3-20.6, 339-342).
167 Montesquieu (2000: 4.5, 36).
168 Montesquieu (2000: 3.10, 29; 6.14-15, 88-89). 
169 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.35, 204-206).
170 Montesquieu (2000: 3.10, 29; 6.14-15, 88-89). 
171 Montesquieu (2000: 5.6, 48, italics added).
172 Compare, for instance, Montesquieu (2000: 10.9, 145) for the reasons why a monarchical state 
cannot establish a middle ground, as it condones “frightful luxury” along the urban axis, 
and “poverty in the [rural] provinces.”
173 Compare, especially, Montesquieu (2000: 20.2, 339).
174 Note again that the power of judgment, according to Montesquieu’s (2000: 11.6, 156) key 
definition, is also one of the two powers of execution. It is not really the “executive 
power over the things depending on the right of nations, [therefore, but mostly the] ... 
executive power over the things depending on civil right.” Whereas Arendt’s Roman 
Republic allowed civil law and treaty law to coincide on relatively equal terms—as 
Arendt was shown (in Chapter One) to compare civil right to the rights of nations—the 
French Magistrate proposes the novel dominance of a more liberal definition of right, 
over executive treaty power, in her stead.
175 As an aside, Marx and Polanyi together help answer that question of how peaceful relations 
are maintained—by showing how often eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal 
theorists were at fault in having disembedded the problem of competition, and in severing 
socio-economic interests from cultural and juridical norms. In light of the continued 
economic as well as the military competition over natural resources, this disembedding 
moment might be said to have been caused by the gravest of all liberal mistakes. For, it 
were the colonial imperialist states (Britain, Holland, France) which, both economically 
and politically, came to benefit the most from that moment. Also, once Weimar Germany 
had been confronted with the constant oligarchization and colonization of the world 
economy, by these imperialist states, it would be Hitler who actually followed their lead 
as he tried to create a new middle class and first initiated international barter trade. The 
international and corporate oligarchization of economies would of course have been an 
ongoing process, yet it were predominantly the twentieth-century totalitarian states that 
could argue they saw no other choice than to resort to barter and then also to mass 
1030
                                                                                                                                                
violence and torture in order to re-embed, decommercialize, reappropriate, and to 
territorialize the (previously-imagined as) open and free market.
176 Compare, especially, Runciman (2003).
177 Montesquieu (2000: 5.7, 50).
178 As most commentaries mention, Montesquieu (2000: bk 5, ch. 9, 55; bk. 6, ch. 5, 78; bk. 11, 
ch. 6, 156-166) precludes the monarchy from judging civil law cases: a task Montesquieu 
tries to reserve for (the nobility’s) “intermediate dependent powers”. This means that he 
is among the first to start to suggest that nobles can hold a third type of (albeit 
intermediary) power: the adjudicative power, which is thus no longer also to be regarded 
as a necessary part of the executive power (although he does well know that adjudication 
is essentially not a power, but much more akin to an institutional form of authority). 
Furthermore, Radasanu (2010: 292) seems mistaken to suggest that the whole 
monarchical state would be “inherently unstable, and always teetering on the brink of 
despotism.” Montesquieu does not believe the monarchical state to be “unstable”—but 
merely that individual kings may seek “glory” and thus become despotic, indeed, unless 
they have to check and unless they themselves would be checked by the other elements 
within their state: by the intermediary powers of the nobles; by their less-than-equal 
peers. For, he is indeed also quite firm that the powers of the nobles, within the 
monarchical state, will be used to promote a “commercial, peaceful way of life”.
179 Aristotle (bk. 5, ch. 2, 1302a, p. 207). Montesquieu (2000: 21.1, 354; 21.20, 389) downplays 
the possibility of  “commerce” becoming eventually “subject[ed] to revolutions”. 
Whenever “commerce” was subordinated to the principle of “goodness of government” 
(as the scholastics and Machiavellians would have helped do, he accuses), it seems to 
Montesquieu that “commerce” would then always become much less likely “to avoid 
violence and [to] maintain itself everywhere”.
180 Compare, for instance, Althusser (1972), Carrithers (1991), Rahe (2005), Samuel (2009), 
Shklar (1990), Spector, (2004), and Wood (1972).
181 Aristotle (5.3, 1302b, 209, and; 5.1, 1301b, 206).
182 Aristotle (bk. 5, ch. 16, p. 145).
183 Hobbes (1994: ch. 17, 118), Aristotle (1958).
184 Aristotle (5.3, 1303b, 210).
185 Hobbes (1994: 18, 121-122).
186 Hobbes (1994: 30, 231).
187 Montesquieu (2000: 3.7, ???).
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188 Seats in the parlements were overwhelmingly held by aristocratic magistrates. Radasanu 
(2010: 290; 288) presents too little textual evidence for her thesis that aristocracy could 
have been “the worst form of government for Montesquieu, short of simple despotism.” 
In other words, theorists who would want to attack her thesis can too easily object that 
Montesquieu (2000: 11.8, 167) instead understood that most aristocratic states were also 
mixed states, in the sense that they depended on monarchs. As one such a mixed state, 
France turned occasionally towards oligarchy (despotism) whenever the French 
monarchy failed to moderate the acquisitiveness of the nobles (leading to unjust spoils, or 
immoderate territorial gains), or whenever the state too strongly supported the monarchy 
in its economic idleness (princely luxury). Hence, aristocracy becomes oligarchy when it 
fails to respect the relative interests of the other constitutional elements (monarchy, 
democracy), and possibly those of other states as well. Ethical realists should ask, 
however, whether it ever suffices for a “ruling class” to call itself a moderate aristocracy 
to the mere degree that it will seem to respect the interests of all the other classes—or to 
the degree that it simply, indeed, “withstands [its] temptation to bully the masses”.
189 As Radasanu (2010: 287) sums up: “Important evidence that a legislator embodies the spirit of 
moderation is the absence of perfectionism.”
190 Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 4.2, 33).
191 Rightly, Radasanu (2010: 305, italics added) concludes that Montesquieu turned sharply 
against the monarchical state and its dependency on an ‘economy’ of luxuries, or of 
honors, as well, which he all believed to be “inimical to the new modes and orders of 
gentle commercial mores.” Furthermore, Radasanu (2010: 298, n. 70) references Rahe 
(2005: 87) to evince why Montesquieu would have called on French legislators to take an 
example to the English, acquisition-driven constitution as an alternative to their own 
ideas about the preservation of and competition for honors: “commerce is the purview of 
the English, while bankrupting wars is that of French monarchy”.
192 See, for instance, Radasanu (2010: 290).
193 Montesquieu (2000: 29.18, 617).
194 Montesquieu (2000: 29.5, 604; 29.7, 605) says, for example, that the old law that allowed 
anyone to destroy hostile towns—as retaliation for their diverting of one’s own town’s 
running water—“was just, but it was imprudent.” In terms of its execution, this law was 
excessively just. Similarly, Syracuse had had a just “law of ostracism”—and yet this law 
had remained comparatively imprudent. Syracuse would have failed to counter-balance 
the powers of the law’s executors, as they must have been making the exiling of their 
rivals into “an everyday business.” That is, in Syracuse all the “principal citizens 
banished each other”—whereas in Athens, moderation had been institutionalized because 
here each citizen was obliged to collect “such a great number of votes that it was difficult 
for anyone to be exiled, unless his absence was necessary.” Also in Athens, “[o]ne could 
banish only every five years.”
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195 Montesquieu (2000: 20.19-20.20, 349-350). Radasanu (2010: 297; 299) adds that: “princes 
ought not to engage in commerce; the prince’s involvement in business affairs translates 
into monopoly and favoritism.”
196 Radasanu (2010: 297) correctly mentions that, according to Montesquieu (2000: 20.4, 340-
341), monarchical states tend to nurture a “commerce of luxury” (excess) rather than a 
“commerce of economy” (moderation).
197 Remarkably, Radasanu (2010: 305, italics added) sees no potential opposition emerge—from 
within Montesquieu’s conception of “post-Christian commerce”—between “universal 
justice and gentle mores”. Yet, contrary to the equal justice norm, mores are actually 
norms particular to the nature of a people and their region.
198 Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 29.3, 603, 19.7, 605). Compare, further, Aristotle (5.3, 1302b, 
208).
199 Montesquieu (2000: 20.4, 340-341; 21.1, 354; 29.9-29.10, 625-627). In many diverse states, 
economic commerce has had an acquisitive rather than a preservative function. It thus 
allowed these states to acquire not only more, but also more diverse goods. This sense of 
diversity followed economic commerce, yet it also spawned new (broader-applicable) 
norms and (international) laws. Although each state has its own climate and natural 
conditions, and will try to hold on to its own natural needs and its own definitions of 
luxury, this sense of particularity therefore certainly does not have to prevent states from 
creating equally-applicable legal norms, nor from defending proportional justice. When 
the two parties of the Burgundians and the Romans came together, for example, they 
distributed the land in question by creating proportionally equal (proportional to the 
needs of the two parties) rather than generally (absolutely) equal plots. As Montesquieu 
(2000: 21.14, 381-382) prefers the German (Burgundian) method of applying justice 
(proportionally), he has much reason to add that Rome would have attacked Carthage for 
military rather than economic purposes (for the purposes of attaining “glory”). He is also 
adamant that the Roman Empire was far from peaceful and, rather, “opposed to 
commerce.”
200 Montesquieu (2000: 29.18, 617).
201 Radasanu (2010: 286), Montesquieu (2000: 29.1, 602).
202 Especially, Montesquieu (2000: 5.11, 57).
203 See, for example, Aristotle (4.11, 1295b, 182-183).
204 Aristotle (5.3, 1303b, 210).
205 Aristotle (5.2, 1302a, 207; 5.3, 1303b, 211).
206 Aristotle (5.2, 1302a, 207). 
207 Aristotle (5.2-5.3, 1302a, 207-208).
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208 Aristotle (5.1, 1301b, 206).
209 Aristotle (5.3, 1303a, 210).
210 Montesquieu (2000: 5.8, 51; 21.4, 356).
211 The label of progressive realism is here used similarly to (but must not be confused with) how 
Scheuerman (2011) applies this label. On Montesquieu’s modernist but aristocratic 
tendencies, see Carrithers (1991).
212 Particularly, Aristotle (3.15, 1286a, 143). He adds that in each state there will always be some 
government members who become “greedy for the gains which office conferred, [and 
will limit their offices] ... to a narrower and narrower circle; and by this policy 
[strengthen] the masses until they [rebel]”.
213 Aristotle (5.16, 1287a, 145).
214 Montesquieu (2000: 5.11, 57).
215 Montesquieu (2000: 21.20, 389).
216 Machiavelli (1950: P 25, 91) more than occasionally treats an exemplary person’s virtù as that 
person’s “free will”—but he also, contrary to Montesquieu’s impression of virtue being 
the dominant form of ambition in republics, sees virtù as governing only up to half of a 
person’s actions. See, further, Benner (2009: 250-251) and Femia (2004: 59-60).
217 Montesquieu (2000: 3.7, 27).
218 Montesquieu (2000: 3.3, 23). See, further, Kinneging (1997: 287).
219 Montesquieu (2000: 4.2, 32-33) suggests strongly that in a monarchical state, honor can check 
itself: only here, “the prince should never prescribe an action that dishonors”. See, 
further, Radasanu (2010: 296).
220 Montesquieu (2000: 3.10, 30).
221 Radasanu (2010: 290).
222 Continue to see, also, Hobbes (1994: 30, 231; 17, 118).
223 Aristotle (1998: 1267a, 60) or, also, (1958: 1267a; 1292a; 1291b).
224 Althusser (1999) touches only too briefly on the dynamics of virtú, yet his reading will here be 
accepted as most reliable.
225 The following paragraphs draw, in great part, from Habermas (2001), Hansen (2010), Levy 
(2009), Manin (1997), Skultety (2009) and, to some extent, Vatter (2008).
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226 See, for instance, Aristotle (1958: 1291a-1292b, 165-170).
227 Gilbert (1990: 18) announces he will read Aristotle (1958), (1998) as having been a pro-
democratic theorist, but that can only be done to the degree that the Philosopher was also 
making an anti-oligarchical argument. Any immoderate form (unchecked-by-aristocracy) 
of democracy, let alone of liberal (or commercial) democracy, would indeed still have to 
be condemned by any genuinely neo-Aristotelian theorist.
228 Especially, Machiavelli (1950: D 1.5, 121): “every republic was composed of nobles and 
people”.
229 Aristotle (1958: 1273a, 85).
230 Skultety (2009: 45, italics added, PT).
231 Skultety (2009: 62-63, italics added).
232 Machiavelli (1966).
233 Aristotle (1958: 1257a, 23; 1258b, 28).
234 Perhaps no longer as strongly as Aristotle, but Machiavelli (1950: D 2.10, 311; 1.34, 202) is 
still utterly dismissive of all those men who only try to become “exceedingly rich”—as 
he warns that their success will derive not from “gold, but good soldiers”.
235 Kinneging (1997: 226) mentions: “the first kind of corruption would be [that of the] ... 
nobleman who refuses to stand for public office because he aspires to acquire a fortune in 
trade.”
236 Arendt (2006: 175-180) clearly rejects this idea, that the Great Legislator should have to have 
been deified by ordinary citizens, and that the Legislator’s transcendental qualities 
somehow aided the people in their religious beliefs as well as their civic faith. However, 
as will be noted shortly, Machiavelli (1996), (1950: Discourses) did not so much ascribe 
transcendental as well as merely transcendent or metaphysical virtues to mortal, and 
extremely fallible men—such as Cleomenes or Numa. Arendt is, probably inadvertently, 
defending the latter’s ascriptions.
237 Machiavelli (1950: P 6, 20) or (1975: ch. 6).
238  Hans Freyer “Machiavelli und die Lehre vom Handeln”, Zeitschrift für Deutsche 
Kulturphilosophie, (109-137; esp. 112), sees this image of Machiavelli appear in the 
works of Fichte and Hegel.
239 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.2, 115).
240 Arendt (2006: 200-202).
241 Arendt (2006: 202-204; 178-179).
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242 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.9, 138) or (1996: 1.9).
243 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.9, 139-141).
244 Compare, in particular, Benner (2009: 415-417).
245 Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).
246 Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139).
247 Althusser (1999: 90-91) refers to passages in the Discourses (1.11; 1.12) to show that not 
Romulus but preeminently Numa ‘maintained a civilized society’ through ‘[an] 
absolutely necessary [support]’ system (that is, religious reverence).
248 Compare, for example, Althusser (1999: 94).
249 Also relevant may still be Guarini (1990), Maddox (1982) and Buttle (2001).
250 See, further, Benner (2009: esp. 416-417).
251 Especially, Schmitt (1985: 12). 
252 For two similar reviews of this exceptional decision, in Schmitt as well as in various other 
books on the notion of a state of emergency, see Kennedy (2011) and Dyzenhaus (2011).
253  Next to Rossiter, (1948), see Barros (2002), Buttle (2001) and McCormick (1998).
254 Machiavelli (1950: 1.34, 202-203).
255 Machiavelli (1950: 1.34-1.35, 201-206).
256 Benner (2009).
257 Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139).
258 Machiavelli (1950: 1.10, 141).
259 Beiner (2011: 30-33, n. 6; 59, n. 64). 
260 Beiner (2011: 21) refers to Machiavelli (1996: 211).
261 Machiavelli (1950: 1.12, 149-151).
262 Machiavelli (1950: 1.18, 170).
263 Although seemingly unaware of Machiavelli’s (1950: D ??? or 1996: 211) mentioning of Saint 
Francis, Hardt and Negri (2000: 413) add that Francis would have been a prototypical 
communist: he had placed “a joyous life, including all of being and nature, ... the poor 
and exploited, [in opposition to] ... corruption.”
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264 Machiavelli (1950: 1.6, 127).
265 Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139).
266 Compare, furthermore, Rossiter (1948) and the study of Roman constitutional dictatorship, by 
Nomi Claire Lazar, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, not further referenced, PT).
267 Gilbert Ryle, On Forgetting the Difference Between Right and Wrong. In Aristotle's Ethics: 
Issues and Interpretations, eds. James J. Walsh and Henry L. Shapiro (Wadsworth 
Publishing, 1967: 70-79, esp. 73, not further referenced).
268 Aristotle (1999: 6.2, 1139ab, 87).
269 See, furthermore, Robert P. George, “Kelsen and Aquinas on the Natural Law Doctrine.” In St. 
Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. John 
Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic, and Richard S. Meyers (The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2004: 237-259).
270 Kelsen (1967: 103), reprinted from What is Justice (Berkeley, 1960: 117-136).
271 Compare, Femia (2004: 53, n. 37, n. 35), Machiavelli (1996: 1.26; 1.30; 2.23), and Parel 
(1992). This author disagrees with aspects of Femia’s overall argument, which holds 
Machiavelli must have been a modern secularist. He might then have used “pagan 
imagery”, but he would overall neither have been making a pro-pagan religious nor a pro-
Christian argument, Femia (24-25) argues. From the point of view of Catholic 
Christendom, admittedly, the Florentinian Renaissance under Cosimo and Lorenzo De’ 
Medici must have seemed awefully heretic and pagan. But Parel (1992) argues, more 
correctly, that this was definitely not a secular Renaissance culture. Rather, paganism and 
alchemy were being actively integrated with Christian culture. And, as so many other 
commentators argue as well, Machiavelli’s point was thereby never to offend the 
Christian laws, however, but to charge only against the overly Christianized, overly 
doctrinal republican institutions. This must have been why he only seems to have 
attacked the Church of Rome’s hereditary papacy and the Church’s aggregate 
concentration of ecclesiastic, not of spiritual power. He does not attack individual popes, 
for instance, as some popes such as Æneas receive even great praise from Machiavelli 
(1966: 6.7, 305).
Moreover, the Florentine Secretary simply finds (hereditary) doctrinal institutions have 
been corrupted by self-contemplation, solipsism, and self-centeredness. To ‘arrest’ their 
cycles of corruption, he wants to take a neo-Aristotelian or a rather synthetic component 
out of Christian political theology. As Femia knows (35), the Florentine theorist cannot in 
good faith advocate any of these corrupting ideas about ‘the middle way’ or ‘the golden 
mean’ or ‘the essence’ because he instead believes that these ideas have led to the type of 
doctrinal sectarianism that divided Italy. These ideas were vulnerable to eschatological 
and synthetic-monistic philosophies. Both in the various human relations between and 
within those philosophies leaving it up to any sect, faction, city, or monastic order to 
explain what ‘the middle way’ might mean for themselves, political stability will be 
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difficult to accomplish. In Machiavelli’s texts’ unique way, and especially in the 
Discourses, therefore, he seeks to Christianize Römertum rather than to paganize 
Christendom. For example, to appropriate Femia’s (35) words, he thinks that the “Roman 
military chiefs” were right to rely on “favorable auguries” in convincing their troops to 
fight an important battle. But this examply merely means the chiefs and the augurs did 
not so much keep alive superstitions, as well as that they already understood the deeper 
meaning of what it means to practice a pre-Christian mysticism: their reliance on visible, 
material divine signs was not strictly utilitarian. This reliance on auguries was also about 
the invisible, spiritual, charismatic certitude they expected to spread among the common 
infantry. Consequentualism also had an ethical purpose, as Benner (2009) argued. And, 
for Machiavelli, as Anthony Parel has indeed shown, the Christian faith is in such 
anecdotes very much being represented by a kind of mysticism and spiritualism which, 
nonetheless, carried strongly cyclical or perennialist overtones: the religious and the 
political realms had always been inseparable, and had yet also remained separate. 
Christian mysticism would thus also, in some way, already have been practiced by the 
Romans before they could have understood its Catholic implications. The proper name 
for the Italian people’s main religious antecessors, for Rome’s atypical pagans, must then 
also not be ‘superstition’ but ‘spiritual dualism.’ For these reasons, against Femia, it 
would just be impossible to say that Machiavelli’s theory was fundamentally secularist or 
areligious.
272 Nijs (1910: 12-13).
273 Compare, for instance, Schattschneider (1960).
274 Skultety (2009), diZerega (2000).
275 Sterling (1958: 179-180) finds that Meinecke thought the national community to have 
remained eternally subjected to abstract metamorphoses, yet also to be politically 
manifesting itself in those concrete truths that are ‘relative according to time and place.’ 
Apparently, Meinecke sustains a qualitative void between the abstract and the concrete 
nature of the (German) nation-state.
276 Arendt (2006: 174).
277 Compare, for this instance, Petterson (1976) to Arendt (2006: 230-231).
278 George W. Bush, et al. petitioners v. Albert Gore, Jr. et al. 531 U.S. SC (2000), 00-949, Justice 
Stevens dissenting.
279Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. SC (2000), Justice Ginsberg dissenting
280 Honig (2009: 135).
281 Honig (2009: 107-108).
282 Honig (2009: 134-137).
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283 Jim Guinness, “Thom Hartmann on Voting Fraud And the Right-Wing Attack On the Middle 
Class.” The Sun (June 2005: 4-13). Note, however, that the Supreme Court decision to 
award the Bush team its victory was not so much an attack on as that it formed a defense 
of (liberal) middle-class values—against the legislative power of the people, as a pluralist 
whole.
284 Dyzenhaus (2011).
285 Kennedy (2011: 544).
286 Comparative politics scholars, including Hansen (2010), have long known that the various 
state judiciaries (were) historically developed as one among the executive departments.
287 Dyzenhaus (1997), (2011), Kelsen (1967b), (1960).
288 This appears to be part of a Kelsenian fallacy in Dyzenhaus (1997), who situates Schmitt on 
the decisionist end and Kelsen on the normative end of his straight line, while pinning 
down the mean in some passages by Heller.
289 Dyzenhaus (2011: 69-78).
290 Kennedy (2011: 545), applauding Negri (1999).
291 Bobbio refers mostly to Kelsen (1967b), in: Norberto Bobbio and Maurizio Viroli. The Idea of 
the Republic. (Cambridge: Polity, 2003: 24).
292 Honig (24; 85).
293 Kennedy (2011: 546).
294 Paulson (1998: 25).
295 Cristi (1993: 292).
296 As an additional note, the fact that the 2000 elections could become so politicized evinces that 
constitutionalist analysts would be mistaken to ignore classic rhetorical figures such as 
the coincidence of opposites. The relation between opposing powers, between 
functionally contrary modes of authority, as well as the relation between necessity and 
freedom became only more intense because this latter figure was misunderstood, 
especially by the mass media. Also, this case evinces that the direct relationship between 
two opposing powers—namely the U.S. electorates/presidential candidates, which is 
represented in the Congress/Presidency relation—was too often portrayed as a 
relationship that could simply be terminated by a third and self-professedly neutral 
power. With the aid of the media, it only took five persons who needed to show the world 
they possessed not so much the legitimate authority to decide the case, as well as that 
they were holding the final power of adjudication to do so; a remarkably deeply 
illegitimate shift from authority towards power, as any Arendtian realist must 
acknowledge.
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297 Manin (1997).
298 Rousseau (1968), (1990), (1979) agrees least to this point in his Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality.
299 Rousseau (1968: 3.4, 113).
300 Rousseau (1968: 2.6, 83).
301 Rousseau (1968: 3.4, 113; 3.5, 114-115).
302 Rousseau (1968: 2.7, 87; 3.6, 117) argues the Great Legislator employs “neither force nor 
argument,
[but should be believed to] ... have recourse to another order, one which can compel without 
violence and persuade without convincing.” This ‘other order’ is probably the natural law 
that governs the people as a whole. Compare the Legislator, however, also to the 
exceptionally skilled monarch who can be “making everything move, while he himself 
seems motionless.”
303 For a useful interpretation of a very similar Rousseauan paradox, see Honig (2007).
304 Todorov (2001: 56, italics added, PT).
305 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58, 262-263).
306 Honig (2007).
307 Rousseau (1979).
308 Todorov (2001: 58; 31-35).
309 Rousseau (1968 : 4.4, 159; 158).
310 Rousseau (1968: 4.5, 169).
311 Rousseau (1968: 4.5, 168).
312 Rousseau (1968: 2.3, 72; 3.1, 103).
313 Rousseau (1968: 3.1, 102-103) does not strictly define government as rule by a prince, but 
rather as a system in which independent kings or special magistrates “can limit, modify, 
and resume [their own power] at pleasure”.
314 Rousseau (1968: 3.5, 116).
315 Rousseau (1968: 3.15, 141).
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316 Rousseau (1968: 3.15, 143).
317 Rousseau (1968: 3.18, 147).
318 Rousseau (1968: 3.18, 146; 3.7, 123) supposes also that in actual practice, all constitutional 
governments are mixed forms, somehow integrating their “mutually dependent” parts—
as “no government of a simple form exists.”
319 Compare, further, Rousseau (1979), (1968: 3.11).
320 Casarino and Negri (2008b), like Rousseau, discern a dual relationship between ‘singularities’ 
and ‘the commons.’ Unlike him, however, they seem to award full primacy to the latter.
321 Walker (1993: 62) speaks specifically of Hobbes and Machiavelli in this context, but it may be 
doubted whether Machiavelli did in fact, as Walker argues here, concern himself only 
“with the very possibility of establishing particularistic communities at all”. Certainly, as 
Nederman (1999) and Parel (1992), each in their own ways, have  suggested: Machiavelli 
did see somewhat similar oscillations as that Hobbes would later come to see occurring in 
the ambivalent space between heavens and earth (Hobbes, of course, rationalizes this 
space rather than that he completely universalizes it). But even this similarity does not yet 
also warrant the validity of Walker’s Hegelian idiom, which would rather allow (such) 
philosophers to retroactively see transcendental moments in between ‘universality’ and 
‘particularity.’
322 This paragraph was in part inspired by Spector (2004).
323 Rousseau (1968: 3.15, 143).
324 Iklé (1991).
325 Machiavelli (1950, Discourses 1.35, 205).
326 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.2). Benner (2009: 408-417; esp. 416; 195) infers Lycurgus was here 
presented, by Machiavelli, as having been far from a perfect legislator, yet his “standards 
of self-legislative virtù” still generally appeared worthy of imitation. Or, what 
Machiavelli learns from Sparta’s laws and orders is that all “human beings can ... regulate 
themselves”, and thus also that they can regulate their “bad humors” or moderate their 
“appetites and passions”. They do not need any intermediary Ephors to do this for them, 
hence.
327 Arendt (2006), (1993), usually references Th. Mommsen to make this point.
328 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.9, 140-141; 1.6, 126; 2.3, 288-290), Benner (2009: 413).
329 Machiavelli (1950: 1.9, 139-141).
330 Benner (2009: 60).
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331 In the secondary literature, consider Wilson (2008), Althusser (1972), and possibly Franklin 
(1973) for Bodin’s neo-Aristotelian constitutionalist vintage.
332 Aristotle (1958: bk. 4, chs. 4-6, 1291a1-1293a11, pp. 162-172).
333 Aristotle (1958: 4.5.9, 172).
334 Aristotle (1958: 4.5.1-4.5.2, 169-170).
335 Aristotle (1958: 4.6.2-4.6.4, 171).
336 Aristotle (1958: 4.6.5, 171). See, further, Manin (1997).
337 This author consulted on this point of a constitutional tension, mainly, Bock (1990), Femia 
(2004), Pocock (1975), Skinner (2002), Sternberger (1975), and Strauss (1958).
338 Benner (2009: 260-261).
339 For instance, Machiavelli (1996: 1.60) clearly prioritizes the many, not the few, as he (in one 
of his typical rhetorical twists) lends his support to ancient Rome’s admitting “all its 
citizens to [the] dignity [of the consulate] without distinction of age or birth; ... merit was 
[Rome’s] only consideration”.
340 Benner (2009: 262), referencing Machiavelli (1996: 2.26, 398-99; esp. 3.22, 478).
341 Montesquieu (2000: 3.2, 22) finds that democracy, as it did even in England, always reverts to 
factionalism.
342 Benner (2009: 350; 344).
343 Montesquieu (2000: 2.8, 54; 52-53) seems to offer a poor exception, for he does not argue that 
aristocratic republics must be called oligarchies once they tolerate “tyrannical 
magistracies”. Instead, they will then have become closer to allowing a “censorship in 
democracy.” As for his note that aristocracies should “prohibit nobles from engaging in 
commerce” (arguably, in order to not revert into oligarchies), it must be added that he 
deems this prohibition a means to the end of diminishing any possible socio-economic 
inequalities between a wealthy merchant-based government, and all of the other classes. 
Aristocracies must not “set up all sorts of monopolies.”
344 Hobbes (1994).
345 As was the common practice in Medici Florence.
346 Montesquieu (2000: 2.2-2.3; 10-15).
347 Montesquieu’s (2000) suggestion that ancient Rome’s constitution suffered from too much 
electoral secrecy finds little support in Husband (1916), and carries no support from 
Ferrero and Barbagallo (1964), for instance.
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348 Montesquieu (2000: 2.2-2.3; 10-15).
349 Aristotle (1958: 7.2, 1325a17, 286).
350 Aristotle (1998: 1304a38, 189).
351 Aristotle (1998: 1267a37, 60).
352 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.9, 139-141).
353 Machiavelli (1950: P ch. 10, 40)
354 Benner (2009: 443).
355 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.55, 252-253).
356 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58; 1.50).
357 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58, 260; 262).
358 Notice that Machiavelli (1950: D 1.58, 261) warns, in this context, against the oppressive 
power of Rome’s Decemvirs—and definitely not the Senators or the Consuls.
359 Machiavelli (1950: 1.55, 257).
360 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58, 262-263).
361 In detecting Hamilton’s liberal affiliation, with Montesquieu, thus, consider Kenyon (1958).
362 Montesquieu (2000: 8.5, 115): “Extreme corruption occurs when nobility becomes hereditary 
[of offices]; the nobles can scarcely remain moderate.” This is not refuted in Machiavelli 
(1996: 2.2, 129; 2.19, 172), who instead argues that republics should only become 
territorially hereditary in the sense that they should be expected to expand themselves 
across space—not that they should allow a few nobles to expand their power through the 
offices they hold across time.
363 Compare, especially, Benner (2009: 180-184) on this analogy of constitutional revolutions to 
metaphysical purgatory.
364 Montesquieu (2000: 2.2, 13; 2.3, 15) mentions that selection “by lot is in the nature of 
democracy; voting by choice is in the nature of aristocracy” (the aristocratic method 
would be less “odious”).
365 Gramsci (1998: 144).
366 Aristotle (1998: 1304a38, 189).
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367 Skultety (2009), rightly, demonstrates that Politics maintains why even in the ideal or in the 
most excellent constitutional state, agonistic relations between the (two) elements should 
persist.
368 This seems consistent with Mearsheimer (2001).
369 Thomas Lindemann, “Peace Through Recognition: An Interactionist Approach of International 
Crises.” International Political Sociology 5 (1), 2010, 68-86, takes such a social 
constructivist approach. By not focusing on those interactions between one aggressor 
state and only one other aggressor state, but by introducing several third powers to his 
equation, he can easily identify intersubjective events involving feelings of humiliation, 
losing face, symbolic emasculation, and of non-recognition. After all, he assumes there 
are few secrets in the relations between two warring states—and that all their symbolic 
actions, in his analysis, are open to public assessment. But in analyzing inter-state 
recognitions as if they are a completely public-symbolic process, he must thereto bypass, 
as his realist critics will point out, the equally important dimension of objectively 
differential constellations of private interests and especially also of power—and, hence, 
of qualitative power differences, such as all those differences politically impacted by 
economic sanctions, terrorism, regional arms races, actual assassination plots, and so on.
370 Montesquieu (2000: 3.3, 22) finds that states in which the democratic element has become the 
dominant element, in whichever way, also tend to be states in which “the laws have 
ceased to be executed.” Democratic organizations are unlikely to moderate themselves, as 
they lack political virtue, and these states will have been “lost” before people know it. 
371 Montesquieu (2000: 6.5, 77-78).
372 Montesquieu (2000: 5.17, 67).
373 Montesquieu (2000: 18.31, 307).
374 Montesquieu (2000: 6.5, 77-78).
375 The question of who judges the judges is according to Hannah Arendt as well as according to 
Slow Food’s Carlo Petrini a matter of mere politics and more irony, of mere convention 
as well as of more laughter and even of more contempt. In redefining the freedom to 
judge the difference between ‘pleasures and displeasures’, these two theorists have 
subsumed conventional measures of judgment to a more humane criterion, as they 
commended taking pleasure in practicing ‘civic virtues’ (including conviviality). Thus, 
Honig (2009: 57-64) rightly mentions the Slow Food movement as having ridiculed the 
conventional presupposition the main judges of taste should be transnational corporate 
agribusinesses.
376 Compare, further, Honig (2009: 21-26) to McCormick (1997) and especially to Benhabib 
(2004), (2009).
377 Honig (2009: 121-122, italics removed by this author), citing Seyla Benhabib, Another 
Cosmopolitanism (Oxford University Press, 2008: 35; 18).
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378 Capra (1997). For the political and social contexts in which this concept of a self-organizing 
system may be used, compare Kessler (2009b) to Walby (2007), on the complex nature of 
social systems.
379 Wohlforth et al. (2007).
380 Compare, also, Held et al. (1999) to Buzan and Little (2000). 
381 Whereas Osiander (2009) rightly finds the Industrial Revolution to have played a constitutive 
role in the (corporate) expansion of the current system, Jackson (2007), (2000), remains 
strangely convinced that the system derives mostly from so-called ‘Westphalian’ 
practices from the seventeenth century. Consider, furthermore, Maitland (2003) for an 
account that influenced nineteenth-century legal theories, and that was used to justify 
corporate immunities. 
382 Vagts (2003), Coleman (2003).
383 Any primer on this problem of sovereignty’s misrecognition of corporate enterprises should 
include Janis (1987), and Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping.
384 John Martin Gillroy, Breena Holland, and Celia Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law and 
Policy Design: Understanding the Use of of Principle and Argument in Environmental 
and Natural Resource Law, (Thomson/West, 2008: 223; 245; 277; 233).
385 Conal Condren, “‘Natura Naturans’: Natural Law and the Sovereign in the Writings of 
Thomas Hobbes.” In Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty: Moral Right and State 
Authority in Early Modern Political Thought (Palgrave MacMillan, 2002: 61-73). Note 
that Condren finds Hobbes’s notes on the civil law to remain confused on the issue of 
finding a proper relationship between philosophy and politics, or also between Cicero’s 
“honestas and utilitas”. Yet, Condren rightly addresses this confusion by pointing to the 
vital contrariness between respectively the divine (deontic?) revelation of “certain natural 
laws” or of “capacities for self-recognition” and the “human propensities”—which are far 
more utiliarian (69).
386 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 274-275).
387 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage: 1992).
388 Vatter (2000: 210-211) 
389 See, particularly, Vatter (2000: 221-235).
390 Lock (2003).
391 Althusser (1999).
392 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 136-137), citing from Giovanni Pontano, De Principe.
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393 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 147).
394 Continue to see Benner (2009).
395 Femia (2004: 47-48, n. 11), in part citing Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and Power: On the 
Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli (University of Minnesota Press, 1993: 79-
80).
396 Femia (2004: 57).
397 Balakrishnan (2005) elegantly picks up a similar strand, of methodologically aleatory non-
dualism, from Althusser (1999).
398 Consider, here, Femia (2004: 30-32) on the issue of how a statesperson should not try to serve 
as “intermediary between God and man” (as a Pontano would have believed he should be 
doing, alternatively). See, further, Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 137; 145), who further suggests 
that Machiavelli’s statesman tries to serve as a ‘true’ (a ‘manly’) man, which is clearly far 
above the animals (another position that would run contrary to Pontano). But regardless 
as to whether Femia or Skinner is correct, neither theorist thinks about a third possibility 
(which might have been far more consistent with Pontano’s, however), namely that the 
statesman is embedded in a duality. He should be expected to act as himself; neither as a 
god nor as an animal, thus, but as a humanist—as he may still be erring (as the dices roll) 
on both sides of that equation.
399 Arendt (1970: 44).
400 Thus, Arendt (1965), (2003) finds that low-ranking and mid-level Nazi SS-officers were 
(deliberately) deluding themselves when they said that their powers had been held only 
by their superiors, such as Hitler himself (the ‘order-is-order’ excuse). Because they had 
not been willing to understand the relational, concerted, and harsh nature of their own 
power, their actions seemed later extremely banal and uncommonsensical 
(“thoughtless”).
401 Machiavelli (1950: eps. 3.9, 441-443), Benner (2009: 178-179; 363). In general, it should be 
added that Louis Althusser concludes in Machiavelli and Us that the populational power 
of the militia should rank above the executive power of the infantry, but this conclusion is 
poorly corroborated (especially since Althusser ignores The Art of War). It is more likely, 
in following with Althusser’s own method, actually, that a void remains and that 
Machiavelli had no ultimate preference for either good arms (the infantry, artillery, 
bulwarks, and so on) or good laws (which includes the trust soldiers will have in their 
captains, the issue of the militia and their discipline, the provisions and storage facilities 
in the cities, and so forth).
402 Machiavelli (1950: 3.21, 473-474). 
403 Machiavelli (1950: 3.21, 474-475).
404 Femia (2004: 53).
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405 Femia (2004: 56), citing the beautifully-phrased formulation (of how Machiavelli made use of 
contrary tropes) by J. Hawkins.
406 Compare, especially, Benner (2009: 197-201), suggesting that the model statesperson who has 
been acting like a lion will have to come to shift course in order to avoid being perceived 
as excessively lionesque, which depends of course on the circumstances. The lion should 
know how to begin to act as a fox, by implication. This is the person who understands 
both types of action: both “force” and “cunning”; or, again, both being feared (by 
“wolves”) and making herself likeable (by avoiding “snares”).
407 Machiavelli (1950: P 14, 54-55; P 16, 59).
408 Rousseau (1979: 123; 127), “Eight Walk”. 
409 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.58, 262-263).
410 Consult, for example, Maddox (1982) for this use of ‘constitution’ or of state constitution as 
an on-going organization of specific powers (as contrasted to as a basic legal document).
411 Cicero (1999: 6.1, 92; 6.26, 101-102).
412 Machiavelli (1950: D 2.23, 359).
413 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58, 262-263).
414 Benner (2009: 396-397), citing also Machiavelli (1996: 1.11).
415 Naess (1989: 184-185).
416 Nicholas de Cusa (orig. 1463), De Ludo Globi. See, for this interpretation, Pauline Moffitt 
Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus: A Fifteenth-Century Vision of Man (Leiden; E. J. Brill, 1982, 
not further referenced).
417 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396), Benner (2009: 202-203). “[J]ustice and license”, like moderation 
and corruption, are here considered “venerable customs” precisely because they are not
being separated by a third ‘golden mean’—and because they somehow simply co-exist. 
Femia (2004: 32, italics added) continues to say that, on the one hand, most Renaissance 
humanists looked up at Rome in order “to extract exampla of good and evil, effective and 
ineffective conduct. Machiavelli, on the other hand, wanted to draw only pragmatic, not 
distinctively moral, lessons from the ancient [Romans].” This is possible, this author 
thinks that Machiavelli (1996: 1.1, 7) is trying to argue, by not breaking with the classic 
Aristotelian dualities—but only by breaking with the neo-Aristotelian or theological 
ambition to find the essence that can somehow dichotomize these classic dualities by 
separating good from evil, for instance, or virtuosity from ineffectiveness. As Femia (83) 
himself adds, “he rejects the premise that there exists some distinctive [third] human 
‘essence’.”
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418 Fortuna is, in so many ways, one of the rehetorical representations Machiavelli (1975: ch. 25), 
(1950: P 25, 94) uses to help readers make sense of historical tensions between 
predetermination and freedom. She is believed part of Creation, yet she is not
representative of God’s will because she may and should be freely opposed. Hence, the 
key passage in The Prince finds fault with all those who come up with “a thousand 
excuses” so not to have to oppose her.
419 Arendt (1951), (1970: 81), (2006: 146-147) finds that individualism or relativism, or the
absence of authority, rather, has found its most banal historical representation in the 
mindset of a Robespierre as well as of a Stalin. Under their rulerships, no one in 
particular would be believed to be in authority. These were tyrannies “without a tyrant”.
420 Especially, Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University Press, 1991: 14-
16).
421 With ‘no one’, this author means to say the general U.S. population, with many exceptions 
possible. Some certain exceptions to be made are for all the dissidents that would range 
from Noam Chomsky to Daniel Elsberg and also to the Black Panthers, SDS (Students 
for a Democratic Society), and the so-called Weather Underground (when seen as 
offspring of SDS).
422 See, especially, Bello (2009) for an attack on the neoliberal expert-mindset that continues to be 
responsible for the failures of the ‘green’ revolution. Krepinevich (1986) helps describe 
how during the Vietnam War the U.S. military remained in the grasp of its own expert-
driven, self-enclosed, seemingly neutral mindset—by simply not taking the Vietnamese 
culture and land into account. See, further,  Latham (2011: 133-142; 109-119).
423 Arendt (1970: 73; 78).
424 In althus using the word ‘neoliberalism’, this author depends for its theoretical connotations on 
Honig (2009), Brown (2006), Connolly (2008), and De Waal (1997).
425 Machiavelli’s (1975: ch. 24), (1950: P 24, 89), treatment of river embankment projects 
receives (more) serious attention from Parel (1992) and Masters (1996). 
426 Close readers of Meinecke (1957) may disagree that this is the image he actually spreads of 
Machiavelli, yet only his great historical personality-theme seems to have survived in the 
literature.
427 Breiner (2008) surpasses both Parent (2005) and Geerken (1999) in terms of explicatory force, 
however.
428 Janara (2006).
429 Machiavelli (1975: ch. 23). On this definition of concerted power, see Arendt (1970).
430 Machiavelli (1975: ch. 24), (1950: P 24, 91).
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431 Machiavelli (1950: P 25, 91).
432 Machiavelli (1950: P 25, 92-93).
433 Machiavelli (1966: 4.1, 163) adds: “fortune is always more favorable to assailants than to such 
as [whom] merely act on the defensive”.
434 Pascal (1995).
435 Machiavelli (1950: P 24, 89-90).
436 For instance, Max Lerner, “Introduction”, in Machiavelli (1950: xxv-xlvi). Lerner here 
(falsely) confuses humanism with modernism.
437 Machiavelli (1950: D 1, 103).
438 Machiavelli (1950: D 3.41, 528).
439 Capra (1996: 169).
440 Benner (2009: 17, n. 9) adds that the Medici family held no hereditary title until 1531, so 
Machiavelli could only have known the Medici men he writes about as ‘first citizens’ (as 
G. Julius Caesar had been).
441 Note that Machiavelli (1950: Discourses, book 1, chapter 12, 151) faults not the Christian 
religion itself for Italy’s decline, but “the Church of Rome” for having destroyed her 
piety.
442 Machiavelli (1966: book 8, chapter 7, 407).
443 The classic reference remains Coby (1999).
444 This remains a puzzle, even according to Althusser (1999), as he immediately announces he 
will not be able to solve it—but just will have to inject Antonio Gramsci’ image of the 
Modern Prince (which Althusser believes akin to the modern nation-state) into the 
original body of texts.
445 Benner (2009: 268-269, italics removed from original, PT) identifies four pillars of republican 
freedom, mostly in the Discourses. These pillars are those of the assemblies (concioni) 
and the public courts, at the organizational level, and the “uninhibited” discussion about 
“the fitness of candidates for high public office” as well as the opening up of all possible 
social modalities through which the “seeking [of] reputation through holding public 
office” is taking place, both at the structural level. The first two, organizational-level, 
pillars seem more critical than the latter, because Machiavelli is also notoriously skeptical 
of any praising, rewarding, and honoring of individuals—and not just of those who may 
not have earned it, as that process could always again begin to foster “gossip”—as 
especially the Florentine Histories clarify. Machiavelli (1966: 8.4, 386; 8.4, 379-383). 
The line between open discussion and gossipy distortion is so thinly-drawn, in other 
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words, that it seems ultimately more safer and more critical to rely on the organizational 
guarantees; and more on courts and assemblies open to all citizens (including Lorenzo) 
equally, rather than on allowing the fallibility of human nature to enter the broader 
structure of reputation-awarding and reputation-seeking.
446 Benner (2009: 495), Machiavelli (1950: P 26, 98).
447 Benner (2009: 150) clearly emphasizes the importance Machiavelli’s political realism attaches 
to the notion of prudence: “prudent agents should take the ordinary and natural ... 
constraints that confront them every day as seriously as necessities that arise in extremis.” 
But, without good reason, she does not seem to want to differentiate, at least not at this 
point, between prudence in confronting the ordinary and the necessitous, first, and in 
meeting the extraordinary and the unprecedented, second. Yet, the first kind of 
confrontation is far less about cautionary prudence than it is about a responsible, 
judicious organizations. It appears Machiavelli himself was aware of the difference, as he 
typically uses “prudence” to describe only the second kind of meeting. Moreover, he 
much more often uses it in the meaning of a personal virtue (as discretionary virtue) than 
of an organizational value  (normatively). Prudent people outstrip any material 
organization in terms of their political importance, including having a filled war chest. 
See, for only a few examples, Machiavelli (1966: 6.2, 271), (1950: 2.27, 375; 2.10, 310-
311), and Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 154, n. 222).
448 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 63-65) mentions that Brunetto Latini “adopts the Senecan classification” 
in which prudence comes first, and is closely-followed by ‘temperance and fortitude 
rather than ... justice’ (citing Latini). This author is not familiar with Latini’s possible 
connection to Machiavelli.
449 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 155) regularly elucidates why, at least for Machiavelli, justice could not 
have been a necessary component of prudence. Injustice may also form a necessary 
“touchstone”, rather, in terms of committing oneself to prudent (or “courageous” or 
“temperate”) actions.
450 Benner (2009: 268).
451 Benner (2009: 268-269).
452 Benner (2009: 202).
453 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 207; 211).
454 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: esp. 63-67).
455 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 154).
456 Compare, here, how extensively Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 155) cites the passage in Machiavelli 
(1950: 3.41, 528). 
457 Skinner (2002, vol. 2: 211-212).
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458 For his overview of systems theory, start with Capra (1996: 86-89; 168-172).
459 Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).
460 Donaldson (1988).
461 Nye (2011). 
462 Dowdall (1923: 101-102; 111).
463 Strauss (1958).
464 Especially, Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 393; 400).
465 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 406).
466 Machiavelli (1966: 8.4, 386).
467 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 407).
468 Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).
469 Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).
470 Machiavelli (1966: 318; 316) corresponds Florence’s “authority” to Cosimo de’ Medici’s 
confidence, for example, as well as to Cosimo’s government, which would have been 
strenghtened by “civil discord”.
471 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 406).
472 Machiavelli (1966: 8.4, 386).
473 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 407).
474 Government leaders are, of course, suspected of being oligarchs whereas commoners would be 
more likely to be absent democrats. In other words, the former pursue too often private 
glory whereas the latter may at sudden moments begin to influence the public realm. 
Compare, for instance, Machiavelli (1966: 8.4, 379; 386) for his fascinating overview of 
how the common Florentines performed various necessary checks, publically, on their 
leaders and basically helped purge their ranks—as these suspected oligarch had probably 
solely been pursuing their private interests.
475 Machiavelli (1966: 405-407) concludes the Florentine Histories with a few remarks perfectly 
congruent with his systems theory, or with his notion of republican alchemy as well. His 
premise is that if the sum of the elements is lesser than the whole, then one element 
cannot be taken out of the equation unless the whole must begin to suffer a tragic fate. 
Or, after Lorenzo de’ Medici had died, the Florentine element is taken out of the system 
as a whole. Now Italy lost a treshold which had previously immunized it against bad 
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fortune: while the Medicis were previously still displaying their prudence and authority, 
the system as a whole had at least represented more than the sum of its parts. After all, 
Lorenzo’s object had been “to keep the City [of Florence] abundantly supplied, the 
people united, and the nobility honored.” This was also why “his reputation for prudence 
[had] constantly increased.” After his death, however, “evil plants began to germinate, 
which in little time ruined Italy”. Florence’s corruption was the seed for the irregularities 
that followed, and thus also for the destabilizing changes throughout the system as a 
whole, as it were. For a beautifully written overview of Machiavelli’s notion of 
constitutional-systemic alchemy, see Parel (1992).
476 Coby (1999), Parel (2000). But note also that since Althusser (1999) does not read the 
Florentine Histories, he may have been wrong at this point to refer to the Italian people 
as a whole as a nation. It is unlikely Machiavelli perceived the various peninsular 
statelets as one nation; he was not a nationalist but much rather optimistic about the 
possibilities to rely again on the ancient Roman Law structures. He was a classicist 
before he was a nationalist, thus.
477 See, particularly, Guarini (1990).
478 Machiavelli (1950: P 26, 97; D 1.55, 256).
479 For instance, Machiavelli (1966: 1.5, 27; 30) early on mentions that “those who supported the 
church [took] ... the name Guelphs, while the followers of the emperor were called 
Ghibellines”. But he gradually stops referencing these names, and soon faults specifically 
local clans such as “the Colonnesi and the Orsini, who with their arms, and the proximity 
of their abode [to Rome], kept the pontificate weak.” Also, the popes are time and again 
shown to make the mistake of siding with either one of the two clans, raising the other 
clan to create ‘unholy alliances’ against them.
480 Free interpretation of Garver (1987: 144).
481 On the importance of structural civil discord, see Bock (1990). Compare, also, Buttle (2001). 
See Sellers (1994) for Rome’s influence on the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
482 For instance, Machiavelli (1966: 5.6, 247) sees the City’s holding on to both cavalry as well as 
infantry (to a self-moderating constitutional code, or a military code of conduct, in other 
words) as a cause for the final defeat of an officer (by the name of Piccinino) who had 
plundered and destroyed “everything to within three miles of Florence.”
483 Althusser (1999) still provides the most detailed study of this dialectical tension.
484 Compare, especially, Machiavelli (1966: 4.1, 158; 4.6, 190-191).
485 Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).
486 Machiavelli (1950: 1.11, 147).
1052
                                                                                                                                                
487 The coincidence of good arms and good laws provides a central theme to The Prince. 
According to Benner (2009: 200), Machiavelli (1975), (1996: 1.3) found that “[l]aws 
need to be backed by force”, and; “He does not explicitly give primacy to forza or to law, 
but says that the use of one without the other non è durabile.”
488 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 400).
489 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 401).
490 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 401-402).
491 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 405).
492 See, further, Pezzolo (2005).
493 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 407).
494 Beiner (2011: 21) blocks the view Machiavelli himself must have seen, alternatively, of Saint 
Francis as having followed ‘the negative way’ of denying human dependencies on 
material goods—and of thus spiritually accepting life, and all its dimensions of suffering. 
Uždavinys (2004) may help clarify how the ‘negative way’ follows the neo-Platonist 
dialectical method.
495 This is consistent with Machiavelli’s (1966: 3.5, 140-141) earlier dismissal of city-states 
governed by “frequent new laws and new regulations, [as they are prone to end up being] 
... put in execution to the injury of those opposed to the [most influential government] ... 
faction.”
496 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396). Benner (2009: 202-203) translates this passage, from the Italian, 
as follows: the Genoese commune of San Giorgio made anyone who had ‘taken over the 
state’ promise or otherwise: ‘swear to observe its laws, which have not been altered up to 
these times, because San Giorgio has arms, money, and government, and one cannot alter 
the laws without danger of a certain and dangerous rebellion. An example, truly rare, 
never found by the philosophers in “all the republics” they have imagined and seen; to 
see within the same circle, among the same citizens, liberty and tyranny, civil life and 
corrupt life, justice and license, because that order alone keeps the city full of its ancient 
and venerable customs’.
497 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396).
498 Plato (1996: 603cd, 294).
499 Arendt (1990).
500 Franklin (2011: esp. 3-5) cites here Plato’s Statesman (262ac, 263ab).
On the premise that Machiavelli’s prescriptive treatment of the Order of San Giorgio reflects his 
neo-Platonist methodology, this would mean that there is no fit between tyranny and 
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freedom. Tyrants may be violent, and republics may be free, but these two different kinds 
of actors are nonetheless paritable parts within one naturally-virtuous constitution. That 
premise can thus also be used to undercut Benner’s (2009: 200) positivist priority of law 
over force: although “[l]aws need to be backed by force”, according to Erika Benner, 
dictates of violence are also to be subordinated to measures of lawfulness. It is unclear 
where and when Machiavelli so strongly views these two measures as of the same kind, 
rather than as of two different kinds but as equal parts.
501 Benner (2009: 203).
502 Machiavelli (1966: 5.2, 212-214).
503 Franklin (2011: 11-13).
504 Continue to see Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396), Benner (2009: 202-203).
505 The idea of the body politick remains relevant to contemporary political theory because
various activist groups, ranging from “Free Speech for People” (which had started 
receiving more publicity by 2010) to FaceBook’s list “Abolish Corporate Personhood”, 
have sought to sharpen the juridical distinction between natural persons and artificially 
incorporated business enterprises, possibly by amending the U.S. Constitution. Corporate 
enterprises would have positioned themselves outside the law. For one study of the legal 
immunities which international food corporations have come to enjoy, consider Brady 
(2008).
506 Machiavelli (1950: P ch. 18).
507 Machiavelli (1950: D bk. 2), Benner (2009: esp. 457).
508 Forsythe (2005) writes remarkably little about, but at least confirms this aspect of Roman 
religiosity.
509 Stark (2006).
510 Particularly, Machiavelli (1950: Discourses 1.58, 265-266).
511 Machiavelli (1950: 3.29, 495; 1.57, 258; 1.58, 260).
512 Canning (1987) and Peterman (1957).
513 Malmendier (2005: 32-33) additionally mentions that those ‘companies’ of the first-named, 
restorative type were named the opera publica et sarta tecta. This name may be of further 
interest to political theorists because the addition ‘sarta tecta’ (meaning “processes of 
renovation, [or] literally ‘roof-mending’”) indicates this first grouping had not been 
servicing public architecture alone: their primary business practice must have been to 
maintain all sorts of architectonic structures. This is of interest because they were then 
not only semi-independent contractors or leaseholders, with certain legal ‘rights’ and with 
sufficiently strong ties to government officials who were respecting these ‘rights.’ They 
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were apparently also responsible for a vital part of the economy, or for a civil society and 
its logistics. By contrast, the earliest companies of mercenaries would not have had the 
same kind of status. Again, because the total sum of ‘roof-menders’ and ‘grazing lessees’ 
and ‘tax-collectors’ (and so on) must have had an appreciated public function within 
Roman society, greater than the separate functions of their own individual companies, 
specifically the societates publicanorum system they thus developed must be sharply 
distinguished from those rule-and-enforcement cycles maintained by mercenaries, or 
buccaneers, or bandits.
514 For this instance, Malmendier (2005: 38; 364-365) refers to, among other texts, Polybius 
(6.17) and Cicero’s Pro Lege Manila (2.6). She also cites from Reinhard Zimmermann, 
The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford, 1996: 
468).
515 Kinneging (1997: 147).
516 Kinneging (1997: 144).
517 Kinneging (1997: 153).
518 Machiavelli (1950: 3.29, 495; 1.57, 258; 1.58, 260).
519 Machiavelli (1950: P 18, 65).
520 See Machiavelli (1950: P 18, 63-66).
521 Femia (2004: 104), referencing Pareto’s The Mind and Society (par. 2410).
522 Machiavelli (1950: P 18, 65).
523 Machiavelli (1950: P 18, 64).
524 Benner (2009: 198-200).
525 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 407).
526 Parel (1992), (2000).
527 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396), Benner (2009: 202-203).
528 Machiavelli (1966: 6.7, 302-305; 308).
529 Machiavelli (1966: 8.7, 407).
530 Machiavelli (1950: D 1.56, 258).
531 Benner (2009: 183).
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532 First, Gramsci (1998) and Meinecke (1957) and, second, Schmitt (1926) and Kalyvas (2000).
533 Machiavelli (1966: 2.1, 46-47).
534 Machiavelli (1950: P 25, 91).
535 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58, 262-263).
536 Benner (2009: 171-172) establishes that Machiavelli does not simply treat Fortuna “as a 
synonym for good or bad luck”, nor can she give up her restistance to human mastery. 
Fortuna is a nominal rather than a substantive entity, and she must thus be understood as 
a superstition, however false, that cannot be erased. Responsible or ‘truly’ pious people 
would not accept Fortuna’s meddling in their affairs, but they also cannot completely 
prevent her from doing so. Benner: “responsible agents try to explain their [changing] 
conditions in terms of [sensorily] identifiable actions and reactions, especially their own, 
reserving [the name] ‘fortune’ for whatever small remainder they consider to have been 
extremely difficult to foresee or to influence.” Also: “If free will were eliminated as a 
causal force, this would not only spare human beings their share of responsibility for 
hardships and evils. It would also render them unworthy of praise”. That is, Fortuna 
constantly threatens to severe the relation between ingenuity and praise, between virtú 
and honor, but it is within the power of free will to maintain a healthy and productive 
relation instead. 
537 Machiavelli (1950: P 13, 52).
538 See, especially, Machiavelli (1966: 6.7, 305). The pope did not organize a crusade, not 
because he himself lacked the funds, Machiavelli seems to suggest, but because the 
crusaders would have had to extract an additional form of tribute or usufruct from the 
Italian people. Renaissance knights would have been expected to contribute financially 
to, in return for, the Pontiff’s honoring them with the privilege of participating in a ‘holy 
war.’ But note that this exchange was part of a cultural context involving complex 
relationships between suzerains and sovereigns: a context alien to the modern state, in 
which virtually all taxes are administered by a central bureaucracy instead.
539 Compare, again, Benner (2009: 202-203).
540 Machiavelli (1966: 8.4, 383).
541 Machiavelli (1966: 8.4, 379-380).
542 Machiavelli (1950: 1.58, 262-263).
543 This author accessed for this reference, in 2008, Cary Nederman’s entry “Niccolò 
Machiavelli,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli.
544 For a useful interpretation of the vital importance of the heavens, distinct from Fortuna, see 
Parel (1992).
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545 Benner (2009: 181).
546 Machiavelli (1950: esp. P 14, 54).
547 Benner (2009: 181-182), Machiavelli (1996: 2.5).
548 As Schweller (2006: 105) argues, within realism there is no room for “a racist ideology”. By 
contrast, Fascism may harbor such an ideology because it holds little faith “in the balance 
of power”. Fascism holds instead “a will to power for power’s sake” as Fascist states 
exceed the limits of “what realists would call prudent and necessary”. 
549 Joseph Femia, “Machiavelli and Italian Fascism.” History of Political Thought  25 (1), (2004: 
1-15).
550 Garver (1987: 144).
551 Like Machiavelli must have done, Arendt (1993), (1958), highly valued the Roman method of 
promising—through treaties. Rome had applied treaty law in order to bind the victors of 
civil disputes to itself: these victors, although not necessarily also having been militarily 
defeated by Rome, were thus regarded as associates or as societies. See, also, Breen 
(2009).
552 See, by contrast, Sullivan (1993).
553 Also, for a valid rebuff of those theorists who would rather portray Machiavelli as one of the 
‘creators’ of a power-positivist and secular-modernist concept of statehood, continue to 
consider Parel (1992).
554 Peterman (n. d. 630-632).
555 The notion of an aleatory dialectical method was formulated by Louis Althusser. Interestingly, 
this notion coheres rather well with Alighieri Dante’s The Divine Comedy, as well as his 
Monarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), because both works try to 
(constitutionally) integrate the individual’s duties with those of a holistic natural rank-
order, yet leave the tension between mortal individuals and the natural laws intact, or 
open to chance.
556 Kinneging (1997: 135).
557 Benner (2009: 183).
558 Peterman (1957).
559 Machiavelli (1966: 3.1, 108).
560 Machiavelli (1950: Discourses 1.26, 184).
561 Fabry (2010: 7-9; 16, n. 5).
1057
                                                                                                                                                
562 Wendt and Friedheim (1996).
563 Weber (1995: 127).
564 Weber (1995: 127-128; 123).
565 Fabry (2010: 138).
566 Simpson (2004). Compare, further, Janis (2004), Bain (2006), and The Covenant of the League 
of Nations.
567 For a later but most eloquently-expressed view on this rise in inequalities, see Pal (2008, orig. 
1946).
568 Krasner (1999: 94-95).
569 Schweller (2006: 103-104).
570 Fabry (2010: 119-122; 138).
571 Fabry (2010: 204-207).
572 Robert L. Rothstein, “On the Costs of Realism”, Political Science Quarterly, 87 (3), 347-362 
(???).
573 Mearsheimer (2001), Schweller (2006), Waltz (2001), Little (2007).
574 Schweller (2006: 118-119).
575 Latham (2011: 215; 172).
576 Latham (2011: esp. 119-120; 175-182). See, also, Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green 
Revolution (Zed Books, 1991) and Soil not Oil (South End Press, 2008).
577 Benner (2009: 183).
578 Kelsen (1967), (1967b). See, further, Paulson (1998).
579 James (1986: 38).
580 Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 
1940-41. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942). “Sovereignty and 
international law.” Georgetown Law Journal, 1960 (vol. 48, no. 4: 627-640).
581 Hans Kelsen, Der Staat als Integration: Eine Prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung. (Wien, Julius 
Springer, 1930: 68).
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582 Dyzenhaus (1997). For additional comparisons between Schmitt and Kelsen on these points, 
consider Hebeisen (1995) and Suganami (2007).
583 George Schwab, Introduction (xvi) to Schmitt (1985: 10).
584 Nijs (1910: 12-13).
585 Ernest Nijs, The Papacy Considered in Relation to International Law. Transl. Ponsonby A. 
Lyons. (London: Henry Sweet, 1879: 30; 54-55, not further referenced).
586 For a summary treatment of Treitschke’s difficult dilemma, consider Dorpalen (1957).
587 Meinecke (1957). Schmitt (1995) includes an elaborate review essay of Meinecke’s historical 
thinking. For his own historical constitutionalist thinking, see especially Schmitt (1950b), 
(1957, transl. 2008), and (1932, transl. 2004).
588 Ellen Kennedy (2004), Seitzer and Thornhill (2008).
589 Paulson (1998: 25).
590 Hans Kelsen. Der Staat als Integration: Eine Prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung. (Wien, Julius 
Springer, 1930: 16; 13; 66, not further referenced).
591 Paulson (1998: 32; 40).
592 Nijs (1910: 12-13).
593 Žižek (1999: 18-20).
594 Machiavelli (1950: 1.26, 183-184; 1.27, 185-186).
595 Machiavelli (1950: 1.26, 183-184; 1.27, 185-186).
596 Femia (2004: 66-67), citing Machiavelli (1996: 2.25, 190) and Machiavelli’s The History of 
Florence, Book 5 (ed. H. Morley, London, Routledge: 1891, this edition will not be 
further referenced, PT). 
597 Machiavelli, both (1975) and (1996) or (1950), (1966), (2003). Also relevant remains Wood 
(1972). On the topic of how to interpret Machiavelli’s republican realism, contrast 
Pocock (1975) to Parel (1992).
598 Machiavelli (1950: 1.4, 119).
599 W. W. Rostow, Lucian Pye, and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan should be mentioned as having been 
involved in the MIT Center for International Studies. The morale of their academic life-
stories is that they would develop “modernization theory” on the bizarre presupposition 
that human history’s acceleration would be morally justifiable, if it could help defeat 
communism. The field’s fascination with rational choice-modeling (IR’s reliance on 
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Prisoners’ Dilemmas) followed from their theory’s conditional logic. See, for additional 
detail, Latham (2011: 53-58) [???].
600 Wendt (2003), (1999).
601 In clarifying this aspect of Machiavelli’s non-dual system, Garver (1987: 144) writes: “one 
cannot say that one’s form, [and one’s forming of] a free and disciplined state, requires a 
certain kind of matter, namely factions, and then go out and create the factions; instead, 
one has to take matter as given and learn how to organize it into the desired form.”
602 Machiavelli (1996: 1.2; 1.6; 1.3-1.4). Benner (2009: 421) says in this context too little about 
the importance of Numa, as he was the one to have first amended Romulus’s ambition 
which, however, had already been limited by Romulus’s own founding of the Senate. 
Machiavelli (1950: 1.1, 109) clearly mentions, however, that both Rome’s independent 
orders and Rome’s laws had never been owed to one Great Legislator, but rather to 
“Romulus, ... Numa, and [others], ... so that neither the fertility of the soil, nor the 
proximity of the sea, nor their many victories, nor the greatness of the Empire, could 
corrupt [these orders and laws]”.
603 Machiavelli (1966: 8.6, 396), Benner (2009: 202-203).
604 While looking at Elizabeth I, Janara (2006) picks up on this notion of the apparently non-
dualist structure and then rightly repositions this notion at the core of Machiavelli’s 
republican theory. 
605 The so-called Pythagorean table of opposites was adopted by Aristotle, in his Metaphysics
(986a, not further referenced at this point).
606 Capra (1996: 169).
607 Paul Thomas, “The State of the State (Review Essay)”, Theory and Society 33 (2004): 257-
271, (esp. 257, PT).
608 Compare, further, Jens Bartelson, “Second Natures: Is the State Identical with Itself? 
European Journal of International Relations 1998, 4 (3), 295-326.
609 Bartelson (2001: 5).
610 For only a few stepping stones within the wide stream of IR literature available on the 
formation of the modern nation-state, see Cohen (1981), Doty (1996), Jackson (2000), 
Osiander (2007), Piel (1975), Philpott (2001), Robertson (1913), Roschin (2006), 
Rosenberg (1994), Sørenson (1998), Spruyt (1994), and Tsao (2004) and Arendt (1951) 
as well.
611 Compare, further, Bartelson (2001: 76) and Held et al. (1999).
612 Bartelson (2001: 38; 41), also cited in Paul Thomas, “The State of the State”, Theory and 
Society 33 (2004): 260.
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613 For additional remarks on the irrelevancy of the principle of mutualy exclusivity (of statehood 
versus anarchy), see Ashley (1988), (1995), Grieco (1988), Kupchan and Kupchan 
(1991), and Kessler (2009a), (2009b).
614 Machiavelli (1996: 2.15; 3.49), (1975: ch. 25) concludes his Discourses with his 
admonishment to take resolve in “daily fresh precautions”, against contingencies, for 
instance, while the pre-final chapter of The Prince admonishes statesmen to actively 
conform their ways to their “circumstances” (to “master” their Fortuna).
615 In all political action, as Althusser (2006b: 174) mentions, for example, “one day new hands 
will have to be dealt out, and the dice thrown again onto the empty table.”
616 Althusser (2006b: 173).
617 For an introduction to the study of states-within-states, see Spears (2004). Non-recognized 
states have created their own association, which includes various indigenous peoples.
618 Fabry (2010: 4).
619 Naticchia (2005: 35-36).
620 Naticchia (2005: 36-37).
621 Naticchia (2005: 37, italics removed from original, PT).
622 Compare, further, Naticchia (2005: 39, n. 15) and Armstrong (1920).
623 Naticchia (2005: 42; 41).
624 Naticchia (2005: 57; 61; 63).
625 For a similar point see Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson (2010) and Hobson (2007).
626 Arendt (2006). Also appropriate, in understanding the discipline’s first erecting and then 
undermining the ‘orderly state’, remain some of the many critical perspectives on 
revolutionary political change, as they have been offered by Keitner (2001), Weyland 
(2009), and Schmitt (1987).
627 While defining political realism, Donnelly (2000: 9) proceeds to cite Treitschke and 
Butterfield to the effect that expressions of faith should not be allowed to dominate the 
realm of political power. Yet, he ignores the possibility that confessions of faith could 
actually be one among the private interests, and should thereto remain in balance with 
(republican) powers. Confessions are private, basically, as powers are public, which is 
sufficient reason why they should both coexist, in moderation. This constitutional 
balancing act is what realism is about.
628 The standard reference remains Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1913).
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629 For another, anti-Beard, reading of the Hamiltonian model, see Oliver (1927).
630 Kenyon (1958: 163, italics added, PT), citing Max Farrand, Records of the Federal 
Convention (New Haven, 1911, vol. 1: 382, not further referenced). Alexander Hamilton 
here is cited as if he is favoring life-long tenures for U.S. Senators and the Presidency. He 
thus seems to be moving beyond the standard Aristotelian (as well as Hobbes’s and 
Machiavelli’s) constitutionalist theory (and is getting extremely close to Montesquieu), in 
not just agreeing to observe the need to balance the power of his peers, of the rich 
oligarchs, against the democrats/ochlocrats, but in also deliberately insulating the former 
against the latter; “All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The 
first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people 
has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted 
and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom 
judge or determine right. Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct, permanent share in 
the government.” And give then, of course, only the remainder of impermanent shares to 
the second class, in their House of Representatives.
631 Madison et al. (1961). See especially, in nuanced contrast to this reading, Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press, 1993).
632 Madison et al. (1961), and as Kenyon (1958: 163) concludes: “[Hamilton] did emphasize the 
necessity of attaching the immediate interest of the moneyed class to the [representative] 
government, and he had stated, in The Federalist, that men in general were much more 
likely to act in accordance with what they believed to be their immediate [or private] 
interests than their long-run [public] interests.”
633 The reputable constitutional law-scholar Cass R. Sunstein has, in recent years, begun to argue 
for a second Bill of Rights which would help protect the rights to employment, health, 
and education (following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s original formulation). Interestingly, 
Michael Moore’s 2009 film documentary Capitalism: A Love/Hate Story also concludes 
with that argument.
634 Arendt (2006: 192; 223) argued that “Hamilton and Jefferson [had been] standing at two 
opposite poles which still belong together.” Hamilton would have said constitutional 
rights are to be made ‘permanent’ (by men) and Jefferson that they ultimately could not 
be constituted (not by men, at least) because human rights are ‘unalienable’. She adds 
elsewhere (esp. 223) that particularly Hamilton (with the express aid of Madison) had 
thought that all rights should be guarded by the Senate’s, the Supreme Court’s, and the 
judiciary’s final authority. However, the Supreme Court could only have retained this 
critical mode of authority, she appears to have cautioned, if the Constitution also were to 
maintain the “ancient characteristics [of] the power of the censores, on one hand, [and] 
their rotation in office, on the other.” Because the seats on the Supreme Court were never 
actually rotating, at least not among popularly-selected citizen-judges and jurors, 
however, its rulings would ignore the Jeffersonian egalitarian imperative and mostly 
protect the Hamiltonian “permanence” of rights. “[I]t is [its] lack of power, combined 
with permanence of office, which signals that the true seat of authority in the American 
Republic is the Supreme Court.” By contrast, the legislative power would have to be 
concentrated, under this Hamiltonian plan, in the hands of the U.S. Senate. That is, with 
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most power concentrated in the Senate and most authority in the Court, the Court would 
have to represent the third or the ‘middle level’ which neither holds the legislative nor the 
executive power. Yet, Arendt ignores the fact that this ‘middle level’ is insufficiently 
porous and simply too rigid—from the perspective of all those, including the Beard-
school’s, who would probably like to see more power being allocated to the House of 
Representatives and to any Article 5-Popular Conventions.
635 Althusser (2006b: 174-175).
636 Paul Thomas, “The State of the State (Review Essay)”, Theory and Society 33 (2004): 257-
271, not further referenced).
637 Bartelson (2001: 183), (1995), seems mistaken to argue that the presupposition of the state 
shapes political discourse, and even public authority, more than that discursive public 
authority has had an impact on the shape of the state. His argument here becomes anti-
Arendtian to the extent that it sides with the state’s conventionalist normativity rather 
than that it allows for spontaneous decisiveness. Continue to see Althusser (2006b), 
(1999) for the theme of a third “void” within the complex relation between the state’s 
Term (1) shaping of authority, first, and authority’s Term (2) restoring of the state, 
second. This abyss somehow appears in the “aleatory” and yet “political” relation 
between these first two Terms—as countless variants of ambivalent authority may 
emerge from within it.
638 Page (2011: 121-124, italics added) rightly suggests that creative systems (on the premise that 
all sovereign states are to be defined as creative systems) “need not satisfy interim 
viability.” Their path-dependency is not absolute; their “evolution is [constitutionally and 
historically] constrained in that steps along the path to an improvement must be viable.” 
Also: “Each step need not have produced an increase in [the state’s political] fitness per 
se, but it did have to function [in order for the state to survive in its original constitutional 
form].”
639 Runciman (2004).
640 Bartelson (2001).
641 Gran (2009).
642 Latham (2011: 191-192).
643 Naticchia (2005: 27-28, n. 1).
644 For three valid critiques of the theorems that have been fed by the ‘Washington Consensus’, 
and thus by institutions such as the IMF and WTO as well as many development aid 
NGOs, consider Bello (2009), De Waal (1997), and Klein (2008).
645 For another early realist attack on pretentious neoliberal theorems, see Noam Chomsky, Profit 
Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999, 
not further referenced).
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646 Donnelly (2000: 9) defines political realism as the general orientation of those scholars who 
have been willing to define IR as “largely a realm of power and interest”—in which 
action is being constrained “by human nature and the absence of international 
government.” This author agrees with his broad horizon on realism; “human nature” is 
indeed a critical variable in anticipating, as well as in accounting for changes within the 
IR system. But, as Morgenthau taught, the idea of an absent “international government” 
should not be considered an endorsement of the status quo. Political realists may either 
like or dislike the liberal ideas behind the creation of a world state, and they even may 
either believe it can exist or that it can not. Hence, realists define their research question, 
rather, as which constitutional balance will have to be struck by international 
governmental agencies, which themselves will have to include sovereign states, even if 
there would be only two such states in the world. That balance will after all, somehow, 
have to be maintained by statespersons holding themselves back from their private 
interests while applying a complex combination of their legislative and executive powers. 
This allows then to gain legitimacy, and thus success for their own lineages. Without 
meaningful ‘translation’ of interest into the language power, either one could come to 
domineer the other, however, causing instability and a breaking up of older lineages.
647 J. J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security 19 
(1994): 5-49 (esp. 14), as cited by Donnelly (2000: 133).
648 Indeed, as Donnelly (2000: 131-133) adds, realists are skeptical about which impact “[liberal] 
international institutions” may actually have on state action. This author, like Donnelly, 
would argue that Mearsheimer has been mistaken to suggest “institutions have minimal 
influence”. Transnational institutions coexist with sovereign parties, or with any other 
such equal political entities, but that does not mean that either the institutions or the 
parties should have maximal influence over the other. Rather than to pose such an 
either/or dilemma, Arendtian and especially Weberian realists would find that “security 
competition” and “international stability” (in Donnelly’s words) should simply be 
observed to coexist and coincide, and that the entire issue should be redefined in terms of
the relationship between “competition” (sovereignty) and “stability” (institutionalism or, 
oftentimes, liberalism). Compare, further, J. J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of 
International Institutions”, International Security 19 (1994): 5-49 (esp. 7, article will not 
be referenced any further, PT). Further, Donnelly rightly mentions in these pages (131) 
that “promises, alliances, and sovereignty and international law” are all examples of 
institutions. On that note, it should be added that how entities decide to cope with their 
breaking of a promise, with the falling apart of an alliance, with a refusal to recognize a 
state, and how they judge any causes of war all involve practices also co-dependent on 
institutions.
649 Arendt (2006: 192) suggests, for example, that “the true seat of authority” can neither be held 
by the legislative nor the executive power, but will have to be held by a jurisdictional 
censor who determines when these two powers are illegitimately ‘encroaching’ on each 
other; when they have no valid reason to disturb their balance. The issue then arises, of 
course, whether the censor (in the U.S. this is the Supreme Court) not acquires a third 
type of power, and thus may lose its public authority.
650 UN (2005), “Summit Outcome Document”, GA A60/1, also cited by Doyle (2011: 72; 80).
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651 Doyle (2011: 73).
652 Doyle (2011: 81).
653 Doyle (2011: 83).
654 Doyle (2011: 83).
655 Compare, particularly on the meaning of international humanitarian interventions, Kennedy 
(2004) to Ingram (2008) and Benhabib (2009).
656 Doyle (2011: 83).
657 Doyle (2011: 76).
658 Doyle (2011 : 73-75).
659 As also admitted, but clarified by the IDRC (2001).
660 On the issue of international interventional legitimacy, compare, further, Berman (2006), 
Crawford (2001), Kratochwil (1995), Roach (2005), Robinson (1996), Walker (2008). or 
Young (2002).
661 For example, Mahbubani (2003).
662 Samantha Powes, interview with Harry Krebbers, available online (University of Berkeley, 
accessed in 2006, PT).
663 Gordon (2010) elaborates on how far the Security Council would be split apart, and 
subsequentially be dominated by U.S. (and UK) intentions to cause régime change in 
Iraq. See, also, Everest (2008).
664 Doyle (2011) does not spell out progress to be a criterion, yet he positions all his cases of 
(non)intervention within one retrospective increase in historical (and therefore also 
moral?) adherence to RtoP norms.
665 For example, the end of the Cold War is being celebrated, but almost without ever taking into 
account this celebration’s own historicist subjectivity, in the first chapter of Paul A. Rahe, 
Soft Despotism: Democracy’s Drift—Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville and The 
Modern Prospect, (Yale University Press, 2009).
666 Appropriate, in this context, is Maogoto (2003).
667 For one meaning of the word ‘power’ see, for example, Barnett and Duvall (2005).
668 For a superb study of the legal parity of states, see Kooijmans (1964).
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669 Actually, not the treaty-organizations are immune from prosecution but the diplomats who 
have been send to work for them. On the hereto-related issue of criminal immunity, 
besides Maogoto (2003), consider especially Janis (1987).
670 See, also, Zwanenburg (2004) and May (2007).
671 But, continue to compare Hurd (2008).
672 Amartya Sen, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”, Journal of Political Economy 78 
(1970), 152-157. 
673 See, further, Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Invidual Values (New York: John Wiley and 
Son, 1963).
674 Manin (1997) reiterates that democracy is the selection of state officials by lot, while 
aristocracy is election by ballot. As there are no notable international organizations which 
organize lotteries to select juries or to recruit staff for peacekeeping missions, for 
instance, contrary to what the Democratic Peace hypothesis suggests, it is from a 
classicist perspective meaningless to speak of cross-state or inter-state democratic 
cultures.
675 William Poundstone, Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren’t Fair (and What We Can Do 
About It), (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008).
676 William Poundstone, Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren’t Fair (and What We Can Do 
About It), (Hill and Wang, 2008, not further referenced).
677 Lowi, Ginsberg, Shepsle (2006: 176-178).
678 See, in sharp contrast to Negri (2008), Sunstein (2010) and Nussbaum (2010).
679 By illustration, Horkheimer and Adorno (1996) conclude with their attack on the mass media, 
accusing them of propaganda, as well as on the rationality of consumer capitalism, which 
subverts human nature.
680 Mair (2006) rightly uses the cartel-analogy to describe dynamic changes within most Western 
party-systems.
681 Mair (2006). See, further, Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Ascendancy of the Party in 
Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies.” In 
Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Changes, eds. Richard Gunther, José Ramón-
Montero, and Juan J. Linz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, not further 
referenced).
682 Hansen (2010), unfortunately, does not connect the dots between the ongoing cartelization of 
party systems, in most Western states, and the monarchical tendencies within the 
executive powers of these states (which he does describe). Consider, in this light, also the 
1066
                                                                                                                                                
‘unitary executive doctrine’—as defended by two consecutive Bush-Cheney 
administrations.
683 On the American issue of political redistricting, begin with Lowi, Ginsburg, and Shepsle 
(2006: 176-178; 437-438).
684 Elements of this conclusion have been corroborated by advanced (‘republican’) realists such as 
Bobbio (2003), Bruner (2009), Connolly (2010), Klein (2008), and Pocock (1975).
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CHAPTER FOUR
A [unified] state cannot be constituted from any chance body of persons, or in any 
chance period of time.
—Aristotle (bk. 5. ch. 3, 1303b, 210).
[S]truggle has priority over unity.
—Slavoj Žižek (2008: 185).
For Machiavelli, a free political life requires the survival of the discord between 
political freedom and rule of laws. [...] But, at the same time, the [freedom of] 
participation of the people ... lacerates the unity of the state.
—Vatter (2000: 97).
If the wise man solution were to work, the quality designed to provide [unity and] 
stability—virtue—would have to fashion itself into its very opposite—fortune. But to look 
for this kind of virtue in an individual human being ... would be contrary to the 
limitations that human nature and sublunar reality impose on men. It would be 
tantamount to trying to square the circle.
—Mikael Hörnqvist (2004: 241).
I would like to bring out: the existence of an almost completely unknown 
materialist tradition in the history of philosophy.... To simplify matters, let us say, for 
now, a materialism of the encounter [between contraries] and therefore of the aleatory.
—Louis Althusser (2006b: 167).
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The Case Against Monism: Defense of the Dual Authority Thesis
It is impossible to be both an advanced realist as well as a conventional or liberal 
realist. There is no solution to the state authority problem, as only advanced realists 
believe, just as that there is no final synthesis of both consumerist ideologies and material 
needs. The potential tyranny of capitalist ideologies cannot be synthesized and reconciled 
with the actual need for political freedom. A tension should be respected instead—within 
the diversity of(international) relationships between ideology and need, between liberal 
idealism and advanced realism, as well as between the Rousseauan ideal of a general will 
and the prudence of aleatory (Althusserian) materialism. For, these tense relations, 
however mysterious, are only present in the emergence and recognition of legitimate 
public authority: in the presence of dual sovereignty.
Nonetheless, Joseph Nye commits the conventional Rousseauan fallacy of trying 
to solve the sovereignty problem by synthesizing the equivalent of the wills of all—in the 
form of open economic market structures—with a general will, in the form of a peaceful 
world-order led by the hegemonic U.S.).1 By contrast, advanced political realism is an 
approach far more respectful of and considerate towards the differences between and the 
diversity of all particular states. Advanced realism holds that any general will-centric 
approach must fail, precisely because it is affirmed by its own ‘natural’ contrary of a free 
and commonsensical public realm. The general will of the statecan never, however
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hegemonically, absorb all the differences and the enormous diversity of (each state-like 
entity’s) the free wills to participate in (or: to revolutionize) the public realm.
To clarify, Nye first tries to make the conventional argument that the “military 
powers” of monopolistic states are, and will remain central to the twenty-first-century 
world. But as a liberal he, in the same book, argues as well that states are disappearing 
into the background as the general will towards a common peace is gaining currency. 
States are becoming progressively less prominant in International Relations due to 
economic and technological globalizations. Financial and economic markets as well as 
numerous Internet-manipulated ideologies are rising against the sovereign state, he finds, 
so that in total it is a general sort of power-oriented idealism that becomes the latest and 
most persuasive will. According to Nye, this must lead to his own conclusion that the 
influence of coercive power-based materialism has been sinking. Consequentially, the 
conventional idea of the state is to be supplemented by a liberal-institutionalist idea. Each 
modern state will then both appear “in terms of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
and [as allowing national] markets to operate.” Yet, Nye further predicts that 
internationally there will not always be “the same utility” for state-led military forces as 
there would have been in the “nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” States will invest less 
in the structures and the means of violence, as they become less inclined to use force 
against each other, and yet they will continue to morally justify their own use of force: 
their “capacity to fight and coerce, protect and assist, will remain important even if inter-
state war continues to decrease.”2 One of the sovereign state’s defining attributes (highly-
structured and massive armed force) will probably be substantially watered down, in 
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brief, but it will also still have to provide structure to the milieu in which another one of 
its other attributes (the opening up of external capitalist markets) continues to solidify 
itself through international cyber-exchanges and institutionalized economic competitions 
with other states. Nye clearly nudges towards liberalism: economic institutions and 
Internet integrations can trump decisions regarding military structures. But how should 
the relation between these two be understood, politically?
Compared to Nye’s liberal idealist variant of realism, which is being nudged 
towards economic liberalism and its globalizing culture of individual rights-based 
consumerism, advanced realists hold the course. Advanced realists hold simply that the 
sovereignty of states is not a quality of Great Powers alone and may very well be 
extended to countless state-like entities, secessionist movements, local federations, and 
revolutionary republics. Sovereignty differs from Nye’s conception of statehood in this 
sense: it is far more often contrary to the economically-prerequisite elements of statehood 
than that Nye can admit. In this sense, sovereignty has remained one of the most 
legitimate and most critical organizational attributes of international politics: it can also 
be claimed to be a revolutionary and anti-capitalist mode of public authority. for 
example, and does not need to be biased towards neoliberal institutions Because of its 
deeply non-idealist and non-rationalist level of organization, the sovereignty-element 
actually transcends issues of institutionalism, commerce, legal property, and territoriality. 
It transcends the status quo and its quantifiable structuration of “military powers”—
precisely because it is an element that consists of a closed organizational process, instead. 
Sovereignty is herein deeply political: it is what organizes and makes states into states. 
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Without sovereignty there would be no political system. Sovereigns also uniquely obey 
the natural law that transcends-yet-includes the structure of state powers. As such, 
sovereignty is relatively timeless and will have to be believed to nearly-continuously 
maintain all its conceptual, archetypal, egalitarian, and political features. Individual states 
may lack the capacity to fight wars, for instance, but this does not mean that the same 
states cannot act as sovereign parties with the archetypal freedom to decide as to who 
their enemy should be.
Certain characteristic features allow only sovereign parties to negate, negotiate, 
and when possible also to transcend the various military and socio-economic structures of 
the world of states. The main difference between such ever-changing open structures and 
the perenniality of sovereign authority is, therefore, that only conventional power-
structures can be assessed rationally whereas sovereignty emerges also through a non-
rational (and usually dialectical) process from within the power-structure’s divisions and 
mutations.
Maybe Nye is correct that statehood should be defined as concisely as possible, 
and only in terms of a (military) power monopoly and the (structural) capacity to regulate 
markets. But Nye is incorrect in suggesting that even minimal theoretical definitions of 
the sovereign state should allow the sovereign state itself to also become increasingly 
modernized, rationalized, or secularized. In this, Nye is too liberal. In his stead, advanced 
realism looks to Machiavelli for guidance. With him, advanced realism can alternatively 
ask whether politicians and diplomats can reach compromises without having to define 
their own state’s interests solely in terms of power inequities and power imbalances. For, 
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sovereign authority emerges also in a qualitatively-different dimension. It not only 
emerges from the structure of powers, actually, but also from a non-rational dimension of 
each human being’s natural characteristics, of group dynamics and ecological ethics, and 
especially of plain commonsense. This non-rational dimension can appear in the form of 
a gesture, a wink, or a trace of a movement. It is an empirical dimension informed by and 
pertaining to more or less religious beliefs, more or less biased opinion formations, more 
or less legitimized national heritages, and all sorts of particular identities. But it is not a 
dimension reducible to the sum of its structural parts. Sovereignty, as a systemic whole, 
is greater than all of its parts.
To understand political relationships between diverse statelets and their structures 
of power, Machiavelli applies metaphorical language. In giving meaning to the realities 
of power, it appears as if his metaphors express regularities and perennialities greater 
than statelet capacities and the historic events visible to the naked eye alone. His speech 
acts are meaningful in the sense that they never refer to the state as if it were one singular 
entity, for example.3 The sovereign state, for Machiavelli, is in flux. Mikael Hörnqvist 
rightly reminds realists that especially the Italian people’s suffering from “foreign troops” 
is described, by the (former) Florentine Secretary, in metaphors. The Omnipotent, 
Fortuna, and the river are all “metaphorical entities” that indicate the ambivelent 
presence of both disorderly flux as well as of emergent orders. In this respect, these 
“entities” are themselves meaningful because they are also believed to be emerging from 
systemic dualities such as these: “free will/fortune; virtue/river; Italian virtue/foreign 
invasions.”
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The Machiavellian political metaphors give meaning to and provide a modicum of 
orderliness within a self-perpetuating tension between public actions and private 
deliberations, as well as between prudence and irresponsibility, or between the cardinal 
virtue of prudential wisdom and the risk that individuals are blame-shifting to Fortuna, 
also.4 But they also are metaphors in which the common poor are presented in relations fo 
parity to the glorious great. As all speech, metaphorical speech expresses a conjectural 
paradox. Advanced realists recognize the faculty of speech as an expression of the 
coincidence of opposites, and as such as a moment in which minds and bodies are 
becoming inseparable without losing their distinctive characteristics.
Conventional and liberal IR theorists have missed Machiavelli’s critical point, 
however, as they usually try to reduce power to a uni-linear scale. Power cannot but 
function otherwise, in their conventional models, than as a structure of coercive influence 
and persuasive order. This mixed structure of power of course reduces the opportunities 
for IR theorists to theorize the tensions between persuasive and coercive faculties. As 
such, it also reduces opportunities to observe the ambivalent (dis)orderliness between 
ideology and balance, between minds and bodies, as it even allows theorists to ignore the 
empirical fact that speech is both mind and body: it is one of the most complex human 
powers of all. Speech acts have both coercive as well as persuasive qualities, for instance, 
just as that the human speech power can both be shifting individual responsibilities off 
towards Fortuna as well as that it can can express prudential wisdoms.5
Machiavelli’s commemoration of History’s “ambivalence” gives expression to, 
for example, the empirical political law that “one and the same revolutionary action ... 
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could trigger two radically opposed dynamics.” As Miguel Vatter has studied this 
phenomenon, advanced (Machiavellian) realists understand and accept the law that 
“revolutionary action” may at any time express itself through the uncertain processes of 
ambivalent authority. It may symbolize a self-organizing but also a self-dividing or 
dualistic sort of sovereignty, in other words. Or, Vatter adds, it should somehow be 
believed to symbolize “the impossibility of reducing political freedom to the form of the 
state.” The “legal order” of the state is thus being maintained by “Machiavelli’s 
republican freedom”, rather, precisely because “freedom” also may and usually will 
radically oppose the state.6
Again, it seems convenient for realists to want to agree with Nye’s suggestion that 
the United States should work towards international stability as well as towards national 
security in terms of economic markets and multilateral institutions. Advanced realists 
would have to disagree, rather strongly, however, with their all-too-convenient side-
stepping of the question of speech and its ambivalence. Nye’s proposal that the United 
States should primarily work to help conserve “accountable institutions” and open up 
“markets” on behalf of other nation-states is a defense of neoliberalism and the 
ideological state apparatuses of a peculiar late-twentieth-century modern culture. As Nye 
further proposes, the cultural hegemon of today must not only learn from nineteenth-
century Great Britain how to promote commerce elsewhere or how to protect “the 
freedom of the seas”. The hegemon must also conserve the current distribution of 
territorial power by disincentivizing those secessionists who aim “to change borders”, 
more or less forcefully, and at the same time help maintain “regional balances of power”. 
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But because Nye says nothing about parity and very little about what it may mean to 
empirically sustain these “regional balances”, in comparison to advanced and 
Machiavellian realists, hence, his U.S. is a Power which would still appear to be acting as 
a private security agent for the rich and powerful, despite their commitments to 
“alleviating poverty”, and not also as a prudent servant of all those people who are 
actually poor and deprived.7 Overall, it can be said that Nye’s neoliberal and neorealist 
image of the U.S. favors the colors of Fortuna’s irresponsibility over the virtues of 
political freedom. It is an image more favorable to the hegemon’s unified general will 
than to the particular wills of all. In this, erroneously, Nye rejects their ‘natural’ 
contrariness.
Why Conventional Realists Make Too Many Mistakes
Conventional realists nudge towards neoliberalism and the inequalities created by 
cultural capitalism. They hereby make two mistakes. They are valuing conceptual 
parsimony too highly, and they are reducing the definition of the state to a few basic 
components. Their state conception consists of and is equal to the total sum of its parts. 
Or, their state is a state governed by statutory laws—which subordinate the state’s 
authority to a legalized monopoly. The mistake of conventional theorists is, in brief, that 
they subordinate the moral authority of particular freedoms to the all-inclusive general 
will and, thus, even to the willful possession of armaments.
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Max Weber has all too often been cited as if he would have defined the state as a 
monopoly. However, on second thought, he realized that a monopoly is only a material 
capability: the concept can only become operational in terms of its dichotomy between 
the capability to commit violence, first, and the legitimization of this capability by means 
of the law. Either a grouping can legally and legitimately use its physical force, within 
any given country, or it cannot. What the preliminary concept of a monopoly excluded 
from consideration, thus, is whether force is also being used in an apparently legitimate 
manner, because illegitimate forces are usually being resisted by counter-forces. By 
implication, a state may come to be believed anti-monopolistic, or all of its armed forces 
may even be seen to no longer belong to one and the same state (if a secession were to 
occur, or if a governments has been exiled). Weber knows, therefore, that there is a 
problem with his definition: physical force is in many cases being contradicted by its own 
appearance of illegitimacy.8
Weber elaborates, therefore, by asking other questions than only whether or not 
the government exercises factual control over the armed forces. He also asks on whose 
terms force is being legitimized. By asking this who-, rather than a when-, question, 
hence, he principally pluralizes his own concept of statehood’s monism.9 Reminiscent of 
Weber, Arendt does not so much define statehood as that she identifies statespersons. Her 
oeuvre’s central question is which statespersons are recognizably acting either 
legitimately or illegitimately, and either common-sensically or thoughtlessly.10 She 
believes such public actions should not be defined by anyone’s material capabilities, and 
certainly also not by how forcible and violent these actions might have been, but by how 
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meaningful appearances in public affairs can be. Violence is meaningless; meaningful 
actions may be recognized as authoritative.11
Arendt had more in common with Weber, at least in terms of how she defines 
state legitimization, than that students of international politics might usually have been 
taught.12 Works by both political theorists are instructive on why conventional definitions 
of statehood—and of what it is that qualifies the state to become recognized, as a 
sovereign state—poorly convey the degree of difference between the armed services and 
police forces, first, and the trust and the hope people are willing to place in and on these 
forces, second. Sheer control over the means of violence forms an inadequate criterion of 
state success, hence, and yet there is no knowledge being conveyed by the people of what 
their ultimate standard of adequacy might be.13 Despite Sofia Näsström’s notable (semi-
Arendtian) effort to theorize popular legitimacy and self-legitimization, there may simply 
be no ultimate ethical correspondence between the people and their state.14 This is the 
one lesson conventional realists seem unable to cover, as they continue to synthesize the 
relation between free people and the state monopoly on violence.
Weber was not alone: Machiavelli and Arendt would also have departed from the 
idea of an ultimate monopoly. Each in their own way, they demonstrate that an 
adequately legitimized assertion of authority has to have at least two foundations—and 
that these foundations betray some sort of intensity between each other. In this respect, or 
recognizing an archetypical tension, each of the theorists can be said to have rejected an 
idealistic-monistic conception of ultimate authority. Why would they have rejected 
monism, then? Should they have? The answers will have to depend, somehow, on a 
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skillful discernment between illegitimate and legitimate, and between rightly and 
wrongly applied modalities of authority. For such a trained and discerning eye, IR should 
return to the Master of Malmesbury.
Hobbes could not have agreed any less with the above-mentioned theorists, 
interestingly, to the degree that he rethought the act of discernment itself in terms of a 
nominal spirit of judgment. Leviathan’s purpose is to establish differences between 
rational theology and biological passion, or between reasonable and substantive 
criterions, between mind and matter, or between intended and actual political 
movements.15
As Chapter Four shall demonstrate, for Hobbesian realists, the concept of 
sovereignty refers to a modality of self-successive and relational authority.16 This 
modality of authority refers to a legitimizer-power and an apparently legit power—and 
has as such been, although partially, captured in the conjectural expression “The king is 
dead: Long live the king!” Also, this modality tends towards its own temporal 
transcendence, yet retains it immanent presence in the recognized moments of succession 
to and transition of office. The civic legitimizer-power, or the moment of popular acclaim 
for the state, usually remains both immanent and pluralistic, first, while the legitimate 
power of the state itself both transcends and includes the individual citizens. In order to 
turn closer to Hobbes, however, Arendt should also be examined on the issue of how the 
pluralities of legitimizer-powers never seem to fully coincide with their own transcendent 
state.
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Did Arendt Ally with Hobbes to Defeat Cartesian Concepts of Authority?
In the discipline of philosophy, modernity is often said to have started with René 
Descartes, who would have separated mind from body—and who would have adhered to 
the doctrine of ‘mind over matter.’ That doctrine would then have come to resonate, 
politically, in the modern image of the statesman, whose rationality should remain 
separate from and higher than his bodily experiences. In making her offensive move 
against Descartes, and in defending her both unmentioned and unlikely ally Hobbes, 
Arendt argues that “mind and body, [or] thinking and sense experience, [are]... ‘made’ for 
each other, as it were.”17
Arendt attacks modern philosophy for having separated mental powers from 
bodily senses. After the Cartesian and the Humean philosophers had had their say, mental 
logics were normatively being disconnected from their physical condition, and from the 
sensory faculties all sociable beings may have in common. Against these philosophers’ 
decoupling of the “bodily senses” from, rather than to have guided these senses through 
the world by means of, “mental activities”, Arendt brings in the practical categories of 
commonsense and natality.18
Descartes still stands accused of having ignored the possibilities of sense, and 
especially also the extraordinary possibilities of recognizing those experiences unequal 
humans beings may have in common with each other. When the French Philosopher 
(Arendt would not have called him a theorist) “no longer ascribed the gratifications of 
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[the great scientific discoveries] ... to the objects of thinking”, he ended up instead 
ascribing “self-sufficiency” and even “worldlessness” to this newly-introduced scientific 
knowledge.19 For Descartes, knowledge arrives through the mind, itself. His cogitating 
self is not, however, a rational self—because rationality implies the application of 
thought to speech, as it would have done for Hobbes, while his own self requires no 
audience. The Cartesian self is solipsistic. Even though some IR constructivists adopt 
now a Cartesian method of analysis, they still fail to acknowledge that the Cartesian 
self’s extra-worldliness will not demand any apparent validation, or public legitimization 
from anyone else but itself.20 Arendt’s accusation against the modern, or the “worldless” 
self is then also motivated by her desire to newly begin to share the world—so that 
people will newly examine the correspondences between the previously-shared mundane 
and newly-discovered, appearing-to-be transmundane worlds.21
Realism refuses to believe Cartesian, positivist claims that the “objects of 
thinking”, in themselves, can gratify the senses. Not the truth values of the objects, not 
the things in themselves, but only the speech acts about them and the appearances of 
interactions between them can be heard, seen, tasted, and sensed.22 But why should it be 
considered trite to suggest otherwise? Arendtian realism answers by simply invoking the 
twentieth-century administrators of genocide, who had presupposed that their thinking 
takes place solipsistically—and that thinking cannot take place anywhere else but outside 
the sense experiences. Arendtian realism objects to their presupposition, calling it 
“thoughtless” and “banal”.23 Realism further holds, as mentioned earlier, that human 
beings are social animals and should therefore express their desire to appear in their 
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world by appearing both as sociable as well as thoughtful beings. Almost any animal will 
be fearing unfair and selfish behavior—as certain transgressions might upset the balance, 
or the natural hierarchy of things.
This fourth Chapter helps lay out how and why sociable animals can additionally 
use speech to ask others to judge themselves, and to determine whether they may have 
been acting selfishly, or whether their acts expressly cohere with societal values. (Speech 
has, it may be remembered from Aristotle, contrary effects.) As for Hobbes, realism’s 
issue is that extended speech faculties can create the kind of common power which 
totalitarian administrators would eventually refuse to consult, or refuse to be checked by. 
They chose to become too absorbed in their own thoughts so that they would no longer 
sense the presence of a common power or a binding, even covenanted authority.24
Arendt rejects both neo-Hegelian as well as Cartesian philosophy, while Hobbes 
rejects important aspects of the latter. Hobbes discerns almost just as sharply as Arendt 
does, besides, between logical or essential consistency, first, and the appearance of 
prudence, second.25 Hobbes’s class of prudent statespersons consists of all citizens 
actively distinguishing, in their speech acts, between “the natural seed of religion” and 
the “true ground of any ratiocination”, or also; between their mental faculty of 
“ratiocination” and metaphysically-shared natural sense experiences.26 To make sense of 
the senses, Hobbes clearly suggests people should publically validate their joint 
ratiocination processes (never individually), by grace of their covenant’s ultimate 
authority.27
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Hobbes also came out against abstract eschatological doctrines, thus basically 
having anticipated Arendt’s (and her anti-totalitarian reading of Kant’s) demonstration 
that pure logics, if left unchecked by naturally sensible experiences, will have absurd 
implications. To reduce that chance on absurdity and banality, then, is to lower the risk of 
a dichotomization between physically-sensing bodies and mentally-rationalizing 
processes. Hobbes demonstrates why man should train himself to discern, with greater 
judiciousness, between sense experience and the potentially doctrinal mental 
imagination.28 The sovereign’s prudence will, by means of that training process, have to 
be expressed through significant speech acts, in particular.29 Hobbes’s core question is 
then also, at least in his Leviathan, how noumenal judgments (“naming”) should be 
considered a positive form of speech. Which speech acts should, and should not be 
judged imprudent and nonsensical?30
Did Arendt align herself with Leviathan’s author to defeat Cartesian conceptions 
of state authority? It seems she did, as she recognized (however tacitly), and probably 
respected, Hobbes’s critical assessment of speech. However, in her own understanding of 
political realism, Arendt also would decline Hobbes’s invitation to singularize sovereign 
authority. But she is as adamant on the public significance of judiciousness. Arendtian 
realism has been called a theory of judgment, in fact. Its primary concern is how 
decisions should be made (in) public, without simultaneously monopolizing all the 
various private opinions that may lead to such decisions. Yet, Hobbes rarely received the 
praise he deserves, certainly not from Arendt, for having attempted not monopolize (or: 
‘monarchize’ and, thus singularize) decisions’ meanings. For instance, Hobbes never 
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denies that decisions gain their meaning in a pluralistic state of public affairs. Rather, he 
does justice to pluralism. By attempting to incorporate the multitudes, and by morphing 
them into a symbolically monarchical body, he affirms classic notions such as ‘many-in-
one’ and ‘one-in-many’. His attempt thus holds on to a balance of two powers, in other 
words, by nesting them within each other. Some of his intellectual predecessors had 
designed less-than direct, or less-equal balances of powers, and he only tries to correct 
the flaws in these constitutional designs. His aim is for the multitudes, confused by their 
doctrinal isolation, to again begin to speak as a single, sensible, and religiously integrated 
people.31
Further, Hobbes must have felt extremely offended by those scholastics who had 
suggested that the (ecclesiastic) authorities should be spiritually present among the 
private citizens. Integration of any state authority with the population in its entirety, 
instead, should remain imperfect. Hobbes thereby goes further than to advocate against 
the Cartesian separation of logical authority and sensory experiences, for he also 
maintains that supreme authority (specifically of a doctrinal nature) never fully applies to 
a plurality of citizens. While others had argued that the application of supreme authority 
could be total, especially if it concerns Church authority, Hobbes rejects their idea that 
such authority could ever be completely embodied by human officials, by their actions, or 
their movements.32 Such a single material embodiment of sovereignty, by all officials and 
all citizens, rather, would have to be considered a fiction of the imagination. This forms 
the point at which Leviathan’s mythological dimension becomes visible, of course, 
because the singular embodiment and physical representation of the people as a whole 
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should nonetheless be believed present—through Hobbes’s myth of an integrated 
“Christian Commonwealth” ultimately responsible for taking all the decisions, rulings, 
and verdicts of the highest order.33
Hobbesian and Arendian theory remains pertinent, as positivist IR theorists 
continue to refer to ‘the’ representation or to ‘the’ voice of the people. Political realism 
helps clarify that any such representations are always indirect, and that popular 
mediations will have to have been negotiated. Compromise is an intimate part of political 
representation and mediation.34 There is no pure logic of democratic representation, for
example, just as that there is no single political self.35 Every state or every statesperson, 
when understood as a cogitating self, rather, can only be recognized as such a political 
actor to the extent that she or he will have been heard by an audience of other actors 
equally willing to publically submit themselves to assessments and possibly to 
judgments. Hobbes joins Machiavelli, in some respect, as he makes the case that 
representations are only meaningful to the extent that they appear to be so.36 Significant 
representations do not require tortuous rationalizations, and may risk becoming absurd 
and senseless, the two realists express caution, once representations have been severed 
from their symbolic qualities. (For example, absurdity may result from mistakenly 
imagined representational barriers between the qualities of “spiritual bodies”, as Hobbes 
refers to them, and those of “lucid bodies”).37
Particularly in the Old Testament, Hobbes encounters several ambivalent 
representations of—as he sets out to lend significance to—the differences between 
“angels and spirits, good and evil”. He will conclude he has not been able to find any 
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evidence of the corporeality or the lucidity of spirits, and such apparitions must not be 
believed to cause any physical movements. He adds that they, therefore, are the type of 
“apparations men see in the dark, or in a dream or vision; [as if they were] ... demons.” In 
contradistinction to such Biblical passages, in which the word spirits must only be 
thought to have an allegorical connotation, Paul the Apostle rightly speaks of “spiritual 
bodies”. The Apostle references to another kind of non-physical bodies, neither capable 
of taking possession of “any man’s body”, nor being ejected from “any man’s body” as if 
“by conjuration”.38 In reading Saint Paul, Hobbes develops a curious Catholic sense of 
spirituality, on the one hand disallowing a spirit if it is an apparition (if appearing in 
voodoo, some might say?), and on the other hand allowing it as the Spirit of the Christ.
Centuries afterwards, Calvinism will become much more wary of false spirituality 
and of what Hobbes himself would have dismissed as, say, apparitions (black magic?). 
“Calvinistic” readers of the Old Testament, Weber argues, now went even further than 
the Catholics had done. Rather than to retain an Apostolic Spirit, they imagined 
themselves to have a duty to eliminate all “magic from the world”, actively promoting the 
“demagification [Entzauberung] of the world”.39 Protestant Calvinists thus rejected the 
notion of a spiritual world, while Hobbes had tried to retain at least some degree of 
spirituality—in the form of angels.40
Theologically speaking, the Protestants’ aim was now not to secularize the world: 
as they eliminated magic from the outside world, they actually also spiritualized their 
inner worlds, or their own minds, especially by excluding any experiences that could not 
be logically verified. They did not take Hobbesian skepticism to a higher level, thus, but 
1086
rather reversed it by increasingly assuming their inner-worldly minds to be spiritual and 
saintly, rather than to continue to believe that both their minds as well as their bodies 
were imperfect and sinful (as Hobbes’s more skeptical belief had instead suggested, even 
though Descartes had almost ended that belief in a clear body-to-mind correspondence). 
Finally, as Protestantism becomes active in the mundane business of spiritualizing and 
sanctifying not only the mental, but also the physical organization of their sects, to 
Weber’s horror, it is Weber who first warns the Calvinists would almost have succeeded 
in turning the meaning of life itself into “a business enterprise.”41
Descartes contemplated the possibility that human beings could be perfectly 
rational—in their own minds.42 As a consequence, modern (Cartesian) philosophy would 
start to treat everyone as a potentially angelic, spiritual being. In response, against 
Descartes, Hobbes points out that this type of equal treatment is at worst unnatural and at 
best illusionary, and that spiritualism should be limited to the Apostolic representation of 
a Christian concept. In this aspect, Hobbes allows for a dualist source of authority: 
mundane and transmundane; physical and metaphysical. His point also makes it possible 
to suggest that he would be joined, at least sometimes, by Weber, who also would argue 
that human beings are not only rational, although they may certainly try to imagine to be 
so in their own minds or their own forms of sectarianism. Alternatively, the rationality of 
their actions should also be seen to remain beholden to how it appears, and thus to how it 
should appear in accordance to the laws of nature (to an audience, which in Weber’s 
studies comes to consist of Puritans, of course). What both realists taught is that, as 
natural beings, humans always try to distinguish themselves from their peers, or from 
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those who believe themselves equal to themselves by, for instance, claiming to have 
spiritual bodies: the foundation of American sectarianism (see, also, the soon-to-follow 
sections).43
For Hobbes, everyone has some degree of experience and imagination, or of 
memory and prudence as well. Some human animals by themselves are simply better in 
speaking about spiritual bodies and the doctrines of such bodies, than others. The 
consequence is that these orators and rhetoricians will reduce the ambivalence of their 
speech: they will amplify their representations of the world by either deeming the world 
demonic and arbitrary, or in respecting the world’s perfection and justice; whatever it 
suits them best. As Hobbes writes, human animals will simply think themselves to be a 
little “wiser and [a little] abler to govern the public [realm]: [as they all] ... strive to 
reform and innovate [it], one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into 
distraction and civil war”.44
Every body politick, if it were left alone to govern its own republic, must remain 
unstable and prone to end up in a civil war. The cause is that man will imagine himself 
morally superior to others, including to other species, as he distorts the natural balance 
and significance of the world. The cause of political troubles is that man imagines 
himself superior to Nature, including his own nature, and uses rhetorical trickery to 
introduce others to his own doctrines. In accordance to Quentin Skinner’s interpretation 
of Leviathan, war and other such tribulations are caused by those who, as Hobbes of 
Malmesbury writes, would deny the fact that the “signification” of anyone’s speech acts 
will not have been also impacted by “the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker”. 
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As a realist, thus, he adds that whatever it is that “one man calls wisdom, what another 
calls fear; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another 
magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity”. Man thinks too often that he can 
decide on matters of “signification” alone, only by means of his mental process of 
“ratiocination”, and without any transmundane authority to decide on these opposite 
signs.45 That is, man imagines too often that he, or that he and only his kin have mastered 
“that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the 
likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good”.46
Language often obscures the fact that the system of states has become, 
economically and financially, to consist of inequal states: the poorest states have become 
mere “juridical shells”. They possess almost no legal recourse to their own equal 
sovereignty. Their sovereignty has become a nominal affair, or an empty and meaningless 
symbol. It is in this context that Robert Jackson defined “failed states” as having some 
“juridical existence, but little if any empirical existence.” To counter the possibility that 
failing states may proliferate, Jackson designs a “pluralist ethics of equal state 
sovereignty ... and non-intervention”, which should be based on the one “societas of 
those fewer than 200 political systems that have [thusfar] managed to gain independence 
and recognition”.47
To secure some sense of societal unity within the great diversity of modern state 
systems, and among diverse religious and juridical traditions as well, Jackson suggests 
that the international society has to be treated as a “framework.” The societas frames and 
structures the main “standards of conduct which statespeople are expected to observe in 
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their foreign relations.” To better understand these ethical standards, statespersons may 
want to revisit the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, he adds, to 
determine which “actors” should be allowed to perform their operations within this 
“framework”. Signed in 1933, the Convention holds that the members of a particular 
international society should be recognized as sovereign states on condition that they 
would have to have “a permanent population, a defined territory, [and] a government”.48
The signatories to the Montevideo Convention did fit the three criterions, so each 
could indeed be recognized as singularly sovereign actors. But the Convention itself also 
allowed them to sign a treaty. This opportunity thus legally affirmed their international 
independence from, especially, their former colonial overlords. A possible exception 
must be made for the United States, however, as it was the signatory party which had 
taken the initiative to thus substantiate the legal personalities of the conveners. It was the 
first to help them fill their juridical shells, as it were. This could mean that the irreducible 
plurality of any non-signatory states was not being respected by the states that were being 
recognized as such in 1933. The Montevideo Convention was not signed by many 
potential enemies of the U.S. so that their own political communities would not have to 
be recognized by the parties to the Convention. Since the U.S. has continued to influence 
the criterions of international recognition, especially after it declared victory in 1945 and 
helped found the United Nations, most twentieth century states have had to satisfy 
themselves with criterions based only on population, territory, and government control. 
But why should specifically the U.S. have remained so instrumental in determining 
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whether other governments should be recognized as sovereigns, capable of legitimately 
and independently exercising political control over their own territories?49
Jackson focuses his lens on a unitary societas, or on one international society, 
within which the plurality of modern states is said to operate. Inversely, Arendt looks at 
the union of ancient Rome’s constitutition as an example of two types of socii; those of 
the plebeians and of the patricians. This particular example serves her, then, in order for 
her to argue that international public law is vested and yet also vests the universal 
tendency towards constitutionalism. This means that in order to maintain the human 
capacity to constitute political societies, the ensuing plurality of all political societies is, 
and should remain to be respected as an irreducible plurality. As does Schmitt’s work, her 
work never suggests there would ever have been one international society—for there 
never should be one. Without any opportunity to appear within a diverse public realm, 
and to here make binding promises to other societies, people would soon be deprived 
from their capacity to begin anew. The unification of society would very soon have 
diminished their distinctively human capacity to immortalize, and thus to legitimize their 
own authorative actions.
To conclude the above note on the meanings of public authority, as well as to 
further summarize and reintroduce the central argument of Ambivalent Sovereignty, there 
remains a substantial tension between (Jackson’s) singularity and (Arendt’s) plurality. To 
better understand that tension, the singular and plural aspects of international systems 
theory have been presented, thusfar, as two competing principles in the process of 
‘awarding’ recognition to those bearing sovereign authority. Some theorists were heard to 
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have favored additional applications of the one principle, others of the other. But their 
apparent disagreement was also suggested to flow from a predicament as old as the 
unresolved confrontation between (Plato’s) idealist and (Aristotle’s) realist philosophies. 
Finally, before turning, in the next section, to what realist IR theorists may believe
about that predicament, it should be agreed that in matters of recognizing ultimate 
authority, the concept itself always harbors a tension or a duality. The sovereignty 
concept, in terms of the meanings it may convey, seems to oscillate between: Platonist or 
Aristotelian conceptions; between transcendent idealism or between structural 
constructivism; world state-government and juridically-respected natural boundaries; 
expectations of supremacy and of autonomy, or; between the singular (Earth) and 
pluralist (juridical, religious) organizational principles.
Dialogue on Civic Religious Beliefs in Heracleitean Sovereignty
Ronald Beiner tracks various other classical (international) political theorists in 
his Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy, besides each of the 
above-mentioned five participants (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Montesquieu). 
He finds that most of them responded to a practical issue which Machiavelli had been 
among the very first theorists to have elaborated on. How should states and churches best 
organize public authority, and what can a rational statesperson do to make better use of 
the domain of civic religion?50 May religious authorities be allowed to make exceptions 
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to positive law and, if so, under which conditions? Particularly Machiavelli’s answer 
might have demonstrated, according to Beiner’s close reading, that neither pagan nor 
Christian authority alone should be allowed into positions of supremacy. The 
statesperson’s ambition should be to revitalize a venerable constitution, rather, by finding 
inspiration in the histories of both Christendom and Römertum as well. Hence, sovereign 
statespeople should learn from different leaders from different eras—such as Cyrus and 
Theseus, or Romulus and Moses—on how to combine virtuous actions (exceptions) with 
just laws (norms).51
Machiavelli did repeat this point: the ancient Romans had best maintained their 
system of power by combining their service in the citizen militia with their healthy fear 
of celestial signs.52 But their pagan conception of celestial supremacy by itself could not 
protect their constitution against its own corruption. Particularly in the third book of The 
Discourses, Machiavelli suggests that the Christ-figure should also be believed to have 
been “a genuine founder” of sovereign authority.53 He admits in this third book that the 
ancients knew very well how to cause constitutional transitions, both leading them from 
tyranny to freedom and from freedom to servitude, whenever their historical 
circumstances would demand such a transition. But, by contrast to Christian cities such as 
Florence, he does not grant the ancient Romans the honor of also having known how to 
regulate these transitions, so that they could be conducted peacefully.
After Rome had defeated Antiochus and eradicated Carthage, for example, its 
citizens no longer feared warfare—which basically caused them to wage more wars than 
were necessary. There was more violence as a result of this. Machiavelli means to say, 
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thus, that the sovereign city had no longer feared its opponents, as they were also no 
longer believed to be enemies of the state, to be more precise. “[I]ncompetent men” could 
from that point onwards become selected for military office. Because these captains, and 
their soldiers, knew no healthy fear for and had no respect of their enemy, which could 
otherwise have united the people as a whole, however, factions were being “kept alive.” 
Yet, the twins of factionalism and conspiracies, according to Machiavelli’s long list in the 
third book, of such threating disorders, can be euthanized by restoring the venerable 
Roman practice of punishing suspected conspirators. The venerable law determines that 
they should literally be decimated, yet Machiavelli does not commend the practice 
because of its violent means but because of its positive effect on peace. The awesome 
punishment of decimation is to be considered, he suggestively argues, the greatest secret 
to the success of the early Roman legions. Just the open possibility that every tenth 
soldier, selected by lot, would be put to death for conspiracy, in other words, was one of 
the most successful disciplinary methods the people had ever used in terms of creating 
respect for the ‘true’ enemies of their state.54
Römertum’s disciplinary dimension should complement Christendom’s regulatory 
dimension. Although the former seems too forceful, and the latter too meek, when these 
dimensions are presented together they can newly animate a practical respect for just 
laws. His hope of a two-dimensional constitution, which integrates prudence and justice, 
as well as order and disorder, allows Machiavelli to scout the area in between the pagan 
and the Biblical concepts of authority. These two concepts symbolize respectively good 
arms and good laws, or respectively forces and freedoms, which he believes to be united 
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in a sovereign republic. Regardless, Beiner’s book passes by on the critical importance of 
Machiavelli’s alchemist belief in these two opposite dimensions of sovereign authority. 
The book sketches a “trajectory of philosophical reflection and debate” which, 
regrettably, ignores Machiavelli’s discovery of this trajectory itself. That is, Beiner passes 
by on Machiavelli’s philosophically absolutely fundamental belief that elemental 
opposites should be brought together, so that quintessentially self-regulating or self-
constituting synergies could be released.55
For example, Beiner draws from Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Nietzsche, 
and Schmitt—among others—by positioning them all within one debate. These authors 
are thus being positioned as if they are debaters, participating in a debate for which the 
rules seem to have been set by Beiner. But the rules should have been set by Machiavelli, 
instead, as he is in fact responsible for formulating the debated thesis: in order to bring 
prudence and justice together, first the histories of the old Republic of Rome and of the 
new Republic of Italy should be brought closer together.
Machiavelli’s realist tactics, in defending his own thesis, are fairly simple. By 
presenting Antiquity’s Rome and Renaissance Italy next to each other, he creates all sorts 
of other synergies between the contrary cases. He thus can maintain all the major 
opposites, as it were, by simply not allowing any separate middle way to be explored, in 
between his opposite historical case studies. For instance, when he refers to the model 
constitution of Venice, he finds it rightly disallows any such a third way. Public authority 
in Venice is purely political, and it cannot easily be neutralized, precisely because it has 
remained so equally divided between the great and the commoners, or between the 
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gentlemen and the commonalty. The effect of Venice’s equal self-partioning is that “the 
former have all the offices and honors from which the latter are entirely excluded; and 
this distribution causes no disorders in that republic”.56 The Venetian commoners 
venerate their distributive law, Machiavelli suggestively argues, because it can be 
believed to be a naturally self-regulating law. That is, the common people here venerate 
their own relations with their public officials, as it is their mutual contrariness that 
precludes the neutralization of their republic by any possible enemies. This is the 
quintessential aspect of their civic religion.
Beiner’s liberal strategy, by contrast, seems to consist of presenting as many 
possible positions that can help launch an attack of the above thesis of equal self-division, 
and that run against the Machiavellian unity of opposites. Beiner finds that several of 
these positions were constructed on the liberal ideas of the aristocrats Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville, whose aim it would thus probably have been to liberalize Roman-type or 
Venetian-type republics. The liberal aristocrats would have aimed to fuse “liberalism and 
civil religion” and would have joined Rousseau, as well, in making common case against 
religious autonomy. In their case, “civil religion is intended to make religion servicable
to politics or citizenship—[and] to put the former at the disposal of the latter.”57 Of 
course, this idea of making religious veneration for the law servicable to citizenship itself 
was never held in Machiavelli’s own dialogical position.
That position, instead, allows for the argument that civic religion should consist of 
expressions of faith in a natural law: in self-discipline and self-regulation. It is an 
argument for a civic faith in self-stabilizing but mutually opposing powers. That position 
1096
also centers in the venerable relationship between two equal opposites, itself worthy of 
public worship as well as of disciplinary punishment precisely precisely because this 
relationship unites two opposites. But then again, modern liberal philosophies reverse 
that argument, as Beiner sums up, as they redefine civic worship and constitutional 
fidelity—and by presenting their own expressions of faith as if they support a perfectly 
civilized religion. This means, if Beiner is correct, that liberal philosophies do not allow 
for worship of a republic of two equal opposites, but only for a state of many competing 
individuals. The concept of religious authority may then only be used if it can help 
liberate—never to also discipline—individuals who believe themselves equal to each 
other. Liberal philosophies may thus very well allow sacred and profane sources of 
authority to coexist, but they only do this on the condition that the former’s disciplinary 
qualities are being subordinated by the latter’s liberating or egalitarian qualities.
In Beiner’s intelligent presentation of Rousseau’s cynicism, the idea of a never-
ending continuum arises. Rousseau was, as may be remembered, distrustful of 
Christendom and yet he admired the deontological universality of its laws. He also 
argued that the pagans had shown why religion is an extremely useful tool in maintaining 
the state. Rousseau then took another step, however, and introduced the idea of a 
continuum which would allow him to measure religion’s civility. This continuum thus 
seemed to fuse “Christian universalism and pagan parochialism”, briefly put. Yet, 
Rousseau did something else. His fusion helped him forever change the tone of the 
canonical dialogue. Machiavelli had always thought Christian modernity and Roman 
antiquity to appear in conjunction, and that the two world could bring out the best in each 
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other, but Rousseau’s presenting them as if they form a novel ‘mixture’ suddenly 
suggested it should become possible for any state agent to also fuse “the two unhappy 
alternatives, of [respectively] a morally true religion that in its essence [is] subversive of 
politics and [of] a sound civil religion that is, ... historically, an anachronism.”58 On this 
assumption, that distinct  religious traditions would have to be fused into a more-perfect 
civil religion, Rousseau did set the stage for an extremely utilitarian form of 
understanding religion as a building block in the house of state supremacy.
Rousseau’s continuum erases the qualitative difference between liberal autonomy 
and state supremacy. It fuses theocratic with egalitarian modes of authority. The net 
outcome of this ‘mixing’ is the greater indeterminability of the original contrast between 
equal liberties (individual autonomy) and the equal distribution of power between the 
people and their state’s officials (state supremacy). Rousseau’s theory harbors no 
antinomy, or no aporia within the complex relation between the common people’s power 
and their own state’s power. There is, in this theory, no division of the sovereign state 
against itself. Instead, the theory advances an idea of a continuum along which variously 
‘mixed forms’ of sovereign authority can be compared. Yet, the idea of the continuum 
itself dooms these ‘forms’ to be slipping and sliding back and forth, as it were, never 
halting at any determinable point of equilibrium and therein—even more 
problematically—never demarcating the difference between material and spiritual 
sources of authority.59
To wind up these first strands of thought, Beiner stands uncorrected in that he 
himself also dismisses Rousseau’s paradox as “irresolvable”. Beiner rightly rejects the 
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“reason-Revelation dichotomy”, because distilling rationalism from theology forms an 
unsustainable activity. Separation of reason from revelation leads theorists to believe they 
may develop either only a liberal or only a theocratic model. This could further lead them 
to believe that they can reject all other models, as they would simply have to measure all 
these other ‘mixed forms’ of authority along the same philosophical continuum with 
Kantians or Lockeans standing near the “the liberal extremity” and with Schmitt and 
Maistre closest approximating the “theocratic extremity.”60 By having tried so hard to 
create a third civil religion, essentially, Rousseau might only have created the illusion 
that such a continuum can be used as a wildcard—and, so, it was Rousseau’s need for this 
card that turned the canonical dialogue into “a hopeless project”.61 Beiner’s point is that a 
philosophical continuum cannot account for the sovereignty concept, as it is likely to 
create dichotomies where none are needed. Yet, this point raises the stakes on 
sovereignty theory: how can the hopelessly sliding scale be avoided?
The project of civil or of liberal religion and the ideas behind political theology 
are very different, and it is the latter notion that will for the most part be explored in 
Ambivalent Sovereignty. First, this booktitle will endorse the same ambivalency as that 
political theologians such as Augustine endorsed when they recognized the persistence of 
a dualistic worldview. The book will also not give up hope on several other political 
theological inquiries, at least not as easily as Beiner does, including not on Hobbes’s 
inquiry. The latter actually well-integrated political scientific with theological interpretive 
methods.
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Second, by defending political realism against liberal idealism, Ambivalent 
Sovereignty will try to respect rather than to break free the Machiavellian dualities within 
the concept of sovereignty. Political realists have long occupied themselves with the 
question of why the sovereignty concept would refer so clearly to dualistic systems, or 
would even help sustain the contrariness of modes of authority.62 A few important 
answers, to this question, as they have been offered by two realist theorists, Carl Schmitt 
and E. H. Kantorowicz, will be introduced in a later stage of this book.63 The latter 
theorist demonstrates why the sovereign is (religiously) believed to be “human by nature, 
and divine by grace”.64 For now, however, it is just critical to note that it was probably 
Schmitt who viewed the reasons why sovereign authority, as a concept, is believed to 
give meaning to both political pluralism as well as to theological singularity. In other 
words, Schmitt might be found to have best understood why the sovereignty concept 
exemplifies the many possible correspondences “between theological and jurisprudential 
ideas, ... found in ‘the structural relationships of ideas between monarchy and 
monotheism, constitutionalism and deism’”—as Clement Fatovic cites, and in the same 
words summarizes his view.65
The Power of Prudence: Illustrations of Hobbes’s Conjectural Distinction
Sovereigns have long been believed to be part of a mysterious system that 
tolerates their supreme powers. Sovereign parties have been imagined to hold some 
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extraordinary power, in brief, but the system from which this power stems remains an 
enigma. Sovereigns are of course capable of interpreting the world’s juridical, moral, and 
metaphysical dualities—or, at minimum, to create such bifurcations in the political 
world.66 In this respect, they could be said to have filled a political need: they serve as 
interpreters of legal norms, knowing how to translate distinct types of rule into daily 
practices. Sovereigns alone can interpret, and decide, on the moral and amoral and the 
just and unjust meanings of the rule of law. The problem for (international) political 
theorists is that the relations between large groupings of people remain so very often 
morally ambiguous. The larger the groupings or the parties grow, the less interpretable, 
determinable and the less decisive the beginning or ending of their relations appear to be. 
To practice sovereignty will under such conditions become increasingly difficult, and 
may perhaps seem meaningless. But, if it is the case that by expanding the scope of the 
continuum of relationships between peoples and nations, in fact the ambiguity and 
irregularity of their relationships is being fostered, does this then also have to cause an 
“alarming uncertainty as to [the starting point of] what is legal”—to appropriate Onuf’s 
words?67
The works of Niccolò Machiavelli, the Renaissance theorist of the problem of 
sovereignty, will in several of the later-following chapter sections be presented as having 
anchored a much broader political philosophical method—of recognizing and 
establishing ethical modes of public authority.68 Louis Althusser, in his The Underground 
Current of the Materialism of the Encounter, situates these works as no longer sounding 
alarmed by legality’s absent starting point. That is, he believes Machiavelli was probably 
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one of the first political philosophers to no longer have been afraid of those conditions in 
which the rule of law lacked an “obligatory beginning”. Much rather, the philosophical 
method he helped develop, but which has been insufficiently acknowledged, would have 
helped his many successors to board a train of thought which, according to Althusser, 
“has been running for all eternity in front of [their shared method], ... like Heraclitus’ 
river.”69
The thread followed in this and the next sections is a thread woven from this 
Althusserian, or this Machiavellian reference to Heraclitus’ river. The thread itself can be 
theoretically identified in the perplexing opposition of the regular and the irregular, or of 
the finite and the infinite, or also the tension between what amounts to the essentially 
created, or positivist laws versus the rules and codes that lack any such essential 
beginnings or endings. In examining the possibility that Heraclitus, who found that all 
things are perpetually in opposition with themselves, might be the single-most 
previously-unacknowledged paradigmatic figure in the field of (international) political 
theory, and might have inspired theorists ranging from Machiavelli to Arendt, Althusser, 
or from Hobbes to Schmitt, these now-following introductions to their field focus 
themselves on the problem of how and why the power of prudence tends to be presented 
as those powers that allow interpreters to discern between the opposites within all things 
and within all relationships—including the power to discriminate between the certainty 
and uncertainty, morality and amorality, and between the legality and irregularity of 
relations between peoples.
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The section currently at hand shall, cursorily, represent Hobbes’s understanding 
of the world’s oppositions—while the two next sections will illustrate the meanings of 
fairly identical oppositions in a few select passages written by Schmitt and Arendt. 
Anyhow, to Hobbes it must have appeared that the world’s oppositions were no mundane 
dualities. They were also oppositions from which a religious type of extraordinary 
discretion could emerge. His intricate distinctions between the political prerogative and 
the theological discreteness, of sovereignty, or rather between authority’s mundane and 
transmundane dimensions, have invited countless commentaries over the years.70 Both 
Hobbes’s own work, as well as several of these commentaries, have retained their 
relevancy for students of the problem why an expanded continuum—along which more 
relations between more diverse popular groupings appear—has to necessite irregular and 
possibly amoral conditions. Does a broadening of the scope of international relations 
automatically cause a narrowing of the meanings of legality and moral regularity? 
Students may bow themselves over reports by delegations to countless peace-treaty 
negotiations, or the contents of diplomatic cables, of course. Yet, they will in these 
sources as well as in Hobbes’s (and Machiavelli’s!) work find that sovereign authority is 
commonly being believed to come with good judgment. State secrecy doctrines, and 
diplomatic immunities are broadly considered as matters of judiciousness—or, really, of 
prudence. For studious interpreters to be able to give meaning to prudence, this book’s 
general premise holds, however, is for them to be able to calculate the chances that 
sovereign authority emerges from within a sort of stereoscopic, dualistic—and, indeed, 
Heracleitean—understanding of world affairs.
1103
Hobbes has usually been represented, within the canon of political thought, as 
having pioneered a negative definition of prudence.71 The presupposition seems to be, in 
the canon, that he would have seen prudence as the absence of irrationality, and of 
metaphysical speculation as well. Hobbesian prudence has to be defined, this 
conventional representation suggests, as the rational choice to create a social contract—to 
prevent the state’s falling back on “false and absurd general rules.”72 But did the Hobbes 
who wrote these words in fact resort to a negative criterion of political prudence? Did his 
actual definition not also present several critically positive criterions, such as justice and 
practical wisdom, but which might simply have been ignored by his conventional 
readers?
The study of Hobbes’s specific concept of sovereign prudence, or of sensible 
modalities of politico-juridical authority in general, forms one of the major challenges 
throughout this book. What could Hobbes possibly have meant when he wrote that
peoples who live without a civic science have to be considered ethically superior to those 
with access to, and educated in, exactly such a science?73 Why would he argue that those 
who live without positivized rules tend to live in a “better and nobler condition, with their 
natural prudence, than [scientifically trained] men”? Are the latter in fact more prone to 
maintain fallacious logics (and to engage in “misreasoning”), and are their rules more 
“false and absurd”? Their “relying on false rules” should be judged, Hobbes adds, 
unforgivable in comparison to all those non-scientifically and non-theologically trained 
peoples who simply profess their “ignorance of causes and of rules”.74
1104
In the next subsections a small selection will be made of a few passages 
communicating a Heracleitean philosophical method of distinguishing between true and 
false, or just and unjust general rules. Selected from twentieth-century texts by Schmitt, 
Arendt, and Althusser, these passages will be used as entries into an alternative Hobbes-
reading, reemphasizing Hobbes’s political theory’s perennially open-ended or its 
historically contingent qualities as well. By thus co-presenting select twentieth-century 
passages with some sentences written by that seventeenth-century sovereignty scholar, by 
Hobbes, this book shall proceed to build a case against common misperceptions of the 
sense of open-endedness that is being defended in his masterwork Leviathan, or: The 
Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil.
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury immediately announces he prefers to use the first 
part of Leviathan, which he titles “Of Man”, in order to inventorize “the thoughts of man 
... singly”. That is, he immediately says that before he can begin to turn towards more 
complex issues involving the power of prudence and right interpretation—which he shall 
especially turn to in his third, as well as in his final and fourth part—his first order of 
business consists of his making a scientific inventory of discrete thoughts, by considering 
them “singly”.75
Single thoughts are essentially concepts, he will go on to demonstrate, having 
been formed or having been caused by the bodily senses. Conceptual thinking is not a 
matter of scope or scale, however, for that would lead one to presuppose, wrongly of 
course, that the more individuals are thinking the more they must have experienced 
through their senses (or: the other way around). Thinking is instead a systemic combining 
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of acts of remembering sense experiences with acts of imagining. Virtuous thoughts 
express themselves primarily among those who have trained themselves to imagine the 
effects various natural, sensible causes might have. These thoughts signal to their 
prudence, which should best be expressed in reference to the imagining of effects that 
natural laws might have not only on the body politick but also on its concept of 
authority.76 Remarkably, the text of Leviathan rhetorically maintains the difference 
between imagining and remembering—or, between abstract logic of reasoning and the 
recollection of concrete sense experiences—by suggesting that the former is a finite 
matter, of singularity, and the latter of an infinite train of natural consequences.
Prior to further explaining Leviathan’s combining, and yet maintaining the two 
elements of the power of prudence, it should first be noted that Leviathan’s first page 
presents its readership with a definition of thinking as being an activity that may either 
have been caused immediately, by the senses of “taste and touch, or [inter]mediately as in 
seeing, hearing and smelling—which [are the senses of a causal] pressure, by the 
mediation of the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body”. Leviathan then of 
course goes on to offer its long inventories of possible disjunctions within this cognitive 
relation between cause and effect, or between natural sense  and conceptual thought, or 
between empirical sense experiences and imagined speech actions. Indeed, only in a 
much later stage will Leviathan also present man’s many private opinions and 
multiplicity of thoughts “in train” with, or parallel to, man’s chances of recognizing a 
common political authority and a single commonwealth.77 Nonetheless, the opposition 
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between singularity and plurality presents itself on the first page, inviting several critical 
questions about the structure of the argument developed in Leviathan.
Why would Hobbes have titled the first part “Of Man”, the second “Of 
Commonwealth”, and the last two parts “Of a Christian Commonwealth” and, as its 
opposite, “Of the Kingdom of Darkness”? “Man” and “Commonwealth” refer 
respectively to chapters on natural and on political science, or respectively to 
sociobiological and his theological inventories of Hobbes’s thoughts on the relation 
between these two planes. Hobbes structures Leviathan’s third part around a conceptual 
conjunction of the first two fields—so that it seems as if mortal human beings can 
somehow coincide with an apparently immortal or resurrected commonwealth. But the 
problem is that, as they are presupossing that the third part represents a synthesis of the 
first two parts, many readers choose to skip the fourth and final part.78 Beiner, for 
example, never receives the critical message of the fourth part and the conclusion, 
however, which holds that there may be no such synthesis: it may be impossible to avoid 
all conceptual or hermeneutical disjunctions between the just general rules of a Christian 
republic and those of its unjust counterpart.79
The relation between the two opposite Parts 3 and 4 should be read as Hobbes’s 
definition of the political theological disjunction he recognizes within all matters of 
authority—as authority may either be civil or ecclesiastical. Importantly, Hobbes 
concludes after Part 4 that even though he had hoped to create a stronger theoretical 
conjunction, and reduce the oppositions between the four parts, he admits that open-
ended either-or considerations have to remain a perpetual possibility.
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Only in the case of the Judaic commonwealth, or only in the Mosaic republic, 
does Hobbesian sovereignty theory allow for almost no either-or disjunction. God was 
there believed to be the only sovereign: God could here be heard to “speak to the people, 
as judge”. Also, divine laws appeared here as direct, and as unmediated, as humanly 
imaginable: criminals were treated as sinners, and sinners as criminals. But Hobbes is 
hesitant to likewise confuse crime with sin, because this would mean that those who sin 
only in terms of their “private zeal” could simply be stoned to death—not only as a 
matter of fact, but particularly also as a matter of right. Stonings could then simply occur 
within the limits of the law. “[S]till the hand of the witness [should] throw the first 
stone”, as a matter of fact, even though the same witness may have falsely accused his 
victim on the basis of the latter’s private beliefs or ideological opinions. By confusing 
fact with right, the witness may pretend the accused had violated moral norms or divine 
commands. “[T]here is no place for [such false] witnesses”, at least not any in questions 
of factual sovereignty and of political right, therefore, as Hobbes concludes Leviathan. In 
such questions, instead, a disjunction should be recognized: that these matters of 
authority may only “depend either upon Reason or upon Scripture”.80 Not on their 
synthesis.
Hobbes’s civic-scientific curriculum trains citizens in using a voluntary, 
uncoercive, merely persuasive mode of authority. But readers who ignore the title of the 
fourth part of Hobbes’s curriculum as well as the reasons why this title opposes the title 
of the third part, Ronald Beiner included, have usually also ignored the ingenuous 
organization of these four elements. Hobbes organizes the four parts in the way an 
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alchemist does, knowing he has not found the formula of sovereignty’s quintessence. So, 
all those readers who have thusfar paid no heed to Hobbes’s concluding parts—where he 
in fact restores the vitally contingent opposition, or the alchemistic disjunction between 
reasonable and revealed moral truths as well as between matters of fact and matters of 
right—might misunderstand Hobbes’s theoretical purpose. For instance, Beiner assumes 
Hobbes would have asserted a clear “preference for (imposed) religious uniformity”, that 
Hobbes’s ideal state would have reserved “to itself [the] privileged interpretation of 
Scripture”, and that his main “project” consisted of his forceful subordination of “church 
to state”. Additionally, he assumes Hobbes would not have tried to maintain any 
theoretical disjunction between church and state, or also not between the punishment of 
sinners and of criminals. Beiner says he, instead, collapsed “the distinction between ‘sin’ 
or ‘trespass’ (sacred, eternal) and ‘law’ (secular, temporal).”81
Yet, contrary to Beiner, it should be asked if Hobbes not actually rejected 
precisely such a total collapse and refused to situate the spiritual underneath the material 
sources of authority—and whether he did not actually reject such a monistic modality of
sovereign power. Perhaps Hobbes lays out the groundwork for a new sort of civic 
science, and his building blocks consist of hybrid, or of both sacred as well as profane 
concepts of authority? It is possible to argue that his civic science is constructed out of 
both his natural science and his theological interpretation, as Leviathan’s readers are 
constantly exposed to civic scientific definitions they are told they may one day need in 
understanding ambivalent signs and other disjunctive speech acts, or any other natural 
systemic dualities. They may one day need to be able to recognize legally and morally 
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ambiguous relations between different representations of right and wrong, next to all the 
various doctrinal or ecclesiastical representations of good and evil, in particular. Nicholas 
Onuf’s phrase of the “alarming uncertainty as to what is legal” nicely captures why 
Leviathan might have been written as an instruction manual on the question of why 
legality is not contingent. Legality is not simply seen by the eyes of the beholder but is, 
rather, dependent on a common belief in justice as well (on civic religion). 
The text of Leviathan is filled with apparently civic-scientific definitions designed 
to help reduce this uncertainty, and to closer combine, without collapsing, sanctionable 
actions and legal norms; both facts and rights.82 Yet, if the text presents the reader with a 
political philosophical method, then why does it conclude with a reiteration of the 
contingent disjunction between ‘trespass’ and ‘law’?83
The thesis defended, in these current chapter sections, is that Hobbes’s answer 
disallows any closing, any collapse, or any synthesis of the religious with the civic 
realms, and of divine natural laws with factual commonwealths. These realms continue to
involve two distinct types of (cogitations of) authority, throughout his work, just as that 
unmediated sense experiences and conceptual or rational thinking are herein presented as 
consisting of two types of cognitive knowledge. Hobbes does not deny these two types 
and realms intersect. But he aks, evidently, how the intersections themselves should be 
believed contingent to regulation, so that they can also be believed to well up from the 
opposite routes they contain.
Hobbes’s answer attains especially suggestive, and rhetorically persuasive 
qualities during his treatment of the civil war problem. Rather than that he understands 
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disputes between citizens, which usually follow from confused sense experiences or from 
other ambiguities in their conceptualizations, to cause civil wars, Hobbes does not appear 
to have believed civil wars really exist. All wars are contingent to self-regulation. For, if 
totally irregular civil wars would indeed exist, then they no longer exist. That is, in the 
history of warfare there would have to have been a transcendental moment, through 
which human history would have progressed from some sort of anarchical condition of 
sinful violence towards the condition of potentially ever-greater peace. Against this idea 
of a progressive peace, as well as against this idea of historical transcendence, Hobbes 
believes civil wars to be logical impossibilities. Not one individual has ever been at war 
with every other individual. Wars have always been self-regulated armed conflicts. Wars 
are a sort of duels, as Schmitt will later concur, in which a modicum of natural law 
authority is being recognized. In every civil war, some confederated authority would 
always emerge. Even in the hypothetical condition of an absolute civil war, thus, 
“wherein every man [is an enemy] to every man, for want of a common power to keep 
them all in awe ... there [still will be] no man [who] can hope by his own strength, or wit, 
to defend himself from destruction, without the help of [his] confederates; where 
everyone expects the same defense by the conferation [as] that everyone else does.”84
Warring parties are akin to duelists. They are conjecturally-related to one and the 
same institution of contraries, or rather to one and the same principle of sovereign 
confederation. Hobbes merely hopes to demonstrate why this principle itself should is 
believed to derive its authority from a Christian covenant, or from a civic religion.85  
Hence, it cannot be denied that Hobbes did sketch a bleak image of enmity or, what 
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amounts to, total civil war: of the “perpetual war of every man against his neighbor”. But 
he instantly added a paradox to his image of civil war. Under the hypothetical conditions 
of this civil war—or, in the thought-experiment that there should be no confederated, and 
also no covenanted sovereign authority—any one individual who is caught up by such a 
“perpetual war” must still somehow have been “thinking sovereign power [had become] 
too great [as he] will seek to make it less.” This means that even in order to lessen the 
power of that supposedly overbearing sovereignty, this rebel must then somehow “subject 
himself to the power that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater [power than his own 
sovereign power].”86
The notorious image of a war of all against all, thus, turns into an absurdity. 
Hobbes twice adds the provision that the participants to such a war cannot be sociable 
animals. Such isolated individuals cannot be human beings, because the latter species is 
instead highly capable of limiting its common power. It would be an unimaginable, or 
absurd idea for human beings to exchange their natural sociability for an infinite regress 
of their social power (resulting in either an ever-greater or in the ever-more limited 
power). Or, in other words, Hobbes warns against the fallacy that sovereign power could 
somehow be presented on a sliding scale, on a continuum, rather than as a unity of 
contraries.
Hobbes is adamant that sovereign authority wells up from a system that unites 
contrary tendencies in human nature. The question is of course which type of system he 
has in mind.87 First, the system seems incapable of comparing authorities along an 
infinite continuum of legitimate moral progression. If it could, then the meanings of the 
1112
sovereign’s judgments and decisions could too easily be shifted back and forth along the 
continuum—depending only on the whims of the day.88 Second, in having to be part of a 
systemic order or of a scientifically cogitable order, sovereign authority seems to have 
very specific effects on people’s memory and on their imagination as well. Sovereignty’s 
effects cannot have been created from nothing. They are not caused by a vacuous 
continuum. If they were, however unimaginably, then certainly those holding the most 
power have to be those who are most judicious and discriminate in taking their decisions. 
Any king or priest, or even any other solitary man, depending on the scope of his power, 
then has to be most judicious in terms of exercising his sovereignty.89 Clearly, this is not 
how life has been organized.
In sum, Hobbes argues that sovereignty emerges from a systemic combination: it 
wells up in the form of self-regulation, and sharply-discerning speech acts. And, it 
primarily emerges from a systemic union both of the monarchical mode of authority as 
well as of a religious covenant, of each citizen with every other such a citizen. This 
systemic combination of a pluralistic covenant with the singularity of the monarchy is a 
combination which in its own turn depends, for its vitality, on distinctions such as the one 
between covenanting and confederating. In a covenant, citizens are willing to perform 
their actions prudentially and freely—but in a confederation or an alliance they do so by 
necessity, and more egoistically. In sum, a strange systemic combination emerges in 
conjunction to active distinctions between ingenuous and disingenous, or just and unjust 
rules of association and sociability.90
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Hobbes’s Definition of Prudence as Illustrated by Schmitt
Who should (be believed to) exercise the supreme power of the state of the 
people? Who decides on the meaning of experiences and concepts such as war and peace, 
life and death? In what has been regarded as one of his most anti-Judaic—and, 
presumably, also one of his most orthodox passages on Hobbes’s masterwork 
Leviathan—Carl Schmitt provides his own answer to precisely this question. In the here-
selected passage, published in 1938, Schmitt defines the supreme power as if it were that 
one power that allows people to truthfully distinguish “between inner and outer, morality 
and right, inner disposition and outer performance”.91
Both as a legal scholar and specifically also as a political theologian, Schmitt 
treats the power of distinction in terms of a paradox. He already studies this curious 
paradox in his book review, published in 1926, in which he demonstrated that although 
the act of distinction itself may result in a dyadic, or in a dualistic representation of the 
world into two mutually negating spheres—and, especially, also in a representing of the 
mutual negation of moral right and political right—these opposite spheres, typically, will 
also be believed to remain inseparable. The paradox is thus somehow responsible for 
placing two types of human action in opposite spheres, broadly classifiable as the spheres 
of moral or religious values and of political decisions on these values, yet it also 
anticipates the possibility that the two spheres form a unity. Before learning more about 
Schmitt’s mysteriously dualistic notion of this unity, and of how sovereign prudence 
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might emerge from within that notion, the current section shall make an unprecedented 
effort to compare Schmitt’s identification of this unity of opposites, to another series of 
unities of opposites. This other series was reintroduced, to the field of political theory, in 
1978, by Hannah Arendt’s last work.92
Arendt does not recognize Hobbes to have offered a valid dual sovereignty 
theory. She is always disparaging towards his monarchist proclivities. In On Violence, for 
example, she suspects him of monism, of homogenizing the fears of all, and of allegedly 
having collapsed his “notion of absolute [monarchical] power” onto “the sovereign 
European nation-state”.93 Before giving a closer look to Arendt, to her following of 
Montesquieu, and before asking why she might have defended a deeply Heracleitean 
conception of authority in the process, it should be asked if her work on the power of 
prudence was not actually much more compatible with Hobbes’s definitions than she had 
realized. This in the sense that both Arendt as well as Hobbes recognized the 
inseparability of, and the need for a distinction between, political judgment and moral 
wisdom. Yet, to better understand Hobbes’s definitions it must first be stressed that it 
would have been Schmitt who most radically reconsidered the disjunctive possibilities 
Hobbes had created: that moral or religious evaluation as compared to political prudence 
and civic action form, usually, two mutually opposing realms. In his reconsideration of 
this originally Hobbesian opposition, Schmitt quite clearly suggested that the sovereign’s 
power to distinguish—between, for instance, “morality and right”—should not be 
believed to have a dichotomous effect on the relation between those realms.
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Schmitt’s paradox of the power of prudence manifests itself in his Catholic 
understanding of war. Once war is being understood as the one type of duel in which 
there are two enemies who self-regulate, or even self-sanction (hedge) their conduct, any 
interpretation of the war will have to distinguish itself from non-hedged enemy conduct. 
War can from that point onwards neither be a civil war nor a total war—nor any other 
sort of indiscriminate violence. The conceptualization of war, within Schmitt’s theory, is 
a matter of how a self-regulating relationship between two partisans or between two 
sovereigns, rather, may conceptually emerge—and of how it, existentially, may be said to 
be experienced.94 The abstract concept of sovereignty and the concrete threat of loss of 
life in a duel between sovereigns, then, appear together throughout Schmittian images of 
political prudence.
The laws applicable to armed duels, on whichever scale, are not positively-
definable international laws. Instead, Schmitt reminds his readers, they are general rules. 
War law consists of a body of prohibitions which cannot be legally enforced, at least not 
statutorily, but which nonetheless helps maintain the ‘union’ of a duel between 
sovereigns. For as long as the duelists are consciously refusing to rely on any “false 
rules” they are apparently issuing legitimate interpretations of the law—in the form of a 
mysteriously emerging code of conduct, and code of mutually recognized forms of 
political prudence. Note that Hobbes himself, centuries prior to Schmitt, had also rejected 
those generally applicable or those positive rules that he nonetheless deemed to be 
alogical: these rules were, in his view, both “false and absurd”.95
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In Leviathan, Hobbes outlines his prospects for a civic science by means of a 
political theological argument. Hobbes argues that any figure holding sovereign authority 
should be allowed to freely interpret the meaning of the generally-applicable rules. 
Hobbes refers hereby both to scriptural as well as to natural rules: both of these types of 
meaning must be decided, and must be distinguished by a single mode of authority. 
Meaningful distinctions between the divine and the human, the free and the providential, 
or probably between the natural law and his own civic science as well, can only be drawn 
by a single state and its single set of authoritative interpretations—in the form of its 
speech acts and other significant signs (Hobbes prefers to describe suspected miracles as 
signs, as they only in rare cases indeed would have indicated a revealed Christian 
miracle). Furthermore, Hobbes is among the first to theorize what it means to be prudent 
in terms of how future states should exercise their ultimate authority, while interpreting 
such acts and signs. Almost regardless as to whether they will exercise their authority 
through an absolute monarchy or an Emperor, and through ethnicity or equal citizenship, 
Hobbesian theory quite simply equates their ultimate authority to their unicity: a category 
in which he clearly included both religious-hermeneutical as well as jurisdictional-
jurisprudential lineages. The theory’s central argument holds that the sovereign’s 
authority may only derive, ultimately, from its own unicity in its relation to other such 
authorities and, thereby, from only one reoccurring and re-emerging (or perhaps, even, 
sempiternal?) lineage of meaningful, judicious interpretative acts.
Schmitt’s understanding of war-as-duel reflects not only his reading of Hobbes 
but also of the medieval Christian mystics, who had spoken about spiritual warfare. This 
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allowed them to represent the great struggles of human nature in terms of a coincidence 
of opposites.96 Their words had also been suggestive of a perennially-reoccurring 
coincidence, or a perpetual struggle between, two opposite this-wordly dispositions. This 
whereas spiritual peace would, instead, have to have been imagined as an other-worldly 
state in which just acts are being performed, and in which the outer appearance of the 
sovereign is being honored—as well as, actually, the state in which the sovereign of 
sovereigns (the Messiah) will have appeared in his most unified, righteous, and just 
manner. Yet, Schmitt’s theory never separates the war-like from the peace-like state, 
instead constantly recombining the two states and always somehow reuniting their inner 
moral values with their outer appearances.97 This theoretically and systematically 
dualistic aspect of Schmitt’s presentation becomes especially clear in the original 1926 
review of Meinecke’s Idee der Staatsräson.98
In comparison to Meinecke, the renowned historian, Schmitt in effect argues that 
the world cannot consist of either political-ideological or moralist-evaluative analyses 
alone.99 Certainly it had for centuries remained the case that, Schmitt seems to admit to 
the neo-Hegelian historian, moral dispositions had helped ground the various ideological 
camps. But Meinecke separates morality from political ideology—without also 
discerning any evolutionary line (Entwicklungslinie), or any relation between the 
realms.100 That is, he goes one bridge too far by claiming that history’s pendulum has 
been swinging and will have to continue to swing towards a stronger, and an extreme 
“dualism of politics and morality”. Schmitt will not forgive Meinecke’s making the claim 
that the ever-more advanced polarization of these realms would be immanent. In thus 
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prophesizing the world’s dichotimization, essentially, Meinecke had ignored—according 
to his critical reviewer—the fundamental problem of who should arbitrate the relation 
between moral disposition and political justice, and of who should ultimately judge and 
decide the difference between one’s inner-worldly life (self-confessed individuality) and 
one’s outer-wordly performances (religious or civic identity). Meinecke’s foretelling of a 
coming split between inner and outer worldss, in brief, had too quickly passed by on the 
vital issue of “who decides? (quis judica bit)”.101
Schmitt recognizes both the general significance of political dualities, when 
formulated in terms of how world history should be interpreted, as well as of the specific 
rhetorical form of the unity of opposites. Rather than to dismiss conventional historians 
entirely, Schmitt would proceed to inspire Koselleck (a conceptual historian) in similarly 
acknowledging the opposite meanings of political theological concepts—such as miracle 
or sovereignty.102 But in contrast to both Koselleck and Meinecke, Schmitt will thereby 
introduce his metaconceptual planes of various mutually opposing meanings. As he will 
show in his notorious studyThe Concept of the Political, which forms its own plane, the 
meaning of an enemy’s actions can only be understood in contradistinction and yet also 
in relation to a friend’s. The secular concept of sovereignty’s meaning, however, lacks 
this relation with a friend. Its meaning has been demarcated by exclusive opposites, or by 
enemies, without meaningful relation between them.
Schmitt, at least in his 1926 review, uses a diamond-shape diagram to show there 
are many metaconceptual opposites which have maintained their theological, or their 
spiritually relational meanings. Perhaps the most critical of these many opposites is the 
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one that unites the political and the ethical realms—or “power and law” or, rather, 
“empirical reality and natural law” (this critical unity is being classified as the juridical
duality). Similarly, Schmitt finds that “good and evil” are to be classified among the 
metaphysical unities of opposites. Indeed, Schmitt’s diagram presents several other 
unified dualities within the metaphysical dimension, as well: “natural necessity and moral 
right”; “nature and culture” or; “fate and creativity.”103
Each such duality connotes both a political and a moral dimension. In this sense, 
each unity of opposites gives meaning to moralizations of political activities—and which 
Schmitt’s later works will treat as part of his political theological system. The implication 
of this system is that any scientific distinction between two enemies fighting ‘to the 
death’ can have no political theological, and no spiritual connotations—for as long as, at 
least, the dispute between these two enemies is not also producing any warrior code 
which hedges their actions. If the political realm were indeed completely informed by 
their unregulated existential enmity, however, then Schmitt would have rejected this 
realm’s amorality. 
If wars are only waged by existential enemies, no warrior ethos can emerge from 
such total wars. Ethics and religion would herein have to remain completely divorced 
from, and incapable of giving meaning to political action. In such a total war there will no 
longer be any relation of friendship which, alternatively, could be believed to give new 
spiritual meanings to acts of violence. On the premise that Schmitt retains his Catholic 
beliefs about the nature of war, as well as that he continues to reject Hegel’s proportional 
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connection between polarization and synthesis, he must have sought new ground for a 
more deeply political theological interpretation of sovereignty.
From 1926 onwards, in fact, this search must have formed the most notable strand 
in Schmittian sovereignty theory. Because of the theory’s rejection of the Meineckean 
dichotomy between the state’s power politics and its moral values—or between the 
state’s egoistic utilitarian interests and relational ethical norms—Schmittian sovereignty 
should be thought an attempt to restore the unity of these opposites, without either 
separating or completely transcending them.104 After all, the above-identified oppositions 
would generally have to have been seen to be playing themselves out within the world’s 
deontic, “ethical” dimensions as well as—and thus not necessarily only within—its 
instrumentalist, strictly existentialist dimension of “the political.”105
Montesquieu’s Sense of Good Judgment Illustrated by Arendt’s Heraclitus
It is no secret that Arendt, especially in her On Revolution, gives much of her 
appreciation to a deeply Montesquiean concept of the power of prudence. Montesquieu 
had in his own turn admired the ancient Roman Republic’s agricultural foundations, as 
may also be known, by suggesting that the Republic’s autonomy was owed to the 
commercially-acquired wealth of the estate-owners.106 This section will clarify why 
Arendt’s citing of Heraclitus helps understand not only Montesquieu’s conception of 
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good judgment. Rather, Arendt’s Heraclitus will also help illustrate why Hobbes’s 
concept of prudential authority remains and should remain divided against itself.
Andreas Kinneging finds that Montesquieu’s ideal state was owed to aristocrats: 
to those men trusted to be capable of displaying “good sense and good judgment.” 
Montesquieu’s neo-classicism had thus also suggested that prudence, practical wisdom, 
should remain the aristocratic virtue. Even though the virtue of prudence would by the 
end of the nineteenth century have become burdened with the more modernist 
“connotation of half-hearted Realpolitik and unauthentic affability”, Montesquieu, as well 
as an entire political culture of Römertum, had nonetheless still treated (Cicero’s) 
prudentia in terms of “tact, Urteilskraft, good taste, and common sense.”107
How did Rome value commonsense? First, on an institutional level, the city-
republic’s constitution gave much more weight to assemblies (comitia) of farmers, and 
thus also to the practical demands of their “life in the country (rus)”, than to the idleness 
of life in the city (urbs), by an estimated ratio of at least ten-to-one.108 Second, on a 
personal level, Machiavelli’s lens on Livy’s realm (the res publica) zooms in on 
Cincinnatus. This dictator returned to his small farm, to “ploughing his fields”, after 
having won the war.109 He is thus not just Machiavelli’s, but Rome’s exemplary yeoman-
farmer. His actions symbolize a venerable, because also “austere and simple, lifestyle.”110
This concept of exemplary austerity would not rule out politically pleasurable 
experiences, however. The concept honors tactful decisions and, therein, expressions of 
good taste as well. Cincinnatus’s austerity is part of a moral code inapplicable to, and 
which cannot be used to honor, private pleasures. Both economic as well as 
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psychological austerity are conducive to good laws, from this early neo-classicistic angle, 
because they prevent aggressive conflicts from emerging.111
Arendt writes in On Revolution (first published in 1963) that “only Montesquieu 
never thought it necessary to introduce an absolute ... power into the political realm.” 
Rather, Montesquieu had argued that despotism and absolutism could be averted for as 
long as “Europe’s peoples ... trusted the laws under which they lived, and ... believed in 
the [moral] authority of those [noblemen] who ruled them.”  Yet, he would feared the 
modern world, because it signaled “the progressive loss of [the] authority of all inherited 
political structures”—including those structures that had long been modeled after Rome’s 
constitutionalist customs and conceptions of virtue.112
By the 1970s, Arendt appears to have become a little less authority-centric (less 
aristocratic, basically) in her outlook on the world. She now had begun to rethink the 
question of why the realm of political activity actually also should be a realm of political 
authority. The short version of her answer holds that the realm depends for its 
continuation on public recognitions of its own legitimacy. This would have meant that 
those holding the supreme power of judgment cannot act arbitrarily, at risk of appearing 
to act illegitimately and possibly illegally as well. Yet, why should the authorities not 
become unjust and corrupt—even though they might very well continue to appear in a 
legitimate manner?
The validity of her answer to this why-question would help her political theory in 
saving the republic. It should help unite all of her theory’s distinctions between inner 
dispositions and public appearances—and to newly respect the public plurality of private 
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opinions.113 “From all things one, and from one all things”—as, she well-knew, had first 
been written by Heraclitus.114 Heraclitus, the process philosopher, would only for a brief 
moment end up being magnified by Arendt (in distinction to another reading of 
Heraclitus, by her former mentor, Heidegger).115 Yet, under her magnifier, unicity 
somehow emerges from multiplicity, multiplicity from unicity—and, in again other 
words, the singular here seems to come from the plural just as that plurality comes around 
from the other direction. The contraries mutually imply each other. They do not simply 
coexist. Buddhism helps illuminate what it might mean to observe a mutual, or a dualist 
implication of two contraries quite similar to Arendt’s. One Buddhist mantra (of 
Transcendent Wisdom) holds this: “that which is form is emptiness/that which is 
emptiness form.”116 To say it differently, the negation of form is emptiness, and the 
negation of emptiness is form, so that from within all form there may emerge 
emptiness—and from all emptiness form. Consider also, for one moment, the first stanza 
of the Japanese Buddhist monk’s, Hakuin’s, Song of Za-Zen: “All beings are primarily 
Buddhas/Like water and ice/There is no ice apart from water/There are no Buddhas apart 
from beings.”117 This stanza is a metaphor both for a dualist, and yet for a non-dualist 
relationship towards the practice of Za-Zen as well: from all ice emerges water, and from 
all water ice—not unlike how, to invoke another Buddhist metaphor for non-dualism, 
neither thorniness nor fragrance and beauty may constitute a rose. The rose as a whole 
serves as a realist metaphor for the non-duality of life’s flux and life’s vicissitudes.118
This is how Arendt cites Heraclitus, while reiterating her own non-dualist 
premises, in her work The Life of the Mind: “The god is day night, winter summer, war 
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peace, satiety hunger”.119 The unity of each of these opposites (whether it is the unity of 
day and night, or of ice and water matters little in this context) is obviously a conjunction 
divided against itself. Yet, it is also a metaphor for both the (Heracleitean) god’s 
singularity and the same god’s dualistic appearances. It is this singularity that can be 
represented by reference to the two, mutually opposing worlds, of both summer and 
winter—or to both the year’s longest night and its shortest day, for instance. Both 
summer and winter are defined by each other: they always appear as opposite worlds 
within the same year or as representations of the same god. But, then again, “[t]here are 
not two [separate] worlds: [winter and summer are still considered one] because 
metaphor unites them”—she adds.120 And, indeed, she has metaphor in mind; metaphor 
should be expected to give meaning to prudential actions.
Despite Arendt’s rejection of Hobbesian absolutism, Arendt’s own calling forth of 
the critical importance of metaphor is consistent with Hobbes’s theory of speech acts—
and of how definitions of conceptual thoughts should help people reduce the ambiguity of 
their speech acts, their legal norms, and their constitutional regulations.121 Like Hobbes, 
Arendt focuses on the importance of discerning the opposite meanings, as they are found 
in metaphor, of a single mode of authority. The practices of sovereign statespersons 
consist, mostly, of their more or less discrete interpretations of a set of general rules. Yet, 
as was alluded to earlier, and in one of the current chapter’s epigraphs, Hobbes says that 
“ignorance of ... [these] rules does not set men so far out of their way as [their] relying on 
false rules.”122 He adds, in the following sentence, that to prevent general rules from 
turning into false rules they should be “purged from ambiguity.” This purging will 
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increase their ethical significance. Hobbes’s civic science does not allow those working 
with the general rule to pretend to be regulating themselves. They must also demonstrate 
why they are capable of discerning true from false rules, and do this by identifying 
“senseless and ambiguous words”, so that they can newly begin to reappreciate their own 
needs—both for sapience and prudence.
To the opposite side of various mundane and pretentious or artificial rules, 
Hobbes presents the possibility of following natural or ethical and transmundane rules. 
Even though he recognizes the open-ended disjunctions between the two types of rules, 
he finds that those who live in ignorance of the first type of rules would be much better 
off than those who have been misled by them. Mundane rules are usually misleading, 
because they are being applied by means of ambiguous speech acts. That is, those only 
living under naturally transmundane rules, and with only “natural prudence”, he finds, 
tend to live in a “better and nobler condition” than those who live with possibly false and 
morally confused rules.123 Yet, it also follows from Leviathan Chapter 6 that the actual 
disjunction or difference between these two conditions cannot be understood without 
their joint, conjectural, metaphorical representations. Sacred-natural and profane-artificial 
worlds intersect in the representative power of metaphor, just as that the transmundane 
natural law is constantly being analogously represented in more mundane institutions.
Not long after Arendt, finally, Althusser will also (albeit only once) mention 
Heraclitus. He will identify Heraclitus while making sense of yet another perplexing 
disjunction, this time no longer between the profane and the sacred, but much more 
clearly between the materialist and the ideological meanings of authority. Thus, 
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Heraclitus is mentioned in Louis Althusser’s essay The Underground Current of the 
Materialism of the Encounter, which was in part inspired by an earlier book, Machiavelli 
and Us. Althusser had in the earlier work pioneered the proposition that Machiavelli 
negated virtually all of the political foundations he himself introduced. These negations, 
of these institutional or foundational alternatives to Machiavelli’s own concept of Italy’s 
popular constitution, then, would have been expressions of his negative dialectical 
method. That is, the Florentine dialectician would probably only have left one opposition 
standing—at the final end of his explorative, critical philosophical method, expressed 
both in The Discourses and The Prince, of possible modes of Italian legitimate authority. 
This opposition, as was further demonstrated in Machiavelli and Us, must be believed to 
have consisted of the one between an army selected from the regular infantry and a 
defense based on the irregular citizen militias—but quintessentially also between the 
positive figure of the, exemplarily republic-oriented, military captain and the peoples of 
Italy.124
Specifically in The Underground Current, then, Althusser begins to suggest that 
philosophical oppositions (including those between civic institutions) are never final. 
Even Machiavelli had known that his own series of oppositions remained historically 
open-ended, or at least open to judgment. Althusser thus begins to find additional 
philosophical and theoretical support for what he had earlier identified as the (indeed, 
Machiavelli’s) aleatory dialectical method. That method should now come to be 
supported, additionally, he writes, by “the thesis of the primacy of disorder over order 
[and by] ... the thesis of the primacy of ‘dissemination’ over the postulate that every 
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signifier has a meaning, ... and in the welling up of order from the very heart of disorder 
to produce a world.” Against the Aristotelian philosophies and against the other such 
“philosophies of essence, ... and therefore of Origin and End”, Althusser denies that his 
own Machiavellian (political) philosophical method should ever be closed off by any 
“obligatory beginning”. “[T]o the contrary, [his philosophical method], ... by sheer 
strength of arm, ‘hoists itself aboard the train’ that has been running for all eternity in 
front of it, like Heraclitus’ river. Hence there is no end, either of the world, or of history, 
or of philosophy, or of morality, or of art or politics, and so on.”125
Althusser, Arendt and Montesquieu, and Schmitt and Hobbes all recognized the 
political philosophical importance of some sort of unity of opposites, and of some sort of 
parallel between contraries—such as, in this case, the parallel between a single, 
essentially historical, event and the train of eternal thought, ‘running in front of it.’ If it is 
the case, as Althusser himself puts it in his own encounter with these parallel contraries, 
which he mostly detects in the Marxist tradition but also apparently in Machiavelli and 
Spinoza, then it may be the case that it was first and foremost Machiavelli’s principal 
philosophical method that would during the centuries afterwards continue to be applied 
by “Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger, ... and Derrida”—as these philosophers would 
all have tried ‘hoisting themselves aboard’ of the same train of (apparently 
Machiavellian) eternal political thought.126 Moreover, perhaps both Schmitt and Arendt 
might also have attempted to board that train, however minimalistically, speeding back 
towards the much longer-standing tradition of a Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx?
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The point of Althusser’s own texts is that many, seemingly very diverse, political 
philosophical methods might have had much more in common than has previously been 
presupposed.127 Althusser was willing to bet that despite the fact that each of these 
individual methods would attach more importance to either positivity or negativity, and 
either to order or disorder, they shared the fundamentally Heracleitean insight: these 
opposites all imply each other’s existence, without deriving from the same Origin or 
without leading to the same End.128 By contrast to what a conventional reader such as 
Beiner has argued about Hobbes and Machiavelli—in concluding they would have tried 
to implement a final theocratic solution, or a complete synthesis of regular civil rights, 
subordinated to divine right—Althusser much rather breathes the Heracleitean notion that 
there is no such effect as synthetic subordination.129 The perennial philosophical train 
(and its sense of divinity, infinity, or God’s transmundane ‘authority’) makes it possible 
for each of the Machiavellian theorists to deliberately maintain their own political 
method’s vulnerability to chance. As Althusser simplifies this wager, the classical
theorists must have have steeped themselves in one “[by now] almost completely 
unknown [probably Epicurean or Heracleitean] materialist tradition”. Their political 
philosophies remained (again: although this has been inadequately acknowledged) tied to 
a fundamentally materialist examination “of the encounter and, therefore, of the aleatory 
and of contingency.”130
To reiterate, it has been proposed that when Arendt shares Montesquieu’s respect 
for public authority and thereby for the power of judgment, but also when Schmitt speaks 
of Hobbes’s faculty of distinction, Arendt and Schmitt both disallowed an increase of this 
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faculty in itself to cause moral progress. Professed in social isolation, the faculty of 
judgment is meaningless. Like Hobbes, in particular, these political philosophers do not 
appear to ever have argued that by drawing sharper distinctions, and by more-clearly 
discerning between moral values and political actions, progress can be realized. 
The curious absence of any strong moral or historical progress, or of any other 
transcendentalized syntheses in their arguments, will have to be discussed elsewhere or 
by other advanced realists. In the ulterior absence of moral progress, it remains a mystery 
why progress should be believed absent in the first place. Do not most religious traditions 
promise the progressive future of a virtuous afterlife or a reincarnate mode of morality? 
This mystery’s existence has been tentatively confirmed by Vatter, whose reading of 
Machiavelli demonstrates that civic religiosity is antithetical to the state order, and yet 
affirms its existence through what advanced realists are referring to as dual sovereignty. 
In defense of advanced realism, this all could mean that both the state and the people find 
themselves in a self-perpetuating and self-organizing revolution—without any fixed 
ideals or progressive ambitions—because neither the state nor the people and because 
neither princely dictator nor free commoner are to claim the middle ground. Vatter 
proposes that Machiavelli’s concept of historical and political flux would herein have 
introduced “a radical discontinuity and innovation with respect to what is ... customary”. 
He further proposes that Machiavelli’s descriptions of “transitions from tyranny to 
freedom and conversely” introduced a notion of flux that can help (realist) theorists to 
further revolutionize the materialism of action in itself. “All political action, in this sense, 
becomes revolutionary: ... political freedom knows no [third] mean.”131
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The disjunctions and conjunctions of political opposites are to remain without a 
staked-out middle, without a third moment of integration, and without neutrality. The 
Aristotelian mean spells death to advanced realism. Freedom and tyranny, progress and 
regress, or moral and amoral values are instead to be politicized. They are the sort of 
opposites that can be generating the longer dialogue that people should be having about 
their state structures. For now, however, it must be noted that (besides and before Vatter) 
it was Althusser who actually opened the theoretical possibility (to this political 
dialogue’s revolutionary participants) that there should remain a systemic disjunction—
which could perhaps express itself as a contingent aporia—between the freedom of the 
people and the dictatorial state, as well as between an infinite commonwealth and a finite 
body politick (as Hobbes would have said in stead of Althusser).
Similarly, the relation between people and state should be theorized as a 
simulation of the one between the religious and the civic realms of human action; that is, 
between the necessitous laws of nature and the free movements of the diverse human 
bodies politick as well. Or, as Vatter concludes, the complex relation between free people 
and the powers of the state is to be understood as a relation which is perpetually being 
regrounded in the public or in the dialogical realm. It is in free public speech that 
revolutionary potentials are being actualized. “Republican freedom means that citizens 
can become princes, that freedom is not only negative [or individual] liberty but also 
isonomy—understood as the [actual] equality of everyone to make and unmake laws, and 
not simply as the [potential or formalist] equality before these laws.”132
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The last word is for the archetypal realist himself: “Nature has created men so that 
they are able to desire everything and are unable to attain every thing [...]. From this 
arises the variability of their fortune; for since some men desire to have more, and some 
fear to lose what has been acquired, they come to enmities”.133
Can a realist theory diminish the income variability between ‘haves’ and ‘have-
nots’ and, if so, can it also turn enmity into discord and antagonism into agonism? The 
discordant relationship between those who desire gaining more and those who fear losing 
more is the ultimate relationship of conjectural materialism. It comprises all those 
relations of political parity, albeit it itself must remain a far from ideal or positive 
relationship.
New Conclusion: From Neo-Rousseauan Idealism to Machiavellian Materialism
This new conclusion opens with a brief summary of two canonical reactions, to 
the grand paradox of the political realm or to the authority problem, as well, before 
venturing into the practical possibilities of how to cope with this paradox or this problem.
To be reaching a theoretical conclusion to these inquiries into sovereignty’s 
foundational two-dimensionality, however preliminarily, is to be reaching back to the 
Introduction, where it was announced that there are two basic responses to the sovereign 
authority problem. The first of these leads theorists back to Rousseau’s both liberal and 
democratic solution. This solution was implicitly welcoming Montesquieu’s notion of an 
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independent third power responsible for maintaining a (democratic) peace. What 
Rousseau probably did not realize, however, is that Montesquieu had allowed social and 
economic interests to dominate within the constitution of the world of sovereign states. 
The latter had ranked judicial neutrality and property rights high above the 
constitutionalist processes of partisanship and symbiotic discords. Consequentially, in 
further neutralizing constitutional and processual discords, Rousseau’s own solution 
became totalizing rather than balanced. Rousseau’s general will was still the total sum of, 
rather than a qualitatively different power than the one representing the wills of each. 
Rousseau aided in eradicating the notion of senatorial authority, furthermore, so that he 
can be said to not have solved the authority problem at all.
Without authority, after all, there can be no legitimate authorizations. Then, 
nobody in particular can be held responsible for the level of public orderliness either. 
This is why his study of an ideal social contract cannot be understood without accepting 
that it, even if inadvertently, is maintaining the complex tension between Senate and 
Tribunes, between state and people, or between the public authorities and their 
authorizers as well. Yet, the paradox of politics, as exemplified by Rousseau’s study, can 
nonetheless be confronted in a more Machiavellian manner.
The second response to the problem of state authority begins with Arendt and 
Schmitt and leads back, through Hobbes, to Machiavelli. This response respects the 
perenniality of the tension between representational and revolutionary tendencies. Not 
only does it respect the flux between these two dimensions of sovereignty, however. It 
also instills confidence in the people because it rejects any Cartesian separation of their 
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minds from their bodies. Their confidence has religious connotations, as Pascal found, 
but in a political context this sense of confidence simply means that human beings are 
coming to believe that the tension within dual sovereignty may produce, rather 
spontaneously, a spirit of self-consciousness as well as of common consciousness, 
political responsibility, and the existential virtue of prudence. It is as if a profane political 
soul is believed to emerge from within the tension between minds and bodies, reason and 
fact, or between regulators and executors.
Confidence is a mysterious third spirit. It can neither be conceptualized in 
rationalist nor in empiricist terms alone. It is a spirit that somehow allows the state’s 
bureaucratic and executive rationalism to coincide with the people’s concrete obedience 
to a natural law: to a law of self-organization and individuation. In other and slightly 
more expansive terms, the state’s ideological apparatuses are believed to be coinciding 
with the people’s existential need to alleviate suffering by transcending the total sum of 
all individual wills. The people as a whole are concretely applying speech, and are thus 
transcending while hedging in the state of nature. But as Hobbes insisted, speech itself 
may have contradictory effects. Political speech is metaphorical and only more or less 
representational. As such, it should be distrusted. It threatens to ambiguate and distort a 
plurality of wills. From the perspective shared by (Schmitt’s) Hobbes and Machiavelli, 
which respects the ambivalence of political concepts, ultimately, there is no Rousseauan 
general will.
This second and broadly Machiavellian response still includes the first response. 
But beyond the first response it sees no solution to the problem of how a third spirit 
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emerges from the contradictory powers of state and people: of both the executors of 
public authority and the regulatory function of their authorizers. Instead, the second 
response finds that particularly sovereign authority transcends these contradictory 
powers. It contains the entire structure of powers, or so it may be believed, within the 
archetypal matter of emergent authority. Of course, also beyond the countless neo-
Rousseauan and Cartesian or Hegelian responses, only the Machiavellian response 
explicitly refers to a coincidence of opposites—in the sense that it alone is so apparently 
referring to the historical cycles of political orders, which are being corrupted and which 
yet also are arresting corruption through participatory freedoms. (See also Miguel 
Vatter’s remarks, although these seem to overprivilege Machiavelli’s materialism by less 
clearly accounting for the Althusserian theorem that Machiavelli’s materialism rather 
implicates but is indeed not to be dominated by his idealism).
Machiavelli refers to several discordant constitutions, further, but he primarily 
mentions the example of the Order of San Giorgio to illuminate why the sovereign 
‘person’ can and should be believed to consist of a coincidence of opposites. Examples of 
such coincidences are manifold, at least within traditions of civic religiosity. One of the 
most famous coincidences (and this is not only the case in the field of political theology) 
is this primordial duality: mind/body. But there are several other such dualities that need 
to be mentioned: creation/degeneration; freedom/license; prudence/irresponsibility; 
closed autopoietic authority/openly structured powers; organizational potential/structural 
fallibility, and; Father/Son.
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The opposites in each of these dualities are commonly imagined present within a 
collective psyche or within some lineage of shared events of political unity. (Paulina 
Ochoa, for example, imagines the coincidence of reason and will to be a coincidence of 
mutually-implying opposites, although compared to Miguel Vatter she says little about 
the archetypal and psychological lineages of this coincidence.) Also, although the 
coincidence-as-unity is never absolute, and although each of its two structural 
components to remain relative to the other opposite, the question is now how the event of 
one-in-many should really be experienced. In the matter of human suffering, it is difficult 
not to ask who should be taking on the role of the one within the many. In identifying the 
one, as social constructivists have set out to do, however, it is impossible to ignore the 
many. Realists argue that it is impossible to be distilling the ideological biases and the 
wills of the many from the actual actions of the state in its entirety. The state is not only a 
unitary agent. The suffering of the many, rather, is omnipresent. So, how can ‘the’ dual 
sovereign authority be believed to remain adequately responsive and caring in its own 
responses towards world-wide suffering?
A first possibility, in creating practical organizations of dual sovereignty, is to 
coherently represent the influences of the rich and the poor in terms of a relationship. 
Poverty is a relative deprivation. It is relative to the resources that are being usurped by 
the wealthiest state parties in the world. To alleviate poverty is to diminish inequalities. It 
is not necessarily the mechanistic accomplishment of social justice, therefore, but rather 
the habitual development of a skill of prudence.
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Hobbes proposed a consumption tax, and his theory supports introduction of a tax 
on the consumption of carbon-emitting products. Hobbesian realists can defend a Tobin 
tax on financial transactions. They can help introduce tax brackets based on functional 
contributions to commonsensical purposes, rather than on quantitative measures of 
income alone. Subsidies for those who use solar and wind energy are also in the best 
interest of prudent statespersons.
Likewise, Machiavelli’s theory focuses on the functional contributions people can 
make and not solely on their quantifiable interests. This realist theory also premises that 
such a focus will have an egalitarian purpose, in that it transcends the means-ends logics 
that are vulnerable to both democratic and oligarchical forces. Regardless of economic 
interests and social classes, for instance, it gives each individual the right to prosecute 
every other individual. It cannot be denied that this equal right serves the overall purpose 
of constitutional balance. Equal prosecutorial (and legislative) rights are conducive to the 
dualization of ambivalent sovereignty.
All this does not lead Machiavelli towards legal positivism, however, but towards 
the abolishment of fictions of neutrality and thereby also of any third and third-party 
branch of government. In a Machiavellian constitutionalist program, there are two 
branches. The institution of executive authority is constantly being balanced against both 
the legislative as well as the adjudicative functional power. This additionally means that 
the duality of the executive authority and the regulative power within the program is to be 
sustained by a complex ‘two-in-one’ person, or by ambivalent sovereignty, rather than by 
two separate and independent powers. Machiavelli hereby raises the prospect that the 
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opposite functions can begin to coincide. The practical issue is of course how he would 
want to continue to mirror this coincidence of, or this mysterious cosmogonic 
relationship between, the functions. 
The prospect of a coincidence of opposites cannot be raised if theorists are not 
also raising matters such as the right to assemble, the right to speech, the right to appeal, 
and the power to banish calumnators. But because of the centrality of these matters, in the 
programmatic theory of realism, it appears highly unlikely that Machiavelli could ever 
have supported the contemporary idea of highly-formalized private property rights. 
Personal property is to a certain degree always considered as public property, rather, in 
the sense that all property is the result of an ambivalent process. It is divinely and it 
should be humanly guaranteed by a complex combination of industriousness and natural 
talent. Individual acquisitiveness does not exist, at least not in a theoretical universe in 
which the individual’s motives are not unifiable but remain always part of a web of 
morally ambiguous relationships. 
Briefly, Machiavelli does not support the extending of legal protection to 
institutions such as individual property rights. As a revolutionary realist, he also cannot 
and does not aim to protect institutions that somehow condone excessive income 
inequalities, to institutions that violate the principles of commonsense and publicality, to 
the private right to advertise, or to the corporate right to speech. Much to the contrary, a 
realist like Machiavelli would defend proposals to maintain a taxation scheme which 
protects individual citizens against the class of oligarchs that has benefited so much from 
the late-modern idea of corporate personhood. This scheme can be designed to protect 
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ecosystems while maintaining a clear ratio of acceptable income inequalities—so that, for 
example, the world’s oligarchs never acquire more than twice of what a substantive 
number of ‘common’ citizens is earning. In practical terms, tax codes can be revised and 
can be internationally standardized so that the top twenty percent of income-earners will 
never accumulate more capital and property than about twice of what the bottom twenty 
percent has acquired in any given annum. This type of revision would not only merely 
but also rightly be prudential.134
The long dialogue on the tension between prudence and justice, as well as the 
dialogue with its own initiator, Machiavelli, can continue for two reasons. Sufficient 
proof has been demonstrated to the effect that Machiavellian realism is not “evil” or 
“wild and demonical”, first. Rather, realism instead denies the existence of any idealist 
type of constitutional state. There is no such thing as a constitutional mixture of both “the 
life of the animals and the slaves, and of the life of the saints.”135 If it could exist, such an 
idealist mixture would have to be non-political: it would neutralize the natural inequality, 
diversity and plurality of personal characteristics. The world’s diverse persons of 
sovereign authority have in the above chapter sections been demonstrated to instead 
coincide with, and yet to have to oppose the unitary (‘Westphalian’) nation-state, second.
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ecclesiastic or rather eschatological foundations. Besides his Christian confession, in 
other words, man should have sufficient prudence to distinguish and reject “idolatry” or 
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significant that Machiavelli concludes his reading of Livy (ch. 3.44) with the exemplary 
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Lucchese (2009: 94), who finds that in this city it was “the scandal represented by the 
Ciompo ... that [demonstrated why] conflict is mainly for the accumulation of wealth. 
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Machiavelli is not always as pessimistic as Del Lucchese seems to portray him with 
respect to the creating of new possibilities to be purifying (secreting) the (Florentine, or 
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59 Compare, for example, Honig (2009: 98-99), mentioning that both Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
and Franz Rozenzweig’s political philosophical tenets fail them in their efforts to 
distinguish between the true and the false prophet, or between “lawgiver and charlatan”. 
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60 Beiner (2011: 109; 417).
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61 Beiner (2011: 3; 417; 57; 117) finds this paradox present in work by Rousseau, Hobbes, and 
Spinoza, among others. Compare, also, Riley (1986: esp. 207-250) for Rousseau’s 
positioning himself within the canon and its grand subject of the individualism/general 
will and the necessity/freedom paradoxes.
62 See, for instance, Wilson (2010).
63 This author will mainly consult, for these answers, Kantorowicz (1955), (1957), Mali (1997), 
and Schmitt (1996), (1976, orig. 1932), (1985), (1985b), (1995), (1996c), and (1988).
64 Especially, Kantorowicz (1957: 65; 84; 87).
65 Fatovic (2008: 487; 489).
66 See, particularly, Schmitt (1926: 229).
67 Onuf (1989: 71).
68 See, especially, Benner (2009). Also relevant may be Hochner (2009) and Janara (2006).
69 Althusser (2006b: 188-190).
70 See the commentaries by, specifically for several political theological implications of Hobbes’s 
argument, Greenleaf (1974), Paganini (2003), Springborg (1996), and Thornton (2002).
71 As an aside, this author has found as of yet no coherent treatment of Hobbesian prudence alone, 
or at least not of how prudence appears within the secondary literature on Thomas 
Hobbes.
72 Hobbes (1996: ch. 5, 36).
73 Buchwalter (1995) formulates a similar question, on Hobbes’s behalf.
74 Hobbes (1996: ch. 5, 36; ch. 9, 60-61) clearly gives his readers the impression he is trying to 
establish the curriculum for a new civic science which can teach the meaning of duty. 
This science will help people integrate their political with their natural registers of 
knowledge. These registers of knowledge themselves are simply defined, by Hobbes, as 
catalogs of all those books that may “contain the demonstrations of consequences of one 
affirmation to another”. By exploring the prospects for his new science, moreover, 
Hobbes thinks he can help people derive moral truths from their “knowledge of 
consequences”, so that deontological meanings may derive from their consequentialist 
practices. To this effect, he argues they should learn both from “accidents of [natural] 
bodies” as well as from “accidents of politique bodies”. As well, the seemingly 
Hobbesian idea of a social contract thanks its notoriety in the secondary literature to a 
dangerous misreading of the text. Hobbes (1996: ch. 14, esp. 94-100) never equates the 
word social contract to what he actually hopes to help establish, which is a meaningful 
covenant. Much rather than to advocate for a contract, which may not be reciprocated, he 
aims to define a new civic covenant which shall not be maintained by means of promises 
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and oaths alone. Against utilitarian readings of Leviathan, which tend to reduce Hobbes’s 
original definition to a modernistic idea of social contract theory, Hobbes actually 
presents his own new covenant in the form of a deontological law: it “binds in the sight 
of God, without the oath as much as with it”. This new covenant is completely 
conditional on “mutual acceptation”—as opposed to on “the bonds of words”, for words 
alone simply cannot hedge people’s “avarice, anger, ... [or their unreasonable] fear of 
some coercive power”. “Words alone ... are an insufficient sign of free gift”. Besides thus 
not being entirely conditional on words, the new covenant or the new transference of 
right whould also not completely conditional on free gift, or on charity alone, however. 
Rather, once again, it must be “mutual” in terms of how it binds people to their own 
juridical authority. This self-binding sense of mutuality means that Hobbes must have 
had in mind a covenant based on both voluntary transferences of right as well as on 
public authority. Yet, ultimately, this covenant is a reciprocal affair in an ethical and not 
just in an egoistic sense—as it is every covenanter’s “duty not to make void that 
voluntary act of his own” (ch. 14, 93).
Note, however, that this impression of Hobbes, as a civic scientist who tries to pair political 
events to the natural law in order to help bring about a new covenant based on duty, 
differs much from the one T. Parsons said Hobbes would have left behind (see the 
former’s The Structure of Social Action, 1937). For Parsons, as Onuf (1989: 128-129) 
sums up, Hobbesian thinking represented much rather an “almost pure” form of 
utilitarianism: [a]utonomous agents, as utility maximizers, clash in their pursuit of scarce 
values, with dire results.” And, for Parsons’s Hobbes, “the social contract is ... the means 
to a solution, which is of course the Leviathan.”
75 Hobbes (1994: ch. 1, 13).
76 Hobbes (1994: chs. 3 and 4).
77 Hobbes (1994: ch. 1, 13).
78 Beiner (2011: 80-83) argues that Hobbes ruled out any “aporia”—or any emergence of 
contingency—by striving to establish the complete synthesis of both sociobiology and 
civic religiosity. Yet, Hobbes (1994) himself nonetheless sees a major “aporia” in the 
contraries of a kingdom of darkness and the light that is being brought into this world by 
the Resurrection of the Christ. For Hobbes’s political theology first consider, therefore, 
Springborg (1996).
79 Beiner (2011: 80) evidently faults Hobbes for having forced his own philosophy into the 
essentialist mold of a new “synthesis” of liberalism (of man?) and civic religiosity (of the 
citizen?). But did Hobbes really force himself to create that “synthesis”? See also, for a 
more nuanced reading, Baumgold (1988).
80 Hobbes (1994: 488-490).
81 Beiner (2011: 69; 66; 52).
82 Onuf (1989: 71).
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83 Compare, by contrast, Beiner’s (2011: ch. 6, esp. 80) reading of Hobbes as seemingly very 
stubbornly having pursued a closed “synthesis of ‘man’ and citizen’ [and thus of the type 
of synthesis] that Rousseau has given up for impossible.”
84 Hobbes (1994: ch. 15, 102).
85 Beiner (2011: 47, n. 4) cites books by Eric Voegelin (The New Science of Politics, 1952) and 
Jeffrey R. Collins (The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes, 2005) in showing why Hobbes has 
to be read as being a “civil-religion theorist”.
86 Hobbes (1994: ch. 21, 145).
87 Compare, also, Zagorin (2009), Watkins (1965), and Schelsky (1937).
88 Pettit (2008) starts on a similar premise.
89 For instance, Hobbes (1994: ch. 29). Compare, also, Beiner (2011: 52-53).
90 Prudence stems particularly from people’s “performance” while discriminating between, 
without fully separating, the “names of just and unjust”, according to Hobbes (1994: ch. 
15, 100; 103).
91 Schmitt (1996: 60). The passage is also cited by Beiner (2011: 366, n. 26; 363, n. 17), who 
proceeds to accuse its cotranslator, George Schwab, of “pathetically” having 
whitewashed Schmitt’s anti-Judaic political thought. Contrary to Schwab, Beiner himself 
calls Schmitt’s “anti-Semitism” unpardonable. The only way in which Beiner thinks 
Schmitt could not have been a Nazi was that he “lacked the cornerstone of Nazi ideology, 
a hodge-podge theory of race.” Yet, would Beiner himself have lived through the German 
1920s and 1930s, with its pervasively racist/racial cultures and counter-cultures, it might 
not have seemed as evident to him that these “hodge-podge” racist theorems formed 
Nazism’s main ideological foundation—rather than Nazism’s historicist, pro-Germanic, 
supra-European aspirations just as well. For contemporaries of the Nazi movement(s) it 
was always possible to discern several interlocking ideological cornerstones, including 
race theory, among others. See, further, Joerges and Ghaleigh (2003) and especially 
Sontheimer (1994). Such a time-travel experiment, therefore, is particularly useful to 
anyone trying to make Schmitt’s (admittedly either anti- or at least non-Judaic) political 
theology turn into an even more racist project than that it probably actually was. Yet, on 
the assumption that Schmitt was not a racist it would be impossible to explain why he 
made several hateful attempts to have a leading Jewish colleague, Hans Kelsen, removed 
from his university post. See Dyzenhaus (1997), who makes the point that Schmitt mostly 
expressed both his anti-Semitism as well as his racism in his actions, rather than that he 
could have done this in his published writings or in his general theory. Dyzenhaus’s 
impression has been further evinced by various signs of Schmitt’s career opportunism, 
and especially by his clinging on to his functions within the association of Nazi ‘legal 
scholars’—even though, after 1936, the latter ‘scholars’ would no longer commend his 
line of thinking. Schmitt would after 1936 in fact come to rely on the indirect protection 
of Göring himself, as has widely been speculated, from being further attacked in the SS 
organ. Also of interest, to anyone thus willing to time-travel first to the 1930s and then 
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into 1940s, might be the accusations the United States initially prepared in order to 
prosecute the Nazi leadership, most of which were used during the Nuremberg Tribunals 
but none of which suggested the latter had been guilty of making racist and anti-Semitic 
theories into the “cornerstone” of their ideology. See, for instance, Office of U.S. Chief 
of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1946). Even the Nazi-leaders themselves hardly ever 
mentioned the idea they had been waging a racist/racial rather than a civilizational (!) 
war—as is also being shown in G. M. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dictatorship: Based on 
an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1979). It should not go unobserved, in brief, that the only way for the Allies to make the 
anti-Semitism-charge ‘stick’ to people’s collective memories, of the Nazi ideological 
structure, was by creating a new category of war crimes, which suddenly had to come to 
include ‘genocide’ (not: racism). Consider in this context that, finally, Adolf Eichmann 
was the first Nazi officer to be tried on ‘genocide’ charges against specifically the Jewish 
people—but not against any or all people. Once over, Beiner faults the Nazis for being 
racists but does not also fault Schmitt for being a racist in terms of how he acted towards 
some Jews (not all, by the way) in his immediate professional environment. Yet, first, as 
a member of the NSDAP, he was vicariously responsible for its racist actions. Second, in 
aspiring to become the leading ‘legal scholar’ of the Third Reich he was directly 
responsible for banning Jews like Kelsen from the profession. Despite this problematic 
part in Beiner’s condemnation of Schmitt and his English translator, Schwab, however, 
together with another part of Beiner’s (2011: 363) examination it seems indeed very 
promising for the current academic field of political thought to really interpret Schmitt’s 
published oeuvre less in terms of how seriously it adhered to the Nazi program, and more 
in terms of how it rejected the “liberal-pluralistic” contents of various other political 
programs. Or, in Beiner’s words, why Schmitt distrusts Hobbes—and why Schmitt wants 
to argue that “Hobbes’s decisionism ultimately gives way to his liberalism”.
92 This author considers The Life of the Mind to be Arendt’s (1978) most mature work, in which 
she clearly puts a (cognitive-theoretical) crown on all of her earlier essays and reports 
(there is no drastic ‘break’, thus, contrary to what has oftentimes been suggested in the 
secondary literature).
93 Arendt (1970: 38, 68).
94 Schmitt’s (1996: 60) distinction fits in his broader theoretical distinction between spiritual and 
material warfare, neither of which can ever be completely just. Against various just war 
theorems, Schmitt (1995), (1997) clearly insists on war’s being the existential opposite of 
sovereignty (war is an event politically opposing, and rendering morally ambiguous, the 
power of making the distinction between life and death, as it were). See, more 
specifically, Kojève (2001).
95 For several excellent remarks on Schmitt’s notion of the duel, as intrinsic to a broader theory of 
sovereignty, consider Brown (2007). See also, again, Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36, italics 
added).
96 The formulaic coincidence of opposites forms a critical pattern in medieval Christian or 
‘political theological’ thinking. Even though Schmitt (1996b), (1985) mentions its 
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original formula, by Nicholas Cusa, rarely and even though he mentions the Christian 
mystic Gregory Nyssa only once, in his later work (Political Theology II), he seems to 
have taken the way these authors represented this pattern in their own ‘theologies’ 
extremely seriously. Both Chen (2006) and Kubálková (2000) have passed by on this 
point, as did Heinrich Meier in his various considerations, but this makes the point not 
any less salient to gaining more understanding of Schmitt’s final return to the (both 
secularized and eschatological) theme of the katechon. For this latter theme, consider 
Hell (2009).
97 Compare further, for instance, Schmitt (1963), (1985).
98 Schmitt (1926).
99 See, also, Schmitt (1950b).
100 Schmitt (1926: 227).
101 Schmitt (1926: 231).
102 See, particularly, Pankakoski (2010) and Schmitt (1976).
103 Schmitt (1926: 229).
104 Kojève (2001) maintained that third moment of synthesis remained a real possibility, in 
Hegelian conceptual thought, while Schmitt seems to have rejected such a moment within 
his own (dualistic) concept of the political. For helpful summaries of the former’s 
Hegelianism, consider both Nichols (2007) and Goldford (1982).
105 See, also, Auerbach’s (1994) representation of Schmitt (1976), (1985). Consider perhaps, 
further, Frye (1966) and Walker (1995b).
106 As a member of the non-urban aristocracy, Montesquieu (1989: bk. 23, chs. 14-15, 435-436) 
connects farming to political autonomy, and thus also to autonomy as a necessary 
element in the art of politics. But he ‘forgets’ the importance of the farmer’s prudence. 
He argues, for instance, that: “if one neglects the arts and attaches oneself only to 
agriculture, the country cannot be populated.” But his argument is premised on the 
‘liberal’ (individualistic) notion that the more a farmer can produce for himself, the less 
he will share with others. Therefore, he mentions that “plowmen and artisans” must either 
be fed with the harvested surpluses, the surpluses must be preserved and sold, and that 
otherwise the land should be distributed more equally so that peasants (“plowmen”) can 
help populate it. But, either way, a political decision will always have to be taken. Of 
course, because Montesquieu (1989: 23.20-21, 440-450; 27, 521- 531) believes Roman 
Law to provide exemplary instructions “for the propagation of the species”, he draws in 
his definition of justice rather extensively from the Roman agricultural tradition and land 
inheritance system. Yet, it may be worthwhile citing Freidberg (2009: 126-127) on what, 
besides strong inheritance laws, additionally must have allowed the Roman agricultural 
system to expand: “Like much more ancient civilizations, the Romans relied on grafting 
to develop bigger, sweeter fruit, and on drying and fermentation to preserve their 
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surpluses. In De Agricultura , Cato the Elder instructs readers how to make raisins and 
how to pickle pears in boiled wine.” What Freidberg does not say is that, in the 
Römertum literature, fermentation was known as a method of expressing or even of 
teaching the immeasurable value of foresight. It would not have been uncommon to read 
that agriculture functions as a source of prudence, whereas urban trade can again 
undercut prudence. Trade serves mostly the rich, and their own definition of justice, and 
yet Montesquieu focuses in his treatment of agriculture mostly on the arts or on 
industriousness: the known source of justice rather than of prudence. By inference, 
Montesquieu seems to have ignored the classic (Roman) order of priority—in awarding 
relatively too little attention to the prudence of farming.
107 Kinneging (1997: 187; 208).
108 As Kinneging (1997: 170) adds: “[I]n ... the two most important republican assemblies ... 
voting took place on the basis of the originally territorial tribus (districts or 
constituencies). From 241 BC on, there were thirty-five of such tribes: four tribus
urbanae and thirty-one tribus rusticae.” Also, “the four urban tribes were each much 
larger than the rural tribes, and contained ... the proletarii, the freedmen, and many of the 
allies.”
109 Machiavelli (1996: 3.25), citing Livy’s “golden words”: ‘Let men not listen to those who 
prefer riches over everything else’.
110 Kinneging (1997: 173), citing extensively from Livy (Book 3.26).
111 Although he does not specifically study Machiavelli’s (neo-classicistic) use of a concept of 
conflict prevention, consult also Demetrios (1990) on the meaning of the concept itself.
112 Arendt (2006: 180; 107-108).
113 See, additionally, Arendt (1993), (2003), (1958).
114 “From all things one, and from one all things” should not be thought to have been the main 
message of Hericlitean philosophy, yet it does display a first precondition for engaging 
Heraclitus. Perhaps the most cited ‘fragment’ by Heraclitus, for example, would instead 
have to be the sentence that “one cannot step in the same river twice”. Yet, once again, 
this more familiar sentence only lays out the precondition for philosophical thought rather 
than that it itself forms Heraclitean thought. More importantly, the latter ‘fragment’ 
asserts only the notion of flux and timelessness, and too little of what an actual moment 
of memorization means to Heraclitus himself. The latter ‘fragment’—once it will have 
been situated among the other ‘fragments’—also does not appear to have been part of 
Heraclitus’s own words, even, which much rather consider the river as a metaphor for the
actual moment of remembrance, and thus for a moment of lived time, rather than for the 
total flux of time. The words are, therefore, much more likely to have been intended as a 
double analogy, suggesting instead that (admittedly, this has been very poorly and 
broadly translated by this author); “one cannot appear to go into the river without doing it 
differently, than previously, just as that the river cannot appear to oneself without having 
become different, than it was.”
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115 See, for instance, the respect Martin Heidegger pays to Plato’s Theatetus—which had posed 
Heraclitus against Socrates’s opponents—in his What is Philosophy? Transl. William 
Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (Twayne Publishers, 1958, not further referenced, PT).
116 The Prajna Paramita (Transcendent Wisdom) Mantra.
117 The Song of Zazen, by Hakuin, has been further interpreted by Abbot Zenkei Shibayama, A 
Flower Does not Talk: Zen Essays (Charles E. Tuttle, 1970, not further referenced).
118 Buddhist Missionary Society, The Buddha and His Teachings (Kuala Lumpur, 1988: 642).
119 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 108).
120 Arendt (1978, vol. 1: 110) thus suggests Heraclitus used metaphors to describe his non-
dualism.
121 Whereas Benhabib (1990) observes the redemptive function of metaphor, in Arendt’s theory, 
Pettit (2008) almost blindfolds himself against the same function in Hobbes’s theory.
122 Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
123 Hobbes (1996: ch. 6, 36).
124 Althusser (1999).
125 Althusser (2006b: 188-190).
126 Althusser (2006b: 167).
127 Althusser (1971), (1972), (1999), (2000a), (2006b).
128 Althusser (2006b).
129 Further compare, for instance, Beiner’s (2011: 333) dismissive approach towards a 
paradigmatically Heraclitean argument, as it was made by Joseph de Maistre (whose 
works would of course in turn inspire Carl Schmitt’s). Maistre apparently argued that 
order and disorder, although contraries, mutually imply each other. In the words of 
Beiner’s own summary: “disorder presupposes ... cosmic order (because one cannot make 
a judgment about disorder without invoking a standard of order that allows us to make 
sense of the idea of disorder)”. Yet, Arendt (1978, 1: 110) found that Heraclitus’s god 
should make exactly this judgment; Heraclitean prudence is believed, by her, to be most 
exemplary. Nonetheless, Maistre’s equally Heraclitean argument is rejected by Beiner 
(2011: 317; 335; 320; 328, n. 106), as he clearly accuses Maistre of reducing order to 
disorder, or, rather, civil justice to divine injustice. Maistre would thus have reduced the 
political realm to a mere issue of “guilt and submission”, and he stands now accused of 
allegedly having ruled out “innocence” or, rather, forgiveness. Additionally, Beiner here 
becomes extremely cynical about Maistre metaphor of Christ’s blood, about Maistre’s 
mutual implication of the opposites of both “original sin” (which is actually a 
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philosophical metaphor for natural law) and “punishment” (a metaphor for positive law), 
as well as about Maistre’s own anti-Lockean position. It cannot be denied, further, that 
Maistre apparently disliked Locke’s philosophical synthesis, which ended up being used 
by liberalism in the ‘splitting of the middle ground’ between natural or metaphorical 
regularities (justice) and social or civilizational irregularities (injustice). Yet, all of this 
may mean that although Beiner (2001) professes great familiarity and even close affinity 
with Arendt, he must by implication of both his predominantly pro-Lockean and his cynic 
anti-Maistrean argument reject her own Heraclitean god: metaphor. In fact, he (2011: 296 
n. 29) seems to reduce the metaphorical, narrativistic significance—which was so clearly 
defended in Arendt’s own theory—of the dualist “relation between politics and truth” by 
trying to square Arendt’s original theory with the monist-liberal (John Rawls’s) attempt 
to subordinate politics to truth, and political action to moral values. For a superb (but too 
pacifistic) reading of Arendt’s concept of political dualities, consider Dallmayr (2004).
130 Althusser (2006b: 167, italics removed from original).
131 Vatter (2000: 246-247).
132 Vatter (2000: 293).
133Machiavelli (1996: 1.37), as cited by Vatter (2000: 197).
134 The proposal for a ratio to limit the distance between the top and bottow tax-brackets has also 
been advocated by Connolly (2008). This entire section, on the practical matter of 
supporting an advanced realist theory, however, continued to draw from various scholarly 
sources—including, on the Rousseauan problem, Riley (1986) and Crocker (1968), and 
Althusser (1972) and, on Machiavelli’s dualism in matters of authority, Vatter (2000), 
McCormick (2003), Sullivan (2006), Hörnqvist (2004), Bock (1990), Balakrishnan, 
(2005), and Althusser (1999), (2006b).
135 Maritain (1960: 92-94).
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